Statutory InterpretationJohn Heggen, Legal EditorLegal Services DivisionLegislative Services Agency
Overview• Methods to determine statutory meaning
• Plain meaning• Iowa Code chapter 4 (construction of statutes)• Overall statutory scheme• Court imposed rules
• E.g., legislative history
Plain Meaning• When we are asked to interpret a statute, we first consider the plain meaning of its language. State v. McIver, 858 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa 2015). If the statute is unambiguous, we will apply it as written. State v. Nall, 894 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2017)
• “The question is not what the legislature should have said, or what it might have intended to say, but what it did say.” Shelby County Myrtue Memorial Hosp. v. Harrison County, 86 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1957).
• Iowa Code section 4.4 Presumption of enactment. • In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:
• 1. Compliance with the Constitutions of the state and of the United States is intended.
• 2. The entire statute is intended to be effective. • 3. A just and reasonable result is intended. • 4. A result feasible of execution is intended. • 5. Public interest is favored over any private interest
Plain Meaning• “[The court] resorts to ‘the rules of statutory construction only when the terms of [a] statute are ambiguous.’ IBP, Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001). If reasonable persons can disagree on a statute's meaning, it is ambiguous. State v. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1996).” State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 2006).
Code chapter 4• Iowa Code chapter 4 (construction of statutes) provides default statutory rules of construction
• Code chapter 4 includes:• Definitions (Section 4.1)• Rules regarding statutory references (Section 4.3)• Certain presumptions (Sections 4.4 and 4.5)• Ambiguous statutes (Section 4.6)• Conflicts between or within statutes (Sections 4.7, 4.8, ,4.11, and 4.12)
• General savings provisions (Sections 4.13)
Code chapter 4• Code section 4.1 contains over 40 rules and definitions. The lead‐in to Code section 4.1 is as follows:• In the construction of the statutes, the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute:
• Some of the rules from Code section 4.1• 8. Figures and words. If there is a conflict between figures and words in expressing a number, the words govern.
• 11. Joint authority. Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers or other persons shall be construed as giving such authority to a majority of them, unless it be otherwise expressed in the Act giving the authority.
• 13A. “Livestock” includes but is not limited to an animal classified as an ostrich, rhea, or emu.
Code chapter 4• 17. Number and gender. Unless otherwise specifically provided by law the singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular. Words of one gender include the other genders.• Porter v. Harden, 564 N.W.2d 414 (Iowa 2017)
• “Farm tenancy” means a leasehold interest in land held by a person who produces crops or provides for the care and feeding of livestock on the land, including by grazing or supplying feed to the livestock.
• "Livestock" means an animal belonging to the bovine, caprine, equine, ovine, or porcine species, ostriches, rheas, emus; farm deer as defined in section 170.1; or poultry. Iowa Code section 717.1
• “This should caution us against reading too much into the presence of the words “a” or “an” in a statute depending on the context.”
Code chapter 4• 17. Number and gender. Unless otherwise specifically provided by law the singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular. Words of one gender include the other genders.
• Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013)• If the mother was married at the time of conception, birth, or at any
time during the period between conception and birth, the name of the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child unless paternity has been determined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction, in which case the name of the father as determined by the court shall be entered by the department. Iowa Code section 144.13(2)
• When a statute employs both masculine and feminine words, the rule does not apply if reading the statute in a gender‐neutral manner "would destroy or change" the plain and unambiguous language.
Code chapter 4• 20. Person. Unless otherwise provided by law, “person” means individual, corporation, limited liability company, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, or any other legal entity.
• 22. Population. The word “population” where used in this Code or any statute means the population shown by the latest preceding certified federal census, unless otherwise specifically provided
• 30. Shall, must, and may. Unless otherwise specifically provided by the general assembly, whenever the following words are used in a statute enacted after July 1, 1971, their meaning and application shall be:• a. The word “shall” imposes a duty.• b. The word “must” states a requirement.• c. The word “may” confers a power.
• 33. Tense. Words in the present tense include the future.
