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Hermeneutical Understanding in Collingwood and Gadamer
Patricia Ussyk
Master of Arts in Political Philosophy
University of York
Department of Politics
2011
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Collingwood and Gadamer appear to have many interests in common. They both seem to be
concerned with the task of understanding and they both also observed its direct connection with
self-knowledge. Moreover, both thinkers were committed to explaining the understanding of mean-
ing in a way that does not result in psychologism or solipsism. The key point of interception between
Gadae ad Colligoods thought is, ithout a dout, the logi of question and answer. Gada-
es ephasis o the ipotae of uestio ad ase is, as he adits, deepl ooted i the
thought of .G. Colligood; the Gea autho hiself paised Colligoods peeptio of the
essential role of question and answer to the mission of understanding. And although Collingwood
never used the term hermeneutics, one cannot ignore that his depiction of the logic of question and
answer (LQA) as an on-going process of inquiry carries hermeneutical characteristics. Furthermore,
one a lai that the olligoodia LQA shouldt e see eel as a logial sste ut as a
dialectic process of knowledge and self-osiousess. As desied Mik, Colligoods LQA is
not a theory of logic at all, in any ordinary sense of that term, nor is it even a theory of semantics; it
is a hermeneutics MINK : . Hoee, Gadae has ot ol paises fo Colligood. His
itiis of the Eglish thikes theo of eeatet sees to put the to authos apat. Gada-
mer claimed that Collingwood did not have a clear perception of the important balance between
past and present in what he called the fusion of horizons and for that reason, as the German author
laied, Colligood fell ito histoiis. But afte Colligoods idea of eeactment is truly un-
destood, it eoes lea that Gadaes itiiss ae i fat ooted i a fe isudestadigs
and that the two authors have more similarities than originally thought; furthermore, it shows that
hermeneutical understanding is more preset i Colligoods thought tha it a hae appeaed
at first glance.
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Collingwood and the Logic of Question and Answer
Colligoods Logi of Questio ad Ase plas a essetial ole i his ideas. I hisAuto-
biography, Collingwood makes it clear that knowledge is not constituted by propositions and judge-
ments alone; in order to truly reach the meaning of something, the proposition must be understood
with the question that it claimed to answer. What he means to say is that one cannot understand
the meaning of what was said or written if he interprets them solely as it appears in writing or spo-
ken words; rather, it must be clear that such statements were always (consciously or not) originally
meant as answers to questions (COLLINGWOOD 1939: 30-2). Colligoods e outlook o logi
as ideed a ioatie oe: it affied that tuth is ot a set of popositios ut complexes con-
sisting of questions and answers; hih ultiatel eas that popositios aot e tue o false
in themselves, rather, the a ol e a ight o og ase to a speifi uestio. The ight
ase, i Colligoods aout, is the oe that allos oe to otiue ith the iuisitie po-
cess (COLLINGWOOD 1939: 37). Through this interpretation, there cannot be contradictions among
statements unless they are answering the same question. Nonetheless, as Louis Mink intelligently
oseed, Colligoods LQA should ot e osideed as a atual sustitute fo taditioal foal
logi: The question-and-answer complex is a model, not of a logical system of interrogative and
indicative sentences, but of stages in the process of inquiry or of active thought in general MINK
1969: 131). The collingwoodian model characterised by Mink matches a dialectic process and it cer-
tainly puts Colligoods ideas i a heeeutial eal.
The ipotae of uestioig i udestadig is peset thoughout Colligoods oks.
As a fist eaple of his heeeutial appoah, let us tu to a fe of Colligoods eaks i
Speculum Mentis. In this work, he distinguishes knowing from asserting; the process of knowing is
based on the interrogation of what is already known in the present; additionally, Collingwood claims,
it is a foad ad ope oeet a perpetual revision of the answer.Meanwhile, understanding
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is always a retrospective activity. Such a distinction is not often made; but, as it is affirmed by Col-
ligood, it aot e fogotte that it is only when the knower looks back over his shoulder at the
road he has travelled, that he identifies knowledge with assertion COLLINGWOOD : .
Knowledge that is printed in books, Collingwood says, can be identified with assertion as it is finished
and dead but can only be truly understood if it is perceived as a discovery from the past, as answers
to questions ( COLLINGWOOD 1924: 80). One can clearly see from these statements that Colling-
wood gave great importance to the dialectic process involved in the practice of thinking that, as he
perceived in the case of intellectual history, involved not only looking at documents and propositions
as mere series of statements but as the means of recovering their corresponding question and
heefoth, disoeig thei eaig. As he ephasises: Information may be the body of
knowledge, but questioning is its soul COLLINGWOOD : .
