UFRGS Model United Nations 2007
General Assembly: Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL)
By Thiago Borne, Helena Jornada, Felipe Jornada, Luiz Alfredo and Paula Lazzari
Dear Delegates,
We are very pleased to have you participating in another bombastic SPECPOL’s
edition. For the past three years, SPECPOL have always been one of the most successful
UFRGSMUN committees. Hoping to follow the tradition, we have been working on two
very controversial and polemic topics, related to the proliferation and the usage of
nuclear materials. They were selected to allow delegates to learn and debate about very
hot issues that are currently “in” in the international scene, and that are interconnected,
giving the participants a wide and global view regarding such notorious matters.
SPECPOL’s staff is composed by five passionate and crazy students that have been
working together since the end of 2006, to prepare you this very thrilling experience.
Let’s meet them:
Helena Lobato da Jornada, Director, is a fourth year International Relations
Student who adores modelling. This edition of UFRGSMUN will be her 11th Model
United Nations experience, as she had already participated in many national and
international MUNS. UFRGSMUN 2007 is her third as a staff member: in the 2004
edition she was a delegate at SPECPOL, in 2005 she was Director of Public Relations,
and in 2006 UnderSecretaryGeneral for Administrative Affairs. So, this year’s
SPECPOL will be her first experience as an Academic Director.
Thiago Borne Ferreira, Director, was first involved in MUNs in 2005, when he
participated as a delegate at AMUN’s Historical Committee and then as a SOCHUM
delegate in UFRGSMUN 2005 edition. The amazing experiences he had by that year
motivated the International Relations student to join SOCHUM’s staff in UFRGSMUN
2006 as an AssistantDirector. This year, he took a step further in his MUN’s life
accepting the task to join SPECPOL. 2007 is also the year he attended the 10th AMUN
at the Council of the European Union Committee.
Felipe Jornada, AssistantDirector, is a fourth year Physics student and one of
the most versatile members of SPECPOL’s 2007 staff. He attended at UFRGSMUN
2005 as a SCITECH delegate. In the following year, he participated at UFRGSMUN’s
SPECPOL Committee. In 2006 he was also UFRGSMUN’s official webmaster. This
year, besides being an assistant at SPECPOL, he is responsible again for UFRGSMUN’s
website.
Luiz Alfredo Vieira, AssistantDirector, is a fourth year International Relations
student. This year, for the first time, he is part of the UFRGSMUN’s Staff. His first
participation in a Model United Nations was in the UFRGSMUN 2004, as an expert at
the International Law Commission. In UFRGSMUN 2005, he attended as a delegate at
SOCHUM. And in UFRGSMUN 2006, he participated as delegate at SPECPOL. This
year, he attended the 10th AMUN at the Historical Committee.
Paula Lazzari, AssistantDirector, is a second year International Relations
student at UFRGS. In 2007, she became part of the UFRGSMUN Staff. Her first
participation in a Model United Nations was in 2006, as delegate at SPECPOL.
We hope that you enjoy reading this guide and studying for the topics. We are
very anxious to meet you all in November to have exhilarating and invigorating
discussions!
Sincerely yours,
Helena Lobato da Jornada
Director
Thiago Borne Ferreira
Director
Felipe Jornada
AssistantDirector
Luiz Alfredo Mello Vieira
AssistantDirector
Paula Lazzari
AssistantDirector
INTRODUCTION
SPECPOL’s General Background
The Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL), also known as
the Fourth Committee, was created in 1993 in accordance with General Assembly
Resolution 47/233, with the main objective of addressing significant political matters,
such as selfdetermination, decolonization and other international security concerns.
SPECPOL originally assessed issues that the First Committee (DISEC) was not able to
handle, but it was given other topics to address and a broader overall scope due to its
success in addressing the Palestine Question, among others.
In its current role, the Fourth Committee can be viewed as the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) entrance door, since the questions discussed at the Security
Council are often assessed earlier by SPECPOL not only because the committee's
approach is broader in terms of international security, but also because it allows all
United Nations (UN) member states to be heard before the question reaches other UN
instances. This explains the fact that although SPECPOL's resolutions are not binding,
they are still very appealing, since they reflect the opinion of the majority of countries
regarding substantive matters.
This year, the UFRGSMUN SPECPOL staff proposes two topics to be discussed
that are related to nuclear production and nuclear proliferation, which are of paramount
importance to international stability. Delegates who come to SPECPOL will face the
challenge of thoroughly addressing these international security questions in a very
extensive way, since the results of their discussions may affect the development of the
international environment for the years to come.
TOPIC AREA A
International Nuclear Safeguards for Atomic Energy Production
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1.1. From the Discovery of the Nuclear Energy Until the Atoms for Peace Program
The early 1900’s are scientifically considered an important mark for the
understanding of the structure of matter.1 Among many researches conducted, one may
be considered a milestone in the development of nuclear science: the discovery of
radiation by Antoine Becquerel and the Curie couple.2 This new phenomenon promptly
called the attention from the scientific community, inasmuch as a great amount of
energy could be released through this process, even by small amounts of certain
materials, such as radium.3 Some scientists, including Pierre Curie, showed concern
about the use of this new source of energy, and stated it could also be employed on
criminal or on military activities.4
A further step for the understanding of nuclear processes was given by the end of
1938, when Lise Meitner, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann reported fission of uranium
atom by bombarding it with neutrons.5 Again, a large amount of energy – millions of
times greater than what is found in chemical reactions – was reported. Three months
later, Hans von Halban, Frédéric Joliot and Lew Kowarski showed that three other
neutrons were scattered during the fission.6 Depending on the material, the newly
emitted particles could split into other nuclei, so that the reaction could be self
1 The Nuclear Weapon Archive Website. Available at: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Med/Dawnage.html. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.2 Nobel Prize Website. Available at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1903/press.html. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.3 Nobel Prize Website. Available at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1911/press.html. Last accessed: 21 May 2007. 4 Nobel Prize Website. Available at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1903/pierrecurielecture.pdf. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.5 Nature Website. Available at: http://www.nature.com/physics/lookingback/meitner/index.html. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.6 HALBAN, Hans; JOLIOT, Frédéric; KOWARSKI, Lew. Liberation of neutrons in the nuclear explosion of uranium. Nature, v. 143, n. 939. 1939.
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Med/Dawnage.htmlhttp://www.nature.com/physics/looking-back/meitner/index.htmlhttp://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1903/pierre-curie-lecture.pdfhttp://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1903/pierre-curie-lecture.pdfhttp://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1911/press.htmlhttp://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1903/press.html
sustained. This process, also called chainreaction, is the very idea employed in nuclear
power plants and warfare.
