Guillermo Larrain R.
Superintendente
Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros
Chile
Longevity risks in Pension Systems
viewed from the pay-out phase in
Chile
Sao Paulo, Mayo 2008
I. Hard facts: longevity is a world wide
phenomena.
II. Consequences: longevity affects all pension
systems:
• DB/DC,
• PAYG/Capitalization,
• Closed/Open
III. Looking for solutions in the Chilean DB
payout phase
Agenda
Ageing, an international comparison
Ageing is affecting all.
Chile is ageing relatively more
Life expectancy at birth (both genders)
Mortality Tables for pensioners in Chile :
2004 vs 1985
Tablas de mortalidad rentistas hombres
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
50 60 70 80 90 100
Años
QxRV2004 H
RV 85 H
Tablas de mortalidad rentistas mujeres
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
50 60 70 80 90 100
Años
Qx
RV2004 M
RV 85 M
Tablas de mortalidad beneficiarios
hombres
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Años
Qx
B 2006 H
B 85 H
Tablas de mortalidad beneficiarios mujeres
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Años
Qx
B 2006 M
B 85 M
Mortality Tables for beneficiaries in Chile:
2006 vs 1985
Tablas de mortalidad inválidos hombres
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 100109
Años
Qx
MI 2006 H
MI 85 H
Tablas de mortalidad inválidos mujeres
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
0,80
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101
Años
Qx
MI 2006 M
MI 85 M
Mortality Tables for disabled persons in Chile:
2006 vs 1985
Life expectancy at each age in Chile:
a gender issue appears
Edad
RV-85 RV-2004 Diferencia RV-85 RV-2004 Diferencia
45 32,71 35,17 2,46 37,79 42,48 4,69
50 28,36 30,71 2,35 33,16 37,67 4,51
60 20,29 22,12 1,83 24,32 28,38 4,06
65 16,65 18,16 1,51 20,21 24,04 3,83
70 13,34 14,56 1,22 16,36 19,83 3,47
Edad
B-85 B-2006 Diferencia B-85 B-2006 Diferencia
45 30,28 35,31 5,03 35,55 40,82 5,27
50 26,07 30,83 4,76 31,01 36,13 5,12
60 18,41 22,21 3,80 22,44 27,12 4,68
65 15,04 18,24 3,20 18,52 22,88 4,36
70 12,05 14,61 2,56 14,9 18,87 3,97
Edad
MI-85 MI-2006 Diferencia MI-85 MI-2006 Diferencia
45 23,79 25,04 1,25 29,25 31,83 2,58
50 21,18 21,97 0,79 26 28,51 2,51
60 15,97 16,72 0,75 19,52 21,84 2,32
65 13,43 14,3 0,87 16,34 18,48 2,14
70 10,96 11,88 0,92 13,22 15,15 1,93
Esperanza de vida según tabla de mortalidad
Rentistas hombres Rentistas Mujeres
Esperanza de vida según tabla de mortalidad
Inválidos Hombres Inválidos Mujeres
Esperanza de vida según tabla de mortalidad
Beneficiarios Hombres Beneficiarios Mujeres
Pensioners Male Female
Male Female
Male Female
Beneficiaries
Disabled
Increase in life expectancy at age
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Male
Fe
ma
le
Beneficiaries
Pensioners
DisabledAge group (increasing)
Conclusions: Women on top
45°
Preliminary conclusions
• Ageing is universal
• It is more acute in countries like Chile
• It may have more impact in rich countries because they had developed more generous PAYG pension systems
• Two broad conclusions: – Retirement age is critical in view of ageing
populations
– Women appear to outpace men's ageing. Huge gender issue with vast implications (social, political, economic, etc…)
I. Hard facts: longevity is a world wide
phenomena.
