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RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
T HR RS 00840 ST
Standard
Version 2.0
Issued date: 04 November 2016
Important Warning This document is one of a set of standards developed solely and specifically for use on Transport Assets (as defined in the Asset Standards Authority Charter). It is not suitable for any other purpose. You must not use or adapt it or rely upon it in any way unless you are authorised in writing to do so by a relevant NSW Government agency. If this document forms part of a contract with, or is a condition of approval by a NSW Government agency, use of the document is subject to the terms of the contract or approval. This document is uncontrolled when printed or downloaded. Users should exercise their own skill and care in the use of the document. This document may not be current. Current standards may be accessed from the Asset Standards Authority website at www.asa.transport.nsw.gov.au. © State of NSW through Transport for NSW
T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
Version 2.0 Issued date: 04 November 2016
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Standard governance
Owner: Lead Rolling Stock Engineer, Asset Standards Authority
Authoriser: Chief Engineer, Asset Standards Authority
Approver: Executive Director, Asset Standards Authority on behalf of the ASA Configuration Control Board
Document history
Version Summary of changes
1.0 First issue 19 December 2014
2.0 Second issue
For queries regarding this document, please email the ASA at [email protected] or visit www.asa.transport.nsw.gov.au
© State of NSW through Transport for NSW
T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
Version 2.0 Issued date: 04 November 2016
Preface The Asset Standards Authority (ASA) is a key strategic branch of Transport for NSW (TfNSW).
As the network design and standards authority for NSW Transport Assets, as specified in the
ASA Charter, the ASA identifies, selects, develops, publishes, maintains and controls a suite of
requirements documents on behalf of TfNSW, the asset owner.
The ASA deploys TfNSW requirements for asset and safety assurance by creating and
managing TfNSW's governance models, documents and processes. To achieve this, the ASA
focuses on four primary tasks:
• publishing and managing TfNSW's process and requirements documents including TfNSW
plans, standards, manuals and guides
• deploying TfNSW's Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) framework
• continuously improving TfNSW’s Asset Management Framework
• collaborating with the Transport cluster and industry through open engagement
The AEO framework authorises engineering organisations to supply and provide asset related
products and services to TfNSW. It works to assure the safety, quality and fitness for purpose of
those products and services over the asset's whole of life. AEOs are expected to demonstrate
how they have applied the requirements of ASA documents, including TfNSW plans, standards
and guides, when delivering assets and related services for TfNSW.
Compliance with ASA requirements by itself is not sufficient to ensure satisfactory outcomes for
NSW Transport Assets. The ASA expects that professional judgement be used by competent
personnel when using ASA requirements to produce those outcomes.
This standard covers rolling stock onboard safety systems that protect train safety in the event
of a failure in the manual functions of train operation. Such systems have previously been
termed 'driver safety systems'. This standard also covers onboard safety systems that protect
the platform-train interface, which was not included in previous versions of driver safety systems
standards.
This document should be read in conjunction with T HR RS 13001 ST Train Safety Systems.
In this document the terms driver safety systems and train safety systems are interchangeable.
This document supersedes T HR RS 00840 ST v1.0 RSU Appendix D – Driver Safety Systems.
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T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
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Table of contents 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 5
2. Purpose .................................................................................................................................................... 5 2.1. Scope ..................................................................................................................................................... 5 2.2. Application ............................................................................................................................................. 6
3. Reference documents ............................................................................................................................. 7
4. Terms and definitions ............................................................................................................................. 8
5. Functional requirements ....................................................................................................................... 10 5.1. React to or respond appropriately to a movement authority to ensure safe movement of trains ........ 11 5.2. Control train speed .............................................................................................................................. 11 5.3. Operate a train only when train crew is present in cab ....................................................................... 11 5.4. Supervise rail corridor .......................................................................................................................... 12 5.5. Supervise passenger transfer .............................................................................................................. 12 5.6. Design .................................................................................................................................................. 13
6. Minimum requirements for rolling stock ............................................................................................. 13 6.1. Multiple unit passenger trains (including locomotives designed to operate exclusively for passenger operations as power units)............................................................................................................................... 13 6.2. Locomotive hauled freight and passenger trains ................................................................................. 14 6.3. Infrastructure maintenance vehicles (with a driver’s compartment or position) .................................. 15
7. Exemption criteria for existing trains .................................................................................................. 19
8. Emergency cock .................................................................................................................................... 20
9. Train stop and trip gear system ........................................................................................................... 20 9.1. Major componentry .............................................................................................................................. 20 9.2. Operation ............................................................................................................................................. 21
10. Operator enable system ........................................................................................................................ 22 10.1. Driver incapacitation ........................................................................................................................ 23 10.2. Circumvention .................................................................................................................................. 23 10.3. Fail-safe ........................................................................................................................................... 23 10.4. Operation ......................................................................................................................................... 23
11. Vigilance control system ...................................................................................................................... 24 11.1. Operation ......................................................................................................................................... 24 11.2. Human factors ................................................................................................................................. 28
12. Passenger transfer supervision system ............................................................................................. 28
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1. Introduction The Asset Standards Authority (ASA) has established interface requirements pertaining to
vehicles operating in the Transport for NSW (TfNSW) metropolitan rail area. The requirements
are specified in T HR RS 00000 ST RSU 000 Series - Minimum Operating Standards for Rolling
Stock - General Requirements.
T HR RS 00000 ST is the first in a series of standards that set the minimum operating standards
for rolling stock. This series should be read in conjunction with the entire standard, which is
made up of the following parts:
• T HR RS 00000 ST (RSU 000 series) General Requirements
• T HR RS 00100 ST (RSU 100 series) General Interface Requirements
• T HR RS 00200 ST (RSU 200 series) Common Interface Requirements
• T HR RS 00300 ST (RSU 300 series) Locomotive Specific Interface Requirements
• T HR RS 00400 ST (RSU 400 series) Freight Rolling Stock Specific Interface
Requirements
• T HR RS 00500 ST (RSU 500 series) Locomotive Hauled Passenger Rolling Stock Specific
Interface Requirements
• T HR RS 00600 ST (RSU 600 series) Multiple Unit Train Specific Interface Requirements
• T HR RS 00700 ST (RSU 700 series) Infrastructure Maintenance Rolling Stock Specific
Interface Requirements
• T HR RS 00811 ST to T HR RS 00890 ST (RSU App A1 to RSU App I) Appendices
RSU (rolling stock unit) is a historical term used to designate individual sections of the series. In
this context unit relates to parts of the standard not a rail vehicle.
