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FREEDOM ON THE NET2015
Key Developments: June 2014 – May 2015
● AccesstotheinternetbecamemorechallengingforSudanesecitizensasinternetpricessurgedwhilespeedsdeclineddramatically(see Availability and Ease of Access).
● Extremelyslowinternetspeedswereexperiencedinpartsofthecountryduringseveralpoliticallycontentiousperiods,leadingtostrongsuspicionsofgovernmentthrottling(seeRestrictions on Connectivity).
● AnewFreedomofAccesstoInformationLawpassedinJanuary2015classifies12typesofinformationthatarerestrictedfromcitizens.Observersbelievethegovernmentpassedthenewlawtolegalizethewithholdingofinformationanditscensorshippowers(seeLegal Environment).
● IntheleaduptotheApril2015generalelections,severalonlinejournalistsandactivistswerearrestedwhilenumerousonlinenewsoutletswerehacked(seeProsecutions andDetentionsandTechnical Attacks).
Sudan2014 2015
Internet Freedom Status Not Free
Not Free
ObstaclestoAccess(0-25) 18 18
LimitsonContent(0-35) 19 19
ViolationsofUserRights(0-40) 28 28
TOTAL* (0-100) 65 65
* 0=most free, 100=least free
Population: 38.8 million
Internet Penetration 2014: 25 percent
Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: No
Political/Social Content Blocked: No
Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes
Press Freedom 2015 Status: Not Free
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Introduction
InternetfreedominSudanremainedunderthreatin2014and2015,asauthoritarianPresidentOmaral-Bashir’sgovernmentintensifieditscrackdownoncriticalvoicesinthelead-uptogeneralelectionsheldinApril2015.Inanattempttoexpandcontroloverthepoliticalspace,thegovernmentenactednumerouslawsdesignedtoincreaseitspowerswhileminimizingopportunitiesforopposition.InJanuary2015,forexample,theSudaneseparliamentapprovedconstitutionalamendmentsthatgavethepresidentpowerstoappointandremoveseniorofficials,1andestablishedanewbodyofsecurityforcesunderthecontroloftheNationalIntelligenceandSecurityService(NISS),whichwasprevious-lylimitedtointelligencegathering.2
AnewFreedomofAccesstoInformationLawpassedinJanuary2015withthepurportedaimofin-creasingtransparencyhasinsteadledtogreaterlimitations,withprovisionsthatdetail12typesofinformationthatarerestrictedfromcitizens,suchasnationalsecurityandforeignpolicyinformation.Thelimitseffectivelyleavenoroomforjournalistsorthepublictoaccessanyinformationofconse-quence.Observersbelievethegovernmentpassedthenewlawtolegalizethewithholdingofinfor-mationanditscensorshippowers.
Meanwhile,governmentauthoritiesmadeotherconcertedeffortstorestrictcriticalinformationandsilencetheopposition,includingproactivelymanipulatingtheonlineinformationlandscapeandar-restingseveraljournalistsandactivistsfortheironlineactivities.Severalhackingattacksagainstcrit-icalnewswebsitesandactivists’socialmediawebpageswerereported,escalatingaroundtheApril2015generalelections.Whilenocriticalnewsoroppositionwebsiteswereblockedduringthecov-erageperiod,Sudaneseofficialsregularlydemandedtheblockingofonlinenewsoutlets,particularlyaftertheoutletscriticizedgovernmentofficialsorpublishedarticlesaboutcorruption.
Obstacles to Access
Access to the internet became more challenging for Sudanese citizens in 2014-2015 as a result of increasing costs and declining quality of services. Extremely slow internet speeds were experienced during several political contentious periods, leading to strong suspicions of government throttling.
Availability and Ease of Access
Accesstoinformationandcommunicationstechnologies(ICTs)inSudanslightlyincreasedoverthepastyear,withinternetpenetrationreaching25percentin2014,comparedto23percentin2013,accordingtotheInternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU).3Thenumberofusersmaybehigherasinternet-enabledmobilephoneshavebecomewidespreadandcheaperinrecentyears.
DespitethespreadofICTservices,accesstotheinternetbecamemorechallengingforSudanesecitizensin2014-2015asthecostofaccesssurgedamiddecliningqualityandspeeds.4Telecomcom-
1 “Sudan:ConstitutionalamendmentsgiveBashirnewpowers,”Asharq Alawsat,January5,2015,http://www.aawsat.net/2015/01/article55340104/sudan-constitutional-amendments-give-bashir-new-powers.2 “Sudaneseconstitutiontobeamendedtograntmorepowerstosecurityservices:official,”Sudan Tribune,April30,2015,http://bit.ly/1GBIqVh.3 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“PercentageofIndividualsUsingtheInternet,”2000-2014,http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.4 “DeteriorationoftelecommunicationservicesinSudanandcompaniescomplainofpiracy,”[inArabic]Sudan Tribune,April
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paniesintroducednewbundlesathigherratesthatdidnotdeliverspeedsasadvertised,whileoldbundlesexperiencedworseningspeeds.AccordingtoAkamai’s2014“StateoftheInternet”fourthquarterreport,5Sudan’saverageconnectionspeeddeclinedby73percentduringtheSeptem-ber-December2014quarteralone,6decreasingfrom3.6Mbpsto1.0Mbps(significantlylowerthantheglobalaveragespeedof4.5Mbps).IncreasingtensionsandviolentclashesbetweengovernmentforcesandrebelfactionsinSudan’sconflictregionshavealsoledtofrequentservicedisruptions.
Asofmid-2015,monthlymobileinternetsubscriptionscostbetweenSDG2.62to68(US$0.62to$11),upfromSDG2to9in2014—anincreaseof31percentfor100MBofdataandaround600per-centfor1GBpackages.Asaresult,mobilephonepenetrationinSudandecreasedslightlyfrom73percentin2013to72percentin2014.7USBinternetmodemsforpersonaldesktopsorlaptopscostbetweenSDG124and261(US$22to$46)permonth,andmonthlyfixed-linebroadbandsubscrip-tionsrangefromSDG26to200(US$5to$35),dependingonthepackage.
Internetaccessatcybercafes,whichareconcentratedinmarketareasandpopulararounduniversi-tiesanddorms,hasalsobecomemoreexpensive,withminimumchargesrangingbetweenSDG3-15(US$0.50-2.51)perhour,upfromSDG2-5(US$0.35-0.87)in2014—a50and200percentincrease,respectively—thoughthenumberofcybercafesinKhartoumstatehasdecreasednoticeablysincetheearly2000sasmobileinternethasbecomecheaperandmoreaccessibletothepublic.Asare-sultofincreasingprices,mobilephoneandinternetaccessisstilloutofreachforthemajorityofthepopulationinSudan.
