EU referendum:
1. Brexit: one year on Anand Menon p4
Part One: Public Opinion
2. Brexitandtheelection JohnCurtice p6 3. Publicattitudes SaraHobolt,ThomasLeeperandJamesTilley p8 4. Publicdebate AlanRenwick p10
Part Two: Parties and Politics
5. MPs PhilipCowley p12 6. Thepoliticalparties TimBale p14 7. Britishpolitics RobertFord,MatthewGoodwinandMariaSobolewska p16 8. TheroleofParliament AdamCygan p18
Part Three: Brexit and the Politics of the UK
9. NorthernIreland JohnGarryandColinHarvey p20 10. ScotlandandBrexit NicolaMcEwen p22 11. WalesandBrexit RachelMinto p24 12. Brexitanddevolution MichaelKeating p26 13. Regionalimplications PhilipMcCannandRaquelOrtega-Argilés p28
Part Four: Brexit and the Economy
14. TheUKeconomy JonathanPortes p30 15. TradeandtheSingleMarket ThomasSampson p32 16. Publicfinances IainBegg p34 17. UKeconomicpolicy SwatiDhingra p36
Part Five: Brexit and Public Policies
18. Thepoliticsofagriculture CarmenHubbard,DavidHarveyandAnneLiddon p38 19. UKenvironmentalpolicy CharlotteBurns,VivianeGraveyandAndrewJordan p40 20. TheGreatRepealBill CatherineBarnard p42 21. Immigration JonathanPortes p44 22. BritonsintheEU MichaelaBenson p46 23. Nationalitypolitics NandoSigonaandLaurenceLessard-Phillips p48 24. Therepatriationofcompetences JoHunt p50 25. Foreignpolicy RichardGWhitman p52 26. Highereducation SimonMarginson p54
Part Six: Brexit and the EU
27. Thememberstates HusseinKassim p56 28. TheEUposition SimonUsherwood p58
TheresaMay’sdecisiontocallasnapelectionthrewupyetmorequestionsregardingBritain’swithdrawalfromtheEuropeanUnion.Suchatimeofuncertaintycallsfortimelyacademicanalysis,andsothePoliticalStudiesAssociation(PSA)isdelightedtohaveteamedupwithTheUKinaChangingEuropeonceagaintoshedsomelightontheBrexitprocess.
Followingtwosuccessfulcollaborationsin2016(Brexit and Beyond and Brexit: Six Months On),EU referendum: one year onexaminestheprogressthathasbeenmadethusfar.
ThePSAiscommittednotonlytostudyingbutalsoinformingpoliticaldecision-making.InwhatfollowsProfessorAnandMenonandhiscolleagueswillguideyouthroughthecomplexpoliticaljourneythatisBrexitandconsiderhowtheUK’swithdrawalfromtheEUislikelytoplayoutacrossarangeofpolicyareas.
Professor Angelia Wilson
Chair,PoliticalStudiesAssociation
Foreword
Image credits for photographs on the front cover and running header can be found on page 60
Well,it’snotboringisit?Politicscontinuestosurpriseus,andallthewhiletheArticle50clockkeepsticking.OneyearonfromtheEUreferendum,thisreportisintendedforallthosewhoareinterestedinwhathashappenedsincethereferendum,andhowtheBrexitprocessmightunfoldinthemonthsandyearstocome.
Asever,mythankstoallthosewhocontributedtothisreport.Theauthorshave,insomecases,hadtoturntheirsectionsaroundextremelyquicklyafterthegeneralelection.Allhavehadtocopewithirritatingquestionsandqueriesfromme.I’mgratefultoHannahBridgesfordoingthecopyeditingsoquicklyandthoroughly.Asever,BenMillerplayedacrucialroleingettingthereportdesignedandproduced,greatlyassistedbyNavjyotLehl,whilePhoebeCouzenshasworkedtirelesslytokeepTheUKinaChangingEuropeshowontheroad.Finally,I’dliketoexpressparticularthankstoCamillaMacdonald,whohasshepherdedthisprocessfromthestartandgoneoverallthetextassiduously.I’msureit’spurecoincidencethatshe’sleavinguson23June.
Professor Anand Menon
TheUKinaChangingEurope
54
Weshouldhaveknownbetter.WhileitisdoubtlessausefulexercisetotrackwhathasbecomeofBrexitayearafterthereferendumonEUmembership,wewerenaïveinexpectinghistorytostandstillwhilewecompletedthetask.Asthedraftsforthispublicationwerecomingin,theGeneralElectiontookplace.AndwhilsttheoutcomemaychangenothingatalltodowithBrexit,onecannotdiscountthepossibilitythatitwillchangeeverything.
So,withthatcaveatfirmlyinmind,thiscollectionlooksatwhatthedecisiontoleavetheEUhascometomeanoneyearon.Wecovereverythingfrompublicopinion,politics,economicsandtheimplicationsforthenationsoftheUnitedKingdom,toaraftofpublicpoliciesrangingfromagriculturetohighereducation.
Inevitably,thereisnoclearconclusionthatcanbedrawnfromsuchabroadoverview.However,severalthingsdostandout.First,thereismuchaboutBrexitthatisnoclearerthanitwasayearago,andmuchthatislessclear.TalkofareferendumonIrishunityhascomeassomethingofashock.JonathanPortespointsoutthatwhatmightoriginallyhavebeenthoughtofas
relativelystraightforwardissues,suchasdealingwiththerightsofEUnationalsintheUK,areinfactfiendishlycomplicated.
Asforthepolitics,well,whatdoIneedtosay?Publicopinionseemstobeinflux,withJohnCurtice,MariaSobolewskaandhercollaboratorsandSaraHoboltandherteamsuggestingnotonlythatoldclassallegiancestoparticularpartiesmightbeloosening,butthatBrexititselfmightbebecominganewpoliticaldivide,alongsidethetraditionalleft-rightspectrum.Atthesametime,aminoritygovernmentwillhavetodealwithaparliamentwhoseapproachtoBrexitisasyetunclear,andwherebackbenchrebellion,asPhilCowleyunderlines,isalltoolikelyindealingwithoneof,itnotthe,mostcomplicatedissueofpublicpolicyofourlifetime.Asfortheparliamentarypartiesthemselves,well,readTimBale’sentertainingpiece.
AllthispoliticswilltakeplaceagainstthebackdropoftheBritisheconomy.AsSwatiDhingraintimates,theeconomymaynotbeintherudestofhealth,andahardBrexitwouldhardlyrepresentacure.Equally,asPhilipMcCannandRaquelOrtega-Argiléspointout,theultimate
impactofBrexitmaywellbefurthercomplicatedbyitsunequalimpactondifferentpartsofthecountry.
Meanwhile,thereismuchwewillneedtoknowratherrapidly.HowparliamentwilldealwiththeGreatRepealBillisonething.Arelatedminefield,exploredbyJoHunt,concernswherethepowersthatarerepatriatedendup–Belfast,CardiffandEdinburghwillallhavetheirpiecetosayonthematter.
Turningtomoresubstantiveissues,thekindofagriculturalpolicythatwillreplacetheCommonAgriculturalPolicyissomethingweshouldstartworryingaboutsoonerratherthanlater.SotooistheneedtodealwiththerightsofEUnationalsinthiscountry.
Incontrasttotheuncertaintythathascharacterisedourapproach,theEU,foritspart,hassortedoutitsnegotiatingpositionandiswaitingfortheBritishgovernmenttoarrive.ForalltheearlyhopesthatcleverdiplomacymightdividetheEU27,theyhaveremainedresolutelyunitedintheirdeterminationtoseetheprocessthroughwithoutweakeningtheEU.Indeed,as
RichardGWhitmanpointsout,BrexitevenseemstohaveprovidedafilliptoplansforsomekindofenhancedEUdefencecapability.
Muchhaschangedoverthecourseofthelastyear.ButthereisevidencethatnotenoughhasbeendonetothinkthroughboththeimmediateprocessofleavingtheEUandthestructuresandpolicieswewouldliketohaveinplaceoncewehaveexited.Brexit,inotherwords,willposeachallengetoourgovernment,ourparties,ourcivilserviceandallthoseinvolvedinthevarioussectorswhereitwillhithome.
By Anand Menon
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PART ONE: PUBLIC OPINION
Introduction
TheEUreferendumwasdeeplydisruptiveforBritain’stwomainpoliticalparties.ConservativeMPsweredeeplydividedintheirpreferenceforLeaveorRemain,whileLabourMPsblamedtheirleader,JeremyCorbyn,fortheRemainside’sdefeatandmountedachallengeagainsthim.Meanwhile,amajorityofConservativesupportersignoredtheadviceoftheirPrimeMinisterandvotedforLeave,whilearoundathirdofLabourvoterswentagainsttheirparty’sadviceandbackedLeavetoo.
Incontrast,fewsuchdifficultiesfacedtheLiberalDemocratsorUKIP.HoldingareferendumtogetoutofEuropewasUKIP’sraisond’être,andthusanissueonwhichboththeparty’selectedrepresentativesanditssupporterswereunited.AndwhilearoundaquarterofLiberalDemocratvotersalsofailedtofollowtheirparty’srecommendationtovoteRemain,oncethereferendumwasoverthetraditionallypro-EUpartywassoonarguingthereshouldbeasecondreferendumaftertheBrexitnegotiationswerecompleted.
Betweenthem,thesedevelopmentsraisedaninterestingquestion.WouldtheConservativesandLabourlosesupportduringthecourseoftheBrexitprocess,asunhappyRemainvotersswitchedtotheLiberalDemocratsandLeavevoterswereattractedbytheunambiguouspositionofUKIP.Ifso,mightBritishpoliticsbefracturedyetfurther?
The general election
Atfirstglance,theoutcomeofthe2017electionsuggestsBrexithashadtheoppositeeffect.SupportforUKIPimplodedtojust2%,lowerthanin2005and2010,letalone2015.ThelevelofLiberalDemocratsupportfailedtorecoverfromthe8%towhichthepartyhadsunktwoyearsago.TheConservativesandLabourbetweenthemwon82%ofthevotescastacrosstheUKasawhole,morethanatanyelectionsince1970.ItseemsasthoughBrexithaspavedthewayforareturntothetwo-partypoliticsthatcharacterisedBritishpartypoliticsintheimmediatepost-warperiod.
However,thisconclusionistoosimple.Brexitwasassociatedwith,andwasprobablyatleastapartialcauseof,areshapingofthechoicevotersmadebetweenConservativeandLabour.
Consider,firstofall,thetrendsinpartysupportamongstRemainandLeavevotersduringthecourseoftheelectioncampaign.InthelastfourpollsconductedbyICMimmediatelypriortotheelectionbeingcalled,53%ofLeavevoterssaidthattheyintendedtovotefortheConservatives,comparedwith38%ofRemainsupporters.However,thisgapwidenedduringthecourseoftheelectioncampaign.InthelastfourpollsICMundertookbeforepollingday,supportfortheConservativesamongstLeavevoterswasfivepointshigherat58%,whilethatamongstRemainvotershaddroppedfivepointsto33%.
SupportforLabourincreasedacrossthecourseofthecampaignamongstbothRemainandLeavevoters.But,at13points,theincreasewasmoremarkedamongsttheformerthanitwasthelatter(sixpoints).Asaresult,whatbeforetheelectionwasa15-pointdifferencebetweenRemainandLeavevotersinthelevelofsupportforLabourhadgrownto22pointsbypollingday.
EvidencethatRemainandLeaveBritaindivergedintheirwillingnesstovoteConservativeorLabourisalsotobefoundinthepatternoftheelectionresults.WiththeexceptionofScotland,theConservativevoteincreasedmostinthoseareasthatvotedLeave,whileLabourmademostprogressinareasthatbackedRemain.
WithinEnglandandWales,Conservativesupportincreasedonaverageby10pointsinconstituencieswhere,accordingtoestimatesmadebyChrisHanrettyoftheUniversityofEastAnglia,Leavewonover60%ofthevoteintheEUreferendum.Conversely,supportfellonaveragebytwopointsinseatswheretheLeavevotewaslessthan45%.Labour,incontrast,sawitsvoteincreasebytwelvepointsinseatswheretheLeavevotewaslowest,butbyonlyninepointsinthoseplaceswhereithadbeenhighest.
NottheleastofthereasonswhytheConservativesgainedgroundmostamongstLeavevotersandinplaceswheretheLeavevotewashighestlastyearisthatthepartybenefittedmostfromthecollapseintheUKIPvote.AccordingtoapollconductedonpollingdaybyLordAshcroft,57%ofthosewhovotedUKIPin2015votedfortheConservativesthistime,whileonly18%switchedtoLabour.Equally,whereinEnglandandWalesUKIPsecuredunder7.5%ofthevotein2015,Conservativesupportfellbackonaveragebythreepoints,whileinthoseseatswhereUKIPwonmorethan17.5%,theConservativesadvancedbytenpoints.
TheConservativepartyis,ofcourse,traditionallythepartyofmiddleclassvoters.ButLeavevotersweredisproportionatelyworkingclass.
Consequently,itwasamongstworkingclassvotersandinpredominantlyworkingclassconstituenciesthattheConservativesadvancedmost.AccordingtoLordAshcroft’spollingdata,Conservativesupportwasuptwelvepointsamongstworkingclass“DE”votersthanitwasin2015,butbyonlyfourpointshigheramongstprofessionalandmanagerial“AB”voters.Equally,Conservativesupportincreasedbyninepointsonaverageinthe30%mostworkingclassseatsinEnglandandWales,butbyonlyonepointinthe25%mostmiddleclass.Inshort,thedivergencebetweenRemainandLeavevotersservedtocutacrossthetraditionalclassbaseofBritain’stwo-partysystem.
What lies ahead?