In the same year such impacting discoveries were made, Germany invaded
Poland and World War II started. The number of public researches diminished, and
countries started to develop their own nuclear technology secretly. It is argued that,
before the war, some scientists had been trying through propaganda to discourage the
Nazis to develop researches in this field. In 1933, the year Hitler took office as
Germany’s Chancellor, Rutherford ,in spite of his former position, suddenly stated that
“the energy produced by the breaking down of the atom is a very poor thing,”7 .
In the USA, scientists such as Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard were convinced of
the importance of developing nuclear technology, mainly because this field could have
been studied by the Germans. As a result, they asked Albert Einstein, because of his
popularity and his academic recognition, to write to president Franklin Delano
Roosevelt informing of the importance of atomic energy, and warning about a possible
Nazi research on this topic.8 One year after the letter, president Roosevelt decided to
invest massively in that technology, launching the Manhattan Engineer District, or
Manhattan Project.9 After spending the equivalent of 20 billion dollars,10 two atomic
bombs were developed and delivered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
After the humanitarian catastrophe the atomic bomb caused in Japan, many
scientists engaged in the Manhattan Project, including the scientific supervisor, Robert
Oppenheimer, showed public concern about warfare and about a possible nuclear race.
In 1946, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) was created to
foster “the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the
least diversion for armaments”.11 Five months after the first meeting, the US
7 The Washington Post Website. Available at: http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/237023812.html?dids=237023812:237023812&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=SEP+13%2C+1933&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc=%22Harnessing%22+the+Atom.&pqatl=google . Last accessed: 21 August 2007. 8 Hyper Text Book Website. Available at: http://hypertextbook.com/eworld/einstein.shtml. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.9 Nuclear Files Website. Available at: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/keyissues/nuclearweapons/history/precoldwar/manhattanproject/. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.10 The Brookings Institution Website. http://www.brookings.edu/FP/PROJECTS/NUCWCOST/MANHATTN.HTM. Last accessed: 21 August 2007.11 United Nations Treaty Collection/Collection des traités des Nations Unies Website. Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art26/english/rep_orig_vol2art26_e.pdf. Last accessed: 23 August 2007.
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art26/english/rep_orig_vol2-art26_e.pdfhttp://www.brookings.edu/FP/PROJECTS/NUCWCOST/MANHATTN.HTMhttp://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/manhattan-project/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/manhattan-project/http://hypertextbook.com/eworld/einstein.shtmlhttp://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/237023812.html?dids=237023812:237023812&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=SEP+13%2C+1933&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc="Harnessing"+the+Atom.&pqatl=googlehttp://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/237023812.html?dids=237023812:237023812&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=SEP+13%2C+1933&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc="Harnessing"+the+Atom.&pqatl=googlehttp://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_historical/access/237023812.html?dids=237023812:237023812&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=SEP+13%2C+1933&author=&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc="Harnessing"+the+Atom.&pqatl=google
representative Bernard Baruch, motivated by the ideas spread by the academics,
proposed a plan to avoid nuclear race. According to his document, the UNAEC would
be the exclusive maintainer of nuclear technology for warfare, and it would have a large
intelligence related to extraction, purification and use of uranium and thorium. No other
country would be able to develop atomic bombs, and the US would have to discontinue
their research and share all their information with the commission.12
The plan was rejected by the USSR, and, in 1949, the UNAEC was adjourned
indefinitely.13 In that same year, the Russians made their first successful nuclear test,
marking the start of the nuclear race. By the end of 1950, the USA had approximately
800 warheads, and the soviets were already building their arsenal.14 In 1953, the newly
elected American president Dwight Eisenhower was determined to solve the “fearful
atomic dilemma.”15 In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly entitled
“Atoms for Peace”, he proposed the creation of an atomic energy association to control
the use of nuclear technology, so that “fissionable material would be allocated to serve
the peaceful pursuits of mankind.”16
In 1955, during a summit at Geneva, Eisenhower presented various documents
concerning nuclear safety and disarmament. Two proposals were submitted and rejected
by the Soviets. One of them aimed at bilateral aerial observation, while the other
recommended ground inspections. The main idea was that, after those suggestions were
implemented, no country would be caught by a “devastating surprise attack.”17 Although
the proposals at Geneva were not accepted, the two nations continued to discuss nuclear
safety. Three years later, Eisenhower decided to declare moratorium on all US nuclear
tests, hoping Russia would follow the example. Indeed, a few days after, the Soviets
adopted the same policy. The moratorium extended until 1961, when USSR resumed
testing as a result of the increasing international tension and of the French nuclear
12 The Streit Council Website. Available at http://www.streitcouncil.org/content/pdf_and_doc/The%20Baruch%20Plan.pdf. Last accessed: 23 August 2007.13 DART, Dorothy. Chronicle of International Events. The American Journal of International Law, v. 40, n. 3, 1946, p. 645662.14 BUNDY, McGeorge. Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Random House, 1988, p. 319325.15 The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library Website. Available at: http://worldnuclearuniversity.org/html/atoms_for_peace/. Last accessed: 21 May 2007.16 The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library Website…17 Eisenhower Memorial Homepage Website. Available at http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidentialpapers/firstterm/documents/1523.cfm. Last accessed: 23 August 2007.
http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1523.cfmhttp://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atom1.htmhttp://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atom1.htmhttp://www.streitcouncil.org/content/pdf_and_doc/The Baruch Plan.pdf
program.
From 1955 to 1963, many technical proposals to ban nuclear testing were made,
but they were all rejected. Most of them were vetoed by the Soviets, either because the
available technology was insufficient to detect tests, or because they would not allow
onsite inspections on the terms proposed.18
Despite the lack of international agreements, Eisenhower decided to initiate a
series of bilateral interactions within his “Atoms for Peace” program. With the help of
the Congress, he created the Atomic Energy Act, under which a series of bilateral
agreements to share nuclear knowledge were made. The USA cooperated with nuclear
reactors, while the other part had to allow safeguard inspections, so that that technology
was used peacefully. By the end of 1959, the USA was cooperating with 42 countries. A
similar program was developed by the USSR.19
1.2. The Implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its
Safeguard Regime
Although the countries could not reach a common ground to stall nuclear race, it
was, then, clear that a multilateral program could be implemented for nuclear
safeguards.20 In 1955, a convention took place in Geneva gathering a large number of
scientists and counting with more than 1500 delegates. It was seen as an important mark
to the opening of nuclear technology after the great secrecy with which researches were
conducted during the early postwar days. Two years after the meeting, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), based on Eisenhower's suggestion to stimulate the
peaceful use of nuclear technology, was created, after long discussions between East and
West, as an autonomous organization. According to its statute, the Agency's work is
focused on three pillars: “nuclear verification and security, safety and technology
transfer.”21
Even though the Agency was not directly linked to the UN, it was decided in its
18 FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS Website. Available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ike/index.html. Last accessed 23 August 2007.19 FISCHER, David .History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997.20 SHENIMAN, Lawrence. The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order. Washington DC: RFF Press, 1987.21 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) Website. Available at http://www.iaea.org/About/history.html. Last accessed 23 August 2007.