Aothe eaple of Colligoods heeeutial appoah to the LQA a e foud i An
Essay on Philosophical Method. While eplaiig the oelap of philosophial oepts i lasses
and the scale of forms, he clarifies that concepts do not stand independently of each other but over-
lap in a series that is developed progressively, in which each level relates to its predecessor (JOHN-
SON 1998: 27). As Collingwood puts it:
philosophy does not, like exact or empirical science, bring us to know things of
which we were simply ignorant, but brings us to know in a different way things which
we already knew in some way; and indeed it follows from our own hypothesis; for if
the species of a philosophical genus overlap, the distinction between the known and
the unknown, which in a non-philosophical subject-matter involves a difference be-
tween two mutually exclusive classes of truths, in a philosophical subject-matter im-
plies that we may both know and not know the same thing; a paradox which disap-
pears in the light of the notion of a scale of forms of knowledge, where coming to
ko eas oig to ko i a diffeet ad ette a.(COLLINGWOOD cited
by HOGAN 1987: 268)
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constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it operatesGADAME : . The
pejudie agaist pejudie, affied Gadae, is ahoed o Desates idea of ethod that pom-
ised to protect reason from all error by upholding doubt towards all authority; hence, to trust au-
thoit epeseted the aadoet of usig oes o easo GADAME : . I ejetio
to the Elighteets total epudiatio of taditio ad pejudie, Gadae agai follos
Heidegges thoughts. Whe describing the way in which understanding is achieved, Heidegger clari-
fies that one is always projecting when trying to understand an object (or text); the subject always
has prior expectations regarding the meaning of the object, and the task of understanding consists
ultimately in the process of working out our preunderstandings and finding out what the text or
ojet is tig to sa. As it is desied Guigo, Heidegge held that any interpretation must
start out from some preunderstanding[] ad itwill interpret particular passages in the light of the
prior grasp of the whole. It will then use the interpretation of specific passages to revise and recon-
figure its initial understanding of the whole. This circular structure has the consequence that, in tex-
tual itepetatio, thee a e o aess to a fats o ute data to goud a eadig of a
textGUIGNON : -. Gadae thus alls fo a ehailitatio of authoit ad taditio
and elucidates that prejudice simply means pre-judgement; judgement that is made before the as-
sessment of all evidence, it can be either confirmed or refuted after further experience and it does
not necessarily have to be illegitimate and deceptive (WARNKE 1987: 76-7). Tradition involves both
an element of freedom and of history, it is not simply the acceptance of what once existed and is
being passed down; but instead, tradition is constantly being confirmed, cultivated and preserved
through the active use of reason - as preservation is as much a freely chosen action as are revolu-
tion and renewalGADAME : -3).
It is also important to highlight that tradition does not merely consist in an eternal precondi-
tion; it is a product of ourselves as it is through our understanding of it that we take part in its con-
tinuous development (GADAMER 2004: 293).The dialectic character of understanding will bring out
not only the meaning of the object but also of the subject. Again, in a heideggerian sense, Gadamer
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something that is understandable, meaningful. Surely, the anticipation of completeness serves as an
enabler element in interpretation but it does not necessarily affirms that the text or object in fact
has a complete meaning. The idea is that prejudices and a presupposition of truth can aid with the
orientation of finding the meaning of the text, otherwise, there will be no basis for deliberating
hethe the uestioailit of the tet oes fo its o failues o the itepetes o iailit
to comprehend it (WARNKE 1987: 83-6).
Questioig is a essetial eleet of the heeeutial situatio. We at hae a epe-
rience, Gadamer affirms, without raising questions. If understanding is a dialogic activity, it is implied
that questioning is what gives meaning to our perspective of the object or, as Gadamer explains:
the sense of the question is the only direction from which the answer can be given if it is to make
sense GADAME : .Questios aise fo ou egatie espose to epeiee he we
are shocked by things that do not accord with our expectationsGADAME : . The uestio
opens up a horizon, a range of possible answers that will be worked out through the tension be-
tee the failiait ad stageess of the sujets ie of the ojet, as Alo ege potaed it:
the process of questioning is carried out in the twilight region between knowledge and igno-
ranceEGEV : . Hee, heeeutial udestadig is ased o the dialogi iteatio
of the sujets pejudies oditioed histoiit ad the ojets o histoial oditios ad
contextwhen reading a text, for example, the reader finds himself in a dialogue that mediates and
integrates familiar and alien notions between the text and the reader. What comes out in the end,
according to Gadamer, is an integration of past and present, that, as in a dialogue, is a sort of
ageeet that always surpasses the original positions of the participants in a not necessarily bet-
te ut diffeet a GADAME : . I sua, as Geogia Wake laifies, Gadaes
fusio of hoizos is the integration of our historically determined concerns with the object of un-
derstanding in such a way that this integration determines the content of the object for us WANKE
1987: 103).
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cerned Colligoods oliio to dise the itetio of the histoial aget ad the eal eaig
of the atios of the histoial eet. I Gadaes ie, udestadig a tet does ot ipl that its
eaig should oiide ith the authos itetio; as its eal understanding always goes beyond
the scope of the intention that originated it (FESTIN 2005: 37). Gadamer cannot accept Colling-
oods eeatet eause it sees to hi that the eaig is the edued to the agets iten-
tios, he affis: the interpreter of history always run the risk of hypostasizing the connectedness of
events when he regards their significance as that intended by the actual actors and plan-
nersGADAME : such an account, Gadamer claimed, trapped Collingwood in undesira-
ble historicism.
