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Bond Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 1 Article 5
6-1-2009
Estoppel in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ A principlepromoting stability threatens to undermine it
Alexander Ovchar
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Estoppel in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ A principle promoting stabilitythreatens to undermine it
Abstract
Estoppel is one of the most powerful and exible instruments to be found in any system of courtjurisprudence; and it has featured in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (the Court)and its predecessor, in a number of cases. Estoppel, in the jurisprudence of the Court, obliges a State to beconsistent in its aitude to a given factual or legal situation. Such a demand has the potential to encouragestability and predictability in international relations. Te Court has not been consistent in the application ofestoppel; commentators assert that estoppel lacks coherence in international law. However, few commentatorshave taken on the task of isolating in what ways the Court has been inconsistent when applying estoppel, andnone have made suggestions as to how the Court should eliminate the inconsistencies. Trough a detailedexamination of the judicial application of estoppel, this paper argues precisely in what ways the Court hasbeen inconsistent, and then makes suggestions as to how the Court should eliminate the inconsistencies.Tese proposals give estoppel a measure of predictability in the jurisprudence of the Court, and thus ensure
that the principle promoting stability does not undermine it. Sir Frederick Pollock, Te Expansion of theCommon Law (1904) 108.
Keywords
estoppel at the ICJ
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ESTOPPELINTHEJURISPRUDENCEOFTHEICJAprinciplepromotingstabilitythreatenstoundermineit
ALEXANDEROVCHAR
IntroductionEstoppel isoneof the mostpowerfuland flexible instruments tobe found inany
system of court jurisprudence.1 In one form or another, it is recognised by all
systemsofprivate law.2Thisrecognitionhasextendedtothe internationalsphere
there is no doubt that estoppel is a general principle of international law. 3Consequently,estoppelhasfeatured in thejurisprudenceof theInternationalCourt
ofJustice (the Court) and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International
Justice,inanumberofcases.4
Estoppel, in thejurisprudence of theCourt,5obliges aState tobe consistent in its
attitude to a given factual or legal situation.6Such ademandhas thepotential to
encourage finality,stabilityandpredictability7in internationalrelations, inanage
whenthiscooperationinmanyfieldsisbecomingincreasinglyessential.8
LLB(FirstClassHonours)(Adelaide),BCom(Adelaide).1 SirFrederickPollock,TheExpansionoftheCommonLaw(1904)108.2 SirHerschLauterpacht,PrivateLawSourcesandAnalogiesofInternationalLaw(1927)204.3 IanBrownlie,PrinciplesofPublicInternationalLaw(6thed,2003)616.4 Althoughestoppelhasfeaturedinthejurisprudenceofotherinternationaljudicialbodies,
theexclusivefocusofthispaperisonthedecisionsoftheCourtanditspredecessor.The
reasonforthisistwofold.First,theCourt,astheprincipaljudicialorganoftheUnited
Nations(CharteroftheUnitedNationsart92),isconsideredtobethemostauthoritative
internationaljudicialbody.See,eg,CliveParry,TheSourcesandEvidencesofInternationalLaw(1965)91.Secondly,theCourtitselfveryrarelymakesuseofthedecisionsofother
internationaljudicialbodiesonestoppel.Therefore,inthisareaofinternationallaw,
decisionsofotherinternationaljudicialbodiesdonotseemtobeperceivedbytheCourtas
persuasiveintheirreasoning.5 AreferencetotheCourt,inthispaper,isareferencetotheInternationalCourtofJustice
andthePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice.6 IainMacGibbon,EstoppelinInternationalLaw(1958)7InternationalandComparativeLaw
Quarterly458,468.7 TerritorialDispute(LibyanArabJamahiriyavChad)(Merits)[1994]ICJRep6,78
(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola)(TerritorialDispute).8 NuclearTests(AustraliavFrance)(Judgment)[1974]ICJRep253.
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The Court has not been consistent in the application of estoppel; there is wide
confusion over the scope of the principle in extracurial literature.9Commentators
arguethattheverydiversityoftheformsinwhichtheprincipleofestoppelhasbeen
applied tend tomake the concept sodiffuseas to impair itsvalueasa termof
art.10However,althoughmanyarecontenttoassertthatestoppelhasnoparticular
coherence in international law,11very fewcommentatorshave takenon the taskof
isolatinginwhatwaystheCourthasbeeninconsistentwhenapplyingestoppel,12and
none have made suggestions as to how the Court should eliminate the
inconsistencies.
Through a detailed examination of thejudicial application of estoppel, this paper
argues precisely in what ways the Court hasbeen inconsistent, and then makes
suggestions as to how the Court should eliminate the inconsistencies. TheseproposalsgiveestoppelameasureofpredictabilityinthejurisprudenceoftheCourt,
andthusensurethattheprinciplepromotingstabilitydoesnotundermineit.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Part II of the paper identifies the three
fundamental elements of estoppel that havebeen distilledby theCourt from the
principleasitoperatesinmunicipallegalsystems.
Upon this foundation,Part IIIanalyses thejurisprudenceof theCourtonestoppel
andsystematicallyexaminestheapplicationofeachelementbytheCourt.Itargues
thattheCourtisclearononeelementbutinconsistentontheothers.Inparticular,theCourthasbeen inconsistentonwhensilencegivesrise toanestoppelandwhether
detrimentalrelianceisrequiredforanestoppeltoarise.
9 See,eg,DerekBowett,EstoppelBeforeInternationalTribunalsAndItsRelationTo
Acquiescence(1957)33BritishYearBookofInternationalLaw176,201;AntoineMartin,
LEstoppelEnDroitInternationalPublic:PrcddunApercudelaThoriedelEstoppelenDroit
Anglais(1979)274.10 MacGibbon,EstoppelinInternationalLaw,aboven6,478.SeealsoChristopherBrown,A
ComparativeandCriticalAssessmentofEstoppelinInternationalLaw(1995)50UniversityofMiamiLawReview369,41012.
11 Brownlie,n3,616.SeeespeciallyBrown,aboven10.12 StudiesbyBowett,aboven9andMacGibbon,EstoppelinInternationalLaw,aboven6,
althoughindepth,arenowoutdated,becausethemajorityofcasesonestoppelwereheard
bytheCourtafterthesearticleswerewritten,anditispreciselyinthesecasesthatthe
inconsistenciesintreatmentoftheprincipleappear.ThestudiesbyYousefYouakim,
EstoppelinInternationalLaw(PhDDissertation,CornellUniversityLawSchool,1969)and
Martin,aboven9,althoughmorerecent,areencyclopaedicincontentanddonotattempt
toisolatetheinconsistencies.Otherrecentstudiesexaminingthetopichavegenerallybeen
incorporatedintolargerstudiesofinternationallaw,thustreatingestoppelinasomewhat
truncatedmanner.
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PartIVconsidersthewayforwardfortheCourt.Itcontendsthattheinconsistencies
discoveredinPartIIIshouldnotremain,astheyaffecttheperceptionofStatesasto
theprobityoftheCourtandcreate legaluncertainty,whichinturnunderminesthe
valueof international lawasaguide to futureState conduct.Suggestionsare then
made as to how the Court should eliminate these inconsistencies; in particular,
silenceshouldbeonlygivenevidentiaryweightanddetrimentalrelianceshouldbe
establishedforanestoppeltoarise.
InternationalEstoppelThe principle underlying estoppel is often expressed in the Latin maxim allegans
contrarianonaudiendusest,translatedasoneshouldnotbenefitfromhisorherown
inconsistency.13
This
principle
is
found
in
all
major
legal
systems.14
It
underlies
the
various typesofestoppel incommon lawjurisprudence15and thecivil lawconcepts
ofpreclusion,debarmentandforeclusion.16
Estoppellikeconcepts inmunicipal lawarebothspecificand technical.17InEnglish
jurisprudence, for example, a number ofbranches or categories of estoppel,with
differentoriginsandinconsistentrules,havebeendevelopedovertheyears.18Oneof
these distinctions is that a statement of fact can give rise only to common law
estoppel;astatementof laworapromise,on theotherhand,cangiveriseonly to
13 TempleofPreahVihear(CambodiavThailand)(Merits)[1962]ICJRep6,39(SeparateOpinion
ofJudgeAlfaro)(TempleofPreahVihear);NorthSeaContinentalShelf(DenmarkvFederal
RepublicofGermany;NetherlandsvFederalRepublicofGermany)[1969]ICJRep4,120
(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAmmoun)(NorthSeaContinentalShelf).Thisisafigurative
translation,whichhasbeenpreferredbymostscholarsonthistopic.Aliteraltranslationis
onemakingcontradictorystatementsisnottobeheard.SeeLordMcNair,LawofTreaties
(1961)485.14 JorgPaulMllerandThomasCottier,EstoppelinRudolfBernhardt(ed),Encyclopaediaof
PublicInternationalLaw(2003)118.SeealsoBoizard(Liselotte)vCommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities[1982]1CMLR157,171(AdvocateGeneralWarner).AngloAmerican
terminologyhasgainedprevalenceinliteratureonthissubjectandthustheprinciple
underlyingestoppelisreferredtoasestoppel.15 See,eg,GeorgeKeetonandLASheridan,Equity(3rded,1987)856.16 See,eg,MuirWatt,PourlaccueildelestoppelenDroitPrivFranaisinBourelBguin
(ed)MlangesenlhonneurdeYvonLoussouarn(1994)303.17 Generally,see,eg,TerritorialDispute,77(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola);Georg
Schwarzenberger,InternationalLaw(3rded,1957)566.Inrelationtocommonlaw
jurisprudence,see,eg,PatrickParkinson,ThePrinciplesofEquity(2003)21416.Inrelationto
civillawjurisprudence,see,eg,Martin,aboven9,240.18 ElizabethCooke,TheModernLawofEstoppel(2000)16.