Thegeneralelectionwas,then,moreofaBrexitelectionthanimmediatelymeetstheeye.ManyaLeavevoterswitchedtotheConservatives,whileRemainvotersweremoreinclinedtobackLabourthantheirLeavecounterparts.Asaresult,theConservativepartyinparticularwonovervotersitwouldnotnormallybeexpectedtoreach.ThequestionthatnowfacesthepartyiswhetheritcankeepthemasittriestonegotiateBrexitagainstthebackdropofahungparliament,inwhichtherewillbepressureonthePrimeMinistertosoftenhervisionofwhatBrexitshouldmean.
By John Curtice
TWO
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PART ONE: PUBLIC OPINION
ThereferendumhasgivenrisetoanewformofpoliticalattachmentbasedontheLeave-Remaindivide.Ayearon,nearlythreequartersofpeoplethinkofthemselvesas“Leavers”(38percent)or“Remainers”(35percent).Thesegroupsaresimilarinsizetotheproportionofpeoplewhoidentifywithpoliticalparties.ItisprimarilythepeoplewhovotedRemainwhohavecometoidentifystronglywiththisperspectiveaftertheelection.TheprospectofBrexithasmadesomepeoplemorecommittedtoEUmembership.AcrucialquestionforthefutureofBritishpoliticsiswhetherthesenewpoliticalidentitiesdissipateovertimeasBrexitbecomesareality,orpersist.Thisislikelytodependonwhether,andhow,politicalpartiesmobilisethisnewfaultlineinBritishpolitics.
What do people want from Brexit?
ThenegotiationsbetweentheBritishGovernmentandtheEUinvolveanarrayofcomplexpolicyquestions.Themostprominentsofarhasbeenthetrade-offbetweentheGovernmentprioritisingpreferentialtradeagreementswiththeEUorprioritisingcontroloverEUimmigrationrates.Buttherearemanyotherpolicychoicesthatrelatetothe“divorcebill”,continuingEUbudgetcontributionsandaccesstoEUfunds,jurisdictionoftheEuropeanCourtofJustice,bordercontrolswiththeRepublicofIrelandandsoon.Thesequestionsdidnotfeatureonthereferendumballotpaper,noraretheyissuesthatmanypeoplenecessarilygavemuchthoughttobeforethereferendum.However,itiscrucialfortheGovernmentthattheoutcomeofthenegotiationsisperceivedtobelegitimatebythepeople.
Ourresearchshowsthat,whenaskedtochoosebetweenoutcomesresemblingwhathavebecomeknownas“softBrexit”and“hardBrexit”,alargemajorityofthepublicfavourthelatter.Perhapsmoresurprisingly,whenaskedtochoosebetweentheGovernment’spreferredoutcomeofhardBrexitanda“nodeal”alternative,thereisamajorityinfavourofwalkingawayfromthetablewithoutanykindofdeal.Inthesurveywe
Introduction
TheEUreferendumwasahistoricdemocraticexercisethathasgiventheBritishGovernmentapopularmandateforleavingtheEU.Yet,thechoicebetweenleavingorremainingintheEUprovidedlittleinthewayofguidanceastowhattypeofBrexitthepublicwanted.AstheGovernmentstartstonegotiatetheUK’sexitfromtheEU,weaskedwhetherthepublicremainsdividedandwhatpeopleactuallywantfromBrexit.Oursurveyevidenceshowsthat,whilethepublicremainsalmostequallydividedonwhetherleavingorstayingisagoodidea,thereisanemergingconsensusaboutwhatBrexitshouldlooklike,andtherearehighlevelsofsupportfora“hardBrexit”alongthelinesproposedbyTheresaMay.
No regrets as the public remains divided
WhilemanycommentatorsspeculatedthatvoterswouldchangetheiropiniononBrexitaftertheimplicationsofleavingtheEUbecameclearer,publicopinionsurveyssofartellaverydifferentstory.Infact,veryfewpeoplehavechangedtheirmindsaboutthewaytheyvoted.Whenasked“Inhindsight,doyouthinkBritainwasrightorwrongtovotetoleavetheEU?”,pollsshowalmostnochangesincethereferendum:peoplewhovotedRemaincontinuetothinkitwaswrongtovoteto
leavetheEU,whilepeoplewhovotedLeavethinkitwasright(seefigureabove).
Interestingly,thecontinuingdividebetweenthosewhofavourandopposeBrexitappearstohavegivenrisetoasetofnewpoliticalidentitiesinBritain.Itiswellestablishedthatmanypeoplefeelattachedtoapoliticalpartyandthisattachmentshapestheirattitudestoallsortsofthings.TheEUreferendum,however,wasahighlyunusualevent.Thetwomainpartieswereopenlysplitovertheissue.Theelectoratewasalsodivided:around40percentofConservativesupportersvotedRemain,whileathirdofLaboursupportersvotedLeave.
conductedinlateAprilthisyear,eachofthesescenarioswasdescribedindetail–cruciallywithoutthe“soft”,“hard”and“nodeal”labels–andpeoplewereaskedtomakeachoicebetweenaseriesofpair-wiseoptionsofdifferentnegotiationoutcomes.OursurveyshowsthatLeaversarerelativelyunitedinpreferringthehardestversionofBrexitwhengivenachoice.Thisisdrivenprimarilybyadesiretocontrolimmigration,tolimitthepowersoftheEuropeanCourtandtoavoidpayinganysortofsettlementbilltotheEU.Incontrast,Remainersaremuchmoredivided:whileasmallmajorityfavoursasoftBrexitoverahardBrexit,40percentpreferthelatter.Onthewhole,RemainersandLeaversarelookingformanyofthesamethingsfromBrexit:greatersovereignty,goodtradearrangementsandnosettlementbill.TheydifferoverthequestionsofcontrollingimmigrationandgivingrightstoEUcitizensresidentintheUK.
Oneyearon,theelectorateremainsdividedonwhetheravoteonBrexitwasagoodorabadthing.However,thosedivisionsaremuchlessstarkwhenwefocusonwhatcitizenswantfromBrexitandwhattheywillaccept.TheresaMay’shardBrexitispopularnotonlyamongLeavers,butalsoamongasizableproportionofRemainers.Moreover,whenaskedhowtheGovernmentishandlingtheBrexitnegotiations,thepercentageofpeoplewhosay“well”hasincreasedfromjust20to35percentoverthelastsixmonths.AsnegotiationswiththeEUstartinearnest,theGovernmentmayalsobenefitfromarally“roundtheflag”effectfrombothLeaversandRemainers.Atthesametime,however,thepossiblecostsofBrexitwillalsobecomemoreapparentasthenegotiationsproceed:thesecouldhardenoppositionamongthosewhocontinuetoidentifythemselvesasRemainers.
By Sara Hobolt, Thomas Leeper and James Tilley
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%August2016
November2016
February 2017
May2017
Right
Wrong
Don’t know
Was Britain right or wrong to vote to leave the EU?Source:YouGovpolls
THREE
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PART ONE: PUBLIC OPINION
Brexitassuch.TheConservatives,capitalisingonMay’shugeearlypollleadoverCorbyn,wantedadebateaboutwhocouldbestnegotiateBrexit,notthedetailsofthedealthatshouldbesought.Indeed,theywantedtoavoidtyingthemselvestospecificnegotiatingobjectives.Labour,meanwhile,soughttoshifttheagendaawayfromBrexit–onwhichtheircompromisepositionriskedpleasingnoone–towardsdomesticpoliciesthatwerepopularwithvoters.
Brexit’s unknowns
TheresultofallthiswasthatanelectioncalledtoclarifytheBrexitpositioninfactdidverylittletoadvancepublicunderstandingordiscussionoftheBrexitoptions.AstheDirectorofTheUKinaChangingEurope,AnandMenon,putit,themainpartymanifestos“dance[d]daintilyroundthetrickyissues”ofBrexit.Subsequentcampaigndebatesdidlittletoexpose,letalonefill,thegaps.TherewaslittleexplicitthinkingabouthowtotradeoffageneralpublicdesireforlowerimmigrationagainstthepreferenceformaintainingtradewiththeEU(seethesectiononpublicattitudes).Therewaslittledebateaboutwhethertheadvantagesofbeingabletonegotiatetradedealswithnon-EUcountriesoutweighthedisadvantagesofleavingtheCustomsUnion.TheConservativesbrandishedtheideathat“nodealisbetterthanabaddeal”asatotem,butlittleattentionwasgiventowhat“nodeal”implies.Laboursaidfreemovementwouldend,butalsosaidtheywantedtheoptionofmembershipoftheSingleMarkettoremainopen,implyingfreemovementmightcontinue.
TheweaknessofdebatearoundBrexitislongstanding.Duringlastyear’sreferendumcampaign,bothsidespeddledmisinformation.Mostcriticismhas,understandably,focusedontheinaccuraciesofthevictors,suchastheinfamous£350millionclaimandthestatementsaboutTurkey’sfutureEUmembership.Buttheloserswereatittoo:thattheTreasurymachinewasusedtopromotehighlymisleadingclaimsaboutboth
ThiswassupposedtobetheBrexitelection.InherDowningStreetstatementon18Aprilannouncingherintentiontoseekthedissolutionofparliament,TheresaMayspokeoflittleelse.Shesuggestedthat,withoutanearlyelection,heropponentswouldhaveboththewillandtheabilitytodisrupthereffortstonegotiatethebestpossibleBrexitdeal.Thevote,shehoped,woulddeliverasecuremajorityforherfavouredBrexitplan.
Brexit’s low profile
Intheend,however,Brexitdidnotdominate.Itwasmentionedonaverage580timesadayinthemainUK-widenewspapersintheweekfollowingMay’sstatement.Butthatfellbelow500forthefollowingtwoweeks,thenbelow400forthefourandahalfweeksbetweenthenandpollingday,dippingtojust155mentionsadayinthesixthweekofthecampaign,immediatelyfollowingtheManchesterbombing.WhentheBBC’sAndrewNeilinterviewedtheprimeministeron22April,hisquestionsturnedtoBrexitonlyinthelastfewminutes.InterviewingJeremyCorbynfourdayslater,NeilaskednothingdirectlyaboutBrexititself,althoughhedidenquiretowardstheendaboutimmigration.TheothermaintelevisiondebatesandinterviewsgaveBrexitmoreattention,butstillitdidnotdominate.
Therewereatleastthreereasonsforthis.One,assuggested,wastheunforeseenandtragiceruptionofterrorintothecampaigncausedbytheattacksinManchesterandLondon.Thisinevitablyshiftedtheagendatowardstheterroristthreat.ItraiseddeepquestionsaboutbothTheresaMay’srecordonpolicefundingandJeremyCorbyn’srecordofoppositiontocounter-terrorismlegislationandseemingfriendshipwithcertainterroristorganisations.
AsecondreasonwasthespectacularmisfiringoftheConservativecampaign.Conservativestrategistsintendedtofocusononecoremessage:thatTheresaMay,notJeremyCorbyn,wasthepersontoprovidethe“strongandstableleadership”neededforsuccessfulBrexit.ButtheConservativemanifestointroducedcontroversialpolicies–mostnotablyonsocialcare–thatdistractedattentionawayfromthatcoremessage.Theprimeminister’sforcedU-turnonsocialcareunderminedthecredibilityofthemessage.VeteranelectionwatcherSirDavidButlertweetedthat“Inthe20generalelectioncampaignsI’vefollowed,Ican’trememberaU-turnonthisscale”.
Athirdreason–andperhapsthemostfundamental–wasthatneitherConservativenorLabourstrategistseverwantedadebateabout
theshort-andthelong-termeconomicimpactsofBrexitshouldbeamatterofmajorconcern.
Strengthening the public debate
ThequestionofhowpublicdebateovercomplexpolicyissuessuchasBrexitcouldbeimprovedisimportant.Inthewakeofthereferendum,50MPssignedamotioncallingforthecreationofabodythatwouldcheckthetruthfulnessofclaimsmadeduringcampaignsandfinethosewhoflouteditsrulings.That,however,isunlikelytoachievemuch:itiseasytomisleadwithoutdirectlylying.Italsoraisesquestionsaboutfreespeech,whilefailingtoaddresstheproblemthatimportantmattersareoftensimplygivenlittlecarefulattention.
Anotherapproachseekstocreateforainwhichmembersofthepubliccanlearnaboutanddiscusstheissuesindepth.Oneversionofthisisacitizens’assembly:agatheringofrandomlyselectedcitizenswhoreflectthediversityofthepopulationatlarge.Theymeettolearnabout,deliberateupon,anddeliverrecommendationsrelatingtotheissuesontheiragenda.AspartofTheUKintheChangingEurope,IamleadingateamthatwillrunaCitizens’AssemblyonBrexitintheautumn.Itsrecommendationswillbepublishedinareportandputtoparliament.
AbetterqualitypublicdiscussionnowwouldstrengthentheBrexitprocess.Itwouldencouragepoliticianstofocusonreal,hardchoicesratherthansloganeering.Itcouldreadypublicopinionforthekindofdealwearelikelytoget,ratherthanthedealwemightdreamof.Itwouldhelpnegotiatorsunderstandthekindoftrade-offsthataremostlikelytoengenderpublicsupport.Withoutthis,adebatedrivenbyrhetoricriskscorneringourleadersintoacceptinganoutcomethatharmsusall.
By Alan Renwick
FOUR
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PART TWO: PARTIES AND POLITICS
Introduction
OneofthemoststrikingdevelopmentsintheHouseofCommonsoverthelast50yearshasbeentheriseofbackbenchdissent.MPsareincreasinglywillingtovoteagainsttheirpartyline.Thiswas,atleastinpart,thejustificationforthecallingofthe2017generalelection.WhilsttheclaimthatextrasupportfortheConservativeswouldstrengthenTheresaMay’sbargainingpowerwithotherEuropeanleadersmayhavebeendubious,therewasmorecredibilitybehindtheideathatitwouldbeeasiertogetalltheBrexitlegislationthroughParliamentwithalargerCommonsmajority.MayhadinheritedaslenderCommonsmajorityfromDavidCameron,which,whenshecalledtheelection,stoodatjust17.IntheHouseofLords–whichhasbeenapermanentlyhungchambersince1999andhasbeenincreasinglywillingtodefythegovernment–shehadnomajorityatall.AlargerCommonsmajoritywouldhavegivenhermoreroomformanoeuvrewithherownMPs,andsomemorepowerwiththeLords.TorepeataremarkmadebyDavidCameronat7amon23June2016:“Well,thatdidn’tgoaccordingtoplan”.