The seod itiis potaed Gadae oes Colligoods The Idea of Historyand
its depiction of the platonic argument in Theaetetus(GADAMER 2004: 514-6). The passage in ques-
tio is: Whe I ead Platos aguet i the Theaetetusagainst the view that knowledge is merely
sensation, I do not know what philosophical doctrines he was attacking; I could not expound these
doctrines and say in detail who maintained them and by what arguments COLLINGWOOD :
301).In this example of interpreting a philosophical text, Gadamer accuses Collingwood of affirming
that the detetio of Platos itetios i the disussio ould e possile ol afte suspedig the
eades pe-judgements and then identifying the context of the platonic discussion. The error in this
ase, Gadae eplaied, ould osist i Colligoods failue to eogise the histoial itepe-
tatio liked to the otet of Platos thought the principles of the LQA would not be then properly
applied. Hence, Gadamer insists that the theo of eeatet doest suessfull gasp the fusio
of horizons of past and present (VARDOULAKIS 2004: 9-10).
But is Colligoods theo of e-enactment really restricted to only reconstructing the orig-
inal intentions of the agent? Does it really ignore the historicity of the interpreter or the importance
of historical interpretation? If looked at attentively, it does not. It must be reminded that there are
ke eleets fo Colligoods theo of eeatet. Fist of all, it ust e elucidated the clear
distitio etee hat Colligood alled hua histo fo atual eets; the histoia is
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not concerned with natural processes but with actions performed by men. When encountering his-
torical evidence, the historian occupies himself with the ideas that gave life to the object and made
them significant (JOHNSON 1998: 82). Human history is thus constituted of human actions (COL-
LINGWOOD 1939: 127-8), and these always possess, according to Collingwood, outside and inside
aspects. The outside characteristics establish the context of the act, they concern the spatial and
temporal circumstances of the event; whereas the inside feature corresponds to the internal charac-
ter of the event as conscious thought. As human action always represents the union of the outside
ad iside featues of a eet, the histoia a ee igoe eithe oe o the othe: His work
may begin by discovering the outside of an event, but it can never end there; he must always re-
member that the event was an action, and that his main task is to think himself into this action, to
discern the thought of its agent COLLINGWOOD : . Colligood is leal statig i this
passage that both outside and inside features are essential to understanding the historical event; the
reconstruction starts with a picture of the spatial and temporal aspect of the past which will be un-
derstood along with the thought behind it (the inside aspect) as it is rethought by the historian him-
self (DEBBINS 1967: xv).
To rethink the histoial agets thought a appea a tad steious, ad it is etail a
soue fo ost of itiis of Colligoods philosoph. I ode to udestad this, aothe ol-
lingwoodian distinction must be clarified: the one between thought in its immediacy and its media-
tion. Immediate thought relates to the subjective context of the agent: his feelings, emotions and
sensations (SAARI 1984: 37)this aspet of the agets id a ee e e-enacted as these fea-
tues are only coincidental with the thought, and they have nothing to do with the thought as
thought, with the thought in its universalityDEBBIN : . I otast, thought i its edia-
tion consists in the objective content of it; this feature does not entail the private mental activities
that elog elusiel to the aget/thike, athe, ediate thoughts ae puli ad aessile i a
manner that everyone can think them for themselvestherefore, this aspect of the thought can
sustain itself through time, through the change of context and can consequently be rethought by
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stating his solution. He must think that problem out for himself, see what possible solutions of it
might be offered, and see why this particular philosopher chose that solution instead of anoth-
erColligood : .
Conclusion
Once it is understood that soe of Gadaes itiiss of the olligoodia theo of
reenactment are rooted in a few misunderstandings, it seems that there are no hermeneutical con-
taditios ut a oo fatos etee the philosophes thoughts. Both Colligood ad
Gadamer agree that understanding meaning involves grasping the question that lies behind the text
or historical evidence; moreover, this does not imply a psychological approach to the intentions of
the original author or agent. Another similarity can be observed i Colligoods potaal of aso-
lute pesuppositios as a asis alas peset i hua ids ad soieties; a haateizatio
that does ot see too diffeet fo the heideggeia depitio of peudestadigs NAUGLE
1993: 21-2), or from Gadames elai of the sigifiat ole of pejudie to udestadig GADA-
MER 2004: 273). Additionally, both authors had the wise perception of the past as always connected
ith the peset hee, histo eoes a liig past that is kept alie i a dialetical relation be-
tween present and past, our current surroundings and tradition (COLLINGWOOD 1946: 226 -1939:
97-8; GADAMER 2004: 293). This dialectical process is not detached from but intertwined with our-
selves; which characterises self-knowledge as an essential factor to both Gadamer, who carried the
heideggerian notion that all understanding involves a self-encounter, and Collingwood, who similarly
thought that: a, ho desies to ko eethig, desies to ko hiself. [] Without soe
knowledge of himself, his knowledge of other things is imperfect: for to know something without
knowing that one knows it is only a half-knowing, and to know that one knows is to know oneself.
Self-knowledge is desirable and important to man, not only for its own sake, but as a condition with-
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