REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
RWANDA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER
October 2010
UNDP - DFID
P.o Box 174, Kigali – Rwanda : Tél. ( +250) 571766, Fax ( +250) 571759
E-mail : [email protected] Website : http //www.nurc.gov.rw
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CONTENTS
Table of contents...............................................................................................................1
Acronyms...........................................................................................................................4
List of tables ......................................................................................................................5
List of figures.....................................................................................................................6
Foreword...........................................................................................................................8
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................9
Executive summary..........................................................................................................10
I INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 14
1.1. Background and context ................................................................................... 14 1.2. Promoting National Unity and Reconciliation .................................................... 15
II LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUALISING RECONCILIATION .................................... 16
2.1. Reconciliation in Theory .................................................................................... 16
III RECONCILIATION IN THE RWANDAN CONTEXT ........................................................ 18
IV RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................ 21
4.1. Project Objective ............................................................................................... 22 4.2.Quantitative measurement of reconciliation ...................................................... 23
V RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 24
5.1. Population Data ................................................................................................ 24 5.2. Sample .............................................................................................................. 25 5.3. Sampling Stratification ...................................................................................... 24 5.4. Data Collection and Entry .................................................................................. 27 5.5. Quality control measures .................................................................................. 27
VI FIELDWORK AND DATA COLLECTION IN PRACTICE ................................................... 28
6.1. Implementation Risks and Challenges ............................................................... 28 6.2. Experiences in the Field .................................... 286.3. Political climate and trends ................................................................................................................................ 30 6.4. Influence of Local Leadership ............................................................................ 31 6.5. Citizen Responses to the RRB............................................................................. 31 6.6. Further considerations: qualitative evaluations ................................................. 32
VII ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................... 32
VIII RRB RESULTS: DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF RESEARCH SAMPLE ............................ 34
8.1. Age and gender....................................................................................................34
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8.2. Area of residence and employment status...........................................................34
8.3. Level of education.................................................................................................35
8.4. Social categories...................................................................................................37
IX RRB RESULTS: POLITICAL CULTURE ......................................................................... .36
9.1. Trust in institutions ........................................................................................... 37 9.2. Confidence in the media .................................................................................... 38 9.3. Trust in leadership............................................................................................. 40 9.4. Citizen participation .......................................................................................... 41 9.5. Political culture summary findings.......................................................................44
X RRB RESULTS: HUMAN SECURITY ............................................................................. 44
10.1. Physical Security.............................................................................................. 46 10.2. Economic Security ........................................................................................... 47 10.3. Changes in Rwanda since 1994 ....................................................................... 51 10.4. Direction of the Country Overall ...................................................................... 50 10.5. Human Security Summary Findings ................................................................. 54
XI RRB RESULTS: CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY ............................................................... 54
11.1. National Identity(a) ......................................................................................... 55 11.2. Individual identity(b) ....................................................................................... 56 11.3. Citizenship and identity summary findings........................................................58
XII UNDERSTANDING THE PAST .................................................................................... 59
12.1. Acknowledgements of facts and history teaching.............................................59
12.2. Summary findings on understanding the past...................................................62
XIII TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ............................................................................................ 63
13.1. Individual Healing ........................................................................................... 63 13.2. Parties to reconciliation .................................................................................. 65 13.3. Transitional Justice in Rwanda ........................................................................ 66 13.4. Transitional Justice Summary Findings..............................................................72
XIV SOCIAL COHESION ................................................................................................... 73
14.1. Personal experience of ethnic discrimination....................................................73
14.2. Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict and genocide.....................................................................................................................76
14.3. Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994.............................................78
14.4. Being Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact....................................................81
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14.5. Approval of inter-ethnic interactions..................................................................84
14.6. Primary and secondary sources of division in Rwandan society.........................87
14.7. Social Cohesion Summary Findings....................................................................88
XV CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. ...88
ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................95
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ACRONYMS
CSO Civil Society Organisation DFID Department for International Development (UK) GDP Gross Domestic Product ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda IJR Institute for Justice and Reconciliation IRDP Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace MINALOC Ministry of Local Administration NURC National Unity and Reconciliation Commission PSGG Programme to Strengthen Good Governance RPF Rwandese Patriotic Front RRB Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer SARB South African Reconciliation Barometer UNDP United Nations Development Programme US$ United States of America Dollar N.B USE OF ‘’ETHNIC GROUPS” TERMINOLOGY This terminology has been used to refer to Hutu, Tusti and Twa but, on scientific basis, Hutu, Tusti and Twa in Rwanda are not Ethnic groups
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TABLES Table 1: Conceptual overview of variables, hypotheses and indicators...........................
Table 2: Age and gender of survey respondents...........................................................
Table 3: Economic security...............................................................................................
Table 4: Changes in Rwanda since 1994...........................................................................
Table 5: National identity and contributions to reconciliation.........................................
Table 6: Understanding the past disaggregated by age category (% Agreement)...........
Table 71: Understanding the past disaggregated by social categories (% Agreement)....
Table 8: Individual healing...............................................................................................
Table 9: Parties to reconciliation.....................................................................................
Table 10: Perceptions on Justice delivered.......................................................................
Table11: Perceptions on Justice to Rwandans disaggregated by their social categories..
Table 12: Experiences of ethnic discrimination by social group.....................................
Table 132: Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict and
Genocide by social category..........................................................................................
Table 14: Spontaneous inter-ethnic contact by social category (% often/always).................................................................................................................
Table 15: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact occurs by age group ........................
Table 16: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions............................................................
Table 17: Approval of spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions by social category .............
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Sampling stratification......................................................................................
Figure 2: Area in which interviews were conducted......................................................
Figure 3: Employment status.........................................................................................
Figure 4: Level of education...........................................................................................
Figure 5: Social categories.............................................................................................
Figure 6: Trust in public institutions..............................................................................
Figure 7: Confidence in the media................................................................................
Figure 8: Trust in leadership..........................................................................................
Figure 9: Citizen Participation.......................................................................................
Figure 10: Ability to influence laws and public decisions............................................,
Figure 11: Ability to influence laws and decisions disaggregated by gender...............
Figure 12: Physical security..........................................................................................
Figure 13 – Economic security disaggregated by gender.............................................
Figure 14: Direction of the country overall..................................................................
Figure 15- Direction of the country overall disaggregated by gender.........................
Figure 16a: Individual identity .......................................................................................
Figure 16b: Individual identity .......................................................................................
Figure 17 Individual healing disaggregated by gender.............................................
Figure 18: Perceptions on Justice delivered...............................................................
Figure 19: Level of agreement over ICTR performance............................................
Figure 20: Experience of ethnic discrimination........................................................
Figure 21: Experience of ethnic discrimination, disaggregated by age group..........
Figure 22: Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict
and genocide.................................................................................................
Figure 23: Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994..................................
Figure 24: Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994 disaggregated
by gender.......................................................................................................
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Figure 25: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact...................................................
Figure 26: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact disaggregated by gender...........
Figure 27: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions disaggregated by gender.............
Figure 28: Primary and secondary sources of division in Rwandan society.............
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FOREWORD
For more than sixteen years, Rwanda has been and is still embarking on the way of reconciliation
after many decades of divisionism which culminated into the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Even
though our past tragedy has passed, Rwandans have to heal the wounds of the past. They have to
do more in rebuilding the needed social cohesion and the recommendable human being under
supportive good governance.
Given the situation where the country is coming from characterized by a collapsed society and state,
we needed for long time to measure in the appropriate manner on going process of unity and
reconciliation in order to evaluate and focus to main challenges if any. On this note, the Rwanda
Reconciliation Barometer (RRB) is addressing that issue as a measurement tool that is assessing the
progress in the field of the Reconciliation in Rwanda.
Variables in relation with reconciliation have been identified and extended to related indicators
which have enabled the drawing of a comprehensive questionnaire that was submitted to a sampled
population. The research findings are very recommendable with some gaps to fill given the fact that
the Reconciliation is a process which was started and still on going.
We have achieved a lot but we have not yet reached the desired level. For such reasons, Rwandans
need to speed up the building of a prosperous and peaceful country. What we have achieved in the
last sixteen years must energize us to go further in cleaning up the understanding and the behaviors
which could be a barrier of unity and reconciliation among Rwandans.
We are witnessing that Rwanda is in a new era, making new records of togetherness, mutual
respect and complementarity. The Miss interpretation and falsification of history that saved to
spread divisionism among Rwandans are over. To day Rwandans are proud to be what they are and
are in the way to make themselves what they want to be. The unity and reconciliation process has
shown recommendable results for which Rwandans are proud of.
GOD bless Rwanda
Bishop John RUCYAHANA
Chairperson
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer (RRB) project is in line with the NURC’s mandate to
promote national unity and reconciliation in a post-genocide Rwanda, and represents an
attempt to deepen its understanding of how ordinary citizens perceive and react to efforts
aimed at promoting these objectives. The study has emerged from the need for a
quantitative monitoring tool that would allow the Commission to access the most current
public opinion on the progress and pitfalls of the country’s national reconciliation
programme, Such a tool would allow it to respond in a more targeted way to social fault
lines and, in the longer term, may serve as an early warning system to potential sources of
societal friction. Public opinion around national reconciliation has, thus far, been an under-
researched aspect in the search to understand national unity and reconciliation processes in
Rwanda, and this report presents the results of exploratory research on this area.
Inspired from, among others, the conceptual framework and methodology of the South
African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB), which has measured public opinion on national
reconciliation in that country since 2003, the Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer (RBB) is a
national public opinion survey that intends to track progress on the road to reconciliation in
Rwanda by means of a structured quantitative research instrument. The survey consisted of
face-to-face interviews with approximately three thousand Rwandan citizens, across all
thirty districts of the country, to represent a sampling universe of all citizens who have
reached the legal age of majority (approximately 4,963,000 adults). Due to the unavailability
of population data on the district level following territorial reforms, the project employed a
multi-stage probability sampling methodology. Sampling stratification was conducted across
different levels: district; sector; cell; village; household; and according to gender (by
ensuring that every second interview was conducted with a woman). A quantitative data
collection approach was used, through the form of face-to-face interviews administered in
Kinyarwanda based on a structured questionnaire.
In preparation the research team, through a series of consultations with experts inside and
outside of Rwanda, distilled six key hypotheses that are critical to the state of-, and future
prospects for national unity and reconciliation in the country. The hypotheses, their
indicators, and public responses to their measurement are summarised below:
1. Political Culture: The first hypothesis posited that if citizens view political structures,
institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and effective, national reconciliation
is more likely to occur. Survey questions and statements therefore measured
confidence in public institutions, trust in leadership, and the respect of rule of law
and courts. In brief, the results indicate moderate to high levels ( more than 90%) of
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trust in public institutions overall (compared to generally lower levels of trust in non-
governmental- and private institutions), in the country’s political leadership. The
survey also recorded significantly high percentages of respondents who indicated
participation or willingness to participate in citizen forums (more than 85%). The
major exception to this has been in regard with the willingness to participate in
actions closely associated with protest or dispute (less than 50%).
2. Human security: The second hypothesis contended that if citizens feel materially,
physically, and culturally secure, they will be more willing to commit themselves to
national reconciliation processes. This hypothesis is based on the contention that
under conditions of scarcity in a society with a history of ethnic friction, conflict is
more likely to arise along such ethnic lines. The indicators that were used included:
physical security; economic security; equality of treatment and access; freedom of
expression; and respondents’ hope for the future. Respondents reported relatively
high levels of physical and economic security; a majority felt that great strides have
been made in all respects since 1994; and there was significant approval of the
overall direction of the country (more than 90% overall). It was, however, evident
that positive public evaluation for human security was less emphatic than that for
most other hypotheses tested.
3. Citizenship and Identity: The third hypothesis suggested that in contexts where a
shared sense of citizenship and identity, as well as tolerance for diversity exists,
national reconciliation is more likely to occur. It explores the indicators of national
and individual identity, attitudes regarding citizenship, and the prevalence of shared
cultural values. Respondents exhibited a strong preference for a national Rwandan
identity (more than 97% overall) and national values, but many participants also
incorrectly believed that references to ethnicity or ethnic groups are prohibited by
law or instruction in Rwanda. Other identities that respondents were likely to
associate with were religious-based, value-based and geographically-based
4. Understanding the past: This hypothesis is based on the assumption that if
Rwandans are able to confront the sources of historical social divisions,
reconciliation is more likely to occur, particularly between those who found
themselves on opposing sides during the genocide. The study identified the degree
to which a shared understanding of the country’s history exists (through the
acknowledgement of facts or the truth) as a critical indicator of the extent to which
the country is coming to terms with its past. The results show that a considerable
majority (87.0%) agreed that in the sixteen years following the genocide, most of the
major issues related to its causes and consequences have been frankly discussed and
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understood. However, a significant percentage of respondents (almost 39.9%)
believe that there are people in Rwandan society that would still perpetrate acts of
genocide if given the opportunity.
5. Transitional justice: The fifth hypothesis contends that if parties to conflict are
convinced that they got proper justice, there is greater likelihood for reconciliation.
This was measured by a range of indicators that are associated with the broader field
of transitional justice. Most respondents felt that significant strides were made in
terms of the creation of domestic transitional justice measures. As far as the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is concerned, the survey found
that although most Rwandans were aware of its purpose and evaluated it positive
(nearly 60%), close to a quarter were not in a position to wage an opinion on its
effectiveness.
6. Social cohesion: The final hypothesis proposes that if trust increases between
Rwandan citizens, and particularly those on different sides of the genocide,
reconciliation is more likely to occur. As a result the survey presented respondents
with a number of statements and questions relating to social distance, tolerance,
and trust. The data suggests that citizens sense significant progress in terms of
forging social cohesion in the wake of the 1994 genocide (more than 92% overall).
Responses suggest positive development (more thatn 80% overall) in terms of inter-
ethnic relations and interactions, as well as the levels of trust that exist between
communities that found themselves on different sides during the genocide.
The report concludes with a discussion of the major findings, policy recommendations, and
suggestions for further research. In terms of methodological lessons learned, the immediate
context on the pre-election mood was found to be less than ideal, given that the very nature
of such campaigns are to sway or reinforce opinions from those citizens may normally hold.
In addition, the RBB questionnaire raises a number of sensitive issues that may require
supplementary qualitative approach in the form of focus group discussion.
In terms of policy-oriented recommendations, it was evident that even though citizens
showed significant levels of confidence and trust in state institutions and political leadership
to deliver on their mandate, responses were more reserved in relation to evaluations
relating to human security, and particularly so where it is concerned with respondents’
sense of economic security is concerned. Since most forms of social conflict has got
economic roots, it is imperative that attention should be paid to this finding. While
economic growth and personal economic security may very often be contingent upon the
whims of the global economy, it nevertheless remain incumbent upon the state to
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guarantee equal access to government resources to all citizens, and to ensure that the
country’s economic and natural assets are managed transparently so as to avoid any
charges of ethnic- or any other sectional form of favouritism.
In conclusion, the RRB instrument has set baseline indicators for future surveys. The results
that it has rendered should, as a result, also be regarded as baseline findings that do not
point to an improvement or decline in the evaluation of the particular indicators. This can
only be done when subsequent surveys are being compared against this first round. The
report, therefore, recommends that the NURC endeavours to ensure a regular update of
this instrument in order to track the current, but also new indicators, should emerge. In
addition, and as mentioned above, it is recommended that this quantitative data should be
supplemented by qualitative approaches, such as focus groups, to further probe the factors
that inform these survey responses.
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I INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background and context
From the 1950’s through the 1990’s, Rwanda came into international focus for a host of
reasons, including ongoing conflict, a record of severe human abuses, and the actions of
successive governments that seriously violated the rights of citizens with impunity. Dating
back to the colonial period, and throughout periods of conflict and regime change,
successive governments’ entrenched deep-set divisions within Rwandan society, particularly
along ethnic lines. These divisions were further enforced through the enacting and
implementation of dehumanising law and policy, inequality of treatment, and differential
access to amenities, basic services and the protection of the state. As a consequence, many
Rwandans left the country as refugees, settling in neighbouring states and further abroad.
During the 1990’s, Rwanda’s political instability and unrest was further exacerbated by the
country’s high levels of poverty, its tenuous relations within the region, and increased
political opposition, both within and outside of the country’s borders, culminating in military
clashes between the regime of President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Rwandese Patriotic
Front (RPF). Although efforts to promote peace and an end to armed conflict appeared to be
on track with the signing of the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord, this peace proved fleeting.
Instead, violence quickly escalated to a massive scale and the final phase of the genocide
claimed over a million lives of Tutsi and fellow Hutu who found themselves on the victims’
side for number of reasons.
The genocide of 1994 shred all that was left of the Rwandan social fabric that provided a
degree of social cohesion prior to the genocide. In its aftermath the country was left with a
collapsed system of governance, a highly polarised society characterised by distrust and fear
between citizens, and a lack of shared national unity.
Fortunately, this sad chapter in African history is being left behind through forward–looking
reconstruction efforts and the will of Rwanda’s people to re-shape and redefine
reconciliation and social reconstruction, from a perspective that emphasises bottom-up
approaches and development from within the country.
With the return of peace, the country’s major challenges were firstly, to build its governance
infrastructure, but this was highly contingent upon the second challenge, national
reconciliation, which was needed to restore national unity and political stability. At the time
few were willing to wage their bets on success in surmounting either of these challenges.
Yet, when compared to several of its East African neighbours, Rwanda today enjoys a
substantial level of political stability. These factors, together with the country’s robust
economic growth in recent years, suggest that its government and public institutions, such
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as NURC, have by and large been successful in arresting the major sources of domestic of
instability.
1.2. Promoting National Unity and Reconciliation
Even prior to the 1994 genocide, and with the 1993 signing of the Arusha Peace Accord,
national unity and reconciliation have been viewed as requisite priorities for the re-
establishment and consolidation of democracy, peace and security, the rule of law, social
cohesion and development in Rwanda. As described by the NURC, the “Arusha Peace
Accords, signed in August 1993 between the then-government and the Rwandese Patriotic
Front, considered Unity and Reconciliation as a process that is fundamental for the stability
and development of Rwanda.”1
In light of this reality, in the post-genocide period, the new Rwandan Government put in
place a unique assortment of international, nation-state, homegrown, and reconciliatory
mechanisms. Rwanda possesses one of the only two international criminal tribunals
established since Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II (the other being the court for
the former Yugoslavia), the efforts of which have contributed substantively to the
developing field of International Criminal Law.
Rwanda’s efforts to prosecute genocidaires may be compared with other cases where
transitional justice prioritised the prosecution of perpetrators of past political atrocities. In
this connection, the “Rwandan approach” to prosecute as many génocidaires as possible
was also in line with the provisions of the Rome Treaty, that amnesties amounting to legal
impunity are no longer acceptable for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.
Although the Treaty was only enacted some years after the Rwanda genocide, it has, since
its ratification, added momentum to international efforts to prosecute génocidaires.2
Moreover, the United Nations-sponsored International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
has added significantly to international genocide case law and has been the subject of
various studies.3
1 National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. “Unity and Reconciliation: Understanding Unity & Reconciliation Profess 15 Years after Genocide.” NURC Review Magazine, p 3. 2 See: http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_English.pdf. 3 See for example, Payam Akhavan, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment,’ The American Journal of International Law 90 (1996): 501–510; Payam Akhavan, ‘Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,’ Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 7, 2 (Spring 1997): 338; as well as Oliver Dubois, ‘Rwanda’s national criminal courts and the International Tribunal,’ International Review of the Red Cross 321 (1997): 718; see also International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed’ (Nairobi, Arusha and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 7 June 2001): 11–12, [Electronic]. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400442_02102001.pdf [9 October 2007]; Alison Des Forges and Timothy Longman, ‘Legal responses to genocide in Rwanda’, in My Neighbor, My Enemy,
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As complement to the activities of its domestic courts, the Rwandan government
established a revamped version of the traditional Gacaca courts in June of 2002, with
elected judges and a jury of the defendant's neighbours, to accelerate justice and to
unburden a prison system overloaded by an estimated 130,000 alleged genocide
perpetrators.4
The establishment of the NURC also represented one of Rwanda’s principle non-judicial
measures to promote reconciliation. With its foundations traceable to Article 24 of the
Arusha Peace Accord, in the Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework
of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of
Rwanda and the RPF5, the formal establishment of the NURC was the outcome of reflection
meetings convened by the Presidency in 1998-1999 to discuss a range of issues pertaining to
the history of Rwanda and ways forward in the aftermath of genocide. The NURC was
formally instituted in Parliament through the passing of law No 03/99 of 12 March 1999,
and with the broad mandate of promoting and fostering reconciliation among Rwandans,
the NURC has enjoyed political will and support from the highest political levels since its
inception.
II LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUALISING RECONCILIATION
The concept of reconciliation, and efforts to measure it quantitatively, is a relatively new
research focus of increasing interest internationally, although substantive work has been
carried out by the IJR in this respect, through the South African Reconciliation Barometer,
conducted since 2003.