What makes for a rebellion?
Indeed,itisprobablyworsethanitlooksonpaper.HereareeightfactorsthathelppartymanagersgetlegislationthroughtheHouseofCommons:
• Attitudinal cohesion.MPsdonotrebelforthesakeofit.Therehastobeadisagreementontheissueforrebelliontobeconsidered.
• A large majority.Althoughlargemajoritiesarenotunambiguouslypositive(theybringwiththemtheirownproblemsofpartymanagement),theydoatleastprovideabufferagainstrebelliousMPswithinagovernment’sownparty.
• Delivery of a manifesto pledge.Knowingthattheyareelectedmostlybecauseoftheirpartylabel,andnotbecauseoftheirownwonderfulpersonality,MPsaremorerestrainedinrebellingifanitemofpolicyhasbeenclearlysetoutintheirparty’smanifesto.
• A first-term government.Discontentbuildsupovertimewithinagoverningparty,sogovernmentsbornoutofaperiodinoppositionusuallyseelowerlevelsofrebellionthanthosethathavebeenreturnedformultipleterms.
• Prime ministerial coattails.MPswhofeeltheyowetheirvictorytotheprimeministercanoftenbepersuadedtoshowloyaltyinreturn(“shegotyouhere”).
• A large cohort of new MPs.The“coattailseffect”appliesespeciallytonewMPssweptinonawaveofsupportforthepartyatthepolls;andanyway,newMPstendtobelesswillingtostanduptotheirwhips,fromamixtureofinexperienceand(insomecases)careerism.
• Low salience issues.Parliamentdealswithalotoflegislation.Onmuchofit,MPsdonothavemuchknowledgeorinterest,andeveniftheydohaveaviewonsomeissues,ifitislowprofiletheycanoftenbepersuadedtosticktothepartylineprovideditisnotsomethingtheyfeelverystronglyabout.
• Threat of an election/resignation.Anuclearoption,tobedeployedonlysparingly,primeministershavethreatenedtomakevotesonlegislationavoteofconfidence–meaningthatadefeatonavotewouldtriggerageneralelection.ThiswasatacticJohnMajor,forexample,usedonoccasioninthe1990s.
What lies ahead?
Oftheseeightfactors,noneapplynow.Thereisnomajority.ThereareonlyahandfulofnewConservativeMPs.NoMPs–oldornew–arethankingtheprimeministerforhermagnificentelectioncampaign.TheConservativeshavebeeningovernmentforsevenyearsnow,eitheraloneorincoalition,andthehabitofrebellionhasbuiltuponthebackbenches.Whateverelseitis,Brexitisnotalowsalienceissue,andwhilstthefundamentalsofBrexitweresketchedoutinthemanifesto,muchofthedetailthatParliamentwillhavetovoteonoverthecomingyearswasabsent.ThislastfactorwouldhavecausedaproblemintheHouseofLordsinparticular,eveniftheConservativeshadwontheelection.
Byrequiringspecificallywordedmotionsforthetriggeringofearlyelection,theFixedTermParliamentsActremovestheabilityofaprimeministertolinkthetriggeringofanelectiontothepassageofspecificpiecesoflegislation.TheresaMaycanstillthreatentoresignasprimeministerifshedoesnotgetherway,ofcourse,butthisisunlikelytohavequitetheleverageitoncemighthavedone.
Intermsofattitudes,weknowrelativelylittleaboutincomingMPs,anditis,anyway,alwaysbesttobescepticalaboutattemptstoreadacrossfromstancestakenbeforeparliamenttobehaviouronceatWestminster.ButontheConservativesideoftheHouseofCommons,atleast,becausetherearesofewnewMPs,wecandrawonsurveysfrombeforetheelection,whichshowplentyofscopefordisagreement.
WeknowthataroundhalfofConservativeMPsvotedRemain,evenifmostsooncametoterms
withtheoutcome.AsurveyofMPsconductedbyIpsosMORIbetweenOctoberandDecember2016askedConservativeMPsaboutthetrade-offsthatmayberequiredinanynegotiations(seefigure).ThepluralityresponseofConservativeMPsisinthetopright-handcornerofthegraph–prioritisingbothcontrollingimmigrationandnotpayingmoneyintotheEUbudgetoveraccesstothesinglemarket–butwithsignificantminoritieswhotookadifferentstance.
ThesamesurveyfoundthatafullquarterofConservativeMPsbelievedthatitwouldnotbehonouringthereferendumresultiftheUKendedupstayinginthesinglemarketaftertheBrexitnegotiations;justoverathirdsaiditwouldbeimpossibletosayitwashonouringthevoteiftheUKstillpaidintotheEUbudget.Almost60%saidthattheywouldnotseeitashonouringthetermsofthereferendumifimmigrationfromwithintheEUcouldnotbecontrolled.
PassingthedetailedBrexitlegislationthroughparliamentwasalreadyahardenoughtaskbeforetheelection;bythemorningof9June,ithadgotalot harder.
By Philip Cowley
On a 0-10 scale, where 0 means being in the EU single market at all costs and 10 means being able to control immigration
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PART TWO: PARTIES AND POLITICS
Introduction
AsfarastheUK’spoliticalpartieswereconcerned,lastsummer’sEUreferendumwasabitlikeoneofthosetag-teamwrestlingmatchesyouseeonTV.Althoughtheboutbeganwitheveryonethinkingtheyknewwhowasonwhichside,bytheendofitno-oneinthering–nor,forthatmatter,intheaudience–wassureanymore.
Everyoneknew,ofcourse,thattheConservativePartywasdividedontheissue.Butitwasn’tuntilthebellwentandthesecondssteppedoutoftheringthatwe(orindeedhe)knewthatDavidCameronwasgoingtobefightingnotonlyNigelFaragebutalsoBorisJohnsonandMichaelGove.
Andwhileno-oneexpectedJeremyCorbyntogetintotheringatthesametimeasDavidCameron,mostpeoplehadassumedhe’ddohisbit.Instead,hespentmostoftheboutinthedressingroom–adecisionwhichallowedgrapple-fanfavouriteslikeKateHoeyandGiselaStuarttogivethedistinct,butmisleading,impressionthatLabour’sMPswereasdividedonwhethertoleaveorremainastheirTorycounterparts.
True,thecountry’ssmallerpartiesmanagedtoholdthingstogetherallthewaythroughtothe
end.No-onecoulddoubt,forinstance,whosesideUKIP(which,asusual,forearmsmashedaboveitsweightmedia-wise)wason.ThesamecouldbesaidfortheLibDems,theSNPandtheGreens.And,althoughno-onewaspayinganywherenearasmuchattentionastheyshouldhavebeen,boththeDUP(pro-Brexit)andSinnFein(anti)behavedentirelyaspredicted.
From referendum to election
Afterthereferendum,thingsseemedtobecomealittleclearer–atleastontheToryside.TheRemainerseitherretiredhurt(DavidCameronandGeorgeOsborne)orelseactedasifthey’dalwaysbeenLeavers(TheresaMayandvirtuallyeveryoneelse)–notonlytotheextentofinsistingonaso-calledhardBrexitbuteventalkingabout“nodealbeingbetterthanabaddeal.”AhandfulofEurophiles(kudos,AnnaSoubryandNickyMorgan)refusedtodrinktheKool-Aidbuttheywerecastintoouter-darkness(andbootedoffthefrontbench)as“Remoaners”,replacedbyveteranEurophobeslikeLiamFoxandDavidDavis.
Labour,however,founditmuchhardertopulloffthecollectiveamnesiatrick.JeremyCorbyn’sAWOLactduringthereferendumcampaignmadehiscriticsintheParliamentaryLabourPartyevenangrierwith
himthantheyalreadywere.Interestingly,however,heseemedtoescapeanycensurewhatsoeverfromhisyouthfulfan-baseoutsideWestminster,eventhoughmanyofthemwerefuriousthattheUKhadvotedtoleavetheEUandthereforemightreasonablyhavewonderediftheirherocouldhavedonemoretoavoidthatoutcome.
HadLabourMPsnotlosttheirheadsandtriggeredaprematureleadershipcontest,perhapsthingswouldhavebeendifferent.Buttheydid,therebyensuringthatanyofCorbyn’sextra-parliamentaryarmywhosharedtheirsuspicionsthathe(andhisShadowChancellorJohnMcDonnell)hadsecretlywantedBrexitallalongpromptlyforgotallabouttheirreservationsintherushtodefend“Jeremy”against“thechickencoup”.
WithCorbynre-elected,LabourMPsfoundthemselvesbeingaskedtogoagainsteverythingalmostallofthemhadeverstoodforbyvotinginfavourofthegovernmenttriggeringArticle50,therebysettingtheclocktickingontheUK’sdeparturefromtheEU.Mostofthemmanagedtoswallowtheirobjectionsandtheirpride,reasoningthatitwastheonlywayofreconcilingthedifferencebetweentheirviewsandthesignificantsupportforLeaveinmanyLabour-heldconstituenciesthatlookedvulnerableeithertoUKIPortotheConservativesasaresult.Thatsaid,nearly50MPsvotedwiththeirconsciencesandinmanycases(andsurelynotcoincidentally)withtheirlargelyRemain-supportingconstituents.
InthewakeofArticle50,Labour’spositiononwhatitwantedoutoftheBrexitithadjustvotedforremained,toputitmildly,alittleunclear.HaditfullyreconcileditselftorejectingfreedomofmovementandthereforeleavingtheSingleMarket?Whatexactlywasthehave-our-cake-and-eat-itsolutionthatitwasproposingifitwasn’t“theNorwayoption”?WouldLabourMPsreallydaretovotedownwhateverdeal(ornodeal)TheresaMayeventuallyagreedwiththeEUintwoyears’time?No-one,notevenLabour’sspokesmanontheissue,KeirStarmer,seemedtoknowforsure.
The election
Allthisconfusion,theLibDemshoped,wouldseetheirfortunesreviveasthestandard-bearerfor“the48%”.ButtheirprayersprovedtobeinvainasthebulkofRemainvoters,eventhosewhocontinuedtohopeBrexitcouldbeavoided,seemeddestined,atelectionsanyway,tostickwiththedevilstheyknewratherthanthrowtheirlotinwithTimFarron.
Brexit’sbiggestloser,however,wasobviouslyUKIP.Farage,whosteppeddowntospendlesstimewithhisfamilyandmoretimewithhisnewbestfriend,DonaldTrump,provedpredictablyirreplaceable.Meanwhile,MrsMaywasofferinghisvotersnotonlymoreBrexitandlessimmigration,butalsogrammarschools,awaronwindturbines,andwholelotmorebesides.
Littlewonder,then,thatshebelatedlyboughtheradvisors’argumentsthatsheshouldcapitaliseonthecollapseoftheConservatives’right-wingrivalbycallinganearlygeneralelection–acontestwhich,bydeliveringherabiggermajority,would,paradoxically,makeherlessdependentonherownEuroscepticultrasatWestminster.
Itdidn’t,ofcourse,turnoutthatway.Sixdisastrousweekslater,theConservativeswerereturnedtoWestminsterwithfewerMPsandnoparliamentarymajority,stuck,whenitcomestoBrexit,betweenScylla(Tory“headbangers”insistingonfull-speedaheadtoaHardBrexit)andCharybdis(theDUPwhichwantsoutoftheEUbutwithoutareturntoahardborderwiththeSouth).Whether,insuchroughseas,MrsMayorhersuccessorcankeeptheshipafloatfortwofullyearsoftoughnegotiationswiththeEU27isanyone’sguess.
By Tim Bale
SIX
1716
PART TWO: PARTIES AND POLITICS
Introduction
The2017generalelectionwasbilledasthe“Brexitelection”.Setagainstthebackdropofthe2016referendumonEUmembership,PrimeMinisterTheresaMayframedtheelectionasawayof“strengtheningherhand”aheadofthenegotiationswiththeEUandensuringstability.But,intheend,sheachievedneither.
WhiletheConservativePartyattracteda42.4%shareofthenationalvote–theirhighestsharesince1979andanincreaseofmorethan5%ontheirresultin2015–thepartyfailedtoincreaseitsnumberofseats.At318,theConservativeswon13fewerseatsthanin2015andwerelefteightshortofamajority.Aworkingmajorityof17madewayforahungparliamentandnegotiationswiththeDemocraticUnionistParty(DUP),whichifsuccessfulwillleaveMay,nowagreatlydiminishedfigure,withaworkingmajorityofjust13.
JeremyCorbyn’sLabour,meanwhile,hadabetternightthanexpected,polling40%ofthenationalvote–theirhighestsharesince2001anda9.5-pointincreasesince2015–andwinning262seats,30morethanin2015.
Cantheelectionresultbeattributedtoa“Brexiteffect”?InitialreactionstotheresultcertainlyfocusedontheBrexitrealignment.TheshockLabourwininCanterburycametoepitomisethis–Labour’svoteincreasedover20percentagepointsinthistraditionallyblueseatwithtwouniversitycampuses,where55%ofvoterswereestimatedtohavevotedRemain.JeremyCorbynbecamethefirstpartyleadertotaketheseatfromtheConservativessinceWilliamGladstone.