http://www.iaea.org/About/history.htmlhttp://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/ike/index.html
statute that it should report directly to the General Assembly and to the Security
Council. The Agency would be financed by the Member States, which would also be
invited to donate fissionable material.22 The IAEA, also known as the "Atoms for Peace
Agency" was established with the main objective of fostering and controlling the pacific
uses of atomic energy and nuclear development. 23 The IAEA exercises its power on the
matter of nuclear verification through its safeguards system, which is based on
safeguards agreements that are basically the accordance of a country or a group of
countries with the IAEA for the inspection of the country’s nuclear facilities.
Although the agreements vary in its substance – and its development illustrates
the advances that the safeguards regime has suffered –, the main scope of the IAEA’s
safeguards regime is to verify if the countries under the Agency’s system24 are not
diverting the use of its nuclear material and plants from pacific purposes – such as
energy, industry or medicine – to military buildup, such as the development of nuclear
armaments and explosives. The System is based on continuous confidence building
measures,25 and the verification process is based especially on visits, inspections and
evaluations, depending on the country’s nuclear status. The Agency developed distinct
modalities of “onsite inspections and visits under comprehensive safeguards
agreements”.26 They can be ad hoc – made to verify a State’s initial report of nuclear
material – special or routine inspections – limited to those locations within a nuclear
facility27 –, or even safeguards visits – that may be made to declared facilities at
appropriate times during the lifecycle to verify the safeguards’ relevant design
information.28
In the beginning of the Agency’s work, the implementation of safeguards was
not open to discussion, especially because of the countries involved in the issues, such
as the United States, the Soviet Union and the European Countries. Until the beginning
of the 1960’s, the IAEA’s safeguards regime struggled to be recognized in a mistrustful
world divided by ideology. Countries were not satisfied with the fact that their national
22 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…23 SMITH, Daryl. The Nuclear Safeguards Program. Los Alamos Science Winter/Spring 1983.24 IAEA Website. IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html. Last accessed: 17 August 2007.25 IAEA Safeguards Overview…26 IAEA Safeguards Overview…27 IAEA Safeguards Overview…28 IAEA Safeguards Overview…
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html
nuclear programs were target of inspectors, who would know their most precious
technological secrets.29 In a time where espionage was a strategic instrument, it is not
surprising that the inspections were not totally accepted. But the increasing fear of the
misuse of nuclear technology made the Agency’s safeguard system to be taken seriously,
as a very important control tool.
The verification of a zero power research reactor’s design in Norway, in 196230,
was the Agency’s first safeguards inspection. In the same year, the IAEA concluded
agreements to apply safeguards to research reactors in several other countries, such as
Pakistan and Yugoslavia and in what was then called “the Congo, Leopoldville”, later
Zaire and now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 1963 the first revision of the
safeguards regime was introduced, with the purpose of applying the safeguards to all
sizes of nuclear reactors, reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants.31 This new system
was called INFCIRC/66 and it was successfully applied until the implementation of the
NPT regime. This system suffered successive expansions and proved, at the time, to be a
very effective control device. The IAEA’s ability to apply safeguards was in clear
expansion, which was confirmed by the USSR’s accession to the IAEA – still in 1963 –,
transforming the Agency’s safeguards system into a much more comprehensive one.32
Therefore the safeguard’s system was evolving to become a much more complex
and dynamic regime. In this sense, the most important document to complete this
evolution was signed in 1968. The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards system, or
the INFCIRC/153 type agreements made all declared nonnuclear weapon States to
place all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards “and to conclude a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with the Agency”33 , “18 months before acceding to the NPT. On
all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of the State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control
anywhere…”.34 One must bear in mind that the NPT treaty identifies only five countries
(United States, Russian Federation, China, United Kingdom and France) as nuclear
29 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…30 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…31 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…32 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…33 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2001.34 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition, International nuclear verification series no. 3.
weapon States.35
When the NPT36 was established, in 1968, the IAEA created a “safeguard
standard suitable for application to simple nuclear activities and to complex nuclear full
cycles.”37 The signatory States, when the treaty is enforced, are obliged to declare all
their nuclear material and facilities, as well as constantly update that information. It is
important to notice that States only need to declare their material and facilities that are
under the safeguards system, which, with the development of new technologies, can
exclude some innovative fissile material from any kind of surveillance.
Under the NPT, one can see a clear evolution on the development of other
measures to strengthen the safeguards syste, the most representative ones are the
regional measures. One can first start with the European Community for Atomic Energy
(EURATOM) – whose original treaty from 1957 established the European Commission
as the responsible body for controlling the use of fissile material in the continent.38 The
European nuclear safeguards system was developed to ensure the European continent
the proper use of nuclear materials, and certify that the nuclear production of the
continent is in accordance with the international community.
Although it is a very specific system, eventually, it got in conflict with the
IAEA’s safeguards structure. Before the five EURATOM’s nonnuclear weapon States
had signed the NPT, the IAEA negotiated directly with the community, which used the
safeguards established in its original treaty instead of those of the Agency.39 The same
happened with countries like Brazil and Argentina, which under the Tlatelolco Treaty,
and before signing the NPT, were able to produce and test small atomic bombs.40
Because of the uncertainty of those treaties that were not under the NPT, it became
patent that negotiating safeguards with non NPT countries was quite ambiguous and
posed problems of legitimacy to the NPT safeguards system.
Obviously, given that since its establishment the NPT proved to have some gaps,
35 It is important to notice that the precedent regime, the INFCIRC/66 system was not completely abandoned, since its safeguards were still applied for the States that had not adhered to the NPT, for example: India, Israel and Pakistan.36 It is essential to understand that the same NPT that was adopted in 1968 is still in force in the present days.37 IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread…38 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Nuclear Safeguards, Europe remains vigilant, 2005. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safeguards/index_en.htm. Last accessed : 24 August 2007.39 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…40 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safeguards/index_en.htm
as time passed it became necessary to revise this regime to strengthen the IAEA
safeguards system. The main event that made this need clear was the discovery, in the
beginning of the 1990’s, of a clandestine nuclear program in Iraq – a State that was an
NPT signatory. This event made the Agency ask for collaboration from the United
Nations Security Council to support its inspections and measures, because under the
INFCIRC/153 the verifying resources of the Agency proved to be insufficient.