This growing importance worldwide is also confirmed by the United Nation’s declaration of
2009 as the International Year of Reconciliation, in order to highlight its significance for the
large numbers of countries facing post-conflict transitions.6 The concept of reconciliation is
extremely complex, and encapsulates a multitude of principles, variables, dimensions, and
meanings. Despite strong consensus over its necessity and desirability for enduring peace,
ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 53f; Madeline H. Morris, ‘The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda,’ Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 7, 2 (Spring 1997): 363; Oomen, ‘Justice Mechanisms,’ 19. See also Reydams, ‘The ICTR Ten Years On,’ 977–988; Helena Cobban, ‘The Legacies of Collective Violence: The Rwandan genocide and the limits of law,’ Boston Review 7, 2 (April/May 2002) [Electronic]. Available at: www.bostonreview.net/BR27.2/cobban.html [April 2008]. 4 Tiemessen, A.E., 2004. “After Arusha Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda”, African Studies Quarterly Vol
8 Issue 1, Fall 2004. 5 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.
Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front. 6 United Nations 2006. “UN General Assembly Resolution 61/17.” Available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/495/45/PDF/N0649545.pdf?OpenElement
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there is little academic agreement over its definition, further complicating the task of
measuring it within societies such as Rwanda.
The measurement of a social trend as complex as reconciliation is not uncontested.
However, Amstutz (2006) suggests that quantifying aspects of progress in reconciliation
should include evaluations of breadth and scope, referring to the numbers of people
involved, as well as the depth and intensity of divisions, including degrees of inter-group
trust and cooperation.7
James L. Gibson (2004) maintains that “truth and reconciliation are concepts that can be
(and should be) measured and assessed using rigorous and systematic social science
methods.” Referring to the case of post-apartheid South Africa, Gibson suggests that
reconciliation can be viewed in terms of “at least four specific and perhaps even
independent sub-concepts”, including: inter-racial reconciliation, including inter-group trust
and the rejection of stereotypes; political tolerance; support for the principles (abstract and
applied) of human rights; and, recognition and acceptance of the political institutions of the
democratic South Africa.8
While global attention to reconciliation is growing, Parmentier (2009) observes that the
current notion of reconciliation is “closely connected” to the ground-breaking work of the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) — although it had already
previously featured in the ICTR’s Statute.9 The principles underpinning the TRC’s approach
to reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa included the needs for “understanding but
not for vengeance”, for “reparation but not for retaliation”, and for “ubuntu but not for
victimisation”. In Rwanda, as well as in South Africa, the process of reconciliation was
posited as a form of restorative justice that would bring together perpetrators of such
crimes (Apartheid and genocide) with victims and the broader public, with the goal of
“correcting imbalances, restoring broken relationships with healing, harmony and
reconciliation.”
2.1. Reconciliation in Theory
A fundamental question posed by both theorists and practitioners is whether reconciliation
should be conceived as a process, or rather, as the end result of a process, or indeed both.
However, often it is construed as a process that is deliberately and systematically pursued
due to the desirability of its end-result.
7 Amstutz, M. R., 2006. “Is Reconciliation Possible after Genocide?: The Case of Rwanda,” Journal of Church
and State 48(3), p. 546. 8 Gibson, J.L., 2004. Overcoming Apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation? HSRC Press and Russell Sage
Foundation, Cape Town and New York, p. 4. 9 Parmentier, S. “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation for International Crimes: who holds the roadmap?”
Promotio Institiae, 103, March 2009, p. 66.
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Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004) synthesise fourteen researchers’ definitions of the reconciliation
process as: “the formation or restoration of genuine peaceful relationships between
societies that have been involved in intractable conflict, after its formal resolution is
achieved.”10 This definition highlights the second major feature of reconciliation: whether
seen as a process or an end, it occurs after the official conclusion to a conflict, and thus
generally aims to resolve “invisible” conflict. Moreover, its focus on “societies” confirms the
aim of uniting disparate groups, wherein the psychological, economic and socio-political
conditions of each party are important considerations.
Kriesberg (2007) identifies the four primary dimensions of reconciliation as truth, justice,
respect, and security, and states that “the degree of reconciliation varies in the extent and
intensity to which all the dimensions are fulfilled.”11 Consistent with the findings of Bar-Tal
and Bennink, Kriesberg suggests that reconciliation “generally refers to the process of
developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between enemies or formerly antagonistic
groups”. Further, the author adds that reconciliation “often refers to the process of moving
toward a relatively cooperative and amicable relationship, typically established after a
rupture in relations involving extreme injury to one or more sides in the relationship”.12
I. William Zartmann, cited by Umutesi (2006), goes further and explicitly incorporates the
importance of confronting the past in order to move forward and “arrive at a pacified
society where free and equal individuals acknowledge each other and are capable of facing
up to a history full of violent acts, and above all, are able to surmount that history.”13
A number of theorists refer specifically to the process of political reconciliation, as referring
to “only those relationships that are proper to the political order.”14 According to Amstutz
(2006), “political reconciliation can be conceived as the restoration of harmonious
relationships”, and therefore, “to become reconciled is to overcome alienation, division, and
enmity and to restore peaceful, cooperative relationships based on a shared commitment to
communal solidarity.”15
Like Gibson, Amstutz suggests that the “truth” is conducive to healing in deeply divided
societies. However, the author also maintains that truth does not guarantee reconciliation,
and that reconciliation and justice are not necessarily compatible, albeit equally important
10 Cited in Nets-Zehngut, R. “Analyzing the Reconciliation Process, International Journal on World Peace. Vol. XXIV No. 3, Sept. 2007, p. 55. 11
Kriesberg, 6. 12
Kriesberg, L., “Reconciliation: aspects, growth, and sequences.” International Journal of Peace Studies 12(1), Spring/Summer 2007, p. 2. 13
Umutesi, M-B., “Is Reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis Possible?” Journal of International Affairs, Fall/Winter 2006, Vol 60(1), p. 164. 14
Philpott, D. “An Ethic of Political Reconciliation,” Ethics and International Affairs, Vol 23(4), Winter 2009, p. 392. 15
Amstutz, p. 546.
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goals.16 The “dominant liberal peace” approach emphasises the importance of pursuing
justice in post-conflict societies through the use of the courts to recover the objective,
forensic truth about conflict, and punish perpetrators accordingly. Philpott (2009) stresses
the importance of this approach, in defining reconciliation as a “holistic concept, [which]
involves a process of restoration [of right relationships within a community] as well as a
state of restoration, addresses the wide range of harms that crimes cause, and enlists the
wide range of persons affected by these crimes.”17
While Philpott confirms Amstutz’s position that justice does not necessarily equate
reconciliation, the author adds that “reconciliation, both as a process and as an end state, is
itself a concept of justice. Its animating virtue is mercy and its goal is peace. These concepts
are expressed most deeply in religious traditions, including Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam.”18 This implies that punitive justice and the forensic truth achieved by trials are not
sufficient to ensure the other two dimensions of reconciliation, namely mutual respect and
security.
Ultimately - and at times outside the scope of reconciliation theorists – ensuring security is
at the heart of most national reconciliation efforts, in which both governments and citizens
strive to achieve genuine and durable peace above all else. Assuring effectiveness, however,
requires a conflict resolution process and peace agreement based on the basic tenets of
justice, impartiality, and establishing trust between parties—which is generally both an aim
and important determinant of reconciliation.19
III RECONCILIATION IN THE RWANDAN CONTEXT
As outlined in the previous section, even prior to the 1994 genocide, reconciliation was
viewed as an important priority for overcoming a history of conflict within Rwandan society,
as captured in the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord.
The NURC has defined unity and reconciliation as “a consensus practice of citizens who have
common nationality, who share the same culture and have equal rights; citizens
characterized by trust, tolerance, mutual respect, equality, complementary
roles/interdependence, truth, and healing of one another’s wounds inflicted by our history,
with the objectives of laying a foundation for sustainable development.”20 The NURC
maintains that attaining unity and reconciliation among all Rwandans will require a “radical
change on the part of the Rwandan society and willingness to transform Rwanda into a
16
Ibid, p. 542. 17
Philpott, p. 392. 18
Ibid, p. 390. 19
Nets-Zehngut, p. 57. 20 Republic of Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 2007. “The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation.” pp. 6-7.
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reconciled and united nation in which all citizens have equal freedoms and a country that
has a common vision for a better future.”21
The work of the NURC is framed historically by both the 1994 genocide, but also by
Rwanda’s history of conflict, resulting from “various historical eras of bad governance
characterized by divisions and discriminations based on ethnicity, religion, region of origin
and nepotism which have had devastating effects on the social relations” between
Rwandans.22
Furthermore, it is worth noting that unity and reconciliation processes are guided by the
following principles23:
To promote the spirit of Rwandan identity and put national interests first
instead of favours based on ethnicity, blood relations, gender, religion,
region of origin, etc.
To combat the genocide and its ideology
To strive at creating a nation governed by the rule of law and respect for
human rights
To combat any form of divisionism and discrimination
To promote interdependence and synergy in nation building
To multiply strive to heal one another’s physical and psychological wounds
while building future interpersonal trust based on truth telling, repentance
and forgiveness
To commemorate the 1994 genocide with the aim of making “Never Again” a
reality
To strive for self-determination and passion for work
Today the NURC concentrates its attention on the following areas:
Preparing and coordinating the national programme for the promotion of
national unity and reconciliation;
Putting in place and developing ways and means to restore and consolidate
unity and reconciliation among Rwandans;
Educating and mobilizing the population on matters relating to national unity
and reconciliation;
Carrying out Research, organizing Debates, Disseminating ideas and making
Publications related to peace, national unity and reconciliation;
21
Ibid, p. 7. 22 Ibid, p. 7. 23
NURC, The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation, Kigali August 2007, p.11
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Making proposals on measures that can eradicate divisions among Rwandans
and to reinforce national unity and reconciliation;
Denouncing and fighting against Acts, Writings and utterances which are
intended to promote any kind of discrimination, intolerance or xenophobia;
and Making an Annual Reports and such other reports as may be necessary on
the situation of national unity and reconciliation. 24
These functions have been achieved, in part, through the implementation of a number of
key programmes, including: Ingando, which has established more than two hundred “unity
and reconciliation clubs”, primarily among youth; Itorero ry’igihugu, focused on ensuring
ongoing peace and security and improving public service delivery; and, Igorora, a radio
broadcast, in addition to a national consultations, research and other work.25
The Reconciliation Barometer comprises one of the new programmes introduced by the
NURC, in partnership with the IJR and IRDP. Although some research has been conducted on
reconciliation in Rwanda during the ten years since the NURC’s inception, no studies to date
have yielded comprehensive quantitative data that measures the impact of reconciliatory
interventions at the national level. According to the NURC, the RRB “will be applied in
measuring the indicators of the impact of unity and reconciliation right from the grassroots
to the national level. The NURC is also “developing a Reconciliation Barometer Policy”,
which “will support our monitoring strategies particularly how unity and reconciliation is
being implemented.” Further, the NURC plans to “list all indicators of unity and
reconciliation.”26
IV RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Rwanda’s substantial achievements over the last sixteen years are commendable, yet the
relatively short period that has lapsed since the genocide must serve as a reminder that
there is no room for complacency. Gains need to be consolidated and areas where potential
weaknesses still exist must be identified, investigated and remedied.
When asked how Rwanda is doing in terms of its governance and pursuit for national unity
and reconciliation, the country needs to have the best diagnostic tools at its disposal to
identify areas of strength and aspects of weakness. A monitoring tool is required, which
24
The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Amendment Nº 3 of 13/08/2008 25
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. “Unity and Reconciliation: Understanding Unity & Reconciliation Profess 15 Years after Genocide.” NURC Review Magazine, p 11. 26 National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. “Unity and Reconciliation: Understanding Unity & Reconciliation Profess 15 Years after Genocide.” NURC Review Magazine, p 22.
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links issues of governance and national unity and can serve as an early warning system to
alert social stakeholders of potential problem areas.
A number of qualitative and quantitative studies have been conducted to illuminate issues
of governance and social cohesion in Rwanda. The IRDP, one of the partners in this
application, has stood at the forefront of some of these. A gap does however still exist in
terms of quantitative survey research that combines and links the questions of national
unity and reconciliation with issues of governance. Public perception around national
reconciliation, in particular, remains an under-researched aspect of this sphere of
investigation. There is therefore a need to examine the sentiments of ordinary citizens
towards national reconciliation. Has it been strengthened, and if so, to what extent has it
contributed to the development of sense of national unity. Moreover, to what extent have
institutions of governance, such as the NURC contributed to the current state of affairs? In
sum, it is critical to know whether ordinary Rwandans feel the country has moved in the
direction of reconciliation and unity or whether it still struggles to come to terms with its
past. What are the essential obstacles and opportunities for reconciliation? Above all, what
can be done to address these concerns?
One major challenge is the absence of comprehensive, reliable and coherent information,
both in terms of the actual circumstances and in terms of the perceptions of reality. And
even when the data is physically available in state archives, university libraries and various
government departments, the data is often of such a complex and technical nature that it
remains effectively inaccessible to the ordinary citizen. This can result in decisions and
actions, whether by government, aid agencies or the business community, that are made
without factoring in a number of social and political realities that are critical to the
understanding of the context upon which they have bearing.
The RRB has endeavoured to find answers to these key questions and to make such
information broadly accessible to relevant stakeholders. It examines how Rwandans from all
spheres of society react towards one another and how they interact with key governance
institutions, specifically as they pertain to questions of national unity and reconciliation.
4.1. Project Objective
The objective of the project is to contribute towards the process of national unity and
reconciliation through an improved understanding of how ordinary Rwandans perceive and
respond to efforts to promote it. It is hoped that such a study will prompt direct
interventions, but also indirectly stimulate national debates around unity and reconciliation
and the role that institutions of governance ought to play in this regard. As such, the project
entailed a comprehensive and systematic attempt to determine perceived successes and
shortcomings related to national reconciliation and the institutions tasked with its
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promotion, and in the process shift discourses on its enhancement to the centre of policy-
making processes.
This information is presented to the NURC in this document, but ideally it should also be
disseminated more broadly to policy makers, civil society organisations and ordinary people
through a targeted multi-media campaign. The knowledge, understanding and insight that
the Reconciliation Barometer can generate will have the potential to equip organisations
and institutions working at the coal face of the promotion of reconciliation and the
protection of human rights to focus and improve their interventions. As a result the impact
of the Reconciliation Barometer will be particularly evident in the quality of the national
discourse on the issues that the survey addresses.
Beyond this comprehensive survey report, further briefings and/or reports may be
arranged, depending on the availability of the partners. To maximise the utility of the survey
as a national resource, it may therefore also be worth considering a number of briefings to
civil society organisations that are working in this sphere.
4.2. Quantitative measurement of reconciliation
When embarking on the task of ‘measuring’ a process that is as subjective and contested as
reconciliation, certain inherent shortcomings have to be accepted. These range from the
need to oversimplify certain dimensions of the reconciliation process for the sake of
measurability, to having to focus on only a select few facets of this complex and multi-
dimensional concept.
The need to conduct rigorous empirical research on the progression of the national
reconciliation process exists and, in fact, is greater than the inherent difficulties in
embarking this task. But, as is the case with all exploratory research (whether of a
quantitative or qualitative nature), a cautionary approach should be employed. The obvious
danger of excessive reductionism in translating such a complex process in relation to a
handful of critical indicators is recognized. On the contrary, this research recognizes the
definitional and contextual ambiguity of the process. It is a first attempt at some necessary
comparable quantification of the national reconciliation process.
Additionally it is important to bear in mind that the results of the first series of surveys
should not be interpreted as representative of particular trends. Even in cases where change
has been tremendous, three measurements – particularly across quite a short time period -
do not provide sufficient evidence to assume the presence of a trend. Such changes should
be treated as fluctuations; the absence or presence of trends will be confirmed by data
emanating from later rounds of the survey. The results of the first rounds should at best be
interpreted as snapshots of the current public sentiment on the issues that are being
measured.
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V RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer is a national public opinion survey that measures
progress on the road to reconciliation by means of a structured quantitative research
instrument. The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with approximately three
thousand Rwandan citizens, across all thirty districts of the country.
5.1. Population Data
Rwanda is a geographically small and densely-populated country, with a surface area of
26,338 square kilometres and a national population that is predominantly rural and highly
youthful.
Its most recent national census, the General Census of Population and Housing, was
conducted in 2002, and estimated the national population at close to 8.2 million persons.
Women marginally outnumbered men, with the national population made up of
approximately 4.2 million females and 3.9 million males. The Report on the Preliminary
Results of the 2002 census measures population density in 11 provinces and Kigali city.
Ruhengeri Province in the north of the country (894,179 residents, or 11.0% of the national
population) was identified as the most populous area of the country, and Umutara in the
east of the country as the least populous (423,642 residents, or 5.2% of the national
population).27
However, in 2006 Rwanda underwent a programme of territorial re-demarcation, resulting
in a reduction of the number of provinces to 5 (Kigali City and the North, South, East and
West provinces). Thirty districts were also delineated around the country.
Although some initial baseline surveys have been conducted in these recently-established
districts, full population data disaggregated according to district is not yet available.28
As of 2008, World Bank estimates place the national population at 9,720,694,29 with an
average population growth rate of 2.8% between 2005 and 2010.30
The population is relatively young, and United Nations data indicates that 42.8% of the
population in 2008 was aged 0-14, whereas women and men older than 60 comprised only
27
Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and National Census Commission, 2007. “National Census Service: The General Census of Population and Housing, Report on the Preliminary Results.” Available at: http://www.statistics.gov.rw/ 28
According to the National Institute of Statistics, baseline surveys have been conducted in the Southern province (Kamonyi, Muhanga, Nyamagabe, Nyanza, Gisagara, Nyaruguru, Ruhango, and Huye districts), the Western province (Nyabihu, Rutsiro, Rubavu, Nyamasheke, Ngororero, Karongi, and Rusizi districts) and in Kigali city (Nyarugenge, Gasabo, and Kicukiro districts). See http://www.statistics.gov.rw/.
29 World Bank. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda 30
UNData Country Profile: Rwanda.
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4.5% and 3.2% of the population respectively. Also as of 2008, numbers of women
nationally were somewhat higher than men, with a sex ratio of 93.4 men per 100 women.
Life expectancy at birth remains low, at 47.8 years for women and 44.6 years for men.31
As of 2007, only 18% of the Rwanda population was characterised as urban by the United
Nations, although the urban population growth rate of 4.2% between 2005 and 2010
surpassed the rural population growth rate of 2.4% over the same period.32
5.2. Sample
Due to the territorial reforms introduced in the period following Rwanda’s most recent
census, and the limited baseline data available as yet on the district level, a reliable national
sample frame is not available. Therefore, a multi-stage probability sampling methodology
was utilised, with the goal of achieving a representative cross-section of Rwandan citizens.
The sample universe for the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer includes all citizens who have
reached the legal age of majority, or 18 years and older. Data from the National ID Project33
places the national population aged 17 or less at 4,466,587 and that aged 18 and elder at
5,452,788, on the 13th January, 2010.
In consideration of required precision, resources and operational constraints, a sample of
3,000 adults was drawn from the sample universe (5,452,788), with every effort to ensure
random sampling and with the goal that every adult citizen had “an equal and known
chance of being chosen for inclusion in the sample.”34
5.3. Sampling Stratification
The primary stratification for the sample was at the district level, and as a baseline survey
and in the absence of a sampling frame, face-to-face interviews were conducted in all of the
thirty districts (Uturere) created through the 2006 territorial reform programme. However,
following this stratification, random sampling methods were introduced to ensure
representation. Sampling occurred as follows:
Within each of the 30 districts (Uturere) nationally, 3 sector (umurenge) were
randomly selected (of a total of 416 across the country);
Within each of the randomly selected sectors (Imirenge), 1 cell (akagari) was
randomly selected;
31 UNData Country Profile: Rwanda. 32
UNData Country Profile: Rwanda. Available at: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Rwanda 33 National ID Project is a Governement-led institution whose objective is to provide every Rwandan citizen
with National ID that is implemented on electronic card. This ID contains information about the Rwandan
citizen such as civil information, health information, traffic information, etc. 34
Afrobarometer. Available at: http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html.
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Within each of the randomly selected cells (Utugari), 1 village was randomly
selected;
On village level, 33 households were randomly selected in each of the 2 first
selected villages, and 34 households in the 3rd selected village for a total of
100 households per district. Households constituted the primary unit of
analysis.
Figure 1: Sampling Stratification
The average village is comprised of approximately 150 households. In many villages, each
household or plot has a unique number, though this is not always the case. Upon arrival in
the village, interviewers and fieldwork supervisors met with the village leader to introduce
the purpose of the research. Village leaders are often very knowledgeable about residents,
and were able to provide the list of households or householder’s names. Interviewers then
randomly selected 45 households from the total number (by drawing random numbers
“from a hat”). A larger number of households than required were randomly selected in each
village, for replacement purposes. (For futher details on village sampling, see Annex 1:
Selected sectors, cells and Villages).
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At the village level, further stratification was introduced according to gender. Interviewers
visited each of the randomly selected households to conduct interviews with household
residents (not visitors) of 18 years and older. Every second interview was conducted with a
woman35, and all interviews were conducted with citizens of Rwanda. In instances in which
there were more than one possible interview participant, meaning more than one adult of
the correct gender for that household, the participant was randomly selected from available
adults.