The effect of the Brexit referendum on the 2017 vote
Figure1illustratesthechangesinEnglishandWelshconstituenciesbytheirestimatedsupport
forLeaveinthe2016EUreferendum,basedonfiguresprovidedbyChrisHanretty.TheConservativesstagnatedorfellbackinRemainareas,gainingthemostgroundinthestrongestBrexitseats,whichalsosawthebiggestcollapseofUKIPsupport.Thisfitswithmuchofthepre-electionpollingshowinglarge-scaleswitchingfromUKIPtotheConservatives.ThesurprisecomesontheLabourside.Theparty’ssurgewasgreatestinthestrongestRemainareas,butLaboursurgedeverywhereelse,too.Corbyn’spartywasupbynearly13pointson2015inseatswherelessthan35%votedLeave;androseastill-hefty7.4pointsinseatswheremorethan65%didso.
Thishadtwoimportanteffects.Firstly,thefallinConservativesupportcombinedwiththesurgeinLaboursupportwassufficienttotopplehugemajoritiesinConservative-heldRemainseats,particularlyinLondon,whereLabouroverturnedlargemajoritiesinBattersea,KensingtonandEnfieldSouthgate,andslashedConservativemajoritiesinpreviouslysafeseatssuchasPutneyandtheCitiesofLondonandWestminster.BigswingsinRemainseatshavecreatedanewswatheofmarginalseatsforLabourtotargetinthenextelection.
Secondly,Labour’sresilienceinLeaveareasthwartedConservativeattemptstoturntraditionalworking-classLabourheartlandsbluebyconsolidatingUKIPsupport.TheConservativesincreasedtheirvoteinsuchareas,oftendramatically,andusuallyatUKIP’sexpense.Yet,Labouralsobouncedbackintheseareas,sothenetLabourtoConservativeswingwasweakeveninthestrongestLeaveseats.TheConservativesmadejustsixgainsfromLabourinLeaveareasofEnglandandWales.MostMPsrepresentingheavilyLeaveseatssuchasDerbyNorth,BolsoverandStokeNorthheldonwithreducedmajorities.
Party strategies
TheresaMayexpectedherembraceofBrexittofundamentallychangetheelectoralmapinherfavour,byholdingRemainvotingheartlandswhileexpandingintoLeave-voting,Labourstrongholds.Insteadtheoppositeoccurred:LabourheldfirmintheirLeave-leaningseats,andachievedoftenstunningadvancesinpreviouslytrue-blue,Remainseats.Onepossiblereasonisthatinthe“Brexitelection”,JeremyCorbyn’spositionontheEUwasbetteralignedwiththeelectoratethanTheresaMay’s.May’severmorestridentandinflexible
languageonBrexitalarmedRemain-leaningvotersintraditionallyConservativeareasandputherreputationasacompetentstewardofnegotiationsatrisk.ShelookedlikealeaderdeterminedtoappeasethemostvocalandideologicalBrexiteersatanycost.
JeremyCorbyn’sstrategy,bycontrast,movedthepartytowardsthemildlyEuroscepticcentre.Facedwithacomplexissuewherehisparty’straditionalpositionwasalongwayfromthemedianvoter’s,MrCorbynembracedthepro-Brexitpositionofthemedianvoter,evenattheriskofantagonisingthestronglypro-EUsegmentsoftheLabourcoalition,inamovereminiscentofanearlierLabourleader’s.In1997,TonyBlairgambledthathecouldpitchtothecentregroundoneconomicissueswhileretainingtheloyaltiesofworking-classleftwingers.OnBrexit,JeremyCorbynpitchedtotheEuroscepticcentregroundbyinvokingArticle50andacceptingtheendoffreedomofmovement,gamblingthatRemainvotersalarmedbyTheresaMay’sshrillrhetoricandhardBrexitpolicywouldrecognisethatLabourwastheonlyviablealternative.ThisBrexitBlairismhelpedblunttheConservatives’appealinLeaveareas,whileallowingLabourtocapitaliseonalarmwithTheresaMay’sNigelFaragetributeactinRemainareas.
Conclusion
Ofcourse,Brexitwasnottheonlyfactordrivingtheresults.LeaveandRemainvotingpatternscapturearangeofotherfundamentaldifferencesbetweenpeopleandplaces:inidentityattachments,socialclass,educationlevels,ethnicdiversityandviewsofimmigration,amongothers.
YetthismaybeanotherreasonBrexitBlairismprovedasmartstrategy.Labour’sdecisiontoembracedeparturefromtheEUinsomeformmayhavehelpedthemreframetheelectionaroundotherissuessuchasausterityandpublicservices,andremindvotersinLeaveareasoftheirtraditionalsuspicionsabouttheConservatives.MeanwhileinRemainareas,thepartycouldadvancebypromisinga“softer”alternativeapproachto“hard”Brexit.
TheConservativeswentintothiselectioneagertopaintLabourasoutoftouchandextreme,butfailedtorealisethat,intheirownheartlands,theywerevulnerabletothesamecharge.
By Robert Ford, Matthew Goodwin and Maria Sobolewska
FIGURE 1: Vote changes in the 2017 versus 2015 general elections in English and Welsh constituencies by share of support for “Leave” in the 2016 EU referendum
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Under 35% 35-40% 40-45% 45-50% 50-55% 55-60% 60-65% Over 65%
Change in Labour vote 2015-17 Change in Conservative vote 2015-17 Swing from Conservative to Labour 2015-17 Change in UKIP vote 2015-17
SEVEN
1918
PART TWO: PARTIES AND POLITICS
Introduction
IntheyearsincetheEUreferendum,thekeyquestionthathaspreoccupiedParliamentishowtolegislatetogiveeffecttothedecisionoftheBritishpeopletoleavetheEU.ThepracticalquestionofhowBrexitwouldbedelivered,andinwhattimescale,wasnotfullydiscussedduringthereferendumcampaign.Sincethereferendum,boththeGovernmentandParliamenthavefocussedonhowtoleavetheEUwithinthetwo-yeartimetableprescribedbytheArticle50process,whilesimultaneouslyformulatingastrategytoaddresstheimmediatelegalconsequencesfortheUKofleavingtheEU.Toaddressthislatterpoint,theGovernmenthasproposedlayingbeforeParliamenttheGreatRepealBill,whichwillconvert,onthedayofwithdrawal,allexistingEUlawintoUKlaw.
Tofurthercomplicatematters(notleastbyshorteningtheparliamentarytimeavailabletodebateBrexit)theprimeministercalledasnapgeneralelectionfor8June2017.TheaimoftheGovernmentincallingthiselectionwastostrengthenitsmajorityand,arguably,provideitwithastrongermandateduringtheArticle50negotiations.However,theoutcomeoftheelection,ahungParliamentwithaminorityConservativegovernment,createsuncertaintyandwouldappeartoleavetheUKinmuchweakerpositionatthecommencementoftheBrexitnegotiations.Bycontrast,theoutcomeofahungParliamentcreatesimprovedopportunitiesfor
ParliamenttoexercisecontrolandscrutinyovertheGovernment.
Parliament since the referendum
TheprocessbywhichArticle50wasformallytriggeredon29March2017providesagoodillustrationoftheparliamentarychallengestheGovernmentfacesindeliveringBrexit,evenifithadretainedanoverallparliamentarymajority.ThejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtinJanuary2017confirmedthatParliament,nottheGovernment,hadthesolepowertotriggerArticle50,therebylayingdownanimportantmarkerthatParliamentcannotbebypassedduringthecourseoftheBrexitnegotiations.OneconsequenceoftheSupremeCourtjudgmentisthatithascreatedanexpectationthatParliamentwillbeengagedintheBrexitprocess,which,inpractice,meansexercisingeffectivescrutinyovertheGovernmentduringtheBrexitprocess.Thisengagementwillonlyincreasewithahungparliament,withtheoppositionlikelytoidentifyopportunitiestoamendorevendefeattheGovernmentonBrexitissueswheretheremaybecross-partysupport.
DespitetheGovernmentmakingacommitmentbeforetheelectionthatbothHousesofParliamentwillvoteonanyfinalBrexitdeal,itisnottotallyclearwhatthiswillmeaninpractice,thoughthehungParliamentshouldplacelimitsontheGovernment’sscopetobypassParliament.Specifically,thereremainsuncertaintyastowhetherParliamentwillbeabletorejectthe
finaloutcome–whetheradealornodeal.Furthermore,beforetheelectiontheprimeministerconsistentlystatedherunwillingnesstoprovidea“runningcommentary”toParliamentontheprogressofthenegotiations.
Followingtheelectionofaminoritygovernment,itmaybearguedthatParliamentisinabetterpositiontoexertinfluenceovertheGovernmentduringtheBrexitnegotiationsbothintermsofscrutinyandwithrespecttothesubstanceofthenegotiations.TheabsenceofaparliamentarymajorityislikelytomakeitdifficultfortheGovernmenttoconductnegotiationswithoutreferencetoMPs,especiallybynotofferinga“meaningfulvote”ontheoutcomeofthenegotiationswhich,withaminoritygovernment,itremainspossiblethatParliamentcouldreject.
The parliamentary challenge of delivering Brexit – democracy versus efficiency
PerhapsthebiggestchallengefacingthenewlyelectedParliamentwillbealegislativeone.TodeliverBrexit,Parliamentwillneedtopassanumberofimportantbills(upwardsof10),includingtheGreatRepealBill(seetheGreatRepealBillsectiononthis)beforethecompletionoftheArticle50negotiations.Thiswillprovechallenginggivenlimitedparliamentarytime.Thetimeavailableconsistsofonlytwofullparliamentarysessions,duringwhichparliamentarianswillneedtocontinuewiththewiderlegislativeprogramme.However,itistheabsenceofaworkingmajoritythatwillundoubtedlymakeitmoredifficulttosecureparliamentaryapprovalforkeyBrexitlegislation,suchastheGreatRepealBill.
DeliveringBrexitwithinthetimescaleprescribedbyArticle50willplaceimmensepressureuponParliament.EffectivemanagementofparliamentarytimewillbeanimportanttacticthatislikelytobeemployedbytheGovernment,notleastasawayoflimitingdebateandscrutiny.ItisthereforecrucialthatParliamentusesthe
opportunityofahungParliamenttoprovideastrongcounterbalancetotherequirementofmeetingtheArticle50deadlineof29March2019byinsistingthatdemocraticaccountabilityandscrutiny,whetherinthechamberorviaselectcommittees,isnotcompromised.
GiventhelegislativeandpoliticalchallengesofdeliveringBrexit,itisessentialthatParliamentandtheGovernmentavoidconflictasfarpossibleandcooperateinorderthattheobjectivesofBrexitandparliamentarydemocracyarefullyreconciled.Intermsofparliamentaryactivity,thiswill,firstandforemost,requireimprovedcooperationbetweenGovernmentandtheoppositiontoensurethatparliamentaryscrutinyisfocussedonkeylegislativeproposals.
Post-election,theGovernmentshouldpresent,withoutdelay,itslegislativeproposals,especiallywherenewandpotentiallycomplexUKlegislationwillberequiredbeforeBrexit–forexamplewithrespecttoimmigrationorcustomsrules–whichcannotbeadoptedviatheGreatRepealBill.Toensurethatthislegislationisenactedwithinthenecessarytimeframe,andtoavoidtheuncertaintyoftheso-called“cliff-edge”,sufficientparliamentarytimeforscrutinyofallnewlegislationmustbebuiltintotheGovernment’slegislativeprogramme.
Ultimately,thesuccessofBrexitwillbejudgednotbytheoutcomeofthereferendum,butonthebasisofhowParliamentgiveseffecttothereferendumdecision.Inparticular,thismeanswhetherUKcitizensbelieve,intheyearstocome,thattheirexpectationsforBrexithavebeendeliveredbytheParliamenttheyelectedtofulfilthistask.
By Adam Cygan
EIGHT
2120
PART THREE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE UK
Introduction
NorthernIrelandvotedtoRemainand,oneyearon,isasocietystrugglingwiththeforcesunleashedbytheBrexitvote.Ithasexacerbatedtensionsandreopeneditsever-presentsovereigntyfracture.
PoliticsinNorthernIrelandtypicallyfocusesonissuesrelatingtothedividebetweenCatholicnationalists(whoarefavourablydisposedtoaunitedIreland)andProtestantunionists(whoprioritisethemaintenanceofNorthernIreland’sunionwiththerestoftheUK).TherecentWestminsterelection(June2017)confirmsthatthisremainsthedominantdynamicinNorthernIrishpolitics.NorthernIrelandisstillasocietyscarredbyethno-nationaldivisionandtheconsequencesofconflict.
IsBrexitanissuethatcross-cutsthisdivide,withsignificantnumbersofCatholicsandProtestantsonbothsidesofthedebate?Thesimpleansweris:No.
IncontrasttoBritain,wherebothConservative-inclinedvotersandLaboursupportersareseriouslysplitontheBrexitissue,inNorthernIreland,Catholicnationalistvotersandpartiesare
overwhelminglyRemain,whileProtestantvotersandthemainunionistparty,theDemocraticUnionistParty(DUP),arestrongly“Leave”.Thus,theeasiestwaytomakesenseoftheconsequencesofBrexitforNorthernIrelandistoviewthesethroughtheprismoftheunionist-nationalistdistinction.
The border
Whattodoabouttheborderisonemajorchallenge.NationalistpartiesinNorthernIreland(andCatholicvoters)firmlyopposeanyformof“hardborder”betweenNorthernIrelandandtheRepublicofIreland.Andtheunionistparties(andProtestantvoters)arehighlyscepticalofanyeast-westalternative,namelybordercontrolsbetweenNorthernIrelandandtherestoftheUK.
Thesearehighlysensitiveissues.Ifnothandledwell,thereispotentialforsignificantdisquiet,eitherfromstaunchnationalistsupsetbyanyphysicalmanifestationofanorth-southborderorfromhard-lineunionistswhoseidentitywouldbewoundedifbarrierstotheirsmoothmovementacrosstheUKwereintroduced.