II. Consequences: longevity affects all pension
systems:
• DB/DC,
• PAYG/Capitalization,
• Closed/Open
III. Looking for solutions in the Chilean DB
payout phase
Agenda
Impact on Pay-as-you-go pension systems
Increasing
dependency ratios
require:
• Increasing state
financing (to be
financed by taxes or
reducing other
expenditures)
• Increasing personal
contributions
Source: SVS, based on INE
Ageing progresses without clear bound and birth rates stall, hence
The previous process is unbound: enormous fiscal pressure whose
political economy is complex (tendency to delay decisions evident)
Dependency ratios
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
19
50
19
60
19
70
19
80
19
90
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
20
35
20
40
20
45
20
50
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Old age
Overall
0-14 years
(% pop, right axis)
Impact on Capitalization pension systems
Pensions are diminished (for any size of personal savings, it is necessary
to finance more years of survival): the buffer becomes people´s pensions
instead of public finances… or so it seems at first glance
Phase I : accumulation
Retirement
age
Phase II : Payout
Interphase
Lifetime
This is a system. As such, the outcome depends on all of its parts
Impact on Capitalization pension systems
Net savings
Life expectancy
at retirement
Pension =
Personal contributions (size, frequency,
starting age)
Financial returns in accumulation phase
Costs
Operational during accumulation phase
Transactional in the interphase of
acc/payout
Operational during payout phase
Financial returns in payout phase
Employers contributions (matching)
State contributions (incentives)
Retirement age
The ongoing pension reform in Chile took care of all of this
elements plus a critical redefinition of the zero-first pillar
Trayectoria de la pensión en Retiro Programado (fuente: SAFP)
Líneas verticales expectativas de vida: --- RV85 y RV 2004
Estimated effects of ageing on
programmed withdrawals in Chile (DC)
Consequences for Life Insurance Companies
(annuity providers, DB)
Spreads are reduced inducing LICs to look for ways of
compensation
Potential increase in investment risks
Incentive to reduce operational costs:
potential market concentration
Increase in capital and reserve requirements to face increased
pension obligations
Increased competition may induced “commercial war” with
unintended consequences on undesired practices
I. Hard facts: longevity is a world wide
phenomena.
II. Consequences: longevity affects all pension
systems:
• DB/DC,
• PAYG/Capitalization,
• Closed/Open
III. Looking for more solutions in the Chilean DB
payout phase
Agenda
Individual Voluntary Savings
Scheme (APV)
• Tax incentive (suitable
therefore only for
income tax payers:
upper middle class)
• More financial
institutions allowed
• Attractive liquidity
feature : unless
mandatory savings,
APV can be consumed
before retirement.
• Taxes are paid when
consumption takes
place
1. Promote voluntary savings:
Individual (APV)
-
100.000
200.000
300.000
400.000
500.000
600.000
Mar-02
May-02
Jul-02
Sep-02
Nov-02
Ene-03
Mar-03
May-03
Jul-03
Sep-03
Nov-03
Ene-04
Mar-04
May-04
Jul-04
Sep-04
Nov-04
Ene-05
Mar-05
May-05
Jul-05
Sep-05
Nov-05
Ene-06
Mar-06
May-06
Jul-06
Sep-06
Nov-06
Ene-07
Mar-07
May-07
Jul-07
Sep-07
Nov-07
-
500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
3.500
4.000
4.500
Número de cuentas Saldo acumulado (MMUS$)
Number of accounts
Balances
Colective Voluntary Savings Scheme (APVC, just introduced)
• Tax incentive with liquidity feature as in APV
• Financial institutions allowed as in APV
2. Promote voluntary savings:
Collective (APVC)
New features
• Matching contribution from employer, tax deductible
• All APVC plans offered to employees are open to them: no
discrimination permitted
• Worker has rights over her savings and earns the right over the
matching contribution after some time. Possible use as an
incentive device to promote permanence in the firm (hence,
training, productivity…)
• Minimum number of workers within the firm must adhere to any
savings plan to make the firm eligible for tax benefit: this
grants access to lower middle classes
3. Tougher conditions for early retirement
Tougher conditions for early retirement and use of excedent of free
disposal.
Early retirement.
• Before 2004: resulting pension should be 110% of minimum pension and
greater than the 50% of the last 10 years income.
• After 2004: same criteria but new parameters 150% of minimum pension
and 70% of last 10 years income..
Excedent of free disposal.