The new measures, used to fortify the safeguards and to grant the Agency further
authority for inspections,41 are based on an Additional Protocol42 that obliges the State to
“provide the IAEA with broader information covering all aspects of its nuclear fuel
cyclerelated activities, including research and development and uranium mining.”43
Countries under this new legal policies must make available every kind of information
regarding their nuclear activities.
At the same time, with the end of the Cold War, there was an obvious change
towards disarmament from both nuclear superpowers of the period (USA and USSR –
now Russian Federation). This transformation on the geopolitical sphere was essential
for the consolidation of the NPT safeguards system since the Treaty became permanent.
As it is stated in the History of the IAEA:
"The IAEA and its safeguards have thus been major beneficiaries of the end of the Cold War. By providing a bridge between the superpowers from the early 1960s (and, in a sense, since 1955, when the Soviet Union joined the Washington talks) until the termination of the Cold War in the late 1980s, and by pioneering the use of institutionalized onsite inspections, they helped in a modest way to bring about that termination."44
Nevertheless, the dynamics of the international arena are constantly challenging
the Agency’s safeguards regime. Bearing that in mind, this system must be constantly
revised, as it is done by the Review Conferences of the Treaty on the NonProliferation
of Nuclear Weapons that happen every five years. The last one happened in 2005, yet
many advances must be made.
2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
41 IAEA Website. The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Available at: www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf. Last accessed: 24 August 2007.42 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. Model Protocol Additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the international atomic energy agency for the application of safeguards. Available at: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf. Last accessed: 24 August 2007.43 IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread…44 FISCHER, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency…
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdfhttp://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf
2.1. The Importance of Nuclear Energy
“Nuclear power will help provide the electricity that our growing economy needs without increasing emissions. This is truly an
environmentally responsible source of energy.”45
Michael Burgess
The international community must face the fact that a growing world population
with both rising standards of living and volatile rising expectations will demand a great
amount of power in the years ahead.46 No doubt a large sum of this energy will come
from fossil fuels over the next few decades, particularly in terms of oil for the
transportation and power fields. But, in spite of forecasts of large reserves, these natural
resources are limited. There is also a limit to nature’s ability to absorb all the pollution
that would result should we try to burn up all these fuels over the next years.
Fortunately, we have discovered alternative sources of power, such as nuclear energy.
“At least 30 countries have active nuclear power reactors. However, there are
scores of other major facilities containing nuclear material in over 70 countries that are
‘safeguarded’ under IAEA agreements with governments”.47 Most of these nations use
nuclear technologies for “a wide variety of peaceful purposes.”48 As stated in the
Program for Promoting Nuclear NonProliferation (PPNN) Briefing Book49, nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes is traditionally divided into five principal areas:
mining and processing of nuclear raw materials; the production of enriched uranium;
the fabrication of nuclear fuel elements; the design, construction and operation of
nuclear reactors; and fuel reprocessing. Apart from the use of nuclear energy to produce
electricity from power reactors, it has also been used extensively in agriculture,
medicine, industry, biology and hydrology.
According to the last IAEA Annual Report, 2005 was a year of rising
45 Brainy Quote Website. Available at: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/michaelbur288596.html. Last accessed: 7 April 2007.46 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION/DIVISION OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: a Collection of Speeches by Glenn T. Seaborg Chairman United States Atomic Energy Commission. Oak Ridge: USAEC Division of Technical Information Extension, 1970.47 IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread…48 IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread…49 BAILEY, Emily; GUTHRIE, Richard; HOWLETT, Darryl; SIMPSON, John. Programme for Promoting Nuclear NonProliferation Briefing Book Volume I: the Evolution of the Nuclear NonProliferation Regime (Sixth Edition). Southampton: The Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 2000.
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/michaelbur288596.html
expectations for nuclear energy, driven by “nuclear power’s performance record; the
growing need for energy around the world coupled with rising oil and natural gas prices;
environmental constraints on the use of fossil fuels; concerns about energy supply
security in a number of countries; and expansion plans for nuclear power in some
States.”50 By the end of the same year, there were about 443 nuclear power reactors
operating in the world, with a total net capacity of 369.6 GW(e),51 supplying about 16%
of the world’s electricity,52 27 power plants more were under construction,53 which
enhances the idea that nuclear power can make a major contribution to meeting energy
needs and sustaining the world’s development in the 21st century.
2.2. International Security Agenda
International security environment has changed greatly since the end of the Cold
War. With the successful implementation of nuclear arms control treaties, the risk of a
largescale nuclear confrontation has been drastically reduced. Communication and
cooperation between old adversaries have improved fundamentally, and are partly
replacing deterrence as the basis for security.54 “Between actors on the two sides of the
Cold War divide, the relationship has, in most cases, radically changed to one of a
pronounced community of interests and even values. The concept of common and
comprehensive security is gradually and in some regions actually becoming a reality.”55
However, since 11 September 2001 security issues “have been propelled back to the top
of the international agenda, and nuclear issues with them.”56 Because of the concern
about transnational, massimpact terrorism, criminals or other irresponsible people or
groups putting their hands on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons,
50 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. IAEA Annual Report for 2005. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2005/index.html. Last accessed: 24 August 2007.51 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA). Operating Experience with Nuclear Power Stations in Member States in 2005. Available at: wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1280_web.pdf. Last accessed: 28 August 2007.52 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. Nuclear Technology Review 2006. Available at: www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Pess/assets/ntr2006.pdf. 24 August 2007.53 Operating Experience with Nuclear Power Stations…54 ANTHONY, Ian; ROTFELD, Adam Daniel. A Future Arms Control Agenda Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 118, 1999. Stockholm: SIPRI; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. p.30.55 ANTHONY; ROTFELD, A Future Arms Control Agenda, p. 30.56 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI). Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials The Political and Technical Dimensions. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Preface.