HowthisborderquestionplaysouthasbeensignificantlyaffectedbytheWestminsterelection.
Asisnowclear,theDUPislikelytoenjoysignificantpost-electionpoliticalleverageinWestminstertopursueanagendaoftheUKexitingtheEU,andwillbeinpolepositiontoshapetheassociatedborderregime.
United Ireland?
AdangerfortheDUP,andforunionismingeneral,isalienatingthenationalistcommunityevenfurther,tosuchanextentthattheybeginagitatinginasustainedwayforareferendumonaunitedIrelandtofacilitatethe“return”ofNorthernIrelandtotheEUonanall-islandbasis.ThefactthatnationalistsinNorthernIrelandhavenoweffectivelyvotedtoturntheirbacksonWestminsterpoliticsisaclearwarningofwherepoliticsmaygointhenot-too-distantfuture.
Thedebateneedstobenormalised.Demandsfora“borderpoll”shouldnotbeseenasstrange,unusualorcontrarytotheconstitutionalstatusquo.ThepossibilityofareferendumonaunitedIrelandisacoreelementofthe1998GoodFriday/BelfastAgreement,whichestablishedthecurrentpoliticalstructuresinNorthernIreland.Ifitisobvious(totheSecretaryofStateforNorthernIreland)thatthereissignificantdesireforsuchareferendum,thensuchapollmaybeheld.
Withbothnationalistpartiesnowputtingthismorefirmlyontheagenda,andwiththemajorgainsforSinnFéinintheWestminsterelection(andtheelectionstotheNorthernIrelandAssemblyinMarch2017),thelikelihooditwilloccurhasincreased.IfopinionpollevidenceoverthecomingmonthspointstoasignificantproportionofNorthernIrelandcitizensfavouringunitywiththeRepublicofIreland(orclearlysupportingthecallforaunityreferendum),itwouldbedifficulttowithstandthepressuretoadvancethisoption.
UnitywouldalsorequireareferendumintheRepublicofIreland,andanysuchdebatewouldgrapplewiththefinancialprosandconsofunity
aswellasthesymbolicandidentity-relatedaspects.AstheDUPisfindinginitsdiscussionsovercooperationwiththeConservativeParty,bothcommunitiesinNorthernIrelandmaydiscovertheyarenotuniversallywelcomedintheirrespectivesovereignstates.
Conclusion
WhileinBritainBrexitmapsontoasetofissuesrelatingtosovereignty,immigrationandglobalisation,NorthernIrelandisgrapplingwithanarguablybiggerbasketofthornierquestionsrelatingtotheplaceandnatureoftheborder,therelatedsignificantthreatofcivildisquiet,andtheprospectofareferendumonaunitedIreland.AllofwhichwouldaddfurthercomplexitytotheUKconstitutionalmix.
ThesechallengeshavetobefacedinthefragilecontextofnofunctioninggovernmentinNorthernIrelandandanunstableWestminsterregimedependingonapartyrepresentingonehalfofNorthern Ireland.
By John Garry and Colin Harvey
NINE
2322
PART THREE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE UK
Introduction
LastJune,Remainsecureda62%voteshareinScotland,withonly38%ofvotersbackingLeave.SupportforremainingintheEUwasthehighestofanynationorregionintheUK,withamajorityinall32localauthoritycountingareasandalmosteverydemographic.
ButthechoicewasnotonlyScotland’stomake.InherspeechtotheConservativePartyConferencelastautumn,TheresaMayinsisted,“BecausewevotedinthereferendumasoneUnitedKingdom,wewillnegotiateasoneUnitedKingdom,andwewillleavetheEuropeanUnionasoneUnitedKingdom.Thereisnoopt-outfromBrexit.”Bycontrast,FirstMinisterNicolaSturgeoninsisted,“wedidn’tvotetoleave–wevotedtoremain.Tobetoldthatwehavetoleave,regardless,istantamounttobeingtoldthatourvoiceasanationdoesn’tmatter”.
Developments since the EU referendum
Themorningafterthereferendum,thefirstministerannouncedherintentiontofindawaytorespectthewishesoftheScottishpeople.ShesecuredthebackingoftheScottishParliamenttonegotiatewiththeUKGovernment,EUinstitutionsandmemberstatestoexploreoptionsforkeepingScotlandintheSingleMarket.AcompromisepropositionwassetoutintheScottishGovernment’spaper,Scotland’sPlacein
Europe.ThefirstprioritywastotrytokeeptheUKwithintheEuropeanEconomicArea(EEA)andtheEUCustomsUnion.IntheeventoftheUKGovernmentnegotiatingwithdrawalfromthese,thepaperarguedthatScotlandshouldeitherbecomeafullorassociatedmemberoftheEuropeanFreeTradeAssociation,orhavedirectassociationwiththeEEA.
Clearly,theprospectofScotlandremainingwithintheSingleMarketwhileEnglandandWalesdonotraisesconsiderablepracticalandlegaldifficulties,notleastaroundthefreemovementofmoney,goods,servicesandpeopleacrosstwoseparatemarkets.TheScottishGovernmentarguedthattheseneednotbeinsurmountable,andthatinnovativesolutionscouldbefound.TheextentofthechallengewouldonlybecomeapparentoncetheUK’sstatusvis-à-vistheEUwasmadeclearer.IftheUK-EUagreementminimisestariffsandnon-tariffbarriers,thepracticalobstaclesinthewayofadifferentiatedBrexitforScotlandwouldbereduced.
Overcomingthepoliticalobjections,however,wasalwaysgoingtobedifficult.IncontrasttoNorthernIreland,wherethelandborderwiththeRepublicofIrelandhasgeneratedpoliticalcommitmentinDublin,LondonandBrusselstofindacompromise,thereislittlesympathyintheUKGovernmentforadifferentiatedBrexitdealforScotland.ThepropositionwasformallyrejectedbytheSecretaryofStateforExitingtheEUinApril.
Brexitalsocatapultedtheindependenceissuebacktothetopofthepoliticalagenda.TheScottishNationalParty(SNP)manifestoforthe2016ScottishParliamentelectionssoughtamandatetoholdanewindependencereferendumiftherewascleardemand,oriftherewasa“significantandmaterialchangeinthecircumstancesthatprevailedin2014,suchasScotlandbeingtakenoutoftheEUagainstourwill”.AmajorityintheScottishParliament(consistingofSNPandGreenMSPs)backedtheGovernment’scallforareferendumoncethetermsofBrexitwereknown.Yet,theScottishParliamentlacksthelegalauthoritytoholdareferendumsimilartothe2014voteandtheUKGovernmentrejectedthecall,declaringthat“nowisnotthetime”.TheScottishConservatives’electoralgainsandtheSNP’slossesinthe2017generalelectionhavebeenwidelyinterpretedaspublicrejectionofanearlyreferendum.
TheprocesstowardtriggeringArticle50hadalreadygeneratedastep-changeinformalintergovernmentalrelationsbetweentheUKGovernmentandthedevolvedgovernments.ButtheJointMinisterialCommittee(EuropeanNegotiations)–setupspecificallytodiscussBrexit–hasbeenafrustratingprocessforallinvolved(seealsothesectiononWales).HavingraisedexpectationsthatitwouldprovideanavenueforjointagreementonaUKapproachpriortothetriggeringofArticle50,itsingularlyfailedtodoso.TherewasnointergovernmentaldiscussionoftheUKGovernment’sBrexitpositionpriortoeithertheprimeminister’sLancasterHousespeech,thepublicationoftheWhitePaperorthetriggeringofArticle50.TheJMC(EN)wasalsosupposedtoprovidethedevolvedgovernmentswithoversightofnegotiationswiththeEU.
TheJMCprocessmaybedifficulttoresurrectwithoutafunctioningExecutiveinNorthernIreland.Besides,priortothegeneralelectionatleast,theUKGovernment’sappetitefortheJMC(EN)haddiminished,ashadtheexpectationsoftheScottishGovernmentregardingitscapacitytoupholditsremit.
Looking ahead
BoththeUKConservativesandtheSNPhavebeenhumbledbythegeneralelectionresults,anditisnotyetclearhowthiswillaffecttherelationshipbetweentheirtwogovernments.ThecomingyearwillbedominatedbytheBrexitnegotiations.Despitethefirstminister’scallforaseatatthetable,theScottishGovernment’scapacitytoinfluencenegotiationsislikelytoremainlimited.Ontheotherhand,theScottishConservativeleader,RuthDavidson,buoyantfromherelectoralsuccess,seemsintentontryingtoinfluencetheUK’sBrexitstance.
Inparallel,theintroductionoftheGreatRepealBillwillintensifydebateabouttherepatriationofEUcompetencesandtheirimpactonthedevolutionsettlements(seethesectiononrepatriation).TheprimeministerhasinsistedthatEUframeworksneedtobereplacedbyUKframeworkstopreservetheUKinternalmarket.ThishasbeenperceivedbytheSNPasanattempttoweakenthepowersoftheScottishParliamentbyexpandingtheareaswheretheWestminsterParliamenthasexclusivecompetence.TheScottishGovernmentdoesn’trejecttheneedforcommonUKframeworkstoavoidbarrierstotradeandmobility.Buttherewillbetensionsoverwhogetstodecidewhatsuchframeworkswouldentail,whoownstheprocessofoverseeingtheirimplementation,andwhowieldsthepowershoulddisputesemerge.
By Nicola McEwen
TEN
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PART THREE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE UK
inpartnershipwithPlaidCymru,asanevidence-basedcontributiontotheUKdebate.TheWhite Paper–‘SecuringWales’Future:TransitionfromtheEuropeanUniontoanewrelationshipwithEurope’–addressedboththeUK’sfuturerelationshipwiththeEU,andtheinternalfunctioningoftheUKpost-Brexit,asaunionoffournations(seethecontributionsbyJoHunt and MichaelKeating).
TheWelshGovernmentpresentsacontrastingvisionofBrexittothatproposedbytheUKGovernment.Notleast,itpreferscontinuedparticipationinboththesinglemarketandtheCustomsUnion.TheWelshGovernmentalsostressestheimportanceoffreedomofmovement,althoughassertsthatthereoughttobeastrongerlinkbetweenfreedomofmovementandemploymentthaniscurrentlyexercisedintheUK.ItcallsforcontinuedWelshinvolvementinanumberofEUprogrammes,includingHorizon2020(forscienceandresearch),ERASMUS+(educationandtraining),CreativeEurope(supportingculturalandcreativesectors)andtheIreland-WalesProgramme(aEuropeanTerritorialCooperationprogrammethatconnectsorganisations,businessesandcommunities).ItalsoseeksfortheUKtoremainapartnerintheEuropeanInvestmentBank.
Despitethesecontrastingpositions,theWelshGovernmenthasconsistentlyemphasisedareasofcomplementaritywiththeUKGovernment,insistingthattheirpositionsare“notirreconcilable”.ItisinthiscooperativespiritthattheWelshGovernmenthasparticipatedinthecross-nationsforumonBrexit:theJointMinisterialCommitteeonEuropeanNegotiationsorJMC(EN),establishedon24October2016.Thisforum“seek[s]toagreeaUKapproachto,andobjectivesfor,Article50negotiations”.However,eventhemostmeasuredparticipantshavebeenmovedtoexpresssomeexasperation.BoththeWelshandScottishrepresentatives(CabinetSecretaryMarkDrakefordandMinisterMichaelRussell,respectively)havebeenoutspokenintheircritiqueoftheforum,withDrakefordstatingthat,“StFagansCommunityCouncil,inmyconstituency,
Introduction
On24June2016,Walesawokeonthe“winningside”oftheEUreferendum.17of22localauthorityareashadvoted“Leave”,totalling52.5%ofthosewhowenttothepolls.AndthisagainstabackdropofhighlevelsofEUfunding,adevolutionsettlementpremisedonEUmembership,andoverwhelmingsupportfor“Remain”fromWelshpoliticiansandsectoralorganisations.SobeganWales’Brexitjourney:adividednationwithaweakbargaininghand,yetwithdistinctintereststoprotectbothwithintheUKandwithinEurope.
Wales’ journey since the EU referendum
TheLeavevoteinWalesplacedtheWelshGovernmentinanunenviableposition.PriortotheEUreferendum,ithadvehementlyexpresseditspreferenceforRemain,assertingthattherisksofBrexitweremanifoldinfinancial,economicandpoliticalterms.Indeed,asabeneficiaryfromEUfunds(totalling£658millionin2014)andasmallnationforwhomtheSingleMarketholdsparticularsignificance,thispro-EUpositionhadbeenrathertakenforgrantedinWelshpolitics.Thevotingpublic,however,didnotagree.
TheLeavevotelefttheWelshGovernmentwithoutamandatetoadvocateitspro-EUposition.AddedtothisistheWelshGovernment’sweakbargaininghandinitsdealingswiththeUKGovernment.Inthis,WalesdiffersfromScotland(throughcallsforasecondindependencereferendum)andNorthernIreland(withacutelysensitivepoliticalissuesthatdemandattention),bothofwhichvotedRemain.
Duringthesummerof2016,thepoliticalinstitutionsofWalessettoworkpreparingthemselvesfortheUK’sprospectivewithdrawalfromtheEU.TheWelshGovernmentestablished inter aliaanEUTransitionTeamtocoordinateallBrexitactivity,andaEuropeanAdvisoryGroupofexternalstakeholders.TheresponseoftheNationalAssemblyforWaleswasswiftanddecisive.DaysaftertheEUreferendum,itissuedareportoutliningsomeoftheimplicationsofthereferendumforWales.Itthenembarkeduponaprogrammeofresearchandanalysis,spearheadedbythenewlycreatedCommitteeonExternalAffairsandAdditionalLegislation.TheCommitteelauncheditsreport,‘ImplicationsforWalesofleavingtheEuropeanUnion’inearlyJanuary2017,inwhichitclearlyoutlinedthepriorityareasforWalesandascrutinyrolefortheAssembly.
