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The Responsibility to Protect
in Southeast Asia
30 January 2009
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The Asia-Pacic Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
The Asia-Pacic Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is an Associate of the Global Centre for the Responsibility
to Protect. The Centres mission is to advance the Responsibility to Protect principle within the Asia-Pacic Re-
gion and worldwide, and support the building of capacity to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.
Staff:
Alex Bellamy (Executive Director), Muhadi Sugiono, Sara Davies, Sarah Teitt, Charles Hunt, Jess Gifkins, StephenMcLoughlin, Kimberly Nackers, Luke Glanville
Report Design:Naomi Smith
Contact:Asia-Pacic Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
c/o School of Political Science & International Studies
The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4072, Australia
Tel: +61 7 3365 3301
Email: [email protected]
Web: www.r2pasiapacic.org
Previous Publications:
December 2008: 'China and the
Responsibility to Protect' Report
October 2008: 'Japan and
the Republic of Korea on the
Responsibility to Protect' Report
October 2008: Joint Submission to
the Defence White Paper by the
Asia-Pacic Centre
for the Responsibility to Protect and
act for peace
August 2008: 'ASEAN, Australia and
the Responsibility to Protect', Joint
Submission to the Joint Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade by the Asia-Pacic Centre
for the Responsibility to Protect and
act for peace
June 2008: The Responsibility
to Protect and the Protection of
Civilians: Asia-Pacic in the UN
Security Council' Report
May 2008: 'Cyclone Nargis and theResponsibility to Protect' Report
March 2008: 'Program on the
Protection of Civilians: Background
and Scope' Report
February 2008: 'Preventing Mass
Atrocities: Asian Perspectives on
R2P' Conference Proceedings
Associated Journal:
The Asia-Pacic Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect launched
and manages the world's rst
quarterly journal dedicated to
publishing the best research on the
Responsibility to Protect: Global
Responsibility to Protect available at
http://www.brill.nl/gr2p
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The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia1
Contents
1. Executive Summary 2
2. A Note on Method 5
3. Translating the Responsibility to Protect from Words to Deeds
6
4. Brunei Darrussalam (Brunei) 10
5. Cambodia 14
6. Indonesia 19
7. Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (Laos) 30
8. Malaysia 33
9. The Philippines 39
10. Singapore 47
11. Thailand 53
12. Viet Nam 57
13. Conclusion 66
14. References 72
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The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia2
1. Executive Summary
The 63rd United Nations (UN) General Assembly is poised to debate Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moons report on the operationalisation of the Responsibility to Protect (referred to as R2P
for the remainder of this report). It is expected that his report will be released and debated in
early 2009. Therefore, this is a good time to examine the position that Member States have
adopted on the R2P since its endorsement at the 2005 World Summit and policy issues
relating to its implementation through the UN. This report will focus on the Member States of
the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) with the exception of Myanmar, which
is currently on the UN Security Councils agenda.1 It concentrates on their position on the
R2P and their policy priorities in areas related to implementing the principle through the UN.
The report identifies steps that might encourage the regions governments to become more
positively engaged with the R2P principle. In relation to how the principle should be
conceptualised and applied, the analysis contained in this report suggests that:
1. R2P should be understood as applying only to the four crimes identified by the WorldSummit Outcome Document and not other sources of human insecurity such as
natural disasters.
2. R2P should be carefully disassociated from any potential expansion of the scope for
coercive interference in the domestic affairs of states beyond the UN Charter.
3. International engagement to implement the R2P should be predicated on cooperation
and the consent of the state as far as possible.
4. Such engagement should proceed with due regard for the attitudes and preferences
of relevant regional and sub-regional organisations.
5. In Southeast Asia, this means that the R2P should be applied in a manner consistent
with the principle of non-interference.
In relation to the best way of actually advancing consensus on the R2P and measures to
translate the principle from words to deeds, the report demonstrates that:
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1. The development and application of the R2P should proceed cautiously, inclusively
and on the basis of consensus in the UN General Assembly.
2. The R2P principle should be related more closely to the legitimate priorities of
developing states, especially in the fields of development and capacity-building.
3. Regional organisations should be involved as far as possible in order to devolve
ownership of the principle.
It is important to note that the regions reservations about the R2P relate not to the principle
itself as set out in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document but to the possibility for the
principle to be abused to justify expanded coercive interference in the domestic affairs of
states or unilateral intervention not properly authorised by the UN Security Council. The
regions governments also take a broader view of protection than that typically offered in the
West and insist that populations are also insecure when they are unable to afford food, proper
health care and access to basic education. As such, Southeast Asian governments are
generally supportive of the concept of human security and are keen to ensure that the R2P
does not crowd out global efforts to assist states in achieving the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs).
Given this, it is possible to deepen consensus on the R2P among Southeast Asian
governments and to engage the region in the effort to translate the principle from words to
deeds. The key to doing so lies in demonstrating how a commitment to the R2P strengthens
sovereignty and assists states to accomplish their core goals, such as economic development
and poverty alleviation and ensuring that the R2P is not misapplied to circumstances outside
the scope set out by world leaders in 2005.
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Map 1: Southeast Asia
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The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia5
2. A Note on Method
This report employs a simple method of document analysis. In order to build a clear picture of
where Southeast Asian governments stand, this report focuses almost exclusively on what
they have actually said in public speeches and statements in various forums (though mainly in
various UN meetings). The report takes the governments at their word on the assumptionthat they normally say what they mean. As well as covering specific references to the R2P,
the report also sets out the thinking of the regions governments on issues related to
implementing the principle through the UN. This is done in the interests of presenting a
comprehensive and holistic account of their thinking about the R2P and related policy
priorities in order to elicit as many ideas as possible from governments about the steps
necessary to translate the R2P from words to deeds. The policy prescriptions that emerge
are those put forward by the states themselves and their cataloguing here should not be read
as indicating the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protects endorsement. Instead,
the report should be read only as a guide to these states thinking on the R2P and related
issues at the UN and an indication of the sorts of measures likely to elicit their support. This
report focuses on the positions adopted by the regions governments, not by ASEAN itself.
Nor does it address specific developments within ASEAN. The report is organised
alphabetically but does not include Myanmar as the situation in that country is a matter on the
agenda of the UN Security Council and will be addressed separately.
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3. Translating the Responsibility toProtect from Words to Deed
Mass killing and forced displacement is an all too frequently recurring phenomenon. Those
who think that tragedies like the Rwandan and Srebrenica genocides at the end of the last
century are a thing of the past need only look to Darfur today to see the durability of
humanitys capacity for acts of conscience shocking inhumanity. In the past few years, the
world has united in insisting that all states have a responsibility to protect their populations
from such grave abuses and that the international community should assist states in fulfilling
their responsibilities and, if the state manifestly fails, take measures to protect vulnerable
populations. World leaders unanimously adopted the Responsibility to Protect at the United
Nations World Summit in 2005. Paragraphs 138-140 of the Summits Outcome Document
declared that:
138. Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, warcrimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in
cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the
General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications,
bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit
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ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on thePrevention of Genocide.
The following year, the Responsibility to Protect was unanimously reaffirmed by the United
Nations Security Council in Resolution 1674, which stated the Councils determination to
protect civilians.
According to the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, the Responsibility to Protect rests on
three pillars:
1) The responsibility of each state to protect its own population from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.
2) The commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting their
obligations.
