Download - Stephenson Keynote

7/30/2019 Stephenson Keynote

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Goodmorning.

ImgratefultotheKingdomofThailandsNationalAnti

CorruptionCommission,alongwiththeWorldBankand

TransparencyInternationalsThailandChapter,forinvitingme

toparticipateinthisconferenceandtoaddressyoutoday.The

topicofthisconferenceEvidenceBasedAntiCorruption

PoliciesisofvitalimportanceinThailandandaroundthe

world,andtheconferenceorganizershaveassembledatruly

remarkablegroupofexpertstodiscussthistopicoverthenext

twodays.Iamhonoredandhumbledtohavebeenincluded.

Indeed,thebreadthanddepthoftheexpertisereflectedbythe

groupofpeopleassembledinthisroomisbothinspiringand

daunting.

Itsinspiringbecauseitisareflectionofhowfarthe

internationalcommunityhascomeinfocusingsustainedattentionontheproblemofcorruption.Ofcourse,awareness

ofcorruptionasaproblemisnotnew.Indeed,itisancient.

Butitwasnotthatlongagothateventhougheverybodyknew

corruptionwasaproblem,itwasnotreallyatoppriorityinthe

internationaldevelopmentagenda,oracentralfocusof

academicresearchineconomicsorpoliticalscience.Thathasclearlychanged,andthisconferenceisareflectionofthat

change.


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Atthesametime,givenhowfarwehavecome,deliveringan

addresstoanaudiencelikethisisquiteadauntingtask,asI

fearthereslittleIcansaytoyouthatyoudontalreadyknow.

Still,myhopeisthatIcanusetheseremarkstoreflectonwhat

seemtometobesomeofthemoreinterestingdevelopments

andinsightsinthestudyofcorruption,andtosuggestsome

aspectsofthisproblemthatmightbenefitfromfurther

sustainedattentionbyexpertslikethoseinthisroom.

Letmestartwithsomebadnewsfirst.Corruption,asIm

sureyouknow,remainsahugeproblemthroughouttheworld.

Justhowmuchofaproblemisquitedifficulttosay,inpart

becauseaconsistentdefinitionofcorruptioniselusive,inpart

becausemeasuringtheamountofcorruption(howeveritis

defined)isextremelydifficult,andinpartbecausemeasuring

theadverseeffectsofcorruptionismoredifficultstill.

Butitisclearthatinmanycountriesincludingsomeofthe

poorestcountries,whereeffectivegovernmentismost

essentialofficialcorruptionisdeeplyembeddedinthefabric

ofnationallife,tothepointwhereitiswidelyaccepted,though

perhapsnotcondoned,asnormalratherthandeviant,

whatevertheformallawsmightsay.Suchpervasive,endemicpubliccorruptioncaninfectallaspectsofnationallifeand

officialconduct,fromthethousandsofpettybribesthatmust

bepaidforthemostbasicgovernmentservices,tothe


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willingnessofgovernmentofficialstotoleraterampantand

sociallydestructivelawbreakinginexchangeforillicitpayments

orotherfavors,tothehighestreachesofthestateandsociety,

whereunscrupulousnationalleaderstreatthestatetreasuryas

apersonalATM,extractingandexportingnationalwealthona

scalethatisbothbreathtakingandheartbreaking.

Thissortofpervasivecorruptionhasprovenincredibly

difficulttorootout,oreventocontain.Partoftheproblemis

thatcorruptioncangenerateanumberofrelatedvicious

circles,inwhichpervasivecorruptionbecomesaself

perpetuatingphenomenonthatisdeeplyresistanttochange.

Inotherwords,societiescanfindthemselvesstuckin

corruptiontrapsthataredifficulttoescape.

Onetypeofcorruptiontraphastodowiththetypeofperson

whochoosestopursueacareeringovernmentservice.Publiccorruptiontendstothrivewhendishonestpeopleenterpublic

life,andtorecedewhenhonestmenandwomenarepresentin

greaternumbers.Buthonestpeopleareattractedtoother

honestpeople,andtoworkperceivedashonest.Ifapublic

agencyisperceivedasabastionofcorruption,honestpeople

willavoidit,whiledishonestpeoplewhoviewpublicofficeasameansofaccruingpersonalwealthwillseekitout.This,of

course,meansthattheagencybecomesevenmorecorrupt.


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Perhapsevenmoreimportantly,thepervasivenessof

corruptionalsoaffectsthestrengthofthesocialnormsagainst

corruption.Mydescriptionamomentagoofhonestand

dishonestindividualswasanobviousoversimplification.

Mostpeopleareneithercompletelyhonestnorcompletely

dishonest.Mostpeoplearesomewhereinbetween,andtheir

perceptionofrightandwrongwillbeinfluencedbywhatother

peopledo.Ifveryfewpeopleinasocietyarecorrupt,then

corruptionwillbeperceivedasdeviantbehavior,andmost

normalpeoplewillavoiditthesamewaymostnormalpeople

dontshoplift.Ifcorruptioniswidespread,however,thenorms

againstcorruptionweaken,becauseoftheperception

everybodydoesit.Thisleadstofurthererosionofthenorm,

andhencemorecorruption.Again,theresultisaself

perpetuatingcycle.

Yetanotherwayinwhichcorruptioncanfeedonitselfhasto

dowiththeprobabilityofdetectionandpunishment.When

corruptionlevelsarerelativelylow,thenifthegovernment

devotesamodestamountofresourcestocorruption

investigationandprosecution,theoddsthatanyindividual

engagingincorruptionwillgetcaughtandpunishedarefairly

high.Thiswilltendtodetercorruption,thoughtherewill

alwaysbesomedishonestrisktakerswillingtobreaktherules.

Whencorruptionispervasive,however,evenifthegovernment

devotessubstantialresourcestoanticorruption,the


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probabilitythatanyoneindividualwillbepunishedfor

corruptionmayremainrelativelylow.Therearesimplytoo

manypotentialtargets,sothelikelihoodthatanyoneofthem

willenduppunishedisquitesmall.Thismeansthatdeterrence

isnotveryeffective,andcorruptionlevelscanremainquite

high.

Theseselfreinforcingdynamicsmeanthatpervasive

corruptioncanbeextraordinarilyhardtorootout.Pervasive

officialcorruptionleadsrelativelydishonestpeopletoselect

intopubliclife,erodesnormsagainstcorruption,andweakens

deterrence.Whenasocietyfindsitselfcaughtinthissortof

corruptiontrap,itcanbeverydifficulttoescape,particularly

throughincrementalmeasures.

Thatsthepessimisticversionofthestory.Buttheresa

moreoptimisticperspectiveonemighttake.ThemirrorimageofthesortofviciouscircleIjustdescribedisavirtuouscircle,in

whichrelativelylowlevelsofcorruptioncanbemaintained.Ifa

countrycanfindawaytogetpervasive,endemiccorruption

undercontrol,theninthelongtermkeepingcorruptionata

manageablelevelmaybeeasierthangettingtothatlevelinthe

firstplace.Oncewecangetpastthetippingpoint,oncecorruptionbecomesdeviantratherthanpervasive,thenmore

honestpeoplewillbeattractedtopublicservicecareers,norms

againstcorruptionbecomestronger,anddeterrencewillbe


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moreeffective.Thesevirtuouscircleswillhelptokeep

corruptionatrelativelylow.

