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Mediterranean 2020
the Future oF Mediterranean Security
and PoliticS
the WeStern Mediterranean in 2020:
ScenarioS For regional Security and cooPeration aFter
the arab uPriSingS
the eaStern Mediterranean and the gulF region in 2020: alternative
ScenarioS For the regional Security environMent
d. e S l
d. ts dks
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2011 Te German Marshall Fund o the United States. All rights reserved.
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a gMF
Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grantmaking institu-tion dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic
and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by conven-
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a M P Pm
Te Mediterranean Policy Program promotes transatlantic analysis and dialogue on issues aecting Southern Europe, North
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exploring opportunities or south-south cooperation and integration; research on key unctional issues aecting Mediter-
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cooperation on Mediterranean strategy.
Cover photo: Benghazi residents hold a oating protest in the port outside the ibisti Hotel in Benghazi Libya as the Arican
Union delegation meets inside to discuss a truce plan between Gaddaf and the rebels.
Katie Orlinsky/Corbis
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Mediterranean 2020:he Future o Mediterranean Security
and Politics
he Western Mediterranean in 2020:Scenarios or Regional Security and Cooperation
ater the Arab Uprisings
D. E S L
he Eastern Mediterranean and the Gul Region in 2020:
Alternative Scenarios or the Regional SecurityEnvironment
D. T Dk
Mediterranean Paper Series
December 2011
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Mediterranean 2020 iii
A - A S , A - . I , , A . M k , , , k .
-, - x x. I, M E N A j , x . I , k k . I, .
A - , A , x , U S E. x M E N A k . x M ,
A S. D. E S L z WM D.
Dk E M. k , M k k .
. - , k, ,
E. E W M , M E - N A. A , M j , S, . L, , A, k ,
.I k k , x , . I , () M .
Dr. Emiliano Alessandri
Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of theUnited States
Washington, DC, December 13, 2011
Foreword
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Scenarios remain v
open, and moving i
one or other directi
depends primarily o
the success of poli
transitions and the
prospects for regiostability.
Introduction1
T A W , j q W
M . S D , A , . I , , MG 4- L,
j , I , E, M, z .
A q x . Y, . k.
W q ? W ? WI ( ) ? C - ? x ?
A j W
M x .S , , -GL. H,
M .I EU, . U S EU x , , k
z, , k, .
WM, - x N A (M, A,, M, L) S E (P, S, F, I, M). A
.I , x . , , N A , , E , . ,, W M
, , .
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States2
Fear of radicalization
nd instability was used
a means to legitimate
the regimes authority
nd, in parallel, upgrade
security cooperation
with internationalactors.
B , M, j A , z k
. P , , k k . F z , , . M k
.A A , q k A, , L j . -- , , (37 35 M A
7 ).
I , j k , , , , , .F , q .
S, , Sk, L () W AR? R F R E Dz E, L Y,MediterraneanPolitics, 15, 1, . 99-7; K, K MS S A W, FRIDE WorkingPaper, 4, N . S, M-F, Kj (9) S E M CMed.2008,Mediterranean Yearbook,B: IEM/CIDOB, . 85-89; , A , D-A H, L ()L A : q LAnne du Maghreb V | 9.
, A 99, - dcenie noire,
. S , , A , q . S, k A Q
I M.3 , U S E .
I , EU U S M j S M E, . S E , , x,
z . I , , z, ,
3 S, : S., G & W, I(7) A Q M SWP Comments, 6, M7 F, J P (9) A-Q IM: A C G ? CarnegiePapers Middle East Programme, 4; Nz V, J,H, B; Kk; Mz (9) : z S, M: L C; F, J P (),C A-Q A S?, Carnegie Papers
Middle East Program, .
he Old Paradigm2
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The centrality of se
needs overshadow
and undermined
attempts by both th
United States and t
EU to promote polit
reforms.
.4 A , M , , . z, ,
k NAO M D 5+5 .5 O , . M S, U S A, L I, , ,-, ,
4 S, , J, G (8) E U,D C- M,Journalof Common Market Studies, 46, , .47-7, Lk,Dk (6) P M,
Mediterranean Politics,, , . 598; W, S (8)B M: , x , Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, , , . 53-7.5 5+5 D R 99 W M B:M, M, A, , L, M, I,F, S, P.
-, z, x x z .6
The centrality of these security needs U S EU . , , U.S.- M E P I(MEPI), , , , , . EU j j k B P E
I D H R6 W, S (7) E z . V, Revista CIDOBdAfers Internacionals, 79-8, .7-3. Z, Y(9) L -U A: , Maghreb-Machrek, , .7-9;V, A () I L: R SR, The International Spectator, 45, 3, . 7-3.
Table 1: Membership in Multilateral Organizations
Source: Own elaboration
European
Union
Arab
Maghreb
Union
Union for the
Mediterranean
NATO
Mediterranean
Dialogue
5+5
Dialogue
Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Malta
Morocco
Mauritania Algeria
Tunisia
Libya O
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States4
The stagnation of
eform processes in the
egion and the paralysis
of the negotiations on
the Western Sahara
onflict indicate that, so
far, the status quo haseen fairly convenient to
the elites in power.
x . I 4, EU E N P (ENP), , M B.
I , W S. , M , .7 S 99,
, UN- .8 P V W, UN W S P [ -] , M , S C .9I 7 , I C G ,
k .
WS , , status quo . I
7 M-F, Kj (997) Sahara Occidental, Les enjeuxdun conflit rgional, P: CNRS 8 J, Ek (5) Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate,L R, L S, (9) W
S: A Y UN I M.9, MYk, B: IEM/CIDOB, . 65-68.9 P V W S , ElPais, 8 A 8, [E -: ://..///S///////888_5/] I C G W S: O IMiddle East/North Africa Report N66, J 7,..
x - . , . M, M- z WS , A Izk L M .
W S ,
S-M . S 98, S z . H, Pj/L, qU.S. .3I S-M
, F-A R 8 F C L I.