3) The responsibility of United Nations Member States to respond in a timely and decisive
manner, using Chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), VII (Action with Respect to
Threats to the Peace), and VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter as appropriate,
when a state is manifestly failing to provide such protection.
The Secretary-General has pledged to make recommendations to operationalise the
Responsibility to Protect and translate the principle from words to deeds. He indicated that
his support for what he describes as the concept of the Responsibility to Protect is deep and
enduring but recognised that it is not yet a policy or reality. The Secretary-General also
recognises the controversy and doubts that surround the Responsibility to Protect.2
In 2007, the Secretary-General appointed Edward Luck as his Special Adviser to work
alongside Francis Deng, his Special Representative on the Prevention of Genocide, on the
prevention of genocide and the Responsibility to Protect. Edward Luck was charged with
consulting with Member States on the Responsibility to Protect and making recommendations
for its operationalisation within the UN system. The Special Adviser is scheduled to submit a
report to the Secretary-General later this month. After further consultations with Member
States, the Secretary-General will submit a report on the Responsibility to Protect in late
2008, which is likely to be debated by the 63rd General Assembly in early 2009.
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The Special Adviser of the Secretary-General argues that the R2P represents the application
of human security perspectives to a specific area of public policy that has long vexed publics
and policymakers alike.3 He has identified four main programmatic dimensions to the
implementation of the Responsibility to Protects core prevention and protection goals: (1)
capacity building and rebuilding; (2) early warning and assessment; (3) timely and decisiveresponse; (4) collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements.4
Capacity building and rebuilding: in relation to R2P, capacity building means strengthening
the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to prevent or diminish the threat of the four
crimes and violations and/or to respond when such atrocities do occur and to rebuild
afterwards.5 Relevant measures include using the Peacebuilding Commission, development
entities and bilateral arrangements to strengthen good governance and effective public
administration. This would involve closer collaboration between headquarters and field
missions, and between UN agencies and various partners.6
Early warning and assessment: paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document
specifically pledged support for the establishment of a UN early warning capability. The
challenge lays less in collecting the relevant information than in analysing and disseminating
it. Member States have traditionally been reluctant to grant the UN the capacity to report
affairs within individual states in this manner and there are also concerns about institutional
overlap. Plans are afoot to consolidate the analysis and sharing of information under a single
UN office for the Prevention of Genocide and the R2P.7
Timely and decisive response: the R2P calls for timely and decisive responses to the four
crimes in cases where national authorities are manifestly failing in the responsibility to
protect their populations. Such responses should be consistent with Chapters VI (Pacific
Settlement of Disputes), VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace), and VIII (Regional
Arrangements) of the UN Charter. Measures under discussion to strengthen the UNs
capacity in this area involve improving the Secretary-Generals good offices functions,
clarifying the role of the secretariat in advocating particular action by the Security Council and
bringing matters to the Councils attention, improving the transparency of the Councils
deliberations, securing the appropriate resources for peace operations, and developing
appropriate doctrine for the protection of civilians.8
Collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements: the R2P can strengthen the UNs
efforts to improve its collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements. Such
collaboration should focus on ways in which the UN might help build regional capacity among
regional and subregional organisations in prevention and protection efforts, and information
sharing. The establishment of a UN Office for West Africa in Dakar might provide a useful
model.9
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In order to make progress in implementing these four programmatic dimensions, the
Secretary-General will need to persuade Member States of their value and assuage concerns
about the potential encroachment of the UN into areas traditionally seen as lying within the
domestic jurisdiction of states and the concerns of those who worry about the duplication of
pre-existing mandates and attendant organisational inefficiencies. With the opening of the63rd General Assembly in September 2008, now is a useful time to consider where states in
the Asia-Pacific region stand in relation to both the R2P principle and proposals for its
actualisation. This Report examines the perspective of Southeast Asian governments and
sets out their views on the R2P principle, the four programmatic dimensions outlined above,
and other issues related to the R2P. It concludes by identifying policy initiatives in relation to
the UN that have been developed or supported by the regions governments which might
contribute to translating the R2P from words to deeds.
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4. Brunei Darrussalam (Brunei)
4. 1 Background
Brunei supported the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document with its endorsement of the
R2P and although it did not specifically comment on the R2P in 2005, it has subsequently
affirmed the principle in the context of the Commonwealth. Brunei often presents itself as an
advocate and mentor to other states in the promotion of responsible sovereignty. In addition,
despite its relatively high GDP per capita (ASEANs highest, standing at $30,159 in 2006),
Brunei regards itself as a developing state and prioritises development issues over peace and
security issues presumably seeing R2P in the latter basket.10 To this end, Brunei insists that
international organisations have an important role to play in providing development
assistance. Finally, Brunei claims a regional leadership role in multilateral dialogue.
4.2 Brunei and the Responsibility to Protect
Although it does not often specifically refer to the R2P, Brunei has indicated its support for the
World Summit Outcome Document and the principle itself. At the 2005 World Summit,Brunei
tacitly indicated its support for the need for states to cooperate to address common
challenges. His Majesty the Sultan stated that:
The new realisations which have resulted can be put quite simply: the future will
involve more and more contact with the rest of the world; we will be more and more
affected by what happens outside our borders; and we will be more and more
dependent on that outside world. That means one thing: future peace, prosperity
and confidence depend not just on ourselves, but on the success of all nations.
Hence, we are all partners, no matter what our backgrounds, cultures, faiths and
histories.11
Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated that Brunei welcomed and
supported the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.12 In so doing, Bruneis Foreign
Ministry listed two principal aims of its foreign policy: [C]ontribute towards promoting peace,
security, stability, and prosperity in the region, particularly by fostering deeper understandingamong countries and Adhere to the United Nations Charter, international law and universally
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recognised principles of sovereignty, self-determination, (fundamental human rights) and
social justice.13
Bruneis clearest statement of support for the R2P came in November 2007 when the Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Trade endorsed R2P at the Commonwealth Heads of GovernmentMeeting (CHOGM) in Uganda. Affirming CHOGMs 2007 Communiqu, Brunei clearly stated
its commitment to the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity is a fundamental Commonwealth value, and reiterated
their commitment to work together to ensure that the responsibility to protect is carried out by
the international community, in accordance with the UN Charter.14
In summary, therefore, although Brunei has seldom specifically referred to the R2P, when it
has done it has been broadly supportive and in 2007 Brunei offered a specific endorsement.
4.3 R2P Related Policy Priorities
Development assistance for capacity building
Reform of the UN and Security Council
Strengthening the UNs capacity to provide humanitarian assistance
Development Assistance for Capacity Bui lding
Brunei regularly raises the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which it considers to be a
vital component of establishing effective and secure sovereign states. Thus, Brunei argues
that, there will be no lasting security for either sovereigns or humans if the Goals are not
realised by everyone.15 Moreover, it emphasised that [a]chieving the goals will help to
consign to history the twentieth-century concept of first-, second-, and third-world countries. It
will help to develop a single twenty-first century world in which we will all have shared
responsibilities and shared hopes.16 This connection between economic development and
national security was again emphasised in 2007, when the Minister for Foreign Affairs andTrade reiterated Bruneis view that achieving the MDGs is vital for establishing the security of
states and hence for international peace and security more generally.17
In Bruneis thinking, even reform of the UN and the Security Council is strongly linked to its
focus on economic development and the need for the global organisation to give a greater
voice to small and developing states.