Tobesure,theproblemwillnevergoaway.Thereisno

countryintheworldnottheUnitedStates,notSweden,not

Singaporethatdoesnothavesomeproblemwithcorruption.

Butthereisalsoreasontobelievethat,nomatterhow

intractabletheproblemappears,itspossibletocontainitand

keepitatmanageablelevels.

Andheressomemoregoodnews:Despitealltheproblemsandchallengesfacinganticorruptionefforts,theresstrong

evidencethatstraightforwardanticorruptionenforcement

audits,investigations,andcrediblesanctionscaninfactbe

effectiveinreducingcorruption.Ofcourse,thefactthat

monitoringandenforcementcanbeeffectiveinreducing

corruptionisperhapsnotallthatsurprising,butitsworthemphasizing.Sometimesrelativelysimpleandstraightforward

approaches,ifbackedbyresourcesandpoliticalcommitment,

canbequiteeffective,atleastindealingwithcertainkindsof

corruption.

Oneexampleofthedramaticeffectsofenforcementon

corruption,aswellashowenforcementinteractswithcultural

andotherfactors,comesfromoneofthemostentertaining

corruptionstudiesIknowof,aboutillegalparkingbyUnited

NationsdiplomatsinNewYorkCity.Heresthestory:Foryears,


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manyUNdiplomatsfloutedNewYorkCitysparking

regulations.Theywouldparkwherevertheywantedandthen

notpaythetickets,andtheNewYorkCitygovernmentwas

powerlesstodoanythingaboutitbecauseofdiplomatic

immunity.Thisisnotexactlycorruptionasmostpeople

conventionallyusetheterm,butitisaformofabuseofa

positionofpublicauthoritytheprivilegesofdiplomaticstatus

forpurelyprivategain:theabilitytoparkinaconvenientspot

evenifitimposescostsonothers.

Itturnedout,however,thattheparkingviolationrateswere

notconstantacrosscountries,oracrosstime.Firstofall,

diplomatsfromcountriesratedashighcorruptioncountriesby

TransparencyInternationaltendedtofloutNewYorksparking

lawsmuchmorefrequently,whilediplomatsfromlow

corruptioncountriestendedtofollowtherules,atleastfora

while.Thisseemslikeevidencethatcorruptbehaviorhasan

importantculturalorhabitualcomponent:afterall,allofthese

diplomatswereoperatinginthesamelegalenvironment,but

theyseemedtoexhibitattitudestowardtheobligationof

governmentofficialstofollowthelawthatmirrorthoseintheir

homecountries.

Furthermore,theratesofviolationforindividualdiplomats

changedovertime.Inparticular,thediplomatsfromlow

corruptioncountriesstartedtoviolateNewYorkparkinglaws


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morefrequentlythelongertheyhadbeenpostedinNewYork.

Thisissomethingofadepressingfinding.Onemighthave

hopedthattheoppositewouldhaveoccurred:onemighthave

hopedthatofficialsfromhighcorruptioncountrieswouldhave

absorbedtheculturalnormsoflawabidingbehaviorafter

havingbeenstationedintheUnitedStatesforawhile.Butthat

didnthappen.Rather,itseemsthatonceotherdiplomats

startedtorealizetheycouldbreaktherulesandgetawaywith

it,theystartedtodoso.Acultureofintegrity,itseems,can

eroderatherquicklyoncepeoplefigureoutthattherulesthat

theyhadbeenfollowingoutofhabitnolongerapplied.

Buttomethosearentreallythemoststrikingresultsofthe

study.Themoststrikingresultshavetodowithwhat

happenedaftertheexasperatedmayorofNewYorkreceived

permissionfromtheU.S.DepartmentofStatetostripthe

licenseplateandimpoundavehicleiftheregisteredownerwas

foundtohavemorethanthreeunpaidparkingtickets.Inother

words,NewYorkfoundawayaroundthediplomaticimmunity

problemandstartedenforcingitsparkinglaws.Sowhat

happenedafterthecitystartedimposingsignificantsanctions?

Ratesofviolationforalldiplomatsfromallcountries

plummetedquicklyandsubstantially.Again,thatsprobably

notsurprising.Butitsevidencethateffectiveenforcementcan

work,evenforatargetpopulationthathadalready


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demonstratedaculturalorhabitualpredispositiontoa

particularkindofcorruptbehavior.

Now,theresonlysomuchonecanlearnfromNewYorkCity

parkingticketsaboutthekindsofcorruptionthatareourmain

concern.TheNewYorkparkingstudyisclever,andfuntotalk

about,butquitelimitedinitsapplicability.Fortunately,theres

plentyofotherevidencefromavarietyofcountriesand

contextsthatshowshowsimple,straightforwardinvestigation

andenforcementcansignificantlyreducecorruptionlevels.

Forexample,researchersworkingwiththeIndonesian

governmentsdevelopmentagencyrecentlyconductedan

experimentinwhichanumberofruralvillagesweregiven

developmentfundsforbuildingroads.Someofthevillages,

randomlyselected,werealertedinadvancethattheirroad

projectswouldbeaudited;otherswerenot.Theresearcherstheninvestigatedtheextentofcorruptionintheprojects,and

foundthatthevillagesthatknewtheywouldfaceanaudithad

dramaticallylowercorruptionlevels.Itsnotjustthatthe

auditsthemselvesfoundlesscorruption.Rather,independent

evaluationsbytheoutsideresearchers,whichtookcore

samplesofthecompletedroadsandcomparedtheresultstothequantityofmaterialsthevillagereportedpurchasing,

verifiedthisresult.


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Inanotherstudy,awidelypublicizedcrackdownon

corruptioninArgentinadramaticallyreducedtheinflatedprices

thatpublichospitalshadbeenpayingforbasicsupplies.The

artificiallyhighpricesthattheyhadbeenpayingbeforethe

crackdownwerelikelyduetokickbackpaymentsfromthe

suppliers,andtheanticorruptioncrackdownsubstantially

curtailedthisbehavior.Andarecentstudyofanticorruptionin

theUnitedStatesfoundthatsimplyincreasingthenumberof

federalprosecutorsinagivenjurisdictionsignificantlyreduced

publiccorruptionlevels.

AsIsaid,thiscanbeviewedasgoodnews.Sometimes,the

moststraightforwardformsofanticorruptionmeasures

investigations,audits,andimpositionofsanctionscanhavea

realeffect.

Anadditionallessonthatseemstobeemergingfromresearchnotonlyonanticorruptionbutoncriminallaw

enforcementmoregenerallyisthatalthoughitsimportantto

havemeaningfulpenalties,itsmuchmoreimportanttohave

regular,consistent,timely,andpredictableenforcementof

anticorruptionrules.Thesefactorsseemtomattermuchmore

thanthemagnitudeofthepenalty,solongasthepenaltiesaresufficientlyhightobemeaningful.

Thisobservation,ifaccurate,isimportantforanticorruption

efforts,becauseonemighthavethoughtthatsolongasthe


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penaltiesforcorruptionweresufficientlydraconian,thenit

wouldntmatteriftheprobabilityofdetectingcorruptionwere

relativelylow.Indeed,ithassometimesbeensuggestedthat,

particularlyforgovernmentswithlimitedresources,itmakes

moresensetodeterunlawfulbehaviorthroughverysevere

punishmentsthanthroughextensiveenforcement.Afterall,

punishingafewpeopleisrelativelycheap,comparedto

investigatingandpunishingalotofthem.Andsomecountries

haveindeedemployedquiteseverepunishmentsfor

corruption.ThePeoplesRepublicofChinahasevenimposed

thedeathpenaltyinextremecases.