2. Purpose The purpose of RSUs is to ensure that all rolling stock operating in the TfNSW metropolitan rail
area meet the minimum standards required to ensure compatibility with the network and its
infrastructure as required by TfNSW’s accreditation with the Office of the National Rail Safety
Regulator (ONRSR).
2.1. Scope This standard covers the requirements of safety related equipment fitted to all rail vehicles
operating in the TfNSW metropolitan rail area.
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T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
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This standard covers safety systems that reduce the likelihood, or protect against the
consequence, of a failure in the manual functions of train operation.
Safety systems not related to manual functions of train operation are outside the scope of this
standard. Figure 1 illustrates the scope of this standard in the overall context of train safety. The
scope of this standard is the element in the box with the red broken border and red text.
Failure in train operation
Failure of a manual function
Failure of the protective system
Initiating event (human error)
Failure of an automated system
Hardware failure or software error
Failure of manual recovery
Failure to respond to Emergency situations
appropriately
Failure of the detection system
Failure of manual recovery
Figure 1 - Scope of T HR RS 00840 ST
2.2. Application This standard is to be referenced by users of the suite of minimum operating standards for
rolling stock documents.
This document applies to all vehicles operating in the TfNSW metropolitan rail area.
Exemptions may be granted for existing vehicles that are not fitted, or are only fitted with some
of, the safety systems specified in this standard. Refer to Section 7.
Alternative or modified solutions
Alternative or modified design solutions may be acceptable, conditional on provision of an
adequate safety assurance case. See Section 6.
An example of an alternative design solution is replacing the existing vigilance control system
with another physiological vigilance measurement device.
An example of a modified design solution is changes to the existing vigilance control system
such as timing cycles.
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T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
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Figure 2 provides an overview of how this standard is applied. The specifications that are only
applicable to multiple unit passenger trains (including locomotives designed to operate
exclusively for passenger operations as power units) are represented in the boxes with a broken
border.
T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D
Functional requirements (Section 5)
Existing and deemed- to-satisfy solutions
Minimum requirements (Section 6)
T HR RS 20003 SP (OES + Vigilance)
T HR SC 01650 SP (ETCS Onboard Equipment)
System requirements (Sections 7 - 12)
Alternative or modified solutions
T HR RS 13001 ST Train Safety Systems
Figure 2 Application of T HR RS 00840 ST
3. Reference documents The following documents are cited in the text. For dated references, only the cited edition
applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document applies.
Australian standards
AS 7527 Rolling stock event recorders
Transport for NSW standards
SPG 0706 Installation of Trackside Equipment
T HR HF 00001 ST Human Factors Integration – Rolling Stock
T HR RS 00000 ST (RSU 000 series) General Requirements
T HR RS 00100 ST (RSU 100 series) General Interface Requirements
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T HR RS 00200 ST (RSU 200 series) Common Interface Requirements
T HR RS 00300 ST (RSU 300 series) Locomotive Specific Interface Requirements
T HR RS 00400 ST (RSU 400 series) Freight Rolling Stock Specific Interface Requirements
T HR RS 00500 ST (RSU 500 series) Locomotive Hauled Passenger Rolling Stock Specific
Interface Requirements
T HR RS 00600 ST (RSU 600 series) Multiple Unit Train Specific Interface Requirements
T HR RS 00700 ST (RSU 700 series) Infrastructure Maintenance Rolling Stock Specific
Interface Requirements
T HR RS 00811 ST to T HR RS 00890 ST (RSU App A1 to RSU App I) Appendices
T HR RS 13001 ST Train Safety Systems
T HR RS 20003 SP Passenger Rolling Stock Driver Safety System
T HR SC 00006 ST Rolling Stock Signalling Interface Requirements
T HR SC 01650 SP ETCS Onboard Equipment
4. Terms and definitions The following terms and definitions apply in this document:
ASA Asset Standards Authority
ATP automatic train protection; a system which supervises train speed and target speed, alerts
the driver of the braking requirement, and enforces braking when necessary. The system may
be intermittent, semi continuous or continuous according to its track to train transmission
updating characteristics.
authorised person a second person authorised to travel in the cab of an infrastructure
maintenance vehicle accompanying the driver or operator and qualified to take control and bring
the vehicle to a stand in case of an emergency
CCTV closed-circuit television
circumvention a deliberate and improper act for the removal or bypass of safety systems, other
than by an authorised procedure
consist rolling stock (vehicles, units, cars, wagons, sets, locomotives) marshalled together
operating as a train
controller key a key that enables operation of the reverser handle and master controller. Also
known as butterfly key
driver or operator a person suitably qualified to operate the controls of a powered vehicle or
train on the TfNSW network
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driver safety systems see TSS (train safety systems)
emergency cock a means of directly venting the brake pipe to atmosphere, usually located
within a crew work area or in an appropriate location on the vehicle for access by authorised
personnel
existing vehicles vehicles currently accepted for operation on the TfNSW network as at the
date of issue of this version of the standard
freight train a train predominantly consisting of freight vehicles
infrastructure maintenance vehicle a railbound self-propelled vehicle that is used to carry out
inspection or repairs, or both either to the track or 1500 volt overhead wiring equipment. Some
of these vehicles can only be removed from the line by the use of special take-offs or portable
turnouts.