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Reform of the UN and the Security Council
Brunei supports the reform of the UN and Security Council to make them better able to
address twenty-first century challenges and is keen to ensure that reforms reflect the priorities
and interests of the developing world. As such, it asked: [d]oes the proposed reform reflectthe current century, its priorities, its special challenges and its changing character? In other
words, are we certain that we are not trying to solve twenty-first century problems with the
mechanisms, priorities and procedures of the twentieth-century and sometimes even of the
nineteenth-century?18
In September 2005, Bruneis Minister for Foreign Affairs declared his governments support
for a reformed and revitalised UN, arguing that a new United Nations is needed by the
ordinary citizens we are privileged to represent here. 19 According to Brunei, reform of the UN
and Security Council are required for two principal reasons. First, the UN should be reformed
to make it better able to deliver on the MDGs. Thus:
Many of us here, especially those from small developing nations, are, therefore,
convinced that world order must be dramatically strengthened. As I stated at the
High-level P lenary Meeting two days ago [see A/60/PV.6], there is no greater way
to begin this process than for each of us to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). For this reason, we in Brunei Darussalam will do whatever we can
to achieve them in our own country and to help our neighbours do likewise. 20
Second, the UN and Security Council should be reformed in order to give a stronger voice to
the organisations small and developing Member States.21
Strengthening Humanitarian Ass istance
Although it has not discussed the issue at length, Brunei has indicated its general support for
measures aimed at strengthening the UNs capacity to provide humanitarian assistance to
troubled states. In 2006, Brunei stated that the UN played a vital role in helping people in
need and that in the refugee camps, in the disaster areas and in all the other arenas of
destruction, the United Nations offers all they have by way of hope and therefore, any reform
within the UN must consider if it is relevant to ordinary peoples personal lives and
problems.22 This seems to suggest that Brunei would support measures aimed at improving
the UNs capacity to provide hope and sustenance to those most in need of it.
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4.4 Summary
Although it has seldom spoken directly on the R2P, Brunei welcomed the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document and indicated its support for the R2P at the 2007 CHOGM. Brunei has
expressed no opinion on the precise meaning and scope of the R2P or on how the principle
can be translated from words to deeds. Without doubt, Bruneis overarching policy priority is
the achievement of the MDGs and the role of international institutions in supporting their
attainment. Bruneis comments on the need for Security Council reform and the strengthening
of the UNs capacity to provide humanitarian assistance indicate that it accepts the idea that it
is appropriate for international organisations to assist states in the protection of vulnerable
populations, but Brunei has not expressed policy proposals of its own and neither has it taken
a clear position on a range of other proposals. Overall, Bruneis statements over the last three
years demonstrate its endorsement of the R2P and an apparent willingness to participate in
dialogue about how the principle can be translated from words to deeds, but exhibit a clear
preference for resources to be dedicated towards economic development and the provision of
humanitarian assistance.
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5. Cambodia
5.1 Background
Cambodia has a bloody and tragic recent history. After years of civil war, Cambodia was
subjected to the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime. Between 1975 and 1979 approximately 2
million people, or a third of the countrys population, died as a result of atrocities and regime-
induced displacement and famine. The Khmer Rouges reign of terror was brought to an endby Vietnamese intervention in 1979 but civil war persisted for a decade, before the Paris
Peace Agreement brought peace to the country, overseen by a UN Transitional
Administration (UNTAC) in 1992. Cambodia has a low GDP per capita of $512, with only
Myanmar recording a lower GDP per capita within ASEAN. Cambodia was one of the first
states to ratify the ASEAN Charter, which contains provisions for the establishment of a
regional human rights body and security community. In addition, Cambodia is the only
ASEAN member to have signed and ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court.
Although Cambodia supported the World Summit Outcome Document and the Secretary-
Generals Report In Larger Freedom, both ofwhich endorsed the R2P, it has not specifically
commented on the principle to indicate either its support or opposition. However, the
Cambodian government has voiced support for a variety of measures that could be linked to
the operationalisation of the R2P. Specific measures endorsed by Cambodia include
strengthening the worlds capacity to use mediation to de-escalate conflicts, measures to
stem the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and broad support for peace
operations. It should be noted that Cambodia emphasises the MDGs at almost everyopportunity but that this is not to avoid discussion about international peace and security, or
broader reform of the UN.
5.2 Cambodia and the Responsibility to Protect
At the 2005 World Summit, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen expressed support for Kofi
Annans report In Larger Freedom, which endorsed the R2P principle, and noted the
relationship between human rights, the rule of law, democracy, security and economic
development. The Prime Minister argued that, with regard to freedom from want, we fully
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share the Secretary-Generals analysis of the interlinkages between human rights, the rule of
law, democracy, security and development. We should therefore work on all fronts at the
same time. Unless all the interdependent causes are advanced, none can succeed.23
Cambodias support for the subsequent World Summit Outcome Document was stated
immediately after the Summit when it argued that outcome document reaffirmed ourcommitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and provided us with a new
hope for achieving our noble goals of strengthening peace and stability in the world, a sine
qua non for the development and prosperity of all humankind. Admittedly, the outcome
document did not respond to all of our concerns [especially in relation to development], but it
gave us a framework for our future action.24 Cambodia also expressed tacit support for the
idea that responsible and effective sovereignty was the bedrock of international peace and
security and that the UN had a role to play in supporting Member States.25
In summary, therefore, although Cambodia has not specifically referred to the R2P in its
public statements to the UN, it welcomed both the Secretary-Generals Report In Larger
Freedom and the World Summit Outcome Document, both of which endorsed the R2P.
Moreover, Cambodia has expressed support for a range of measures aimed at assisting
states to fulfil their responsibility to protect and strengthening international capacity.
5.3 R2P Related Policy Priorities
Economic development
Disarmament as conflict prevention
Peacekeeping operations
Reform of the UN
Economic Development
Given Cambodias GDP per capita, it is not surprising that it prioritises economic
development. Cambodia has repeatedly argued that assisting with economic development
should be the UNs main priority. In expressing his support for the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document, Prime Minister Hun Sen also argued that development and aid should
have been more at the forefront of the international communitys attention.26 He argued that
Cambodias progress towards achieving their MDGs required increased investment by foreign
donors and that the developed world should commit 0.7% of their GDP to foreign aid.
Significantly, Hun Sen argued that measures to improve economic development and alleviate
poverty should be considered conflict prevention measures and that development was a
necessary link to good governance and capacity building. Thus, he maintained that: It goeswithout saying that development is the cement for peace. Development in one part of the
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world cannot be sustained without development elsewhere. Cambodia believes in national
ownership in devising strategies to develop itself. We also believe in the crucial importance
and necessity of international partnership. We equally believe in the importance of good
governance at the national, international and corporate levels.27
Disarmament as Conflict Prevention
It is often remarked that one of the greatest difficulties within ASEAN is securing support for
measures that seem to replace the idea that sovereignty is always inviolable with the idea of
sovereignty as responsibility. However, in September 2006, Cambodia spoke in support of
the Secretary-Generals progress report on the prevention of armed conflict.28 The
Cambodian delegation agreed with the Secretary-Generals assessment that there has been
a gap between rhetoric and reality. Admittedly, the performance of the United Nations has so
far not been satisfactory to Member States in terms of the efforts made to avert the armed
conflicts which we have seen in the context of the current developments unfolding in different
parts of the world, in which a large number of people, both civilians and military personnel,
have been killed.29 Cambodias endorsement of the Secretary-Generals position on
prevention implies a degree of support for the preventive aspects of the R2P. In relation to the
question of specific preventive measures, however, Cambodia has been less forthcoming
though it has exhibited a commitment to measures aimed at regulating the flow of small arms
and light weapons.