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equitableestoppel.19Similarly,inAustralianjurisprudence,thereisasmorgasbord
of concepts to choose from under the heading of estoppel. 20 Comparable
complexitiessurroundestoppellikeconceptsincivillawjurisprudence.21
The Court, however, has not adopted the technicalities of specific forms of
estoppel.22Instead,ithasheldthatestoppelconsistsofthreefundamentalelements:
first, a Statemustmake a representation to another; secondly, the representation
must be unconditional and made with proper authority; and finally, the State
invoking estoppel must rely on the representation. 23 If all three elements are
established,anestoppelarises.24
19 See,eg,JordenvMoney(1854)5HLC185;TerritorialandAuxiliaryForcesoftheCountyofLondonvNicols[1949]1KB35;TomlinvReid[1963]EGD338.See,generally,JohnMcGhee,
SnellsEquity(31sted,2000)5689.Thedivisionbetweencommonlawandequitable
estoppel,however,hasbeencriticisedinCrabbvArunDistrictCouncil[1975]3AllER865,
880(LordScarman);AmalgamatedInvestment&PropertyCoLtd(InLiquidation)vTexas
CommerceInternationalBank[1982]1QB84(LordDenning).ForcriticisminBritishextra
curialliterature,seeespeciallyRogerHalson,TheOffensiveLimitsofPromissory
Estoppel[1999]LloydsMaritimeandCommercialLawQuarterly257;MarkLunney,Towards
aUnifiedEstoppel[1992]TheConveyancer239.20 JohnCarterandDavidHarland,ContractLawinAustralia(4thed,2002)140,butnotethat
theauthorsthemselvesdoubtthevalidityofthedistinctionsbetweenthedifferentformsofestoppel.ThisdistinctionwascriticisedinWaltonsStores(Interstate)LtdvMaher(1988)164
CLR387,420(BrennanJ);CommonwealthvVerwayen(1990)170CLR394,413(MasonCJ).
ForcriticisminAustralianextracurialliterature,see,eg,JusticeRoderickMeagher,Justice
DysonHeydonandJusticeJohnLehane,Equity,DoctrinesandRemedies(4thed,2002)4058.21 SeeMartin,aboven9,274;TempleofPreahVihear,39(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro);
CharlesVallee,QuelquesObservationsSurLEstoppelenDroitdesGens(1973)77Revue
GeneraledeDroitInternationalPublic949.22 MllerandCottier,aboven14,118.SeealsoTempleofPreahVihear,40(SeparateOpinionof
JudgeAlfaro),625(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).Forsupportinextracurial
literature,seeespeciallyLauterpacht,PrivateLawSourcesandAnalogiesofInternationalLaw,aboven2,3956.
23 See,eg,NorthSeaContinentalShelf,26.Forsupportinextracurialliteraturesee,eg,Bowett,
aboven9;MeganWagner,JurisdictionbyEstoppelintheInternationalCourtofJustice
(1986)74CaliforniaLawReview1777.24 TheCourthasnotbeenconsistentintheuseofterminologywhendiscussingestoppel,
usingtermssuchasestoppel,preclusion,acquiescenceanddebarmentinterchangeably.
This,however,isnotsignificantbecauseiftheabovementionedelementsareestablished,
theprincipleisappliedineffect.Itisthenirrelevant,insubstance,whatithasbeenlabelled
asbythecourt.See,eg,TempleofPreahVihear,40(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro),625
(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice);TerritorialDispute,77(SeparateOpinionofJudge
Ajibola).ForsupportinextracurialliteratureseeSchwarzenberger,InternationalLaw,above
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Consequently,estoppel inthejurisprudenceof theCourt isfreefrom the manifold
refinements grafted onto itby domestic legal systems.25In its transition from the
municipaltotheinternationalsphere,theconceptofestoppelhasbeenbroadenedso
substantially that the analogy with the estoppel of municipal systems may be
positivelymisleading.26Consequently,asobservedbyJudgeAlfaro in theTempleof
Preah Vihear case, although there are similarities between estoppel in the
jurisprudenceofinternationalandmunicipalcourts,
[t]here isaverysubstantialdifferencebetween thesimpleandclearcut rule
adopted and applied in the international field and the complicated
classifications,modalities,species,subspeciesandprocedural featuresof the
municipalsystem.27
TheCourt, therefore,hasadopted asimpleandwhollyuntechnicalconception28of
estoppelandapplieditasaruleofsubstanceandnotmerelyasoneofevidenceor
procedure.29
Notwithstanding this simplification, theCourthasnotbeen consistent inapplying
estoppel.30Thenextpartofthepaperexaminesthescopeofeachelementandisolates
theinconsistenciesintheapplicationofestoppelbytheCourt.
InconsistenciesinapplicationRepresentationArepresentationisthefirstelementrequiredtoestablishestoppel.Arepresentation,
andthuspossiblyestoppel,canarisefromadeclarationorfromsilence.31TheCourt
n17,566;Wagner,aboven23,1780;RobertJenningsandArthurWatts(eds),Oppenheims
InternationalLaw(9thed,1992)527.25 AnthonyDAmato,Consent,Estoppel,andReasonableness:ThreeChallengestoUniversal
InternationalLaw(1969)10VirginiaJournalofInternationalLaw1,8.26 MacGibbon,EstoppelinInternationalLaw,aboven6,477.27 TempleofPreahVihear,39(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro).28 Ibid62(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).29 TerritorialDispute,77(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola).Thequestionofwhetherthe
juridicalbasisoftheprincipleofestoppelinthejurisprudenceoftheCourtisfoundinits
inceptionasaruleofcustomarylaworasageneralprincipleoflawrecognisedbycivilised
nationsisnotclear;anditisnotthepurposeofthispapertoanswerthisquestion.See,eg,
VladimirDegan,SourcesofInternationalLaw(1997)55.30 Seeeg,Bowett,aboven9,201;Martin,aboven9,274.31 Seeeg,TempleofPreahVihear,62(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice);ElettronicaSicula
SpA(UnitedStatesofAmericavItaly)[1989]ICJRep15,44.SeealsoGeorgSchwarzenberger,
TheFundamentalPrinciplesofInternationalLaw(1955)87Recueildescoursdel Acadmie
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has consistently held that a declaration gives rise to an estoppel only if the
declaration is clear and consistent.32At the same time,however, theCourthasnot
beenconsistentinholdingunderwhatcircumstancessilencegivesrisetoanestoppel.
ArisingfromaDeclarationTogiverise toanestoppel,adeclarationmustbeunequivocal,andconsistentwith
theotherdeclarationsof theState.Not alljudicialdecisionsexpressly refer to this
criterion;all,however,applyitineffect.
In theSerbianLoanscase, theCourtobserved thatadeclarationmustbe clearand
unequivocal33togiverise toanestoppel. In theNorthSeaContinentalShelfcase, the
Courtobserved that theFederalRepublicofGermanywouldbeestoppedonly if it
clearlyandconsistentlyevincedacceptance34ofaConvention itdidnotratify.Themerefactof takingpart in thedraftingof theConventionandacting inaccordance
withitwasnotenoughtosatisfythiscriteriononlyaverydefinite,veryconsistent
courseofconduct35onthepartoftheFederalRepublicofGermanycouldhavegiven
risetoanestoppelinthecircumstances.
A similar testwas applied in the Land, Island andMaritimeFrontierDispute case.36
There, El Salvadorian andHonduran expressions of views as to the existence or
natureofNicaraguan interests37didnotgiverise toanestoppelbecause theywere
not clear and consistent declarations they were only ambiguous statements of
deDroitInternationaldelaHaye195,256;RobertJennings,AcquisitionofTerritoryin
InternationalLaw(1963)3841;DominiqueCarreau,Droitinternational(7thed,2001)230.32 TheCourtreferstodeclarationsandconductinterchangeably.SeeMilitaryand
ParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(NicaraguavUnitedStatesofAmerica)
(Jurisdiction)[1984]ICJRep392,415;LandandMaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonand
Nigeria(CameroonvNigeria)(Jurisdiction)[1998]ICJRep275,303.33 PaymentofVariousSerbianLoansIssuedinFrance(FrancevSerbCroatSlovene)[1929]PCIJ(ser
A)No20,38(SerbianLoans).EstoppelreceivedpassingattentioninFactoryatChorzow
(GermanyvPoland)(Jurisdiction)[1925]PCIJ(serB)No3andEuropeanDanubeCommission(AdvisoryOpinion)[1927]PCIJ(serB)No14.However,thebrevityofthejudicial
examinationofestoppeldoesnotallowonetodrawanyusefulconclusionsaboutthe
principleinthejurisprudenceoftheCourt.SeeJCWitenberg,lEstoppel,UnAspect
JuridiqueduProblemedesCreancesAmericaines(1933)60JournalduDroitInternational
531,537.34 Ibid25.TheConventioninquestionwastheGenevaConventionontheContinentalShelf,
openedforsignatureOpenedforsignature29April1958,499UNTS311(enteredintoforce
10June1964).35 Ibid26.36 (ElSalvadorvHonduras)(ApplicationForPermissionToIntervene)[1990]ICJRep92.37 Ibid118.
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opinion.38In theMilitaryandParamilitaryActivities inandagainstNicaraguacase, the
Courtobservedthatanestoppelmaybeinferredfromtheconduct,declarationsand
thelikemadebyaStatewhichclearlyandconsistentlyevincedacceptance39ofa
particular state of affairs. Similarly, the Court observed in the Land andMaritime
BoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeriacasethat:
an estoppel would only arise ifby its acts or declarations Cameroon had
consistently made it fully clear that it had agreed to settle the boundary
disputesubmittedtotheCourtbybilateralavenuesalone.40
Theseconditionswereconsiderednottohavebeensatisfiedinthiscaseandthusno
estoppelwasestablished.41
Inthe
Legal
Status
of
Eastern
Greenland
case,
42
theCourt
held
that
astatement
made
by
theNorwegianMinisterofForeignAffairs in1919effectively recognisedthewhole
ofGreenlandasDanish43;andbecause thestatementwasclearandconsistentwith
previous Norwegian declarations,44 the declaration made in 1919 gave rise to an
estoppel.45
In theArbitralAwardMadebytheKingofSpainon23December1906case,46Honduras
argued thatby accepting the appointment of the arbitrator, Nicaragua was now
estopped fromquestioninghis competency.TheCourt agreedwith theHonduran
contention,observingthat:
Nicaragua,byexpressdeclarationandbyconduct,recognized theAwardas
validand it isno longeropentoNicaraguatogobackuponthatrecognition
andtochallengethevalidityoftheAward.47
38 Ibid.39 (NicaraguavUnitedStatesofAmerica)(Jurisdiction)[1984]ICJRep392,415.40 (CameroonvNigeria)(Jurisdiction)[1998]ICJRep275,303.41 Ibid304.Ontwooccasions,theCourthasheldthatanestoppeldidnotarisewithout
elaboratingonwhenadeclarationgivesrisetoanestoppel.SeeBarcelonaTractionLightand
PowerCo(BelgiumvSpain)(Judgment)[1964]ICJRep4,245(BarcelonaTractionLightand
PowerCo);SovereigntyOverPedraBranca/PulauBatuPuteh,MiddleRocksAndSouthLedge
(MalaysiavSingapore)(Merits)[2008]ICJRep[228]at19April2009
(SovereigntyOverPedraBranca).42 (DenmarkvNorway)(Merits)[1933]PCIJ(serA/B)No53(LegalStatusofEasternGreenland).43 LegalStatusofEasternGreenland,68.44 LegalStatusofEasternGreenland,646.45 Ibid73.46 (HondurasvNicaragua)[1960]ICJRep192(ArbitralAwardMadebytheKingofSpain).47 Ibid213.