isolation the deactivation of safety systems by an authorised procedure
locomotive a self-propelled railbound vehicle, powered by any form of energy, which does not
convey passengers or freight but that is used to control and move one or more other vehicles
which form a train
manual functions of train operation basic train control functions requiring human input (for
example, ensure safe movement of trains, drive train, supervise rail corridor and supervise
passenger transfer)
metropolitan rail area rail freight network and the rail passenger network within the
metropolitan rail area bounded by Newcastle (in the north), Richmond (in the northwest),
Bowenfels (in the west), Macarthur (in the southwest) and Bomaderry (in the south), and all
connection lines and sidings within these areas, but excluding private sidings
OES operator enable system; a device that applies emergency brakes and disables traction
power if a continuous control input required of the driver or operator is interrupted or not
detected. On conventional vehicles with an automatic brake, the emergency brake is achieved
by directly venting the brake pipe to atmosphere
ONRSR Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator
possession closure of one or more lines to allow work to be carried out in the danger zone
using a local possession authority (LPA) or a track occupancy authority (TOA)
power unit a self-propelled vehicle, which may or may not convey passengers or freight or
both, and operates in conjunction with similar vehicles in a multiple unit consist
railbound infrastructure maintenance vehicle an on-track infrastructure maintenance vehicle
that cannot be removed from track without the use of a heavy crane. These vehicles are
transferred around the network on rail.
reverser handle an operating control used to determine the direction of travel
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road rail vehicle any type of track vehicle that can travel on either road or rail and can easily
transfer from one mode of operation to the other
RSU (rolling stock unit) historical term used to designate individual sections of the Minimum
Operating Standards for Rolling Stock
second person a suitably qualified person (with route knowledge and ability to recognise signal
aspects), who is required to accompany the driver in the driver’s cab of a locomotive or train or
a vehicle performing the function of a locomotive and is able to bring the train or vehicle to a
stand in the event of emergency
task linked vigilance control system a vigilance control system that accepts specified task
functions as input, to satisfy acknowledgment within the vigilance control system
TfNSW Transport for NSW
train a train is:
• any locomotive or locomotives or powered unit or powered units either attached or
unattached to vehicles
• any self-propelled passenger unit or units
train stop and trip gear system a system involving a trip valve on the train or vehicle and a trip
arm located track side which when engaged, directly vents the brake pipe on the train or vehicle
to atmosphere. The train stop is used at signals in conjunction with a red aspect and in areas
where train speed is required to be externally controlled.
TSS train safety systems; systems for reducing the likelihood, or protect against the
consequences, of a failure in the manual functions of train operation
unit a single item of rolling stock (passenger vehicles or locomotives)
vehicle general term used to describe rolling stock
vigilance control system a system that will react by bringing a vehicle or train to a stand if an
acknowledgment input is not received within a specified time increment. On conventional
vehicles with an automatic brake, this is achieved by directly venting the brake pipe to
atmosphere.
5. Functional requirements All functional requirements in Section 5 are numbered in the format of 'TSS', followed by a
series of numbers. Each individual number indicates a standalone requirement.
TSS5.0-1: Safety systems shall be fitted to rolling stock to reduce the likelihood, or protect
against the consequences, of a failure in the manual functions of train operation.
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TSS5.0.1-1: Changes in the operational context of rolling stock shall initiate a review to
determine if any changes to existing safety systems are required to ensure TSS5.0-1 is fulfilled
under the new operations.
An example of a failure of a manual function being the failure of a driver to stop prior to a signal
at danger (SPAD).
Note: If a manual function is subsequently automated (such as by a change in
operational context) then a safety integrity level (SIL) shall be determined and
allocated to the equipment as part of the train safety SFAIRP demonstration.
TSS5.0-2: Safety systems shall render the train to a safe condition in the event of a failure of a
manual function during train operations.
Note: While most safety systems render the train to a safe condition in the event of a
failure of a manual function automatically (via an engineering solution), safety systems
requiring manual activation by a second train crew is permitted under certain
operational contexts (for example in freight locomotives, a second driver in place of
trip gear to apply emergency brakes manually for SPADs).
5.1. React to or respond appropriately to a movement authority to ensure safe movement of trains TSS5.1-1: Emergency brakes shall be applied to all vehicles in the train consist and remove
(cut) traction power if a safe separation (distance) between trains, governed by the signalling
aspects, cannot be maintained.
An example of a system in current operations on multiple unit passenger trains is the trip gear
for mitigation of the potential consequences of a SPAD (Section 9).
5.2. Control train speed TSS5.2-1: The train shall not exceed the maximum allowable line speed.
TSS5.2-2: An onboard automatic train protection (ATP) system shall be fitted in accordance
with T HR SC 01650 SP ETCS Onboard Equipment for multiple unit passenger trains (including
locomotives designed to operate exclusively for passenger operations as power units)
categorised under Section 6.1.
5.3. Operate a train only when train crew is present in cab TSS5.3-1: The train shall remain stationary unless the presence of a train crew member is
confirmed continuously in the driving position.
An example of a system in current operations on multiple unit passenger trains is the operator
enable system (OES) (Section 10).
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5.4. Supervise rail corridor TSS5.4-1: There shall be methods and systems to prevent the train colliding with objects or
persons on track.
Currently a train driver is responsible for supervising the rail corridor by looking out for obstacles
on track and applying braking if required. An example of a system in current operations to
support driver alertness is the vigilance control system, which brings the vehicle or train to a
stand if the driver or operator fails to acknowledge the necessary control indications within a
specified time interval (Section 11).
TSS5.4-2: There shall be obvious means to apply emergency brakes to all vehicles within the
train consist and remove (cut) traction power by the driver or other train crew inside the cab.
An example in current operations is through the application of the emergency brake cock (refer
to Section 8) which results in emergency brake application and removal (cutting) of traction
power.
5.5. Supervise passenger transfer TSS5.5-1: There shall be methods and systems to ensure the safety of passengers boarding
and alighting from the train at platforms.
5.5.1. Control the opening and closing of doors at platforms TSS5.5.1-1: Only doors adjacent to a platform shall be opened for passengers at station stops.