Code chapter 4• 34. Time — legal holidays. In computing time, the first day shall be excluded
and the last included, unless the last falls on Sunday, in which case the time prescribed shall be extended so as to include the whole of the following Monday. However, when by the provisions of a statute or rule prescribed under authority of a statute, the last day for the commencement of an action or proceedings, the filing of a pleading or motion in a pending action or proceedings, or the perfecting or filing of an appeal from the decision or award of a court, board, commission, or official falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, a day on which the office of the clerk of the district court is closed in whole or in part pursuant to the authority of the supreme court, the first day of January, the third Monday in January, the twelfth day of February, the third Monday in February, the last Monday in May, the fourth day of July, the first Monday in September, the eleventh day of November, the fourth Thursday in November, the twenty‐fifth day of December, and the following Monday when any of the foregoing named legal holidays fall on a Sunday, and any day appointed or recommended by the governor of Iowa or the president of the United States as a day of fasting or thanksgiving, the time shall be extended to include the next day which the office of the clerk of the court or the office of the board, commission, or official is open to receive the filing of a commencement of an action, pleading or a motion in a pending action or proceeding, or the perfecting or filing of an appeal.
Code chapter 4• 39. Written — in writing — signature. The words “written” and “in writing” may include any mode of representing words or letters in general use, and include an electronic record as defined in section 554D.103. A signature, when required by law, must be made by the writing or markings of the person whose signature is required. “Signature” includes an electronic signature as defined in section 554D.103. If a person is unable due to a physical disability to make a written signature or mark, that person may substitute either of the following in lieu of a signature required by law:• a. The name of the person with a disability written by another upon the request and in the presence of the person with a disability.
• b. A rubber stamp reproduction of the name or facsimile of the actual signature when adopted by the person with a disability for all purposes requiring a signature and then only when affixed by that person or another upon request and in the presence of the person with a disability.
Code chapter 4• 4.3 References to other statutes.
• Any statute which adopts by reference the whole or a portion of another statute of this state shall be construed to include subsequent amendments of the statute or the portion thereof so adopted by reference unless a contrary intent is expressed.
• Note that this rule applies to other statutes of this state• Some statutory references will adopt a statute by reference as of a specific date.
Code chapter 4• 4.4 Presumption of enactment.
• In enacting a statute, it is presumed that:• 1. Compliance with the Constitutions of the state and of the United
States is intended.• 2. The entire statute is intended to be effective.• 3. A just and reasonable result is intended.• 4. A result feasible of execution is intended.• 5. Public interest is favored over any private interest.
• 4.5 Prospective statutes.• A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.
Code chapter 4• 4.6 Ambiguous statutes — interpretation.• If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, may consider among other matters:• 1. The object sought to be attained.• 2. The circumstances under which the statute was enacted.• 3. The legislative history.• 4. The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects.
• 5. The consequences of a particular construction.• 6. The administrative construction of the statute.• 7. The preamble or statement of policy.
Code chapter 4• 4.7 Conflicts between general and special statutes.
• If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision.
• 4.8 Irreconcilable statutes.• If statutes enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment by the general assembly prevails. If provisions of the same Act are irreconcilable, the provision listed last in the Act prevails.
• 4.11 Conflicting amendments to same statutes — interpretation.• If amendments to the same statute are enacted at the same or different sessions of the general assembly, one amendment without reference to another, the amendments are to be harmonized, if possible, so that effect may be given to each. If the amendments are irreconcilable, the latest in date of enactment by the general assembly prevails.
Code chapter 4• 4.12 Acts or statutes are severable.
• If any provision of an Act or statute or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act or statute which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the Act or statute are severable.
Code chapter 4• 4.13 General savings provision.• 1. The reenactment, revision, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not affect any of the following:• a. The prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken under the
statute.• b. Any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation, or liability previously
acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred under the statute.• c. Any violation of the statute or penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred
in respect to the statute, prior to the amendment or repeal.• d. Any investigation, proceeding, or remedy in respect of any privilege,
obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment; and the investigation, proceeding, or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced, and the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment imposed, as if the statute had not been repealed or amended.
• 2. If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for any offense is reduced by a reenactment, revision, or amendment of a statute, the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment if not already imposed shall be imposed according to the statute as amended.
Statutory Scheme• “Context is king[.]” Des Moines Flying Serv., Inc. v. Aerial Servs. Inc., 880 N.W.2d 212, 221 (Iowa 2016).• Consider the section as a whole • Consider the chapter as a whole• Consider the title the chapter is in
• Defined terms
Statutory Scheme – Section as a Whole• Phelps v. State Public Defender, 794 N.W.2d 826 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010)
• Court considers other subsections and the Code chapter to interpret meaning
• Richard Phelps is an attorney who has contracted with the state public defender to perform legal work. On the contract, Phelps had checked “criminal”, but not “appellate”. Phelps performed and billed for appellate criminal work, and the state public defender's office refused to pay Phelps on the theory that the Phelps was appointed contrary to Code section 814.11 (indigent’s right to counsel).