Furthermore,approximately1.2millioncitizenslivinginrebel-controlledareasinSouthKordofanhaveextremelylimitedaccesstotheinternet.8Nearlytwomillioninternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)livingincampshavenoaccesswhatsoever.
Inapositivestep,previousobstaclestoaccessimposedbyU.S.economicsanctionsinplaceagainsttheal-Bashirregimesince1997weremitigatedinFebruary2015,whentheU.S.TreasuryDepart-mentannounceditwaseasingthelong-standingsanctions.9ThesanctionsbannedtheimportofICThardwareandoriginalsoftwaremadebyAmericancompanies,suchasanti-virus,anti-malware,an-ti-tracking,andanti-censorshipsoftwareandmoresecureICTapplications.Thebanhadbeenpartic-ularlypunitiveonSudaneseactivistsandordinarycitizens,whoseuseofoutdatedtechnologiesandsoftwaremadethemvulnerabletomalwareandothertechnicalattacks.UndertheFebruaryamend-mentstothesanctions,thesevitaltechnologiescannowbeimportedintothecountry.10
Restrictions on Connectivity
Sudanconnectstotheglobalinternetthroughthreeinternationalgateways—thepartlystate-owned
2014,http://bit.ly/1KkHeXp.5 Akamai,“AverageConnectionSpeed,”mapvisualization,State of the Internet, Q4 2014, accessedMay29,2015,http://akamai.me/1LiS6KD.6 Akamai, State of the Internet, Q4 2014 Report, 2015,http://bit.ly/1Lgq4AI.7 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion,“Mobile-CellularTelephoneSubscriptions,”2000-2014,http://bit.ly/1cblxxY.8 See“MayorsinSudan’sSouthKordofandemandno-flyzone,”RadioDabanga,February24,2014,http://bit.ly/1RkJ8gf,andUNHCR,“Sudan,”2015,http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html.9 “USEasesSudanSanctionstoAllowCommunicationsGear,”Voice of America News,February17,2015,http://bit.ly/1RSINSX.10 U.S.DepartmentofTreasury,“PublicationofSudanGeneralLicense-RelatedtoPersonalcommunications,”February17,2015,http://1.usa.gov/1GeXnmr.
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SudanTelecomCompany(Sudatel),Zain,andCanarTelecom11—whichareconnectedviafoursub-marinecables:SaudiArabia-Sudan-2(SAS-2),SaudiArabia-Sudan-1(SAS-1),EasternAfricaSubma-rineSystem(EASSy),andFALCON.12Partialcontrolovertheinternationalgatewayhasenabledthegovernmenttorestrictinternetconnectivityduringparticulareventsinthepast,suchasduringtheSeptember2013nationwideprotestswhenthegovernmentshutdownserviceofalltelecomprovid-ersfornearly24hours.13
InAugust2014,afive-dayinternetblackoutwasreportedintheWestDarfurregionofSudan,nega-tivelyimpactinghundredsofstudentswhowereunabletoapplyforuniversity,thoughthecauseofthedisruptionremainsunclear.14Inmanyotherpartsofthecountry,extremelyslowinternetspeedswereexperiencedduringseveralpoliticalcontentiousperiodsin2014-2015,leadingtostrongsus-picionsofgovernmentthrottling.Forexample,inthelead-uptotheone-yearanniversaryoftheSeptember2013protests,broadbandconnectionspeedsinKhartoumdeclinedsignificantlyfromanaveragespeedof3.2Mbpsto2.22MbpsinSeptember2014,15whichobserversbelievedwasanintentionaleffortbytheSudanesegovernmenttoimpedeanniversaryprotests.16InOctober2014,duringalargescalecampaigninitiatedonlinetoraiseawarenessaboutthemassrapeof200womenintheDarfuritownofTabit(see“Media,Diversity,andContentManipulation”),internetconnectionswerereportedlyaslowas1.48Mbps.DuringtheApril2015elections,speedswerealsoslowerthanaverageat2.34Mbps.17
ICT Market
ThereisfairlystrongmarketcompetitioninSudan’stelecomssectoramongfourlicensedtelecom-municationsoperators:Zain,MTN,Sudatel,andCanar.Allfourprovidersareprivatelyownedbyforeigncompanies,withtheexceptionofSudatel,whichhas22percentofitssharesownedbythegovernment;theremainingsharesareheldbyaforeignentity.18TheSudanesegovernmentmanip-ulatesthetelecommunicationssectorindirectlythroughSudatel’sboardofdirectors,whichincludesthecurrentMinisterofFinanceandNationalEconomyastheboard’schairman19andthecurrentGovernoroftheCentralBankofSudanasaboardmember.20
MTNandSudatelbothofferbroadbandinternet,whileZainoffersfastinternetthroughitsUSBmo-demandmobileinternetservices.Canaroffersfixedphonelinesandhomeinternet.Majorinternetprovidersprovide3Gservices.21InDecember2014,theMinisterofCommunicationsandInformation
11 DougMadory,“InternetBlackoutinSudan,”DynResearch,September25,2013,http://bit.ly/1QN46V3.12 Checkinteractive,HuaweiMarineNetworks,“SubmarineCableMapforSudan,”http://bit.ly/1ZRMhKz.13 SeeFreedomHouse,“Sudan,”Freedom on the Net 2014, http://bit.ly/1M2wVig. 14 “OnlineregistrationtoSadnessUniversitiesandInstitutes,”3ayin,August20,2014,http://bit.ly/1M1optw.15 NetIndex“TheGlobalStandardinInternetMetrics,”Sudan’smapvisualization,http://bit.ly/1GPBfK4.16 Author’sinterview.17 NetIndex“TheGlobalStandardinInternetMetrics.”18 RupaRanganathanandCeciliaBriceno-Garmendia,Sudan’s Infrastructure: A Continental Perspective,AfricaInfrastructureCountryDiagnostic, (Washington,D.C.): WorldBank,June2011)http://bit.ly/1OOZoXz.19 “DirarnamedChairmanofSudatel’sBoardofDirectors,TarigasaCEO,”[inArabic]Alintibaha, May18,2014,http://bit.ly/1jQCymW.20 SudanCentralBank,“ThePresentBoardofDirectors,”http://bit.ly/1jxA7pG.21 3Gshortformofthirdgeneration,isthethirdgenerationofmobiletelecommunicationstechnology.InternationalTelecommunicationunion,“IMT-2000Project,”http://www.itu.int/osg/imt-project/.