TSS5.5.1-2: Passenger doors shall not be opened until the train has reached a complete stop.
5.5.2. Ensure passengers are not hit by or trapped in door during the door opening and closing sequence TSS5.5.2-1: Passengers shall be warned prior to door closure, release and opening at stations.
TSS5.5.2-2: The door closing sequence shall be interrupted if a passenger or object is
obstructing the closing of doors.
5.5.3. Ensure a safe starting condition TSS5.5.3-1: The train shall only be allowed to depart from the platform if all passenger doors
are fully closed and no objects or persons have the risk of being dragged along the platform.
A combination of various systems, referred to in this standard as a passenger transfer
supervision system is currently used to manage this platform train interface (Section 12).
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5.6. Design TSS5.6-1: The design of train (driver) safety systems shall consider and incorporate features to
minimise the possibility or opportunity for unauthorised circumvention of any or all of the safety
system elements.
Note: The fitment of seals to isolation devices provides a deterrent for deliberate
circumvention.
TSS5.6-2: All systems shall comply with T HR HF 00001 ST Human Factors Integration –
Rolling Stock.
TSS5.6-3: All systems shall be designed to permit authorised isolation of each sub-system in
the event of failure of any critical train (driver) safety systems component, thus requiring an
authorised procedure to allow the train or vehicle to proceed out of service.
TSS5.6-4: Any failure of a critical component in the system shall result in the train or vehicle
being brought to a safe condition.
TSS5.6-5: Operation of a critical component or system outside its designed parameter shall
result in the train or vehicle being brought to a safe condition.
6. Minimum requirements for rolling stock Train (driver) safety systems shall be fitted to meet all relevant requirements specified in
Section 5.
Data logging requirements shall comply with AS 7527 Rolling stock event recorders.
Note: For rolling stock fitted with analogue or tape type data logger or recorders, such
as Hasler recorders, the system will need to meet the requirements specified in the
ONRSR rail safety compliance coded - Data Loggers.
Section 6.1 to Section 6.3.3 describes deemed-to-satisfy solutions for different types of rolling
stock. For operators that wish to adopt an alternative or modified solution, the development
framework and assurance requirements outlined in Section 6 and Section 7 of
T HR RS 13001 ST Train Safety Systems shall be used.
6.1. Multiple unit passenger trains (including locomotives designed to operate exclusively for passenger operations as power units) The fitting of all of the following systems shall be considered satisfactory in meeting the
minimum requirements:
• a vigilance control system (task linked and non-speed dependant)
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• a trip gear valve
• European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) level 2 compliant ATP onboard
equipment in accordance with T HR SC 01650 SP
• an emergency cock
• an on-board control system that shall not allow the train or vehicle to power up, move or
continue in motion with any of the driver safety systems isolated except under degraded
and specifically defined operating conditions
• a passenger transfer supervision system meeting the requirements in Section 5
Note: T HR RS 20003 SP Passenger Rolling Stock Driver Safety System provides the
details on developing an OES and vigilance control system based on those currently
in use in NSW.
6.2. Locomotive hauled freight and passenger trains Each locomotive driver’s compartment, for locomotives without driver only operation, shall
include driver safety systems incorporating the following:
• a vigilance control system
• a second person
• an emergency cock
• an on-board control system that shall not allow the train to power up, move or continue in
motion with any of the driver safety systems isolated except under degraded and
specifically defined operating conditions
• a passenger transfer supervision system meeting the requirements in Section 5 (passenger
trains only)
Note: Locomotives operating exclusively in shunting yards do not require driver safety
systems. However, if such locomotives are required to be moved on the main line they
need to be hauled dead attached or operated within a locomotive consist but not as
the lead locomotive.
Driver only operation on locomotive hauled freight and passenger trains is considered a
significant change to the operational context and hence requires additional safety assurance
prior to operation on the network. Refer to Section 6 and Section 7 of T HR RS 13001 ST.
Note: Practice has shown that for driver only operation, the following should be fitted
in each locomotive driver's compartment, as a minimum:
• a vigilance control system
• an OES
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• an emergency cock
• an on-board control system that does not allow the train to power up, move or continue
in motion with any of the driver safety systems isolated except under degraded and
specifically defined operating conditions
• a pressure maintaining brake valve
• working onboard communications equipment which provides direct communications
with the train control centre
• door locks to prevent illegal entry of cab while locomotive is unattended
• a dump valve clamp (DVC) present in the lead locomotive
Note: For shunting locomotives operated by a single person with a second person on
track as shunter, an OES or vigilance system should be fitted.
6.3. Infrastructure maintenance vehicles (with a driver’s compartment or position) Driver safety systems requirements for different types of infrastructure maintenance vehicles are
outlined in Section 6.3.1 to Section 6.3.3.
6.3.1. On-track (railbound) infrastructure maintenance vehicles On-track (railbound) infrastructure maintenance vehicles operating in travel mode, alone or as a
motive power unit hauling or controlling other infrastructure maintenance vehicles between and
within track possessions, may have potentially a kinetic energy (E) exceeding 600 kNm, based
on Equation 1.
Equation 1 - Potential kinetic energy of on-track (railbound) infrastructure maintenance vehicles
E = 0.0386 MV²
Where:
E = kinetic energy (kJ)
M = maximum vehicle mass (tonnes)
V = maximum vehicle speed (km/h)
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Driver and authorised person
When the value of 'E' for a vehicle is greater than 600 kNm the driving compartment or position
controlling the operation of the vehicle, without driver only operation, shall include driver safety
systems incorporating the following:
• a vigilance control system
• an authorised person to stop the vehicle or train in the event of an emergency
• an emergency cock or alternate suitable device for stopping the vehicle in an emergency
(application of emergency brake)
• an on-board control system that shall not allow the vehicle to power up, move or continue
in motion with any of the driver safety systems isolated except under degraded and
specifically defined operating conditions
• an ONRSR approved process to enable suppression of the vigilance control system whilst
the vehicle is in work mode within a possession
Driver only
When the value of 'E' for a vehicle is greater than 600 kNm, the driving compartment or position
controlling the operation of the vehicle, for driver only operation, shall include driver safety
systems incorporating the following:
• a vigilance control system
• an OES
• an emergency cock or alternate suitable device for stopping the vehicle in an emergency
(application of emergency brake and removal (cutting) of traction power)
• an on-board control system that shall not allow the vehicle to power up, move or continue
in motion with any the driver safety systems isolated except under degraded and
specifically defined operating conditions
• an ONRSR approved process to enable suppression of the vigilance control system whilst
the vehicle is in work mode within a possession
If it is not possible to incorporate suitable driver safety systems within the vehicle, the vehicle
maximum allowable speed shall be reduced to bring the value of 'E' below 600 kNm.