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Therefore,bymaking a clear declaration that it accepted theAwardmadeby the
King of Spain as valid prior to the arbitration, Nicaragua was estopped from
questioningthevalidityoftheAward.
In theNuclearTestscase,Australia asked theCourt todeclare French atmospheric
nuclear testing in theSouthPacificOcean illegal.Before theCourtheard thiscase,
Francemadeaseriesofdeclarationstotheeffectthatallatmospherictestswhichare
soontobecarriedoutwill,inthenormalcourseofevents,bethelastofthistype.48
The Court held that these declarations gave rise to an estoppel because of
intention. 49 This intention, the Court explained, is to be ascertained by
interpretation of the act 50 of making the declaration itself. Therefore, the Court
observedthatforadeclarationtogiverisetoanestoppel,thesolerelevantquestion
is whether the language employed in any given declaration does reveal a clear
intention.51
This test, ineffect, isnodifferent from the clearand consistent criteriondiscussed
previously.IntheNuclearTestscase,noemphasiswasplacedontheactualintention
of the State the focus was on the declaration itself. 52 Therefore, whether the
declarationgaverisetoanestoppelinthiscasewasamatternotofsubjectiveintent
butofexternalobjectivejustice.53
Further support for this interpretation canbe foundon the factsof the case it is
clear that theFrenchgovernmentdidnotevincean intention tobebound.Noneof
the statements made by French officials contained an express assumption of
obligation.Commentatorshavestressed theextremeunlikeness thatFrancewould
have really intended to assume an obligation.54DrDegan, for example, observed
that:
the probable intentions of French officials were quite the opposite: avoid
assuming a firm legal obligation, but by these political and informal
48 Ibid266.49 Ibid267.50 Ibid.51 Ibid268.52 PhillippeCahier,LecomportementdesEtatscommesourcededroitsetdobligationsin
RecueildEtudesdeDroitInternationalEnHommageaPaulGuggenheim(1968).53 MarttiKoskenniemi,FromApologytoUtopia:TheStructureofInternationalLegalArgument
(2006)348.SeealsoThomasFranck,WordMadeLaw:DecisionoftheICJintheNuclear
TestsCases(1975)69AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw612,617.54 Koskenniemi,aboven53,351.MllerandCottier,aboven14,118.
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statementstocalmtheanxietyofapplicantsandtopreserveitsfreedomof
actionforthefuture.55
Itis
thus
clear
that
the
test
adopted
in
the
Nuclear
Tests
case
is
objective
the
Court
construed the French intent from the declaration itself, and not from the actual,
subjectiveintentionsoftheState.56
Given thisobjectivefocus,therewouldbenodifferencebetweenthis,and theclear
andconsistenttest,whichfeaturedinpreviouscases.57Togiverisetoanestoppel,a
declaration,undereithertest,mustbeunambiguous,atleastinthesensethatitmust
reasonablysupport themeaningattributed to itby thepartyraising theestoppel.58
Therefore, in effect, the Court in the Nuclear Tests case applied the clear and
consistentcriterionofpriorcases.
The foregoing analysis has shown that the Court has consistently held that a
declarationcangiverisetoanestoppelbutonlyifitisclearandconsistent.Insome
cases theCourthasexplicitlyapplied this criterion,while inothers itapplied it in
effect.ThenextsectionarguesthattheCourthasnotbeenconsistentindetermining
whensilencegivesrisetoanestoppel.
ArisingfromSilence:IsSilenceEvidentiaryorConclusive?In addition to a declaration, an estoppel can also arise from silence.59The Court,
however,has
not
been
consistent
in
determining
when
this
occurs.
60
Onclose
analysis
55 Degan,aboven3,55.SeealsoLuigiBravo,MethodesdeRecherchdela
CoutumeInternationaledanslaPratiquedesetats(1985)192RecueildesCours233,260.56 SeeEricSuyandKarelWellens,InternationalLaw(1998)217.57 AlfredRubin,TheInternationalLegalEffectsofUnilateralDeclarations(1977)71American
JournalofInternationalLaw1,2630;JeanDidierSicault,Ducaractreobligatoiredes
engagementsunilatrauxendroitinternationalpublic(1979)83RevueGeneraledeDroit
InternationalPublic
633,68788.
58 IanSinclair,EstoppelandAcquiescenceinVaughanLoweandMalgosia
Fitzmaurice(eds),FiftyYearsoftheInternationalCourtofJustice:EssaysinHonourof
SirRobertJennings(1996)107.59 Onecommentatorsuggeststhat,inthejurisprudenceoftheCourt,estoppelisaseparate
principletoacquiescence,andthussilencecangiverisetoacquiescencebutnotestoppel
andviceversa.SeeIainMacGibbon,TheScopeofAcquiescenceinInternationalLaw
(1954)31BritishYearBookofInternationalLaw143,1478.Theusefulnessofthisdistinctionis
doubtfulinlightofthefactthatthemajorityofcases,aswellasextracurialliterature,treat
estoppelastheconsequenceoftheacquiescenceofaState.Thus,itisunnecessarytoconsider
thedistinction,ifany,betweenthetwoconcepts.Forcurialsupport,see,eg,TempleofPreah
Vihear,63(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).Forextracurialsupport,see,
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ofthecircumstanceswhensilencegivesrisetoestoppel,twodiametricallyopposed
approachesbecomeevident.
Oneapproachcontendsthatthemerefactofsilencegivesrisetoanestoppel.Onthisapproach, silence and lack of protest are so fundamental that they decide by
themselves alone thematter in thedispute61and thus, arguesJudgeAlfaro in the
TempleofPreahVihearcase,constituteapresumptionjurisetdejureinvirtueofwhich
aStateisheldtohaveabandoneditsright62toopposeanadverseclaimbyanother
State.Ajurisetdejureassumption isone thatdenotes conclusivepresumptionsof
lawwhichcannotberebuttedbyevidence.63Therefore,accordingtothisview,there
isnoneedtoconsiderotherevidencewhichmightgiverisetoadifferentinference;
silenceisconclusiveinestablishingestoppel.
Anoppositeapproachassertsthattogiverisetoanestoppel,silencemustbeviewed
in context of the circumstances in which it was maintained; the presumption of
consent derived from silence may be rebutted by a clear indication of contrary
intention.Silenceisthusofevidentiaryvalueonly.64
Therefore, thedistinctionbetween the twoviews is thejudicialimportancegiven to
silenceby theCourt; sometimes it is conclusivewhile at other times it is of only
evidentiaryweightinestablishingestoppel.
Thisisafundamentaldistinction.WhentheCourtadoptstheconclusiveview,aclear
response opposing a claim of another Statemustbemade in order toprevent an
estoppelarising.Ontheevidentiaryview,however,thereisonlyaneedtoprotestan
adverse claim if the position of the State is not clear from its current conduct.A
detailedexaminationofcases thathavedealtwith this issue reveals that theCourt
hasnotbeenconsistentintheapproachitprefersnoviewhasgainedprevalence.
An estoppel arising from silencewas considered for the first time in the Fisheries
Case.65There,theUnitedKingdomobjectedtotheNorwegiansystemofdelimitation
ofitscoastlinealongtheNorthSea.TheUnitedKingdomarguedthatthissystemof
delimitation effectively extended theNorwegian territorial sea into the high seas,whichareopentousebyallnations.
Schwarzenberger,InternationalLaw,aboven17,566;McNair,aboven13,488;Bowett,
aboven9,201;Youakim,aboven12,158;Wagner,aboven23,17834.60 TheCourtreferstosilence,acquiescenceandlackofprotestinterchangeably.61 TempleofPreahVihear,43(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro).62 Ibid44(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro).63 MarkShain,PresumptionsundertheCommonandtheCivilLaw(1944)18Southern
CaliforniaLawReview91,97.64 TempleofPreahVihear,131(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).65 (UnitedKingdomvNorway)[1951]ICJRep116(FisheriesCase).
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Themajority of the Court held, however, that theUnited Kingdom should have
illustrated itsdiscontentwith this system ofdelimitation earlier. Inparticular, the
majorityobserved thatas thedelimitation significantly affected thepositionof the
United Kingdom in the North Sea, the United Kingdom should have protested
against it,andbynotdoingsoforover60years,wasnowestopped fromclaiming
otherwise.66Thus, the British silence, in the form of a prolonged abstention from
protesttothissystemofdelimitation,gaverisetoanestoppel.67
Incomingtothisconclusion,themajorityadoptedaconclusiveviewofsilence;itdid
notexaminethecircumstancesinwhichthesilencewasmaintained.Haditdoneso,
this examination would have revealed that the United Kingdom was never
completely awareof theNorwegian systemofdelimitationduring the 60years in
whichNorwayclaimedtheBritishshouldhaveprotested.68Theinformationthatwasavailable to the United Kingdom revealed contradictions in the system of
delimitation used by Norway, and thus the British government felt it was
unnecessarytoprotest.
It is precisely the examination of the circumstances in which the silence was
maintained which seems to be the underlying reason for the dissent of Judges
McNairandReid. Immediatelyafterexamining thesecircumstances,JudgeMcNair
concludedthat:
Inthesecircumstances,IdonotconsiderthattheUnitedKingdomwasaware,oroughtbutfordefaultonherparttohavebecomeaware,oftheexistenceofa
Norwegiansystemoflongstraightbaselinesconnectingoutermostpoints.69
Thus, theJudge held that the British silence should not give rise to an estoppel.
Similarreasons impelledJudgeReid tohold likewise.JudgeReidobserved that the
various decrees of the Norwegian government, which set out the system of
delimitation,werenot brought to theattentionofothergovernmentsandcertainly
not to theattentionof theBritishGovernment.70Thus,as theUnitedKingdomwas
notcompletelyawareofthespecificsystemofdelimitationusedbyNorway,nordid
the United Kingdom receive constructive notice of the system, 71 Judge Reidconcludedthatitshouldnotbeestoppedfromdisputingthesystem.