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Technologystatedthat4GwouldbeintroducedinSudanmid-2015,22thoughasofJune2015,4Ghadnotbeeninstalled.23
Increasingpricesontelecomservicesin2014-2015werepartiallyduetotaxincentivesgiventotele-comprovidersalongsidehighervalueaddedtaxes(VAT)imposedonconsumers.In2013,thegov-ernmentofSudanexemptedthetelecommunicationssectorfroma30percenttaxonallprofitsuntiltheendof2015.24Despitetheexemption,thegovernment’srevenuefromthetelecommunicationssectorgrewin2014-2015duetoVATrevenuestotalingUS$600millionperyearfromconsumers,25whilerevenuetaxesontelecomsdidnotexceedUS$40millionperyear.26
Regulatory Bodies
Foundedin1996andhousedundertheMinistryofTelecommunicationsandInformationTechnol-ogy,theNationalTelecommunicationsCorporation(NTC)istaskedwithproducingtelecommunica-tionsstatistics,monitoringtheuseoftheinternet,introducingnewtechnologyintothecountry,anddevelopingthecountry’stelecommunicationsandITindustry.Itisalsoresponsiblefordecidingwhatcontentshouldbeaccessibleontheinternet.Althoughitisastatebody,theNTCreceivesgrantsfrominternationalorganizationssuchastheIntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopmentandtheWorldBank,anditswebsitedescribesthebodyas“self-financing.”
Limits on Content
Online self-censorship increased notably in 2014-2015 in response to the government’s heavy-handed crackdown against both print and online media in advance of the April 2015 elections. Government ef-forts to manipulate the online information landscape also became more concerted and systematic.
Blocking and Filtering
NewswebsitesandsocialmediaplatformswerenotblockedinSudanduringthecoverageperiod,thoughaccesstoFacebookandtheonlinenewsoutletAl Rakobawasreportedlyverysloworattimesvirtuallyinaccessibletomanyusers.27Meanwhile,Sudaneseofficialsregularlydemandedtheblockingofonlinenewsoutlets,particularlyaftertheoutletscriticizedgovernmentofficialsorpub-lishedarticlesaboutcorruption.28
TheSudanesegovernmentopenlyacknowledgesblockingandfilteringwebsitesthatitconsiders“immoral”and“blasphemous.”TheNTCmanagesonlinefilteringinthecountrythroughitsInternetServiceControlUnitandissomewhattransparentaboutthecontentitblocks,reportingthat95
22 “Futureplanstoreducetelecommunication’tariff,”[inArabic]Alkhartoum,December23,2014,http://bit.ly/1MzSAbR.23 SeeWorldTimeZone:http://www.worldtimezone.com/4g.html24 MattSmith,“Sudanshelvestelecomprofittaxforthreeyears,”Reuters,June16,2013,http://reut.rs/1MQ13w3.25 “AninterviewwithAlfatihErwah,”[inArabic]Alssayha,March11,2015,http://bit.ly/1OERWzU.26 “NationalCouncilstressestheneedtorevisethelawonprivatization,”[inArabic]Almighar,December22,2014,http://bit.ly/1ZRNMIz.27 Author’sinterviews.28 “TabitaBoutroscallsforclosingsomeonlinenewsoutlets,specificallySudanMotion,”[inArabic]Sudan Motion,March14,2014,http://bit.ly/1W2w8ma.
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percentofblockedmaterialisrelatedtopornography.29TheNTC’swebsitealsogivesuserstheop-portunitytosubmitrequeststoeitherblockorunblockwebsites“thataredeemedtonotcontainpornography,”30thoughitdoesnotspecifywhethertheappealsextendtopoliticalwebsites.Usersattemptingtoaccessablockedsitearemetwithablackpagethatexplicitlystates,“ThissitehasbeenblockedbytheNationalTelecommunicationsCorporation,”andincludeslinkstofurtherinfor-mationandacontactemailaddress.31
InadditiontotheNTC,NISSagentsreportedlyhavethetechnicalcapabilitytoblockwebsitesdeemedharmfulandthreateningtoSudan’snationalsecurity,32whiletheGeneralProsecutoralsohastherighttoblockanysitethatthreatensnationalsecurityorviolatessocialmores.33
DuringaJune2014workshopononlinemedia,theSudaneseInformationMinisterdescribedFace-bookandindependentonlinenewsoutletsAl Rakoba,Hurriyat,andSudanese Onlineas“anomalous”and“mercenary”andstatedhisintentiontocensorthesitesfortarnishingSudan’simageandblock-ingpotentialforeigninvestmentopportunities.34Theministerreiteratedthesameofficialpositionagainstonlinemediainatelevisedinterview,35affirmingthatthegovernmentblockscontentthatitperceivesasimmoralorathreattonationalsecurity.
Content Removal
Theextenttowhichthegovernmentforceswebsitestodeletecertaincontentisunknown,thoughanecdotalincidentsin2014-2015suggestedthatsomedegreeofforcedcontentremovalbythestateexists,andthatsuchadhocrequirementslacktransparency.Forexample,inMarch2014,thegovernmentforcedthreenewsoutletstodeletearticlesfromtheirwebsitesthathadcitedagov-ernmentpressrelease,whichquotedanofficialfromtherulingNationalCongressParty(NCP)usinganoffensiveslurtocharacterizetheopposition.36Criticismofthequotewentviralonsocialmedia,promptingtheNCP—beleagueredbystrongpushbackfromtheoppositionintheleaduptotheApril2015presidentialelections—todeletetheoriginalpressreleasefromitsownwebsite,inad-ditiontoforcingotheroutletstobothdeletethestoriesandpostaretraction.37Furthermore,theNCPdismisseditsKhartoum-chapterwebmasterfromhisjobforpublishingthestatementthathadcausedthesocialmediauproar.38
Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation
Despiteincreasinginstancesofinternetcensorshipinrecentyears,onlinenewspapersinSudancon-
29 NationalTelecommunicationsCorporation,“BlockingOrUnblockWebsites,”lastmodifiedOctober22,2014,http://bit.ly/1GnidzI.30 “BlockingOrUnblockWebsites.”31 Imageofablockedsite:http://bit.ly/1GeYxyn.32 “Expert:NISSiscapableofblockingwebsitesthatareposingathreattoSudan’snationalsecurity,”Aljareeda,November7,2014.33 “Cybercrimeisanactofterrorismthatthreatensthesovereigntyofthestate,”[inArabic]Alintibaha,August13,2014,http://bit.ly/1NRfFg5.34 “AhmedBilal:Thesewebsitesareanomalous”and“mercenary,”[inArabic]Alrakoba,June30,2014,http://bit.ly/1RSLYKi.35 SeeYouTubevideoinArabic,Sudan national TV,29:50to34:00,June20,2013,http://bit.ly/1RSM7gJ.36 “NCP:thosewhocallforabstentionareriffraff,”[inArabic] Alyoum Altali,March7,2015,http://bit.ly/1LGV2Ro.37 “ClarificationformNCPaboutthestatementattributedtoYasserYoussef,”Alyoum Altali, March8,2015,http://bit.ly/1jxBdBR.38 “Webmasterexpelledfromhisposition,”Al-Tayar,March8,2015.