Butwhilesufficientlyseverepunishmentsmightworkif

everyonebehavedlikethesimplerationalagentsofclassical

economictheory,theavailableevidencefromseveralareasof

criminallawenforcementseemstoindicatethatalthoughthe

severityofthepunishmentdoesmatter,itdoesntmatter

nearlyasmuchastheprobabilitythatapunishmentwill

actuallybeimposedinatimelyfashion.Ifthatiscorrect,then

unfortunatelyonecannotmakeupforscantyenforcementwith

severesanctions.

Partofthereasonthattheprobabilityoftimelydetectionandpunishmentseemstomattersomuchmorethanthe

severityofthepunishmentisthatpeopletendtoignore


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entirelyeventsthathaveanextremelylowprobability,orthat

areunlikelytooccuruntilthedistantfuture.

Asecondandrelatedreasonthatconsistentandpredictable

enforcementmaybemoreimportantthanthemagnitudeof

thepenaltyisthatcorruptionpunishmentsworknotonly

throughtheirdeterrenteffect,butalsobyreinforcingsocial

normsagainstcorruption.Whencorruptactionsarepunished

onlyrarelynomatterhowseverelythepunishmentsseem

morelikerandombadluckforthetargets,ratherthanthe

legitimateconsequenceofviolatingasocialandlegalnorm.

Moreover,wheninvestigationandpunishmentareextremely

rare,itiseasierforthoseraresevereenforcementstobeseen

asdrivenbypolitics,orpersonalgrudges,orsomethingsimilar.

Aperceptionofconsistent,evenhandedenforcementofthe

lawisimportanteverywhere,andmaybeparticularlyimportantinanarealikeanticorruption.

Acloselyrelatedpointisthattheevidencesuggeststhatto

beeffective,anticorruptioneffortsneedtobesustained

steadilyovertime.Highprofileanticorruptioncrackdowns

cansometimesbeeffective,butinmanydifferentcountries

andcontextsthereisevidencethattheeffectofsuch

crackdownsisfleeting.Corruptofficialslearntotakethe

occasionalcrackdownaspartoflife,muchascriminalslearnto

laylowwhentheheatison:itsanannoyance,butnotareal


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disruption.Evenworse,acycleoftemporarycrackdowns,

followedbyareturntobusinessasusual,canbreedcynicism,

andfurthererodeorimpedenormsofanticorruption.

Takentogether,whatIwanttosuggestisthatthemost

effectiveanticorruptionenforcementeffortsarenot

necessarilythosethatmakethesplashiestheadlines,eitherin

theformofmajorcrackdownsoroccasionalhighprofile

prosecutions.Rather,themosteffectiveanticorruption

campaignsarelikelytobethosethatarebroadandsustained

thatis,thosethatachievethegreatestdegreeofconsistency

acrosstimeandacrosstargets.

Itsalittlebitlikelosingweight.Thereareallsortsoffad

diets,popularizedbysplashybooks,thatwillhelpyoulose

weightintheshortterm,butyougainitallbackwithinafew

months.Ultimately,toloseweighttheresnosubstituteforahealthybalanceddietandlotsofexercise,eventhoughthat

advicedoesntsellalotofbooks.Sotoo,agreatdealof

effectiveanticorruptionpolicyamountstothelaw

enforcementequivalentofabalanceddietandlotsofexercise:

regular,steady,consistentenforcementofpredictableand

legitimaterules,withsustainedpoliticalandfinancialsupport.Theresnothingmagicalaboutit,butitshardtosustain.

Anotherlessonthathasemergedfromthestudyandpractice

ofanticorruptionisthatsomeofthemostimportantfeatures


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ofanticorruptionstrategiesarenotdirectlyaboutcorruption

atall,butratheraboutotherfeaturesofthelegalorpolitical

systemthataffecttheprevalenceorseverityofofficial

corruption.

Oneobviousexample,whichhasgottenagreatdealof

deservedattentionfromscholarsandpolicymakers,concerns

theroleofthemediaandcivilsocietyincombatingcorruption.

Theimportanceofthemediaininvestigatinganddisclosing

corruptactivitieshasbeenwelldocumented.Atthehighestlevelofgenerality,crosscountrycomparisonsrevealastrong

negativerelationshipbetweenmeasuresofpressfreedomand

measuresofcorruption.Inotherwords,societiesthatare

ratedashavingarelativelyfreepresstendtohavelowerlevels

ofperceivedcorruption,whilecountrieswithlesspress

freedomseemtohaveabiggercorruptionproblem.

Thatcorrelationbyitselfmaynotbeallthatmeaningfulas

evidencethatafreepresscausesreductionsincorruption:Its

possiblethathighlycorruptsocietiestendtorestrictthepress,

orthatsomethirdfactor,suchaspovertyorauthoritarianism,

explainsbothcorruptionandrestraintsonthepress.

Buttheresconsiderablymoremicrolevelevidencethat

aggressivemediawatchdogscanmakeabigdifference.For

example,astudyinUgandaafewyearsbackfocusedontheft

ofcentralgovernmentgrantsintendedforlocalschools.Theft


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ratesinthisgrantprogramweredepressinglyhigh.Insome

areas,asmuchas85%ofthefundsintendedforlocalschools

werestolenoutrightbythelocalofficialsresponsiblefor

administeringtheprogram.

Then,newspapersbeganpublicizinginformationaboutaid

providedtolocalschools,includinginformationabouthow

muchmoneythecentralgovernmenthadprovidedtoeach

village.Corruptionoveralldeclinedmarkedly,whichbyitselfis

evidencethatmediacoverageandprovisionofinformationcan

havesignificanteffects.Perhapsevenmorenotably,the

amountofthedeclineincorruptionineachvillagedependedin

partonthedistancebetweenthevillageinquestionandthe

nearestnewspaperoutlet.Thosevillagerswithgreateraccess

tonewspaperreportingoncorruptionintheschoolfunding

programsawmuchlowerlevelsofcorruption.Otherstudiesin

othercountrieshavefoundsimilareffectsoftransparencyand

mediacoverage.

Indeed,corruptofficialsthemselvesseemtoviewavigorous

freepressasaseriousthreattotheirenterprises.Someofthe

bestevidenceforthiscomesfromtheFujimoriregimeinPeru.

FujimorissecretpolicechiefwasamannamedMontesinos.MontesinoswasinchargeofmaintainingFujimoriscontrol

throughanextensivenetworkofbriberyandotherformsof

corruption.Remarkably,Montesinoskeptmeticulousrecords


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ofthebribesthathepaid,evengoingsofarastohavesigned

contractsinmanycases,andsometimeseventovideotapethe

bribetransactions.Asaresult,Montesinossrecordsprovide

someofthemostdetailedevidenceavailableoftheeconomics

ofcorruption.

Oneofthemoststrikingthingsthattheserecordsrevealis

thatalthoughMontesinosbribedallsortsofpeople,including

legislatorsandjudges,hishighestpriority,asreflectedinthe

exorbitantbribeshepaid,wastobuyoffthemedia,particularly

thebigTVstations.Montesinossview,whichheexpressedto

associates,wasthatthemedia,andTVinparticular,wasthe

mostimportantpotentialthreattotheFujimori

administrationssubversionofPeruviandemocracy.