TheWelshGovernment’swhitepaperonBrexitwasreleasedlaterthatmonth,on23January2017,
wouldbebetterorganisedthanmostJMCmeetingshavebeen.”Indeed,thereislittletoindicatethattheUKGovernmenthasengagedseriouslywiththedevolvedadministrations.Thisdoesnotbodewellforthelatter’sroleintheBrexitnegotiationsthemselves,somethingboththeWelshandScottishGovernmentshavecalledfor.
What next for Wales?
Today,WalesisworkingtoprotectitsfuturebothwithintheUKandwithinEurope.OfcentralimportancetoWalesistheGreatRepealBill,anditsconsequencesfordevolutionandthefutureoftheUK’sownunion(seeJoHunt’scontribution).AttachedtothisarefundamentalquestionsabouthowpowerswillberepatriatedtotheUK,how(orindeedwhether)lostEUfunds(specificallyforagricultureandregionaldevelopmentpolicy)willbecompensatedforviaUKdomesticsources,andhowWelshinterestswillbeprotectedininternationaltradedeals.Beyondthis,duringthenegotiationsthemselves,Waleswillcontinueworktodefenditskeyindustries,seekingtoensuresufficientlevelsofmigrationandpushingforacloserelationshipbetweentheUKandtheEU.
However,whateverthefinalrelationshipbetweentheUKandtheEU,WalesisinvestinginitsownfutureinEurope,asa“Europeannation”initsownright.Asitstands,fromtheWelshoutpostinBrussels(WalesHouse),anumberoforganisationsworktoadvanceWelshinterestsandsupportWelshparticipationincollaborativeventureswitharangeofnationalandregionalactors.MuchofthisEuropeanactivityalreadyreachesbeyondtheEU,providingfoundationsuponwhichtobuildpost-Brexit.Indeed,WelshengagementwithEuropeissettocontinuefollowingtheUK’swithdrawalfromtheEU,albeittailoredtoarenewedsetofcircumstances.
By Rachel Minto
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PART THREE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE UK
viewoftheconstitutioninwhichsovereigntymustbeinoneplace.ThemajorityinScotlandandNorthernIreland,however,votedRemain,wantingtoremaininboththeUKandEuropeanunions.Nowtheyareforcedtochoose.
From then till now
BrexitthereforepresentsaseverechallengetotheUK’sevolvingconstitution.WecanillustratethisbythreedevelopmentsintheyearsincetheBrexitvote.
ThefirstisthejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtin the Millercase,whichprimarilyconcernedwhetherParliamentneededtoapprovetheGovernment’striggeringofArticle50,givingnoticeofwithdrawalfromtheEU.TheScottishGovernmentjoinedthecasetoarguethatitwouldalsoneedtheconsentofthedevolvedlegislatures.Thisisbecauseitwouldrequirechangesinthedevolutionactsinvariousways.AttheminimumtheprovisionsbindingthemtoactwithinEUlawwillhavetoberemoved.TheSupremeCourtcouldhaveruledthattheconventionwasnotapplicablebecausethesituationwasnot“normal”,orbecausetheEUcomesunderforeignaffairsandisnotdevolved.Instead,attheurgingoftheUKGovernment’sAdvocateGeneral,itruledthattheconventionwasamerepoliticaldeviceandnotbindinginanycircumstances.
ThesecondissueconcernstheideathatScotlandandNorthernIrelandmighthaveadifferentiatedfromofBrexit,allowingthemtoremaininpartsoftheEU,includingtheSingleMarket,evenastherestoftheUKwithdraws.AplanwaspresentedbytheScottishGovernmentinDecember2016.NationalistsinNorthernIrelandhavemadetheirownsuggestionsforadifferentiatedsettlement,althoughunionistshaveopposedtheidea.TheUKGovernmentresponseisthattheremustbea“UKapproach”inwhichthewholeoftheUKmustinthefuturehavethesamerelationshipwiththeEU.
Introduction
TherearetwoverydifferentviewsoftheUK’slargelyunwrittenconstitution.One,the“Westminster”view,isbasedontheprincipleofparliamentarysovereigntyandsupremacy.ThisholdsthattheUKParliamentisthesupremesourceoflawandcandoanythingexceptbinditself.Parliament,inturn,isanswerabletoaunitaryBritishnation.ItisthisviewoftheconstitutionthatclasheswiththeEuropeanproject,whichisbasedonaphilosophyofsharingsovereigntyandpower.
Theotherview,widelyheldinScotlandandtheotherUKnations,isthattheUnitedKingdomisaunionofnations,eachofwhichhasitsownrelationshipwiththecentre.Devolutionsince1999hasreinforcedthisviewbyprovidingScotland,NorthernIrelandandWaleswiththeirownelectedlegislaturesandgovernments.Itisfurtherstrengthenedbythe“SewelConvention”underwhichWestminsterwillnot“normally”passlawsindevolvedareaswithouttheconsentoftheScottishParliament,NationalAssemblyforWalesorNorthernIrelandAssembly.TheconventionwasputintolawintheScotlandAct(2016)andtheWalesAct(2017).TheNorthernIrelandsettlementrejectstheideathatthereisaunitaryBritishpeople.Instead,itallowspeopletodefinethemselvesasBritish,Irish,NorthernIrishofanycombinationofthose.Italsoprovidesthat
thepeopleofNorthernIrelandcanvotetojointheRepublicofIreland.
The constitution and the EU
This“devolved”viewoftheconstitutionisentirelyconsistentwiththeEuropeanproject.TheUnitedKingdomandtheEUarebothunionsinwhichdifferentnationssharepower.Bothareopen-ended,withoutaclearendpoint.Rathertheyadjustaccordingtothetimes.Theissueofsovereigntyisfudgedandneverabsolutelyresolved.
OpinionsurveyshaverepeatedlyshownthatthepeopleofScotlandandNorthernIrelandhavenoproblemwithmultiplelayersofauthority.OurworkontheScottishindependencereferendumshowedthat,despitebeingforcedtochoosebetweenindependenceandtheunion,mostvoterscontinuedtoprefersomethinginbetween.InNorthernIreland,thepower-sharingsettlementhasgainedcross-communitysupport.ThenumbersofpeopleinScotlandandNorthernIrelandwhowanttoputallthesovereigntyinoneplaceissmall.
TheargumentforBrexitwasto“takebackcontrol”,andrestorethesupremacyoftheUKParliamentandpeoplebyeliminatingtheprovisionsthatmadeUKlawsubordinatetoEUlawinfieldswheretheEUiscompetent.ThisreflectstheWestminster
ThethirdissueconcernsthosepowerscurrentlyheldbytheEUwhicharealsodevolvedwithintheUnitedKingdom.Themainonesareagriculture,fisheries,theenvironmentandsomeaspectsofjusticeandhomeaffairs.TheUKGovernment’spositionisthatallpowerswillcomebacktoWestminster,whichcanthendecidewhichonestopassdowntothedevolvedlevel.TheScottishandWelshGovernmentshavearguedthatthesepowersconstitutionallybelongtothem.TheremightneedtobeUKframeworkstoreplaceEuropeanframeworksbutthesewouldhavetobenegotiatedvoluntarilyamongthefournations.
What lies ahead?
BrexitexposesverydifferentviewsoftheUKconstitution,somethingthathasnothadtobeaddressedsincedevolutioninthelate1990s.TheUKGovernment’spositionshaveimpliedareaffirmationofWestminstersupremacyatoddswithdevelopmentssince1999andtendingtocentralisation.
TheissuecouldberesolvedbytheUKbreakingup,withScotlandandNorthernIrelandremainingintheEU.Alternatively,itcouldberesolvedbytheUKGovernmentimposingitswillandleavingtheEUontermssetbyitself.TheresultoftheGeneralElectionsuggeststhatneithertheUKGovernment,withitsunitaryviewoftheconstitution,northeScottishorIrishnationalists,arestrongenoughtoalloweitherofthesetohappen.Instead,BrexitwillremainentwinedinthechangingconstitutionalpoliticsoftheUK.
By Michael Keating
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Introduction
TwoclaimsweremadeduringthereferendumcampaignconcerningtheimplicationsofBrexitfortheUK’sregions,citiesandnations.ThefirstwasthatthemajorbeneficiariesofEUmembershipwerethe“metropolitanelites”inLondon,whiletherestofthecountrywaslargelydeprivedofthebenefitsofEUmembership.Thisthemereappearedonmanyoccasions,andwasreferredtobymanyhighprofileLeaveadvocates.Italsofrequentlyre-surfacedwhenthemembersofthepublicwereinterviewedbythemedia,suggestingthat,asacampaignslogan,ithadgainedrealtraction.Indeed,thegeographyofthereferendumresultprovidedfurtherevidenceforthe“metropolitanelite”argumentwithinEnglandandWales,revealing,asitdid,astarkdivisionbetweenpro-RemainLondonanditshinterlandandtherestofthecountry.
The“metropolitanelite”argumentwasalwaysaboutLondon,notcitiesingeneral.Therewasneveranysuggestionthatpro-LeaveadvocateshadplaceslikeLiverpoolinmindwhentheyreferredto“elites”.Anditwasneverbasedonanyempiricalevidence.
Thesecond,interrelatedclaim,wasthattheUKhasaverystrongeconomichandtoplayinthe
BrexitnegotiationsbecauseofitsbalanceofpaymentsdeficitwiththerestoftheEU.Assuch,otherEUmemberstateswillbeeagertoagreeacomprehensivefreetradedealwiththeUKinordertoprotecttheirtradesurplus.Thisargumentfindslittlesupportinmoderneconomics.Incontrast,mosteconomistsagreethatthestrengthoftheUK’spositioncanonlybeunderstoodintermsoftheimpactoftradeandforeigndirectinvestmentonalleconomicactivitytakingplaceinthedomesticeconomy,irrespectiveofwhetherthoseactivitiesarethemselvesinvolvedintradeornot.Crucially,tradesurplusordeficitlevelssimplyhavenorelevancefortheseissues.Again,thetruthofthisclaimcanonlybetestedbyexamininghowtheinternationalandinterregionaltradestructuresoftheUK’sregionsaffecttheirinternaleconomicperformance.
Testing the claims
Testingbothclaimsrequiresmovingbeyondsimplenumbersregardingthelevelsorchangesingrossexportsandimports,becausethesenumbersactuallytellusverylittleabouttheeconomicdependenceofacountry,acityoraregion,onitstraderelationships.Modernglobalvaluechainsinvolvemovinggoodsandservicesacrossmanydifferentbordersmultipletimesbeforeafinalproductorserviceisproduced.Thismeansthat
onlyasophisticatedanalysisbasedondetaileddatalinkingtradepatternstodomesticeconomicstructuresandpatternscanuncovertheserelationships.
Thisshowsusthat,firstly,the“metropolitanelite”argumentiscompletelywrong.LondonislessdependentontheEUforitsprosperitythananywhereelseintheUK.Indeed,theregionswhichvotedLeavetendtobetheregionswhicharemostdependentonEUmarketsfortheirprosperity.ThisstronglysuggeststhatitistheUK’sweakerregionswhicharemostexposedtoBrexit.
Secondly,ineconomicterms,theUKanditsregionsarefarmoreexposedtoBrexittrade-relatedrisksthanregionsinanyotherEUmemberstateexcepttheRepublicofIreland.EvencountriessuchasGermanyortheNetherlandswillbelessaffectedbyBrexitthantheUK,whilemanyothermemberstateswillfeelalmostnoeffect.ThissuggeststhattheeconomicstrengthoftheUK’snegotiatingpositionisfarweakerthanmostoftheUKpublicunderstands.
The regional rather than just the sectoral dimension
Untilnow,muchofthediscussiononBrexithasbeendominatedbythepotentialimpactonparticularindustriessuchasautomobilesorfinanceandwhetherthiswouldrequirespecificdealsforcertainindustries.Importantly,however,thisdiscussionhasoverlookedthefactthatthespecificdetailsofthefinalUK-EUagreementarelikelytohaveverydifferentimpactsondifferentpartsoftheUK,andhavethepotentialtounderminemuchoftheeconomic“rebalancing”agendathatiscurrentlybeingwidelydiscusseddomestically.TheimpactsofBrexitontheUK’sdevolvedadministrationsandcity-regionsarelikelytodiffermarkedlydependingonthetermsofthefinalUK-EUagreement,andtherearenowgrowingvoicesthatadvocateagreaterinvolvementofdifferentpartsoftheUKinthenegotiations.
CurrentpoliticaldebatesfocusontherolethatthedevolvedadministrationsmayplayintheBrexitnegotiations,butthesegivelittleornoattentiontotheissuesaffectingtherestofthecountry.Takentogether,thepopulationsoftherecentlyconstitutedcity-regioncombinedauthoritiesaremuchlargerthanthetotalpopulationsofthethreedevolvedadministrations,althoughtheseareasbarelyfigureincurrentdiscussions.Furthermore,manyofthesmallertownsandruralareaswhichvotedstronglyforBrexit,andwhicharelikelytobethemostadverselyaffectedbyit,effectivelyhavenorepresentationwhatsoever.Althoughvariouslocalgovernmentleadershaveraisedtheseissues,thishasachievedlittleornobroaderresonance.However,astheBrexitnegotiationsproceedandthepotentialimpactsondifferentareasstarttobecomeclearer,itmaybethattheUK’scitiesandregionsbecomemoreinvolvedintheprocess.
By Philip McCann and Raquel Ortega-Argilés
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bethemainloserinanyresultingrestructuringsbecauseoftherelativesizeofthetwomarkets.Andlabourmigration–particularlyofhighlyskilledworkers–appearstohaveslowed.Noneofthesespellimminentdisaster,butallwilldamagetheUK’slong-termgrowthprospects,verymuchaspredictedbeforethereferendum.