Since the definition of a household may differ from one cultural context to another, it was
necessary to ensure that conceptual clarity exists as far as this term is concerned. The
European Social Survey, for example, defines a household as “one person living alone, or a
group of people living at the same address (and have that address as their only or main
residence), who either share at least one main meal a day or share the living
accommodation (or both).”36 The World Values Survey described respondents as “belonging
to the same household if they spend more than 5 nights per week in the said household”37,
while Afrobarometer regards it as “a group of people who presently eat together from the
same pot.”38
The working definition of a household in the RRB is that of the Rwanda General Census of
the Population and Housing (2002). This census gives the following categories of households
and definitions:
1. The private household – a group of persons who live in the same dwelling, share the
same budget and have meals together, or one person living separately. The
members of a household should not necessarily be in family or marital relationship.
2. The family household – a household comprising two or more persons who are in
marital or family relationship. It can be spouses/cohabitants with or without a child
(-ren) or one of parents with a child (-ren) living alone or together with other
persons, etc.
3. The non-family household – a household comprising one person or a group of
persons who are not in marital or family relationship.
4. The institution – a household consisting of persons whose shelter and living needs
are satisfied by an institution.
35 However, in few villages, the rule did not apply because large majorities of residents were widows.This is the
reason why in the respondents distribution we do have slightly more female than male rather than 50% male and
50% female. 36
Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, J.H.P. and Warner, U., 2009. “Private Household Concepts and their Operationalisation in Cross-National Social Surveys” Metodološki zvezki, 6(1), pp. 1-26. 37
The Steadman Group of Companies, 2007. “WVS Rwanda 2007: Field Technical Report”. Available online at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 38
Afrobarometer, www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html,
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All of the following circumstances required the interviewer to leave the selected household
and continue to the next randomly selected household: (1) no one at home; (2) residents
refused to, or were unable to participate in the research; (3) there were no adults, aged 18
or older, present; (4) there was no respondent of the appropriate gender for that
household.
However, when practicable, interviewers were permitted to return to the household at a
later time if a potential participant was likely to be available. In instances in which the
selected respondent was not at home to conduct the interview, supervisors instructed
interviewers to conduct two additional recalls at two different times of the day when the
respondent was likely to be at home. Should it happen that the selected respondent was
not available at all on that day or when respondents were unwilling to participate (though
this was seldom the case), interviewers regarded this as a non-response. This
methodological approach is consistent by that followed by the Rwandan sample of the
World Values Survey in 2007.39 This approach also did not allow for the substitution of
respondents within the same household/dwelling.
5.4. Data Collection and Entry
A quantitative data collection approach was used, through the carrying out of face-to-face
interviews using a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was translated and
administered in Kinyarwanda according to the preference of research participants. The
instrument was also pre-tested prior to the commencement of fieldwork. For further
details, see questionnaire here attached as Annex 2.
Data collection was carried out by 30 interviewers, recruited and trained by the Consultants.
Requisite employment requirements included a minimum of secondary school education
and experience in data collection. Training was provided by the Consultants, and focused on
the context and aims of the RRB, sampling procedures, content of the survey instrument,
interviewing methods, and neutrality, objectivity and research ethics. All data collection was
supervised directly by the IRDP. Interviews wore clearly-marked identification confirming
their status as independent fieldworkers at all times while engage in data collection. The
Consultants also worked to ensure that fieldwork teams were perceived as independent,
professional and broadly representative of Rwandan society.
Temporary staff were be recruited to undertake data entry, using a template developed by
the Consultants in SPSS format. Consultants took full responsibility for data cleaning.
5.5. Quality control measures
39 The Steadman Group of Companies, 2007. “WVS Rwanda 2007: Field Technical Report”. Available online at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
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Cumulatively, the following activities and measures further enforced the quality and
integrity of the data collection process: the use of a participatory approach in developing
research instruments; the hosting of a workshop aimed at validating the research
instruments; recruitment of experienced and well-educated interviewers; comprehensive
training for interviewers; pre-testing of the research instruments; close supervision of all
data collection in the field; recruitment of experienced and skilled data entry staff; and close
supervision of all data entry. Data analysis and reporting have been carried out jointly by the
IRDP and IJR.
VI FIELDWORK AND DATA COLLECTION IN PRACTICE
6.1. Implementation Risks and Challenges
The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer is the first national survey of its kind to be conducted
in Rwanda. As such, several implementation challenges and risks were taken into
consideration at the outset of the research.
First, as discussed previously, no national census has been conducted since territorial
reforms were recently introduced, and therefore limited baseline population data was
available as yet on the district level. For this reason, an equal number of interviews (100)
will be conducted across each of the thirty districts, to ensure as wide a geographic
distribution of respondents as possible.
Secondly, because the Reconciliation Barometer was the first of its kind to be conducted in
Rwanda, there was a distinct risk that fieldworkers may be met with scepticism and distrust
by members of the population. However, efforts to mitigate this risk included:
Recruitment and training of qualified and experienced fieldwork staff;
Use of easily-identifiable fieldwork badges;
Close supervision of fieldwork by experienced and professional fieldwork
supervisors; and
Use of interview scripts that comply with international ethical standards, and
guaranteeing the confidentiality and anonymity of all respondents.
6.2. Experiences in the Field
Critical to the interpretation of any survey of this nature is the political and socio-economic
context within which it has been conducted. While certain public attitudes may be informed
by experience and tradition over long periods of time, public opinion is far more fluid and
open to be influenced by a given social context at a particular moment. Public opinion
literature is replete with examples of how political events, economic conditions, or even
natural disasters, can sway sentiments within a very short space of time. In the interest of
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scientific rigour and the integrity of survey findings, it is therefore also of importance to
assess and report on the environment within which it takes place,
This has, for example, been evident in the responses of the South African public to the SA
Reconciliation Barometer Survey, where the researchers have noted distinct changes in
particular results where fieldwork coincided with national and local election campaigns.
Similarly, it was evident in recent years how the sudden decline in global economic fortunes
has impacted on South African citizen’s evaluation of their own material and physical
security.
In the interest of project transparency, this report also contains a frank assessment of the
socio-political and economic context within which fieldwork has taken place. This enriches
the value of the report, but also will provide important interpretational markers in terms of
which this dataset should be compared with datasets that will follow in its wake.
Fieldwork for the RRB began in late June, and was concluded in July, 2010, lasting
approximately four weeks in total. A number of contextual considerations based on
experiences in the field must be taken into account in the analysis, interpretation and
understanding of the results of the RRB.
6.3. Political climate and trends
A significant characteristic feature of the fieldwork is that, data collection happened to start
two months prior to presidential elections, held on 9 August.
The political mood around the country was influenced by anticipation of upcoming
elections. The process of registering voters was concluding, political parties had already
nominated their candidates, and opposition political parties were attempting to register to
contest in the presidential race. In the same period, some party leaders were facing
presumed criminal charges of “genocide denial” and destabilisation attempts.
In the pre-election environment, fieldworkers perceived some challenges in eliciting
forthright responses from research participants, particularly in relation to evaluation of the
governance system and related institutions. Despite multiple measures taken to ensure that
fieldworkers were perceived to be independent and neutral, this was not always accepted
by research participants. On many occasions, citizens were surprised that the interview did
not include questions related to the upcoming elections and political party support.
Challenges resulting from the pre-election climate in the country were also marked by
reciprocal allegations between the Rwandan government and emerging political opposition
parties, as well as with some independent media that the Media High Council ended up
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closing because considered to be subversive. It is worth noting that Rwandan citizens follow
with interest all those informations especially through spoken national and international
media and consequently were aware of the ongoing political climate. Field supervisors
managed to always assure local leaders of the constructive objective of the Barometer.
6.4. Contribution of Local Leadership
Local leadership played an important role in the conduct of the present research. Though
well intended, especially to ease interviewers work, leaders’ presence on field may have
influenced both the data collection process and the research findings.
From the outset of the RRB, the Consultants accepted that fieldwork of this kind could not
be conducted in small towns or villages in Rwanda without the consent and cooperation of
local leadership. Though authorization to conduct interviews was received at the national
level through the Ministry of Local Governance, and this permission was communicated to
district mayors, this was not in fact sufficient to begin fieldwork in practice. Local leadership
was informed about research conducted for the RRB within respective administrative
territories; while in most cases researchers were welcomed, this required advance
assurance that more senior administrators had been informed and accepted the presence of
fieldwork teams in the area. In some exceptional cases, local leaders demanded that they be
allowed to check the content of the questionnaire before allowing interviews to begin.
Both citizens and local leaders are regularly sensitised and exposed to government
programming and policies, including through assessments that often result in rewards to the
best performers. In addition to this sense of competition, none of the local leaders would
like his entity to be seen as niche of bad opinions. It was clear to research teams that this
spirit was driving many local leaders. Many local leaders (Akagari, Umudugudu) appeared to
anticipate responses that local citizens would give to the RRB and therefore attempted to
prepare those living in the sampled Umudugudu, or to secure an active role in determining
which households would be visited. As Umudugudu residents themselves, local leaders also
had an equal chance of being included in the research sample. Where local leaders were not
interviewed, their reactions varied from indifference to anxiety. Field supervisors played
important role in insuring these leaders of the objectivity of the study and in seeking
leaders’ neutrality.
6.5. Citizen Responses to the RRB
Based on the experiences of administering the RRB in the field, interviewers concluded that
citizens were generally reluctant to participate in interviews related to very sensitive topics.
Prior to agreeing to participate in the research, many citizens wanted to know whether
permission had been received from local leadership for the fieldwork to proceed.
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Fieldworkers remarked on a tendency amongst citizens to agree to participate only when
assured that local leaders had been informed and granted consent for the research to take
place in advance. In some instances, this even required a formal introduction of the
interviewers to citizens by local leaders. While such introductions both hastened the pace of
fieldwork and reduced numbers of refusals, fieldworkers also remarked that such direct
involvement of local leaders in the research process could in some instances have impacted
on citizen perceptions of the independence of the research team.
Another significant observation that holds particular relevance to this survey is the fact that
respondents were generally hesitant to respond frankly to questions related to ethnicity.
Many research participants told fieldworkers that referring to ethnic groups, such as Hutu,
Tutsi or Twa, is “currently forbidden” by government. Fieldworkers also detected significant
reluctance to respond to questions related to government institutions and public policies,
including those of the gacaca courts, the tig, and national reconciliation policy and land
redistributions. Some research participants were also under the impression that they
themselves were being evaluated or tested on their knowledge and compliance with
government policies.
6.6. Further considerations: qualitative evaluations
As discussed above, the first round of the RRB was an exploratory baseline study, and
research methods were exclusively quantitative: the research instrument consisted only of a
structured questionnaire with close-ended questions. Limitations, including resources and
time, prevented collection of additional qualitative data, such as comments, testimonies,
anecdotes, and explanations from respondents. However, such data could have allowed for
a better understanding of the meaning and motives underlying public opinion, perceptions,
attitudes and the behaviours of respondents.
VII ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer measures public opinion on a range of issues, and
according to six main variables: human security, political culture and governance, cross-
cutting relations, historical confrontation, and social cohesion and integration. These
indicators are shown in Table 2 below.
The research instrument is comprised of close-ended items, predominantly on five-point
scales, which measure the strength of public opinion among respondents. Research results
have been analysed nationally, as well as according to a range of demographic variables,
including gender, age, education level, social category and level of urbanisation.
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Table 1: Conceptual overview of variables, hypotheses and indicators
Variable Hypothesis Indicators
Political Culture If citizens view political structures,
institutions , values and leadership
as legitimate and effective,
reconciliation is more likely to occur
Confidence in public institutions;,
Trust in leadership,
Respect of rule of law and courts.
Human Security If citizens feel secure (materially,
physically and culturally), they will
be more willing to commit
themselves to national reconciliation
processes
Physical security
Economic security
Equality of treatment/access
General security
Hope for the future
Freedom of expression
Citizenship and
Identity
A shared sense of national identity,
inclusive citizenship and increased
tolerance will promote the cause of
national reconciliation
National identity
Individual identity
Citizenship
Shared cultural values
Understanding
the Past
If Rwandans are able to confront the
sources of their historical social
divisions, reconciliation is more likely
to occur especially between those
who found themselves on different
sides during the genocide
Acknowledgement of facts
History teaching
Transitional
Justice
If parties to conflict get proper
justice, they are likely to be
reconciled
Truth
Punishment
Compensation
Forgiveness
Individual healing
Social Cohesion If trust increases between Rwandan
citizens, and particularly those on
different side of the genocide,
reconciliation is more likely to occur.
Social distance
Tolerance
Trust
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VIII RRB RESULTS: DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF RESEARCH SAMPLE
As described in previous sections, fieldwork for the RRB was carried out between June and
July of 2010, with face-to-face interviews conducted with approximately three thousand
citizens randomly selected from across each of Rwanda’s thirty districts (Uturere). Prior to
undertaking analysis of research results, it is important to present an overview of the
demographic characteristics of the sample overall.
Rwanda is a densely-populated country, with a national population that both predominantly
rural and highly youthful. Women make up approximately 51.6% of the national population, 40 and the research sample was weighted on the basis of this information.
8.1. Age and gender
As shown in table 2 below, the highest percentages of both male and female respondents
were aged 25-34, and the lowest percentage aged 65 or older.
Table 2: Age and gender of survey respondents (%)
Male Female
18-24 15.5% 14.9%
25-34 34.4% 31.6%
35-44 21.0% 22.8%
45-54 14.7% 15.3%
55-64 8.1% 9.1%
65 and older 6.3% 6.3%
Total n = 1436 n = 1533
8.2. Residence and Employment status
Given Rwanda’s very low levels of urbanisation, the large majority of interviews were
conducted either in villages or rural areas (90.5%), and only 6.4% in large cities.
Correspondingly, when asked about employment status, high percentages of Rwandans
described themselves as agricultural workers (75.3%), and only 2.7% employed in the formal
sector. The two figures below summarise the data.
40
See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS
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Figure2: Area in which interviews were conducted (%)
Figure 3: Employment status (%)
8.3. Education
Most Rwandans responding to the RRB reported relatively low levels of education, with
26.2% indicating that they had received no formal education whatsoever, and 57.6%
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completing only primary education. Only 1.5% of respondents had received tertiary
education.
Figure 4: Level of education (%)
In the past, a number of social divisions were created in Rwandan society, as a result of
colonialisation, conflict and political change and migration patterns. Within Rwandan
society, these groups exist as a social reality for many citizens, although substantial work
has been done to attempt to overcome cleavages within society and foster a sense of
shared national unity and identity. Although discussion of these social categories is highly
sensitive for some Rwandans, analysis attitudinal and perceptual differences according to
social categories can provide important data on the impact of policy and programming on all
Rwandans in the country. Within the RRB sample, 16.4% of respondents identified
themselves as “genocide survivors”, 19.7% as “new case refugees”, and 26.7% as “tigistes”
or relatives of genocide perpetrators. A further 32.6% identified themselves as members of
another social category, or refused to answer the question.
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8.4. Social categories
Figure 5: Social categories (%)
IX RRB RESULTS: POLITICAL CULTURE
The first variable examined through the RRB was that of political culture, based on the
hypothesis that if citizens view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as
legitimate and effective, reconciliation is more likely to occur.
Open conflict and violence is a sounding sign of public institutions’ failiure to manage
ordinary conflict between communities or community members. Differences and conflicts
based on them are natural, it belongs to government institutions to regulate and prevent
any sidesliping. In post conflict societies, leaders need to build institutions that ensure
stability on the society. As far as no social group think that any government institution is
built or operation against the group’s interests, then ties between government and social
goups will be strong due to high level of trust. To be more trustable, institutions have also to
be effective and fair. They may be well designed, built on precious principles; they may not
serve to sustainable reconciliation if such valuable principles are not visible in decisions and
actions. The likelihood for real reconciliation depends on level of legitimacy, trust and
effectiveness citizens perceive in key institutions such as security organs, justice system,
parliament as well as the leadership. Non state institutions play important role in both
conflict fueling and conflict transformation. Civil society organisations, political parties and
religions are spaces that contribute much in shaping people’s behaviours vis-a-vis
government institutions and leadership. One can choose and change his political party,
religion or CSO but the government is one and is there for all citizens. Hence, reconciliation
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and national unity are on likely to be sustainable when citizens have confidence and trust in
both state and non state institutions.
9.1. Trust in institutions
To begin, the RRB tested citizen confidence and trust in a range of public and governance
institutions, including the national parliament, Cabinet and the justice system. This focus on
institutions is important, given the need for strong, impartial bodies that could facilitate
unity and national reconciliation across all spheres of society. The destruction of many of
these institutions and the divisive nature of the conflict made this a formidable task.
Data collected through the RRB indicates moderate to high levels of trust in public institutions
overall, as shown in the table below. More than nine out of every ten Rwandans indicated that they
had either “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of trust in Cabinet (92.4%), and responses were comparably
high for parliament (91%), the justice system (90%), community policing structures (89.8%) and local
authorities (84%).
Trust in these public institutions was notably higher than trust in several other non-governmental
organisations, including political parties, religious institutions and civil society organisations (CSO’s).
Comparable to social survey data collected in other countries, only 16.1% of respondents indicated
that they had a “great deal” of trust in political parties, and 9.7% had no trust in political parties at
all. Still, close to three-quarters of all Rwandans had either “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of trust in
religious institutions, and 64.8% in CSOs.
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Figure 6: Trust in public institutions (%)
9.2. Confidence in the media
Respondents indicated a higher level of trust in public media as opposed to private media
institutions. 85.2% of respondents indicated at least quite a lot of trust in public media
institutions, whereas 53.6% of respondents indicated quite a lot of trust in private media
institutions. 89.4% indicated that the media has quite a lot to contribute to reconciliation.
As noted above, the appearance of mutual allegations between the Media High Council and
some independent media has mounted over the course of this year, culminating recently
with the closure of two newspapers. Rwandans participating in the RRB were asked about
their levels of confidence in the media, and while many feel that the media has contributed
to increasing reconciliation either a great deal (42.1%) or quite a lot (47.3%), trust levels are
distinctly higher in the public media than the private. The table below shows that while
confidence in the private media is still relatively high at 53.6%, close to a quarter of
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respondents over a third of respondents (‘not very much’ and ‘none at all’ combined) have
little or no confidence in this branch of the media.
Figure 7: Confidence in the media (%)
9.3. Trust in leadership
In addition to demonstrating relatively high levels of trust in public institutions, survey
respondents have also displayed high levels of trust in the political leadership of the
country. Research participants were asked about the degree to which they trust the
country’s leaders to do what is in their best interest, and in addition, whether they feel that
country’s leaders care about all Rwandans equally. In response to both items, agreement
levels are high. Cumulatively, more than 90% of Rwandans strongly agreed or agreed that
they can trust the country’s leaders to do what is in their best interest. Responses were only
slightly lower to the question of whether leaders care about all people in Rwanda equally,
with 13.5% disagreeing. Nonetheless, 82% strongly agreed or agreed that the country’s
leaders care equally about all Rwandans. (See Table 4)
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Figure 8: Trust in leadership (%)
9.4. Citizen participation
In addition to evaluating confidence in both institutions and leadership, the RRB also sought
to measure public attitudes related to citizen participation in political and public life, and
ability to influence the policy and decision-making processes of government. It follows
logically that participation in the official forums and institutions for unity and reconciliation,
should be an important indicator of the extent to which citizens have bought into national
policies around these issues.
With regard to citizen participation, a clear pattern is discernable in the RRB results: a
majority of citizens indicate that they “always” attend community meetings (71.4%), and a
high percentage that they would do so under certain circumstances (25.4%). When asked
how likely they would be to “get together with others to raise an issue”, responses were
somewhat lower, yet remained high: just over half (51.9%) indicated that they would do this
“always”, and about one-third (33.6%) under certain circumstances.
However, citizens appeared much more reluctant to engage in actions closely associated
with protest or dispute, even where these may be permitted in law. Overall, 41% indicated
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they would never sign a petition, 48.6% that they would never join a boycott, and 53.3%
that they would never participate in a legal protest.
Figure 9: Citizen Participation (%)
Beyond the likelihood of direct participation in this range of events, the RRB sought to
assess whether or not Rwandans feel they can actively influence and shape policy and
decision-making processes that happen within government and affect the lives of citizens.
Here, variation was also evident across citizen responses. About one-third (33.1%) of all
respondents disagree that they have “space and opportunities to influence those that make
the laws of the country”. A further 34.2% of respondents agreed that they have “very little
say in the important decisions” that affect their lives.
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Figure 10: Ability to influence laws and public decisions (%)
Variation of responses is also evident according to analysis of male and female participants.
It is evident that two-thirds of male and female respondents are in agreement that there is
space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country. However,
there is a distinct lack of agreement as to whether individuals have very little say in
decisions affecting their lives, with only a third of both male and female respondents who
are in agreement with the statement.
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Figure 11 – Ability to influence laws and decisions disaggregated by gender (% agreement)
5855.1
35.4 34.9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Level of
participation (%
agreement)
I have space and
opportunities to influence
those that make the laws
of the country
I have very little say in the
important decisions that
affect my life
Statement
Ability to influence laws and decisions disaggregated by gender
Male
Female
9.5. Political culture summary findings
This section examined political culture as an independent variable with the potential to
explain reconciliation occurrence in Rwanda. It is based on the assumption that if citizens
view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and effective,
reconciliation is more likely to occur.
The results suggest a very high level of confidence (90% and above) in national public
institutions, especially the Cabinet, the Parliament, the judiciary system and the Community
policing. A lower level of confidence in political parties, civil society organisations and in
private media was also revealed by the RRB.