• Antes de 2004: Igual que retiro de ELD
• Ley Año 2004: Igual que retiro de ELD
Gradually increase in legal retirement age,
still a possibility for the future
Diminish asymmetries of information, promote healthier
competition reducing fees charged : the SCOMP system
4. The challenge of the interphase:
The SCOMP system
Objective: promote a clear and comparable market for annuities and
other retirement products
Electronic market for Life Insurance Companies, Pension Fund
Administrators, Brokers
Blind quotation mechanism: each LIC compete for providing the best
possible annuity to an unknown client
Client can iterate (even organizing an auction among providers) or
postpone decision (except in case of auction)
Joint supervision: SVS - SAFP
Started 19 de agosto de 2004.
3. Diminish asymmetries of information, promote healthier
competition reducing fees charged : the SCOMP system
4. The challenge of the interphase:
The SCOMP system
3,89
%
5,91
%
2,19
%
2,16
%
2,13
%
2,13
%
2,47
%
2,68
%
2,67
%
5,84
%5,
45%
5,33
%
5,58
%
4,66
%
4,67
%
3,47
%
3,62
%
3,40
%
0,00%
1,00%
2,00%
3,00%
4,00%
5,00%
6,00%
7,00%
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Feb 200
8
Solicitud
de Ofertas
AFP o CSV o
Corredor RV o
Asesor Previsional
SCOMP Certificado
Electrónico
Saldo
Montos RP,
Bono, Proyección
Ofertas
Formulario Solicitud de Ofertas
AFP
origen
Inicio
Trámite
Certificado Saldo
Certificado de Ofertas
Consultante Solicitud de Ofertas
+
Certificado de Saldo
CSVn
AFPn
7
4
5 6
1 2
2 2
3
4. Working of the SCOMP
8 Oferta Externa de RV
9 Remate
AFP
Compañía de Seguros
Corredor, Asesor Previsional
AFP
CIAS. SEGUROS
Solicita Oferta
Envío Antecedentes del
potencial pensionado
Recepción Ofertas de
Montos de Pensiones
Certificado de Ofertas de
Montos de Pensiones
TRABAJADOR
POTENCIAL PENSIONADO
SISTEMA
4. Working of the SCOMP
Better risk-adjusted returns on assets
• More flexible approach focused on financial and operational risks. It should allow investments on more variable income instruments looking for a better risk-return profile
• Hedging instruments desirable
• Critical good governance of LICs
• Risk based capital requirements
5. New Investment Regime for
Life Insurance Companies
Differed Annuity.
• It allows to fix the terms of an annuity during the working life period. This annuity, coupled with other pension products will consist in the final pension.
• It transfers longevity risk to the insurer
• It allows future pensioners to take advantage of good market conditions for buying annuities. It requires significant financial advise.
6. Potential new pension products :
Differed Annuity
Inflation protection
• In Chile annuities are indexed to inflation measured by
the Consumer Price Index
• Consumption bundle of retired persons eventually
coincide with the average worker (relevant for CPI
purposes) but it gradually moves significanly away from it
as the person gets older
• The older the person, less relevant is CPI as relevant
measure of inflation
• Challenge:
• Create a Pensioner Price Index
• Design a market for instruments linked to this:
government, private companies (health institutions,…)
including derivatives or outright subsidies
7. Potential new pension products :
Bonds indexed to relevant inflation
8. Potential new pension products
Longevity Bonds
A longevity bond promises a yearly payment indexed to a mortality index
which replicated the behavior of the pensioners
Pago del Bono
(CLP bn)
Años
-
2
4
6
8
10
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 etc
• LICs would obtain an instrument to hedge against longevity risk.
Indexation could consider size of payments or maturity of the
instrument
• Hedge is adequate, even though not perfect as it relies on
average mortality, not LIC specific
• Issuer
• Must have interest in exposing itself to this kind of risk
• Derivative market desirable
• Transfer longevity risk to a reinsurer.
• Calculation of official mortality tables critical: Which entity will do
it? Public or private? How frequent?
8. Potential new pension products
Longevity Bonds
Guillermo Larrain R.
Superintendente
Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros
Chile
Longevity risks in Pension Systems
viewed from the pay-out phase in
Chile
Sao Paulo, Mayo 2008
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