In line with many other states in the Asia-Pacific region, Cambodia has consistently
emphasised the importance of disarmament as part of any effort aimed at preventing the
escalation of conflict into mass atrocities. Cambodia has called for regional and global
cooperation directed at the promotion of confidence-building measuresin that endeavour.30
To this end, Cambodia has ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and a range
of other legal instruments. Moreover, Cambodia supported efforts to reach consensus on the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treat and regretted the international communitys inability to reach
a consensus on that in 2005. We believe that people need food, not weapons, Cambodia
maintained.31
In relation to small arms and light weapons, Cambodia has expressed support for multilateral
efforts in the systematic collection, destruction, and registration of small arms and light
weapons as a conflict prevention measure.32 In rather generic terms, it has suggested that
efforts at the bilateral, subregional and regional levels should continue to be pursued in
parallel with a multilateral approach for disarmament and non-proliferation.33 Cambodia
reiterated this position in 2007, when it raised the importance of addressing the proliferation of
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small arms and light weapons as a key preventive measure against terrorism, violence and
regional conflicts.34
Peace Operations
Given Cambodias history, it is not surprising that it supports the strengthening of the UNs
capacity to deploy peace operations in a timely and decisive fashion. In 2006, Cambodia
expressed its full support for UN mandated peacekeeping operations and has, since 2005,
begun to contribute to peacekeeping by providing troops and equipment to the UN missions in
Sudan and Timor-Leste.35 In relation to the need to strengthen peace operations, Cambodia
has highlighted two critical points. First, the need to ensure that forces can be deployed in a
timely fashion. Cambodia argues that timely deployment requires the cooperation, political
will and mutual trust of all the parties involved.36 Second, Cambodia supports the
strengthening of regional peacekeeping capacity. It has suggested that as ASEAN is working
towards the establishment of the ASEAN security community, it could eventually also
become active in strengthening the work of the United Nations.37
Reform of the UN
Cambodia maintains that reform of the UN should be cautious and focus on areas of
consensus, as divisive reform debates divert attention away from key priorities such as
development. It is worth noting that Cambodia believes that too much attention was devoted
to reform of the Security Council at the cost of the other reform measures that Kofi Annan had
proposed prior to the World Summit. Thus, Cambodia noted that failure to achieve all of the
agendas set out for the reform process of the United Nations in 2005 was due to too much
emphasison the reform of the Security Council.38 Cambodia argued that all states should
learn from this lesson and that in future debates about organisational reform discussions
should first address issues that are less controversial.39
5.4 Summary
There is much scope for engaging Cambodia on translating the R2P from words to deeds.
Having welcomed both In Larger Freedom and the World Summit Outcome Document,
Cambodia appears to be open to the need to help states build the necessary capacity to
prevent conflicts, the need for disarmament and better regulation of the trade in small arms
and light weapons, and the need for reform of the UN. Cambodia is willing to discuss matters
of international peace and security, and to engage in dialogue about how ASEAN could
further engage with the UN in areas such as peace operations. Furthermore, the ratification
of the ASEAN Charter and Rome Statute, reflects Cambodias eagerness to be active in
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promoting the new agenda. However, Cambodia stresses the idea that dialogue should focus
on areas of consensus and avoid divisiveness as far as possible. In sum, therefore, although
Cambodia has not been an overt supporter of the R2P, it is likely to welcome dialogue to find
consensus and the development of measures focusing on the capacity building and rebuilding
aspects of the R2P and the role of regional arrangements such as ASEAN.
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6. Indonesia
6.1 Background
Indonesia is the worlds most populous predominantly Muslim state and ASEANs largest
economy. It has enjoyed rapid progress in the past few years. After years of rule by
dictatorship, Indonesia has begun to consolidate its democracy and has resolved a number of
major violent conflicts, including those in Timor-Leste and Aceh, the former with the help of a
UN-mandated international force (INTERFET) and UN Transitional Administration that
oversaw Timor-Lestes transition to independence. However, the peace in Aceh remains
fragile and Indonesia confronts challenges posed by Islamist terrorist organisations such as
Jemaah Islamiya. Although it has enjoyed steady economic growth, its GDP per capita
stands at approximately $1,639, which makes it the fifth most prosperous state in ASEAN
(behind Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand).
Indonesia has expressed support for the R2P but has also voiced concern about the lack of
clarity as to when the principle should apply, leading to disagreements with some,predominantly Western, UN Member States over the most appropriate way to engage with
major crises. These disagreements have led some to the erroneous conclusion that Indonesia
does not support R2P. More accurately, Indonesia is careful to distinguish between the R2P
and the so-called right to intervention and is concerned lest the principle undermine
ASEANs principle of non-interference. Critically, as the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document is careful to insist that action under the rubric of R2P be consistent with Chapters
VI, VII and VIII of the Charter, Indonesian concerns about non-intervention and non-
interference did not prohibit its endorsement of the World Summit text. Even after the French
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner called for the R2P to be applied to Myanmar to justify the
delivery of humanitarian aid without the consent of the host state after Cyclone Nargis in May
2008, Indonesia did not abandon the principle of R2P. Rather, it argued that the R2P did not
apply in this case because the principle refers only to the crimes of genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and not to natural disasters.
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Indonesia and the Responsibil ity to Protect
At the 2005 World Summit, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyno stated that we
need a consensus on the responsibility to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. To this end, force should be used only when all other means havefailed.40 Indonesia endorsed the idea of the R2P relating to the four crimes (genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity) and was also prepared to accept that
in some circumstances it was legitimate for the UN Security Council to authorise enforcement
measures to protect populations from these crimes. However, as President Yudhoynos
statement infers, Indonesia thought it necessary to continue dialogue to provide clarity on the
situations in which the application of enforcement measures might be necessary and
appropriate in order to avoid the potential misapplication of the principle.
Even prior to the World Summit, Indonesia had expressed a degree of support for the R2P,
providing that it was consistent with the UN Charter and existing international law. Reflecting
on the UN Secretary-Generals proposals set out in In Larger Freedom, Indonesia maintained
that it is our view that, although there are some moral justifications for the Secretary-
Generals recommendation in that regard [the R2P], we feel that a number of political and
legal questions remain unaddressed.41 Indonesia went on to argue that its concerns about
the R2P were similar to its concerns about recommendations concerning the use of force.
That is, Indonesia was concerned about the potential legitimisation of unilateral intervention or
interference in the domestic affairs of states and the possibility that proposed criteria to guide
decision-making might be abused.42 The R2P principle would only be acceptable to Indonesia
if it was squarely consistent with the UN Charter.
Indonesia reiterated its cautious support for the R2P at the 2006 General Assembly Plenary
Session However, it stressed the need for clarity and caution about the types of situation to
which the R2P applied and the circumstances in which enforcement measures might need to
be applied. Thus, according to Indonesia:
[T]he concept of the responsibility to protect should be approached very carefully,
taking into account the sovereignty and equality of all States. My delegation
opposes the threatening of peoples, groups or countries by others, and sees that as
a counterproductive measure. While we realise that sanctions may be required in
some exceptional circumstances, we believe that extreme care should be exercised
in that regard. We also believe that aid should not be tied to conditionalities.