Thecodatothestorysuggeststhathewasright:The

downfalloftheFujimoriregimecameafterMontesinosjiltedoneofhismistresses.Thespurnedwomanmanagedtoget

holdofMontesinossstashofvideotapesandprovidedsomeof

themtotheoneTVstationinPeruthatMontesinoshadfailed

tobuyoffacablestationinLimathatMontesinoshad

thoughtwaspoliticallyirrelevant.Thatstationstarted

broadcastingoverandovervideoclipsofMontesinosbribingpoliticians,judges,andothers.Atthatpointthegovernment,

despiteallitsbribes,couldntmaintainitsholdonpower.


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Soitseemsthatafreepress,aswellascivilsocietyNGOs

thatperformsimilarwatchdogfunctions,canbepowerfuland

perhapsindispensibleforcesinthefightagainstcorruption.

That,inturn,meansthatlawsthataffectpressfreedomand

freedomofinformation,suchasdefamationlawsand

governmentsecrecylaws,canbequiteimportanttothe

struggleagainstcorruption,eveniftheselegalissuesarenot

aboutcorruptionperse.Lawsthatfacilitatethefreeflowof

informationcansometimesconflictwiththosethatmakeit

unlawfultospeakorwritecriticallyaboutgovernmentofficials,

ortorevealinformationabouthowthegovernmentoperates.

Whiledefamationandgovernmentsecretslawsserve

importantends,concernsaboutcorruptionhaveledmany

governmentstorethinkwhethertheirapproachtoprotecting

publicofficialsfromdefamationandtomaintaininglegitimate

secrecyneedsrevisiontoreflectthepublicinterestin

combatingcorruption.

Theroleofthemediaandexternalmonitoringinturn

implicatesamoregeneralsetofquestionsquestionconcerning

thecomplicatedandnotespeciallywellunderstood

relationshipbetweenpubliccorruptionandpolitical

democracy.

Aswithpressfreedom,whenonelooksacrosscountries,

thereseemstobearoughnegativecorrelationbetweenthe


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degreetowhichcountriesaredemocraticandthelevelof

perceivedcorruption.Inotherwords,onaveragecountries

thatareratedbyvariousNGOsasmoredemocraticalsotendto

havelowerlevelsofcorruption.Countriesthatareless

democratictendtohavemorecorruption.

Theideathatpoliticaldemocracymightbeaneffective

constraintonofficialcorruptionhasalonghistory,andis

animatedbyasimplelogic:AsLordActonfamouslyremarked,

Powertendstocorrupt,andabsolutepowercorrupts

absolutely.Politicaldemocracyisacheckonthepowerof

governmentofficials:Thevoters,ifdissatisfied,canthrowthe

rascalsout.Inotherwords,ifvotersdislikecorruption,orif

corruptiontendstoleadtobadoutcomesformostpeople,they

canexpresstheirdispleasureattheballotbox.Thisbothallows

voterstochoosebetterrepresentatives,andcreatesathreat

thatdetersincumbentsfromabusingtheirpositionsofpower.

Forthisreason,manytheoristshavearguedthat

democratization,inadditiontoitsothereffects,maybea

potentanticorruptionmechanism.

TheChineseprotesterswhooccupiedTiananmenSquarein

1989certainlythoughtso.Thoseprotestsareremembered,particularlyintheWest,asprodemocracyprotestswhich

theywere.Butwhatissometimesforgottenisthatthey

startedoutasanticorruptionprotests.Theyevolvedintopro


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democracyprotestsduetothebeliefthatsomeformof

democratizationwasthebestway,orperhapstheonlyway,to

combattherampantofficialcorruptionthataccompanied

Chinaseconomicreforms.Thetragicoutcomeofthe

TiananmenprotestsmeansthatmostChinesecitizensdont

makethisargumentpubliclyanymore,butIknowfirsthand

thatmanyofthemstillbelieveittobetrue.

Morerecently,manyoftheprodemocracyproteststhat

emergedoverthelastyearintheMiddleEastthesocalled

ArabSpringemergedinlargepartfromdisgustwiththe

rampantcorruptionoftheincumbentgovernments.Thesepro

democracyprotests,liketheTiananmendemonstrations,were

alsoanticorruptionprotests.Sotheideathatdemocracyisa

potentialantidotetocorruptionhaswidespreadappealand

potentiallyenormousconsequences.

Thatsaid,therelationshipbetweendemocracyand

corruptionisquiteabitmorecomplicatedthanthesimplestory

Isketchedabovewouldsuggest.Theevidenceisalsomore

mixed.

Whilethereisindeedanegativecorrelationbetween

democracyandcorruption,withmoredemocraticcountries

tendingtobelesscorrupt,itsnotatallhardtothinkof

countriesthatdontfitthisgeneralpattern.Indiaistheworlds

largestdemocracy,anditalsosuffersfromaseverecorruption


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epidemic.Singapore,whichhasbeenadefactooneparty

stateformostofitshistory,isoneofthebiganticorruption

successstories.Andinsomecountries,likeRussiaand

Indonesia,thereisevidencethatthecorruptionproblemgot

worseafter,andarguablybecauseof,democratization.

Thatlastobservationhighlightsafeatureofthecross

countrydatathatcangetlostifonelooksonlyattheoverall

correlationbetweendemocracyandcorruption.Althoughthe

overallcorrelationisnegative,thedataactuallyrevealakindof

invertedUshape:asonemovesfromundemocraticcountries

tomoredemocraticcountries,thelevelofcorruptionfirstrises

andthenfalls.Corruption,thatis,tendstobehigherinnewer

orlessconsolidateddemocracies,orincountriesthatarepartly

butnotfullydemocratic,butcorruptionislowerinmore

established,consolidateddemocracies.

Moreover,thecrosscountrycomparisonsdonotreallytell

usallthatmuchaboutwhetherorhowpoliticaldemocracy

affectsthelevelofcorruption.Imentionedasimilarproblema

fewmomentsagowithrespecttothenegativecorrelation

betweenpressfreedomandcorruption.Therearesimplytoo

manyothervariables,andtoomanycomplicatedpotentialcausallinksbetweenthem.Itsvirtuallyimpossible,incross

countrycomparisons,toteaseoutthedegreetowhich


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democracyitself,asopposedtosomeotherfactororfactors,

causescorruptiontodecrease.

Thatsaid,thereissomemicrolevelevidencethatdemocratic

accountability,whencoupledwithsufficienttransparencyand

effortsbythemediaandcivilsocietygroupstomonitorand

exposecorruption,doesseemtoconstrainotherwisecorrupt

officials.Arangeofstudieswithinindividualcountriesseemto

showthatcorruptionlevelsgodownwhenofficialsaremore

concernedaboutreelection,andthatelectedofficialsareless

likelytobereelectedwhentheyareperceivedasmorecorrupt.

Thatevidence,then,seemstocorroboratethetraditionalstory.