6.3.2. Road rail infrastructure maintenance vehicles Road rail infrastructure maintenance vehicles (except those covered by Section 6.3.3),
operating in travel mode, alone or as a motive power unit hauling or controlling other
infrastructure maintenance vehicles between and within track possessions, may have potentially
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T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
Version 2.0 Issued date: 04 November 2016
Equation 2 - Potential kinetic energy of road rail infrastructure maintenance vehicles
E = 0.0386 MV²
Where:
E = kinetic energy (kJ)
M = maximum vehicle mass (tonnes) including any attached trailers
V = maximum vehicle speed (km/h)
Driver and authorised person
When the value of 'E' for a vehicle is greater than 600 kNm, the driving compartment or position
controlling the operation of the vehicle, without driver only operation, shall include driver safety
systems incorporating the following:
• a vigilance control system
• an authorised person to stop the vehicle or train in the event of an emergency
• an emergency cock or alternate suitable device for stopping the vehicle in an emergency
(emergency brake application and removal (cutting) of traction power)
• an ONRSR approved process to enable suppression of the vigilance control system whilst
the vehicle is in work mode within a possession
Driver only
When the value of 'E' for a vehicle is greater than 600 kNm, the driving compartment or position
controlling the operation of the vehicle, for driver only operation, shall include driver safety
systems incorporating the following:
• a vigilance control system
• an OES
• an emergency cock or alternate suitable device for stopping the vehicle in an emergency
(emergency brake application and removal (cutting) of traction power)
• an on-board control system that shall not allow the vehicle to power up, move or continue
in motion with any of the driver safety systems isolated except under degraded and
specifically defined operating conditions
• an ONRSR approved process to enable suppression of the vigilance control system whilst
the vehicle is in work mode within a possession
If it is not possible to incorporate a suitable driver safety system within the vehicle, the vehicle
maximum allowable speed shall be reduced to bring the value of 'E' below 600 kNm.
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T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
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6.3.3. Road rail prime mover vehicles authorised to operate as a
locomotive only within a track possession Section 6.3.3 covers road rail prime mover vehicles operating in travel mode, alone or as a
locomotive hauling or controlling railbound rolling stock, exclusively within a track possession.
Driver and second person
The driving compartment or position controlling the operation of the vehicle or train, without
driver only operation, shall include driver safety systems incorporating the following:
• a driver suitably qualified to operate the vehicle both on road and as a locomotive on rail
• a brake controller compatible with the brake system on the vehicles to be hauled or
controlled
• a vigilance control system
• a second person
• an emergency cock or alternate suitable device for stopping the vehicle or train in an
emergency (emergency brake application)
• an on-board control system that shall not allow the vehicle to power up, move or continue
in motion with any of the driver safety systems isolated except under downgraded and
specifically defined operating conditions
Driver only
Driver only operation on road rail prime mover vehicles is considered a significant change to the
operational context and hence requires additional safety assurance prior to operation on the
network. Refer to Section 6 and Section 7 of T HR RS 13001 ST.
Note: The driver needs to be suitably qualified to operate the vehicle both on road and
as a locomotive on rail.
Note: Practice has shown that for driver only operation, the following should be fitted
in each locomotive driver's compartment, as a minimum:
• a brake controller compatible with the brake system on the vehicles to be hauled or
controlled
• a vigilance control system
• an OES
• an emergency cock or alternative suitable device for stopping the vehicle or train in an
emergency (emergency brake application and removal (cutting) of traction power)
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T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
Version 2.0 Issued date: 04 November 2016
• an on-board control system that shall not allow the train to power up, move or continue
in motion with any of the driver safety systems isolated except under degraded and
specifically defined operating conditions
• a pressure maintaining brake valve
• working on-board communications equipment which provides direct communications
with the train control centre
• door locks to prevent illegal entry of cab while vehicle is unattended
• a dump valve clamp (DVC) present in the lead vehicle
Note: Such vehicles needs to be fitted with a suitable air compressor and main
reservoir system to meet the duty requirements for a main reservoir and train brake air
supply.
7. Exemption criteria for existing trains Rolling stock currently operating on the TfNSW metropolitan rail area that is not fitted with the
deemed-to-satisfy safety systems specified in this standard shall be assessed to determine if
they need to be upgraded.
A cost benefit assessment shall determine the cost, risk and benefit of upgrading existing rolling
stock to meet the functional requirements in Section 5 based on a SFAIRP (so far as is
reasonably practicable) argument.
Factors to be considered include the following:
• the extent of non-compliance and associated risks involved
• the current and future operational context of the rolling stock, including the amount of time
the rolling stock operates or is going to operate on the TfNSW metropolitan rail area
• alternative means to achieve the equivalent level of overall safety
• the remaining service life of the rolling stock
• time required for the upgrade or modifications to be implemented
• cost of modification in relation to risk and benefit
The rolling stock operator shall have documented evidence that an appropriate assessment has
been undertaken to support its decision to upgrade or not upgrade the rolling stock.
Written confirmation shall be available from the operator that the appropriate assessment has
been undertaken.