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Pess/assets/ntr2006.pdfhttp://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2005/index.html
“The possible nuclear capabilities of States like Iraq and North Korea have become a focus of both debate and action, because of their potential contribution to further proliferation but also because of these states’ record of regional confrontation. Relations between India and Pakistan have gone trough periods of extreme tension, when actual hostilities seemed only a step away and the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange could not be ruled out.”57
2.2.1. The Strengthened Nuclear Safeguards System
“Well, I think that the first thing, which is probably the easiest, is to make sure that countries that are parties of the NPT have safeguard
agreements and additional protocols enforced.”58
Mohammad El Baradei
Safeguards are a set of activities by which the IAEA can verify if “a State is
living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programs for nuclear
weapons purposes.”59 It is based “on assessment of the correctness and completeness of
the State’s declaration to the IAEA concerning nuclear material and nuclearrelated
activities.”60 In other words, the major objectives of safeguards are the maintenance of
an efficient, precise and realtime nuclear material accountancy system at all types of
facilities engaged in the fuel cycle.61 In addition to that the regime assists nuclear
inspectorates to develop and deploy powerful verification systems to check if operators
and States comply with their international obligations.62 To date, the IAEA inspects
nuclear and related facilities under safeguards agreements, like the Nuclear Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with more than 140 Member States.
Over the past decade, the IAEA has taken steps to strengthen its safeguards
system. The measures taken might be considered a radical departure from the Agency’s
traditional safeguards approach, “which focused on verifying that declared nuclear
material at specific facilities or locations in a country had not been diverted for nuclear
weapons.”63 The first safeguards strengthening steps were implemented under the
57 Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials...58 Brainy Quote Website. Available at: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/mohamedelb228115.html. Last access: 7 April 2007.59 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. IAEA Safeguards Overview. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html. Last accessed: 24 August 2007.60 IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread…61 There are several steps in the nuclear fuel cycle. The front end of the fuel cycle includes uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. Once uranium becomes spent fuel (after being used to produce electricity), the back end of the cycle follows. This may include temporary storage, reprocessing, recycling, and waste disposal.62 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Nuclear Safeguards. 2002.63 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO). Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.htmlhttp://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/mohamedelb228115.html
Agency’s existing legal authority upon a comprehensive safeguards agreement at
declared nuclear facilities in the early 1990’s. These measures increased the Agency’s
ability to monitor declared and undeclared activities at nuclear facilities once they
permitted the IAEA to (i) conduct short notice and unannounced inspections; (ii) take
locationspecific environmental samples inside facilities to detect traces of nuclear
material; and (iii) use measurement and surveillance systems that operate unattended
and can be used to transmit data about the status of nuclear materials directly to its
headquarters.64
The second series of steps under strengthened safeguards began in 1997 with
the approval of the Additional Protocol65 by the IAEA’s Board of Governors. The
document is “designed to ‘supplement countries’ safeguards agreements by requiring
countries to provide the IAEA with broader information on and access to nuclear and
nuclearrelated activities”66 and constitutes a “qualitatively new approach to monitoring
and controlling fissile material”.67 According to Schaper (2003),
“The Additional Safeguards Protocol in INFCIRC/540 primarily
addresses the completeness of states’ declarations with the aim of ensuring
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It gives IAEA
inspectors the right to obtain from the parties to the Protocol more
information than was previously required about all the parts of their nuclear
fuel cycles, from uranium mines to nuclear waste. It also grants them more
intrusive physical access to locations subject to safeguards as well as
complementary access to undeclared sites. In addition, inspectors have
stronger authority to use new verification techniques, such as collecting
environmental samples for laboratory analysis, for the purpose of assisting
the IAEA in drawing conclusions about the presence or absence of
undeclared material or nuclear activities at a specific location.”68
Once the Additional Protocol broadens the IAEA’s authority and the
requirements under existing comprehensive safeguards agreements, each country must
Need to be Addressed, 2005, p.14. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0693.pdf. Last accessed: 7 April 2007. 64 GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation…65 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. Model Protocol Additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the international atomic energy agency for the application of safeguards. Available at: www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf. Last accessed: 24 August 2007.66 GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation…67 Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials..., p. 209.68 Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials...
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdfhttp://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0693.pdf
take certain actions to bring it into force. States are required to submit “expanded
declarations” on nuclear fuel cycle technologies, such as centrifuge enrichment
technology, and exports and imports of such technologies must also be declared, as well
as ongoing research activities.
In brief, under the Additional Protocol, the IAEA has the right to (i) conduct
“complementary access”, which enables the Agency to expand its inspection rights for
the purpose of ensuring the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities; (ii)
collect environmental samples beyond declared nuclear facilities, when deemed
necessary; and (iii) receive more comprehensive information from a country about all
aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle, including information about research and development
on the fuel cycle, the manufacturing and exporting of sensitive and other key nuclear
related equipment, and all buildings on a nuclear site, and compare this information
with information from other sources.69
Numerous initiatives were launched to eliminate and control nuclear weapons
and to prevent proliferation over the six decades following the attacks in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki allied to the IAEA’s initiative to strengthen the safeguards regime. However,
they seem to have had mixed results. On the one hand, almost every State in the world
has adhered to the NPT. The United States and Russia have withdrawn thousands of
nuclear weapons from service; the UK has significantly reduced its arsenal after the end
of the Cold War and France no longer deploys nuclear weapons on surfacetosurface
missiles or as gravity bombs. On the other hand, global stocks of these weapons are still
huge, and more States and even terrorists might acquire them.
It is a fact, however, that many States do not feel a need for nuclear weapons of
their own. In this case, most of them may have assurances of protection through their
alliances and other arrangements, while some others may have responded to political
and diplomatic pressures to renounce nuclear weapons. A small number of countries
may not have had technical capability to develop such kind of technology. Conversely,
when States have perceived threats to their security, like Israel, India and Pakistan, or
have felt ostracized and at risk, like North Korea, Libya and Iran, this may have
weighted heavily on their calculations. “So long as any state has nuclear weapons,
others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain, there is a risk that they will
69 GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation…
one day be used, designed or trigger an accident. And any such use would be
catastrophic.”70 Even if the basic ideas behind the NPT continue to have strong
international support, the treaty is facing several problems that must be squarely faced.
2.2.2. The Nuclear Terrorism Menace
Current scientific and technological progress and growing quantities of nuclear
material available for warlike uses coming from the global movement for nuclear
weapons reduction, made the access to nuclear explosives devices much easier and
cheaper. As a consequence, the risk of terrorists, rogue nations or other groups
acquiring such equipments with relatively small amounts of money has significantly
risen. After September 11 2001, what seemed to be only a distant and almost unreal
menace turned into a real concern not only for the US, but also for the whole
international community, since the attacks showed how great the organization power of
such terrorist groups can be.