Ontheotherhand,thereisadarksidetodemocracy.Firstof

all,innewdemocracies,ordemocracieswithoutstablepolitical

competitionbetweenestablishedparties,politicaltime

horizonscanberelativelyshort.Thatmeanstheresanincentiveforofficialsandpoliticianstotakeadvantageofa

temporarypositionofpowerasmuchastheycan,whilethey

can.Thistendstoencouragegreatercorruption,anditmay

provideanexplanationfortheinvertedUshapeofthecross

countrydata.Italsosuggeststheimportanceofdeveloping

strong,stablepoliticalparties,builtaroundpolicyplatformsratherthanindividualpersonalities.

Furthermore,elections,particularlymodernelections,canbe

incrediblyexpensive,andtheneedforpoliticalpartiestoraise


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thecashtowinelectionscanbecomeamajormotivationfor

corruptactivity.IntheUnitedStates,manycriticshaveargued

thatwhathasemergedintheU.S.isaformoflegalized

corruption,intheformoftheexchangeofcampaigndonations

forpoliticalfavors.Ofcourse,theresplentyofsimpleold

fashionedillegalcorruptionintheUnitedStatesaswell.But

whethertheexchangeofcampaigndonationsforfavorable

treatmentisnominallylegalorillegal,itisahugeproblem.

Furthermore,electoraldemocracyalsocreatespressureto

rewardsupporters,oftenwithprominentofficialpositions,

whichmaythemselvesbevaluedpreciselybecausetheycanbe

asourceoflucrativecorruptrents.

Anothersignificantformofcorruptionassociatedwith

democraticelectionsisvotebuying,inwhichitisthepolitician

doingthebribing,ratherthanreceivingthebribe.Votebuyinginmanycountriesisarampantproblemthatisnotonlyitselfa

formofcorruption,butonethatmakesdemocracyless

effectiveinconstrainingotherformsofcorruption.

Sopoliticaldemocracy,andthepressuresofelectoral

competition,canbebothacauseofandacureforofficial

corruption,dependingonhowthedemocraticsystemis

structured.Overall,theevidencedoessuggestthat

democratizationseemstobeanimportantfeatureofalong

termanticorruptionstrategy.Atthesametime,the


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23

relationshipiscomplicated,andfeaturesofthedemocratic

system,suchastheelectoralsystem,thepartysystem,andthe

rulesoncampaignfinance,maythemselveshaveimportant

implicationsforanticorruption,eveniftheselegaland

institutionalfeaturesarenotusuallyconceivedashavingtodo

withcorruptionspecifically.

Whilewereonthesubjectoftherelationshipbetween

democracyandcorruption,letmetouchonanotherconcern,

particularlyinsocietiesthataredemocratic,thathastodowith

thepoliticalindependenceandaccountabilityofanticorruption

lawenforcementefforts.

Oneunfortunatefactisthatalthoughaggressiveanti

corruptionenforcementcanbequiteeffective,itcanalso

becomequitepoliticized.Particularlyincountrieswithdeep

politicaldivisionswherecorruptionispervasive,corruptioninvestigationsandprosecutionscanbecomeatoolwhereby

onepartyorfactionharassesitsopponents.Sometimesthis

happensonalargescale:Therearenumerouscasesinwhicha

victoriouspoliticalparty,havingwrestedpowerfromits

opponents,initiatesananticorruptioncrackdownthatquickly

becomesapoliticalpurgetheopposition.Thiscandegenerateintoadestructivecycle,particularlyiftheformeropposition

partyeventuallymanagestotakecontrolandthenunleashes


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itsownwaveofpoliticallymotivatedanticorruption

prosecutionsinretaliation.

Evenwhenthingsdontgetquitethatbad,thereisplentyof

evidencethatanticorruptioneffortscanbecomepoliticized,

bothinthesensethatlawenforcersmaygoeasyontheparty

currentlyinpower,andinthesensethatanticorruption

enforcersmaybemoreaggressiveagainstopponentsofthe

rulingparty.Thiscanoccureveninmaturedemocracies.

RecentevidencefromtheUnitedStatesindicatesthatthe

federalgovernmenttendstomoreaggressivelyinvestigateand

prosecutecorruptionallegationsagainstmembersofthe

oppositionparty.

Therealorperceivedpoliticizationofanticorruptionefforts

hasanumberofundesirableconsequences.Thefirstandmost

obviousisthesimpleunfairnessofselectingtargetsonthebasisoffactorsotherthantheseriousnessofthecorruption

involved.

Itsclearlyaproblemwhentheanticorruptionenforcersgo

easyon,orcompletelyignore,corruptionbythegovernmentin

poweroritsallies.Thatsafamiliarconcerninvirtuallyevery

countrythathasstruggledwithhighlevelpoliticalcorruption.

Itsalsoaproblemwhenanticorruptionenforcersgoafter

politicalopponentsformarginal,orevennonexistent,

infractions.


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Politicizationofanticorruptioneffortscanalsohavefar

reachingdeleteriouseffectsonanticorruptionnormsmore

generally.AsInotedearlier,effectiveanticorruptionefforts

dependnotonlyonadirectdeterrenteffectbutalsoonthe

cultivationofstrongsocialnormsagainstcorruptionasense

thatcorruptioniswrong,andthatpunishmentsforcorrupt

activityarefairandlegitimate.Realorperceivedpoliticization

ofanticorruptionenforcementunderminesthoseperceptions.

Onenaturalwaytoaddressconcernsaboutexcessive

politicizationofanticorruptionenforcementistoinsulatethe

mainanticorruptionagenciesfromdirectcontrolbythe

government.Thatis,onemightwanttoensurethepolitical

independenceoftheanticorruptionenforcementapparatus.

And,indeed,thisiswhatmanycountrieshavetriedtodo.

Thereare,however,somedifficultieswithcreatingindependentanticorruptionagencies.

First,itsnotentirelyclearhowtomakesuchagenciestruly

independent.Legalorofficialindependenceisnotthesameas

trueindependence.Forananticorruptionagencytohaveboth

trueindependenceandrealauthority,powerfulpolitical

factionsincludingthosethatmightbenefitfromcorruption,

orfromusinganticorruptionasatooltoharasstheir

opponentsmustbewillingtocommittotheindependenceof


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26

theanticorruptionagency.Itsnotclearhowtoachievethis,

however.

Second,theremaybeatradeoffbetweenananticorruption

agencysindependenceandtheamountoffinancialand

politicalsupportforthatagency.Aseveryoneinthisroomis

wellaware,oneofthebiggestchallengesfacinganticorruption

agenciesaroundtheworldisalackofresources.Another

challengeisalackofcooperationfromotherdivisionsinthe

government.Anindependentandinsulatedanticorruption

agencymaysometimesfindthesechallengesevenmore

daunting.Thereasonisthatpoliticianstendtospendmoney

whentheycanalsoexerciseinfluence.Iftheycantexercise

anyinfluence,theymaybestingywiththeirfinancialsupport,

andotherformsofsupportaswell.

Third,andperhapsmostimportantly,makinganticorruptionagenciesindependentofelectedgovernmentofficialshascosts

aswellasbenefits.Decisionsaboutanticorruptionpolicyare

oftenthemselvespoliticaldecisions.Notpoliticalinacrude

partisansense,butpoliticalinthesensethattheyinvolvebasic

strategicandvaluechoices,aboutwhichreasonablepeople

mightdisagree.Inademocracy,itsdangerous,bothinprincipleandinpractice,totrytoremovefundamentally

politicaldecisionsentirelyfromthepoliticalprocess.