66 Ibid140.JudgesAlvarezandHsuMo,intheirseparateopinions,didnotaddressthe
specificpointraisedaboveandthustheirjudgmentsarenotincludedinreferencestothe
majorityinthiscase.67 Ibid139.68 Ibid138.69 Ibid180(DissentingOpinionofJudgeMcNair).70 Ibid200(DissentingOpinionofJudgeReid).71 Ibid172(DissentingOpinionofJudgeMcNair).
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Thedifference inopinionbetween themajority,anddissentingJudgesMcNairand
Reid, was the judicial weight given to the British silence. The majority seemed
contenttoimputeconstructiveknowledgeofthedelimitationtotheUnitedKingdom
without specific regard to the particular circumstances in which the silence was
maintained. Thus, themajority adopted a conclusive view of silence. In contrast,
dissenting Judges McNair and Reid meticulously considered the circumstances
surroundingthesilenceandconcludedthatitdidnotgiverisetoanestoppel.Thus,
JudgesMcNairandReidsawsilenceasbeingonlyofevidentiaryweight.
The facts concerning theTempleofPreahVihearcase centredona territorialdispute
betweenCambodia(thenknownasFrenchIndoChina)andThailand(thenknownas
Siam) over the Preah Vihear Temple. A joint committee of topographers was
establishedin1904todeterminetheprecisecontoursofthefrontierlinebetweenthetwo countries. This committee produced amap in 1907 thatwas sent to the Thai
authorities, according towhich the Temple was situated in Cambodian territory.
TherewasnoreactiononthepartoftheThaiauthoritiestothismap,eitherthenor
formanyyearssubsequently.72
It is not entirely clear who had effective possession over the Temple over the
followingfourdecades.TheonlyJudgeswhomadeaconclusivefindingonthisissue
were Judges Koo and Spender who, in dissent, held that Thailand exercised
administrativecontrolovertheregionsurroundingtheTempleandhadcontrolover
theTemple itself.73In1954,Thaimilitary forcesoccupied theTemple following the
French withdrawal from Cambodia. A dispute arose over the ownership of the
Temple.
CambodiacontendedthatThailandhadacceptedthemappreparedin1907which
placedtheTempleontheCambodiansidebecauseitfailedtoprotest itscontents.
Therefore,Cambodiaargued,Thailandwasestoppedfromclaimingsovereigntyover
theTemple.
Thailand argued that abundant evidence has been given that Thailand has
exercisedfullsovereigntyintheareaoftheTempletotheexclusionofCambodia.74
Therefore, Thailand contended, no estoppel couldbe established as Thailand, in
effect,didprotesttothecontentsofthemap.ThemajorityoftheCourtobservedthat
themapcreatedcircumstancesthat:
72 Ibid23.73 Ibid93(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo),138(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).74 Ibid12.
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calledforsomereaction,withinareasonableperiod,onthepartoftheSiamese
authorities, if they wished to disagree with the map or had any serious
questiontoraiseinregardtoit.75
AsThailanddidnotdoso,themajorityheldthatThailandshouldbeestoppedfrom
claiming sovereignty over the Temple. 76 However, Judges Koo, Spender and
Quintana,intheirdissentingreasonsforjudgment,arguedthatinlightofthebroader
circumstances of the case, particularly the Thai exercise of sovereignty over the
Temple,theThailackofprotestshouldnotgiverisetoanestoppel.77
Thisdifferenceinconclusionswascausedbyavaryingdegreeofjudicialimportance
accordedtotheThaisilence.ThemajorityobservedthattheThaisilencegaveriseto
an estoppel regardless of evidence to the contrary, such as the Thai exercise of
sovereignty over the Temple. Absence of protest, even in light of seeminglycontradictory conduct, gave rise to an estoppel. Thus, according to the majority,
silencewasconclusiveinestablishinganestoppel;silencewasjurisetdejure.
JudgeSpenderarguedindissentthatiftheThaisilencewastheonlyevidenceinthis
caseitcouldwellbeconclusive.78However,whentheThaisilenceisweighedagainst
theThaioccupationoftheTemplearguedJudgeSpenderitwillbeseenthatsuch
admissionsasmaybespeltoutoftheconductofSiambytheCourthavelittleifany
evidentiaryvalueinthedeterminationofthiscase.79
Similarly,JudgeKoospokeofsilenceasbeingarelevantfactoronlyinthelightofits unequivocal conduct and of the attendant circumstances.80The alleged lack of
protest,JudgeKooargued,was plainlycontradictedbyevidenceofsustainedState
[Thai]activityinexerciseofsovereigntyintheTemplearea.81Therefore,asThailand
hadconsistentlyindicatedabeliefthattheareainquestioncontinuestobelongto
herownsovereignty,hersilenceshouldnothavegivenrisetoanestoppel.82
JudgeQuintana, inhisdissent,similarlyobserved that,apartfrom theThaisilence,
[o]therconsiderationsadducedbythePartiesmustbeevaluatedbyaninternational
75 Ibid23.76 Ibid24.JudgesAlfaroandFitzmaurice,intheirseparateopinions,concurredwiththe
majorityonthispoint,andarethusincludedinreferencestothemajorityinthiscase.See
ibid39(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro),55(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).77 Ibid52(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo),70(DissentingOpinionofJudgeQuintana),130
1(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).78 Ibid131(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).79 Ibid.80 Ibid96(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo).81 Ibid52(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo)82 Ibid51(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo).
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tribunalat theircorrectsignificance.83Consequently,silenceand lackofprotest, as
evidence,haveonlyacomplementaryvaluewhich is in itselfwithout legaleffect.84
Consequently,JudgesKoo,SpenderandQuintanasawThaisilenceasbeingofonly
evidentiaryvalue.
IntheElettronicaSiculaSpAcase,85theUnitedStatesallegedthatItalyviolatedatreaty
between the twocountries inpreventingRaytheon,acompany incorporated in the
UnitedStates,fromliquidatingtheassetsofitswhollyownedItaliansubsidiary.
In 1974, theUnited Stateswasof the opinion thatRaytheonhad exhausted every
legal remedyavailable to it in Italy. Italywasawareof thisconviction,but at that
timewasoftheopinionthatthelocalremedieshadnotbeenexhausted.86WhenItaly
raised the local remedies defence in 1978 that Raytheon should have sued the
ItalianGovernmentintheItaliancourtstheUnitedStatesarguedthatthisabsence
ofripostefromItalyamountstoanestoppel.87ItwasarguedthatItalyshouldhave
apprisedtheUnitedStatesofitsopinion,andbyfailingtodoso,shouldbeestopped
fromclaimingthatalllocalremedieshavebeenexhausted.88
TheCourtrejectedthisargumentonthebasisthattheItaliansilencedidnotgiverise
toanestoppel.TheCourtobservedthatalthough
an estoppel could in certain circumstances arise from a silence when
something ought to have been said, there are obvious difficulties in
constructing an estoppel from a mere failure to mention a matter at aparticularpointinsomewhatdesultorydiplomaticexchanges.89
The Court examined the extensive communication between the two States and
effectively discounted the value of the Italian silence in light of the wider
circumstances in which it was maintained. In particular, by viewing the Italian
silence in the context of the relatively informal and disorganised communication
betweenthetwoStates,itheldthatitdidnotgiverisetoanestoppel.Thus,theCourt
adoptedtheevidentiaryviewofsilence.
TheJanMayencase90concernedadisputeover thedelimitation in theareabetweenGreenland (Denmark) and theJanMayen Island (Norway).Denmark argued that
83 Ibid70(DissentingOpinionofJudgeQuintana).84 Ibid71(DissentingOpinionofJudgeQuintana)(emphasisadded).85 (UnitedStatesofAmericavItaly)[1989]ICJRep15.86 Ibid44.87 Ibid.88 Ibid.89 Ibid.90 MaritimeDelimitationintheAreabetweenGreenlandandJanMayen(DenmarkvNorway)
(Merits)[1993]ICJRep38.
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Greenlandwasentitledtoafisheryzoneatadistanceof200nauticalmilesfrom its
baseline,whilstNorwayclaimedthattheouterlimitoftheDanishfisheryzonewas
themedianlinebetweentherelevantcoasts.
In support of its claim,Norway contended thatDenmark had knowledge of the
longstanding position of the Norwegian Government in the matter of maritime
delimitation,91andbynotillustratingitsdiscontentwiththisposition,shouldnowbe
estoppedfromchallengingtheexistenceandvalidityofthemedianlineboundary.92
TheCourtexaminedthecircumstances inwhichtheDanishsilencewasmaintained
andconcludedthatnoestoppelwasestablished.TheCourtobservedthattheDanish
silence was explained by the concern not to aggravate the situation pending a
definitive settlement of theboundary.93 Therefore, the underlying reason for the
Danish restraint in the enforcement of its fishing regulations was to avoid
difficultieswithNorway.94
The Court was not exclusively concerned with the question of whether Denmark
should have protested the Norwegian delimitation. Its examination of the facts
extendedalso to the reasons forwhyDenmarkkept silent.Thus, it seems that the
Court considered the two competing factors theneed toprotest and theDanish
hesitationindoingsoandobservedthatitwasreasonable,inthecircumstances,for
Denmarktoremainsilent.
Silencewasthusonlyofevidentiaryweight.HadtheCourtadoptedajurisetdejure
viewofsilence,itwouldnothaveconsideredthereasonsfortheDanishhesitationto
protest,andthuslikelyheldthatanestoppelwasestablished.
In the TerritorialDispute case, themajority of theCourt found that theboundary
between Chad and Libya was defined by the 1955 Treaty of Friendship andGood
Neighbourliness(the1995Treaty).95In itspleadings,Chadoffereda supplementary
reasonforwhytheboundarybetweenthetwoStatesshouldbedefinedbythe1955
Treaty.Chadcontendedthatevenifthe1955Treatywasinvalid,thefactthatLibya
didnotprotestagainstthisboundaryinsubsequentdealingsbetweenthetwoStatesestoppeditfromclaiminganotherboundary.
91 Ibid53.92 Ibid.93 Ibid54.94 Ibid55.95 TreatyofFriendshipandGoodNeighbourliness(withAnnexes,SpecialConvention,Conventionon
GoodNeighbourliness,ConventiononEconomicCooperationandCulturalConvention),10
August1955,FranceLibyanArabJamahiriya,1596UNTS264(enteredintoforce20
February1957).