D , S-S .E - A M U, 989,
G Lz, B () S-M:
, Poltica Exterior, 5, 39, . 38-46. H L, M (9) MP S, : M P A B. B: N, . 38-6.3 S, C, I (6) V j; E M. B: GxG; G, R (6) S LI: A N C WM, I P, 43, , . -3.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States6
Most analysts,
observers, and
politicians did not
anticipate that Arab
ocieties were reaching
a saturation point.
T W M, M, M
. j ME N A (MENA) , 967 , 978 C D , 979 I R I, M E. I , N A A W,
- .7
M , , A , , , I . I ,
, , UNDPA H D R. : , , , , , , .
A S Bz, - ,
. M Bzz, , ,
7 S, B, A () L M N I, 9, A M, op cit.
, , Z E A B A. E , k H Mk, A .D , M G , , .
A A , M, , : ) , ,) - , 3) z , 4) x , , , . , .
Tunisia, x , . x - . Y, .8 I , 5 x W S
I S , ,8 k j : M C& V G (3), Le Syndrome Autoritaire, P:P S P, H, B (6) La force delobissance: conomie politique de la rpression en Tunisie, P :L ; B R, M () Tunisie :Etat, conomie et socit - Ressources politiques, lgitimation etrgulations sociales, P : P.
2011: A Point o No Return3
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With a single major
in the new Constitu
Assembly, Ennahda
will play a major ro
shaping Tunisian p
in the months and
to come but will nereach agreements
other political parti
8, j G k .9D , , x, k .I, D J
, , . , z P
. z , k, z . D B A
9 G, E () G M B : B A [O- : ://.-./-55786_] A I () Tunisia in Revolt, State Violenceduring Anti-Government Protests [ -: ://..////MDE3////9994--498-7-395949/3.]
, , k . A B A , 959C . E C A O 3 E, I R
G, 37 . W j C A,E j .
Algeria x J , B O q A C , , .Uk ,
, , A . x, , 99,
Table 2: Socio-Economic Indicators in the Maghreb
Source: World Bank, International Transparency, Reporters Without Borders, FAO, International Labour Organization.
*International Transparency 0= Highly Corrupt; 10= Very Clean
CountryHDI 2011
(ranking)
Youth
Unemployment
% 2009
Corruption
Perception
Index*
Gini
Index
2011
Press
Freedom
2010
(ranking/
mark)
Gender
Inequality
Index
2011
Food
Import
Dependency
2008
Morocco 3 .9 3.4 4.9 95/ 8.38 .5 %
Algeria 96 4.3 .9 35.3 33/47.33 .4 9%
Tunisia 94 3.7 4.3 4.8 64/ 7.5 .93 9%
Mauritania 59 . .3 39 95/ 8.38 .65 %
Libya 64 . . . 6/ 63.5 . .
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States8
hile the new Moroccan
constitution has
introduced significant
political reforms,
there are doubts as to
whether the content
and form of this reformwill calm the protest
movements.
. S, - z , , . , , , k . F, k . , A
. Y, PAzz Bk .
Morocco k , W
E U .3
I, - Y L. H, x k k, , , j N I H D.M , ,
A, L () W D P A F G M? Foreign Policy, M 3, .
A F G . IF G () A S A: E E C A Notes Internacionals CIDOB,3.3 S R A W: x M,Mediterranean Politics, , J , 9.
z. F E , x - - M F.4 I ,K M VI M 9 , J , N5. F x, J D P, I , . W x
, j , z Az , . H , z, - , M , k , M- W S,
,q, k .5
4 F , x I . R E , k z M . F , D, () D :
z j MARI85/, M: R IE.5 A M O, .S; O, M () N M C:R C M S?, Commentary CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, J , .
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I 3, G Libya W M D , U.S. E A Q.6 L .7H, -F,G Jamahiriya . k L , E .8
R G , UN S C R 973 - z .9 z , L , k . L
6 S, , J, G & P, E ()L F P: D Oj, W, G M F U S; B,G (8) P W M D: C L International Relations, , . 5-6;Z, Y (7) U S & L: FC - R G F B, A, Les Etats-Unis et le Maghreb Regaindintrt, A: CREAD, 5 - 5 Mz, L (6)L, MediterraneanPolitics, , , . 5-65.7 P, E () M : L, The Journal of North African Studies, 6, , .5-3.8 G , , M E
. H E .9 S k , () k L A J, Bz, x L R 973() S C 6498 , M 7, .
: , , z k L - .
Mauritania M , , 5 8, . , MO A Azz, 8
9 .S F , . M .3 L, S , . P k z q. Y, M
A . , A-Q M, A, M.3 U, Nk A-Q, j k .3 , , j M .
3 L, K M Arab ReformBulletin, M 8, .3 A A, L () L M , Notes Internacionals CIDOB, . 9.3 O M M, , AQMI k M J.
The new Libya face
enormous challeng
to hold the country
together, and the
disarmament and
demobilization of th
militias.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States10
A . European Union z . EU EN P . B . , EU k,
, x.33 I S, EU SPRING P (S P,R, I G) , -, , 35. A E , L, k
, E U - .
S E W M .34France, B
33 S, , , N () EU A S: A (M?) O R E N P, EuroMeSCoBrief, . B, R () A S, C M, EU: S S? European Policy Center brief, J ; S L, E & V, E () R EN P: A k Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 36; B: CIDOB.34 S A, R . () S E M: N A P, M P S, GMFUS/IAI.
A , , , L , M G8 , k $4 A .Italy z x, F A M, FF, k x I L.35 W I
q L, I j NAO L, I MP A . Spain, M, E . , P, , ,
L. I M, S .S F I , S q .
W S E : )
k ; ) 35 S F C S, F 3, L: F, x. E [ -: ://../MAE/EN/S_S/ANz/A///4_L_z_.]
The EUs response
reflects the structural
roblems of a European
Union self-absorbed
in the management of
the effects of its own
conomic and financialcrises.
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A E ; 3) k . H, , S I, .
I , , - A x,
N A z . ,, , , ( x) z, - .
M U S, EU, EU F, I, S . S, A , , , , , k M.