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Iwanttoemphasizethis,becausetheresacommonidea,

particularlyamongexpertsinsomefield,thatifonlywecould

takethisissueawayfromthepoliticiansandgiveittothe

experts(thatis,tousortopeoplelikeus),wedbeabletosolve

theproblem.Butthatsoftenanillusion.Yes,thereare

technicalaspectsofanticorruptionpolicythatarebestleftto

theexperts.Andyes,excessivepoliticizationofanticorruption

canhavedevastatingeffects,renderinganticorruptionefforts

ineffective,orevencounterproductive.Yetwealsovalue,or

shouldvalue,politicalaccountabilityandpoliticalsustainability.

Ourfrustrationwiththepoliticalprocessandourlegitimate

concernsaboutthepoliticizationofanticorruption

enforcementsometimesleadsustotrytoplaceanticorruption

policyoutsideofpolitics,orabovepolitics.Butanticorruption

effortsmustworkthroughthepoliticalprocess,andwiththe

politicalprocess,iftheyaretobeeffectiveinthelongterm.

Theycannotbeentirelyaboveoroutsideit.

Thatsaid,somedegreeofinsulationforanticorruption

enforcersislikelynecessary.So,oneofthebigchallengesin

designingeffectiveanticorruptionagenciesisstrikingtheright

balancebetweenpoliticalindependenceandpolitical

accountability.Theresnosimpleformulaoreasyanswer,but

thisisoneareathatneedsmoreattentionthanithasreceived.


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Sofar,Ivebeenfocusinginmyremarksonvariouswayswe

mighttrytocombatcorruptionbyinvestigating,exposing,and

punishingit.Butanothervitalelementofanyanticorruption

strategyistoreducethemotivationsandincentivesfor

corruptionthatmayexistwithingovernmentorganizations.

Inthisregard,itsworthkeepinginmindthatinsome

circumstances,pervasivecorruptionistheconsequenceoflaws

andrulesthatarethemselvesinefficient,orelseofsufficiently

lowvaluethatthegovernmentwouldnotreallybewillingto

bearthecostsofenforcingthemconsistently.

Inthesecases,theinefficiencyoftherulescreatesan

overwhelmingpressurefindwaysaroundthem.Furthermore,

informalnormativeconstraintsonviolatingsuchrulesare

relativelyweakbecausetherulesthemselvesmaybeperceived

asarbitraryandillegitimate.Theresultisthataninformalsystemofcorruptiondevelops,inwhichpartiesbargainaround

therules,essentiallysubstitutingashadowmarketsystemfor

theinefficientnonmarketsystemestablishedbytheofficial

rules.So,althoughinsomecircumstancescorruptionisitself

themainproblem,sometimescorruptionismorelikea

symptomofadifferentproblemthecorruptionisthefever,butthebadrulesaretheunderlyinginfection.

Itwasthispossibilitythatledsomeprominentscholarsinthe

1960sand1970stoconcludethatcorruptionwasnotonlynot


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bad,butwasaffirmativelygood,atleastforeconomic

development.AsthedistinguishedpoliticalscientistSamuel

Huntingtononcequipped:Intermsofeconomicgrowth,the

onlythingworsethanasocietywitharigid,overcentralized,

dishonestbureaucracyisonewitharigid,overcentralized,

honestbureaucracy.

Itsacleverquip,buttheevidenceisoverwhelmingthat

Huntingtonwaswrongaboutcorruptionbeingagoodthing,for

acoupleofreasons.

First,hisargumentonlyholdsupifthegovernmentrulesin

questionareinfactinefficient,tothepointthatanillicitmarket

allocationsystemwouldbesuperior.Huntingtonsperception

thatthiswasgenerallythecasemayhavebeeninfluencedby

prominentexamples,liketheSovietUnionand1950sIndia,

whereonecouldplausiblyarguethatsomeformsofcorruptionwereindeedsociallyandeconomicallybeneficialwaysof

evadingheavyhandedgovernmentregulation.Butitsnot

generallytrue.

Tothecontrary,thegovernmentrulescircumventedby

corruptionareoftenincrediblyvaluable.Letmeoffertwo

examples,bothinspiredbyrecentstudiesofcorruptionin

Indonesia.Governmentlimitsonthemaximumweightof

trucks,ifenforced,wouldpreservethelongtermconditionof

Indonesiaspublicroads.Likewise,governmentlimitson


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timberextractionpreservethelongtermsustainabilityofthe

countrysforests.Inbothcases,therestrictionscreate

economicpressuresforcircumventionoftherulesviabribery,

whichindeedoccursinIndonesiawithdepressingfrequency.

Butitisnotbecausetheserulesareinefficientforsocietyin

general.Rather,itisbecausetherulesimposecostson

individualstruckersorloggerswhowanttogetaround

them.

ThesecondflawinHuntingtonsargument,originallypointed

outbyGunnarMyrdalinhisclassicbook,The Asian Drama,is

thatthedynamicHuntingtondescribesinwhichpeoplewill

paybribestogetaroundinefficientrulesinfactcreates

perverseincentivesforpublicofficialstocreateandmaintain

thoseinefficientrules,preciselysotheycanextractthebribe

revenue.Inotherwords,itsnotjustthatinefficientrules

causecorruption,butalsothatopportunitiesforcorruption

causetheentrenchmentofinefficientrules.

Still,theflawsinHuntingtonsanalysisshouldnotblindusto

thekerneloftruthattheheartoftheargument:sometimes,

theunderlyingsourceofcorruptionisthesubstanceoftherule

itself.Asaresult,sometimesthebestwaytodealwiththeproblemboththecorruptionproblemandtheunderlying

inefficiencyistochangethesubstantivelaw.Doingsomay

havecosts,particularlyiftherearesomebenefitsassociated


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withthelaw,butthosecostswouldhavetobeweighedagainst

thecostsofcorruption.

Arelatedpointherehastodowithbureaucratic

organization,andinparticularthedegreetowhichdifferent

sortsofgovernmentdecisionssuchasthedecisiontogranta

licenseorpermitarecentralizedordecentralized.Certain

formsofdecentralizationmayhelpamelioratecorruption,

whileotherformsmayexacerbatecorruption.

Toillustrate,thinkaboutasimplebaselinecaseinwhichtheresonegovernmentofficialwhohasthepowertogranta

licensetoengageinsomeactivity,suchasstartingabusinessor

harvestingtimber.Thelawspecifiessomecriteriathatthe

officialissupposedtoapply,buttheofficialmightdeviatefrom

therulesinexchangeforabribe.Forexample,theremaybean

applicantwhomeetsthelegalcriteriaforapermit,buttheofficialmayrefusetoissuethepermitunlesstheapplicantpays

abribe.Or,theremaybeanapplicantwhodoesntmeetthe

legalcriteriaforapermit,buttheofficialofferstoissuethe

permitanywayinexchangeforabribe.

Thisisasimple,stylizedexampleofastandardcorruption

problem.Butwhathappensiftherearetwoofficials,bothof

whommustgivetheirapproval?Well,nowthereeffectively

twomonopoliststwoofficialseachofwhomwilltakethe

othersbehaviorasgiven.Economictheorypredictsinthiscase


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thateachapplicantwillhavetopayalargertotalbribetoget

thepermit,thougheachindividualbribewillbesmaller,and

therewillbefewerpermitsissuedintotal.