Statutory Scheme – Section as a Whole• Iowa Code section 814.11(4) (2010)
• If the state appellate defender is unable to handle the case or withdraws from the case, or if the appeal is other than an indictable offense or denial of postconviction relief including a juvenile case in which a petition on appeal is not required or a juvenile case in which the trial attorney has withdrawn from the case, the court shall appoint an attorney who has a contract with the state public defender to handle such an appeal. (emphasis added)
• State public defender’s office argues that that was no contract to handle such an appeal, and therefore no authority to make the payment.
Statutory Scheme – Section as a Whole• Issue: Does “such an appeal” mean that the contract between the attorney and the state public defender’s office must specifically be for an appeal? Or is it enough that Phelps had a contract to perform legal services in a criminal case that went to appeal?
• Court looks at the rest of Code section 814.11• Court says that the distinction made in that section is between contract and noncontract attorneys. E.g., Code section 814.11(5) (2010)• If the court determines that no contract attorney is available to handle the appeal, the court may appoint a noncontract attorney, if the state public defender consents to the appointment of the noncontract attorney. The order of appointment shall include a specific finding that no contract attorney is available and the state public defender consents to the appointment.
• Court says “such an appeal” is a “reference” that “acknowledges” that Code chapter 814 is titled “Appeals from the District Court”
• Court rules that Phelps should be paid
Statutory Scheme – Chapter as a Whole
Statutory Scheme – Chapter as a Whole• “Forfeitures are not favored under the law and this court strictly construes statutes allowing forfeitures. State v. Kaufman, 201 N.W.2d 722, 723 (Iowa 1972).” In re Property Seized from Williams, 676 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 2004).
Statutory Scheme – Chapter as a Whole• “Although our supreme court has said that it strictly construes statutes allowing forfeitures, In re Property Seized from Williams, 676 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 2004), section 809A.23 states: ‘The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.’ Ultimately, our goal is to promote and give effect to the legislature's intent. In re Property Seized from Williams, 646 N.W.2d 861, 865 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002).” In re Property Seized from Mirzai, No. 11‐0540, slip op. at 4 (Iowa App. Dec. 21, 2011).
• “‘Forfeitures are not favored under the law[,] and this court strictly construes statutes allowing forfeitures.’ In re Prop. Seized for Forfeiture from Williams, 676 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 2004).” In re Property Seized from Li, No. 17‐1237, slip op. at 7 (Iowa Apr. 27 2018)
Statutory Scheme – Chapter as a Whole• Purpose of chapter can be relevant in interpreting statutes• Star Equipment, Ltd. v. State, 843 N.W.2d 446 (Iowa 2014)
• Code sections 573.2 and 12.44 requires state agencies to waive the bond requirement for targeted small businesses that “are able to demonstrate the inability of securing such a bond because of a lack of experience, lack of net worth, or lack of capital.”
• “If the requirement for a bond is waived pursuant to section 12.44, a person, firm, or corporation, having a contract with the targeted small business or with subcontractors of the targeted small business, for labor performed or materials furnished, in the performance of the contract on account of which the bond was waived, is entitled to any remedy provided under this chapter. When a bond has been waived pursuant to section 12.44, the remedies provided for under this paragraph are available in an action against the public corporation.” Iowa Code section 573.2
Statutory Scheme – Chapter as a Whole• Subcontractors argue that Code section 573.2 entitles them to collect from the Iowa Department of Transportation the amounts owed by the targeted small business when the bond has been waived and the retained funds are insufficient.
• The Iowa Department of Transportation argues that the provision only means that the subcontractors are entitled to seek compensation from the retained percentage when the bond requirement has been waived.
• Court interprets Code section 573.2 to effectuate the legislature’s purpose in enacting that statute, which was to protect subcontractors and materialmen against the risk of nonpayment on public projects, and therefore can recover against the public corporation.
Statutory Scheme – Chapter Placement • Shumate v. Drake University, 846 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 2014)• Issue was whether Code chapter 216C (rights of persons with disabilities) created a private cause of action
• Dispositive factor in test for whether a private cause of action is created is legislative intent
• Court looks at other chapters in subtitle 1 of Title VI of the Iowa Code and observes that chapters 216 (civil rights commission) and 216E (assistive devices) expressly created a private cause of action• “This is an indication that the legislature did not create such a right in Chapter 216C; had it intended to do so it would have used language similar to that in Chapter 216E.”
• Court holds that legislature did not intend to create a private cause of action in chapter 216C
• In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 2000)
Statutory Scheme - Definitions • Legislative body may be its own lexicographer. Young v. O’Keefe, 69 N.W.2d 534 (Iowa 1955).