Meanwhile,Brexithasprecipitatedsignificantchangesintheorientationofdomesticeconomicpolicy,withlessemphasisonfiscalrestraintorderegulationthanintheOsborne-Cameronera;indeed,theMaygovernmentisarguablytheleast“liberal”ineconomicorientationforfourdecades.
Finally,thenotionthatBrexitwillleadtoanoverallreductionin“redtape”nowseemsincreasinglyabsurd.Rather,increasedbureaucracyandgovernmentinterventionappearlikely.Evenonanoptimisticreading,businessfacestheprospectofbeingforcedtoimplementnewimmigrationcontrolsonEUworkers,newworkers’rights,andcopewithcustomschecksatborders.
What happens next?
Intheshortterm,theeconomyappearstobegraduallyslowing.Growthfellto0.2%inthefirstquarterof2017(downfrom0.7%inthefourthquarterof2015)andrecentindicatorsofconsumerandbusinessconfidencehavebeenweak.However,employmentremainsathistoricallyhighlevelsandthereislittleevidenceyetofadramaticreversal.Unemploymentmayrise,althoughnotrapidly.Onceagain,thisisthecentralview;thereareasalwaysriskstoboththeupsideanddownside–withthelatterperhapsratherlarger.Theinconclusiveresultoftheelectionaddsafurtherelementofuncertaintyintheshortterm.
ButwhatwillbecrucialoverthenextyearistheinteractionbetweentheeconomicsofBrexitandthepoliticsofthenegotiations.Underonescenario,thenegotiationsprogresswell,witharelativelyearlyagreementonthebroadtermsofwithdrawal,aconstructiveapproachonboth
Introduction
TheRemaincampaignmadetheeconomicconsequencesofBrexitthecentralelementoftheircase.Inthis,theyweresupportedbytheapparatusofgovernment,thekeyinternationaleconomicinstitutions,andthevastmajorityofacademiceconomists.MostforecasterspredictedthataBrexitvotewouldlead,intheshortterm,toasharpfallintheexchangerate;turbulenceinfinancialmarkets;and,overthesubsequentfewmonths,toasignificantslowdowningrowth(withtheTreasurypredictingamildrecession).Credibleanalysesofthelong-termeconomicimpactofBrexitforesawasignificanthittoGrossDomesticProduct(GDP),althoughwithconsiderableuncertaintyovertheprecisemagnitudeofthisimpact.Whilesomeelementsofthiscampaignmaywellhavebackfired–inparticular,GeorgeOsborne’s“punishmentbudget”,widelyregardedaspoliticalposturingratherthancredibleeconomics–mostpollssuggestedthatvotersexpectedBrexittodamagetheUKeconomy.
What’s happened since the referendum?
Intheshortrun,however,anydamagewasminimal.Thepounddidfallsharply,butstabilisedandhasrecoveredsomewhatinthelastfew
months.TheBankofEnglandcutinterestratesinAugustandannouncedfurtherquantitativeeasing;thisappearstohavesupportedmarketsandbusinessconfidence.Financialmarkets,intheUKasglobally,havebeenbuoyanttothepointwheremanyfeartheyareovervalued.Mostimportantly,growthandemploymentheldupwell.Indeed,themainstrengths(aremarkablyresilientlabourmarket,strongconsumerspendingandsteadygrowthintheservicessector)andweaknesses(weakprivateandpublicinvestment,poorproductivitygrowthandaverylargecurrentaccountdeficit)oftheUKeconomyremainedlargelyastheywerebeforethereferendum.
However,thepoorrecordofshort-termforecastsconcerningtheimpactoftheBrexitvotetellusalmostnothingaboutlonger-termpredictions.Here,theindications–albeittentativeatthispoint–arebothgloomierandmoreconsistentwiththeeconomicconsensus.Asexpected,somefinancialsectorjobsandinvestmentarebeingrelocatedelsewhereintheEU.Sofarthisisatrickle,butitseemslikelytoaccelerateasthenegotiationsprogresswithlittleornoprospectofanyearlydealoncontinuedmarketaccess.Companiesthatrelyonpan-Europeansupplychainsaremakingcontingencyplanstodealwithbordercontrolsand/ortradebarriers;theUKstandsto
sidestowardsthelonger-termrelationship,and,crucially,anextended“implementation”phaseafterBrexitinwhichlittleornothingchangeswithrespecttotheUK’seconomicrelationshipwiththeEU27.Thiswouldmaintainconfidenceandgivefirmstimetoadjust;anynegativeimpactswouldbespreadoveralongerperiodand,atthesametime,theUKcouldbegintopursuedeepereconomicrelationshipswithnon-EUcountries.ThisscenariowouldalsohelpgivetheUKGovernmentpoliticalspacetomakethenecessarycompromisesneededtosecureasuccessfuloutcome.
However,ifnegotiationsstall,orworse,breakdownentirelywhiletheArticle50clockkeepsticking,theriskisthatthereisarapiderosioninbusinessandconsumerconfidenceasfearsofa“cliff-edge”or,stillworse,a“chaotic”Brexitgrow.Atitsworst,thiscouldspiral,withasuccessionofannouncementsofbusinessrelocationsinavarietyofsectors.Thiswouldalsospilloverintofinancialmarkets,withafurtherfallinthepound.Politically,therewouldagainbefeedbackloops,thistimenegative,giventheGovernment’sdomesticpoliticalweakness.Fromaneconomicperspective,thelastyearmaywellprovetohavebeenthecalmbeforethestorm.
By Jonathan Portes
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Facedwiththesetrade-offs,TheresaMay’sgovernmentwantstoprioritisesovereignty.TheGovernmenthopestoendfreemovementoflabourandtoremovetheUKfromthejurisdictionoftheECJ.Consequently,PrimeMinisterMayannouncedinJanuary2017thattheUKwouldleaveboththeSingleMarketandtheCustomsUnion,andwouldseekanewfreetradeagreementwiththeEU.TheGovernmentalsosignalleditwaswillingtoleavewithoutadealifasufficientlyattractiveagreementcouldnotbereached.Thisapproachwasdrivenprimarilybytheprimeminister’sneedtosecuresupportfromvoterswhobackedBrexittotakebackcontrolfromtheEU.However,theConservatives’failuretowinamajorityofseatsinthegeneralelectionmeanstheGovernmentisnowunderpressuretoappealtoabroadercoalitionofvotersbydevelopingaBrexitplanthatislessharmfultotheeconomy.
Negotiating a free trade agreement
IftheUKdoesleavetheSingleMarketandtheCustomsUnion,whattypeoffreetradeagreementshoulditaimfor?ThemostbasicagreementwouldsimplybantariffsonUK-EUtrade.ButeconomicanalysisfindsthelargestpotentialcostsofBrexitcomenotfromthethreatoftariffs,butfromhighernon-tarifftradebarriersduetotheimpositionofcustomsproceduresandtheemergenceofregulatorydifferencesbetweentheUKandtheEU.Anambitiousfreetradeagreementneedstogobeyondtariffsandtakestepstokeepthesenon-tariffbarrierslow.ThismeansfindingcreativewaystominimiseborderchecksandensurethatchangestoUKregulationdonotcreatenewtradecosts–agoalthatconflictswiththedesiretoreassertnationalcontroloverregulatorypolicy.AswillbecomeincreasinglyapparentduringtheBrexitnegotiations,givingupcontrolisthepricecountriespaytokeeptradecostslow.
ItisalsoimportantfortheUKthatanyagreementcoversservicesindustries.ClosetohalftheUK’stradeisinservices,butmostagreementsdolittletoreducebarrierstoservicestrade.EvenSwitzerlanddoesnothaveacomprehensiveservicestradeagreementwiththeEU,despiteallowingfree
Oneyearago,theUKvotedtoleavetheEU.However,votersdidnotchoosewhatwouldcomeafterBrexit.
Options for “life after Brexit”
OneoptionistoremainintheSingleMarketandpreservethefreemovementofgoods,services,capitalandlabourwiththeEU.AnotheristonegotiateabespoketradeagreementwiththeEUthatkeepstradebarriersaslowaspossiblewhileendinglabourmobilityandgivingtheUKgreatercontrolovereconomicregulation.Finally,ifnodealisreached,theUKandEUwouldtradeunderWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)terms.ThismeanstheUKwouldhavemuchthesameeconomicrelationswiththeEUaswithnon-EUcountriessuchastheUSorJapan.Itwouldleadtotariffsongoodstradeandreducedmarketaccessforserviceexporters.
EachofthesealternativeswasendorsedbydifferentfactionsoftheLeavecampaignpriortothereferendum.Askingvoterswhattheypreferdoesnotresolvetheconundrum:opinionpollsshowsupportformaintainingthebenefitsofSingleMarketmembership.YetpollsalsofindsupportfortakingbackcontrolbyrestrictingimmigrationandremovingtheUKfromthejurisdictionoftheEuropeanCourtofJustice(ECJ)(thoughseethesectiononpublicopinion).
Europeanintegrationbringseconomicbenefitsbyreducingbarrierstotradeandinvestment.But,toreapthesebenefits,countriesmustgiveupunilateralcontroloversomeareasofeconomicpolicy.Forexample,harmonisingproductstandardsacrosstheEUcreatesexportopportunitiesforUKbusinessesbecausetheydonothavetosatisfydifferentregulationsindifferentmarkets.But,harmonisationisonlypossibleifallcountriesagreetoadoptthesamestandards,whichmeansgivingupnationalcontrolofregulation.Similarly,theEU’s CustomsUnionkeepstradecostslowbyallowinggoodstocrossborderswithoutfacingcustomscontrols.However,countriesthatbelongtotheCustomsUnioncannothaveindependenttradepolicies.
The integration–sovereignty trade-off
AsitleavestheEU,theUKmustchoosewhethertoprioritisemaintainingeconomicintegrationorassertingitssovereignty.Thischoicewillhaveimportanteconomicconsequences.ResearchconductedwithcolleaguesattheCentreforEconomicPerformanceattheLondonSchoolofEconomicsfoundthatthefallinUKlivingstandardscausedbyBrexitwouldbetwiceaslargeiftraderevertstoWTOtermsthaniftheUKstaysintheSingleMarket.
movementoflabour.NotradeagreementwillofferthesamemarketaccessthatmembershipoftheSingleMarketprovides,particularlyforfinancialservices,buttheUKshouldseektokeepbarrierstoservicestradeaslowaspossible.
TosecureagooddealwiththeEU,theUKmustbepatientandwillingtocompromise.Tradenegotiationsarelengthy,complexandoftencontentious.ThereislittlechanceanambitiousagreementcanbereachedbeforeBrexitoccursinMarch2019,sotheUK’sfirstobjectiveshouldbetonegotiateatransitionarrangementtogovernUK-EUrelationsuntilalonger-termagreementispossible.Togiveadequatetimefornegotiations,thetransitionarrangementshouldlastuntilatleast2022.Andtoavoideconomicdisruption,itshouldmimicthestatusquoascloselyaspossible.
Oncelonger-termnegotiationsbegin,progresswillrequiretheUKtomakeconcessions.PossibleconcessionsincludemakingpaymentstotheEUbudget,agreeingEUregulationswillcontinuetoapplyinsomeindustries,andguaranteeingimmigrationrightsforEUcitizensofferedajobintheUK.TheUKhasaweakernegotiatingpositionthantheEU,soevenwiththeseconcessionsitisunlikelytoachieveallitsobjectives.Butrefusingtocompromisewillguaranteefailure.ResearchestimatesthatleavingtheEUwithoutadealcouldreduceUKincomepercapitabyupto10%intheworst-casescenario.
Where next?
AsBrexitapproaches,theUKisfacingmorechallengesthanopportunities.Fromaneconomicperspective,thequestionisnotwhetherBrexitwillharmlivingstandards,buthowlargethecostwillbe.Followingthegeneralelection,theGovernmentneedstoaskhowmuchvotersarewillingtopaytoasserttheirsenseofnationalidentity.IfleavingtheSingleMarketisviewedastoocostly,theUKisheadedinthewrongdirection.
By Thomas Sampson
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PART FOUR: BREXIT AND THE ECONOMY
closetothegrossamount(afterdeductingtheUKrebate)theUKwasexpectedtopayintotheEUbudgetovertheentirespanofthe2014-20MFF.Unsurprisingly,messagesfromtheUKsidedismisstheseclaimswhich,ithastobeemphasised,no-oneon,EUBrexitnegotiator,MichelBarnier’steamhasformallymade.
AnarguablyrathervindictiveproposalinanEUbriefingdocumentpublishedattheendofMay2017suggeststheUKmayalsobeaskedtopayforrelocatingEUagenciesfromtheUK,suchastheEuropeanBankingAuthority,aswellasthesalariesofteachersattheEuropeanSchoolsinBrussels.TheBankofEnglandcan,however,lookforwardtorecoveringitspaid-incapitalfromtheEuropeanCentralBank.
If€100billionisfanciful,asresearchersfromBruegelimply,whatisrealistic?DespiteaHouseofLordsCommittee’sverdictthatthereisnolegalobligationtopay,Britishministershavebeencarefulnottoruleoutsomepayment,usinglanguagesuchas“obeyourlegalobligations”[DavidDavis].Evenso,theUKisreluctanttocountenanceanearlyagreement,forfearofanegativepublicreaction.
What sort of compromise could be envisaged?
Asexplainedin an earlier paper,themainelementsofafinancialsettlementarenotundulycomplex.Theyturnon:theextenttowhichtheUKacceptsthatitisboundbythecommitmentsmadeforthefulldurationoftheMFF,andnotjustuptothedateofBrexit;theshareoftotalcommitmentstheUKshouldbear;andonapportioningtheassetsandliabilities(notablypensions)oftheEU.TheEUpositionistousethetotaltransferredbytheUKfrom2014-18asaproportionofthetotaltransferredbyallmemberstates.Extrapolatingfromthedatafor2014-16,thiswouldmeanaratioofaround12%.