Every international or regional treaty or mechanism to prevent the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, including the NPT and the strengthened safeguards system
implemented by the Additional Protocol, seems to be inefficient to stop criminal groups
from acquiring clandestine information, materials or even nuclear weapons, especially
for the US and its allies. Despite these countries’ commitment to use nuclear energy
only for pacific purposes and to submit to international control, the recent discovery of a
black market in nuclear weapons and related technology obliged the nations to accept
the possibility of a deliberated nuclear dispersion. Even the use of a nuclear bomb itself
is not excluded if nuclear materials or information is possessed by terrorist groups.
A recent National Academies report71 and several other extensive studies72
stressed the importance of protecting already existent nuclear weapons from theft, but
concluded that improvised nuclear devices built from stolen or diverted fissile materials
pose a greater threat.
70 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION (WMDC). Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms. Stockholm, 2006, p. 60.71 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. Making the nation safer: The role of science and technology in countering terrorism. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2002.72 FALKENRATH, R. A.; NEWMAN R. D.; THAYER B. A. America’s Achilles’ heel: Nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism and covert attack. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998; FERGUSON C.; POTTER W. C.; SANDS A.; SPECTOR L. S.; WEHLING F. L.; The four faces of nuclearterrorism. Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute – Center For National Security Studies, 2004.
One might say that fissile materials have only two practical uses: in nuclear
weapons or as fuel materials in nuclear reactors. Considering that all nuclear warheads
have fission energy elements that rely on the use of them, “controls on the production,
storage, use and export of fissile materials are accordingly the principal focus of
international efforts to impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons, specifically, of
IAEA safeguards.”73 Most nuclear power reactors in the world use uranium enriched to
some 4% as fuel. Even though it is produced in a technically difficult process, it may
also allow enrichment to levels suitable for use in nuclear weapons, 85% or more. It is a
matter of political will since, technically, any enrichment plant can, thus, be used for the
production of reactor fuel or bombgrade material or both. “The production of highly
enriched uranium (…) [is] regarded as raising the greatest difficulties for anyone
wishing to make nuclear weapons.”74
Fortunately, the technologies necessary to enrich uranium or construct reactors
to produce plutonium are considered to be beyond reach for any terrorist group today
and procurement and construction activities are not easily carried out clandestinely. In
other words, it would be hard for terrorists to construct their own weapons. However,
they can potentially steal them or buy them because of the great amounts available
worldwide, with some being inadequately secured. Keeping fissile materials out of
terrorists’ hands is a great challenge. Siegfried S. Hecker75 presents five reasons why
securing fissile materials is more difficult than generally appreciated.
First, existing inventories of fissile materials are far greater than the amount
required for a nuclear bomb. Although many States have stopped producing weapon
grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), studies report that approximately
1.9 million kilograms of HEU and 1.83 million kilograms of plutonium exist worldwide.
Excluding about 1.4 million kilograms of plutonium which would not be very attractive
to terrorists, since they are found in highly radioactive spent fuel, the remaining 2.3
million kilograms of weaponsusable fissile material must be protected. However, to
truly prevent a terrorist attack, we must be able to account for a few tens of kilograms
out of more than 2 million available worldwide.
Second, fissile materials exist in every imaginable form. Plutonium and uranium
73 Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials…. p. 234.74 Weapons of Terror… p. 60.75 HECKER, Siegfried S. Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System: Keeping Fissile Materials out of Terrorists' Hands. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 607, 2006.
are highly reactive metals that oxidize rapidly, especially in humid conditions or in the
presence of hydrogen. In addition, plutonium transmutes into other elements over time,
and is constantly created and destroyed during reactor operations. For both reactor and
weapon applications plutonium and uranium can be used in metallic form. For both
reactor and weapon applications they are processed by the same industrial processes.
When tons of plutonium or HEU are processed, large operating losses and inventory
differences are expected. “Moreover, largescale processing without adequate control
and accounting leads to the potential of pant operators covertly diverting small but
significant quantities of these materials.”76
Third, fissile materials exist in many locations, not just in a few storage vaults.
Plutonium and HEU might be found in enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities,
reactors, reprocessing plants and storage facilities. Historically, the security for these
places has not been adequate. And, of course, these materials also exist in transport,
being always secure. Moreover, not only fissile materials exist in many locations within
one’s country, but they also exist in multiple countries.
Fourth, fissile materials are difficult to measure and handle. A “safeguards
system must be able to measure fissile materials accurately.”77 However, monitoring and
accounting of plutonium and HEU might be a hard task, not only because these actions
require expensive costs but also due to these elements’ extraordinary scientific
complexity. Many measurements and analytical capabilities are not available in many
locations that house plutonium or HEU.
Finally, military secrecy hampers safeguards and transparency. Excessive
secrecy and, in particular, compartmentalization impede implementation of a rigorous
safeguard system. Although secrecy is important to protect a state’s nuclear program, it
can impede accounting, the establishment of systemwide inventories and the sharing of
best practices. Besides that, communication might be limited among sites that produce,
use and dispose of fissile materials.
For these five reasons, implementation of a comprehensive safeguards system is
imperative to protect fissile materials worldwide. However, even the strongest
safeguards system seems to fail to prevent theft of weaponusable material by
determined individuals or groups. While the safeguard agreements with more than 130
76 HECKER, Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System…, p. 124.77 HECKER, Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System…, p. 124.
states cover about 900 facilities and locations, only 20,000 kilograms of HEU and
5000,000 kilograms of plutonium are covered. Not much compared to the 1.9 million
kilograms that exist worldwide. Nuclear materials in military programs are not subject
to international safeguards. Uneven and incomplete application of domestic and
international safeguards contributes to the inadequacy of these materials’ security
nowadays. The fact is that the stronger the safeguards system become, the harder it is for
the countries to implement them. Adequate security depends not only on correct nuclear
materials protection, control and accounting, but also on operational and safety practices
as well as on rigorous application of domestic safeguards in order to prevent theft or
diversion of weaponusable materials.
3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION
With the explosion of the first Russian atomic device in 1949 and the first British
one in 1952, it became clear that “the ‘secret’ of creating a fission explosive was no
longer the exclusive monopoly of the US and, perhaps more significantly, that the
necessary scientific knowledge to create such a device could be acquired by the
ingenious efforts of other states.”78 Attempts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
and technologies date back to these times.