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tinuetohavemorefreedomthantraditionalmediaoutlets,whicharefrequentlysubjecttopre-pub-licationcensorship,confiscationsofentirepressrunsofnewspapers,andwarningsfromNISSagentsagainstreportingoncertaintabootopics,whichincludehumanrightsviolationslinkedtothecountry’sconflictregions,statecorruption,theeconomicrecession,andcriticismofnationalsecurityagents.39RestrictionsonprintandbroadcastnewsoutletsincreasedfollowingtheNationalSecurityActof2010,whichgavetheNISSpermissiontoarrestjournalistsandcensornewspapersunderthepretextofnationalsecurity.
Comparedtothehighlyrestrictivespaceinthetraditionalmediasphere,theinternetremainsarela-tivelyopenspaceforfreedomofexpression,withboldvoicesexpressingdiscontentwiththegovern-mentonvariousonlineplatforms.Manyprintnewspaperscirculatecensoredorbannedmaterialontheirwebsitesandsocialmediapages,leadingSudanesecitizenstoincreasinglyturntoonlineout-letsandsocialmediaforuncensoredinformation.Continuouspressureontraditionalmediahasledanumberofindependentjournaliststoestablishonlinenewsoutletsinthepastfewyears,thoughseveraloutletsweresubjecttofrequenttechnicalattacksbygovernmentforcesthroughout2014-2015aspartofanapparentattempttolimitaccesstoindependentnewsandvoicesinthelead-uptotheApril2015elections(see“TechnicalAttacks”).
Bloggingisanimportantplatformforjournalistsandwriterstopublishcommentaryfreefromtherestrictionsleveledonprintnewspapers.Blogsalsogiveethnic,gender,andreligiousminoritiesavenuetoexpressthemselves.Asofmid-2015,therewereabout300SudaneseblogsregisteredwiththeSudaneseBloggersNetwork.ThemoreactiveSudanesebloggerswriteintheEnglishlanguage.
Nonetheless,onlineself-censorshipincreasednotablyin2014-2015inresponsetothegovernment’sheavy-handedcrackdownagainstbothprintandonlinemediainadvanceoftheApril2015elec-tions.40Themajorityofjournalistswritingforonlinenewspapers,suchasthenewlyestablishedAlta-reeqandAltaghyeer,writeanonymously.41
Governmenteffortstomanipulatetheonlineinformationlandscapehavebecomemoreconcertedandsystematic.Duringthecoverageperiod,thegovernment’sCyberJihadistUnitcontinuedtospreadmisinformationonnewsrelatedtohumanrightsviolationsandcorruptionallegations.Theunit,whichfallsundertheNISS,proactivelymonitorscontentpostedonblogs,socialmediawebsites,andonlinenewspaperforumsandinfiltratesonlinediscussionsinanefforttoascertaininformationaboutcyber-dissidents.
AlargescalecyberjihadistcampaignwaslaunchedinNovember2014inresponsetoglobalonlineandofflineactivismsurroundingthemassrapeofover200womenandgirlsinTabittowninNorthDarfurbySudanesesoldiers,42whichwasfirstreportedbyRadioDabanga.43LedbyKhalidEwais,a
39 “ChairmanoftheSudaneseNationalPressCouncil:securityservicesintervenewhen“redlinesarecrossed”andthreatennationalsecurity,”[inArabic] Asharq Alawsat,February,15,2015,http://bit.ly/19IMgmC;“President:Wewillnotallowthepresstogobeyondtheredlines,”Ashorooq,February25,2015,http://bit.ly/1XfYExM.40 Author’sinterview.41 Altaghyeer[Arabicforchangewithpoliticalconnotation]wasestablishedin2013followingthegovernment’scrackdownonindependentjournalists,whowereeventuallybannedfrompracticingtraditionaljournalisminSudanin2012.Formore,seeReemAbbas,“Sudan’sShiftfromPrinttoOnlineNewspapers,”DohaCentreforMediaFreedom,May16,2013,http://bit.ly/1GniAKB.AltareegwasestablishedinJanuary2014,andits“Whoweare”sectiondoesnotincludenamesofstaffbutrathertheinstitution’sreportingcodeofconduct.42 “Massrapeof“200”inNorthDarfur,”Radio Dabanga,November2,2014,http://bit.ly/1W2wEk9;HumanRightsWatch,“Sudan:MassRapebyArmyinDarfur,”February11,2015,http://bit.ly/1E9pI7e.43 LaunchedfromtheNetherlandsinNovember2008,RadioDabangafocusesonreportingonDarfurandhasastrongonlinepresenceandwideaudienceinconflictsareas.Itwebsiteisbilingualandrunsindepthreportsandfeatures.Itisa
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SudanesejournalistbasedintheUnitedArabEmirates,thesocialmediacampaigntoraiseaware-nessaboutthemassrapeledtoseveraldemonstrationsaroundtheworldandinSudan.44Variouscounter-campaignsfromtheCyberJihadistUnitweresubsequentlylaunchedonbothgovernmentandostensiblyapoliticalsocialmediapagesthataimedtodelegitimizetherapeatrocitybysmearingRadioDabangaandKhalidEwais.45Forexample,cyberjihadistscirculatedamessageonWhatsAppclaimingthatEwaishadreceivedaUS$1millionbribefromtheAfricanUnion/UnitedNationsHy-bridoperationinDarfur(UNAMID),46whichEwaisdeniedinaninterviewwithaKhartoum-basednewspaper.47