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JudgeAjibolawastheonlyJudgetoconsiderthisargument.Inhisseparateopinion,
heobservedthat:
basedontheprincipleofestoppelthesilenceoracquiescenceofLibyafromthedateof signing the1955Treaty to thepresent time,withoutanyprotest
whatsoever,clearlymilitatesagainstitsclaim.96
JudgeAjibolathenconcludedthatinlightofthebroadercircumstancesinwhichthe
silence was maintained, Libya was estopped from denying the 1955 Treaty
boundary.97
The use of theword militate in the reasoning ofJudgeAjibola is significant. It
impliesthattheJudgesawsilenceashavinginfluential,butnotconclusiveweightin
establishingestoppel.
Following
an
examination
of
the
broader
circumstances
in
which the silence was maintained, theJudge concluded that there was no other
evidencewhichcould leadone toadifferingconclusion;Libyadidnotoccupy the
territory inquestionnordid itengage inanyotherconductwhichwas inconsistent
withitssilence.98Therefore,hadLibyaexercisedsomesovereigntyovertheterritory
inquestion,itseemsthatnoestoppelwouldhavearisen.Silence,therefore,wasonly
ofevidentiaryweight.
The preceding examination reveals that the Court has not been consistent in
determiningwhensilencegivesrisetoanestoppel.Thisiscausedbytheconflicting
judicialimportancegiventosilence:sometimesitisconclusive,yetatothertimes,itisonlyofevidentiaryweightinestablishingestoppel.TheCourthasbeenunclearon
theapproachitprefersandthisisthereforethefirstareaofsubstantiveinconsistency
intheapplicationofestoppelbytheCourt.
Inconclusion,thiselementofestoppelisunclear:althoughcoherentinitstreatment
of an estoppel arising from a declaration, the Court has not been consistent in
determiningwhensilencegivesrisetoanestoppel.
Authorisedand
Unconditional
Thesecondelementofestoppelisthatarepresentationmustbebothauthorisedand
unconditional.Ifthiselementisnotsatisfied,arepresentation,evenifitisclearand
consistent,doesnotgiverisetoanestoppel.
The Court has been consistent in the judicial treatment of this element. It has
continuallyheld thata representation isauthorisedonly if it ismadebyanorgan
96 TerritorialDispute,81(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola)(emphasisadded).97 Ibid83(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola).98 Ibid845(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAjibola).
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competenttobindtheStateandarepresentationisdeemedunconditional,unlessitis
madeinthecourseofnegotiationsorissubjecttoexpressconditions.
The question of proper authoritywas first discussed in the LegalStatus
of
Eastern
Greenlandcase.There,theCourtheldthat:
areplyofthisnature,givenbytheMinisterforForeignAffairsonbehalfofhis
Government in response to a requestby the diplomatic representative of a
foreignPower in regard toaquestion fallingwithinhisprovince, isbinding
uponthecountrytowhichtheMinisterbelongs.99
This reasoning illustrates that the Courtwas not concernedwith the question of
whether theMinister had actualauthority tomake the representation.Rather, the
focusoftheCourtwasonwhethertheMinisterwascompetenttobindtheState;was
theMinistergiven thepower to engage the State internationally?When theCourt
concludedthatitwas,itobservedthattherepresentationwasauthorised.100
This particular view of authorisation was endorsed in the Nottebohm Case. 101
AlthoughtheCourtheldthattherewasaclearandconsistentrepresentation,itthen
proceeded to conclude that the representation was not authorised because a
consulate is not an organ which is competent to bind a State; it is not given
responsibility to bind the State internationally on such affairs. Thus, the Court
concluded that as the representation of theConsulGeneral ofGuatemalawasnot
authorised,itdidnotgiverisetoanestoppel.102
Similarly, in the Gulf ofMaine case,103 the Court held that although a clear and
consistent representation was present, a midlevel government official 104 the
Assistant Director for Lands and Minerals of the United States Bureau of Land
Managementhadnoauthoritytodefineinternationalboundariesortakeaposition
on behalf of his Government on foreign claims in this field. 105 The Court thus
concluded that the Assistant Director was not competent to bind the State and
thereforehis representation, although clear and consistent,didnotgive rise to an
estoppel.
99 LegalStatusofEasternGreenland,71.100 SeealsoBowett,aboven9,192.Cf.Martin,aboven9,160.101 (LiechtensteinvGuatemala)(SecondPhase)[1955]ICJRep4.102 Ibid1718.103 DelimitationoftheMaritimeBoundaryintheGulfofMaineArea(CanadavUnitedStatesof
America)[1984]ICJRep246(GulfofMaine).104 Ibid306.105 Ibid307.
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Inadditiontobeingauthorised,arepresentationmustalsobeunconditional.Inthe
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, Norway argued that her representation to
DenmarkwasconditionalonDanishcooperationonaseparateissueofsovereignty
over the Spitsbergen Island. 106 The Court held, however, that the Norwegian
representation was unconditional because it was not made in the course of
negotiations.107However, the Court suggested that had the above argumentbeen
successful,noestoppelwouldhavearisen.108
Inconclusion,thiselementofestoppeliscleartheCourthasconsistentlyheldthata
representationmustbeauthorisedandunconditionaltogiverisetoanestoppel.
TheCourthasalso consistentlyapplied the respective test foreach requirement:a
representation isauthorised if theorganmaking therepresentation iscompetent to
bind the State, while a representation is unconditional if it is made outside of
negotiationsandisnotsubjecttoexpressconditions.Attentionmustnowturntothe
thirdandfinalelementofestoppelreliance.
RelianceThefinalelementoftheprincipleisthatthepartyclaimingestoppelmusthaverelied
ontherepresentation.109TheCourthasnotbeenconsistentinholdingwhetheraState
must have suffered detriment as a result of its reliance; it is unclear whether
detrimentalrelianceisrequiredforanestoppeltoarise.
ThePrerequisiteofDetrimentMostdecisions support theproposition that for an estoppel to arise, apartymust
showthatithastakendistinctactsinrelianceontheotherpartysstatementeitherto
itsdetrimentortotheothersadvantage.110Thesedecisionsalltakeabroadviewof
detrimentalreliance;aStatethatsufferednodirectharmcanstillinvokeestoppelby
virtueofthebenefitgainedbytheotherState.111
IntheSerbianLoanscase,theCourtheldthatnosufficientbasishasbeenshownfor
applyingthisprinciple[ofestoppel]astherehasbeennochangeinpositiononthe
106 LegalStatusofEasternGreenland,88.107 Ibid8890.108 Ibid88.109 See,eg,NorthSeaContinentalShelf,25.110 TempleofPreahVihear,63(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice);NorthSeaContinental
Shelf,26.ThispassagehasbeencitedwithapprovalinLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontier
Dispute(ElSalvadorvHonduras)(ApplicationbyNicaraguatoIntervene)[1990]ICJRep3,118;
SovereigntyOverPedraBranca,[228].111 See,eg,TempleofPreahVihear,63(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).
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partofthedebtorState.112IntheNorthSeaContinentalShelfcase,theCourtstatedthat
theconductoftheFederalRepublicofGermanymusthavecausedDenmarkorthe
Netherlands,inrelianceonsuchconduct,detrimentallytochangepositionorsuffer
someprejudice.113
In the Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and againstNicaragua case, the Court
observed thata representation, in the formof conduct,musthave causedanother
StateorStates,inrelianceonsuchconduct,detrimentallytochangepositionorsuffer
somedetriment114togiverise toanestoppel.Further, in theBarcelonaTractionLight
and Power Co case, the Court refused to uphold the Spanish estoppel argument
becausenodetrimentalreliancewasestablished;theCourtwasnotabletoholdthat
anytrueprejudicewassufferedbytheRespondent.115
Thisviewwasendorsed intheLand,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDisputecase,where
theCourtobservedthatforanestoppeltoarise,apartymustrelyonanotherpartys
representationtohisdetrimentortotheadvantageofthepartymakingit.116Inthe
LandandMaritimeBoundarybetweenCameroonandNigeriacase,theCourtheldthatan
estoppelwouldonlyarisewhereaState, inrelianceonarepresentationofanother,
hadchangedpositiontoitsowndetrimentorhadsufferedsomeprejudice.117
In the Temple ofPreahVihear case, themajority held that detrimental reliancewas
required to invoke estoppel. In particular, themajority held thatCambodia could
invoke estoppelby virtue of thebenefit gainedby Thailand,whichwas a stablefrontierwithCambodia.118JudgeFitzmaurice,inhisseparateopinion,arguedthatthe
essentialconditionoftheoperationofestoppelwasthat:
[t]he party invoking the rule must have relied upon the statements or
conduct of the other party, either to its own detriment or to the others
advantage.119
DissentingJudges Koo and Fitzmaurice also supported this view, although they
questioned its application on the facts.Judge Koo argued that the legalbasis of
estoppelwas
that
one
party
has
relied
on
the
statement
or
conduct
of
the
other
either
to itsowndetrimentor to theothersadvantage.120JudgeSpenderheld thataState
112 SerbianLoans,39113 [1969]ICJRep4,26.114. (NicaraguavUnitedStatesofAmerica)(Jurisdiction)[1984]ICJRep392,414.115 BarcelonaTractionLightandPowerCo,25.116 (ElSalvadorvHonduras)(ApplicationbyNicaraguatoIntervene)[1990]ICJRep3,118.117 (CameroonvNigeria)(Merits)[1998]ICJ275,304.118 TempleofPreahVihear,32.119 Ibid63(SeparateOpinionofJudgeFitzmaurice).120 Ibid97(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo).
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claimingestoppelmusthavebeenprejudicedortheStatemakingtherepresentation
musthavesecuredsomebenefitoradvantageforitself.121
These cases, therefore, unequivocally show that detrimental reliance must beestablishedforanestoppeltoarise.
EstoppelwithoutDetrimentalRelianceWhilerequiringdetrimentalrelianceinsomecases,theCourthasheldinothersthat
detrimentalrelianceisnotrequiredforanestoppeltoarise.