Effective partnerships for development are those that are based on mutual
understanding, trust, respect and accountability among all parties.43
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It is important to stress that the Indonesian government does not dispute that sovereigns have
a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity, nor that the responsibility shifts to the international community which may
enforce various types of sanctions in situations where a state is manifestly failing to fulfill its
responsibilities. Rather, Indonesia has called for clarification as to when R2P applies, theprecise measures that the international community is entitled to adopt and the appropriate
authorising bodies for various types of action.
6.2 R2P Related Policy Priorities
The role of regional organisations
Protection of civilians in armed conflict
Post conflict reconstruction
The response of the Security Council to the situations in Sudan, Zimbabwe and
Myanmar
The Role of Regional Organisations
As a founding member of ASEAN, Indonesia argues that regional organisations have an
important role to play. In particular, Indonesia has taken a leading role in seeking to enhance
ASEANs capacity in the areas of preventive diplomacy, human rights promotion and conflict
mediation. In December 2006, Indonesias Foreign Minister, Hasan Wirajuda gave a keynote
speech at the 2nd Roundtable Discussion on Human Rights in ASEAN, noting the need for
greater efforts to promote human rights within the region. Wirajuda also set out key steps for
achieving this ambition:
Only four ASEAN members have national human rights institutions. And even when
these national institutions exist, the internal coordination among different human
rights stakeholders is often a problem.
Hence, our best option is for a gradual or building block approach to the
establishment of a regional human rights mechanism. Thus the Vientiane Action
Programme provides for the establishment of an ASEAN Commission on the
promotion and protection of the rights of women and children. This is a modest
stepbut very feasible. And it serves as basis for further initiatives.
The work of this ASEAN Commission could start on the soft side of the cause of
human rights: education, training, capacity building. It can gradually move on to
more sensitive aspectslike fact-finding on human rights violations.
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Over time, as more and more people are aware of and become involved in the
promotion of human rights, as national human rights institutions mature and
increase in number, as the networks promoting human rights expand and gain in
influence, the Commission can enlarge its scope and strengthen its mandate. Ormore Commissions, each focusing on specific human rights issues, can be
established.
Eventually, the Commission or Commissions could evolve into human rights courts.
Meanwhile, a strong case can also be made for the Malaysian proposal for the
establishment of an ASEAN human rights mechanism involving initially only the
member countries ready for itwith the others joining in when they are ready.
It is easy to become impatient with this evolutionary approach. But there is more
than meets the eye in ASEANs gradualism in establishing a regional human rights
mechanism. It is the dictate of political common sense and wisdom.
We know that we lag behind other regional groupings in addressing human rights
concerns. The European Union has its European Court of Human Rights. The
African Union has its African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. And the
Organisation of American States has its Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and its Court of Human Rights.
These mechanisms provide an avenue for the redress of human rights violations
that occur in their respective regions. We have no such regional mechanism.
So we have to catch up. Perhaps not today or next month. But in the foreseeable
future we have to advance far enough to catch upfor at stake in the
establishment of an ASEAN human rights mechanism is our credibility as a regional
organisation, our standing in the eyes of the world and our idea of ourselves as a
caring and sharing community.
At stake also is our own cohesivenessfor if we do not effectively address human
rights concerns in our region, there is bound to be internal friction. With such
friction, we drift apart and away from becoming a Community.
When gross violations of human rights take place in a member country, invariably
we shy away from discussing it in ASEAN meetings in deference to the principle of
non-interference in the internal affairs of states. But in todays world, gross
violations of human rights are no longer a purely domestic matter. They are also a
matter of international concern.
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When human rights violations become a matter of human security as defined in the
United Nations today, then it is a concern of all humankind.
Thus if ASEAN members still feel that an incidence of gross violations of human
rights is too sensitive an issue for open discussion in a meeting, then the logicalalternative is to have it addressed within the neutral premises of a regional
commission. To ignore it is no longer an option.
Moreover, in a globalised world where fundamental issues are intertwined, at stake
is also our economic competitiveness. There is a real and heavy economic cost to
impunity or even just negligence in addressing the issue of human rights. The
people will not bear that cost indefinitely.
And so as we gather here in the spirit of a shared commitment to the cause of
human rights, the task at hand is clear: we must find the most practical ways to
move forward to the establishment of an ASEAN human rights mechanism without
causing the jolt that will set back our efforts.44
This speech is noteworthy for a number of reasons in relation to Indonesias commitment to
the R2P and its approach to capacity-building. First, Wirajuda highlighted that sovereigns
have the primary responsibility to protect their populations and that the international
communitys principle role is to assist sovereigns in exercising this duty. In the context of
ASEAN and human rights, this means developing mechanisms that can effectively utilise
cooperation to promote human rights and address grave violations. Second, Indonesia
recognises that the international community should play a role in promoting human rights,
assisting states and in extreme situations of grave abuse, holding states to account. Third, the
statement is noteworthy for its implication that ASEANs Member States should be made
accountable to the regional body and that ASEAN should develop its institutional capacity
accordingly, whilst assisting national governments to build their capacity.
In 2007, Indonesia argued that ASEAN has the potential to assist with preventive diplomacy
and mediation efforts to address threats to international peace and security in the region with
the support of the UN. Thus:
[The] EU has broadened its reach beyond Europe. It collaborated with ASEAN in
deploying a monitoring mission in Aceh, Indonesia. This becomes the first model for
inter-regional cooperation in the Southeast Asian region. There are three scenarios
on how UN regional organisations may be able to nurture their relationship with
regard to conflict resolution.
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First, both entities may develop a joint mission deployed in different parts of the
globe. This concerted venture requires complementarity of resources.
Secondly, the UN can resume a mission previously under the organisation of a
regional organisation. This is what has been under discussion for Somalia. And
thirdly, regional organisations take responsibility of the continuation of a UNinitiated peace mission. A good example of this scenario is the take over of the UN
IPTF by the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Another scenario could be a subcontracting, by which the UN tasks a regional
organisation to do all or part of its work. This option is taken particularly when using
regional organisation to address threats to peace is considered more effective than
by direct involvement of the UN.
Cooperation between UN and regional organisations will be viable when it develops
on the basis of equal partnership. Nevertheless, my delegation believes that
regional arrangements should not, in any way, substitute the role of the UN in the
maintenance of peace and security.
It is the primary responsibility of the UN, as stipulated in its Charter, Chapter VII, to
maintain international peace and security. The UN must remain the centre for
harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of peace and security as rightly
mentioned by the President of the UN Security Council in her opening remarks.45
In addition, Indonesia has argued that the UN and regional organisations should cooperate
more deeply on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Thus, it maintained in 2008 that
the United Nations is surely not in a position to tackle all of the issues related to the
protection of civilians. Regional organisations have an important role to play in the protection
of civilians. It is important to remember that the best preventative medicine for war is fruitful
negotiation and dialogue, which is often achieved by inviting the participation of regionally
relevant players.46
Thus, Indonesia argues that regional organisations should play a greater role in assisting the
UN to maintain international peace and security. In particular, Indonesia argues that ASEAN
should play a leading role in the promotion of human rights and work in partnership with the
UN to strengthen the regional capacity to resolve conflicts, conduct joint peacekeeping and
policing operations, develop the capacity to enable the UN to subcontract its activities to
regional organisations, and strengthen the protection of civilians in armed conflict though it
has not developed specific proposals in relation to these initiatives.