The Arab uprisings
a window of opport
to revise security
strategies, to redef
the relation betwee
security, stability, a
democracy, to dissonational security fr
the regimes securi
and to reformulate
accordingly security
political dialogue a
security cooperatio
frameworks in the
Mediterranean.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States12
T W M , , . I M,
, , . S, EU S E . S , , , , .
The Struggle Between Democratic
and Reactionary Forces
S J , M x : B A ;M A k , x ; M z
z; , L -G z .
, , . M
. I -, :
;
;
k j ;
.
I -, - :
, , I , , j AKP k;
;
q -
;
, ;
;
x ,
, .
- k. M x; z
Drivers o the New Decade4
The coming years
will lay the ground for
the formation of new
political systems, for
egional cooperative or
competitive dynamics,
nd for the resolution oreterioration of regional
conflicts.
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. I , . Lk, A W M. S, E x - .
I M, E, A W, z . , , - M, A, . G z - .O z k ,k, ,
R acquis. z B A Mk, , .
Regional Stability and Prospects
for Integration
C ? W k W
M ? L, W S R A z M . A
W M , M S z .
- L , , L . F, , x E.36 S, k , q
, A.37 , L k . F, S E (F, I, S) L, L j N-S W M.
x k W S : ? C P k 99 - k M?C S M- k L? H M
36 F G, A Jz (J 5, )
L , j z: , k -Q I M x L $ L L .37 S B, A () Op cit, . -3.
The persistent
mobilization of a
generation that
succeeded in
overthrowing Ben A
and Mubarak, but
also their capacityto endorse political
compromises, will
determine whether
democratic forces
withstand the offen
of authoritarian an
reactionary sectors
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States14
S? WA k P? C P ?
F , M z.R S , -
k. M S . I , M , , z .
Y, - , - . O , , A, rapproachment A M.38 I, K , xM z 994.39 O , E x z -
38 98, A M-A
987 - ( Z 988, U AM q P M, z 99 -).39 M K A.Al Arabiya. J 3, (A ://..///7/3/65. )
S .4
I x M S. M S N A (C M) k j M . k M R x,
M . I , S z .
Overcoming the European Crisis
I EU, 8 , k E . A - E, E M U, E,
E EU j.
D x , EU . I , , k , j E. E k. EU
q
4 S F Dk, L S M S . F , - M S .
Morocco relies on the
me factor, its domestic
olitical reform process,
and international
fears for regional
destabilization to
strengthen its positionin the Western Sahara
conflict.
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E . R , , EU, . U, .
E
, SM. N A E k,, k E . B k, S E z , N A q. P
x .A , - -kE S M.
I , EU , - , , SM . k EU,
. A - EU - M, -, , .
Troubled Neighborhoods
A , W M k S M E. I , z A Q IM j W
M k N, M, C. O L z .4 A k W A, G G S E, j j
.O q z S 4 O-M, M M () MF A Q I M, GCSP Policy Paper,5, M .
Figure 1: Area of Activity of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Source: Agence France Press
The effects of an
unresolved Europe
crisis can have a
global impact but
its effects could be
particularly strong
neighboring regionincluding the South
Mediterranean.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States16
q, q -, j , A M. A , x .4
A M E, A-I A , M. A
M E, k I, N A . P I
4 C, D & F R () A Q I M (AQIM): I A R I R IAI Wk P, /7 (A).
, , . M, z P q k , , . I , P P .
A Shifting Regional Balance of Power
I A S,
E, S A, k, I .S C D 978 I 979, M E - -W I- . . W k E M M,
.
E k - -P I.43 SA - G S B. W A , S
G C C43 S, , H, O N E ,Al Masry al Youm, A ; N, H E Al Masry al Youm, M 3, ; B-M, A E , The Jerusalem Post, M, ,Bk B H E ?Al Jazeera, J 9, ,
Figure 2: Cocaine Seizures
in North-Western Africa
Source: World Drug Report 2011, UNODC
As has happened
before, the terrorist
threat also could be
exploited to induce
international actors
to be less demanding
about democraticreforms.
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(GCC) J M.44S x, M,M-M OM, SA k
A - .45k, M E, A .46 Ak
k AKP , I x
44 E-K, M () G C CE: G R, Notes InternacionalsCIDOB, 33, (B: CIDOB).45 W S A S?, The Washington Note,J 4, .46 A k A ( , Gk, N E N: C kI? G M F U S On Turkey,M 5, ) , k z C W CA R M E ( Ak, M(5). k M Dz ME,Arab Studies Quarterly, 7, -. .-7.
.47 M,k
E-k x , , Bk S N V S.48 I, ,
47 I K, k , Todays Zaman M 3 k A S, , k A, M B E, -N M , H P A
E , k . K A k k , k48 k E . The New York Times S 8, (A: ://..//9/9///k-------.?=).
Figure 3: Migrants Smuggling Routes from Africa to Europe
Source: Migrant smuggling routes from Africa to Europe. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Organized
Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe Report, 2006
Turkey, a country
that has rediscover
its Middle Eastern
neighbours, is often
described as a mod
or as a source of
inspiration for Arabcountries.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States18
, S z j . D A x I z , k I x .49
A , M E M.
I , A M 96.H, M GCC, k N A, Iz , S A A M , E-S .5
The EU and the United States:
Readapting or Resetting Policies?
U S E , A S, z . , S
49 M A S F I ( F F) Council on Foreign Relations, A 7, .5 N, B E-S A A A O-, J 6, . B &Mk A(FIIA B , 76, M ) A C W - G .
L . N, ,, -.
EU x , , - , , , . , EU , S E , EU
M .C EU, x , EU k -k k .D E S M, EU
- - M. I, EU .
U S k , .5 k -A , E A , U.S. ,
W H, q z O 9 U.S.-A . H,U.S. , M, k
5 Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North AfricaM 9, .
The effects of this
reconfiguration of
regional alliances and
the changing spheres
f influence of the main
regional powers are
more profound in theMiddle East than in the
Maghreb.
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, M E .
U S , , : ) M EC (P U.S. ), )
U.S. , 3) I I .
Global Trends, Regional Effects
z x . A , , , , , k WM .
I , A .
A x k E .5 A , E M , E k x k .
I , k NA ( 3). P k A.Cq, x ( ) .