Alternatively,wemightwanttothinkaboutwhathappensif

wehavetwoofficials,eitherofwhomcangrantthepermit

withouttheothersconsent.Inthiscase,economictheory

predictsthatsolongastheofficialscannotcolludewithone

another,bribeswillbelower,becausetheofficialswillcompete

onthepricefortheillicitservice,andthetotalnumberof

permitsissuedwillbelargerasthebribepricedrops.

Whethertheseeffectsaregoodorbad,andwhichsortof

systemwemightprefer,dependsonwhetherwethinkthe

biggerproblemiseligibleapplicantsneedingtopayabribeto

getsomethingtheyshouldhavegottenforfree,orineligible

applicantspayingbribestogetsomethingtheyshouldntget.

Ifweremoreworriedaboutofficialsdemandingbribesfor

servicesorpermitstheyshouldbegranting,thencreating

multiplecompetingbureaucraciesisagoodidea,butrequiring

theapprovalofmultiplebureaucraciesisadisaster.Thisbasic

findingisconsistentwithevidence,particularlyfromRussiaand

anumberofLatinAmericancountries,thatcomplexprocedures

forstartingorrunningabusiness,whichrequirethe

independentapprovalofmultipleregulators,tendtodepress

lawfulcommercialactivity,inpartbecauseofthenumberof


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bribesthathavetobepaid.Andthereissomesuggestive

evidence,thoughhardlyconclusive,thatcompetitionbetween

regulatoryjurisdictionsintheUnitedStates,China,and

elsewhere,hasplayedapartinconstrainingbriberylevels,at

leasttosomedegree.

Ontheotherhand,ifthebigproblemisthatgovernment

bureaucraciesareprovidingapprovalswhentheyshouldnt,

thendrivingdownthesizeofbribes,whileincreasingthe

overallnumberofbribesandunjustifiedapprovals,isabad

thing.InIndonesia,forexample,whenanyofseveral

bureaucratscanbebribedtoallowillegaltimberharvesting,

totalillegalharvestinggoesup,aseachbureaucratiswillingto

acceptasmallerbribe.Inthissortofsituation,paradoxically,

wewouldbebetteroffifpeoplepaidhigherbribes,because

theywouldpayfewerofthem.

Anotheraspectofthesubstantivelawthatmayaffectthe

extentofcorruptionhastodowithwhetherofficialshave

broaddiscretioninmakingparticularkindsofdecisions,or

whethertheirdecisionsarecoveredbystrict,relativelyrigid

rules.

Hereagain,therelationshiptocorruptioniscomplex.Onthe

onehand,broadopenendeddiscretioncanbearecipefor

rampantcorruption.Again,onethinksofLordActonsremark

thatabsolutepowercorruptsabsolutely.Hemmingin


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governmentdecisionmakerswithclearrulesmayhelpreinin

corruption,inthatitiseasiertomonitorwhethertheseofficials

areinfactfollowingtherules.

Butrigidrulescansometimescontributetocorruptionas

well.Thereareafewreasonsforthis.

First,recallHuntingtonsobservationthatrigidrulescanbe

inefficient,andcancreatepressuresforcircumvention.Ifthe

applicationofarulewouldrequireagovernmentofficialtodo

somethingthattheofficialherselfviewsassillyormisguided,shemaybemoresusceptibletopersuasiontodosomething

elseifshecangetawaywithit.

Rigidrulesmayalsoalterthekindofpersonwhobecomesa

governmentofficial,attractingpeoplewhoarelessinvestedin

themissionoftheorganization.Afterall,itsnotallthat

satisfyingorinterestingtobeafunctionary.Itsmore

rewardingtohavesomesayinhowthingsgetdone.Overly

rigidrulescancontributetopublicservantsfrustrationand

alienationwiththejob,whichinturncanfosteranattitude

conducivetocorruption.

ThatlastobservationrelatestooneothersuggestionIwanttomake.Ithinkweneedtopayrelativelymoreattentionto

thepsychologyofcorruption.Letmesayabitmoreabout

whatImean.


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Therearetwomainwaysthatmostacademicandpopular

discoursedepictsthecorruptofficial.First,theresthe

languageoftraditionalmoralism,inwhichcorruptindividuals

areimmoralindividualsdishonest,scheming,andgreedy.

Corruption,onthisaccount,isamoralfailing.

Then,theresthelanguageofclassicaleconomics,inwhich

corruptindividualsarerationalactorsrespondingtotangible

materialincentives,primarilythesizeofabribe,theriskof

gettingcaught,andtheexpectedpenalty.

Neitheroftheseaccountsiswrong.Indeed,bothareclearly

correct,asfarastheygo.Corruptionisbothamoralfailureand

arationalresponsetoaparticularsetofincentives.

Butneitheroftheseperspectives,atleastintheirtraditional

form,issufficientlyattentivetowhatwemightthinkofasthe

psychologyofcorruption.

Mostpeopledontthinkofthemselvesasbadorcorrupt

people.Mostpeopledontliketothinkofthemselvesasbador

corruptpeople.Thereareexceptions,ofcourse.Somepeople

stealbrazenlyandwithoutconscience.Butmostpeoplearent

likethat.

Forcorruptiontoreachepidemicproportions,asithasin

manypartsoftheworld,itmustbethecasethatlargenumbers

ofpeoplewhothinkofthemselvesasbasicallydecent,honest


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peopleandwhoprobablyare,inmostotherareasoftheir

life,decent,honestpeopleareengaginginfundamentally

dishonestconduct.Howdoesthathappen?Howdopeople

rationalize,orjustifytothemselves,thissortofbehavior?How

arepeoplesnaturalinhibitionsagainstdishonestbehavior

eroded?

Ithinkthatunderstandinghowthatpsychologicalprocess

occursmaybequiteimportantindevelopinglongtermanti

corruptionstrategies.

Theressurprisinglylittleresearchonthistopic,butletme

hazardafewconjecturesabouthowbasicallygoodpeoplecan

becomecorrupt.

First,asIvementionedseveraltimesoverthecourseofmy

remarks,socialnormsagainstcorruptionmaybeprofoundly

affectedbyperceptionsofwhatisnormaloraccepted.When

weseerulesflagrantlyviolatedallthetime,welearntoaccept

certainviolationsastolerated,andtoviewenforcementofthe

ruleasbizarre,unexpected,andillegitimate.

Totakeanexamplefrommyownexperience,thespeedlimit

onmosthighwaysnearwhereIliveintheUnitedStatesis65milesperhouronthehighway.Ineverdrive65milesperhour,

andnooneelsedoeseither.Iusuallydrivearound7075.I

dontthinkofmyselfasalawbreaker.Rather,theresatacit

understandingthat65isntreallythespeedlimit,nomatter


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whatthesignssay.IfIweredriving70andacopweretopull

meoverandgivemeaticket,Idprobablybereallymadatthe

copforactingunreasonably.

Isuspectsomethingsimilarhappenswithrespecttoofficial

corruption.Insomecountries,eventherethoughthereare

officialrulesthatsaynooneiseversupposedtotakebribes,

virtuallyallgovernmentofficialssolicitandacceptillegal

paymentsforallsortsofservices.Despitetheofficialrules

againstbribery,thegovernmenttacitlyandhypocritically

condonesthisbypayinglowsalariestocivilservants,withthe

implicitbutobviousexpectationthattheyllmakeupthe

differenceinillicitbribeincome.Itsnotsohardtoseehow

peoplelivinginsuchcountriescouldstarttotreattherules

againstpettycorruptionthewayItreattheofficialspeedlimit.