In theLegalStatusofEasternGreenlandcase, theCourtheld thatNorwaywasbound
by theverbalassurancegivenby theNorwegianMinisterofForeignAffairs tohis
Danishcounterpart.Initsjudgment,theCourtimpliedthatdetrimentalreliancewas
notrequiredforanestoppeltoarise.122
Onecommentatorisoftheview,however,thatdetrimentalreliancewasrequiredin
thecasebecausethere
canbe no doubt that the Court was impressedby the fact that Denmark,
relying on Norways unilateral promise of noninterference, thereafter
proceededtoexecuteplansandprojectsforitsremotecolony.123
This, however, is confusing reliance with detrimental reliance. Reliance does not
alwayslead
to
adetriment
aState
must
be
worse
off
in
amaterial
way
from
its
reliance.ThisobservationwasmadeintheBarcelonaTractionLightandPowerCocase,
wheretheCourtheldthatSpaindidrelyontheBelgianrepresentation,butindoing
so,itsufferednomaterialprejudice.124
The same canbe said for the Danish claim.Although Denmark did rely on the
Norwegian representation, it suffered no prejudice. This interpretation of the
judgment is supported by Professor Higgins, who observes that in this case,
detrimental reliance is distinct from the assumption of legal obligation 125 and
concludesthatdetrimentalreliancewasnotrequiredbytheCourt.LordMcNairalso
121 Ibid1434(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).122 LegalStatusofEasternGreenland,701.AlthoughtheCourtupheldtheDanishclaimwithout
requiringdetrimentalreliance,Denmarkarguedinitspleadingsthatdetrimentalreliance
wasrequiredforanestoppeltoarise,andthatthisrequirementwassatisfiedonthefacts.
SeeLegalStatusofEasternGreenland(DenmarkvNorway)(Merits)[1933]PCIJ(serC)No63,
843.123 Franck,aboven53,617.124 (BelgiumvSpain)(Judgment)[1964]ICJRep4,267.125 DameRosalynHiggins,ProblemsandProcess(1994)36.
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supportsthisviewheconcludesthatthecaseshowsthatdetrimentalrelianceisnot
requiredforestoppeltooperate.126
IntheArbitralAward
Made
by
the
King
of
Spain,themajorityobservedthatanestoppel
was established Nicaraguawasboundby its declarationwhich recognised the
AwardoftheKingofSpainasvalid.127However,onthefacts,Hondurassufferedno
detrimentfrom itsrelianceon theNicaraguanrepresentation.128Therefore, itcanbe
concluded that actual harm was not demanded by the Court. Judge Holguin,
appointedadhocbyNicaragua,criticisedthis,arguinginhisdissentthatnoestoppel
wasestablishedbecauseHondurasdidnotsufferanydetrimentfromitsreliance.129
IntheNuclearTestscase,theCourtheldthatdetrimentalreliancewasnotrequiredto
establishestoppel.TheCourtobserved thatneithera subsequentacceptanceof the
declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the
declaration130tocreateanestoppel.Consequently,Francewasestoppedfromgoing
back on its representations, even thoughAustralia suffered nodetriment from its
reliance. 131 Therefore, in effect, the Court accepted an estoppel claim without
requiringthattheStateinvokingitsufferanydetrimentorharm.132Inthethreecases
discussed above, detrimental reliance was not required to establish estoppel. 133
Therefore, the foregoing analysis illustrates thatjudicial decisions are divided on
whether detrimental reliance really is required for estoppels to operate;134 some
casessupporttheneedfordetrimentalreliance,whilstothercasessuggestotherwise.
126 McNair,aboven13,487.SeealsoChristianDominice,Aproposduprincipedelestoppel
endroitdesgens,inRecuieldEtudesdeDroitInternationalEnHommageaPaulGuggenheim
(1968)327.127 ArbitralAwardMadebytheKingofSpain,209.128 Ibid.SeealsoBrown,aboven10,391.129 Ibid222(DissentingOpinionofJudgeHolguin).130 (AustraliavFrance)(Merits)[1974]ICJRep253,267.131 Cf.KrzysztofSkubiszewski,UnilateralActsofStatesinMohammedBedjaoui(ed),
InternationalLaw:AchievementsandProspects(1991)236,whoisoftheviewthatrelianceper
sewasnotrequiredinNuclearTests.132 SeeBrown,aboven10,409.133 TheNottebohmCase(LiechtensteinvGuatemala)(SecondPhase)[1955]ICJRep4doesnotyield
itselftoeasyclassification.TheCourtdismissedtheestoppelargumentofLiechtenstein
withoutelaboratingonwhetherdetrimentalreliancewasrequired.However,onthe
pleadings,Liechtenstein,theStateclaimingestoppel,arguedthatMrNottebohmdidsuffer
detriment,andthisassertionwasnotcontestedbyGuatemalainherpleadings.See
NottebohmCase(LiechtensteinvGuatemala)(SecondPhase)[1955]ICJPleadings393.134 Higgins,aboven125,36.
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Some commentators, however, suggest that there is no inconsistency in the cases
discussedinthissection.135Attentionnowturnstotheirarguments.
AJustificationforthisInconsistency?Some commentators deny that there is an inconsistency in the treatment of
detrimentalrelianceinthecasesoutlinedearlierinthissection.136Theyjustifythisby
observingthatthereareactuallytwoseparateprinciplesatworkinthesecases;that
ofestoppelandthatofabindingunilateralundertaking.137Detrimentalrelianceisa
prerequisitefortheformer,butisnotrequiredinthelatter.138
Thisproposedapproachisattractive.Itseparatesthecasesdiscussedpreviouslyinto
twocategoriesthoserequiringdetrimentalrelianceandthosethatdonot.Casesnot
requiringdetrimentalreliancecouldbeexcludedfromfurtheranalysisastheyarenotbased on estoppel beingbased on a separate principle of abinding unilateral
undertakingandarethereforebeyondthescopeofthisstudy.Onewouldthenbe
leftwithestoppelcasesthatunanimouslysupporttheviewthatdetrimentalreliance
isrequiredandtherewouldbenoinconsistencyinthiselement.
Althoughattractive,thisapproachisbasedonfictionithasnojudicialsupportand
itstheoreticaljustificationsareflawed.139Abindingunilateralundertakingisbinding
because of estoppel.140Therefore, it is nothing less than estoppel shorn of its
relianceanddetrimentelements.141
The Court has not confirmed that abinding unilateral undertaking is a separate
principle to estoppel. There are nojudicial discussions concerning the distinction
between estoppel and a binding unilateral undertaking.142 There is, however, an
135 Seebelown136.136 SeeSergioCarbone,PromiseinInternationalLaw:AConfirmationofitsBindingForce
(1975)1ItalianYearBookofInternationalLaw166;WilfriedFiedler,ZurVerbindlichkeit
eisetigerVersprechenimVolkerrecht(1976)19GermanYearBookofInternationalLaw35;
Cahier,aboven52,237;AdolfoMiajadelaMuela,Losactosunilateralesenlasrelacionesinternacionales(1968)3RevistaEspanoladederechointernacional429.
137 Termsbindingunilateralundertaking,bindingunilateralpromiseandbinding
unilateraldeclarationareusedinterchangeablyinextracurialliteratureonthissubject.138 See,eg,Carbone,aboven136,170.139 SeeJennings,aboven31,4254;MllerandCottier,aboven14,120.140 Wagner,aboven23,1788.141 Brown,aboven10,410.142 Cf.SovereigntyOverPedraBranca,[228],[229],wheretheCourt,forthefirsttime,considered
aclaimofestoppelandaclaimofabindingunilateralundertakingseparatelyinthesame
judgment.Theanalysiswassobrief,however,thatnotangibleconclusionscanbedrawn
abouttherelationshipbetweenthetwoconcepts.
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observationmadebytheCourtintheNuclearTestscasethattheprincipleofbinding
unilateralundertakingiswellrecognized.143Itisdifficulttoseehowthisisso,when
theCourtprovidednoauthoritytosupportthisclaimanditspriordecisionsreveal
no consensus supporting a rule asserting an international obligation tobe
createdbyaunilateraldeclarationutteredpubliclyandwithan intent tobe
bound,intheabsenceofanaffirmativereactionfromotherStates.144
Giventhislackofjudicialsupport,howdoproponentsjustifytheviewthatabinding
unilateralundertakingisaseparateprinciplefromestoppel?
ProfessorJacqueargues that the twoprinciplesestoppelandabindingunilateral
undertaking differ in theory. 145 He explains that estoppel develops from the
meaninggiven
to
acts
or
promises
by
the
party
invoking
the
estoppel
whereas
a
binding unilateral undertaking depends on the intention of the promisor. 146 He
proceeds to argue that both principles apply subjective tests of intention of the
parties, although estoppel does thisby focusing on the party invoking estoppel,
whereasbindingunilateralundertakingsfocusonthepromisor.147
ThisdistinctionisinconsistentwiththeCourtsdecisionintheNuclearTestscase.The
Court made it clear that the sole relevant question is whether the language
employed inanygivendeclarationdoesrevealaclear intention.148Thisfocus isnot
ontheintentionoftheStatemakingthedeclarationbutonanobjectiveinterpretation
ofthewordsofthedeclarationitself.149
Furthermore, in the context of the explanationproposedbyProfessorJacque, it is
difficulttoimaginearepresentationthatwouldgiverisetoanestoppelbutnottoa
bindingunilateralundertaking. Inapossibleattempt toexplain this,oneauthority
suggests thatwhen properlyanalysed,detrimentalrelianceseemsmorerelevantto
estoppelthantothebindingnatureoftheunilateralact.Aunilateralactiseitherbinding
or not.150 It is unclear, however, how a declaration that gives rise to a binding
unilateralundertaking,wouldnotalsogiverisetoanestoppel.Giventhatthefocus
inboth ison theobjective interpretationof thedeclaration itself, the resultwould
143 NuclearTests267.144 Rubin,aboven57,8.145 JeanPaulJacque,AProposdelaPromesseUnilateraleinPaulReuter(ed),LeDroit
International:UniteetDiversite(1981)32739.SeealsoFiedler,aboven136,702.146 Jacque,aboven145,327.(Authorstranslationoforiginaltext).147 Ibid328.148 NuclearTests,268.Seeaboven56andaccompanyingtext.149 Ibid267.150 Higgins,aboven125,36(emphasisinoriginal).