If the cost benefit assessment determines that existing rolling stock should be upgraded to meet
the requirements of this standard, a temporary concession should be applied for to cover the
period of time of operation on the TfNSW metropolitan rail area. © State of NSW through Transport for NSW Page 19 of 29
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If the cost benefit assessment does not justify that the existing rolling stock be upgraded to
meet the requirements of this standard, a permanent concession should be applied to provide
justification for continuing operation on the TfNSW metropolitan rail area.
8. Emergency cock An emergency cock shall be provided in the driving cab for the driver and other train crew to
apply emergency braking.
On vehicles with an automatic brake system, opening of the emergency cock shall ensure that
the brake pipe is directly vented to atmosphere, resulting in an automatic (emergency) brake
application applied to all vehicles within the train consist and removal of (cut to) traction power.
On vehicles without an automatic brake system, opening of the emergency cock shall remove
(cut) traction power and vent or release the pressure that is holding the spring parking brake
cylinder off, resulting in the application of the spring parking brake.
On some vehicles without an automatic brake system, an emergency brake button may be used
in place of an emergency cock. In this case the activation of the emergency brake button shall
remove (cut) traction power and apply the emergency brake on all vehicles within the train
consist.
9. Train stop and trip gear system The function of the train stop and trip gear system is to intervene and stop a train or vehicle
fitted with trip gear if it fails to stop for a signal at stop (red signal aspect). When the train stop
arm engages the trip gear lever, the associated valve directly vents the train or vehicle brake
pipe to atmosphere, initiating the removal of (a cut in) traction power and an automatic
(emergency) brake application on all vehicles within the train. The train stop is used at signals in
conjunction with a red signal aspect and in areas where train speed is required to be externally
controlled.
Emergency trip braking performance is specified in Section 7.4 (Train braking requirements) of
T HR RS 00100 ST RSU 100 Series – Minimum Operating Standards for Rolling Stock –
General Interface Standards.
9.1. Major componentry The major components of the train stop or trip gear system are the following:
• a trackside train stop or arm
• a bogie axlebox mounted trip valve or lever
• a control governor pressure switch or switches
• a safety apparatus isolating (SAI) or trip valve isolating cock © State of NSW through Transport for NSW Page 20 of 29
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T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
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9.2. Operation The vehicle mounted trip gear system shall interface with the existing signal train stop and train
braking system.
9.2.1. Trackside equipment The train stop is an existing piece of trackside equipment positioned adjacent to signals and
positioned as a group of timed train stops in areas requiring speed control. The train stop arm is
raised when the signal is displaying a red signal aspect (signal at stop) or in the area requiring
speed control.
Figure 3 shows the trackside train stop set up limits.
© State of NSW through Transport for NSW Page 21 of 29
Figure 3 - Train stop mounting dimensions
9.2.2. Train or vehicle onboard equipment The trip gear valve or trip lever system is mounted on the left hand leading axlebox beneath
each driver or operator compartment. The trip lever shall be designed to engage the raised
trackside trip arm.
The trip gear shall be of lightweight construction. A robust design is an important factor in
reducing the dynamic loading on the mechanism and its attachment to the bogie axlebox. The
trip lever shall be spring loaded to allow passing obstructions such as ballast and other signal
trip arms in the reverse travel direction.
For rolling stock with no automatic or remote trip gear valve dropping and lifting capability, a
manual latch shall be provided on the trip valve to retain the trip lever in the latched up position
on all non-leading vehicles. The design shall be such that, if the operating trip lever is manually
latched up (out of service), the trip valve is held open and thus exhausts the brake pipe to
atmosphere (maintains an emergency brake application).
Further information is available in SPG 0706 Installation of Trackside Equipment.
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T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
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Systems that provide automatic raising of the trip gear lever for operation outside the limits of
the TfNSW metropolitan rail area shall be designed to maintain the trip valve in the closed
position.
When the trip valve is activated, an emergency brake application shall be made and the traction
power shall be removed (cut).
On a train or vehicle with an automatic brake system, the emergency brake application is made
by venting the brake pipe to atmosphere. Removal (cutting) of the traction power is made by the
brake pipe pressure dropping to a predetermined level (for example 250 kPa), the pressure
switch (control governor or equivalent) shall isolate traction power to the train or vehicle, which,
together with an automatic brake application, will bring the train or vehicle to a stationary
positon.
The trip valve shall be designed to not reset unless the driver makes a deliberate action to reset
the trip gear.
On a train or vehicle with an automatic brake system, this may be accomplished by reducing
brake pipe pressure below a predetermined level (for example 70 kPa), such that the brake pipe
will not fall below this level with the brake pipe being charged and with the minimum allowable
number of compressors running.
Systems that provide automatic or remote raising of the trip gear lever shall provide detection of
the raise or lower status, such that traction power is disabled if the trip lever is not lowered,
when operating in the TfNSW metropolitan rail area.
The trip lever shall be capable of striking a raised train stop arm whilst travelling in the reverse
direction at a minimum speed of 25 km/h without trip valve activation or it shall be latched up on
terminal cars when trailing in the direction of travel. When the train or vehicle is propelling or
reversing, the trip arm shall be in the lowered position on the leading car in the direction of
travel.
The trip lever shall be capable of striking a raised train stop arm whilst travelling in the forward
direction at the train or vehicle maximum design speed without causing trip valve malfunction or
damage to the trip gear or train stop mechanism.
10. Operator enable system The function of the OES is to detect the presence of the driver or operator at the controls of the
train or vehicle. If a required continuous control input by the driver or operator is interrupted or
not detected whilst the train or vehicle is in operating mode, then the system shall react by
making an emergency brake application and removal of (cutting the) traction power.
On trains or vehicles with an automatic brake system, the emergency brake application is made
by venting the brake pipe to atmosphere. The venting of the train or vehicle brake pipe shall be
accomplished by the system opening the emergency application valve, resulting in a full brake © State of NSW through Transport for NSW Page 22 of 29
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application on the train or vehicle and traction power isolation. Isolation of traction power is
effected through a pressure switch when the brake pipe pressure drops to a predetermined
level (for example, 250 kPa), which together with the brake application will bring the train to a
stand.