Second,peoplemayrationalizecorruptbehaviorbynotinghowtheyrebeingunfairlytreatedinsomeotherrespect.Ijust

mentionedlowsalaries;thatsoneaspectofit.Whencivil

servantsfeelthattheydontgetrespect,thattheirsuperiors

dontcaremuchaboutthequalityoftheirwork,whentheyare

frustratedintheirabilitytomakeapositivecontributionto

society,whentheyfeelunderpaidandunderappreciated,theyaremorelikelytoviewillicitincomeasakindofcompensatory

entitlement.


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Third,thedegreeofcorruptioninanorganizationmaybe

relatedtohowmuchthemembersoftheorganizationidentify

withthemissionoftheorganization,andhowmuchthe

organizationitselfseemstobeorganizedalongprofessional

lines.

Thisobservationrelatestoanimportantstrainincriminology

researchoverthelastseveraldecadessometimesknownas

BrokenWindowstheory,afterafamousarticlebyJames

WilsonandGeorgeKelling.Therearemanystrandsofthe

theory,buttheonethatismostrelevantforpresentpurposes

goeslikethis:Theappearanceofdisorderinaneighborhood

brokenwindows,graffiti,litter,publicdrunkenness,andso

forthcanleadtomoreseriouscrime,becausetheappearance

ofdisordersendsthesocialmessagethatnobodycaresmuch

aboutthestateoftheneighborhood.Thecontroversial

suggestionofthetheoryisthatcleaninguptheneighborhood

fixingthebrokenwindowscanbeacriticalelementof

combatingmoreseriouscrime,becauseitcreatesaperception

oforderandcommunitycommitmenttotheneighborhood.

Thetheoryiscontroversial,andIcertainlyamnotexpert

enoughtoevaluateitfully,butwhatIwanttosuggestisthatthebasicidea,ifsound,mayhavesomeapplicationtocertain

formsofbureaucraticcorruption.Thinkaboutagovernment

office,suchasamotorvehicleregistry.Imaginethattheoffice


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isdirtyanduncomfortable,visitorscrowdtogetherratherthan

standinginacue,officialsappearunkemptandrude.Now

imagineasimilargovernmentofficethatperformsthesame

function,butitlooksandfeelsdifferent.Theofficeiscleanand

wellmaintained.Officialsaredressedincleanuniforms,and

areprofessionalandcourteous.Peoplestandinline.

Inwhichofficearepeoplemorelikelytooffer,or

governmentofficialsmorelikelytorequest,smallbribe

paymentstodeviatefromlegalpractices?Manypeople

instinctivelyassumethatthissortofcorruptionismorelikelyin

thefirstoffice.

Wedonot,tomyknowledge,haveanyevidenceasto

whetherthatisactuallythecase,orifitis,whetherthereisany

causalrelationshipbetweentheseothersignsofdisorderand

corruption.ButIwanttosuggestsucharelationshipisatleastplausible,becauseoftheideathatcommitmenttothemission

ofanorganizationmayinhibitengaginginactivities,like

corruption,thatunderminethatmission,andalsobecausea

perceptionofprofessionalismmaydiscourageactivitiesseenas

unprofessional,suchasofferingorsolicitingbribes.

Again,thissuggeststhatacomprehensiveanticorruption

strategymayinvolvemeasuresthatarenotnecessarilyabout

corruptionassuch.Indeed,thisisoneofthemainmessagesI

wanttoimpartinmyremarkstoday.Whetheritssomething


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big,likedemocratization,orsomethingsmall,likemaintaining

normsofprofessionalism,allsortsofpolitical,institutional,and

legaldecisionsmaybearontheextentortypeofcorrupt

activitythattakesplace.Directanticorruptionisimportant

andpotentiallyquiteeffective,asInotedearlierinmytalk,but

theseotherelementsareimportantaswell.

Ibeganthistalkbynotinganumberofreasonsthatwemight

bepessimisticaboutcombatingpervasivecorruption.Such

pervasivecorruptionmaygenerateanumberofviciouscircles,

makingescapefromthecorruptiontrapseeminglyimpossible,

oratleastextraordinarilyunlikely.

Idliketoendmyremarkstodaybynotingtwothingsthat

makemyhopefulabouttheprospectsformeaningfulprogress

inthestruggleagainstrampantcorruption,despiteallofthe

reasonsforpessimism:thehistoryofwarfareandthescienceofbumblebeeflight.

First,astowarfare:Warusedtobeconsideredanatural,

inevitable,evengloriouspartoflife.Statesmadewarthats

whattheydid.Andtheykilledthousandsuponthousandsof

peoplewhiledoingit.Acenturyortwoago,anyonewho

suggestedthatwarmightbecomearareevent,viewedas

illegitimateexceptinextremecircumstances,wouldprobably

havebeenridiculedasastarryeyedoptimist.


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41

ButasStevenPinkerhasdocumentedinhisrecentbook,in

factpreciselythishasoccurred.Dowestillhavewars?Yes,of

coursewedo,andtheyarestillhorrible.Buttheirfrequency

andcumulativeimpacthavedeclineddramaticallyina

relativelyshorttime.Noonetodaydescribeswarasnormalor

acceptable,letalonegloriousordesirable.Warisaproblemto

becontained,notanormalandacceptedfactofeverydaylife.

Perhapsaswithwar,sotoowithcorruption.Perhapsovera

similartimeframesay,50to100yearswecanmake

corruptionarareandillegitimatedeviationfromanormof

integrity,muchasoffensivewarhasbecomearareand

illegitimatedeviationfromanormofpeace.Eventosuggest

thisistoinviteridiculeasastarryeyedoptimist,butPinkers

accountofthehistoryofwargivesmesomehope.

Now,astobumblebees:Inthe1930s,asthenewscienceofaerodynamicswasemerging,someofthepioneersofthis

sciencemadearemarkableandtroublingdiscovery:Itwas

impossibleforbumblebeestofly.Thiswasnotaproblemfor

thebumblebees,whocontinuedtoflyastheyalwayshad.The

problemwassimplythatthesciencehadnotyetbecome

sophisticatedenoughtoaccountforbumblebeeflight.Today,ithas.Scientistsunderstandperfectlywellhowbeescanfly,

butittookthemawhiletofigureitout.


42/42

ThehopefullessonthatIdrawfromthisisthatwedont

needtobetoopessimisticwhenoursocialscienceandpolicy

analysistellusthataparticularproblem,suchaspervasive

corruption,isimpossibletosolve.Maybeitsimpossible,but

maybeourunderstandingjustisntgoodenoughyet.

Thebigdifference,ofcourse,isthatthebumblebeesnever

neededthescientiststohelpthemtofly.Thebeesweredoing

justfineontheirown.Butfightingcorruptionisahuman

enterprise,sotheneedtofigureouthowtosolvetheproblem

ismuchgreater.

Thisconferenceispartofthatenterprise.Imhonoredtobe

apartofit,andImverymuchlookingforwardtolearningfrom

allofyouoverthecourseofthenexttwodays.

Thankyouverymuch.