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Protection of Civilians
As an elected member of the UN Security Council (2007-8), Indonesia has been an active
participant in the Councils on-going work on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
Indonesia recognises that civilians are often the primary victims of contemporary armedconflict and that displacement and attendant problems are major issues that deserve
international attention. Without making specific proposals, Indonesia commended the work of
the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies and criticised groups that ambush and attack
humanitarian aid workers. Significantly, in light of Myanmars reticence to admit humanitarian
aid in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, Indonesia also criticised those who restrict the delivery of
humanitarian aid and place displaced populations out of reach of international assistance.47
In addition to its call for more cooperation between the UN and regional organisations on this
matter, Indonesia has identified a number of measures aimed at strengthening the protection
of civilians. First, Indonesia has stressed the need for the establishment of alternative legal
measures to hold non-state combatants accountable for violations of human rights and
humanitarian law. In this regard, Indonesia welcomed the role of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) in promoting awareness of the relevant legal instruments among
non-state combatants and called upon the UN to become involved in this endeavour.48
Second, Indonesia has argued that all parties to a conflict should make arrangements to meet
the protection and assistance requirements of children and women and ensure the
unhindered delivery of basic necessary services.49
Third, Indonesia has noted the threat to civilians posed by landmines and other munitions. It
has welcomed the UNs mine action activities and emphasises the need for collaboration with
national governments and regional organisations. In particular, it has emphasised the
importance of demining, victim assistance, mine-risk education and the destruction of
stockpiled landmines as a part of mine-action.50
Fourth, Indonesia has suggested that the Security Council has a larger role to play in
protecting civilians during armed conflict, arguing that the Council has an imperative duty to
stand for those who are defenseless and in need of protection in times of conflictIt is our
shared responsibility to alleviate the suffering of victims wherever and whenever it occurs.51
Finally, Indonesia suggests that more support should be sought from the often under-utilised
efforts of private aid organisations and philanthropic organisations. Such bodies could be
invited to provide funds, expertise and innovative solutions to the problems associated with
the protection of civilians.52
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Post-Conflict Reconstruct ion
Because a high proportion of peace agreements fail in their first five years, it is reasonable to
argue that post-conflict reconstruction plays an important role in the prevention of genocide,war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. One of the other major
achievements of the 2005 World Summit, therefore, was the establishment of the UN
Peacebuilding Commission. During his address to the World Summit, President Yudhoyono
clearly indicated that he believed that the R2P and the Peacebuilding Commission were
connected.53 Since 2005, Indonesia has remained a key supporter of the Peacebuilding
Commission and its efforts in assisting states that have recently emerged from conflict to
restore the rule of law, reform security sectors, buttress human rights mechanisms and
ensure a fair electoral process.
The Security Councils Response to Situations in Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe
As demonstrated thus far, since the 2005 World Summit, Indonesia has generally endorsed
the R2P principle and the idea that in certain extreme situations, the international community
has a responsibility to take measures through the UN Charter to ensure the protection of
civilian populations. However, the way Indonesia approached the application of the R2P
during its time as a non-permanent member of the Security Council has differed somewhat
from both the approach taken by the West and other, more conservative, ASEAN members.
As such, Indonesias position on the situations in Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe helps
identify ways in which the R2P might be operationalised in a manner that is consistent with
the principle of non-interference. If the R2P is to be used to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, it is important to better
understand the position of governments like Indonesia in order to increase the likelihood of
the Security Council acting in a timely and decisive manner with the support of all of its
members.
When the US presented a draft resolution censuring and imposing economic sanctions on
Myanmar in 2007, Indonesia did not join China and Viet Nam in voting against the resolution.
Instead, it chose to abstain, indicating that whilst it did not agree with the position adopted by
the draft resolution it was also deeply concerned about the situation in Myanmar. Indonesia
argued that although it was appropriate for the international community to express concern
and encourage the government of Myanmar to exercise restraint, words of condemnation
would prove counter-productive and economic sanctions were inappropriate. Moreover,
Indonesia maintained that international engagement should be spearheaded by ASEAN in
cooperation with the UN. Thus, explaining Indonesias decision to abstain, its permanent
representative called upon the UN to work with regional organisations to find a solution in
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cooperation with the Myanmar government.54 Although a less robust stance than the US and
its supporters had wanted, Indonesias position reflected a changing conception of the
principle of non-interference and a willingness to concede that the human rights situation in
Myanmar was a matter of legitimate concern for the international community. Moreover, whilst
expressing disquiet at the approach taken by the US, in abstaining Indonesia did not allowthis disquiet to override its concern about human rights in Myanmar.
In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in May 2008, the French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner famously called on the Security Council to invoke the R2P to
justify the delivery of humanitarian assistance by force if necessary in the face of the
governments refusal to accept much-needed aid. Unsurprisingly, given its view that the R2P
should be carefully and cautiously applied, Indonesia flatly rejected Kouchners call, arguing
that invoking the R2P would both complicate efforts to secure humanitarian access. As such,
Indonesias permanent representative to the UN told reporters that the moment an issue is
brought to the Council under the flag of the responsibility to protect, which is a very loaded
term at the UN, the whole humanitarian effort will be politicised.55 He added that there were
other, more appropriate, mechanisms within the UN system that were better suited to the
situation at hand, and that invoking the R2P principle would jeopardise and undermine aid
work, not only for Myanmar, but also for future humanitarian situations. In line with other
ASEAN governments, Indonesia maintained quite simply that the R2P was not intended to
apply to natural disasters, or to legitimise the forcible distribution of humanitarian assistance
in such circumstances. It argued that there were other tools available to secure humanitarian
access a view shared by the UN Secretary-Generals Special Adviser and the Asia-Pacific
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, among others.56
The idea that Indonesias position on Cyclone Nargis reflected more its understanding of the
scope and meaning of the R2P rather than a backsliding from the commitment made in 2005
can be seen by considering the positions in took on Darfur and Zimbabwe shortly after the
Nargis debate. Despite concerns that events after Cyclone Nargis could erode support for the
R2P within ASEAN, Indonesia used the language of the R2P, specifically referring to the idea
of sovereignty as responsibility, to support its insistence that the government of Sudan
cooperate fully with the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Thus, Indonesia
argued that:
[F]ailure to achieve peace produces not only prolonged suffering but also the
continuation of those crimes. Indonesia strongly condemns all gross violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law. We condemn those who commit
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Impunity must not be tolerated, and
perpetrators of those crimes must be brought to justice without unnecessary
delayMy delegation strongly believes that Sudans sovereignty must always be
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respected, but that sovereignty also comes with rights and responsibilities. In this
regard, we underline the obligations of the Government of Sudan to comply with the
provisions of resolution 1593 (2005) and actions of the [International Criminal
Court] Prosecutor shall neither nullify the principle of complementarity nor absolve
Sudans national court of its responsibility regarding the perpetrators. We areconfident that Sudans national court will take up that responsibility. Cooperation
with the ICC will be essential if Sudan is expected to investigate and prosecute the
cases selected by the prosecutors. Indonesia strongly believes that the issue of
cooperation by the Government of Sudan with the ICC should be addressed in a
comprehensive manner, in the context of achieving durable peace and security.57
Indonesias position on this matter is important because it demonstrates that it is prepared to
act on the idea that underpins the R2P - that sovereign states have responsibilities towards
populations within their own territory and that Indonesia accepts that the international
community should take steps to protect civilians and end impunity in cases where a state is
manifestly failing to do so.