The OES shall interface and be fully compatible with the train or vehicle traction control and
braking system.
10.1. Driver incapacitation Loss of circuit continuity within the OES could mean driver incapacitation and possible loss of
control of the train or vehicle. The interface between the driver or operator and the OES shall be
designed such that it is necessary for the driver or operator to remain at his or her work station,
either sitting or standing, and maintain the detection circuit continuity whilst the train or vehicle
is in motion with the brakes released.
10.2. Circumvention The OES shall be designed, as far as practicable, to prevent intentional or unintentional
circumvention of its operation whilst the train or vehicle is in motion with the brakes released.
10.3. Fail-safe In addition to the fail-safe requirements specified in Section 5.6, the equipment providing the
OES function shall provide a fail-safe function whenever the brakes on the train or vehicle are
released and the controller key or reverser handle is in the operating position. This requirement
shall apply unless the OES is isolated in accordance with an authorised procedure to allow the
train or vehicle to proceed.
The OES shall be designed to make an emergency brake application if the system becomes
inoperative due to technical failure or due to inappropriate actions by the driver or operator
whilst the train is moving with the brakes released.
10.4. Operation The driver or operator shall be required to maintain input to a suitable OES (for example a
spring-loaded pedal, controller handle or both) continuously in a predetermined position or
range, such that the detection circuit continuity is maintained. An emergency brake application
shall be initiated if all or either of the OES controls are released and the detection circuit is
opened, whilst the train or vehicle is in motion with the brakes released.
On vehicles fitted with an automatic braking system, the emergency brake application is
achieved by venting of the train or vehicle brake pipe.
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T HR RS 00840 ST RSU Appendix D - Train (Driver) Safety Systems
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Resetting the OES shall be readily achieved by moving any of the OES controls back to their
predetermined position or range within a specified time interval or otherwise a full penalty brake
application shall occur.
A means shall be provided to suppress the OES without driver or operator input, whilst the train
or vehicle is stopped at stations or signals.
For multiple unit passenger rolling stock (including locomotives designed to operate exclusively
for passenger operations as power units) the driver or operator shall be provided with at least
two methods by which they can maintain a suitable input and can easily change between
methods whilst operating the vehicle or train, as per Section 6.1.
11. Vigilance control system The function of the vigilance control system is to monitor the responsiveness of the driver,
operator or crew person and bring the vehicle or train to a stand if the driver or operator fails to
acknowledge the necessary control indications within a specified time interval.
On rolling stock fitted with an automatic brake system, this may be achieved by venting the train
or vehicle brake pipe to atmosphere and removing (cutting) the traction power.
11.1. Operation The vigilance control system is a timed cycle of warning events consisting of first, a visual
flashing light warning, followed by an auditory warning that, if neither is acknowledged, results in
a brake penalty being initiated (emergency brake application).
Some vigilance control systems randomly select the time interval and thus the driver or operator
can only acknowledge the vigilance warning after the visual signal. Other systems use task
linking to reset the vigilance cycle before the visual warning occurs. The latter system is
preferred because it reduces the driver or operator workload and in the main receives
confirmations of driver awareness more frequently.
Some trains are fitted with a speed dependent vigilance control system. In this case, as the
speed increases through speed bands, the vigilance cycle times are decreased.
The vigilance control system may be suppressed if the vehicle or train brakes are applied
sufficiently to hold on any grade on the network and the vehicle has come to a stand. This is a
mandatory requirement for multiple unit passenger rolling stock (and locomotives designed to
operate exclusively for passenger operations as power units).
11.1.1. Vigilance cycle and timing
When there is no vigilance control input detected, then the cumulative elapsed time before the
onset of, and the time intervals between the visible and audible alarm indications, and brake
penalty application shall be as specified in Table 1 or Table 2. © State of NSW through Transport for NSW Page 24 of 29
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Table 1 - Timings for a non-speed dependent vigilance control system
Rolling stock type
Maximum time interval from acknowledgement to visual warning (seconds)
Maximum time from visual to audible warning (seconds)
Total elapsed time from acknowledgement to audible warning (seconds)
Maximum time interval from audible warning to brake penalty (seconds)
Total elapsed time from acknowledgement to brake penalty (seconds)
Multiple unit passenger - suburban or intercity*
30 5 35 5 40
Multiple unit passenger - regional or interstate*
40 5 45 10 55
Passenger - loco hauled (driver plus second person)
60 17 77 17 94
Freight - driver only
40 10 50 10 60
Freight - driver plus second person
60 17 77 17 94
Infrastructure maintenance vehicles - operator plus second person
60 17 77 17 94
* Including locomotives designed to operate exclusively for passenger operations as
power units
If after the elapsed time specified in Table 1 or Table 2, from the initial vigilance
acknowledgment, the driver or operator, has not made another vigilance acknowledgment via
the available system control inputs, the following shall occur:
• An in-cab visible warning shall start in the form a flashing light located such that it is visible
to all crew personnel, under all operating conditions. Only the driver or operator shall
respond to the visible warning through the operation of any of the task linked driving
controls, or press a vigilance acknowledgment button, or by fully depressing the OES pedal
(if fitted), for no more than 3 seconds.
• If the visible warning is not acknowledged within the time interval specified in Table 1 or
Table 2, from the onset of the visible warning, an additional audible warning will sound. The
audible warning shall be audible to the crew persons under all operating conditions. Only © State of NSW through Transport for NSW Page 25 of 29
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the driver or operator shall respond to the audible warning sound in the same manner as
for the visible warning.
• If the audible warning is not acknowledged within the time interval specified in Table 1 or
Table 2, from the onset of the audible warning, a brake penalty is initiated by an application
of the emergency brake and the traction power is removed (cut).
