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Evolving Component Risks March 19, 2013
Barry Birdsong
Division Chief
MDA QSP
21st Annual Conference on Quality
in the Space and Defense Industries
Approved for Public Release
13-MDA-7210 (12 Mar 13)
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Ballistic Missile Threat To Homeland
And Pacific Region
• Growing and Unpredictable
• Threatens regional stability
North Korean
Road-mobile ICBM on parade
April 2012
North Korean
Taepo Dong-2
April 2012
Approved for Public Release
12-MDA-6778 (1 June 2012)
North Korean
SCUD-B
North Korean
No-Dong Ballistic Missile
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Today’s Ballistic Missile Defense System
Satellite
Surveillance
Sea-Based
X-Band Radar
Aegis BMD
SPY-1 Radar
Forward-Based Radar Early Warning
Radar
SENSORS
ASCENT DEFENSE SEGMENT
BMDS The Ballistic Missile Defense System
C2BMC Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications
NMCC USSTRATCOM USNORTHCOM USPACOM EUCOM CENTCOM
Terminal High
Altitude Area
Defense
Ground-Based
Midcourse
Defense
Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense Standard Missile-3
SM-3
DEFENSE SEGMENT
MIDCOURSE TERMINAL DEFENSE SEGMENT
GBI
Sea-Based
Terminal
Patriot Advanced
Capability-3
Approved for Public Release
12-MDA-6778 (1 June 2012)
Layered Ballistic Missile Defense
THAAD Fire Units
(2011)
Patriot Fire Units (2003)
Aegis Ships -SM-3 IA (2011) -SM-3 IB (2015) -SM-3 IIA (2018)
SM-2 (2008)
Ground-based Interceptor
(2008)
Vandenberg Air Force Base
C2BMC
(2011)
Early Warning Radars (2010)
Aegis Ashore
(2015)
Beale, Shemya,
Thule, Fylingdales
SRBM
Defense
ICBM Defense
Sea-based X-band Radar
(2011)
Ft. Greely
Ground-based Interceptor
(2010)
NATO ALTBMD
(2011-2018)
IRBM / MRBM
Defense
AN/TPY-2
(2009)
Israel Shariki, Japan
Kurecik, Turkey
SM-3 IIB
(2020)
Space-Based Infrared
(2007)
Includes European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
SRBM = Short Range Ballistic Missiles
MRBM = Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
IRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
ICBM= Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
SRBMs
< 1,000 km
IRBMs /MRBMs 1,000-5,500 km
ICBMs
> 5,500 km
Precision Tracking
Space System
(2018)
Approved for Public Release
12-MDA-6778 (1 June 2012)
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Introduction
• Electronic Parts continue to move with the Commercial
Industry:
– Commercialization sometimes reduces servie life a reliability
for mIiitary applications
– Copper Wire Bonds, GaN transistors, BME Capacitors, Non-
traditional & 3D Packaging
• Expensive products (Au, Pd, Tantalum) removed from
commercial product to increase profit
• Counterfeiters continue to evolve, making it difficult to
detect using existing methods
• Lower tier contractors still do not understand the
counterfeit risk
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Copper Wire Bonding
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Qualification and Reliability of Base-
Metal-Electrode (BME) Capacitors
• The standard capacitor material for
commercial, automotive and medical
applications
– Aerospace industry the last to adopt
• Thin dielectric layers (~1um) cause concern for
historical precious metal (PME) based MIL-PRF
123 spec
– Oxygen vacancy driven long term failure
mechanism
• BME are critical part of power distribution
networks
– Degradation of BME impedance may impact signal
integrity for long term missions
• JPL qualification based on mission risk
– Statistical analysis of acceleration coefficients
(temperature and voltage) of precise dielectric
thickness is required
D. Sheldon - JPL
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Qualification of Non-traditional
Packaging for Complex Parts
• Now the exception, soon to be the rule.
– Packaging now fundamental part of complex device performance
• Successful qualification requires significant cooperation and
detailed engineering information from vendor.
• Individual device and board level stress tests now required.
• Military industry needs to fill in physics of failure mechanisms for
extended life missions
– Materials analysis of constituent layers
– Determine failure population statistics for accurate mission life prediction
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Reliability of TSV and 3D Packaging
• Gaining momentum in high
performance, high bandwidth
commercial applications.
• Defect density for 10K-100K via
connections need to be defined and
reviewed.
– Variations in materials and processing
from vendors
– How to determine extrinsic vs intrinsic
defects
• Temp cycle remains main screen and
life test evaluation tool
– Many interfaces mean Thermal Coefficient
of Expansion (TCE) will drive reliability
D. Sheldon - JPL
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Reliability and Radiation Capability
Of GaN Power and RF Transistors
• New GaN Transistors are becoming very
attractive for power and RF applications
• GaN HEMTs are currently only available
commercially
• Verified TID immune
• Vulnerable to SEDR from Drain to source,
40% of rated Vds for some devices
• Little reliability data available
• Process defects not fully understood
• What qualification process should be
applied
• Are the qualification processes of Mil-PRF-
19500 applicable for GaN
Dielectric
GaN
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Si
AlGaN Electron Generating Layer
DGS- - - -
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Counterfeit Part Mitigation Concerns
Clones with Malicious Intent (Replicated or
Emulated Parts) • Parts are undetectable by ‘refurbishment analysis’ (e.g.,
blacktop, re-tinned leads).
• Parts can be almost electrically identical to authentic parts.
• Detection methods like electrical test and decapsulation
may be only marginally effective or not at all.
• May be used to collect critical data or to cause mission
failure.
11 Excerpt from website of company offering legal cloning
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Cost of Implementing Robust Counterfeit Parts Plan • Risk of counterfeit parts is still poorly understood at lower tier
suppliers. - Cost of failures/rework/deaths not well-defined
- Reluctance to fund appropriately
- Interpreting third party lab test results
• Qualification of suppliers
• Inspection and test for purchases from unauthorized suppliers. - Obsolescence management and purchases from authorized
suppliers must minimize this cost
• Training.
• Multiple plan implementations. - Hundreds of critical subcontractors
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Counterfeit Part Mitigation Concerns
SOME CONTRACTORS BID EXCESSIVE COSTS WHILE OTHERS
CAN BE AS LOW AS $500K
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Insufficient Intra-Government and Government-
Industry Collaboration • DoD Components may implement their own avoidance and
detection requirements to comply with Policy. - Supplier approval and removal
- Documentation (traceability, test reports, etc.)
- Inspection and test
- Containment, reporting, and disposal
- Collaboration on all of the above would be most efficient
• Component manufacturers’ support becomes more critical
with the introduction of cloned parts. - Interpreting die markings and layout
• DoD must aggressively manage obsolescence and
procurement from authorized suppliers. - Encourages support from component manufacturers
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Counterfeit Part Mitigation Concerns
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Microblasted/Lapped Parts • Parts are undetectable by solvent methods (e.g.,
blacktop).
• Surface texture differences not detectable at low
magnification.
• Parts are exposed to mechanical, thermal, or
electrical stress.
Source: SMT Corporation
Evolving Counterfeit Concern
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Summary
• PMP products continue to move with the Commercial
Industry:
– Copper Wire Bonds,GaN transistors, BME Capacitors, Non-
traditional & 3D Packaging
• Prohibited materials (Pb) removed from commercial
product impact military product
• Expensive products (Au, Pd, Tantalum) removed from
commercial product to increase profit
• Counterfeiters continue to evolve, making it difficult to
detect using existing methods
• Lower tier contractors still do not understand risk
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