5 I M F. R E Ok.M E C A, M 9.
Table 3: Food Price Index (1990-2011)
Source: FAO, 2011
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
2011
2010
200
9
200
8
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
Foodp
ricei
ndex
The impact of the r
of food prices and
the popularization
new communicatio
tools during the 20
uprisings are two te
and recent examplehow global trends a
regional dynamics.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States20
E- , z .U j , . I , x L A
z - M.I , k .
I , j (- k A).
z . - Fk A Jz
. Y,
k .
A , xz M
. C ,-x , , .53 I S , x, , . ,
M A, x , , - .
F, , U S E W M. - BRICS .54 C A -
53 A -x
MEDSEC Environment andSecurity Issues in the Southern Mediterranean Region -: ://..///__.]54 S, : M, R & W, E (New Players in the Mediterranean, M P S,W: G M F; BRIC N A: C N G?
AfDB; North Africa Quarterly Analytical, .
Table 4: Internet Data (Per 100 Inhabitants)
Source: World Bank, International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
Country 2000 2005 2010
Algeria .49 5.84 .5
Morocco .6 5.8 49Libya .9 3.9 4
Tunisia .75 9.66 36.8
Mauritania .9 .67 3.
Table 5: Facebook Data (2010)
Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
Country Population Users Penetration
Algeria 34,895, 878,66 .4%
Morocco 3,85,74 ,767,38 5.6%
Libya 64, 43,96 .%
Tunisia ,486,339 ,554,76 4.9%
Mauritania . . .
High energy prices are
a necessary condition
to allow rentier states
to maintain heavily
subsidized policies
and appease social
tensions.
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M .55 Y,
Bz-A j,56 R-A ,57 S A I M .58 O BRICS , , N A x ( 6).
55 L, F (7) L C A, Rk. M , . 45-55.56 A, S & N, J (9) L B, ?, Futuribles, 359, . 3-9.57 A - R : P M,LExpression, A 7, 6; A-R : U , El Moudjahid, O 6, 58 A M W, (op. cit, . 9), I M .
W M :
; (.. k ); , , E U.S. .
Figure 4: Desertification in the Mediterranean
Source: MedSec
The United States
and Europe are no
longer the only gam
in town in the West
Mediterranean. The
so-called BRICS are
broadly regarded anew players in the
region.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States22
Table 6: North African Export Trends to the BRICS
Source: African Development Bank (AfDB), The BRICs in North Africa: Changing the Name of the Game? AfDB; North Africa QuarterlyAnalytical, n.1, p. 3
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Mediterranean 2020 23
D , ,
x, A S. A M , x [] .59I, k x .
. W M . O,
, q, . W , .
A dream-world scenario WM ,, . A , . L x, . I , k AKP x, j . M, z.S
.
N M -
59 M, A () A S, E S,BEPA monthly brief, 46, . .
j .D , W S , x, - x . S M A, x j j, - . M
W . N-A .6C N A S , .
I , E , , . N M , ,
, - M. E U , U S, N A -. S -A - -z , -- , -x,, j -
j. I , U S, EU, N A ,
6 Maghreb Regional and Global Integration: A dream to befulfilled, P I G E, WDC, O 8.
Scenarios or the WesternMediterranean in 20205
A dream-world sce
consists of the Wes
Mediterranean
becoming an area
prosperity, freedom
stability.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States24
j , , , A .
A nightmare scenario, , S R W M . , M
Table 7: Western Mediterranean, Road to 2020/Certainties and Uncertainties on
the 2020 Western Mediterranean Road
Relative Certainties Uncertainties
J j M
C I
S
I k S M
D z M E
E
F M
S E M
G
I
C/F
P/Ex I
R -
R , ,
A
Sz L -
R W S
D/I M- A
S M
S , E M
R x E
S E
S E I M
E W M
W
5+5, UM NAO M D
U.S. N A M E
E
O
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Mediterranean 2020 25
E A , . B I, , . M A ; k , , ;L , z
, A;M . Ex I SA N A S M.
( ) z , , - . A-M, W S( S M- ), , , M
S, - / M ( M Bk), A ( K), L( ).A
- . k. , , x , E.
I , E , . P x
, E k, k E U. I - , E .E M . Cq, , E, .
M A .
F, mixed z ,k , z , EU U.S. . I , , x, .
L, A, M M .
A nightmare scena
on the contrary, im
that the Southern
Rim of the Western
Mediterranean cou
become a new arch
crisis.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States26
, W S , L S j . B , . I-M , x , , ,
. H, .
W , EU U.S. A S k, , , N A. E ,
S E k. B , E , x, EU : , z . A , k M
A L A .
mixed scenario would
be characterized by
disparate political
volutions in the region,
deadlocked regional
integration, frozen
conflicts, and limitedansformative influence
of EU and U.S. policies.
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Mediterranean 2020 27
Table 8: Scenarios for Western Mediterranean 2020
Key Drivers Nightmare Scenario Mixed Scenario Dream-World Scenario
Struggle between
democratic and
reactionary
forces in the
Maghreb
-
Nx
S
O
I , S,
x
-
S L, A,
M
D
I
R z
D
Regional stability
and prospects for
integration
L , z
S MA, W
S,
C
N M S
L
W S
D
L
M S
R z L
V W S
D A-M
R
M R
EU Crisis
C E
P
R x
N
E(z SE)
E
S ( SE)
A EU
E
I
A
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States28
Key Drivers Nightmare Scenario Mixed Scenario Dream-World Scenario
Troubled
Neighborhoods
S -
S I-P z
M
S
S q ME
S x
P ME P P
Shifting regional
balance of power
(Egypt, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia,
Iran)
V / N A
B N A
R N A
EU and U.S.
policies towardsNorth Africa and
the Middle East
EU N A
U S
M E
S-
Lk EU U.S.
EU U.S.
EU US j -
D-zM
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Mediterranean 2020 29
Key Drivers Nightmare Scenario Mixed Scenario Dream-World Scenario
Global Trends
S -
F
N
S ,
O
W
S
M
E (.. )
M A L A
G
Sz
N
E M
M
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States30
W
M? O, , z , , ? , , , , . B ,
x , .