Initsattempttodistortthefacts,cyberjihadiststhenpostedavideoonYouTubeinwhichTabitresidentswereintervieweddenyingtheRadioDabangareport.48Simultaneously,thegovernment’s“OfficialPageoftheRapidResponseOperationsRoom”Facebookpagepublishedphotosshow-ingawomen’srallyinTabitdenyingthereportandclaimingthatRadioDabangahaddishonoredthem.49Allthewhile,membersoftheSudaneseparliamentopenlydemandedtheblockingofRadioDabangainSudan.50ThegovernmenteventuallyyieldedtointernationalpressuregarneredbythecampaignandallowedofficialsfromtheUnitedNationsMissioninDarfur(UNAMID)toconductaninvestigation,51albeitunderthegovernment’ssupervision.52Unfortunately,thegovernmentsubse-quentlyblockedtheinvestigation53andlatercloseddowntheUNHumanRightsofficeinKhartoum.54
Digital Activism
DespitenumerousobstaclesandrestrictionsonICTsinSudan,thecountry’sgrowingpopulationoftechnologicallysavvycitizensregularlyengagesindigitalactivismtodemandgovernmentaccount-abilityandsocialchange.Digitalactivismwasparticularlyvibrantinthelead-uptotheApril2015generalelections,asexemplifiedbythe“Leave!”campaignlaunchedinFebruary2015inresponsetoPresidentOmarAl-Bashir’sstatementthathewouldnotleavethepresidencyunlesshewasvotedout,whichcitizensrejectedgiventheAl-Bashir’srecordofriggingelectionsinthepast.55Thecam-paignencouragedawholesaleboycottoftheelectionasaformofprotestagainstAl-Bashir’sau-
projectoftheRadioDarfurNetwork.Dabnga,“AboutUs,”http://bit.ly/1LkMr5H.44 “Sudan:WorldwideProtestsandSocialMediaforDarfurMassRapeGrow,”All Africa,November23,2014,http://bit.ly/1Pv2SjN;MarkKerrison,“SudaneseprotestagainstmassrapesinDarfuroutsideDowningStreet,”DEMOTIX,November14,2014,http://bit.ly/1LGWLGr.45 CollectionofthecartonsincludedinthisPDFhttp://bit.ly/1M2BF7p;SeeFacebookpost[inArabic],November20,2014,http://on.fb.me/1Gf02N8;KhalidIbrahimEwais,FacebookPost,November23,2014,http://on.fb.me/1QN8y6i.46 KhalidIbrahimEwais,FacebookPost,November23,2014,http://on.fb.me/1QN8y6i.47 “khalidEwaisdeniesreceivingmoneyfortheUnitedNations,”[inArabic]Almijhar,November25,2014.48 “FactsaboutTabet,”[inArabic]YouTubevideo,9:54,postedbySudan’sHoopoe,November23,2014,http://bit.ly/1RSOmk3.49 PhotosformOfficialPageoftheRapidResponseOperationsRoom:FacebookPhoto,November20,2014,http://on.fb.me/1jxCusL;FacebookPhoto,November22,2014,http://on.fb.me/1Xg0RJr;FacebookPhoto,November22,2014,http://on.fb.me/1M1uHcE;FacebookPhoto,November22,2014,http://on.fb.me/1RSOH6q.50 “ConfrontationwithRadioDabanga,andthesearchformeanstohushit,”[inArabic]Alsaiha,November29,2014,http://bit.ly/1RkOKqI.51 JennPsaki,“GovernmentofSudanDelaysAccesstoInvestigateReportsofMassRapeinNorthDarfur,”pressstatement,U.S.DepartmentofState,November12,2014,http://1.usa.gov/1EEFdp5.52 “Sudan:ArmyFilmedUNAMIDMassRapeInvestigationsinTabit,”All Africa,November12,2014,http://bit.ly/1KkNnTx.53 “SudanagainblocksUNAMIDinvestigationintoDarfurmassrapeclaims,”Sudan Tribune,November16,2014,http://bit.ly/1RkOSqn.54 AFP,“SudanasksUNtoshuthumanrightsofficeinKhartoumoverabuseclaims,”The Guardian, November27,2014,http://bit.ly/1LkOIO9.55 “Sudanesepresident:Iwillnotleaveunlesspeopledecidethatthroughtheballotbox,”[inArabic]Al-Youm Al-Sabie, February26,2015.
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thoritarianism.56Thoughseveralorganizersofthe“Leave!”campaignwerearrestedaroundthecoun-try57andAl-Bashirwasultimatelyre-electedinApril,voterturnoutstoodatbetween30-35percentcomparedto72percentinthepreviouselectionsin2010,reflectingtheboycott’srelativesuccess.58
Violations of User Rights
A new Freedom of Access to Information Law passed in January 2015 classifies 12 types of information that are restricted from citizens, which observers believe was part of an effort to legalize the govern-ment’s censorship powers. In the lead-up to the April 2015 general elections, the government took preemptive measures to restrict critical information and silence the opposition by arresting numerous online journalists and activists. Hacking attacks against critical news websites and activists’ social me-dia accounts also escalated around the general elections.