J ust as significantly, in J uly 2008 Indonesia departed from the position taken by Viet Nam and
China on the situation in Zimbabwe and abstained on a draft resolution demanding the
imposition of targeted sanctions. Indonesia chose not to support the resolution primarily
because it did not enjoy the support of the relevant regional and sub-regional organisations
(AU and SADC) or of the South African mediators. However, Indonesia did not believe that
these concerns outweighed the Security Councils legitimate concerns about the situation in
Zimbabwe and chose to abstain rather than vote against the draft resolution. In explaining its
position, Indonesia argued that, the leaders of the country, in particular, are called upon to
recognise the burden of responsibility on their shoulders and to leave no stone unturned in
the quest to extricate Zimbabwe from its present predicament. The people of Zimbabwe
deserve international support in that endeavour.58 Indonesia went on to emphasise that whilst
it was legitimate for the Security Council to be engaged in the crisis, it was imperative that the
Council work in cooperation with the relevant regional and sub-regional organisations: [T]he
Security Council, in synergy with such regional efforts, must also support the people of
Zimbabwe in tackling the challenges before them. The promotion of peace, stability,
reconciliation and democracy should guide our endeavours. In that, we cannot emphasise
enough the importance of the Council working together with SADC and the African Union.59
In its response to all three situations, therefore, Indonesia has maintained that sovereignty
implies responsibilities and that it is appropriate for the international community to become
engaged in order to either assist states to fulfil their responsibilities or protect populations in
cases where they are manifestly failing. There are, however, three important lessons about
the use of the R2P that can be learned from Indonesias position on these three situations.
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First, it is important that the R2P be understood as only applying to the four crimes (genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity) identified by the World Summit
Outcome Document and not other sources of widespread human insecurity such as natural
disasters. Second, although international engagement is sometimes appropriate, such
engagement should be predicated on cooperation with the host authorities as far as possible.Third, international engagement should proceed with due regard for the attitudes and
preferences of relevant regional and sub-regional organisations and wherever possible the
UN should focus its attention on supporting regional efforts.
6.3 Summary
From this brief analysis it is clear that Indonesia cautiously supports the R2P principle as
agreed at the 2005 World Summit and is also prepared to support efforts to translate the
principle from words to deeds. Indonesia insists that the principle should be narrowly applied
to only the four crimes specifically referred to in the Outcome Document and cautious about
the measures that the international community can use to respond to situations involving the
actual or imminently apprehended commission of those four crimes. As such, Indonesia
opposed the application of the R2P to the situation in Myanmar in the wake of Cyclone Nargis
in May 2008, whilst supporting regional efforts to secure humanitarian access, calling on the
government of Sudan to cooperate with the ICC and refusing to oppose the application of
targeted sanctions to Zimbabwe. In addition to this, Indonesia has also put forward and
indicated its support for a range of initiatives that would make a significant contribution totranslating the R2P from words to deeds, including: the establishment of an ASEAN human
rights body; the strengthening of regional capacity to conduct peace operations; the
subcontracting of UN activities to regional organisations; the strengthening of the protection of
civilians in armed conflict by creating a mechanism to hold non-state belligerents accountable,
insisting that belligerents make plans to protect and assist women and children, and doing
more to protect civilians from landmines; and the development of the Peacebuilding
Commission. It is important to end by noting that Indonesia emphasises the role of regional
organisations in leading international responses to crises and maintains that the UN should
strengthen its partnership to and assistance with regional organisations.
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7. Lao Peoples Democratic Republic(Laos)
7.1 Background
Although Laos has not specifically referred to the R2P in its public statements, it accepted the
2005 World Summit Outcome Document and enthusiastically welcomed the appointment of
Ban Ki-moon as Secretary-General of the UN. Ban was the only candidate for that position to
emphasise the R2P. Laotian priorities focus on poverty alleviation to address what it
considers to be the greatest threat to a states capacity to govern. Beyond this, Laos has
indicated its support for collaborative efforts at conflict prevention through economic
development, arms control and disarmament, and reform of the UN. It is important to note
that Laos confronts an on-going problem in relation to its Hmong minority which dates back to
a protracted civil war in the 1970s which involved several external powers including the US.
Laos has the third lowest GDP per capita within ASEAN at $612, slightly ahead of Cambodia
and Myanmar. Laos has offered general support for reform of the UN aimed at making the
Security Council more legitimate, representative, effective and democratic but it prefers to
focus on regional initiatives spearheaded by ASEAN.60
7.2 Laos and the Responsibility to Protect
As mentioned above, Laos has not specifically referred to the R2P principle in its public
statements since 2005. However, it did support the World Summit Outcome Document and
the appointment of Ban Ki-moon a noted supporter of the R2P as Secretary-General of
the UN. Although we cannot read too much into this support, it is worth stressing that Laos
specifically voiced its support for Bans strong commitment to the reform process in pursuit of
a strong, fully mobile and multifunctional United Nations, a process which of course include
the Secretary-Generals well known support for the R2P.61
It should be noted that in the same year, Amnesty International released a report arguing that
J apan should use its influence over the Laos government (as its largest foreign donor) to
encourage it to permit humanitarian access to the Hmong region to allow agencies to provide
humanitarian aid and monitor human rights abuses in the area.
62
Natalie Hill, deputy AsiaPacific Director at Amnesty International invoked R2P in relation to the Hmong, telling
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journalists that: The Hmong groups living in the jungle are destitute. The Lao authorities
have a responsibility to protect them, not least because of the children involved. Instead, their
regular attacks mean the groups live in perpetual danger of their lives. She continued, the
Lao authorities must end all attacks against the Hmong people living in the jungle and allow
access to international organisations that can provide humanitarian aid and monitor humanrights abuses.63 The Laotian government rejected Amnestys claim that it was attacking
Hmong villages and civilians, arguing that the allegations were fabricated.
Interestingly, this episode did not prompt Laos to reject or criticise the R2P principle itself
though Laos did feel the need to reassert the importance of sovereignty and the principle of
non-interference, noting that the threat of use of force and other violations of sovereignty
hindered the cause of international cooperation on peace and security.64
7.3 R2P Related Policy Priorities
Economic development, specifically through the MDGs
Regulating the trade in small arms and light weapons
In line with its relatively passive stance on the R2P principle itself, Laos has not identified a
broad range of policy priorities at the UN. Two themes have been evident, however: the
priority of economic development and the control of small arms and light weapons as a form
of conflict prevention.