In December 1953, the US President Eisenhower presented his “Atoms for
Peace” project to the 8th session of the United Nations General Assembly and launched
the idea of an international organization responsible for promoting peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and for inhibiting its use for military purposes. In 1957, inspired on these
ideas, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created. According to its
Statute, the IAEA’s main tasks were: to promote the development and application of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world; to provide materials and
other facilities for the research in this area; to establish and adopt standards of nuclear
safety; and to establish and administer safeguards to ensure that nuclear energy would
not be used for military purposes.79 Although it declared a safeguards system, the
78 MOUNTBATTEN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (MCIS); CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES (CNS). The 2007 NPT Briefing Book. Available at: http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/index.htm. Last accessed: 15 May 2007.79 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. Statute of the IAEA. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html. Last accessed: 15 May 2007.
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.htmlhttp://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/index.htm
Statute did not specify how those safeguards should be applied.
It was only in 1961 that the Agency published its first Information Circular,80 the
INFCIRC/26,81 establishing the arrangements of the IAEA safeguards system. It dealt
basically with the inspections on nuclear materials, equipments and facilities, but in a
very partial and limited way. It was mainly due to the countries’ mistrusts regarding
international inspection at that time.
This first arrangement was revised in 1965 and provisionally extended in 1966
and 1968 by the INFCIRC/6682. This new document established a more comprehensive
system, extending the spectrum of nuclear materials, technologies and transfers among
states covered by the Agency’s safeguards. However, because at that time there were no
uranium enrichment plants operating in nonnuclear weapon states, they were not
covered by the INFCIRC/66 safeguards system. INFCIRC/66 is said to have established
the preNPT safeguards regime.
The traditional IAEA safeguards system for the NPT is laid out in INFCIR/153.83
The objective of safeguards under INFCIR/153 is to provide “timely detection of
diversion of significant quantities84 of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities
to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for
purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection”85 by
the use of material accountancy and containment and surveillance.
The text is replete with provisions to be implemented in a manner designed “to
avoid hampering” technological development, “to avoid undue interference” in civilian
nuclear energy, and “to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and
disturbance to the State”.86 In other words, INFCIR/153 was written to ensure that
safeguards would not be too intrusive. Hence, it lays out a regime based primarily on
following nuclear material at selected key “strategic points” at declared sites. The IAEA
would gain the right to obtain more information about undeclared sites from the parties
80 Information Circular is the official name of the IAEA information documents.81 INFCIRC/26. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/index.html. Last accessed: 17 May 2007.82 INFCIRC/66. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf66r2.shtml. Las accessed: 17 May 2007.83 INFCIRC/153. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf. Last accessed: 21 August 2007.84 “Significant quantities” are defined as 8kg of Pu or U233, or 25 kg of U235 contained in HEU.85 INFCIRC/153.86 INFCIRC/153.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf66r2.shtmlhttp://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/index.html
only under the Additional Safeguards Protocol presented in INFCIR/54087.
INFCIR/25488 from 1978 presented some fundamental guidelines for nuclear
transfers to any NNWS for peaceful purposes. Besides that, suppliers had defined an
export trigger list and agreed on common criteria for technology transfers.
The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was created in 1957,
and, since then, it rules a particular safeguards system in Europe. Its safeguards are part
of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Tripartite agreements concluded
between the Member States, the EURATOM and the IAEA establish that the
Community safeguards must be applied in conjunction with those of the International
Agency.89 An important aspect of the EURATOM safeguards system, in contrast to that
of the IAEA, is that it subjects to inspection all the civilian nuclear installations and
materials in the states parties, including the ones in the United Kingdom and France,
recognized nuclear weapon states.
The Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) “forms the
principal legal foundation of the broader regime of rules and constraints designed to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as well as weaponusable fissile material and
bomb making technology.”90 It is also the only global legal instrument through which a
State can commit itself to nonnuclearweapon State status. The treaty was signed on 1
July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. “The provisions of the Treaty,
particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty
every five years.”91 These review conferences have been convened since 1975. The NPT
might be considered a landmark international treaty since more countries have ratified it
than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement.
The NPT parties are divided into nuclear weapon states (NWS)92 and non
87 INFCIRC/540. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf. Last accessed: 21 August 2007.88 INFCIRC/254. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc254.shtml. Last accessed: 21 August 2007.89 Europa – SCADPlus Website. Available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/euratom_en.htm. Last accessed: 23 August 2007.90 ANTHONY; ROTFELD. A Future Arms Control Agenda, p.289.91 United Nations Website. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/. Last accessed: 21 August 2007.92 As defined in article IX , “a nuclearweapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”. By this definition, China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA are nuclear weapon states.
nuclear weapon states (NNWS), with a number of basic obligations following them. In
accordance to Article I, the treaty prohibits the transfer by NWS parties of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as well as the assistance, encouragement or
inducement of any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons or
devices. On the other hand, Article II prohibits NNWS parties from undertaking
manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. These parties are also prohibited from exporting nuclear materials or
equipment to any NNWS unless that material or equipment is subject to the safeguards
arrangements specified in the treaty.
In order to minimize charges of discrimination, Article IV declares that nothing
in the treaty should be interpreted as “affecting inalienable right of all the Parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes.”93 Article V guarantees the sharing of any peaceful benefits from nuclear
explosives while Article VI mandates that all parties “pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
to nuclear disarmament.”94
A clause in Article X had the effect of postponing any decision on the duration
of the accord for 25 years after its entry into force. In 1995, the NPT Review and
Extension Conference established the indefinite duration of the treaty, as well as other
two decision documents mandating changes in the way NPTrelated issues are to be
addressed in the future. Furthermore, the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference
“sought to strengthen the review process by requiring that Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom) meetings be held in each of three years leading up to the quinquennial
review conferences.”95
The 2000 NPT Review Conference was marked by the common idea between the
parties that cooperation and timely action were needed to prevent further erosion of the
NPT regime. In that way, the Conference ended with the adoption by consensus of a
Final Declaration for the first time since 1985. The text contained an important forward
looking element setting out a number of concrete disarmament goals. The five NWS
committed themselves to pursuing a program of actions on arms control and
93 UNITED NATIONS. Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. IV. Available at: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html. Last accessed: 28 August 2007.94 Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. VVI.95 ANTHONY; ROTFELD. A Future Arms Control Agenda, p.290.
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html
disarmament, and “collectively made an ‘unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the
total elimination of their nuclear arsenal leading to nuclear disarmament to which all
Parties are committed under Article VI’.”96 The Final Declaration also pointedly noted
that, despite their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of a NWS. The
main question now seems to be how far the parties, in particular the NWS parties, will
be willing to go to keep their words.