Legal Environment
Freedomofspeech,expression,andassociationarenominallyprotectedunderthe2005InterimNationalConstitution(INC)thatwasadoptedaspartofthe2005ComprehensivePeaceAgreement(CPA)betweenthegovernmentofSudanandthesouthernrebelgroup,thoughtheconstitutionofficiallyexpiredfollowingtheindependenceofSouthSudaninJuly2011.InJanuary2015,theparliamentapprovednewamendmentstotheconstitutionregardingtheelections;59however,apermanentconstitutionisstillbeingdevelopedasofmid-2015,leavingtheINCasthecountry’shighestbindingdocument.Sudan’sjudiciaryisnotindependent,thoughitrecentlyruledagainstthegovernmentinsupportofpressfreedom,reversingagovernmentordertoshutdowntheAl-TayarindependentdailyinMarch2014.60
Sudanhasseveralrestrictivelawsthatseektolimitpressandinternetfreedom.Forexample,theIn-formaticOffences(Combating)Act(knownastheITCrimeAct,orelectroniccrimeslaw),61criminal-izestheestablishmentofwebsitesthatcriticizethegovernmentorpublishdefamatorymaterialandcontentthatdisturbspublicmoralityorpublicorder.62Violationsinvolvefinesandprisonsentencesbetweentwotofiveyears.The2009revisionstothehighlyrestrictive2004PressandPrintedPressMaterialsLawallowsforrestrictionsonthepressintheinterestsofnationalsecurityandpublicorder
56 FatimaNaib,“BoycottcalldampensSudan’selectionspirit,”Al Jazeera,April10,2015,http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/sudan-gripped-election-fever-opposition-boycott-150410154035525.html.57 “PreemptivearrestsbeforethesecondpubliceventfortheSudaneseoppositionfor“Leave!”campaign,”[inArabic]Sudan Tribune,February5,2015,http://bit.ly/1M2Ejdt.58 “Sudanelections:Pollscloseafterlowturnout,”BBC,April17,2015http://bbc.in/1HAm4aT;InternationalInstituteforDemocracyandElectoralAssistance,“VoterturnoutdataforSudan,”http://bit.ly/1Gf2eUI.59 AFP,“SudanamendsconstitutiontoletBashirnamegovernors,”Daily Mail,January4,2015,http://dailym.ai/1M1w8b2.60 “Sudan’stopcourtreversesnewspaperclosureamidcontinuedcrackdownonpress,”All Africa,March5,2014,http://bit.ly/1NkNtz4.61 TheInformaticOffences(Combating)Act,2007,http://bit.ly/1NkNx1R.62 AbdelgadirMohammedAbdelgadir,Fences of Silence: Systematic Repression of Freedom of the Press, Opinion and Expression in Sudan,(InternationalPressInstitute,2012)http://bit.ly/1Pv7nee.AccordingtoSection4,crimesagainstpublicorderandmoralitySudancyberlaw,ofSudan’sCybercrimeLaw(2007),intentionalorunintentionalproducing,preparing,sending,storing,orpromotinganycontentthatviolatespublicorderormorality,makestheoffenderliabletoimprisonmentof4to5yearsorafineorboth.Themaximumpenaltyforcommittingbothcrimesis7yearsorfineorboth.Also,underthesamesection,creating,promoting,using,websitethatcallsfor,orpromote,ideasagainstpubliclawormoralityispunishedby3yearsinprisonorfineorboth.Cyberdeformationcrimesnecessitate2yearsinprisonorfineorboth.Publicorderisnotdefinedclearlyinthelaw.Subsequently,mostoftheoppositioncontentonlinefallsunderthissectionmakingonlineactivistsliableunderthislaw.
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andholdseditors-in-chiefliableforallcontentpublishedintheirnewspapers.63The2010NationalSecurityActgivestheNISSimmunityfromprosecutionandthepermissiontoarrest,detain,andcensornewspapersunderthepretextofnationalsecurity.64Thoughtherearenospecificreferencestoonlinemedia,thepressandnationalsecuritylaws’broadwordingallowsthemtobeappliedtoonlinecontent.
InJanuary2015,thegovernmentpassedanewFreedomofAccesstoInformationLaw65withthesupposedaimofimprovingSudan’slastplacerankingonTransparencyInternational’sCorruptionPerception’sIndex.66Whilethegovernmentclaimedthatthelawwouldincreasetransparencyandthepublic’saccesstoinformation,67thelawitselfhasnotbeenmadepubliclyavailableasofmid-2015.Accordingtolocalreportsandobservers,thelawisinpracticehighlylimiting,withprovisionsthatreportedlyclassify12typesofinformationthatarerestrictedfromcitizens,suchasnationalse-curityandforeignpolicyinformation,amongothers.68Theclassificationsystemeffectivelyleavesnoroomforjournalistsorthepublictoaccessanyinformationofconsequence.Moreover,freedomofinformationrequestswillbeoverseenbyaministerappointedbythepresident,givingtheexecutivebranchexclusivecontroloveraccesstoinformation,whilearbitrarilydeterminedfeesimposedforeachinquirywillmaketheprocessofrequestinginformationburdensome.Furthermore,accordingtolocalsources,individualswillbeperverselysubjecttopenaltiesunderotherlawsiftheyrequestcertaintypesofclassifiedinformation,suchasinformationthatthegovernmentcoulddecideisathreattonationalsecurity.69Manyobserversbelievethegovernmentpassedthenewlawtolegalizethewithholdingofinformationanditscensorshippowers.70Otherscontendthelawprovidesthele-galgroundstoargueformoreaccesstoinformation.71
Meanwhile,anewdraftpresslawintroducedinDecember2012isstillintheworksasofmid-2015.AccordingtoastatementbytheheadofthePressandPublicationsCouncilinNovember2014,thenewpresslawwillincludesectionsgoverningonlinejournalism.72AlsoinNovember2014,theSuda-nesepolicedepartmentstatedthatithadover200cybercrimecasesopenagainst250defendantsduring2014,whichtheauthoritiesusedasanargumentforincludingonlinejournalisminthenewpresslaw.73Activistsbelievethatthegovernmentexaggeratedthenumberofcybercrimecasestojustifypassingmorerestrictivelawstoregulatetheinternet.
OnlinejournalistshavenolegalstatusinSudan.74Whilethislegallimbocanbebeneficialforonline
63 CommitteetoProtectJournalists,“RepressivepresslawpassedinSudan,”June11,2009,https://cpj.org/x/2c67.64 AmnestyInternational,“Sudanesesecurityservicecarriesoutbrutalcampaignagainstopponents,”July19,2010,http://bit.ly/1OP3OOi.65 NationalCouncil,“SudaneseParliamentpassesnewlaws,” January28,2015,http://bit.ly/1M1wRJh.66 InternationalTransparency,“Sudanvisualization,”http://www.transparency.org/country#SDN.67 LoriBaitarian,“Sudanpassesfreedomofinformationlawbutjournalistsremainwary,”CommitteetoProtectJournalists,February5,2015,https://cpj.org/x/5ee7.68 Otherclassifiedinformationrestrictedfromaccess:confidentialdocuments;nationaldefensesecrets;informationaboutlawsinprocess;personalinformationsuchaseducation,profession,andfinance;personalcorrespondence;informationthatcouldaffectongoingnegotiations;informationrelatedtopoliceinvestigationsorjudicialcommittees;confidentialpoliticalinformation;andinformationthatisscheduledtobepublic.See:“Governmentclassifies12typesofinformationandchargesfeesobtaintheinformation,”[inArabic]Alyoum Altali, January19,2015,http://bit.ly/1RSQB75.69 AccordingtoFreedomHouseinterviewswithananonymousSudanesejournalist,March2015.70 Author’sinterview,March2015.71 Author’sinterview,March2015.72 “Expert:NISSiscapableofblockingwebsitesthatareposingathreattoSudan’snationalsecurity.”73 “Police:Increaseincybercrimesinthecountry,”Alyoum Altali,November7,2014.74 PressandPrintedPressMaterials2009:https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/laws/sudan-draft-of-the-press-and-printed-press-material-act-2008.pdf.