Significant percentages (80% and above) of trust in country’s leaders to do what is in the
best interest of the citizens and to care about all people equally were suggested by the
survey.
Although the RRB reported a significant level (70% and above) of permanent participation in
community meeting attendance and in voting, it was also found that a significant proportion
of citizens (nearly 50 %) never use other political participation modalities such as joining a
boycott, a legal protest and signing a petition.
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In the same vein, significant percentages of respondents (33.1%) disagree that they have
“space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country”, while a
further 34.2% of respondents agreed that they have “very little say in the important
decisions” that affect their lives.
All in all, for most indicators used except that on citizen participation, more than 70 % of
responses suggest that citizens view political structures, institutions , values and leadership
as legitimate and effective. It can therefore be argued that political culture in Rwanda,
though not optimal yet, remains in a position to contribute positively to reconciliation
process. However, much is still to be done especially in the area of boosting citizen
participation in decisionmaking, and confidence in non-government-led
frameworks/organisations such as political parties, civil society organisations, religious
organisation, and private media.
X RRB RESULTS: HUMAN SECURITY
In conflict time, people are characterised by fear for their lives and their properties. This
feeling of insecurity is caused by the “them”, ie the enemy. Human security goes beyond
fear for existing properties and embraces hope for better life conditions such as access to
employment, acces to land, acces to housing, health conditions, equality in resources
distribution and equality of treatment regarding each form of public rights. Increasing
human security increases peace of mind and paves way to sustainable reconciliation and
stronger national unity.
A second variable assessed through the RRB was that of human security, with the
hypothesis that if citizens feel secure (materially, physically and culturally), they will be
more willing to commit themselves to national reconciliation processes. Indicators used in
the RRB to test this variable included both physical and economic security, equality of
treatment and access, freedom of expression and hope for the future.
The longevity of democratic systems, regardless of what form they take, are largely
dependent on the security that they can offer to those that are governed. Such security not
only relates to the physical safety of citizens, but importantly also to their economic
wellbeing. Freedom from starvation is no less important than the guarantee of physical
safety, and a citizenry’s submission to the laws and institutions that govern them will
depend on the extent to which they are instrumental in furthering the prospects for shared
prosperity in a safe environment. Without such assurances, the liberties and rights that a
democratic state offers in theory become meaningless, its legitimacy wanes, and political
stability increasingly becomes challenged by those that choose to exploit such weaknesses.
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A substantial international body of scholarly work points to the fact that political stability is
unsustainable in societies where poverty is entrenched and the prospect for its alleviation is
limited. Popular discontent is further exacerbated when such societies are characterised by
crude levels of income inequality and inequities in terms of access to state services. In
Africa, such inequality has particularly been manifest along ethnic, tribal, and often also
regional lines. Whereas high levels of poverty may therefore result in a direct challenge
from the poor to state authority, the added dynamic of inequality along social group lines,
superimposed upon it, further fractures the social order.
In the decades running up to the 1994 genocide, successive Rwandan governments have
had to suppress perennial social challenges to perceived ethnic dominance of material
resources. The end result was the self-destruction of a state through the violation of its
reason for existence, the provision of human security to its citizens.
A primary challenge to the post-genocide state has therefore been to restore its legitimacy
in the eyes of citizens, and it could only do so through the restoration of their sense of
physical safety and economic wellbeing. Given the total destruction of the country’s social
cohesion and an economy that was in ruins, this was always going to be an extremely
difficult challenge.
An evaluation of the country’ key economic indicators suggest remarkable progress, even
when compared to other states in the region that have not been exposed to similar levels of
trauma. While the country continues to be classified as a low-income country, the strides
that it has made from a low developmental base have been significant. In 2008 its GDP
totalled US$4,46bn, compared to US$1,7bn in 2000 and US$754m in 1994 when the
genocide occured.41 Annual growth continued to climb and peaked at 11,2% in 2008, before
it declined to 6% in 2009 in the wake of the global economic downturn.42 GDP per capita has
increased from US$218 in 2000 to US$458 in 2008, and life expectancy increased during the
same period from 43 to 50 years.43 These figures point to marked progress towards some of
the objectives that the country has set for itself in its Vision 2020,44 the strategic document
that guides its economic growth path to 2020.
Such achievements are commendable, yet it remains significant that levels of poverty have
only declined marginally in spite of the robust growth that the country has experienced in
recent years. In 2000, 60% of the population could be categorised as poor, while the
comparative figure for 2006 was only three percentage points lower at 57%. This does
41
World Bank, (2010) World Bank Data Webpage [online], Available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda, [Accessed on 15/08/2010] 42
Ibid. 43
Ibid. 44 Republic of Rwanda, (2000) Rwanda Vision 2020 [online], Available at: http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf, [Accessed on 16/08/2010]
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suggest that the way in which the economy distributes growth within society may not be as
equitable as it should be. This view has been confirmed by a study, titled “Turning Vision
2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development”, which finds that the
country’s Gini coefficient (the global measure of inequality where a score of 0 represents
complete equality and 1 complete inequality) has increased from 0.47 to 0.51 between 2001
and 2006.45 These statistics suggest that solutions have to found to avoid them having an
impact on Rwanda’s political and social stability.
10.1. Physical Security
Public responses to a number of questions, related to the sense of physical safety that
Rwandans experience and anticipate in future, suggest that the overwhelming majority of
citizens do not perceive or expect any form of threat to their physical safety in the short- to
long term.
Figure 12: Physical security (%)
45 United Nations Development Programme, Rwanda (2007) Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development, National Human Development Report of Rwanda 2007, Kigali: UNDP, p.5
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The figure above shows that 86% of respondents either agree or strongly agree with the
statement that they do not currently fear a threat to their own physical safety or that of
their families. Seventy percent either agree or strongly agree with the contention that an
armed conflict within Rwanda is unlikely within the next few years, and indeed more than
94% of respondents noted that Rwanda is becoming a safer country to live in. 94.3% of
respondents either agreed or disageed with this statement. Similarly around 79% of
respondents noted that they either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they
were happy with their lives at the time that the survey was conducted.
In surveys to come it would be interesting to track responses to the statement relating to
the likelihood of a conflict erupting within foreseeable future again in Rwanda. While the
vast majority of respondents indicated that they do not regard this as likely, responses to
this statement were more dispersed. Close to 13% did regard it as likely (“disagree” and
“strongly disagree”), while close to 9% responded that they don’t know. Eight percent did
not wage an opinion on this issue. Responses to this statement are therefore not as clear-
cut in one direction. Similarly for the statement relating to satisfaction with life, the
disagreement categories added up to close to 17%. When viewed together with the
responses in the “neither” category, which totalled 4,6%, close to 22% of respondents did
not respond as being satisfied with their lives at present.
10.2. Economic Security
Overall, it appears as if Rwandans evaluate their levels of economic security and the future
prospects thereof quite positively. Most respondents indicated confidence in the prospects
of their own security, but also in the commitment of the Rwandan state to disburse its
services and resources in an equitable way that benefits all citizens. Responses in the
economic security category are, however, not as overwhelmingly optimistic as has been the
case with regard to those in the physical security category.
Table 3: Economic security (%)
Strongly agree
Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree
Don’t Know
In Rwanda, all people have an equal opportunity to make a living
27.8 42.5 3 21.7 3.8 1.1
It is likely that I will lose my house or land in future
7.3 25.2 7.4 40 16.5 3.4
All people benefit equally from government service delivery
21.6 47.3 3.9 19.5 5.3 2.3
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In Rwanda, all people have access to land
16 44.3 5.3 25.3 5.1 4
National resources are equitably distributed in Rwanda
17.9 42.5 5.9 23.6 6.3 3.7
In Rwanda all groups enjoy equal rights
34.4 51.6 2.6 6 2.6 2.6
In the table above, the first, third, fifth and sixth statements deal with questions of
equitable distribution of economic resources and rights, with the most notable of these
being land. The second and fourth statements deal with questions of access, and here again
the focus is on the question of land.
As noted above the response pattern to these statements differ somewhat from that of
those that focussed on the issues of human security. While 70% of respondents agreed with
the first statement that all Rwandans have an equal opportunity to make a living, just over a
quarter of respondents disagreed (‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ combined) with this
sentiment. Similarly, 25% felt that not all Rwandans benefited from government service
delivery and 30% believed that national resources are not equitably distributed in society.
As far as the distribution of rights in society is concerned, the picture looks somewhat
different. Eighty six percent (‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ combined) of respondents
felt that all Rwandans do indeed have equal access to the rights that are offered in its
constitution, while only 9% per cent disagreed that this was the case.
As far as the two statements relating to access is concerned, close to a third of respondents
agreed with the second statement in the table, which suggests the possibility that
respondents might lose their homes and/or land in future. In response to the fourth
statement, 30% disagreed that all Rwandans have access to land.
None of these findings show particular strong correlations with the key demographic
variables. Some results may, however, be of interest. Twenty seven percent of all 18-24
year-olds indicated that they do not believe that all people have equal opportunities to
make a living. Just over a quarter of this group also felt that Rwandans do not benefit in
equal measure from government service delivery. Looking into the future, it would become
increasingly important that this sentiment should change amongst young Rwandans.
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Figure 13 – Economic security disaggregated by gender (% agreement)
72.868.2
30.534.4
70.167.8
64
56.9
63.1
57.9
86.1 85.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Security level (%
agreement)
In Rw anda, all
people have an
equal
opportunity to
make a living
It is likely that I
w ill lose my
house or land in
the future
All people
benefit equally
from government
service delivery
In Rw anda, all
people have
access to land
National
resources are
equitably
distributed in
Rw anda.
In Rw anda, all
groups enjoy
equal rights
Statement
Economic security disaggregated by gender (% agreement)
Male
Female
Both male and female respondents appear to be in favour of the country’s progress in terms
of economic security. Approximately two-thirds of both male and female respondents
believe that all Rwandans have an equal opportunity to make a living, all individuals benefit
equally from government service delivery, access to land, national resources and equal
rights. Only a third of respondents feel that it is likely that they will lose their houses or land
in the future.
These findings above, particularly those relating to land tenure and access, as well as its
distribution may be of considerable significance, given the immense importance that
agriculture plays in the lives of the majority of Rwandans. While the majority of Rwandans
harboured positive sentiments towards each of the statements in figure 13, it would be
advisable that future rounds monitor the extent to which negative sentiment fluctuates.
10.3. Changes in Rwanda since 1994
Respondents to the RRB were asked about improvements made in the country since 1994,
and in comparison with the experience of genocide, it is clear that a majority feel great
strides have been made in many respects. Probably the most significant of these
improvements has been in the field of education. In this regard 50.1% of Rwandans noted
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that the education system has ‘improved a great deal’ and a further 41.4% felt that it has
‘improved’. Perceptions related to improvements were also highly positive in relation to
issues of overcoming social divisions in the post-conflict period: 94.0% indicated that
relations between different ethnic groups have improved since 1994; 90,6% noted
improvements to relations between people of different backgrounds; 88,5% felt that the
situation of returnees improved; and 84,5% indicated that their hope for the future
increased. (See the table below)
Notably, however, the level of positive evaluation for economic change is somewhat lower.
Overall, 15.4% of respondents indicated that their personal economic situation has in fact
worsened over the past sixteen years since the genocide. A further 21.5% felt that access to
employment opportunities has worsened, and a further 28.2% responded in this way with
regard to the gap between rich and poor. Access to both land and housing seemed to be of
concern for Rwandans, with 41.5% and 39.7% respectively indicating that these had
worsened.
Table 4: Changes in Rwanda since 1994 (%)
Improved a great deal
Improved Stayed the same
Worsened Worsened a great deal
Don’t Know
Personal economic situation
19.0 57.6 7.3 13.0 2.4 0.5
Relations between different ethnic groups
27.6 66.4 2.3 2.8 0.3 0.5
Family well-being 17.0 63.5 6.4 10.4 2.2 0.4
Relations between people from different regional origins
25.9 64.7 3.5 3.1 0.6 2.2
Employment opportunities
14.6 47.1 8.3 17.2 4.3 8.3
Access to education 50.1 41.4 1.6 4.7 1 1.2
Hope for the future 28.5 56 3.6 6.7 1.8 3.3
Access to land 9.8 35.9 8.9 31.2 10.3 3.8
Access to housing 10.8 39.3 7.1 28.9 10.8 3
Security of national borders
28.7 52.3 2.4 2.9 0.7 12.8
Situation of returnees in country
30.6 57.9 3 2.6 0.7 5
Gap between rich and poor
11.2 43.4 13.6 19.7 8.5 3.4
10.4. Direction of the Country Overall
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The results of the RRB also indicate an overwhelming level of approval for the overall
direction of the country. Of the total sample, 95.2% indicated that national reconciliation in
Rwanda was going in the right direction. A further 91.7% of respondents also indicated that
democratic governance was going in the right direction.
Figure 14: Direction of the country overall (%)
95.2
2.8 0.2
91.7
4.40.5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Level of
agreement (%)
National reconciliation
in Rwanda
Democratic governance
in Rwanda
Statement
Direction of the country overall (%)
Right direction
Undecided
Wrong direction
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Figure 15- Direction of the country overall disaggregated by gender (% agreement)
95.8
94.8
91.1
92.2
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
Level of
agreement (%)
National reconciliation in
Rwanda
Democratic governance in
Rwanda
Statement
Direction of the country overall disaggregated by gender (%
agreement)
Male
Female
The majority of respondents, both male and female, believe that the country is going in the
right direction, in terms of both national reconciliation and democratic governance in
Rwanda.
10.5. Human Security Summary Findings
The results cited in the preceding two sections suggest that Rwandans, by and large,
experience a significant degree of physical security. Large majorities have also indicated that
they do not foresee significant changes in future as far as this state of affairs is concerned.
Such security, it can be argued, is however largely dependent on the degree of material
security that citizens experience. In this regard the majority of respondents have also
expressed positive sentiments towards the prospects for their personal economic
circumstances, as well as the commitment of the state to support human development in an
equitable and fair fashion. It has nevertheless been apparent that respondents have more
reservations about matters relating to economic security than is the case for physical
security. In some instances more than a quarter of respondents felt that more could be
done to improve matters in this regard.
Since the responses to these statements all represent baseline measurements, it is difficult
to assess at this stage whether they represent improvement or decline. Further
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measurement and analysis, especially as far as socio-economic security is concerned, will
therefore be critical in future surveys.
XI RRB RESULTS: CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY
Coming from any part of the country, speaking a given language, belonging to a certain
ethnic group, etc. does not make someone to be less citizen than any other who belong to a
different ethnic group, speaks a different language, or comes from a different part of the
country, of opposed sex, etc. Every individual is a set of identity elements that are not
conflicting as far as only one person is concerned, problem raise when interests of people
from “opposing” identity elements clash. Rebuilding an identity based post conflict society
bring leaders to decide on how to manage differences, on whether focus on overlapping
identity or individual ones. As would ask Engin F.ISIN & Patricia K. WOOD, “What happens
when we take the ethos of pluralisation seriously in specific fields of politics today against a
fear of fragmentation?”46. Dispite sceptical positions of these authors who speak of “false
hope for a promised land where citizenship and identity are forever reconciled”, choosing to
strengthen shared identity shoul not equal negation of individual identity. Path to national
unity implies a society where no one feels more national than others, where citizens feel
proudness of bearing shared national identity, where shared values are empowerd and, at
the same time, individual identity recognized.
A third variable tested by the RRB was in relation to citizenship and identity among
Rwandans, with the hypothesis that a shared sense of national identity, inclusive citizenship
and increased tolerance will promote the cause of national reconciliation. Indicators used in
relation to this variable included national and individual identity, attitudes regarding
citizenship, and the prevalence of shared cultural values.
11.1. National Identity
Since the end of the genocide, the Rwandan government has worked to build and
strengthen a shared national identity, specifically through the NURC as well as other
governance institutions.
A large majority of RRB respondents (72.1%) strongly agreed that they are proud to be
citizens of Rwanda – cumulatively, “strongly agree” and “agree” responses to this question
were close to 100%. A further 46.2% of respondents strongly agreed that all citizens share
common values. When asked about whether some see themselves as “more Rwandan” that
46 Engin F.ISIN & Patricia K. WOOD ,in Citizenship and Identity, ( SAGE Publications Ltd,
6 Bonhill street, London)
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others, disagreement with this statement reached 71.1%, though about one-fifth did agree
that some citizens do see themselves as “more Rwandan than others”.
The RRB also tested the extent to which Rwandans believe reconciliation has been
embraced as a national value and practice by citizens. More than 90% agreed that “common
national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today,” and 97.4%
agreed that “most Rwandans believe that reconciliation is an important priority”. A further
96.4% agreed that the everyday actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote
reconciliation. (See table below)
Table 5: National identity and contributions to reconciliation (%)
Strongly agree
Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree
I am proud to be a citizen of Rwanda 72.1 25.8 1.4 0.4 0.1
In Rwanda, all citizens share common values
46.2 47.5 1.8 2.1 0.7
There are some Rwandans who see themselves as more Rwandan than others
7.0 14.4 3.0 42.6 28.5
Common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today
43.0 51.5 1.4 1.4 0.5
Most Rwandans believe that reconciliation is an important priority
46.6 50.8 1.2 0.8 0.2
In everyday life, the actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation
44.2 52.2 1.9 0.9 0.2
11.2. Individual identity
The RRB also sought to assess how Rwandans identify themselves individually, in the
context of significant efforts to overcome past divisions in the country (see table below).
A large majority of respondents (70.8%) strongly agreed when asked whether they would
want their children to think of themselves as Rwandans, over and above any other social
identity. A slightly lesser majority (63.6%) strongly agreed that it is more important to
identify oneself as Rwandan than any other form of identity. As discussed in relation to
experiences in the field, many research participants indicated that they believed that
references to ethnicity or ethnic groups are prohibited in Rwanda.
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Figure 16a: Individual identity (%)
Barometer respondents were also asked about the social groups with which they identify
most strongly (see table below), with interesting results. Across a range of response options,
Rwandans were most likely to associate themselves closely with either others who shared
their religious beliefs (16.6%) or those with similar values (16.6%). A further 12% identified
most closely with others from the same geographic region. When asked about secondary
identity, responses were relatively similar, though larger percentages indicated a close
association with others of the same age (11.9%) or gender (10.2%).
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Figure 16b: Individual identity (%)
11.3. Summary findings on citizenship and identity
In this section, the analysis focuses on citizenship and identity among Rwandans, with the
hypothesis that a shared sense of national identity, inclusive citizenship and increased
tolerance will promote the cause of national reconciliation. In this regard, national and
individual identity, attitudes regarding citizenship, and the prevalence of shared cultural
values are the indicators used.
The RRB survey came up with very high percentages of Rwandans (more than 90%) who feel
proud to be citizens of Rwanda, and who believe that in Rwanda, all citizens share common
values.
The feeling that common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in
Rwanda today is also very significant (94%). The results suggest also a slightly bigger
percentage of Rwandans (96%) with the view that in everyday life, the actions and
behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation.
As far as individual identity is concerned, more than 9 in 10 Rwandan citizens (98%) want
their children to think of themselves as Rwandan rather than hutu, tutsi or twa. In the same
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vein, almost the same proportion believes that it is more important to identify oneself as
Rwandan than any other identity.
Surprisingly and unlike the common belief, the RRB results suggest that Rwandans are more
likely to associate themselves closely with others who shared their religious beliefs (16.6%)
or those with similar values (16.6%) rather than those who belong to their ethnic group
(6%).
Obviously, the survey indicates that the Rwandan identity remains the primary identity for
almost all Rwandan citizens. Given that large majority of Rwandans believe that
reconciliation is a key national priority and that national values leading to reconciliation are
being promoted, the likelihood that citizenship and identity contributes to bringing about
reconciliation in Rwanda remains very high.
XII UNDERSTANDING THE PAST
A fourth variable, which the RRB examined, related to an understanding of the past, with
the hypothesis that if Rwandans are able to confront the sources of historical social
divisions, reconciliation is more likely to occur, particularly between those who found
themselves on opposing sides during the genocide. The project identified the degree to
which a shared understanding of the country’s history exists as a critical indicator of the
extent to which the country is coming to terms with its past. To this end the project
presented respondents with a number of statements that attempts to measure the question
from various perspectives.
12.1. Acknowledgements of facts and history teaching
The tables below present the levels of agreement with each of these statements in terms of
the total national sample, but also in disaggregated form to account for responses from
different age groups.
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Table 6: Understanding the past disaggregated by age category (% Agreement)
The results show that an overwhelming majority of respondents (97.9%) do feel that the
way in which history was conveyed from one generation to another has contributed to
major divisions in society, and as a result 94.7% indicated that they felt that the current
approach to its teaching is far more conducive to the promotion of reconciliation. A
considerable majority (87.0%) also agreed that in the sixteen years following the genocide
most of the major issues related to its causes and consequences have been frankly
discussed and understood. A somewhat lower level of agreement (59.3%) was registered for
the statement, which proposed that conflicts between members of the political elite has
been effectively managed. Agreement levels for those that agreed with the suggestion that
“many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation” (69.7%), are also less
emphatic than those for most of the other statements. A result, which may be of concern
and should be taken note of, is the fact that 39.9% of respondents agreed that “although it
is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were
favourable”. This does raise questions about respondents’ sense of human security and may
need further probing.