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havetobethesameundereithertest.151Therefore,itseemsthatabindingunilateral
undertakingisnotaseparateprinciple;it isnothingmorethananestoppelwithout
its detrimental reliance requirement. Dr Brown agrees with this conclusion,
observingthattheeffortsofsomewriters
todistinguish estoppel fromunilateralpromise serveonly to show thevast
misunderstandings in this area of the law the court [in theNuclearTests
case], ineffect,acceptedapromissoryestoppel claimwithout requiring that
thepartyinvokingitsufferanydetrimentorharm.152
It is thus clear that the Court has not been consistent in determining whether
detrimental reliance must be established for an estoppel to arise. Conflicting
decisions cannot be explained by reference to a principle of binding unilateral
undertaking;thisinconsistencyiscausedbyanarbitraryapproachoftheCourttothequestionofwhetherdetrimentalrelianceisrequiredforanestoppeltoarise.
TheforegoinganalysishasarguedthattheapplicationofestoppelbytheCourthas
beensubjecttotwouncertainties.First,itisunclearunderwhatcircumstancessilence
gives rise toanestoppel; sometimes silence is conclusivewhileatother times it is
onlyofevidentiaryweight inestablishingestoppel.Secondly, it isunclearwhether
detrimentalreliance isrequiredforanestoppeltoarise;somecasessupportthisyet
othersdenytheneedfordetrimentalreliance.Judicialdecisionsontheseissueshave
beenarbitrary
and
ad
hoc
they
cannot
be
reconciled.
The
next
part
of
the
paper
examinestheimpactoftheseinconsistencies,andconsidershowtheyshouldbedealt
withbytheCourt.
AnendtoinconsistencyThispartof thepaper considers theway forward for theCourt. It argues that the
inconsistencies established in the preceding part should not remain, as they
undermine theperceptionofStates as to theprobityof theCourt and create legal
uncertainty.
Article 59 of the Statuteof the InternationalCourtofJustice (the Statute) states that
decisions of the Court have nobinding force exceptbetween the parties and in
respectofthatparticularcase.153Nevertheless,despiteanabsenceofstaredecisis,the
151 SeeKoskenniemi,aboven53,348.152 Brown,aboven10,408.153 StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeart59.Article59oftheStatuteisidenticaltoArticle
59oftheStatuteofthePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice.Foranexaminationofdebates
betweenjuristsontheAdvisoryCommitteepreparingtheStatuteofthePermanentCourtof
InternationalJustice,seeespeciallyPermanentCourtofInternationalJusticeAdvisory
CommitteeofJurists,ProcsVerbauxoftheProceedingsoftheCommittee(1920)332,336.
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Courtdoesexamineitspreviousdecisionsandtakesthemintoaccountwhenseeking
the solution to adispute.154Even though aparticulardetermination of law is only
formallybindingonthepartiesbeforeit,theCourtwill invariably,inthecourseof
makingsuchadetermination, invokepreviousjurisprudenceanddictapertinent to
thepresentfacts.155
Given that theCourt almost always takesprevious decisions into account,156it is
thus imperative for the Court tomaintainjudicial consistency.157This isbecause
intellectualcoherenceandconsistencyisthecornerstoneofcontinuingrespect158for
thejurisprudenceoftheCourt.Furthermore,thesuccessoftheCourtisdependentto
a large degree upon its reputation for impartial adjudication, 159 and judicial
consistencyisthemostobviousmeansofavoidingaccusationsofbias.160SirRobert
Jenningsemphasisesthis,byobservingthatjudicialinconsistencyisacircumstancewhich must be a discouragement if not even a deterrent to governments
contemplating international litigation.161Therefore, inconsistent decisions, such as
thoseregardingestoppel,affecttheperceptionsofstatesmenastotheprobityofthe
Court,aswellasthewillingnessofStatestoreferrealcasestoit.162
Furthermore,judicialconsistencyprovides somedegreeofcertaintyas towhat
the law is on a particular issue. 163 Thus, inconsistent decisions create legal
uncertainty.This in turnundermines the value of international law as a guide to
futureStateconduct.164
154 SeeRebeccaWallace,InternationalLaw(2005)26.155 Higgins,aboven125,202.156 MichaelAkehurst,AModernIntroductiontoInternationalLaw(6thed,1993)150.157 Brownlie,n3,21.SeealsoJHWVerzijl,InternationalLawinHistoricalPerspective(1976)526.158 Higgins,aboven125,202.159 SeeThomasHensley,NationalBiasandtheInternationalCourtofJustice(1968)12
MidwestJournalofPoliticalScience568,568.160 PeterMalanczuk,AkehurstsModernIntroductiontoInternationalLaw(6thed,1997)53.
AccusationsofbiasarenotinfrequentagainsttheCourt.See,eg,EricPosnerandMiguelde
Figueiredo,IstheInternationalCourtofJusticeBiased?34JournalofLegalStudies189.161 RobertJennings,WhatIsInternationalLawAndHowDoWeTellItWhenWeSeeIt?
(1981)37AnnuaireSuissedeDroitInternational59,60.162 Rubin,aboven57,1.163 Wallace,aboven154,26.SeealsoOscarSchachter,InternationalLawinTheoryandPractice
(1991)40.JohnHenryMerrymanandRogelioPerezPerdomo,TheCivilLawTradition:An
IntroductiontotheLegalSystemsofEuropeandLatinAmerica(3rded,2007)arguethatthis
propositionistrueforalllegalsystems:at48.164 LungchuChen,AnIntroductiontoContemporaryInternationalLaw:APolicyOriented
Perspective(1989)85.
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Article38(1)(d)oftheStatutereferstojudicialdecisionsassubsidiarymeansforthe
determination of rules of law. 165 However, far from being treated as such, the
judgments of the Court are treated as authoritative pronouncements upon the
currentstateof international law.166ProfessorParryobserves that thejudgmentsof
theCourtareconsideredhighlypersuasiveastopropositionsofinternationallaw.167
Professor Sohn agrees with this view, arguing that decisions of the Court are
consideredasrecognizedmanifestationsofinternationallaw.168
Given thatthejudgmentsof theCourtare indeedauthoritativepronouncementson
thestateofinternationallaw,169itisreasonabletoexpectthatStateswillrefertothem
forguidancewhenevertheyconsiderthepossibilityofissuingadeclarationoffuture
policy170orembarkingonagivencourseofaction.171
165 StatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeart38(1)(d).AlthoughArticle38(1)oftheStatuteis
expressedintermsofthefunctionoftheCourt,itisgenerallyregardedasacomplete
statementofthesourcesofinternationallaw.SeeBrownlie,n3,19;JenningsandWatts
(eds),aboven24,514.Article38(1)oftheStatuteisbasedonArticle38oftheStatuteofthe
PermanentCourtofInternationalJustice.166 Higgins,aboven125,202.SeealsoGeraldFitzmaurice,SomeProblemsRegardingthe
FormalSourcesofInternationalLawinBaronFredrikMarivanAsbeck(ed),Symbolae
Verzijil(1958)153.167 CliveParry,TheSourcesandEvidencesofInternationalLaw(1965)91.SeealsoFitzmaurice,
SomeProblemsRegardingtheFormalSourcesofInternationalLaw,aboven166,172;
Sinclair,aboven58,116;Schachter,aboven163,39.168 LouisSohn,TheDevelopmentoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations:PresentStatein
MaartenBos(ed),ThePresentStateofInternationalLawandOtherEssaysWritteninHonourof
theCentenaryCelebrationoftheInternationalLawAssociation18731973(1973)59.The
PermanentCourtofInternationalJusticehadsimilarinfluenceduringthetimeofits
operation(192042),notwithstandingthattheCovenantoftheLeagueofNationsart2didnot
enumerateitamongtheorgansoftheLeagueofNations.See,eg,ManleyHudson,The
PermanentCourtofInternationalJustice19201942(1943)11112.169 Higgins,aboven125,202.SeealsoMalcolmShaw,InternationalLaw(2003);Godefridus
Hoof,RethinkingtheSourcesofInternationalLaw(1983)171;SamMuller,DavidRai and
HannahThurnszky(eds),TheInternationalCourtofJustice:ItsFutureRoleafterFiftyYears
(1996)17;MuhammadNawaz,OtherSourcesofInternationalLaw:AreJudicialDecisions
oftheInternationalCourtOfJusticeaSourceofInternationalLaw?(1979)19IndianJournal
ofInternationalLaw526.Cf.LouisHenkin,InternationalLaw:CasesandMaterials(2nded,
1987)whoisoftheviewthatdecisionsoftheCourtareonlyapersuasiveauthorityof
existinginternationallaw:at107(emphasisadded).170 Rubin,aboven57.SeegenerallyConstanzeSchulte,CompliancewithDecisionsofthe
InternationalCourtofJustice(2005)ch4.171 ThequestionofwhetherStatesdorefertodecisionsoftheCourtforguidanceontheir
futureconductisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.SeeLouisHenkin,HowNationsBehave(2nd
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Inconsistentdecisions thusmake itdifficult, ifnot impossible,forStates toconduct
theiraffairsinconformitywithprevailinglaw.Thiseffectivelyunderminesthevalue
of international law as a guide to future State conduct.172Stateswould thus have
fewer reservations about failing to abideby their representations. Consequently,
cooperationbetweenStateswouldbeplaguedbygreatercautionandmistrust.This
willaddfurtherinstabilityandinsecuritytointernationalrelations.
It is therefore imperative for the Court to confront these inconsistencies. As
[e]stoppelisaconceptinevolution173inthejurisprudenceoftheCourt,suggestions
arenowmadeastohowthisevolutionshouldprogress.Inparticular,thefollowing
sections argue that silence should only be given evidentiary weight and that
detrimentalrelianceshouldberequiredforanestoppeltoarise.
ThedrawbacksofaconclusiveviewofsilenceTheCourtshouldnotgivesilenceconclusiveweight.Otherwise,itwillbegivingthe
State claiming estoppel an unfair advantage and creating other undesirable
consequences.
AStatemaybesilentinlightofanadverseclaimagainstitforanumberofreasons.
First, fordiplomatic reasons, itmayprefer to letadispute liedormant fora time.
Secondly,itmaynotbeawareofanadverseclaimagainstit.Finally,itmightassume
thatthereisnoneedtoprotest.AconclusiveviewofsilencegivestheStateclaimingestoppelanunfairadvantageineachcase.