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journalists,freeingthemfromthelimitationsoftherestrictivepresslaw,theyforfeitmanyprivilegesavailabletoprintjournalists,suchasmediaaccessatofficialevents.75
Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities
Inthelead-uptotheApril2015generalelections,thegovernmenttookpreemptivemeasurestore-strictcriticalinformationandsilencetheoppositionbyarrestingonlinejournalistsandactivists:
• InDecember2014,policedetainedAltayyarjournalistTagelsirWadelhkhairforpublishingonthenewspaper’swebsiteastoryaboutrealestatecorruptionthatinvolvedtheseniorlegaladvisortotheMinistryofJusticeandtheformerdirectoroftheLandRegistryOffice.76Hewasheldforonedayandchargedwithdefamation.
• InMay2015,onlinefemaleactivistSolafaSaadwasarrestedbyplainclothessecurityser-vicesfollowingaFacebookpostdescribingherpersonalexperiencewithracism,whichwaswidelydisseminated.77Shewasinterrogatedforsevenhours,duringwhichherinterrogatorsblamedherforthewidecirculationofherFacebookpost.Theinterrogatorswereparticu-larlyfuriousthatherpostwaspickedupbythesatiricalFacebookpage“Al-BashirDiary.”78Saadwasbeatenbyherinterrogators,whousedracialslursandshavedherheadfortalkingbackatthem.79
• InJuly2015,WaleedAlHussein,thecreatorofthecriticalonlinenewsoutlet,Al Rakoba,wasarrestedbytheauthoritiesinSaudiArabia,wherehehadbeenresidingwithhisfamily.80AsofSeptember,hewasbeingheldinsolitaryconfinementwithoutchargesandsubjectedtointerrogationsabouthisworkwithAl Rakoba.FamilymembersbelievehewasarrestedattherequestoftheSudanesegovernment,whichhadtargetedHusseinforhisworkinthepastandwasseekingtohavehimextraditedbacktoSudan.81
Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity
UncheckedsurveillanceofICTsisagraveconcerninSudan.TheSudanesegovernmentactivelymon-itorsinternetcommunicationsonsocialmediaplatforms,particularlytargetingonlineactivistsandjournalistsduringpoliticalprotests,andtheNISSregularlyinterceptsprivateemailmessages,en-abledbysophisticatedsurveillancetechnologies.
AccordingtoCitizenLabresearchfromJune2013,Sudanpossesseshigh-techsurveillanceequip-mentfromtheU.S.-basedBlueCoatSystems,atechnologycompanythatmanufacturesmonitoringandfilteringdevices.ThesurveillancesystemwasinitiallytracedtothreenetworksinsideSudan,in-
75 Author’sinterview,March2015.76 “PolicedetainsjournalistTagelsirWadelhkhairandkeepshiminCybercrimeProcuratorateOffice,”[inArabic]Almshaheer, December26,2014,http://bit.ly/1M2GTjH.77 SolafaSaad,FacebookPost,April30,2015,http://on.fb.me/1NRkypr.78 Retrievedfrom:AlBashirDiary,FacebookPhoto,May4,2015,http://on.fb.me/1W1sdk5.79 RetrievedfromtheactivistFacebookaccount-herstatuswassettopublic.SolafaSaad,FacebookPost,April30,2015,http://on.fb.me/1NRkypr.80 JournalistsforHumanRights,“SaudiAuthoritiesDetainsSudanesecitizeninAl-khobarasbeingdemandedandsleekedbySudaneseIntelligenceorgans,”September1,2015,http://bit.ly/1LzJuw0.81 AmnestyInternational,“SudaneseActivistArrested,RisksDeportation,”urgentaction,September9,2015,http://bit.ly/1LH10lk.
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cludingonthenetworksoftheprivatetelecomproviderCanar.82Inaddition,CitizenLabalsolocatedsophisticatedcomputerspywaretechnologyknownasRemoteControlSystem(RCS)bytheItaliancompanyHackingTeaminSudaninearly2014.83AdvertisedbyHackingTeamas“offensivetechnol-ogy”soldexclusivelytolawenforcementandintelligenceagenciesaroundtheworld,RCSspywarehastheabilitytostealfilesandpasswordsandinterceptSkypecallsandchats.84InternalemailsleakedbyhackersinJuly2015confirmedthatSudan’sNISShadpurchasedHackingTeam’sRCSspy-warein2012,85thoughanotherleakedemailfromJanuary2014revealedthattrainingofintelligenceagentswasstymiedbyanoverwhelminglackofcomputerliteracyandEnglish-languageskills.86OtherleakedemailsrevealedthatthecompanyhaddiscontinuedbusinesswithSudaninNovember2014.87
Useofmobilephoneshasbecomeincreasinglydangerousforactivists,givenwidespreadsuspicionthattheauthoritiespossessphone-tappingandlocationtrackingtools.88AnumberofSudanesejournalistsandactivistshavereportedfearsthattheirphonesaretapped,89andthereisastrongbeliefamongSudaneseactivistsandjournaliststhatthegovernmenthasadvancedcapabilitiestoremotelyactivateamobilephone’smicrophonetoeavesdroponconversationsevenifthecellphoneisswitchedoff.Accordingtoanonymoussources,theIranianAmbassadoroncerequestedjournaliststoplacetheirinactivecellphonesfarawayfromtheirconversationwiththeAmbassador,whohadadmittedthatthey[theIranians]themselveshadintroducedthiscapabilitytotheSudanesegovernment.90
SIMcardregistrationrequirementswereenactedin2008,compromisingmobilephoneusers’priva-cyandanonymity,particularlygiventhestrongsenseamongobserversthatthegovernmentisabletoaccessusercommunicationsthroughproviderswithoutdueprocess.91Inarenewedefforttoen-forceSIMcardregistration—whichrequiresanofficialidentificationcardandhomeaddressinforma-tion92—thegovernmentdisconnectedallunregisteredSIMcardsinJune2014andreportedlyplanstolinkSIMcardstousers’nationalidentificationnumbersinthefuture.93
Intimidation and Violence