In relation to this particular question, it was important to examine potential differences in
terms of age categories, particularly given the recent changes in the way Rwandan history is
AGREEMENT 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 + Total
Many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation.
64.7 68.4 67.7 69.8 65.5 71.1 69.7
Major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood.
86.9 87.6 87.3 83.3 87.5 91.4 87.0
Before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society.
89.4 95.3 95.6 94.2 95.7 94.1 97.9
Conflict between the elite within the political sphere have been effectively managed.
62.0 60.8 58.0 55.1 56.7 63.1 59.3
Today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages reconciliation.
95.8 95.8 94.3 92.6 93.7 94.7 94.7
Although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable.
41.9 44.2 39.1 38.7 32.0 29.4 39.9
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 450 979 652 446 255 187 2970
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taught to a new generation in schools and through public awareness campaigns. The results
show few generational differences between the first five age categories. The eldest
category, those older than 65, is however distinct in that the level of agreement at 29,4% is
about 10% below that of the average level of agreement.
Table 73: Understanding the past disaggregated by social categories (% Agreement)
Genocide survivor
Tigistes/ Relatives of perpetrators
Old case refugees*
New case refugees
Historically marginalised*
Other/ refused
Many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation.
73.3 73.8 70.2 62.2 74.2 63.3
Major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood.
84.8 84.4 87.2 91.1 93.5 87.5
Before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society.
94.9 94.6 95.7 94.2 96.8 93.5
Conflict between the elite within the political sphere have been effectively managed.
57.0 54.9 61.7 62.7 61.3 62.0
Today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages reconciliation.
95.3 93.7 91.5 95.6 93.5 95.1
Although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable.
52.0 35.3 63.8 39.0 41.9 35.7
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
486 792 94 586 31 969
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.
Given the country’s historical social fragmentation and its further entrenchment by the 1994
genocide, it would also be of significance to investigate the degree to which there may be
variance in responses of the country’s different social sectors. From the results that have
been presented in the table above, it is apparent that there have been relatively little
differences in the responses of the respective categories to each of the statements. The one
important exception, however, lies with opinions regarding the final statement that there
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are elements in the Rwandan society that would perpetrate acts of genocide if given the
opportunity. While the national average for agreement on this question stands at 39,9%, the
figure for the ‘genocide survivors’ and ‘old case refugees’ stood at 52% and 63,8%
respectively. This must be contrasted with the 35,3% of ‘tigistes/relatives of perpetrators’
category. Yet, given the history related to the latter category, it is significant that also here
we find more than a third of respondents in agreement.
12.2. Summary findings on understanding the past
In this section, the degree to which a shared understanding of the country’s history exists as
a critical indicator of the extent to which the country is coming to terms with its past was
examined. The underlying assumption was that if Rwandans are able to confront the
sources of historical social divisions, reconciliation is more likely to occur, particularly
between those who found themselves on opposing sides during the genocide.
The results suggest very high percentages of Rwandans with the view that before the
genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society
(98%), and that today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages
reconciliation (94.7%). Moreover, there are significant percentages of respondents with the
view that major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed
and understood (87%), and that many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic
manipulation (69.7%).
The survey also came up with a significant belief that although it is against the law, some
Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable (almost 40 %).
Surprisingly, such a belief remains higher in younger people (aged 18-34) than among older
people, and among genocide survivors and old case refugees than among relatives of
genocide perpetrators, tigistes and new case refugees.
Based on the above results, it is obvious that large majority Rwandans share the view that
history teaching and ethnic manipulation have significantly shaped the division among
Rwandans. This common understanding of some aspects of the past, we can argue, is a good
sign that the likelihood that Rwandan citizens can reconcile is high. However, the persisting
fear- among some Rwandans, mainly genocide survivors, old case refugees, and young
people - of a genocide reoccurance might hinder the reconciliation process, if concrete
measures are not taken.
XIII TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
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In the aftermath of the genocide a profound need existed for justice towards its victims.
Without it the rebuilding of this society that had been torn apart by violence would have
been inconceivable. The collapse of the judicial system had been one of the major casualties
of this period, and in the light of a system that was not equipped with such massive
challenges, the need existed to deal with the issue of genocide justice through alternative
transitional structures. The domestic response primarily came through the use of the
Gacaca courts, as a restorative justice measure to deal with perpetrators on a communal
level. On the international front, the United Nations instituted the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to focus on perpetrators that were no longer resident in
Rwanda.
The fifth variable examined through the RRB was that of transitional justice, based on the
hypothesis that if parties to conflict get proper justice, they are likely to be reconciled.
Indicators used are individual healing, truth, punishment, compensation and forgiveness.
The results are presented in different tables and figures below.
13.1. Individual Healing
The questions in the table bellow provide an overview of how Rwandans think about a
number of a key questions relating to justice and reconciliation, as far as individual healing is
concerned.
Table 8: Individual healing (%)
Strongly agree
Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree
Don’t Know
I have forgiven those who hurt others in the past.
36.5 53.4 6.5 2.2 .7 .6
Many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes.
21.6 61.2 5.9 6.9 1.6 2.8
Those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness.
23.0 57.4 8.8 7.5 1.8 1.3
The attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past.
5.8
20.1
5.8
37.6
23.5
6.9
I feel that I have healed from the wounds of the past.
23.0 55.5 8.2 8.9 2.7 1.5
I have no choice but to reconcile with others in my community, or face the consequences
11.3 23.2 6.8 35.6 20.9 2.0
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I personally have experienced reconciliation in my own life.
34.3 51.1 7.3 3.2 2.2 1.5
The responses to these questions suggest that Rwandans are willing to forgive crimes that
were perpetrated against them or their families; that they largely perceive perpetrators to
be remorseful; and that they are willing to commit themselves to a national reconciliation
project. If one combines the ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ responses for the statement that
the respondent has forgiven those that have hurt others during the past, it is apparent that
close to 90% agreed that this has indeed been the case; 82,9% felt that genocide
perpetrators have demonstrated sufficient remorse; and 80,4% of Rwandans were
convinced that most wrongdoers have sought forgiveness since the genocide. Just over a
quarter of respondents (25,9%) do, however, believe that revenge by some in society still
remains a possibility, while 61,1% disagreed with this notion.
The same table shows that 78,5% of respondents experienced personal healing in response
to the statement: “I feel that I have healed from the wounds of the past”, and a further
85,4% indicated that they have personally experienced reconciliation. In response to the
statement that suggests that respondents have reconciled with others because they don’t
have any other option, 34,5% agreed, while 55,6% disagreed.
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Figure 17 – Individual healing disaggregated by gender (% agreement)
The majority of male and female respondents indicate a willingness to forgive perpetrators
of the genocide (89.3% of males and 90.3% of females). 83.2% of males and 82.4% of
females believe that many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes and
79.9% of males and 81% of females believe that those who did wrong in the past have
sought forgiveness. A small percentage of males (26.6%) and females (25.4%) agree that the
attitude of some Rwandans suggest that they still want to take revenge for the events of the
past. 79.6% of males and 77.5% of females agree that they have healed from the wounds of
the past. A small percentage of male and female respondents agree that they have no
choice but to reconcile with others in their communities (33% of males and 35.7% of
females). A larger percentage of Rwandans agree that they have personally experienced
reconciliation in their own lives (85.3% of males and 85.4% of females).
13.2. Parties to reconciliation
For reconciliation to take root in a society, some form of consensus need to exist around
who the primary parties to such a process should be. The survey has attempted to ascertain
which groups ordinary Rwandans think are critical to the national reconciliation process. The
tables below contain a number of options, with which respondents were presented, as well
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as the results that this measurement instrument has rendered. Participants were asked to
suggest a primary and secondary combination of parties that need to be reconciled.
Table 9: Parties to reconciliation
Primary response Secondary response
% N % N
Rwandans and other Rwandans 33.2 983 25.9 759
Genocide perpetrators and genocide survivors 48.4 1434 15.9 466
Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups 15.0 443 20.2 594
Civil society organisations and citizens .9 27 1.5 45
Old case refugees and other Rwandans .7 21 1.8 53
Citizens and leaders .3 9 2.0 60
Leaders between themselves .4 13 3.2 95
Rwandan government and the international community
.2 5 4.5 131
Other .1 4 6.1 178
Refused .2 7 2.4 71
Don't know .5 15 16.4 482
TOTAL 100.0 2961 100.0 2935
In response to the request to identify the primary parties to national reconciliation, the first
option for 48,4% or was “Genocide Perpetrators and Survivors” with 48,4%, followed by
“Rwandans and other Rwandans” with 33,2%, and then “Hutu and Tutsi Ethnic Groups” with
15.0%. Responses to the remainder of categories are insignificant, given response
percentages of less than 1%. In terms of the next table, which reflects on the second most
important combination of parties to national reconciliation, “Rwandans and other
Rwandans” (25,9%) was the most selected option, followed by “Hutu and Tutsi Ethnic
Groups” (20,2%), and surprisingly the third most selected option has been the “Don’t Know”
option with 16,4%. Following shortly behind this category has been the “Genocide
Perpetrators and Survivors” category with 15,9%. Further investigation would probably be
required to ascertain why the “Don’t know” option could elicit more responses than a far
more obvious category such as the latter.
13.3. Transitional Justice in Rwanda
After a violent and divisive conflict, such as that of Rwanda, it is very likely that perceptions
of justice will vary according to the side of the conflict that an individual found him or
herself on. It therefore follows that the creation of a justice system, which enjoys
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confidence and legitimacy from all opposing parties, would be a massive challenge for the
transition from violence to sustainable peace. An important indicator of reconciliation in
such contexts is therefore the extent to which people trust the justice system to bring about
law and order, regardless of who comes before it. The table below presents a number of
statements that gauge Rwandan public opinion in this regard.
Table 10: Perceptions on Justice delivered
Strongly agree
Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree
Don’t know
The truth about the genocide in Rwanda, as it really happened, was revealed through Gacaca courts.
49.4 44.3 2.0 2.0 1.0 .2
Inyangamugayo were impartial in the Gacaca process.
35.7 47.7 5.6 8.0 1.4 .1
Those convicted through gacaca received fair punishment
34.1 55.2 3.0 5.4 .9 .1
Those convicted through gacaca have served sentences and been reintegrated into Rwandan society
40.6 54.2 1.8 1.4 1.4 .1
Genocide survivors have been compensated for the crimes committed against them.
19.6 51.2 7.5 12.8 4.1 .0
Genocide will never occur again in Rwanda, because the underlying causes have been dealt with.
35.8 47.2 5.3 3.8 4.2 .1
Survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from government.
18.5 51.0 6.2 11.4 8.8 .1
Those whose properties/assets had been abusively taken from them (1959 and 1994) have recovered them.
28.0 49.3 5.8 10.6 4.5 .0
Land redistribution after 1994 has lowered land-related issues.
16.5 45.4 3.8 5.9 26.4 .1
Land redistribution after 1994 has impacted positively on social cohesion.
17.2 41.8 4.3 7.5 26.6 .1
A cursory view of the results presented above suggests that Rwandans are generally
satisfied with the course of justice and the instruments and institutions that have been used
to bring this about.
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For an overwhelming percentage of Rwandans, 93,7% (agree and strongly agree combined),
most of what happened during the genocide has become known through the processes of
the Gacaca courts. Since all respondents were older than 18 it is therefore likely that most
have attended a Gacaca court at least once. This percentage is significantly high to suggest
that all Rwandans social categories hold a majority view that almost all information were
revealed throughout Gacaca meetings. This finding may be largely due to the fact that an
overwhelming majority (83,4%) of respondents also indicated that they believed in the
impartiality of Gacaca Judges.
The objective of Gacaca justice was not a retributive justice, but rather restorative, which
implies that its primary purpose was not punishment but rebuilding trust among Rwandans
and to facilitate reconciliation. Asked about the fairness of punishment, 89% of Rwandans
responded that they felt that the punishment received by perpetrators were fair. The
statement relating to compensation shows that 70.8% of respondents felt that genocide
survivors were fairly compensated. It is worthy noting that compensation was meant and
understood by both researchers and respondents as restitution of material belongings lost
following the genocide.
Instead of compensation, in its legal sense, Rwanda post-genocide leadership placed specific
emphasis on the provision of support to more vulnerable genocide survivors. A Genocide
Survivors’ Fund (FARG: Fonds d’Assistance aux rescapés du Génocide) was, for example,
instituted for this purpose. Though significant achievements were made, there are also
number of shortcomings to this dispensation that have been raised Rwanda. As shown in
the statement relating to government support for survivors, 69,5% of respondents indicated
that they approved of government efforts in this regard.
Land restitution remains a critical issue in post-genocide Rwanda, given the central role that
land has played during the genocide but also the in the decades leading up to it. A sensitive
and efficient approach to this question was therefore critical over the past sixteen years. In
terms of the public opinion expressed in this survey, the majority of citizens (83%) have
expressed approval for the measures thus far to restore ownership to those who were
forcefully removed. A lower percentage (62%) has however indicated that restorative
measures have reduced the number of disputes related to land, while an even lower
percentage (59%) felt that it has contributed to social cohesion.
In terms of the future stability of Rwanda it is important that citizens do not live in fear of
the kind of violence that the country has witnessed in 1994. Often the tension associated
with such fear can be enough to ignite unnecessary conflict. Most respondents (83%),
however, indicated that they believe that the causes of the violence have been sufficiently
dealt with to ensure that this would not happen again.
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Figure 18: Perceptions on Justice delivered (% agreement)
The data indicates that the majority of both male and female respondents believe that the
truth about genocide was revealed through gacaca (94.4% of males and 93.2% of females).
83.5% of males and 83.3% of females believe inyangamugayo were impartial during the
gacaca process. 89.2% of males and 89.5% of females believed that those convicted through
gacaca received received fair punishment. 95.1% of males and 94.3% of females agreed that
those convicted through gacaca have served sentences and have been reintegrated into
Rwandan society. 70.1% of males and 71.6% of females agreed that genocide survivors have
been compensated for crimes committed against them. 85.6% of males and 80.5% of
females agreed that genocide will never occur again in Rwanda, because the underlying
causes have been deal with. 68.7% of males and 70.3% of females believe that survivors of
the genocide have received enough support and assistance from the government. 78.4% of
males and 76.2% of females agree that those whose properties/assets had been taken away
from them have recovered them. 63.9% of males and 59.8% of females agreed that land
redistribution after 1994 has lowered land-related issues. 60.8% of males and 57.4% of
females believe that land redistribution after 1994 has impacted positively on social
cohesion.
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The figure above presents findings for the entire Rwandan population. For a proper analysis,
it would however also be necessary to ascertain whether there are significant differences in
the way that historically distinct social groups or sectors respond to these same questions.
The table below disaggregates the same results on this basis.
Table11: Perceptions on Justice to Rwandans disaggregated by their social categories (%
Agreement)
Genocide survivor
Tigistes/ relatives
Old case refugees*
New case refugees
Historically marginalised*
Other/ refused
Many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes.
71.5% 86.1% 68.1% 85.9% 96.8% 85.1%
Those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness.
69.1% 84.7% 66.0% 84.8% 83.9% 81.2%
The attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past.
30.0% 24.9% 29.8% 26.8% 19.4% 24.3%
I have no choice but to reconcile with others in my community, or face the consequences.
42.6% 32.5% 42.6% 31.0% 41.9% 33.3%
Those convicted through gacaca received fair punishment.
80.7% 92.2% 90.4% 92.0% 93.5% 89.5%
Genocide survivors have been compensated for the crimes committed against them.
56.7% 73.7% 66.0% 79.1% 67.7% 71.5%
Survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from government.
61.2% 69.4% 73.1% 77.4% 60.0% 69.1%
Land redistribution after 1994 has lowered land-related issues.
58.6% 54.6% 76.3% 66.2% 61.3% 65.6%
Land redistribution after 1994 has impacted positively on social cohesion.
55.6% 51.9% 73.4% 63.0% 67.7% 62.8%
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS n = 486 n = 792 n = 94 n = 586 n = 31 n = 969
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.
As became evident in previous tables, most respondents agree about the positive
achievements of the transitional justice measures that have been put in place. The table
above shows that if broken down in the respective population sectors, genocide survivors,
perpetrators relatives, tigistes, historically marginalized people, old and new case refugees
and the “others“ group display high levels of agreement with the idea that genocide
perpetrators have shown remorse. Such agreement is highest amongst historically
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marginalised people (96,8%), followed by the combined category of ‘tigistes’ and the
relatives of genocide perpetrators at 86,1%. It is worth noting that the more reluctant
category seems to be the “old case refugees”, which registered a considerably lower level of
agreement at 68,1%.
An interesting aspect of these disaggregated findings has been the fact that responses for
genocide survivors have been quite similar to those of “old case refugees.” Similarly, the
same is observable for the responses of “perpetrators relatives and tigistes” and “new case
refugees” groups.
Levels of agreement are relatively lower when it comes to assertions regarding land
redistribution and its impact on the lowering of conflict and the promotion of social
cohesion. The table above show that “old case refugees” display high levels of agreement
with the relevant statements, as opposed the slightly lower affirmative responses by the
“perpetrators relatives and tigistes” category. On the final two statements, responses from
“genocide survivors” and “perpetrators relatives and tigistes” appear to be quite close to
each other. In this regard it is worth remembering that most “old case refugees” do not live
in their “traditional lands”, largely because they were not able to reoccupy them when they
returned back to Rwanda after 35 years in exile. Many have settled on new sites, which have
been allocated by the government, while others have bought properties through their own
means.
All statements up to this point have dealt with domestic responses to justice in Rwanda. In
the table below we present responses to the effectiveness of an external instrument of
justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
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Figure 19: Level of agreement over ICTR performance
While most Rwandans are aware of the purpose and nature of the ICTR, it is quite notable
that close to a quarter of citizens are not able to wage an opinion on its effectiveness. While
about 59% of respondents felt that it was effective (‘very effective’ and ‘effective’
combined), only about 13% regarded it as ineffective.
13.4. Summary findings on transitional justice
This section looked at transitional justice as a critical ingredient of reconciliation, with the
hypothesis that if parties to conflict get proper justice, they are likely to be reconciled. The
RRB results suggested very high percentages (more than 80%) signs of individual healing
based on occurrence of forgiveness seeking and giving, healing from the wounds of the past
and experience of reconciliation in one’s life.
However, the survey came up with significant percentages of Rwandans (34.5%) who feel
that engaging in reconciliation process is not a voluntary commitment, and that the attitude
of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past
(almost 26%).
As far as parties to reconciliation is concerned, respondents mentioned primarily and in
order of importance genocide survivors and genocide perpetrators (48.4%); Rwandans and
other Rwandans (33.2%); as well as Hutu and Tutsi (15%).
The RRB also suggested a very high confidence in Gacaca as a transitional justice
mechanism. More than eighty percent of respondents appreciate positively the
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achievements of Gacaca in terms of truth unveiling, punishment, impartiality of judges, etc.
However, the survey showed less appreciation vis-a-vis the compensation for the genocide
survivors. Lesser appreciation was also recorded as far as ICTR is concerned.
Globally speaking, for the majority of indicators used, more than 70 % of responses suggest
high satisfaction with the justice that they received. This percentage is high enough to argue
that transitional justice in Rwanda is in a better position to enhance reconciliation as
suggested by the working hypothesis.
XIV SOCIAL COHESION
A descriptive analysis of the RBB data points to significant progress in terms of forging social
cohesion in the wake of the genocide in 1994. It suggests a positive shift in inter-ethnic
relations and interactions, and a considerable degree of willingness to engage in
interactions with people from different ethnic groups. It appears, according to the data, as if
this predisposition stems from an increase in trust of people from these different groups.
The RBB also indicates that, contrary to popular belief, it is not ethnic-, but rather economic
cleavages that are most divisive in Rwandan society today. Thirty percent of adult Rwandans
responded that the gap between rich and poor is the primary source of division in society,
14.1. Personal experience of ethnic discrimination
Figure 20: Experience of ethnic discrimination
The data suggests a low level of ethnic based-prejudice, discrimination and stereotyping
among adult Rwandans. Most (about 93%) indicated that they have never experienced
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ethnic prejudice since the end of the genocide, while only 6% reported that they have fallen
victim to prejudice of this nature. However, the data indicates that an important percentage
of Rwandans (31.5%) think that ethnic discrimination is still practiced in Rwanda, even
though it is legally banned. Sixty percent of respondents indicated that ethnic
discrimination does not occur in Rwanda anymore and, in the same vein, 62% of Rwandans
believe that citizens do not judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes any more.
The results however show that 30.5% perceive such judgements still to take place.
Table 12: Experiences of ethnic discrimination by social group (% Agreement)
Genocide Survivor
Relative of Perpetrator
Tigiste Old case refugee
New case refugee
Hist. marginalised People
Refused Other
I have never experienced ethnic prejudice in Rwanda since the end of the genocide
87.9 93.0 97.1 87.2 94.2 96.8 95.9 94.8
Although ethnic discrimination is banned in Rwanda, it still occurs
44.1 30.3 18.2 52.1 31.2 41.9 42.6 32.2
Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes
39.1 28.3 18.2 43.6 28.0 32.3 35.2 27.7
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
486 757 34 94 585 31 122 845
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.