Table 2 - Timings for a speed dependent vigilance control system
Vehicle / train speed (km/h)
Maximum time interval from acknowledgement to visual warning (seconds)
Maximum time from visual to audible warning (seconds)
Total elapsed time from acknowledgement to audible warning (seconds)
Maximum time interval from audible warning to brake penalty (seconds)
Total elapsed time from acknowledgement to brake penalty (seconds)
0 to 75 45 5 50 10 60
Over 75 to 90
35 5 40 10 50
Over 90 to 110
30 5 35 5 40
Greater than 110
25 5 30 5 35
On vehicles fitted with an automatic brake system, the emergency brake application is achieved
by venting the train or vehicle brake pipe to atmosphere.
It shall not be possible to release the brakes until the reset time stated in Table 1 or Table 2 has
elapsed. When the time has elapsed, the vigilance cycle can be reset, by pressing the
acknowledgment button and the brakes can be operated, in the normal manner.
In addition to the timing requirements for non-speed dependant vigilance control systems, as
detailed in Table 1, the vigilance control system shall ensure that:
a. the minimum time before the vigilance control system can be reset after a penalty brake
application, that is the train is fully stopped (stationary):
i. is 3 seconds for multiple unit passenger rolling stock (suburban/intercity). If no speed
input is available the minimum no reset time shall be 45 seconds.
ii. is 10 seconds for multiple unit passenger rolling stock (regional/interstate). If no speed
input is available the minimum no reset time shall be 90 seconds.
iii. is 30 seconds for all other rolling stock
b. where a vehicle is fitted with a speed dependent vigilance control system, the maximum
times shall not exceed any of the above timings for any speed
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c. vigilance control systems designed to be only acknowledged after the visual warning (that
is, an acknowledgment made before the visual warning), does not reset the vigilance
control system timing cycle.
In addition to the timing requirements for speed dependant vigilance control systems, as
detailed in Table 2, the vigilance control system shall ensure that:
a. In the event of a defective speed input signal, the vigilance timings shall default to the
times for the greater than 110 km/h speed range.
b. After a train or vehicle has come to a stop after a vigilance penalty application, the
vigilance control system shall not be able to be reset for at least a further 3 seconds. If the
speed signal is faulty, the reset shall not occur until at least 45 seconds from the time of the
penalty application.
11.1.2. Vigilance control system acknowledgment and task linking Acknowledgement of the vigilance control system may be made through pressing the
acknowledgement button (alternatively using an OES pedal) or automatically via task linked
activities, which may include the following:
• a minimum meaningful movement of the power controller handle
• a minimum meaningful movement of the brake controller handle
• operation of the warning horn
• operation of headlight high or low beam switch (where fitted)
A task linked vigilance control system is preferred over a non-task linked vigilance control
system and is mandatory for multiple unit passenger rolling stock (and locomotives designed to
operate exclusively for passenger operations as power units) as per Section 6.1.
It is preferred that acknowledgement of vigilance control system pre-emptively before the visual
warning period by non-task linked inputs (vigilance acknowledgment button or OES pedal) is not
permitted, that is, resetting of the vigilance control system by use of the vigilance acknowledge
button should only occur during the visual or visual and audible warning periods. This is a
mandatory feature for multiple unit passenger rolling stock (and locomotives designed to
operate exclusively for passenger operations as power units).
Note: A single voluntary reset (SVR) function is permitted on TfNSW
regional/interstate passenger rolling stock which allows the driver to reset the vigilance
just once via the vigilance acknowledgement pushbutton before the activation of the
first stage warning. Refer to T HR RS 20003 SP.
The operation of setting the OES pedal is not considered a task linked function, however the
pedal may be used as a vigilance acknowledgment function during the visual or visual and
audible warning periods. © State of NSW through Transport for NSW Page 27 of 29
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The system design shall be such that if the vigilance acknowledgment button or operator enable
pedal or both are depressed continuously the time cycle will remain uninterrupted and thus it will
continue to cycle as if no acknowledgment has been made.
11.2. Human factors Human factors experience in operation of the vigilance control system mandates the following
requirements:
• The in cab visible warning (vigilance) light shall be clearly visible to the driver at any time of
the day or night and not diminish the driver's night vision. In multiple unit passenger rolling
stock, a control shall be provided to the driver to adjust the brightness of the vigilance light
however the brightness shall remain above zero.
• The vigilance acknowledgment button or buttons shall be located on the driver's desk or on
a vertical face in the control area such that the driver shall be able to reach the button with
an outstretched arm and without upper body movement. The button shall not be located
such that the movement of the driver’s thigh, knee or foot can operate it.
• The vigilance audible warning shall be distinguishable from any other audible information
devices from within the cab.
12. Passenger transfer supervision system A combination of systems (traction interlocking, door obstruction detection, visual and audio
door motion warnings and closed-circuit television (CCTV)) used in isolation or in combination
under different configurations are utilised across different passenger fleets to act as passenger
transfer supervision system.
Traction interlocking
The function of traction interlocking is to ensure traction is only applied when all body side
passenger doors are fully closed and locked. A stationary train at the platform shall not be
allowed to move relative to the platform until interlocking of all body side passenger doors is
achieved (confirmed closed and locked).
Note: For passenger trains with manual doors opened and closed by the train crew,
mechanical locking under an approved operator procedure can be considered as an
alternative to traction interlocking.
Door obstruction detection system
The function of a door obstruction detection system is to reduce the possibility of passenger and
objects being trapped in doors by detecting if a passenger or object is in the path of a closing
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passenger body side door. The door shall automatically reopen allowing the passenger or
object to move out of the path to enable the door closing sequence and traction interlocking.
Note: For passenger trains with swing type doors operated manually, an approved
operating procedure including manual operation by the train crew can be considered
as an alternative to automatic obstruction detection.
Door motion warning system
The function of a door motion warning system is to warn passengers from inside and outside
the vehicle prior to door motion (closure, release and opening).
A visual and audible warning, inside and outside the vehicle shall be provided to warn
passengers prior to door motion.
Closed-circuit television
CCTV may be used, in conjunction with traction interlocking, door obstruction detection and
door motion warnings to assist with supervising passenger transfer at platforms.
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