SecurityagentsinSudanregularlyemployextralegalintimidation,harassment,andviolenceagainstonlinejournalistsandactivists.Theauthoritiesalsoroutinelyabusepoliticaldetaineestoobtainaccesstoprivatecommunicationsthatcouldbeusedasevidenceincourt.94InonecasefromSep-
82 EllenNakashima,“Report: WebmonitoringdevicesmadebyUSfirmBlueCoatdetectedinIran,Sudan,” Washington Post,July8,2013,http://wapo.st/1Pv95fA.83 BillMarczak,etal.,Mapping Hacking Team’s “Untraceable” Spyware, CitizenLab,February17,2014,http://bit.ly/1kPDo0Y.84 HackingTeam,“CustomerPolicy,”accessedFebruary13,2014,http://bit.ly/1GnkbjG.85 PDFofareceiptthatshowstheNationalIntelligenceandSecurityServicesofSudanpurchasedHackingTeam’sservices:http://bit.ly/1Pv9A9p.86 EmailfromAlessandroScarafile,“SudanFollow-Up,”HackingTeam,http://bit.ly/1jxGpWe.87 CoraCurrierandMorganMaqruis-Boire,“ADetailedlookAtHackingTeam’sEmailsAboutItsRepressiveClients,”The Intercept,July7,2015,http://bit.ly/1jxGv0h.88 InterviewinKhartoum,Sudan,August1,2012.89 LoriBaitarian,“Sudanpassesfreedomofinformationlawbutjournalistsremainwary,”CommitteetoProtectJournalists,February5,2015,https://cpj.org/x/5ee7;Author’sinterview,March2015.90 Author’sinterview,March2015.91 FreedomHouseinterview,March2015.92 “NTCannouncestheendofgraceperiodtoregistersimcards,”[inArabic]Sudani Net,June1,2014,http://bit.ly/1W2A0n3.93 “Sudan:Telecomscompaniesblocknon-registeredSIMcards,”African Manager, June1,2014,http://bit.ly/1NRlJ8x.94 “Sudan:Telecomscompaniesblocknon-registeredSIMcards.”
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tember2014reportedbytheSudaneseHumanRightsNetwork,NISSofficialsusedtorturetoforceapoliticaldetaineetorevealhisemailpasswords.95
Sudanesewomenareregularlytargetedforharassmentandcyberbullyingbybothstateandnon-stateactorsfortheironlineactivities.Throughout2014-2015,numerousfemalebloggersreceivedonlinethreatsforactivitiesthatrangedfromsharingtheirviewsonwearingthehijabtowritingfem-inistpoetry.96Therewerealsoreportsofsecurityagentsarbitrarilydetainingfemaleonlineactivistsforperiodsbetweensevenhoursandthreedaysonspuriouschargesofdefamationandspreadingrumors.
Technical Attacks
IndependentonlinenewsoutletsarefrequentlysubjecttohackingattacksbywhatactivistsbelieveistheworkoftheCyberJihadistUnit.AgroupcallingitselfHarasalHudoud(“soldiersofthefron-tier”)alsoclaimedresponsibilityforseveraltechnicalattacksthroughouttheyear,97advertisingitselfonscreenwhenuserstriedtoaccesshackedsiteswhiletheyweredown.98SomeonlinenewspapersreportedhackingattemptstracedtohackersinIndiaandSudan.99
Severalcyberattacksagainstcriticalnewswebsitesandactivists’socialmediaaccountsoccurredduringthecoverageperiod,escalatingaroundtheApril2015generalelections:
• ThewebsiteofNuba Reports,whichprovidesin-depthcoverageofongoingconflictsinSu-dan’swar-tornregions,washitinSeptember2014withamassiveDDoSattack.TheattackcamethreedaysafteraNuba Reportssummaryofhumanrightsviolationsintheconflictregionssince2012wascirculatedatthe27thsessionoftheUNHumanRightsCouncilinGeneva.100Sincethen,thesitehasbeenunderconstantattack.101
• InOctober2014,duringthecampaigntoraiseawarenessaboutthemassrapeof200wom-eninSouthDarfur,campaignleaderKhalidEwais’sFacebookaccountwashackedanumberoftimes,leavingitdisabledforfivedaysinarowduringoneoftheattacks.102
• InNovember2014,independentoutletAlrakobawashackedbyHarasalHudoudandwasofflineforaday.
• OnApril12,2015,theeveofnationalelectionsinSudan,onlinenewsoutletsSudaNileandHurriyatexperiencedsimultaneousDenialofService(DoS)attacks.Theoutlet3ayinwasattackedtwodayslater.Consequently,twoofthewebsitesweredisabledforovertenhours,whileSudaNilewasdownforfiveconsecutivedays.
95 SeethefullreportontheSudaneseHumanRightsNetwork,بيذعتلالخادتلاقتعمزاهج,نملاا2015,http://bit.ly/1NkPgEo.96 Authorinterviews.“HijabisaheadcoveringworninpublicbysomeMuslimwomen” Oxford Dictionary.SudanesePublicOrderLawordersthatwomenwearheadcoverwhentheyareinpublicspace.97 “HarasalHudoudreferstoagroupofthegovernment’sarmedforcesinDarfur,thoughthereisnodirectevidencethatthegovernmentwasbehindthehackingattack.”SeeFreedomHouse,“Sudan,”Freedom on the Net 2014. 98 Alnilin[inArabic],http://www.alnilin.com/1183731.htm.99 Author’sinterview.100 ReportersWithoutBorders,“HACKERSATTACKWEBSITETHATCOVERSSUDAN’SWAR-TORNREGIONS,”September19,2014,http://bit.ly/1BTrNnN.101 “NUBAREPORTSWEBSITEUNDERATTACK,”Nuba Report,September18,2014,http://bit.ly/1LkSdUS.102 Author’sinterview.
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FacebookuserWadGaluba,103whopostsnewsaboutcorruptionandinsidersinsightsofNISSoper-ations,reportedfrequenthackingattemptsanddeaththreatseverytimetheuserpublishedahottopic.104
InternationalexpertsandcommentatorsonSudanalsoreportedmassive,andrepeated,attacksontheironlineaccounts.105
103 FacebookPage,https://www.facebook.com/Wdglibaa.104 Author’sinterview.105 EricReeves,TwitterPost,February22,2015,http://bit.ly/1KkRf6X;EricReeves,“IHaveBeenSilenced,”NewYorkTimes,February25,2015,http://nyti.ms/1Gf5oYJ.
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