The table above presents levels of agreement (those who either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’)
with a number of statements measuring perceptions of ethnic prejudice since the end of the
genocide. These have been disaggregated in terms of the different population sectors
between which the survey distinguishes. Twenty seven percent of those that do not regard
themselves as falling in any of these categories agreed with the statement that they have
never experienced ethnic prejudice in Rwanda, while 23.8% of genocide
perpetrators/suspects, 18.6% of new case refugees, 14,5% of genocide survivors, and 2,8%
of old case refugees responded in the affirmative to the statement. The results show that
the perception among genocide survivors (7.3%) is slightly higher than among genocide
perpetrators (6.7%). The same perception is, of course, also visible among those who do not
find themselves in any of the suggested social categories (9.2%) and among new case
refugees (6.2%). The data indicates that, as far as the perception that Rwandans still judge
each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes is concerned, the perception is higher among
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those who do not find themselves in any of the suggested social categories (8.0%) and
among relatives of genocide perpetrators/suspects than among other suggested social
categories.
Figure 21: Experience of ethnic discrimination, disaggregated by age group (% agreement)
This figure above presents responses to the same three questions, but disaggregated in
terms of different age categories. It points to only slight difference in the way that different
generations of Rwandans experience ethnic prejudice. Although at least more than 91% in
all age groups have never experienced it since the end of the genocide, the absence of such
experiences increases from younger to older age categories.
Differences between age groups in responses to whether ethnic discrimination still takes
place are also marginal. Just over 38% of young people (age group 18-24) thought this to be
the case, compared to 29.1% of those aged 55-64, and 28.5% of those aged 65 and older.
This situation is nearly the same as far as responses to ethnic stereotyping is concerned.
Amongst those who are aged 18-24, 36.8% felt that this is the case, 23.9% of those aged 55-
64 perceived it to be true, as did and 25.1% of those aged 65 and older.
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14.2. Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict and genocide
Figure 22: Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict and genocide (%
agreement)
The figure above presents findings on perceptions relating to trust amongst those who
found themselves on different sides of the genocide. The results point to substantial levels
of trust between the different groups. More than 92% of adult Rwandans believe that
relations have improved between groups that found themselves in opposing camps during
the genocide. Almost 7 out 10 respondents disagreed with the statement that they or their
families found it difficult to trust Rwandans who were at the other end of the conflict. It is,
however, notable that almost 1 in 4 adult Rwandans (24.7%) agree with with this sentiment.
As far as the impact of the past on current social relationships is concerned, the data
suggests that 78% of adult Rwandans disagree with the opinion that Rwanda’s past still
divides its people, 16 years after the genocide.
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Table 134: Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict and genocide by social category
(%)
AGREEMENT Genocide Survivor
Relative of Perpetrator
Tigiste Old case refugee
New case refugee
Historically marginalised People
Refused Other
Since 1994, relations have improved between those who found themselves on different sides of the genocide
89.3% 92.3% 97.1% 92.6% 94.2% 87.1% 92.6% 93.0%
It is difficult for me or my family to trust Rwandans who found themselves on the other side of the conflict during the genocide.
37.7% 19.0% 21.2% 34.0% 25.1% 35.5% 24.6% 20.7%
Rwanda's past still divides its people today.
20.8% 14.9% 18.2% 23.4% 15.7% 16.1% 5.7% 22.2%
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
486 757 34 94 585 31 122 845
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.
The data presented in the table above looks at the same statements, but through the prism
of the respective population sectors. As far as the statement regarding the improvement of
social relations since 1994 is concerned, all respondent categories have registered very high
levels agreement, with the lowest of these being the ‘Historically Marginalised’ category
with 87%. Agreement levels with the following statement on the difficulty that respondents
may have to trust those that found themselves on the other side of the genocide divide, are
considerably lower, albeit somewhat more disparate. The highest level of agreement came
from ‘genocide survivors’ at 37,7%, which is 17 percentage points higher than the national
average. On the other side, the lowest level of agreement has been 19.0% amongst
‘relatives of perpetrators.’ Affirmative responses to the statement that Rwanda’s past still
divides its population is equally low and disparate. ‘Old Case Refugees”, with 23,4%
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registered the highest level of agreement, while those who refused to categorised
themselves were the least likely to agree with the statement at 5,7%.
14.3. Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994
Figure 22: Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994 (%)
The figure above presents data that reports on respondents’ interaction with people from
ethnic groups other than their own. It is worth bearing in mind that though there is no
statistic on inter-ethnic interactions right after the genocide. The highest agreement level
(83,3%) has been for instances related to material or financial assistance for somebody from
another ethnic group, while the lowest frequency recorded was for the receiving of financial
or material support from somebody from another ethnic group.
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Figure 23: Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994 disaggregated by gender(%
agreement)
Opinions on spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994 show that 73% of males and
75.4% of females often assist those from other ethnic groups, both materially and
financially. 70.8% of males and 72.8% of females often receive financial assistance/material
support from those from another ethnic group. 79.9% of males and 81.7% of females
indicate that they will often borrow a tool or use a service from someone from a different
ethnic group in their communities. 81% of males and 82.8% of females will often lend a tool
or give a service to someone from a different ethnic group in their communities.
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Table 14: Spontaneous inter-ethnic contact by social category (% often/always)
Often/Always Genocide Survivor
Relative of Perpetrator
Tigiste Old case refugee
New case refugee
Hist. marginalised people
Refused Other
Assist someone from another ethnic group materially or financially
76.5 77.4 66.7 81.9 70.8 64.5 68.9 73.6
Receive financial assistance/material support from someone from another ethnic group
73.5 76.8 75.8 76.6 69.6 54.8 62.3 69.7
Borrow a tool or use a service from someone from a different ethnic group in your community
84.8 83.9 91.2 90.4 76.3 74.2 77.9 78.4
Lend a tool or give a service to someone from a different ethnic group in your community
85.2 85.1 91.2 93.5 77.8 77.4 77.9 80.0
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
486 757 34 94 585 31 122 845
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.
The table above presents findings for the same statements as those in the previous table,
but is disaggregated in terms of responses by the country’s different social groups. It,
furthermore, only reports on the levels of agreement (“always” or “often”), within each. The
overall picture, presented by the data, is one where a generally high level of receptiveness
exists for various forms of inter-group contact. The majority of responses register an
approval of over 70 percent, with only one being lower than 60%. Generally respondents in
each of these groups appeared to be more reticent to give or receive material or financial
assistance from other groups. In contrast, the last two categories relating to the borrowing
or lending of a tool from somebody from a different group, received higher approval ratings.
Since all these percentage are high, it must, however, be emphasised once again that these
difference are very relative.
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14.4. Being Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact
Figure 24: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact (%)
Sixteen years after the genocide mistrust and fear between members of different ethnic
groups seem to have dissipated significantly, as suggested by the data in the above figure.
More than 90% of respondents felt comfortable to engage with other groups in acts, which
were incomprehensible in the immediate wake of the genocide. Such behaviour include:
asking favours from somebody from another ethnic group; having an intimate friend from
such a group; joining an association/cooperative of which the majority of members are from
another group; joining a political party whose supporters are mostly from another group; or
joining a church where the respondent’s ethnic group is in a minority. Responses to all
these statements overwhelmingly point towards the willingness of Rwandans to engage
with each other across historically-defined ethnic lines.
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Figure 25: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact disaggregated by gender (% comfortable)
93.8% of males and 94.1% of females feel comfortable asking a favour from a neighbor of a
different ethnic group. 93.5% of males and 91.6% of females indicated that they feel
comfortable having an intimate friend from another ethnic group. 96% of males and 95.4%
of females feel comfortable joining an association or cooperative made up mostly of people
from a different ethnic group. 91.7% of males and 90.7% of females feel comfortable joining
a political party made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. 96.5% of males
and 96.5% of females feel comfortable joining a church congregation made up mostly of
people from a different ethnic group.
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Table 15: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact occurs by age group (% Comfortable)
Comfortable 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 and older
Asking favour from neighbour of different ethnic group
91.8 94.7 94.6 93.7 94.5 93.0
Having an intimate friend from another ethnic group
90.2 93.0 93.5 93.7 91.4 89.8
Joining association/ cooperative made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group.
95.3 95.6 96.9 96.0 94.9 93.6
Joining a political party made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group
91.1 91.4 91.1 92.6 91.0 88.2
Joining a church congregation made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group
96.0 96.9 96.6 97.1 95.7 95.2
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 450 979 652 446 255 187
A breakdown of the same responses in terms of age groups, as has been presented above,
shows that Rwandans, irrespective of their age, are comfortable in engaging with other
groups in the mentioned contexts. Within the sampled population there therefore seems to
be little generational variance in the degree of ease with which respondents interact with
other groups.
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14.5. Approval of inter-ethnic interactions
Table 16: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions (%)
Strongly approve
Approve Neither Dispprove
Strongly disapprove
Owning/operating a business with someone from another ethnic group
50.9 45.2 1.5 .4
Working for and taking orders from someone from another ethnic group
50.2 47.9 .6 .5 .1
Voting for someone from another ethnic group 56.2 41.4 1.0 .7 .2
Marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group
50.8 43.2 1.8 3.2 .6
Leaving your child, or the child of a family member, in the care of someone from another ethnic group
50.4 46.1 1.0 1.4 .5
The table above presents results to a next series of statements, probing the extent to which
respondents were willing to forge relationships with ethnic groups, other than the one that
they belong to. The data shows that more than 90% of Rwandans approve of interactions
between members of different ethnic groups in all of instances that were measured. Ninety
eight percent of respondents indicated that they are willing to work or take orders from
someone from another ethnic group; 94% percent approved of marriages across ethnic
lines; 96% were open to the idea of owning/operating business with someone from another
ethnic group; 98% indicated that they would for someone from another ethnic group; and
97% approved of leaving their child, or the child of a family member, in the care of someone
from another ethnic group.
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Figure 26: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions disaggregated by gender (% approval)
Almost 96.7% of males and 95.5% of females approve of owning or operating a business
with someone from another ethnic group. 98.6% of males and 97.7% of females approve of
working for and taking orders from someone from another ethnic group. 97.8% of males
and 97.4% of females approve of voting for someone from another ethnic group. 94.6% of
males and 93.4% of females approve of marrying or having a close relative marry someone
from another ethnic group. 96.8% of males and 96.6% of females approve of leaving their
child or a child of a family member in the care of someone from another ethnic group.
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Table 17: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions disaggregated by social category (% approval)
Approval Genocide Survivor
Relative of Perpetrator
Tigiste Old case refugee
New case refugee
Historically marginalised People
Refused Other
Own/operate business with someone from another ethnic group
93.0 96.0 100.0 98.9 96.9 90.3 95.9 97.4
Working for and taking orders from someone from another ethnic group
96.3 98.8 100.0 98.9 98.5 96.8 99.2 98.5
Voting for someone from another ethnic group
92.2 98.8 100.0 97.9 97.9 96.8 98.4 99.3
Marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group
88.7 93.0 100.0 92.6 94.4 93.5 96.7 97.2
Leaving your child, or the child of a family member, in the care of someone from another ethnic group
90.3 97.9 100.0 94.7 97.1 96.8 99.2 98.3
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
486 757 34 94 585 31 122 845
*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.
The table above shows that if broken by social category, approval (’approve’ and ‘strongly
approve’ combined) remains very high for the same group of engagements. The lowest
levels of approval came for inter-ethnic marriages from ‘genocide survivors’, but at 88.7%
agreement to this most intimate level of engagement still remains substantially high.
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14.6. Primary and secondary sources of division in Rwandan society
The last measurement in this section relates to the most divisive aspects of Rwandan
society. The figure below shows how Rwandans have ranked different aspects of Rwandan
society in terms of the division that they bring to the country.
Figure 27: Primary and secondary sources of division in Rwandan society (%)
The results show that economic status, ethnicity and political party membership are being
regarded as the three primary sources of division in the country. It is of particular
significance here that, in the eyes of ordinary Rwandans, economic inequality (30.4%)
surpasses ethnic difference as a source of divisions (22%). Far lower down in the third place
is the issue of differences between political parties. The latter has however featured most
strongly as the most mentioned secondary source of division, with 15% of respondents
mentioning this category. Income inequality, followed by ethnic divisions has been the
second and third most mentioned secondary divisions. An interesting aspect of responses
to this collection of options is that close to 24% of respondents could not identify a
secondary source of division.
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14.7. Social Cohesion Summary Findings
This section examined through RRB social cohesion as measure of horizontal reconciliation,
with the hypothesis that if trust increases between Rwandan citizens, and particularly those
on different side of the genocide, reconciliation is more likely to occur.
A descriptive analysis of the RBB data points to significant progress in terms of forging social
cohesion in the wake of the genocide in 1994. It suggests a positive shift in inter-ethnic
relations and interactions, and a considerable degree of willingness to engage in
interactions with people from different ethnic groups. It appears, according to the data, as if
this predisposition stems from an increase in trust of people from these different groups.
The RBB also indicates that, contrary to popular belief, it is not ethnic-, but rather economic
cleavages that are most divisive in Rwandan society today. Thirty percent of adult Rwandans
responded that the gap between rich and poor is the primary source of division in society,
Obviously, the RRB came up with high levels of social cohesion indicators including social
distance, tolerance and trust. For the majority of indicators used, scores go higher than 80%
of positive perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. Based on these findings one can argue
that the current state of social cohesion is a critical indicator that reconciliation in Rwanda is
on good track. However, the gap between rich and poor, between those of different ethnic
groups and that between members of political parties, in order of importance, remain the
primary sources of division among Rwanda. The government of Rwanda, the Private sector
and civil society organisations should endeavour to take up this challenge for fear of letting
them (gaps) hinder the social cohesion and finally the reconciliation process.
XV CONCLUSION
This first Rwandan reconciliation barometer (RRB) has been conducted 16 years after the
genocide against the Tutsi and 11 years after the establishment of the National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission. The new government set up after this genocide, and NURC in
particular have embarked, among other things, on rebuilding the social fabric which was
torn by ethnic and region-based divisions as well as the genocide. The RRB has investigated
perceptions, attitudes and practices of the Rwandan citizens on progress in unity and
reconciliation.
The tracking of the state of reconciliation in Rwanda was based on six variables. They
include political culture, human security, citizenship and identity, transitional justice,
understanding the past and social cohesion.
The following are major conclusions emerging from the RRB findings:
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The first section examined political culture as an independent variable with the potential to
explain reconciliation occurrence in Rwanda. All in all, for most indicators used except that
on citizen participation, more than 70 % of responses suggest that citizens view political
structures, institutions , values and leadership as legitimate and effective. It can therefore
be argued that political culture in Rwanda, though not optimal yet, remains in a position to
contribute positively to reconciliation process. However, much is still to be done especially
in the area of boosting citizen participation in decisionmaking, and confidence in non-
government-led frameworks/organisations such as political parties, civil society
organisations, religious organisation, and private media.
Concerning human security, large majorities of Rwandans report high levels of physical
security. In this regard the majority of respondents have also expressed positive sentiments
towards the prospects for their personal economic circumstances, as well as the
commitment of the state to support human development in an equitable and fair fashion.
However, it has been apparent that respondents have more reservations about matters
relating to economic security than is the case for physical security. There are good reasons
to believe, from the above, that Rwandans have acceptable security grounds to move
towards reconciliation, although there is still much to be done on economic side.
In relation with citizenship and identity, the RRB survey suggests that most of Rwandans
(more than 90%) feel proud of being citizens of Rwanda, and want their children to think of
themselves as Rwandan rather than hutu, tutsi or twa (98%). The feeling that common
national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today is also very
high (94%), with most of Rwandans (96%) believing that in everyday life, the actions and
behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation. Given that large majority of
Rwandans believe that reconciliation is a key national priority and that national values
leading to reconciliation are being promoted, the likelihood that citizenship and identity
contribute to bringing about reconciliation in Rwanda remains very significant.
As far as understanding the past is concerned, almost all Rwandans are with the view that
before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created
divisions in society (98%), and that today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan
history encourages reconciliation (94.7%). Furthermore, majorities of Rwandans are with
the view that many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation (69.7%).
The RRB also reports a significant belief that although it is against the law, some Rwandans
would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable (almost 40 %).
By and large, it is obvious that large majority of Rwandans share the view that history
teaching and ethnic manipulation have significantly shaped the division among Rwandans.
This common understanding of some aspects of the past, we can argue, is a good sign that
the likelihood that Rwandan citizens can reconcile is high. However, the persisting fear-
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among some Rwandans, mainly genocide survivors, old case refugees, and young people - of
a genocide reoccurrence might hinder the reconciliation process, if concrete measures are
not taken.
With regard to transitional justice, majorities of Rwandans (more than 80%) feel that they
have experienced individual healing. This is based on occurrence of forgiveness seeking and
giving, healing from the wounds of the past and experience of reconciliation in one’s life.
However, some Rwandans (34.5%) feel that engaging in reconciliation process is not a
voluntary commitment, and that the attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still
want to take revenge for the events of the past (almost 26%).
On the question about who should reconcile with whom, Rwandans mentioned primarily
and in order of importance genocide survivors and genocide perpetrators (48.4%);
Rwandans and other Rwandans (33.2%); and Hutu and Tutsi (15%). A very high confidence
in Gacaca as a transitional justice mechanism was also reported, especially in truth
unveiling, punishment, impartiality of judges, etc. There is however less appreciation vis-à-
vis the compensation for the genocide survivors.
All in all, for the majority of indicators used, more than 70 % of responses suggest high
satisfaction with the justice that they received. This percentage is high enough to argue that
transitional justice in Rwanda is in a better position to enhance reconciliation as suggested
by the working hypothesis.
Regarding social cohesion, RBB data suggest tremendous progress in terms of forging social
cohesion in the wake of the genocide in 1994. A positive shift in inter-ethnic relations and
interactions, and a considerable degree of willingness to engage in interactions with people
from different ethnic groups is very high, assumingly as a result of increase in trust of these
people.
Contrary to popular belief, the survey shows that it is not ethnic primarily, but rather
economic cleavages that are most divisive in Rwandan society today. Thirty percent of adult
Rwandans responded that the gap between rich and poor is the primary source of division in
society.
For the majority of indicators used, scores go higher than 80% of positive perceptions,
attitudes and behaviours. Based on these findings, one can argue that the current state of
social cohesion is a critical indicator that reconciliation process in Rwanda is on good track.
However, the gap between rich and poor, the division between Rwandans from different
ethnic groups and that between members of political parties, in order of importance,
remain the primary sources of division among Rwandans.
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It is important to emphasise that the results of the first RRB represent baseline
measurements. The results therefore present a picture of where Rwanda currently finds
itself in terms of national unity and reconciliation. They can however not be used to draw
conclusions of trends or progress over time. In order to do this, more such surveys will need
to be conducted in future.
Recommendations
I. Methodological recommendations (lessons learnt)
1. Data collection for the first RRB were conducted on the eve of presidential
campaign and after some mutual accusations between the government and
some independent media and members of political opposition. Given that
these events knew wide media coverage, it was assumed that they shaped to
some extent the views/opinions of the Rwandan population including
respondents to the RRB survey. In a bid to minimize the biases resulting from
such influence, the timing of future RRB surveys should take this reality into
consideration and, where possible, avoid data collection in months
characterised by high political temperature.
2. RRB questionnaire included a number of sensitive questions. If the popular
belief that “Rwandans do not open up immediately on most sensitive
issues”is true, an exclusively quantitative approach would not be enough to
collect citizen perceptions on reconciliation. A qualitative approach should be
added to the latter for future RRB surveys to allow data collectors build more
trust among respondents and therefore bring them to opening up and give
their real views. Obviously, the combination of both approaches has an
implication on the RRB surveys resources. NURC should bear this in mind in
planning future RRB surveys.
3. During the data collection activity, local leaders at the village level were
requested by researchers to collaborate with them in making the sampling
frame (households) and in identifying physically the households. Such a
presence and active involvement of local leaders could draw much attention
from residents who were likely to take the research as government-
supervised process, which could lead some of them to answer what they
think would please the government. The National Institute of Statistics,
thanks to the development of Information and Communication Technology in
Rwanda, should endeavour to set up and regularly update a nationwide
sampling frame (households) to be used by different researchers.
4. The RRB instrument has set baseline indicators for future surveys. However,
due to maturation effect (changes in socio-political environment over the
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time), NURC should endeavour to ensure a regular update of this instrument.
This update could help track new indicators emerging from the environment,
and drop out those deemed to no longer be of relevance.
II. Policy-oriented recommendations
1. The inequality between rich and poor has been identified as the primary source of
division in present day Rwanda. Effort made by the government of Rwanda to boost
economic growth over the past years should go hand in hand with that of reducing
the gap between rich and poor. Thus, poor-focused initiatives following the example
of that of Girinka Munyarwanda (One cow one family programme) should be
multiplied by both the government and civil society organisations.