At last, we must observe the importance of another traditional instrument for the
strengthening of the nonproliferation regime: the NuclearWeaponsFree Zone
(NWFZ). Recognized by the Article VII of the NPT, NWFZs can be understood as
regional arrangements concluded by states in order to completely ban the menace of
nuclear weapons in a determined area. It means the prohibition of developing,
manufacturing, acquiring, stockpiling, possessing, controlling and testing nuclear
weapons within the zone. Another important aspect of these arrangements is the
“negative security assurances”: by signing and ratifying protocols to the NWFZs, the
five NWS bind themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states
parties to the agreement. The NWFZ treaties also prohibit the transit of nuclear
weapons through the zone.
There are five great NWFZ in the world today, covering Latin America and the
Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast
Asia (Treaty of Bangkok), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba)97 and Central Asia (Treaty of
Semipalatinsk). Other treaties also establish the demilitarization and denuclearization of
specific territories such as Mongolia98; the Antarctic; the Seabed, the ocean floor and
the subsoil thereof; the outer space; the Moon and other celestial bodies.
Over the past four decades, the NWFZs, together with the NPT, have proved
their substantial contribution to international security.99 While the NPT is a global and
singleform commitment, the NWFZs enable its members to undertake regional
approaches that are difficult to be taken in a global level. They also generate important
regional dialogues, very beneficial for the casetocase security specificities. In
96 ANTHONY; ROTFELD. A Future Arms Control Agenda, p.291.97 Not yet into force.98 Mongolia is the only state recognized by the United Nations as a singlestate NuclearWeaponFree Zone.99 ELBARADEI, Mohamed. NuclearWeaponFree Zones: Pursuing Security, Region by Region. Available at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n005.html. Last accessed: 29 April 2007.
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n005.html
committing themselves to regional agreements, member states tend to be more
committed with their international community obligations.
4. BLOC POSITIONS
North America: The United States of America has demonstrated a steady
position against the proliferation of WMDs, and it “reserves the right to respond with
overwhelming force [...] to the use of WMD.”100 With the recent terrorist activities,
attention is now being driven to nonStates actors. In order to diminish nuclear terrorist
threats, the United States has been investing in intelligence, as well as bilateral and
multilateral initiatives.
Besides that, the United States has its own policies to hinder NonNuclear
Weapon States from producing WMDs, such as economic sanctions, under the Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act101. The United States also defends the ratification of the
IAEA Additional Protocol by all NPT states parties,102 so that the Agency is granted
more rights to inspect nuclear facilities. Although the U.S. signed this Additional
Protocol in 2004, it has not yet taken the necessary measures to implement the protocol
inside the country.103
Southern Asia: Despite having participated in the first drafts for the creation of
the NPT, India is not a signatory of the treaty, and it has declared itself a nuclear
power.104 According to the country, the “treaty only legitimized the continuing
possession and multiplication of nuclear stockpiles by those few states possessing
them,”105 and accuses China of illegally fostering the Pakistani nuclear military
program. The U.S. government imposed economic sanctions on India in 1998, after
100 THE WHITE HOUSE. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.101 Foreign Press Centers. Available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19206.pdf. Last accessed: 23 Aug 2007.102 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction...103Arms Control Association Website. Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtocol.asp. Last accessed: 19 May 2007.104 South Asia Analysis Group Website. Available at: http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers2%5Cpaper117.html. Last accessed: 19 May 2007.105 Embassy of India – Washington DC Website. Available at: http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/embassy_non_proliferation.htm. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/embassy_non_proliferation.htmhttp://www.saag.org/\papers2\paper117.htmlhttp://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtocol.asphttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf
India nuclear tests, which were kept until 2001.106
Some discussion was raised when, in 2005, an AmericanIndian civil nuclear
cooperation program was launched. Being a signatory of the NPT, the United States is
forced not to exchange nuclear technology to NNWS for military proposes. As a result,
the Indian government decided to separate its civil nuclear facilities from its military
ones, the former being, now, under the IAEA’s safeguards.107 There is still no sign,
however, that India will sign the NPT.
Furthermore, Pakistan is not a NPT signatory either, and it has started its nuclear
program shortly after the independence of East Pakistan in 1971. As a result of the
resuming of missile tests by Asian countries in 1998, the United States adopted, once
more, sanction policies. However, this picture changed completely after Pakistan has
shown itself as a great ally on America's War Against Terror.108
Europe: Europe depends heavily on nuclear power; 88% of the French energy
matrix, for example, is based on nuclear energy.109 The continent has a long history of
safeguards and technical cooperation, which started with the establishment of the
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), in 1957.110 A recent effort to
reduce costs and increase efficiency of inspections was launched with a cooperation
program between EURATOM and the IAEA, creating the New Partnership Approach.111
The European continent is also concerned about a nuclear terrorist threat. In
2005, the European Parliament approved a resolution on the nonproliferation of
WMDs, in which it remembers the danger Cold War fissile materials represent, and
acknowledges, for instance, that the EU “should play a more active role in non
proliferation and disarmament policies.”112 Currently, Europe Union also counters
106 U.S. Department of State Website. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.107 SQUASSONI, Sharon. India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33292.pdf. Last accessed: 19 May 2007.108 U.S. Department of State Website. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.109The EDF Group Website. Available at: http://www.edf.com/12025i/Homefr/EDFEnergies/Nuclearpower.html. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.110 Europa – SCADPlus Website. Available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/euratom_en.htm. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.111 IAEA Website. Available at http://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull371/chitumbo.html. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.112 EurLex Website. Available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce280/ce28020061118en04530463.pdf. Last Accessed: 19 May 2007.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce280/ce28020061118en04530463.pdfhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce280/ce28020061118en04530463.pdfhttp://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull371/chitumbo.htmlhttp://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/euratom_en.htmhttp://www.edf.com/12025i/Homefr/EDFEnergies/Nuclearpower.htmlhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htmhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33292.pdfhttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm
terrorists’ activities by sharing information from Interpol, Europol and the European
Commission with IAEA. 113
Latin America: The largest NuclearWeaponFree Zone was established in 1967
with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was signed by all 33 countries in the region.114
Despite the great advance towards nonproliferation, both Argentina and Brazil
developed covert nuclear programs during the seventies. The picture only changed in the
nineties, when both countries resigned their WMD programs and ratified both the
Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT.115 In 2004, there was an incident involving the IAEA and
Brazil, as the agency’s inspectors claimed not have complete clearance to perform on
site verifications in a Brazilian uranium enrichment plant. Brazil replied that all the
production was destined to peaceful purposes, and that the obstruction aimed only at
preserving Brazilian proprietary technology.
Although both parts have reached a common ground, neither Brazil nor
Argentina is a signatory of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.116 It is unlikely�
Top Related