, L
, WM . , , , , I , , - , , k
, x.R EU, x ,
, z k .
EU U S , , M, W M , , . q
, ,
EU, U S, , , ,
Conclusions and Policy Implicationsor the ransatlantic Community6
OIL AND
FOOD
PRICES
INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS
ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION
EFFECTS
EMERGING POWERS
IN A MULTIPOLAR
WORLD
INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGIES
POLITICAL
TRANSITIONS
Social
demands
Civil-military
relations
New forms
of radicalism
Ethnic and
communitarian
tensions
Authoritarian
resilience
Islamist
parties
Ongoing
reforms
Constitutional
pacts
TROUBLED SAHEL
SHIFTING
REGIONAL
BALANCE
OF POWER:
Egypt,
Turkey,
Saudi Arabia
and Iran
EU/US
POLICIES
EU CRISIS
MIDDLE EASTCONFLICTS
SPILL-OVER
EFFECT
OF LYBIAN
CONFLICT
WESTERN
SAHARA
CONFLICT
SPANISH
MOROCCAN
TERRITORIAL
DISPUTES
ALGERIA
MOROCCO
RELATIONS
Figure 5: Factors Defining Western Mediterranean Security
and Cooperation Dynamics
Source: CIDOB
The successes or
frustrations of ongoing
transitions and reform
rocesses are the most
crucial factor in the
nfiguration of Western
Mediterranean securityand cooperation
dynamics for 2020.
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. S, EU , - M EU . F E M .
D , EU U S
z, , . I , k k, k , , , j .
k k , , z , , . A k .
I L - , - L, , , z,
. A k L, UN-, z A U A L, EU .
M, , M , W M E-M -A ,
x L. N EU U S M . I , U M,NAO M D, 5+5D W M
. A M A . I z ME N A . A status quo ante . W
A E , , - .
Despite its pressing
internal difficulties
the EU and the Uni
States still have som
margin of maneuve
contribute to politic
stabilization, democonsolidation, and
economic dynamis
the region.
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he Eastern Mediterranean and the Gul Region in 2020:Alternative Scenarios orthe Regional Security Environment
D. T DkD-G, H F E & F P
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T E M j G z ,
H.A P-I , Iq, I , S Y, , M z , , , .
EM G , M E, C W, 9/ U.S. Iq A. A x
. I x, k
, : q
x ( , , - I , , );
(C, I) (R) x- M, (k, I);
Introduction1
EU U S M;
q z , x, .
A , , ( I-P/A , K , C), ,
I , Iq U.S. , A .
x z x . x . G, E M, M E j
M. I x, F B M ? D M x , -, , M E, Bk, ?W x , j . A , - : E M (Mq), , WM (M), . S M - .I , k x M, E W, , j P G, /C A, -S A, H A.
The Arab revolts wi
probably cause an
exponential increas
in the regions vola
and unpredictability
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States36
k .
A k , k ( - , / , , ) .
, k 3 x:
D 4 : E, k, I,S A, I;
k : ) I-P/A ;) I G ; ) K Iq k; ) ;
F , B Bz . H
x k x , . (B Bz, P, States and Fear. An Agenda forInternational Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. NYk, 99, . 94).3 A M D D,C D C, . (Global Strategic Trend - Out to2040, S P, UK M D,4 , J , . 6) F NAO, . (Future Security Environment (FSE) 2025, SA C, , Nk, V, J7, . ) J Lj
. (J Lj,C B F -3: S F A D P, Defense & Security
Analysis, V. 7, N. , J , . 49).4 D , , . (R C, EH, P K (.), The Pivotal States, W.W. N &C, N Yk, 999, . 4).
H : ) W ; ) x ; ) j ;
C x-: U S, EU, R, C, I. Cq , ;
S : ) z , -, ; ) ( z); ) ( /); ) (,); ) / (-S A); ) z. D ()-() ;
G (.. I I ; ; j; j -- ; , .)
A z , :) H (
); ) H ( ); 3) E( ).
here is an obvious link
with global trends and
changes.
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Mediterranean 2020 37
[Relevant] Global rends*
T x k U.S.
,5 U S primus inter
pares, C ( j US x ), I, J, EU, . I ,
q . A G7/8 G, k G (US C). CHIMERICA U S C z .6 A , modus vivendi . A
, M E.
,7
5 BRIC(S) ( Bz, R, I, C, S A) G S . , , .6 Strategic Trends 2011: Key developments in global affairs (.D Mk, : M H, P M,D Mk, R P), C S S, EHZ, , . .7 D , ( k, ,-z , , , []k, ( Lj, .49-5).
[ ].8 x. N , RP/ , , , .
D . G 7 k x 8 5. I -, 98.4 k , x j: I, C ( ),9 Pk, N,B, I. A , , E,
8 EU I S S (EU-ISS), Global Governance2025: At a Critical Juncture, P, , . ; R H -, , - . ( Lj . 54).9 C . xC 975; 35 C . (, .7) HBj z , ? (N E, D I,Foreign Affairs, V. 89, N. 6, N/D , . 59)F , Jk A.G, N P B. F M W C W, Foreign Affairs, V. 89, . ,J/F , . 3-43. FSE 5, . 65; EU-ISS, . 5; E x , -S A, B Pk k (E, . 56).
2
Ambitious regional
powers will cause
turbulence and ten
in various parts of t
world, the Middle E
included.
* NAO . Cq, () (FSE 5, . ). A DCDC, (Global Strategic Trends- Out to 2040, . 6).
8/3/2019 Mediterranean 2020: The Future of Mediterranean Security and Politics
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States38
. 44 5.
A 98 34 E 33 J, 3 47 E, 5 J, 39 U S ( 37 ). A , M E, x, ( I 7 3).3
O k
(, , k ). , x k [ .6 k q ]. B 5, 3 , -OECD .4 W - . D 8,43 x .5 I J R.