2. Second on the list of sources of division is the difference between ethnic groups. In
the same vein, simportant percentages of Rwandans (31.5%) feel that although
ethnic discrimination is banned in Rwanda, it still occurs, and 30.5% feel that
Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes. This shows, as
suggested by the RRB findings, that though Rwandan citizens are on good track of
reconciliation process, much is still to be done to fill the gap created by ethnic
divisions. The government of Rwanda should keep on ensuring that members of all
Rwandan ethnic groups have equal chance to access public services such as
education, employment, health, and to country’s resources. Particularly, NURC
should double its effort to fight against ethnic stereotypes based in the Rwandan
culture (proverbs) and the daily sayings of Rwandans. Itorero, Ingando, schools
(curricula for all levels) and Igorora can still be convenient frameworks and channels
through which such a fight can operate. Religious denominations and civil society
organisations should also double efforts for such an endeavour.
3. Political parties came in the third place as a source of division in Rwanda today. Since
1959 through 1991-1994 until now, political parties confrontations, especially
between those in power and those on opposition side have thrown people in
confusion and have contributed to a big extent to the division among the Rwandans.
Mutual allegations between the government and emerging political opposition
parties in Rwanda supports the above finding.
4. Political parties, irrespective of whether they are in opposition or not should abide by
the law and commit to promote unity and reconciliation of the Rwandan people.
They should avoid any speech, writing and behaviour of a sectarian nature or which
can throw people in confusion.
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5. About 40% of respondents declared that since the end of the genocide, acces to land
and housing worsened. Thirty percent (30%) disagree with the opinion that national
resources are equitably distributed. The government should keep on enforcing the
policies of grouped settlement, land consolidation and agricultural mechanisation. In
collaboration with priavete sector and civil society organisations, the government
should promote non-agricultural income generating activities. MINALOC in
collaboration with, local governments, the Private sector and CSO’s should double
effort to build houses for those who do not have decent houses. Participants in
Ingando, Itorero and Umuganda can also be very useful as far as manpower is
concerned. Urban planning and expropriation policy should take into consideration
the capacities of different socioprofessional categories, and therefore plan build sites
accordingly with clear regulations to abide to.
6. Sensitive percentages of citizens feel that they do not have space to actively
influence and shape policy and decision-making processes that happen within
government and that affect their lives. Close to a third of all respondents disagree
with the statement that they have “space and opportunities to influence those that
make the laws of the country”, and further third agree that they have “very little say
in the important decisions” that affect their lives. Although Rwanda has high scores
in many areas of good governance such as fighting against corruption, promotion of
gender equality, attractive business doing environment, etc. the above finding
suggests a lower score in citizen participation in decision-making. The government,
the Parliament and local government should make tangible effort to involve citizens
in decision-making. Consultations prior to making major decisions and setting key
policies and laws that affect daily life of citizens can be one of participation
mechanisms.
III. Further research (sectorial research, qualitative...)
The RRB has exclusively used a quantitative approach. One shortcoming of this
option is that the survey helped get estimates on current state of reconciliation
in Rwanda without yielding relevant explanations on the “why” of many
significant results. Further research studies, mainly from a qualitative approach,
are therefore needed to take up this challenge. Findings from such studies should
inform sectorial policies in terms of setting up and/or revision. Below are some
suggested focuses for further research:
- Obstacles to citizen participation in decision-making
- Levels, forms, causes of ethnic discrimination and stereotypes, and strategies
to eradicate them.
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- Reasons behind lower trust in political parties, religious institutions, and civil
society organisations (CSO’s).
- It is established that the elite (political , intellectual and economic) played a
key role in shaping ethnic conflict in Rwanda. The RRB survey suggested a
significant percentage (48.7%) of Rwandans who believe that the conflicts
between the elite within the political sphere have not been effectively
managed. There is an urgent need to conduct a study involving the elite with
a focus on reconciliation process.
This study encompasses tremendous data and opinions necessary to building true and
lasting reconciliation as well as unity among Rwandans. The above mentionned
recommendations are few of many that may be drawm from number of data and analyses
made throughout the document. Reading systematically this document may be of great
interest as this may inspire other sectorial and practical recommendations.
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ANNEXES
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RWANDA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER
SAMPLING
Selected sectors, cells and villages
Province
District
Sector
Cell/Akagari
Village
Choice
NORD Burera Bungwe Mudugari Mubuga
Kagogo Kiringa Kirigari
Rwerere Ruchonsho Kamatengu
Gakenke Busengo Kamina Kamina
Kivuruga Rugimbu Mugari
Rushashi Mbogo Gisanze
Gicumbi Bukure Kivumu Karushya Centre
Mukarange Mutarama Mafunirwa
Shangasha Nyabishambi Gasiza
Musanze Busogo Nyagisozi Cyasure
Kinigi Kampanga Rubara
Shingiro Mudende Nyarutende
Rulindo Base Gatare Mugendera 1
Kisaro Mubuga Gako
Tumba Misezero Kavumu
SUD Gisagara Gikonko Gikonko Gahabwa
Muganza Remera Agakurwe
Save Rwanza Akarambo
Huye Gishamvu Ryakibogo Impinga
Mbazi Mwulire Bumbogo
Tumba Gitwa Nyarurembo
Kamonyi Gacurabwenge Kigembe Kagarama
Musambira Kivumu Nyarenga
Runda Kagina Gasharara
Muhanga Cyeza Makera Binunga
Muhanga Nyamirama Namakurwe
Shyogwe Mubuga Matsinsi
Nyamagabe Buruhukiro Kizimyamuriro Gikungu
Kibumbwe Kibibi Gutandaganya
Uwinkingi Mudasomwa Gicaca
Nyanza Busasamana Kibinja Ngorongari
Kigoma Gahombo Birembo
Rwabicuma Mushirarungu Kirwa
Nyaruguru Busanze Nteko Nyarukeri
Munini Ngeri Akagera
Rusenge Mariba Miko
Ruhango Bweramana Murama Karima
Kinazi Kinazi Nyabinyenga
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Ruhango Musamo Ryanyiranda
EST Bugesera Gashora Kagomasi Kuruganda
Mwogo Rugunga Rukira
Shyara Nziranziza Kagarama
Gatsibo Gasange Teme Biburankwi
Kiziguro Ndatemwa Akamamesa
Rwimbogo Nyamatete Akajevuba
Kayonza Gahini Kiyenzi Kabuye
Murundi Murundi Kayongo
Rwinkwavu Mukoyoyo Busasamana
Kirehe Gahara Nyagasenyi Cyabihama1
Mahamba Saruhembe Gisenyi
Nyarubuye Nyabitare Rugarama
Ngoma Gashanda Munege Gakuto
Murama Mvumba Mvumba
Zaza Ruhembe Kabeza
Nyagatare Gatunda Nyamirembe Kajevuba
Mimuri Mahoro Cyabwana
Tabagwe Nyabitekeri Kabeza
Rwamagana Fumbwe Nyamirama Agatare
Munyaga Rweru Kabingo
Rubona Karambi Karambi
Karongi Bwishyura Kayenzi Buhoro
Murambi Nkoto Kibamba
Twumba Gitabura Gatare
Ngororero Bwira Gashubi Rugeshi
Kavumu Nyamugeyo Gatovu
Sovu Musenyi Gihonga
Nyabihu Bigogwe Kora Kageri
Kintobo Nyamugari Kabagandu
Shyira Mpinga Mukaka
OUEST Nyamasheke Bushekeri Ngoma Keshero
Karambi Kabuga Mugohe
Shangi Mugera Bweranyange
Rubavu Bugeshi Kabumba Bonde
Kanzenze Nyamikongi Kivugiza
Rugerero Muhira Gatebe 1
Rusizi Bugarama Pera Kiyovu
Kamembe Kamashangi Amahoro
Rwimbogo Mushaka Gakombe
Rutsiro Gihango Kongo-Nil Kandahura
Mukura Kagusa Bukeye
Rusebeya Remera Bihira
MVK Gasabo Bumbogo Ngara Birembo
Kacyiru Kamutwa Urugero
Rutunga Kabariza Kabaliza
Kicukiro Gahanga Murinja Nyamuharaza
Kanombe Karama Byimana
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Nyarugunga Nonko Amahoro
Nyarugenge Gitega Kigarama Umurava
Mageragere Ntungamo Nyabitare
Rwezamenyo Rwezamenyo 1 Abatarushwa
RWANDA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER/ IGIPIMO CY’UBUMWE
N’UBWIYUNGE MU RWANDA
QUESTIONNAIRE TO CITIZENS/ IKAYI Y’IBIBAZO BIGENEWE UMUTURAGE
INTERVIEWER TO FILL IN: INTERVIEWER NAMEI IZINA RY’UBAZA :______________________________________________________________________ District (select one)/Akarere :
1 BURERA 11 NYANZA 21 KARONGI
2 GAKENKE 12 NYARUGURU 22 NGORORERO
3 GICUMBI 13 RUHANGO 23 NYABIHU
4 MUSANZE 14 BUGESERA 24 NYAMASHEKE
5 RULINDO 15 GATSIBO 25 RUBAVU
6 GISAGARA 16 KAYONZA 26 RUSIZI
7 HUYE 17 KIREHE 27 RUTSIRO
8 KAMONYI 18 NGOMA 28 GASABO
9 MUHANGA 19 NYAGATARE 29 KICUKIRO
10 NYAMAGABE 20 RWAMAGANA 30 NYARUGENGE
VILLAGE NAME/UMUDUGUDU:______________________________________________________________________ CELL NAME/AKAGARI:______________________________________________________________________ SECTOR NAME/UMURENGE:______________________________________________________________________ QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER/NUMERO Y’IKAYI Y’IBIBAZO: ______________________ FIELD SUPERVISOR CHECK: UMWANYA W’UMUGENZUZI W’UBUSHAKASHATSI________________________________________________
Household Selection Procedure. Uko ingo zitoranywa (See interviewer’s instructions book)
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INTRODUCTION/KWIMENYEKANISHA: Good day. My name is __________ and I am an independent researcher working with the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace in Kigali. We are studying the views of Rwandans on issues of reconciliation, national unity and good governance. We are conducting interviews with Rwandans in all of the thirty districts of this country. Your household was chosen randomly, by chance, and we would like to interview one person. All of the information you give us is completely confidential. This information will be combined with that provided by thousands of other Rwandans. There will be no way to identify your individual answers, so please feel free to tell us what you really think. Muraho. Nitwa,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,ndi umushakashatsi wigenga ukorera Ikigo cy’ubushakashatsi n’ubusabane bigamije amahoro gifite icyicaro i Kigali.Turakora ubushakashatsi bugamije kumenya icyo abanyarwanda batekereza ku bumwe n’ubwiyunge n’imiyoborere. Ubu bushakashatsi bukorerwa ku banyarwanda mu turere twose tw’u Rwanda. Urugo rwanyu rwatoranyijwe mu buryo bwa tombola kandi turifuza kugirana ikiganiro n’umuntu umwe wo muri uru rugo. Ibyo tuganira ntibizigera bitangazwa kw’izina ryawe, ahubwo bizashyirwa hamwe n’iby’abandi banyarwanda babazwa hatitawe kumazina y’ababitanze, Bityo rero ntugire impungenge zo kutubwiza ukuri ku byo utekereza. If you feel uncomfortable, you may refuse to answer any question, or end the interview at any time without any negative consequences. Nihagira ikibazo wumva udashaka gusubiza wacyihorera, nanone uramutse wumvise utagishaka gukomeza gusubiza , ntiwitinye nta ngaruka nimwe byakugiraho.
Male Female
Previous interview was with a:
1 2
This interview must be with a:
1 2
INTERVIEWER (Read out): Now, let’s begin the interview. First, I would like to start by asking you a few questions about yourself. Reka noneho dutangire ikiganiro nyirizina. Ndatangira nkubaza ibibazo birebana nawe bwite.
1. How old are you today? [WRITE IN][If respondent is under 18, stop interview and return to selection procedure] Ufite imyaka ingahe?
2. Which, if any, of the following religions do you associate yourself with? Niba hari idini cg itorero ubamo ni irihe muri aya akurikira?
Roman Catholic Umugatulika
1 Protestant Umuporotestanti
2 Seventh Day Adventist Umudiventi
3 Muslim Umuyisilamu
4
Born again /Umurokore
5 Other Irindi
6 Refused Yanze
98
Don’t know Ntaryo ngira
99
POLITICAL CULTURE/GOVERNANCE /IMIYOBORERE
TRUST IN PUBILIC INSTITUTIONS / Icyizere mu nzego n’ibigo bya leta
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Now, I would like to talk to you about public institutions. Please indicate how much confidence you have in the following institutions in Rwanda. Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?
Reka noneho tuganire ku nzego n’ibigo bya leta. Kuri buri rwego mu zo ngiye kugusomera wambwira uko icyizere urufitiye kingana. Ese ni cyinshi cyane, cyinshi, ntigihagije, ntacyo namba.
A great deal
cyinshi cyane
Quite a lot
cyinshi
Not very much
ntigihagije
None at all
ntacyo namba
Refused Yanze
gusubiza
Don’t Know
Ntabizi
3. Parliament Inteko Ishinga Amategeko
4 3 2 1 98 99
4. The justice system Ubutabera muri rusange
4 3 2 1 98 99
5. Cabinet Guverinoma/Abaminisitiri
4 3 2 1 98 99
6. Religious institutions Amadini
4 3 2 1 98 99
7. Political parties Amashyaka ya politiki
4 3 2 1 98 99
8. Local authorities Abayobozi b’inzego z’ibanze
4 3 2 1 98 99
9. Civil society organisations Imiryango n’amashyirahamwe bitari ibya leta
4 3 2 1 98 99
10. Community policing Inzego z’abaturage zishinzwe umutekano
4 3 2 1 98 99
Now, I would like to talk to you about the media. Please indicate how much confidence you have in each of the following. Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all? Reka noneho tuvuge ku bitangazamakuru . Wambwira uko ikizere ufitiye buri cyiciro cy’ibitangazamakuru (cy’ibinyamakuru) bikurikira kingana? Ese ni Cyinshi cyane, ni cyinshi, ntigihagije, cyangwa ntacyo namba.
A great deal
cyinshi cyane
Quite a lot
cyinshi
Not very much
ntigihagije
None at all
ntacyo namba
Refused Yanze
gusubiza
Don’t Know
Ntabizi
11. Public media (print and broadcast) Ibitangazamakuru bya Leta ( ibyandika , Radiyo na TV)
4 3 2 1 98 99
12. Private media (print and broadcast) Ibitangazamakuru byigenga ( ibyandika , Radiyo na TV)
4 3 2 1 98 99
13.
In your opinion, how much does the media in Rwanda today contribute to increasing reconciliation? Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all? Kubwawe, wumva itangazamakuru rifite uruhare rungana iki mu guteza imbere ubwiyunge mu Rwanda? Ese ni rwinshi cyane, rwinshi , ntiruhagije , cyangwa ntarwo namba.
A great deal Runini cyane
Quite a lot Runini
Not very much ntiruhagije
None at all Ntarwo namba
Refused Yanze gusubiza
Don’t Know Ntabizi
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4 3 2 1 98 99
TRUST IN LEADERSHIP/ICYIZERE MUBUYOBOZI
Now, I would like to ask you about the political situation. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n’ibitekerezo ngiye kuvuga hepfo aha, Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, Ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera , cyangwa ntubyemera na mba
Strongly agree
Ndabyemera cyane
Agree Ndabye
mera
Neither Ntaho
mpagaze
Disagree simbyem
era
Strongly disagree Simbyem
era na mba
Refused
Yanze gusubiza
Don’t know
Ntabizi
14.
I can trust this country’s leaders to do what is in my best interest. Nizera ko abayobozi b’iki gihugu bakora ibiganisha kunyungu zanjye
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
15.
The country’s leaders care about all people in Rwanda equally. Abayobozi b’igihugu bita ku bantu bose kimwe
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
16.
I have space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country. Mfite uburyo bwanfasha kugera kubashyiraho amategeko no kuba natuma bashingira kubitekerezo byanjye
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
17.
I have very little say in the important public decisions that affect my life. Nta ruhare rugaragara ngira mubyemezo by’ingenzi bireba imibereho yanjye nk’umunyarwanda
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
There are a number of ways that citizens can participate to influence the decisions of government. Please indicate which of the following activities you are willing to participate in.
Hari inzira nyinshi abanyarwanda bashobora kunyuramo kugira ngo bagire uruhare mu byemezo bya guverinema. Wambwira, muri ibi bikorwa, icyo wumva wakwitabiira? Umbwire niba ari : Igihe cyose, rimwe na rimwe, cyangwa nta
narimwe.
Always
Buri gihe
Only under certain circumstances
Rimwe na rimwe
Never
Nta na rimwe
Refused
Yanze gusubiza
Don’t know
Ntabizi
18. Attend a community meeting Kwitabira inama y’aho utuye
3 2 1 98 99
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19. Get together with others to raise an issue Kwishyira hamwe n’abandi ngo mwunvikanishe ikibazo
3 2 1 98 99
20. Voting in an election Kujya gutora
3 2 1 98 99
21. Signing a petition Gushyira umukono ku nyandiko rusange ifite icyo isaba ubuyobozi
3 2 1 98 99
22. Joining a boycott Kwanga kwitabira ibyo utemeranya nabyo
3 2 1 98 99
23. Participating in a legal protest Kujya mumyigaragambyo yemewe n’amategeko
3 2 1 98 99
HUMAN SECURITY /UMUTEKANO WA MUNTU
Physical Security / KUDAHUTAZWA Now I would like to ask you about security. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Reka noneho tuganire ibirebana n’umutekano. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n’ibitekerezo ngiye kuvuga hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, Ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera, cyangwa ntubyemera na gato.
Strongly agree
Ndabyemera cyane
Agree
Ndabyemera
Neither
Ntaho mpagaz
e
Disagree
simbyemera
Strongly disagree
simbyemera na
gato
Refused Yanze
gusubiza
Don’t know
Ntabizi
24.
My family and I do not fear any threat to our physical safety. Yaba jye, yaba umuryango wanjye ntacyo dutinya twumva ko cyaduhutaza
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
25.
Overall, I am satisfied with my life today. Muri rusange, nezerejwe n’imibereho mfite muri iki gihe
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
26.
It is unlikely that there will be any armed conflict within Rwandan borders anytime in the next few years. Nta ntambara ishobora kongera kuba kubutaka bw’u Rwanda mu myaka mike iri imbere
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
27.
Rwanda is becoming a safer country to live in. U Rwanda rurarushaho gutekana kuburyo rubereye guturwamo
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
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Now I would like to ask you about expressing your opinion. How comfortable do you feel expressing your true opinion in the following situations? Is it very comfortable, comfortable, neither comfortable nor uncomfortable, uncomfortable or very uncomfortable?
Reka noneho nkubaze ibijyanye n’uburenganzira bwo gutanga ibitekerezo. Wumva ufite umutekano ungana iki mugutanga igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo mu bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese wavuga ko ari mwishi cyane, ari mwinshi, ko ntaho
uhagaze, ko ntawo, cyangwa ko ari ntawo na mba
Very comforta
ble Mwinshi
cyane
Comfortable Mwinshi
Neither Ntaho
mpagaze
Uncomfortable ntawo
Very uncomfo
rtable Ntawo na mba
Refused Yanze
gusubiza
Don’t know
Ntabizi
28.
Expressing your true opinions to your family and close friends Kubwira igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo abavandimwe cyangwa inshuti
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
29.
Expressing your true opinions in public Gutanga igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo mu ruhame
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
30.
Expressing your true opinions to a member of the media Kubwira umunyamakuru igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
Economic security / Umutekano w’umutungo Now, I would like to ask you about the economic situation. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree..
Noneho ndashaka ko tuganira kubirebana n’umutekano w’ibintu byawe. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n’ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato
Strongly agree
Ndabyemera cyane
Agree Ndabye
mera
Neither Ntaho
mbagaze
Disagree Simbyem
era
Strongly disagree Simbyem
era na gato
Refused Yanze
gusubiza
Don’t know
Ntabizi
31.
In Rwanda all people have an equal opportunity to make a living. Mu Rwanda, abantu bose bafite amahirwe angana yo gukora icyababeshaho
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
32.
It is likely that I will lose my house or land in future. Birashoboka ko natakaza cyangwa nabura inzu yanjye, cg
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
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isambu mu myaka iri imbere
33.
All people benefit equally from government service delivery. Abantu bose bahabwa servisi za leta kuburyo bumwe
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
34.
In Rwanda all people have equal access to land. Mu Rwanda, abantu bose bahabwa amahirwe amwe yo kubona ubutaka
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
35.
National resources are equitably distributed in Rwanda Umutungo w’igihugu/ Ibyiza by’Igihugu bigera ku Bantu bose nta kuryamirana
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
General security / Umutekano rusange Please think back on the changes that have happened in Rwanda since 1994. For each of the following statements, would you say that things have improved a great deal, improved, stayed the same, worsened, or worsened a great deal?
Na none, dushubije amaso inyuma, tukareba impinduka zabaye kuva muri 1994, wambwira uko ubona ibivugwa hepfo aha. Ese byateye imbere cyane, byateye imbere , nta cyahindutse, byasubiye inyuma, cyangwa byasubiye inyuma cyane.
Improved a great
deal
byateye imbere cyane
Improved
byateye imbere
Stayed the same
nta cyahind
utse
Worsened
byasubiye
inyuma
Worsened a great
deal
byasubiye
inyuma cyane
Refused Yanze
gusubiza
Don’t Know
Ntabizi
36. Your personal economic situation Ubukungu bwawe bwite muri rusange
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
37. Relations between different ethnic groups Imibanire hagati y’amoko
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
38. Family wellbeing imibereho y’umuryango wawe
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
39.