AStatemayabstainfromprotesttoretaintepidrelationswithanotherState.174Oneof
the reasons why Thailand did not officially protest the Cambodian claim of
sovereigntyovertheTemple intheTempleofPreahVihearcasewasthatThailand, in
thewords ofPrincessPhunPhitsamaiDiskul, only gave the French an excuse to
ed,1979)47;EdithBrownandHaroldJacobson(ed)EngagingCountries:CompliancewithInternationalEnvironmentalAgreements(1998);BethSimmons,Compliancewith
InternationalAgreements(1998)1AnnualReviewofPoliticalScience75;RogerFisher,
BringingLawtoBearonGovernments(1961)74HarvardLawReview1130;JackGoldsmith
andEricPosner,DoInternationalNormsInfluenceStateBehavior?TheLimitsofInternational
Law(2005).172 Generallysee,eg,JohnBraithwaite,RulesandPrinciples:ATheoryofLegalCertainty
(2002)27AustralianJournalofLegalPhilosophy47.173 MllerandCottier,aboven14,116.174 SeeTempleofPreahVihear,85(DissentingOpinionofJudgeKoo);MaritimeDelimitationin
theAreabetweenGreenlandandJanMayen(DenmarkvNorway)(Merits)[1993]ICJRep38,53
4.
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seizemore territoryby protesting.175When observed in light of historic relations
betweenThailandandFranceatthetime,176thePrincesssexplanationseemsnatural
andreasonable.177
It is reasonable for a State towithhold from protest so that it does not provoke
another.Bynottakingthisintoaccount indecidingwhethersilencegivesrisetoan
estoppel, a relatively weak State, with no desire to antagonize a powerful
neighbour,isataconsiderabledisadvantageifitfindsitselfinapositiontoasserta
rightlater.178
ThiscanextendtocasesnotasextremeasthatofThailandandFranceintheTempleof
Preah Vihear case a current disputebetween China and India will serve as an
example.IndiacurrentlyclaimssovereigntyovertheAksaiChinregionwhichChina
has been administering since the SinoIndian War. 179 India, however, has been
activelycooperatingwithChinaonvariouseconomic issueswhileabstaining from
protestover thisdispute.180It isclearlynot Indias intention toconcede thedispute
overtheAksaiChinregionitstemporarylackofprotestismostlikelyafunctionof
its aim to furtherdiplomaticprogress onother fronts.However, theCourtwould
cometoanoppositeconclusionifitappliestheconclusiveviewofsilence.
Secondly,aStatemaynotprotestbecauseitisnotawareofanadverseclaimagainst
it.Statesare agglomerationsofmanyorganseachofwhich ismadeupofmany
individuals.181This leads to theobviousdifficulty thataStatedoesnotnecessarily
175 TempleofPreahVihear(CambodiavThailand)(WrittenPleadingsofThailand)[1962]ICJRep
401.176 CambodiawasaprotectorateoftheFrenchcolonialempirefrom1887to1954.See,
generally,JohnTully,FranceontheMekong:AHistoryoftheProtectorateinCambodia(2002).177 GMKelly,TheTempleCaseinHistoricalPerspective(1963)39BritishYearBookof
InternationalLaw462,465.SeealsoTempleofPreahVihear,91(DissentingOpinionofJudge
Koo).178 AtheneMunkman,AdjudicationandAdjustmentInternationalJudicialDecisionsand
theSettlementofTerritorialandBoundaryDisputes(1972)46BritishYearBookofInternationalLaw1,97.
179 TheSinoIndianWarwasfoughtin1962.See,generally,ChihLu,TheSinoIndianBorder
Dispute:ALegalStudy(1986)180 Forexample,inJanuary2006bothStatessignedtheMemorandumforEnhancing
CooperationintheFieldofOilandNaturalGaswhichallowsforjointSinoIndianbidsfor
energyassetsinotherStates.SeeChina,IndiaSignEnergyAgreement,ChinaDaily
(Beijing),13January2006,3.ForSinoIndiancooperationonotherissues,see,eg,Nancy
Jetly,SinoIndianRelations:OldLegaciesandNewVistas(1994)30ChinaReport215;John
Lancaster,India,ChinaHopingtoReshapetheWorldTogether,WashingtonPost
(Washington),12April2005,16.181 Munkman,aboven178,97.
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speakwiththeonevoiceatthesametime.IntheFisheriesCase,forexample,Judge
Reid observed that the information available to the United Kingdom revealed
contradictions in the system of delimitation usedbyNorway.182In such cases, no
simple, tidy estoppels can really be made out.183 Inferences drawn from silence
become excessively subjective; they can no longer be assumed to be accurate
representations of the attitude of the State. Such situations, therefore, require a
weighingof the activities andpositions takenby the claimants;184they requirean
evidentiaryviewofsilence.Otherwise,theCourtwouldreachconclusionswhich,as
was argued in the Temple of Preah Vihear case by Judge Spender, would be
inconsistentwiththefactsincontrovertiblyestablishedbytheevidence.185
Finally, a Statemight not see the need to protest the claim of another State if it
assumes that itsconductsufficiently illustrates itsattitudeonagivendispute.Thisassertion can be exploredby examining an ongoing disputebetweenJapan and
RussiaoversovereigntyovertheKurilIslands.TheIslandshavebeenunderRussian
administrationand control forover sixdecades.186Japan,however, contends that it
shouldhavesovereigntyovertheIslandsastheywere improperlyseizedbyRussia
aftertheendofWorldWarTwo.187In2005,theMinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan
releasedapamphlet thatstated that theIslands are inherent territoriesofJapan.188
Todate,Russiahasnotofficiallyrespondedtothispamphlet.Undertheconclusive
view of silence, Russia would be estopped from claiming sovereignty over the
Islandsbecause it failed toprotest theJapanese assertions in thepamphlet,whichcreated circumstances that called for an official reaction fromRussian authorities.
This, however, wouldbe an unjust result by occupying and administering the
Islands, the Russian authorities, in effect, are protesting the Japanese claims of
sovereigntyovertheIslands.
182 FisheriesCase,200(DissentingOpinionofJudgeReid).183 Munkman,aboven178,99.184 Rubin,aboven57,10.185 TempleofPreahVihear,109(DissentingOpinionofJudgeSpender).186 See,generally,SeokwooLeeetal,TowardsaFrameworkfortheResolutionofthe
TerritorialDisputeovertheKurileIslands(2001)3InternationalBoundariesResearchUnit
Boundary&TerritoryBriefings1;YakovZinberg,TheKurilIslandsDispute:TowardsDual
Sovereignty(1998)5BoundaryandSecurityBulletin89.187 MinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan,ThePositionoftheJapaneseGovernmentontheNorthern
TerritorialIssue(1965)45.SeealsoYutakaOkuyama,ThedisputeovertheKurileIslands
betweenRussiaandJapaninthe1990s(2003)76PacificAffairs37.188 MinistryofForeignAffairsofJapan,JapansNorthernTerritories:ForaRelationshipof
GenuineTrust(PressRelease,8March2005)2.
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FurthertogivingtheStateclaimingestoppelanunfairadvantage,aconclusiveview
ofsilenceputsanemphasison inactionandprotestaspartofStateconduct,rather
than objective and clear conducts 189 , which leads to undesirable practical
consequences.Givingsilenceconclusiveweightistoputahighpremiumonconstant
andvigorousprotest.ItcreatesasituationinwhichStatesarecompelledtobecome
exceptionallytouchyininternationalrelations,perusingeachothersstatutebooks
andputtingoutreservationsoftheirpositiononeveryconceivableoccasion190infear
of an estoppel arising against them. This is likely to lead to a barrage of State
declarations,moreakintomediareleases,thesolepurposeofwhichistoprotectthe
Statefromanadverseestoppelarising.Thisisunlikelytoencouragecooperationon
issuesindispute;itonlyfuelstheneedtoprotestandrewardsvigorousvindication.
JudgeAlfaro,whoadoptedtheconclusiveviewofsilenceintheTempleof
Preah
Vihear
case,observedthatestoppelis
rootedinthenecessityofavoidingcontroversiesasamatterofpublicpolicy
Bycondemninginconsistencyagreatdealoflitigation isliabletobeavoided
and the element of friendship and cooperation is strengthened in the
internationalcommunity.191
ItisdifficulttoseehowthiscanbeachievedbyencouragingStatestoprotest.Infact,
it seems the effectwouldbe quite the opposite therewillbe less emphasis on
cooperationin
the
resolution
of
disputes
and
greater
emphasis
on
alitigious
outcome.Thisshiftinfocuswouldbeinimicaltoplacidinternationalrelations.
Therefore,anestoppelarisingfromsilencealoneshouldnotbeeasilypresumed.The
Court should examine the surrounding circumstances in which the silence was
maintained,devoidofanyjurisetdejurepresumptions,when consideringwhether
silenceshouldgiverisetoanestoppel.
TheneedfordetrimentalrelianceTheCourt should only allow an estoppel to arise ifdetrimental reliancehasbeen
established.An estoppelwithoutdetriment isnotwell grounded in theory and is
undesirableasamatterofpolicy.
189 NunoSergioMarquesAntunes,RachaelBradleyandCliveSchofield,Estoppel,
AcquiescenceandRecognitioninTerritorialandBoundaryDisputeSettlement(2000)2
InternationalBoundariesResearchUnitBoundary&TerritoryBriefings1,35.190 DavidJohnson,InternationalCourtofJustice.JudgmentsofMay26,1961,andJune15,
1962.TheCaseconcerningtheTempleofPreahVihear(1962)11Internationaland
ComparativeLawQuarterly1183,12034.191 TempleofPreahVihear,42(SeparateOpinionofJudgeAlfaro).
30
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The principle of estoppel that one should not benefit from his or her own
inconsistency192stemsfromfundamentalnotionsofjusticeandfairness,193whichare
almostuniversallycitedforestoppelininternationallaw.194Whatinjusticeiscaused
byaStategoingbackonarepresentationthatcausesnodetrimenttoanyone?Howis
itfairtoallowaStatetoclaimthatanother isestoppedwhenitisnotprejudicedin
anywayfromitsrelianceontherepresentation?
Detrimental reliance isan integralpartofestoppel. Prejudiceordetrimentarenot
simply addenda; they trigger the very justification 195 for estoppel in the
jurisprudenceoftheCourt.Therefore,asDrBrownargues,ifaStatecouldbebound
bythemereutteranceofapromiseorassurance,onecanonlyconcludethat,in
internationallaw,thetheoryofunilateralpromisewouldbeamodificationof
estoppelandthatthelattertheorywouldberenderedlargelyobsolete.196
Some have argued that this modification is justified under the overarching,
fundamental principle of good faith. 197 However, how can good faith justify an
esto
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