, , , , . A , , - .6 x Fk . F,
J C. G, G & Ez F,
2010 State of the Future, M Pj, WD.C., , . 4. C C & J G (.), Global Forecast 2011.International security in a time of uncertainty, CSIS, . 4.3 FSC 5, . 65.4 EU-ISS, . 53; 2010 State of the Future, . 4 & 4.5 C & G, . 6.6 Ibid, . 48.
, - x k x.
A , , x , k, . G q k k
.
7
Exk,-- k, x 8 z .9 S .
E , , . -x , q , k , . H, x ,, .
A , . : M E, N7 EU-ISS, . 9.8 C & G, . 4.9
S x, P. W. S, Wired for War. The RoboticsRevolution and Conflict in the 21stCentury, P P,N Yk, 9. U.K. P O S ,
Adapting to climate change in developing countries, O6, . . J P & P O, S I C C, The Washington Quarterly, 3:, W7/8, . 5-6.
Environmental issues
will increasingly affect
economic, social, and
political developments
throughout the world.
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Mediterranean 2020 39
A, S z, S A, CA, A (j , B, Pk,I, C) P, L A( A Az) C, G Mx, A.
G A C G C, World inTransition: Climate Change as a Security Risk, B, 7, . 7;D G Z, ClimateChange and Security Challenges for German DevelopmentCooperation, E, A 8, . 7; Climate Change and
International Security, P H R E C E C (S3/8),4 M 8, . 6-8.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States40
Domestic Developments and Foreign Policies
of Pivotal Regional States: Egypt, Turkey,
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran
T A k ( x E,
k Mk x, ). z (
x q ) . A E S , WM : S RS C A U, A , , , , , ,
.3
A A , M E z , x . C , , S S A I. L- ,
, q W A ( )
3 E S I L, The Western Mediterranean in 2020:Scenarios for regional security and cooperation after the Arabuprisings, GMFUS, , 6.
. A k 4 zM.
Egypt k 5 A . E M E.6 I, E ,
-- W I, I ,
. B E A, G , SA S S I. I , , E . , E .7
Iran M E.I , S Hz, j ; ; . H,
4 I , , , / (N , State (un)Sustainability inthe Southern Mediterranean and Scenarios to 2030: The EUsResponse, MEDPRO P P . /A , . 3).5 A N , M E E . I -A k I k (, . 7).6 C & G, . 64 & 66.7 I k .
Main Drivers in the Middle East3
As a result of the Arab
revolts, todays Middle
East can be compared
to a seismic faultline
which will continue to
produce tremors of
unpredictable size invarious parts of the
region, at least for the
next few years.
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Mediterranean 2020 41
3, I x . I A , z k .F, W, , x Hz H, I. I x
x ( ), . , x I , q -k . Q I , : k k ;
, , V- q( j) ; I -- , I, W, k ( ) E.
A Israel ,
O A( , U.S.-I U.S. ), N P
k I .8 A E ( J)
-- I W. F I -: ) P , k , k I x , .. (
M I P x) ) I ( A I).
K A Saudi Arabia , ( z).
A H S /, x . U B SA GCC , - . D I S A , B . A , W , q
I . S A k x ,
8 A Kz S B k I (A Kz & SB, I R Sk in Strategic Survey forIsrael 2011, INSS, -A, , . ).
King Abdullahs
succession in Saud
Arabia will not
necessarily be a
smooth process, an
the country has alr
been faced with sosocial tension.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States42
x E (A) k , C (, x, I) S x W.
Turkeys - z . P A D,
AKP ,q k O x/ k ME, Bk, . UAk , ( ) M ( -x I ).
S q AKP k I- K - k , , W ( k?). k -x (..
j), . j k k W , EU ,
E k . Kq k E I x k , I, k , K .
Regional Conflicts
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
P , I-P ,
, , M E. I , , M j j(). :
. A - (C-D
[], , S P I, GI, .). A M F (MNF) . P I, S, L x
Important Variables for
the Palestinian Problem
L Hz I ( S?)
S
H
U.S.
D I ( x )
If not resolved in a
mutually acceptable
and viable manner,
[the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict] will continue
to cause tension and
suffering in all partiesinvolved, and to be
used by radicals in
the Muslim world as a
stifying cause for their
jihad(s).
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Mediterranean 2020 43
M E P . - [] ;
. C status quo. A k ;
3. S . F , P k x , k I ,
. S 3 M E , I.
Gulf Security29
R I , W I . G M E q x: , ,
. Wk, , (Iq,L, P) -x k E, k S A, , I.3 B G , Iq Y, GCC I, U.S. , GCC 9 F G , The GCCCountries and the World: Scenarios to 2025. x ( F G, S, O) q: () () .3 A, D, C, S, F, S & S,Azz,Middle East Perspectives, G P N.4,G C S P, G, 8.
.
O Iq. U.S. Iq . A , Iq . O :
Important Variables for Stability in Iraq
k K N Iq;
I Iq;
D U.S. ;
D I S A
The Kurdish Issue
K
. 5 3 , k, Iq, I, S. K . K N Iq j k q . I j .D k K
Iq, Ak K K k K. , x, K I S.
Regional security
problems are not li
to the Iranian nucle
issue, although this
perceived by Weste
countries and some
of Irans neighborsbeing the most pre
security concern.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States44
Iq , ( K ), I . , -W, -W. Iq ;
Iq . K jde facto , de
jure Iq. I , . -W. Iq q ;
Iq . K , - . I -W,
I . A K / K ( k).
New Types of Conflict
I , ME. F x, ( N -/ ), S-S ,
- .3
Hard Security Threats/Risks
WMD Proliferation
D I q . AI x, I N ,
3 S x, G D, Climate Wars, O,Ox, . A, J Mz, Climate Conflict, IISS/R, .
Figure 1: Areas of Physical and Economic Water Scarcity
Dealing with Irans
nuclear file is
undoubtedly the
most critical strategic
question in the
proliferation field and
a very important issuen todays international
security agenda.
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Mediterranean 2020 45
.
k q I q . I , , k x k -k. z I , ,
. z, I , E, S A, k ( ) .3 A q k , I
k q . O Iz k k.
I.I q I - k k-k. q I z
I, I , / W 3 C B , , I k SA, E x 4 I . (C B, Rethinking Iran: From Confrontationto Cooperation, C P , A 8, EU-ISS,P).