Relations between people from different regional origins Imibanire hagati y’abantu badaturuka hamwe
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
40. Employment opportunities Amahirwe yo kubona akazi
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
41. Access to education Kubona ishuri
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
42. Your hope for the future Icyizere cyawe cy’ ejo hazaza
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
43. Access to land Kubona ubutaka
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
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44. Access to housing Kubona inzu yo guturamo
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
45. Security of national borders Umutekano ku mbibi z’u Rwanda
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
46.
The situation of returnees in the country Imibereho y’abahungutse bagaruka mugihugu
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
47. The gap between rich and poor Icyuho hagati y’abakire n’abakene
5 4 3 2 1 98 99
What about the direction of the country overall? In terms of the following, would you say that the country is going in the right direction or the wrong direction, or are you undecided?
Kubirebana n’aho igihugu kigana muri rusange? Muri ibi bikurikira wavuga ko u Rwanda rugana aheza, rugana ahatariho, cg ntuhabona neza ?
Right
direction Undecided
Wrong direction
Refused Don’t know
48. National reconciliation in Rwanda Ubwiyunge mu banyarwanda
3 2 1 98 99
49.
Democratic governance in Rwanda Imiyoborere abanyarwanda bafitemo ijambo
3 2 1 98 99
CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY / UBWENEGIHUGU n’IBIRANGA ABANTU
National Identity Ubunyarwanda
Now, I would like to ask you about being a citizen of Rwanda. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Reka none ho nkubaze kubijyanye n’ubunyarwanda. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n’ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato
Strongly
agree
Agree Neither Disagree Strongly disagree
Refused Don’t know
50.
I am proud to be a citizen of Rwanda. Mfite ishema ryo kuba umunyarwanda
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51.
In Rwanda, all citizens share common national values. Mu Rwanda , abanyarwanda basangiye indangagaciro
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52.
There are some Rwandans who see themselves as more Rwandan than others. Hari abanyarwanda bumva ko barusha abandi ubunyarwanda
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53. Common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today
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Mu Rwanda Indangagaciro ziganisha ku bumwe n’ubwiyunge ziratezwa imbere
54.
Most Rwandans believe that reconciliation is an important national priority. Abanyarwanda hafi ya bose bumva ko ubwiyunge bw’abanyarwanda ari gahunda yihutirwa kandi y’ingenzi mu gihugu
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55.
In everyday life, the actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation, Mu buzima bwa buri munsi, ibikorwa n’imyitwarire by’abanyarwanda benshi biteza imbere ubwiyunge
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Individual Identity/ Ibiranga umuntu
Now, I would like to ask you about yourself. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Reka noneho nkubaze kubikureba ubwawe. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n’ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato
Strongly
agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly disagree
Refused Don’t know
56.
I want my children to think of themselves as Rwandans, rather than Hutu, Twa or Tutsis. Nifuza ko abana banjye bajya bibona nk’abanyarwanda aho kwibona nk’abahutu, abatutsi,cyangwa abatwa.
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57.
It is more important to identify oneself as Rwandan, than any other form of identity. Igifite akamaro ni ukwibona nk’umunyarwanda kurusha ibindi byiciro umuntu yakwibonamo
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58.
Many people identify themselves in numerous different ways. Besides being Rwandan, what other group do you identify with most strongly? What group do you identify with second most strongly? INTERVIEWER: Read response options below aloud.
Umuntu agira uburyo bwinshi yibonamo. Uretse kuba uri umunyarwanda, ni ikihe kiciro kindi wiyumvamo kurusha ibindi? Igikurikiraho se ni ikihe? MUSOMERE IBIKURIKIRA
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Primary
Kiza mbere Secondary
Kirakurikira
Those who come from the same region as I do Abo dukomoka( hamwe) mu gace kamwe
1 1
Those who belong to my ethnic group Abo dusangiye ubwoko
2 2
Those who share my religious beliefs Abo duhuje ukwemera ( mu iyobokamana)
3 3
Those who share my values Abo dusangiye indangagaciro z’ingenzi
4 4
Those who study or work with me Abo dukorana / twigana
5 5
Those who are of the same gender as I am Ab’igitsina gabo/gore nka njye
6 6
Those who are the same age as I am Urungano
7 7
Other Ikindi
8 8
Refused Yanze
98 98
Don’t know Simbizi
99 99
Let’s now turn to the question of equality of treatment of all citizens. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Reka noneho turebe niba kubwawe abanyarwanda bafatwa kimwe. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n’ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato
Strongly
agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly disagree
Refused Don’t know
59.
All Rwandans are treated equally by the courts. Abanyarwanda bose bafatwa kimwe imbere y’inkiko
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60.
All Rwandans have an equal opportunity to get a job within the civil service. Abanyarwanda bose bafite uburenganzira bungana muguhabwa akazi muri leta
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61.
All Rwandans have an equal opportunity to access public tenders Abanyarwanda bose bafite amahirwe angana muguhabwa amasoko ya leta
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99
UNDERSTANDING THE PAST / GUSOBANUKIRWA AMATEKA
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Now, I would like to discuss with you the events that took place in Rwanda in 1994. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree. Reka none ho tuganire kubyabaye mu Rwanda muri 1994. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n’ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha.
Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato
Strongly
agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly disagree
Refused Don’t know
62.
Many of Rwanda’s conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation. Ibibazo byinshi u Rwanda rufite bishingiye ku myumvire n’imikoreshereze mibi y’amoko
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63.
Major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood Ibibazo by’ingenzi birebana n’amakimbirane yabaye mu Rwanda hagati y’abanyarwanda byamaze kuganirwaho neza kandi byumvikanyweho.
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64.
Before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society. Mbere ya jenoside, uko amateka yigishwaga n’uko yumvikanaga byateye amacakubiri mu banyarwanda
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65.
Conflicts between the elite within the political sphere have been effectively managed. Amakimbirane hagati y’abanyepolitike yamaze gukemurwa neza
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66.
Today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourage reconciliation. Muri ikigihe, uko amateka y’u Rwanda yumvikana kandi yigishwa biratanga icyizere cy’ubwiyunge mu banyarwanda
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67. Although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if
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conditions were favouring. Nubwo bitemewe n’amategeko , hari abanyarwanda bashobora kuba bakora indi jenoside iyaba byabashobokeraga
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE/ UBUTABERA BW’INZIBACYUHO
Individual Healing
I would now like to ask you about your personal feelings today. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Reka na none nkubaze kubijyanye n’uko wiyumva. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n’ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato
Strongly
agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly disagree
Refused Don’t know
68.
I have forgiven those who hurt others in the past? Namaze kubabarira abahemukiye abandi mu bihe byashize
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69.
Many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes. Benshi mubakoze jenoside bagaragaje akababaro batewe n’ibyaha bakoze
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70.
Those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness. Abagize nabi mubihe byashize bamaze gusaba imbabazi
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71.
The attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past. Hari abanyarwanda baba bagitekereza kwihorera kubera ibyababayeho mu bihe byashize
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72.
I feel that I have healed from the wounds of the past. Numva naramaze gukira ibikomere natewe n’ibyabaye mu mateka yahise
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73.
I have no choice but to reconcile with others in my community, or face the consequences. Nta mahitamo mfite, ni kwiyunga cg kwirengera ingaruka zo kutiyunga
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74. I personally have experienced reconciliation in my own life.
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Jyewe ubwanjye nabashije kwiyunga
75.
Many people agree that reconciliation is important in Rwanda. In your opinion, in Rwanda today, who should be reconciling with whom?
Abantu benshi basanga ko ubwiyunge ari ngombwa mu Rwanda. Kubwawe wumva ari nde ugomba kwiyunga nande?
INTERVIEWER: DO NOT read out responses below. Code first response, then prompt with the following statement: NTUMUSOMERE IBISUBIZO BIKURIKIRA Are there any others who should be reconciling? Abakurikiraho se ni bande? INTERVIEWER: Code second response.
Primary Secondary
Rwandans and other Rwandans Abanyarwanda hagati yabo
1 1
Genocide perpetrators and genocide survivors Abakoze jenoside hamwe n’abacitse ku icumu rya jenoside
2 2
Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups Abahutu n’Abatutsi
3 3
Civil society organisations and citizens Imiryango itegamiye kuri leta hamwe n’abanyarwanda
4 4
Old case refugees and other Rwandans Abahungutse ba 1959 hamwe n’abandi banyarwanda
5 5
Citizens and leaders Abayoborwa n’abayobora
6 6
Leaders between themselves Abayobozi hagati yabo
7 7
Rwandan government and the international community Ubuyobozi bw’u Rwanda hamwe n’ Amahanga
8 8
Other Abandi
9 9
Refused Yanze
98 98
Don’t Know Simbizi
99 99
Justice / Ubutabera As you know, one of the main ways that Rwandans pursued justice and reconciliation after the genocide was through gacaca courts. I would now like to ask you about your opinion of the gacaca courts. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Nk’uko mubizi, bumwe mu buryo bukomeye abanyarwanda bakoresheje bagana ku butabera n’ubwiyunge ni Inkiko Gacaca. Ndifuza kukubaza icyo utekereza ku nkiko gacaca. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n’ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo
aha: mbwira niba ubyemera cyane, ubyemera, ntaho uhagaze, utabyemera, cyangwa utabyemera na gato.
Strongly
agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly disagree
Refused Don’t know
76. The truth about the genocide in Rwanda, as it really happened, was revealed through gacaca
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courts. Ukuri nyako kubyabaye muri jenoside kwabashije kumenyekana kubera inkiko Gacaca.
77.
Inyangamugayo were impartial in the gacaca process. Mu guca imanza, Inyangamugayo z’Inkiko Gacaca ntizabogamye ( zarararamaga)
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78.
Those who were convicted through gacaca received fair punishment. Abagize uruhare muri Jenoside babonye ibihano bikwiriye
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79.
Those convicted through gacaca who have served their sentences have been successfully reintegrated into Rwandan society. Abakatiwe na gacaca bakarangiza ibihano byabo bashoboye gusubira mubuzima busanzwe muburyo bukwiye
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Now I would like to ask you about some of the other initiatives and efforts to bring about justice and reconciliation in Rwanda. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Reka nkubaze kubirebana n’ibindi bikorwa /gahunda zigamije kuzana ubutabera n’ubwiyunge mu Rwanda. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n’ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha, mbwira uti : Ndabyemera cyane, Ndabyemera, Ntaho mpagaze,
Ndabihakanye, mbihakanye nivuye inyuma
Strongly
agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly disagree
Refused Don’t know
80.
Genocide survivors have been compensated for the crimes committed against them. Abacitse ku icumu rya jenoside bahawe indishyi kubera ibyaha bakorewe
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81.
Genocide will never occur again in Rwanda, because the underlying causes have been dealt with. Nta jenoside izongera kuba mu Rwanda kuko Impamvu za yiteje zitakiriho.
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82.
Survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from government. Leta yahaye abacitse ku icumu
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rya jenoside inkunga zihagije
83.
Those whose properties/assets
had been abusively taken from
them (1959 and 1994) have
recovered them
Imitungo yari yarabohojwe
yasubijwe ba nyirayo yose
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84.
Land redistribution after 1994
has lowered land related issues
Isaranganya ry’amasambu
ryagabanyije ibibazo bishingiye
ku butaka
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85.
Land redistribution after 1994
impacted positively social
cohesion
Isaranganya ry’amasambu
ryateje imbere imibanire myiza
mu baturage
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Please tell me your impressions of the effectiveness of each of the following. Are they very effective, effective, neither effective nor ineffective, ineffective, or very ineffective?
Mbwira uko ubona imikorere y’Urukiko mpuzamahanga rwashyiriweho u Rwanda ruba Arusha (Tanzania) Ese ni myiza cyane, myiza, ntaho uhagaze, mibi, mibi cyane?
Very
Effective Effective Neither
Ineffective
Very Ineffectiv
e Refused
Don’t know
The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda Imikorere y’Urukiko mpuzamahanga mpanabyaha rwashyiriweho u Rwanda, ( ruri Arusha)
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SOCIAL COHESION / IMIBANIRE In the past, many Rwandans experienced discrimination and prejudice on the basis of their ethnic origins. After the genocide Rwandans agreed that this should never happen again. We would like find out what progress we have made as a country in this regard. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Mu bihe byashize, abanyarwanda benshi bagiye bagirirwa ivangura rishingiye ku bwoko. Nyuma ya jenoside, abanyarwanda bumvikanye ko ibi bitagomba kuzongera kubaho ukundi muri iki gihugu. Turifuza kumenya intambwe u
Rwanda rwateye muri uru rwego. Muri ibi bikurikira mbwira niba ubyemera cyane, ubyemera, ntaho uhagaze, utabyemera, cyangwa utabyemera na gato.
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Strongly
agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly disagree
Refused Don’t know
86.
I have never experienced ethnic prejudice in Rwanda since the end of the genocide. Kuva jenoside yarangira ntavangura rishingiye ku ubwoko ndakorerwa.
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87.
Although ethnic discrimination Is banned in Rwanda, it still occurs. Nubwo ivangura rishingiye ku ubwoko ribujijwe mu Rwanda, riracyaboneka.
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88.
Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes. Abanyarwanda baracyareberana mu ndorerwamo z’ubwoko
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Since 1994, some social relationships in Rwanda may have changed. Thinking about the present time, how often do you do each of the following? Is it always, often, sometimes, rarely or never? Kuva muri 1994, hari imwe mu imibanire hagati y’abanyarwanda ishobora kuba yarahindutse. Muri iki gihe cya none, ni
kangahe ukora ibi bikurikira? Ni buri gihe, kenshi, rimwe na rimwe, gake cyane, nta na rimwe?
Always Often Some-times
Rarely Never Refused Don’t know
89.
Assist someone from another ethnic group materially or financially. Guha umuntu mudahuje ubwoko inkunga/intwererano y’igikoresho cyangwa amafaranga
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90.
Receive financial assistance or material support from someone from another ethnic group Kwakira inkunga/intwererano y’igikoresho cg amafaranga uyihawe n’umuntu mudahuje ubwoko
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91.
Borrow a tool or use a service from someone from a different ethnic group in your community Gutira igikoresho cg gusaba servise ku muntu mudahuje ubwoko mu gace utuyemo
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92. Lend a tool or give a service to 5 4 3 2 1 98 99
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someone from a different ethnic group in your community. Gutiza igikoresho cg guha servise umuntu mudahuje ubwoko mugace utuyemo
After the genocide, Rwandans from different sides of the conflict had to learn to trust one another. Thinking about Rwanda today, to what extent would you agree with the following statements? Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree?
Nyuma ya jenoside, abanyarwanda bo muruhande rwiciwe no m’uruhande rw’abicaga bagombaga kwiga kwongera kwizerana. Murebye aho tugeze muri iyi minsi, ku byo ngiye kugusomera, mbwira niba ubyemera cyane, ubyemera ,
ntaho uhagaze, utabyemera, utabyemera na gato.
Strongly
agree Agree Neither Disagree
Strongly disagree
Refused Don’t know
93.
Since1994, relations have improved between those who found themselves on different sides of the genocide. Kuva nyuma ya jenoside ya 1994, imibanire hagati y’uruhande rw’abahigwaga n’urwabahigaga imaze gutera imbere
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94.
It is difficult for me or my family to trust Rwandans who found themselves on the other side of the conflict during the genocide Biragoye haba kuri njye cg umuryango wanjye kugira ngo twizere bariya tutari ku ruhande rumwe igihe cya jenoside
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95.
Rwanda’s past still divides its people today. Amateka y’u Rwanda aracya tandukanya abanyarwanda.
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How comfortable would you feel in the following situations? Would you feel very comfortable, comfortable, neither comfortable nor uncomfortable, uncomfortable or very uncomfortable?
Wumva waba ufite umutekano ungana ute mugukora ibi ngiye kugusomera. Ese ubona umutekano wawe waba ari mwinshi cyane, mwinshi, ntaho uhagaze, muke, muke cyane.
Very
comfortable
Comfortable
Neither Uncomfo
rtable
Very uncomfo
rtable Refused
Don’t Know
96.
Asking a favour from a neighbour of a different ethnic group. Gusaba umuturanyi mudahuje ubwoko kugira icyo agufasha
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97.
Having an intimate friend from another ethnic group. Kugira inshuti magara yo mu bundi bwoko
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98.
Joining an association/cooperative made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. Kujya mw’ishyirahamwe/ umuryango wiganjemo abo mudahuje ubwoko
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99.
Joining a political party made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. Kujya mw’ishyaka rigizwe n’abanyamuryango benshi bava mu bundi bwoko
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100.
Joining a church congregation made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. Kujya mw’idini/itorero rigizwe n’abayoboke benshi bava mu bundi bwoko
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To what extent would you approve the following situations? Would you strongly approve, approve, neither approve nor disapprove, disapprove, or disapprove strongly? Ibi bikurikira ubyemera ku gipimo kingana iki? Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera, cyangwa ntubyemera na mba?
Strongly approve
Approve Neither Disappro
ve
Strongly disappro
ve Refused
Don’t know
101.
Owning and operating a business with someone from another ethnic group. Gufatanya ubucuruzi n’umuntu wo mubundi bwoko
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102.
Working for and taking instructions from someone from another ethnic group Gukorera umuntu cg gutegekwa n’umuntu wo mu bundi bwoko
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103.
Voting for someone from another ethnic group. Gutora umuntu mudahuje ubwoko
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104.
Marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group Gushaka umufasha (umugore/umugabo) cg kugira umuvandimwe washaka umufasha mudahuje ubwoko
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105. Leaving my child, or the child of a family member, in the care of
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someone from another ethnic group Gusiga umwana wawe cg uw’umuvandimwe wawe ku muturanyi/umuntu mudahuje ubwoko
To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree? Wambwira niba wemera cyane, wemera, ntaho uhagaze, utemera cyangwa utemera na gato ibi bikurikira?
106.
In Rwanda, all groups enjoy equal rights Mu Rwanda abantu b’ibyiciro byose bafite uburenganzira bungana
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107.
In your opinion, what is the biggest division in Rwanda today, if any? Apart from this one, what would you say is the second biggest division in Rwanda today? Kubwawe usanga ari iki gitandukanya abanyarwanda kurusha ibindi? Ubona icya kabiri ari ikihe? INTERVIEWER: Code first mention and second mention. Andika icya mbere mu mwanya wacyo n’icya kabiri mu mwanya wacyo
First
mention Second
mention
The division between rich and poor Icyuho hagati y’abakire n’abakene
1 1
The division between those of different ethnic groups Amoko
2 2
The division between members of different religions Amadini
3 3
The division between those of different linguistic backgrounds Indimi
4 4
The division between supporters of different political parties Amashyaka ya politiki
5 5
The division between different regions Amacakubiri ashingiye aho umuntu aturuka
6 6
Other Ikindi
7 7
No division Nta na kimwe
8 8
Refused Yanze
98 98
Don’t know Ntabizi
99 99
We are now coming to the end of our interview. I would just like to ask you a few more questions about yourself. Ubu turi hafi yo gusoza ikiganiro cyacu. Gusa ndifuza kukubaza utundi tubazo dukeya.
108. What is the highest level of education you received? Ni ikihe cyiciro cya nyuma cy’amashuri wize?
None Ntayo
Primary Abanza
Some secondary
Completed secondary
Vocational Ay’imyuga
Tertiary Amakuru
Refused Yanze
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Sinarangije ayisumbuye
Narangije ayisumbuye
1 2 3 4 5 6 98
109. How would you describe your current employment status? Ukora iki?
Unemployed, not looking for work Nta kazi, nta n’ako nshaka
1
Unemployed, looking for work Ndigushakisha akazi
2
Employed in the formal sector Akazi gahamye
3
Employed in the informal sector Akazi ko kwirwanaho
4
Self-employed Ndikorera
5
Agricultural worker Umuhinzi-mworozi
6
Retired Ndi mu kiruhuko cy’izabukuru
7
Unable to work/disabled Naramugaye
8
Housewife Umugore wo murugo
9
Student Umunyeshuri
10
Refused Yanze
98
110. In which of the following categories do you find yourself most? Muri ibi byiciro by’abanyarwanda ni ikihe wibonamo kurusha ibindi?
Genocide survivors Abarokotse jenoside
1
Relatives of genocide suspects/perpetrators Abavandimwe b’abakekwaho jenoside cyangwa abahamwe n’icyaha cya jenoside
2
Tigistes Uwakoze/ukora igihano nsimburagifungo
3
Old case refugees (1959) Impunzi za kera zatahutse , zarizarahunze 1959
4
New case refugees (1994 and after) Impunzi za vuba zatahutse, zari zarahunze 1994 cg nyuma y’aho
5
Historically marginalised people Abasigajwe inyuma n’amateka
6
Refused Yanze
98
Other Ikindi (Utarahunze kandi utarishe, udafite umuvandimwe uregwa genocide, utari umucikacumu)
99
Have you ever attended any of the following programme conducted by NURC Wigeze ujya muri gahunda zikurikira zitegurwa na Komisiyo y’Ubumwe n’Ubwiyunge?
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Yes No
111. INGANDO 1 2
112. ITORERO 1 2
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