Economic Development
Given its GDP per capita, it is not surprising that Laos emphasises the need for more
assistance on economic development. In April 2005, Laos argued that the UN should direct
more attention and resources towards providing assistance to help the worlds least
developed countries meet the MDGs.65 In September 2005, the Prime Minister emphasised
the importance of meeting the MDGs and requested that donor states develop coherent and
uniform policies on loan repayment.66 Three years later, Laos reiterated this argument arguing
that it was the shared responsibility of developed and developing countries to implement their
joint commitments with more resources and more action, so that the Millennium Development
Goals can be achieved successfully by 2015.67
Regulating the Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
No doubt the continued resistance of some Hmong hill tribes to the Lao government
contributes to the governments keen advocacy of the regulation of the trade in small armsand light weapons. Nonetheless, the Lao governments support for small arms control as an
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important element of conflict prevention is shared by other ASEAN Member States and is
therefore worth exploring. Laos supports the Programme of Action on Small Arms and
measures to strengthen its implementation. In 2006, Laos noted its disappointment at the
weak state of the Programme, arguing that in light of negative developments, we cannot but
share concern of the world community about the failure of the recent Conference to ReviewProgress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. However, the
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic believes that the Programme of Action is a living
document, which remains a framework for cooperation that empowers States to continue to
work for its full and effective implementation.68
7.4 Summary
Laos has not specifically referred to the R2P to offer either support or dissent.
The closest Laos came to expressing concern with the possible encroachment of R2P into the
domestic affairs of sovereigns was in 2007, the same year that Amnesty International issued
a report on Laos treatment of Hmong hill tribes, referred to the governments responsibility to
protect the Hmong, and called upon J apan to use its development assistance as leverage to
put pressure on the government. These issues notwithstanding, Laos supported the 2005
World Summit Outcome Document does and has not openly voiced concerns about the
principle, despite the Hmong case. Laos understandably emphasises the priority of economic
development but has also demonstrated an interest in strengthening regulation of the trade insmall arms and light weapons.
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8. Malaysia
8.1 Background
Malaysia is a quintessential Southeast Asian tiger. It is the regions third wealthiest country,
with a per capita income of $5,890 and has enjoyed steady economic growth over the past
two decades, only interrupted by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Malaysia is one of the
regions more progressive countries and has advocated the reform of ASEAN, including the
establishment of a regional human rights mechanism. In 1997, Malaysias Deputy Prime
Minister Anwar Ibrahim put forth the notion of constructive engagement through which
ASEAN members would be encouraged to invite regional assistance to promote human
security through education, human rights promotion and economic initiatives. On the one
hand, its former Prime Minister Mahatir Mohammed was a staunch advocate of the Asian
values concept which held that certain human right values were Western in orientation and
therefore inappropriate for an Asian context. Moreover, as an active member of the Non-
Aligned Movement, Malaysia has defended a conservative interpretation of the principle of
non-interference. On the other hand, however, in 1999 Malaysia participated in the Australian-
led INTERFET intervention in Indonesia and voted against a Russian sponsored draft
Security Council resolution condemning NATO for its armed intervention in Kosovo.
Malaysia has adopted a cautious position on the R2P it has welcomed the principle but
expressed disquiet about the potential for unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of
states and called for more deliberation in the General Assembly and the establishment of
safeguards to ensure that the R2P principle does not violate the non-interference principle.
Moreover, it is important to understand that Malaysia views issues connected to sovereignty
as responsibility, such as human rights promotion, through the prism of non-interference. For
Malaysia, the non-interference principle means that matters should be dealt with in a
cooperative fashion through patient dialogue. What it refers to as constructive intervention
characterised by loud criticism, adversarial posturing and grandstanding should be avoided
because it tends to do more harm than good. In place of interference, Malaysia advocates an
approach to peace and security matters based on active dialogue and confidence-building.69
According to Malaysia, it is adherence to the principle of non-interference and a commitment
to dialogue and cooperation that underpins ASEANs success in maintaining regional peace
and security.
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8.2 Malaysia and the Responsibility to Protect
Prior to the 2005 World Summit, Malaysias position on the R2P was quite similar to
Indonesias. As early as 2004, Malaysia argued in a UN Security Council meeting on the
Protection of Civilians that:
[P]erpetrators of these criminal and cruel acts [targeting civilians,
particularly women and children] must be brought to justice to arrest the
culture of impunity that is so pervasion in so many areas of armed conflict
around the worldThe affected civilians should not only be assured of
their physical security in situations of armed conflict but also be provided
with legal protection under international lawThe international
community must collectively demonstrate its resolve to punish those
responsible.70
Malaysia welcomed the proposal to discuss R2P at the 60th General Assembly in
2005 but expressed some caution about its application.71 Thus, at the World
Summit itself, Prime Minister Badawi further clarified Malaysias position on R2P,
noting:
I am aware of the growing consensus towards accepting that the
existing provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding the use offorce are sufficient to address the full range of security threats; that the
only issue remaining is how to ensure that the use of force is applied
only as instrument of last resort. Undoubtedly, this is a priority issue
especially as it is connected to the question of responsibility to protect
civilian populations from crimes against humanity. However, any
intervention must give due recognition to Charter principles pertaining
to sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference. While the
Security Council would appropriately be the body to take decisions on
these matters, it is Malaysias view that provisions must also be made
for the General Assembly to have an oversight role in this crucial
matter of the use of force to deal with threats to international security.72
Significantly, Badawi did not object to the R2P itself but expressed concern about the
potential for it to sanction the use of force. These concerns were reiterated later in the year,
when Malaysia argued in the Security Council that whilst humanitarian intervention had no
basis in international law, the Security Council had a right to take action in situations where
clear violations of international law, international humanitarian law and human rightsthreatened international peace and security.73 Interestingly, Malaysia maintained that whilst
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the Security Council has a role to play in humanitarian emergencies, this should be limited to
cases where grave violations arise out of conflicts that threaten international peace and
security. This view was reiterated in 2006 when Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid
Albar maintained that Malaysia recognised the need to intercede on humanitarian grounds in
international conflicts simultaneously acknowledging the appropriateness of internationalengagement in humanitarian crises and the idea that intercession is only appropriate in
response to international conflicts.74 Moreover, Syed Hamid went on to note that there
remained a whole range of questions that involve legal, moral, operational and political
constituting the debate around humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect,
warning that the preoccupation with human security should not lead to human insecurity.75
8.3 R2P Related Policy Priorities
Reform of the UN Security Council and the role of the General Assembly
Human rights
Peace operations
Strengthening humanitarian assistance
Reform of the UN Security Council and the role of the General Assembly
Malaysia has been an active participant in the open ended debate about the reform of the UN
Security Council. Although Malaysia shares the Non-Aligned Movements view that enlarging
its membership would improve the Councils international legitimacy, it argues that an
expanded membership would likely make the Council less effective.76 As such, Malaysia has
suggested that debate about Security Council reform should focus on its working methods
rather than its membership and that the two questions (working methods and membership)
should be considered separately to ensure that divisions about enlarging the Councils
membership do not derail progress on reforming the Councils working methods.77 In
particular, Malaysia maintains that the veto powers enjoyed by the Councils permanent
members should be regulated and the relationship between the Council and General
Assembly recalibrated.
According to Malaysia, the permanent members veto privilege is problematic because it does
not conform with the principle of sovereign equality and is open to abuse by permanent
members who use it to overrule the wishes of the majority.78 As such, Malaysia argues that
the use of the veto should be regulated. Although it sympathises with the proposals put forth
by the S5 group of states on the veto (see the section on Singapore), it believes that a
stronger regulatory framework is necessary to limit the discretionary use of the veto.79
Therefore, Malaysia has proposed a modified veto whereby two permanent and three othermembers of the Council would be needed to block any Council resolution.80
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In relation to the Councils working methods, Malaysia argues that it is important that the
Council fulfill its obligations to the larger membership by limiting itself to matters that fall within
its mandate for international peace and security, reporting regularly and frankly to the broader
membershi
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