. I I ? A k , ,
I.R H q I . A I - ? A k U S, E, I, I ?
C x I q . I
- (NWS) , , k x NWS . , , . W x ,
Important Variables
R G
D I k GCC
S P A key issue remain
of course, whether
deterrence will be
sufficient to ensure
restraint in the cas
Iran.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States46
. O , .33
( ) . k -k C3I -- q
. A k , k .
W I z? I I , q ( ), q k z. I , , k ?
( ) :
. P I . I . A, I q
33 A E K (K, E(.), Israel and a Nuclear Iran. Implications for Arms Control,Deterrence and Defense, M 94, INSS, J 8) I z x k , z I , . k I I , x, , , .
, , W I , ;
. I ( U.S. ?) z I . H G I . I ;
3. z, I q .U I I. A , . z.
R , I (CW) CW SCUD
B . I x (BW) , , BW . S VX. BW R& D . I, . I CW E.
M F, S S
However small the
risk of each individual
scenario may be, one
ould also consider the
umulative risk of all the
ossible dangers arising
from assumed nuclearproliferation.
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Mediterranean 2020 47
x .34
Iq (A-A A-H) - . A , SCUD-B -C, I k S-3 , NK , , k.A IISS M B, S 94+ FROG, SS-, SCUD B/C/D , x 85 . I ,
x J , k 5, k.
O 7 (4 , E, I, I, S) 75, - , k. A , - : q, , q
.35
, I A - , U.S.- PARIO , NAO x ( I ).
34 I , . I , q q
. G W, NBC .35 D G, H A C-M, Survival, V. 4, N. , S 998, . 93 & 95; MkS, A M P G L& Bk S (), Fighting Proliferation - EuropeanPerspectives, C P N. 66, EU-ISS, P, D3, . 6-8.
Military Expenditures and the Possibility
of a Conventional Arms Race
S 96, q A-I , M M E GNP q . I -99, , q. D x
4 -9 9 $3 . N, z GCC .
W x I, k,S M j ( ), k - k . W x, -- ,
, , C4I , , , . .A W , M M E q S U/E . A k M M E,I
q R, C, N K,
With the exception
Israel, and perhaps
Turkey, Southern
Mediterranean stat
do not have a powe
projection capabilit
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States48
. I ,- , , - . x x .36
A , M M E ,
z . I q q x q ( ). I , , .
Jihadist Terrorism
A Q U.S. 9/ j . x j I x z , A-Q j z I 37 M I
36 q SIPRI Yk M B IISS. F q , Dk, A R M Med.2008, IEMED-CIDOB, B, 8,. 68-7.37 Strategic Trends 2011, . 9.
k .38
k O-L. , j x W.39 , , / M E, k q .
Changing Role and Influence of Extra-Regional
Actors: United States, EU, Russia, China,
and IndiaC M E . C - A G .4 R , I x k . F , C, x, I , U.S. . B
. A ,
C G , I N M A 9, C - G Pk4 5 S Hz, j k-C
38 W MC, A Q C, Foreign Affairs,S/O , . .39 S x, IISS, Strategic Survey 2011, . 5-53.4 I C 5
M E. C M E x - x- 3, 7 8 . j I q .(Strategic Trends 2011, . 5 & 64); Ez E, G C: C W C F P R,Foreign Affairs, V. 89, N. 6, N/D , .4.4 Strategic Trends 2011, . 65.
It is argued by several
analysts that Jihadist
terrorism should no
onger be perceived as
an existential threat to
Western security.
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Mediterranean 2020 49
x . A , U S EU ( G, EU q , E M).4
O EU . I , EU , x , EU
. . EU . EU U k, M , . I , EU , N , -- M E. U M
, .N S M q k.
4 EU-ISS x EU : ) k , ) , 3) Ex, 4) : (EU-ISS, . 4-5). V Lj EU: ) EU , j U S. A , ; ) U U S; 3) U ;4) U ; 5) EUx z, ( Lj . 5). S , Project Europe 2030,Challenges and Opportunities, A E C R G F EU 3, M.
U S A M. I M . A, :
. U S P . I ,, M E M j ;
. U S P
G. I j , US ;
3. A U.S. R I . U S M E.
I ,
, , M E - W ( , ) j M E .
Soft Security Drivers
Demographic Trends and Population Movements
D E
z E , . I,E - k x 5 E . EU -
The wider Middle E
gradually evolving i
a multiplayer secur
system and the We
concept which prob
needs redefinition,
anyway) may have adjust to a new rea
where its influence
the Middle East wil
decline.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States50
6 M, N A. I x N A M E
[] k EU G , , . NA M E j 4 99 5 .43 D z, , k j ( M M). , , .
43 G W, The Role of NATOs Mediterranean Initiative,G P, I., N Yk & L, , . .
Natural Resources
. O j . C - k, M
E . E ME , . I ,
j , k S-S N-S.44
I, q W ME x k .45
44 A I L , , , M x . I M - . I . (IL, Security and Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean,
ELIAMEP P P N 5, A, 5, . 4).45 A A C, M E x. (AC, Evolving Threats in the Middle East: TheirImplications for U.S. Defense Planning, ME A P H A SC, S 8, 5, . ).
Table 1: Populations of ajor Mediterranean Countries
Country 1960 2000 2025
Greece 8.3 .5 .France 45.7 58.8 6.8Italy 5. 58. 56.Spain 3.5 39.6 4.6Portugal 8.8 9.9 .Total Mediterranean North 43.5 76.7 77.9Morocco .6 3.7 47.5Algeria .8 3.7 5.8unisia 4. 9.8 3.4Libya .3 6.4 .9Egypt 5.9 64.8 93.5urkey 7.5 68. 9.9Syria 6.4 7 34Total Mediterranean South 87.7 3.3 346.
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1993, World Development Report 1994
One of the most critical
geopolitical questions
haunting the West is
whether the Middle
East will be a reliable
supplier of oil and gas
ports at market drivenprices.
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Mediterranean 2020 51
, . O , M E
x x. I , E , NAO ( EU) .