• “‘If, however, the definitions are arbitrary and result in unreasonable classifications or are uncertain, then the court is not bound by the definitions.’ (quoting 1A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 20.08, at 59 (4th ed. 1972)).” Iowa Beef Processers, Inc. v. Miller, 312 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1981).• His employment is principally localized in this state, that is, his employer has a place of business in this or some other state and he regularly works in this state, or if he is domiciled in this state . . . . Code section 85.71 (1981)
• Watch out for chapters with multiple definition sections (e.g., Code chapter 232 (juvenile justice), Code chapter 422 (individual income, corporate, and franchise taxes), and Code chapter 633 (probate code)).
• Definitions in Code section 4.1
Court Imposed Rules• Headnotes are not part of the law. “[N]o part of the statutory law of the State, and its inclusion in the information in the instant case adds nothing to the information." State v. Chenoweth, 284 N.W. 110, 112 (Iowa 1939).• Exception for Uniform Commercial Code. Iowa Code section 554.1107
• Tax statutes are strictly construed against the taxing body. DodgenIndustries, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Comm’n, 160 N.W. 2d 289, 296 (Iowa 1968).• However, exemptions from tax are construed strictly against the taxpayer. Iowa Auto Dealers Ass'n v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 301 N.W.2d 760, 765 (Iowa 1981) .
• Penal statutes are strictly construed, and if they are subject to different interpretations, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Oldfather, 306 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Iowa 1981).
Court Imposed Rules• Legislative History
• “We also consider the legislative history of a statute, including prior enactments, when ascertaining legislative intent.” Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Iowa 2013).
• Courts consider prior forms of bills in relation to the bill the legislature ultimately passed. Branstad v. State ex rel. Nat. Res. Comm'n, 871 N.W.2d 291, 297 (Iowa 2015).
• “In common with most states we will not consider a legislator’s private interpretation of the statute, even if the legislator was actively involved in drafting and enacting the legislation.” Ruthven Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Emmetsburg Comm. Sch. Dist., 382 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Iowa 1986).
Court Imposed Rules• Karen L. Wallace, Does the Past Predict the Future?: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Iowa Supreme Court Use of Legislative History as a Window into Statutory Construction in Iowa, 63 Drake L. Rev. 239 (2015).• Analysis of Iowa Supreme Court decisions between 2004 and 2013• Court relied on legislative history in 11% of relevant cases
Court Imposed Rules• Legislative History
• Bill explanations• The legislature enacts the bill — not the accompanying explanation.
But, the internal rules governing the general assembly require the title and explanation to be accurate. . . . [W]hen the explanation accompanies the text of the bill enacted without a relevant substantive change, the explanation is part of the legislative history that can be examined in our efforts to determine the meaning of the text. Star Equipment, Ltd. v. State, 843 N.W.2d 446, 454 n.3 (Iowa 2014).
Court Imposed Rules• Expression of one excludes others
• Iowa Bankers Ass'n v. Iowa Credit Union Dep't, 335 N.W.2d 439, 446 (Iowa 1983)
• Court did not impose a specific time constraint for when an agency must provide a concise statement of a rule after request was made, as the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA) did not specifically provide it and there are numerous other places in the IAPA where such time limits exist.
• IAPA was later amended to include a specific time constraint• Statutes with the same subject matter must be considered together (pari materia)• State v. Harrison, 325 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982)• Court interpreted Code section 725.7 (gaming and betting – penalty) by also considering Code section 725.10 (pool selling – places used) to distinguish bookmaking and registering bets
Court Imposed Rules• Rule of ejusdem generis
• “Where general words follow specific words in an enumeration describing the legal subject, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. Where the opposite sequence is found, i.e., specific words following a general, the doctrine is equally applicable, restricting application of the general term to things that are similar to those enumerated.” Fleur de Lis Motor Inns, Inc. v. Bair, 301 N.W. 2d 685, 690 (Iowa 1981).
• “No person shall sell, give, or otherwise supply alcoholic liquor or beer to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe him to be under legal age . . .” Iowa Code section 123.47. “Since the words ‘sell’ and ‘give’ are more specific than ‘otherwise supply,’ the latter words should be construed to embrace meanings similar in nature to ‘sell’ and ‘give’ rather than the different and much broader meaning for which plaintiffs contend.” De More v. Dieters, 334 N.W. 2d 734, 738 (Iowa 1983).
• “[A]ll sleeping rooms, apartments or sleeping quarters in any hotel, motel, inn, public lodging house, rooming house, or tourist court[]” does not include hospital rooms. Fleur de Lis Motor Inns, Inc. at 690.
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