A
- . x z I C
S M E .
Climate Change
I , x , , , , , .46 -.47 I j M E , , - /.
46 W Bk 75-8 , , , 3, $75 $4 -
. EU $3 - (The State of theFuture 2010, . 67).47 W , , , (J P & P O, S I C C, The Washington Quarterly, 3:, W7/8, . 6).
Figure 2: Crude Oil (2007)
Table 2: Per Capita Availability of Water
Country 1990
(m3/per
capita/
year)*
2025
(estimate)
Algeria 75 38
Libya 6 6
Morocco , 68
Tunisia 53 33
Egypt ,7 6
Israel 47 3
Jordan 6 8
Lebanon ,6 96
Saudi Arabia 6 5Cyprus ,9 ,
United States 9,94 8,6
Canada 9,389 9,88*M q , 3/ /.
It is projected that p
of the Middle East
be affected by clim
change in terms of
desertification and
production, availab
of water resources,environmentally-ind
refugees/migrants.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States52
Cyber-Warfare, Organized Crime,
and Maritime Security
A C H , C k , , C , C .48Cyber-warfare , , q M E, k. SUXNE I
48 P K, D L, D C, CYk, On Cyber Warfare, A C H R, N, . . S , R Ck & R Kk, CyberWar. The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do AboutIt, HC, N Yk, .
x , . O , - - z .
transnational organized
crime ( $5-9 ) .
q j
M E x . , k.
A S R S I O , , , maritime security,
EU . A , M M 5 , 5 , k
Source: Climate Change: Addressing the Impact on Human Security, ELIAMEP Policy Paper, May
2008, p. 61
Figure 3: Conflict Constellations in Selected Hotspots
Although it can be
argued that piracy in
the Southern Red Sea
and the Indian Ocean
is, for the time being,
more a nuisance than a
eal threat for maritimecommerce, there is
increasing concern
bout maritime security,
especially among EU
countries.
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Mediterranean 2020 53
, , q .49 S - .
Fragile and Failed States
, , , zq j . I , k ( x, A /A-Q ). -S A .5 I , - , . I , S, . O ME , , Y, x, , ,
.5 A Gz. O ,
.
Globalization
Gz 5 q , x,
49 Maritime security in the Mediterranean: Challenges and policyresponses, SDA D , J , . .5 J Mz, Climate Conflict, .87-8.5 S, x, S P, Yemen and the Politics ofPermanent Crisis, IISS/R, Ox, J .5 IISS News, D , . 8.
.53
B C () G () z z M E: (I) (M E), . k , , , z.54 A z , (Fk, ,
, A-Jz, A-A) A S .
53 U MEDPRO j, S M 3 GDP 3 ( , 9 k I). R A & C S, What scenarios for theEuro-Mediterranean in 2030 in the wake of the post-Arab spring?, MEDPRO P P N. /O .54 B, The Pentagons New Map. War and Peace inthe 21stCentury, P, N Yk, 4, . 49 & 93.
The emergence of
fragile, unstable,
dysfunctional, or
failed states can ha
important destabili
consequences not
beyond their bordebut also in adjacen
regions.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States54
T .W k ,
q . Ex , I I, ( I,
), j - q, k k , j ( x, - ), .O k .
Game Changers4
The Road to 2020
Relative Certainties Uncertainties
P
P E
P ,
N W
C q
M E A
R U S EU
I C(+I?)
J j (A S )
D
C : I-P ,K , Iq, I
L
P z*
S S A I
R I -W
* R H k (R H, A S , Financial Times, J 6, ).
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Three Scenarios for Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East in 20201
Key Drivers Hell Earth Heaven
Domestic
developments and
foreign policies of key
regional states: Egypt,
Turkey, Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Iran
V / k
, k
S , , k -W
Regional conicts: 1)
Israeli-Palestinian/
Arab conict; 2) the
Iranian problem and
security in the Gulf
region; 3) the Kurdish
issue and resulting
problems of stability
in Iraq and Turkey; 4)
new conicts
S I-P;
L G ; Iq k;
k K ;
W , , .
C q P;
H G ;
k Iq q;
K ;
W , ,
V P;
D G;
Iq K ;
N
Hard security threats:
1) WMD proliferation;
2) conventional arms
race; and 3) terrorism
I z;
N ;
Q q zq;
R J
Cz I k; I ;
H x ;
J
P I ;I ;
L x;
J
A R A & C S:. Iz E-M . S EU-M U ( k k )3. E-M (k )4. S - EU-M - ( ) (A & S . ).
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States56
Key Drivers Hell Earth Heaven
Changing role and
inuence of extra-
regional actors: United
States, EU, Russia,
China, India, GCC,*
and NATO
EU ( )x;
United States I
; China
G ;
Russia India W ;
Lk x ; Z
- ; C ;
Oz kNATO GCC
EU: B (.. );
United States I P ;
G Chinese ;
L Russia India; ;
L NATO GCC
EU NP -- M E;
United States P
M E; W-
j :China, Russia,
India W ;
GCC
Gulf;
NATO P G
* GCC J M j C. A, IISS, GCC A (IISS, S S , . 58).
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Key Drivers Hell Earth Heaven
Soft security drivers:
organized crime,
cyber-warfare,
maritime security;
demographic trends
and population
movements
impact of climate
change on already
fragile ecosystems
natural resources failed/dysfunctional
states
pace and impact of
globalization
Oz ,-, ;
Mj ;
S ;
M E ;
S q ;
S / ;
N
Oz ,-, ;
P EU;
U (, );
N /;
Gz
Oz ,-, ;
A N & S k;
S ;
E ;
M ;
N /
; N
k-z
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States58
J j k
. F, - q, , k x . W , , k (x ,, j x
) ME . R , , x, , . I .
I, x - q. I , q : W
? W U S, EU, NAO, z ? A ?F, k /j ?
A
, :
A . F
E U S;
S, , , - M M E S E ( - M , , ).
EU U ;
R P ;
W j I , . O
;
I k , G. B . I x, x- ;
I ,
( ) ;
I x G , k
Conclusion5
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I , , q G M E.
M E .
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