Aneatanswermightbetoallowthe2014-20MFFtoplayoutaspartofabroadertransitionaldeal,implyingtheUKcontinuestopayinuntilthe
endof2020,whilecontinuingtoreceiveitsshareofEUfundingforagriculturalsupport,regionaldevelopmentandresearch.ThissolutionhasthepragmaticadvantageofenablingtheGovernmenttofulfilthepromisetomaintainfundinguntiltheendof2020toUKbeneficiariesfromtheseEUprogrammes.FortheEUside,higherpaymentstoBrusselsorcutsinEUprogrammeswouldbeavoidedforthe2014-20MFF,althoughtheissuewillreturnwithavengeancewhenthenextMFFhastobenegotiated,mostprobablywhileBrexitnegotiationsareheadingtowardsaconclusioninlate2018.UsingTreasuryprojections,thenetcosttoUKtaxpayerswouldbeoftheorderof£18billion(€22billion)fromApril2019totheendof2020.
RALwouldstillbeaproblembecause,underEUrules,claimsforEUregionalprogrammesarealloweduptothreeyearsbeyond2020;aswouldthebalanceofassetsandliabilities.TheamountofRALchangesfromyeartoyearasprojectsarecompletedandnewmulti-yearcommitmentsarecontracted,butistypicallyintherangeof€200-300billion.WhethertheUKshouldbeliableforaproportionofRALisnegotiable:theUKcouldarguetherewasalreadyastockofRALfromthepreviousMFFanditshouldonlybeliableforashareofthechangeinRAL,whereastheEUsidecouldinsisttheUKpayitsshareofthefullstock.SimilarbargainingcouldbeenvisagedforEUpensionliabilitiesandassets.
Bestguess?Around€30billion.
By Iain Begg
Introduction
Duringthereferendumcampaign,themaindebatearoundpublicfinanceswasaboutwhetherleavingtheEUwouldrelease£350millionaweektobespentontheNHS.Evenonthemostfavourableassumptions,theclaim–whichinfluencedmanyvoters–wasrepeatedly showntobeexaggerated.TherewerealsoconcernsthatanydownturnintheeconomyasaresultofBrexitwouldreducetaxrevenues in a waythatcouldworsentheUKfiscalposition.
TheEU’sfinancesaresetinaseven-yearMultiannualFinancialFramework(MFF),currentlycovering2014-20andformallyenactedina2013CouncilRegulation.TheMFFisahardfoughtbargain,invariablyagreedaftermuchacrimonyandbrinkmanship.AswithmanyEUaccords,theministersconcernedusuallyclaimvictoryathome,whilebemoaninginBrusselshowmuchtheyhaveconceded.Theadvantageoftheseven-yeardealisinallowingtheannualbudgettoproceedrelativelysmoothly,preciselybecausetheMFFiswhereallthebigcompromisesaresettled.
What has changed since the referendum?
Thesubsequentemergenceofthe“divorcebill”rapidlybecameanewandpotentiallydivisiveissueintheBrexitnegotiations.Itarisesmainly
becausemanyEUprogrammes,principallyforresearchandforEUregionalpolicy,aremulti-annualincharacter.Inbothcases,theaimistoavoidpiecemealprojectsandtolookinsteadforcoherentprogrammesdeliveringresultsgreaterthanthesumoftheparts.Itdoes,however,meanthatcontractssignedinonefinancialyearwilloftennotfalldueforfinalpaymentuntilseveralyearslater–knowninEUcirclesasRAL,fromtheFrenchexpressionresteàliquider.
Againstthisbackdrop,thedepartureoftheUK(assumingApril2019),willbesevenquartersbeforetheendoftheMFF.AnimmediateendtoBritishpaymentswouldleaveaholeinthebudgetthatwouldhavetobefilledbyothermemberstates.ForthelikesofGermanyortheNetherlands,theadditionalpaymentswouldbemanageable,butthepoliticalfalloutwouldbeopentoexploitationbyanti-EUpopulists.Others,suchasGreece,Italy,SpainorevenFrance,alreadystrugglingtoconsolidatetheirpublicfinances,wouldneedtomakecutsinotherspendingprogrammesatatimewhenausterityisalreadyhavingdamagingpoliticaleffects.
What happens next?
AfinancialsettlementhasbeenputforwardasoneofthreekeyareasonwhichtheEUsidewantstoseesignificantearlyprogress.ReportssuggestthedemandfromtheEUcouldexceed€100billion,
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Introduction
WhatformofrelationshiptohavewiththeEUafterBrexitisthekeyeconomicpolicyissuefacingtheUK.Thiselectionwasmeanttogivetheprimeministerastrongmandatefora“hardBrexit”.TheConservativePartyandtheDUP,whosesupportwillbenecessarytoallowTheresaMaytocontinueasprimeminister,agreeonthemainelementsofUK’sfutureeconomicrelationshipwiththeEU.TheywanttoleavetheSingleMarketandtheCustomsUnion,andtheydon’twanttobesubjecttothejurisdictionbytheEuropeanCourtofJustice.Both,inthissense,supporta“hard”Brexit.NowthattheDUPissupportingthegovernment,however,thereareacoupleofnewprioritiesfortheConservativeParty,notleastdecidingonreplacementsfortheincomesupportthattheEUprovidestothefarmingsector,whichisimportantforNorthernIreland.
Softly, softly?
Broadlythough,whilebothpartiesintherulingcoalitionagreeontheplanforBrexit,theinconclusiveelectionresultmeansthatahard
Brexitlooksfarlesscertain.Thepress,foritspart,hasneverbeenmorescepticalofthispath.
OnereasonforthisisthattheseatshareofMPsfrompro-RemainScotlandintheConservativepartyhasincreased,whichcouldsoftenthegovernment’spreviousstanceof“nodealisbetterthanabaddeal”.Anotherreasonisthewaythisgeneralelectionresultwillchangethepublicdiscourseoneconomicpolicy.Earlyestimatesarethattheturnoutofyoungpeoplebetween18to24yearsincreasedfromabout40%in2015to70%.Youngpeopletendtobemuchmorepro-Remainthanoldervoters,soahardBrexitwouldignorethewishesofanewlymobilisedelectorate.Inaddition,theRemain-LeavedivideseemstohavebeenafactorunderlyingwhichconstituenciesswungtoandfromtheConservativepartyinthisgeneralelection,withtheGovernmentperformingparticularlybadlyinpro-Remainurbanandsouthernconstituencies(seethecontributionbyJohnCurtice).TheelectionresultshaveunderminedtheplansoftheConservativeparty,whichstoodontheplatformofastrongandstableleadershipintheBrexitnegotiations.
The economics of Brexit
TheWhitePaperonBrexitprioritisesimmigrationcontrolsandcommitstoleavingtheSingleMarketandtheCustomsUnion,whiletheprimeministercontinuestoreaffirmthat“nodealisbetterthanabaddeal.”Thereisnearconsensus amongeconomiststhatthehard–orchaotic–formofBrexitthatthisimplieswouldhurttheUKeconomy.AlthoughtherewaslittleimmediateeconomicfalloutfromtheBrexitvote,inthefirstquarterofthisyearUKeconomicgrowthwastheslowestofanyEUeconomy.Themodestrecoveryinrealwagethatstartedin2014hasbeenerodedbythehigherpriceinflationfromthedepreciationofthepoundsincetheBrexitvote.Youngworkersbetweentheagesof18and21haveseenthebiggestdeclinesinrealweeklyearnings,whichforthemhavefallenby16%sincetheglobalfinancialcrisisin2008.
Allthiswillputpressureonthegovernmenttosoftenitsapproach,perhapsseekinganextensionofthe2-yeartriggerperiodoraquicktransitiondealthatmaintainssinglemarketmembershipforanextendedperiod.Thiswouldavoidthe“cliffedge”scenarioofanodeal,whichwouldmeanthattheUKrevertstoWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)membershipwithoutaspecialdealwiththeEUonthefreemovementofgoods,services,peopleandinvestments.Werethistohappen,itisestimateditwouldreduceGDPintheUKbyabout3%peryearduetohighertradebarrierswiththeEU.
WealsohavemoretolearnabouthowtheRemain-Leavedivideshiftedpartyaffiliationsandtheroleplayedbytheverydifferentapproachestoeconomicpolicysetoutbyeachparty.Certainly,therhetoricofalow-tax,Singapore-styleeconomythatmanyhardBrexiteersdreamoflooksincreasinglydistantfromtheUKcentreofpoliticalgravity.Inturbulentpoliticaltimes,futureeconomicpolicyishardtopredict.Theonlycertaintyisthattherealeconomic
challengeremains–howtoreversethedecadesofeconomicstagnationthathaschangedthepoliticallandscapeoftheUK?Thereareseveralpolicyproposalstoaddressthesechallengesandmanyhavebroadpoliticalsupport.Hopefully,theywillbecomeacentralissueinthenextelection.
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Incontrast,manyenvironmentalgroupsareconcernedthatthelossofEuropeansupportforenvironmentalconservationendangersourcountryside(seeenvironmentsection).Theyarecallingforpoliticalcommitmentstopreserveandenhanceincentivesthatprovidepublicgoods,suchasthemaintenanceoftraditionallandscapes,wildlifehabitatsforbothplantsandanimals,andhigh-qualitywater,airandsoil.UKconsumergroupshavenot,sofar,articulatedanyconcernsaboutrisingfoodpricesorthepotentialthreatstofoodqualityandstandardsfromfreertradewiththerestoftheworld.Thepoliticalbargainingbetweentheseinterestgroupshasyettobegin,sincenooneisatallclearaboutwhatthefuturemightbring.
The future
TherewillclearlybemajorpoliticaldebatesabouttheneedforcontinuedtaxpayersupportforfarmersandtheroleoftheGovernmentinprotectingourenvironmentandensuringthesafetyandqualityofourfoodsupplies(includingtheregulationofinputssuchashormonetreatmentofbeefandgeneticallymodifiedcrops).
Therearealsoconcernsabout:
i) Immigration:Partsoftheagriculturalandfoodsectors(especiallyhorticulture,livestockprocessingandretailing)areheavilydependentonmigrantlabourfromtheEU.
ii)Tradingrelations:Thesectorisalreadynervousabouttheextenttowhichagriculturaltradewillbesacrificedtoobtainpreferentialtradeagreementswithnon-EUcountries.ManyofthesecountriesmayregardaccesstotheUKfoodmarketasavaluablebenefittooffsetincreasedUKaccesstotheirindustrialandservicesmarkets.
TheuncertaintythatsurroundsthetermsofnegotiationswiththeEUhavemadefarmersand
Introduction
ThereferendumcampaignsmademuchoftheUK’spaymentstotheEUandofhowmuchtheUKGovernmentcouldsaveifweleft.Therewas,however,verylittledebateontheEUspendingonagriculture,otherthanclaimsthatwecould,afteraBrexitvote,achievethesameendsmuchmoreefficiently,andwithsubstantiallylessregulation.
EUspendingontheCommonAgriculturalPolicy(CAP)peakedinthemid-1980sat73%ofthetotalEUspend,decliningtoabout40%today.Thisfollowedmajorreformsofthepolicytosubstantiallyreducetariffprotectionanddistortionofinternationalmarkets.ThesereformswerefullysupportedbyUKgovernments,whichhavebeenhighlycriticaloftheCAPsincewejoinedtheEuropeanEconomicCommunityin1973.Thecurrentannualpaymentstofarmers(totalling£2.5bnperyeartotheUK)aretheremnantsoftheprotectionistCAP.Afurther£0.8bnperyearisspentintheUKundertheCAPforenvironmentalconservationandruraldevelopmentschemes.Thesepayments(£3.3bnperyear)formthemajorpart(90%)ofthefinancialbenefittotheUKofEUmembership,offsetbytheUK’scontributiontotherestofEUspending(whichhasalsobeensubjecttothecontroversialUKrebatefromtheEU).
Since the referendum
WhiletherehavebeenreportsthatthemajorityoffarmersfavouredBrexit,wehavefoundnocompellingevidenceofthis.Ontheonehand,itisclearthatCAPpaymentsarecurrentlyamajorpartoftheincomesearnedfromfarming,leadingtogovernmentcommitmentstomaintainthesepayments.TheConservativemanifestopledgestocontinuethesepaymentstotheendofthenextparliament(2022).Ontheotherhand,manyintheindustrybelievethatthesepaymentsaredistortinglandvaluesandrents(andpossiblyothercapitalandinputcostsaswell),thusmakingitmoredifficultforfarmerstoentertheindustryandexpandtheirbusinesses.Meanwhile,theincreasingtendencytomakethefarmpaymentsconditionalon“greening”measures(e.g.thethree-croprulewhichrequiresfarmerswithmorethan30hectaresofarablelandtogrowatleastthreecrops)andtheincreaseinredtapeingeneralirritatessomefarmers,whofeelthataBritishagriculturalpolicywouldbepreferable.
Thedepreciationofsterlingsincethereferendumhashelpedouragriculturalexportersandmayhaveboostedfarmprices,encouragingsomefarmerstobelievethattheycansurviveBrexit.Equally,however,aweakerpoundhasmadeimportsmoreexpensiveandincreasedcostsacrossthesupplychain.
ruralcommunitiesveryanxious.Theyfearthattheendofsubsidiescouldhaveadevastatingimpactontheirlivelihoodsandontheindustryasawhole.Intheshortterm,farmersmayexperienceareductioninfarmincomes,buttherearethosewhomaintainthattheeffectsofBrexitonagriculturaloutputandfarmers’incomesmaynotbeassevereasexpected,atleastinthemediumandlongrun.Whatwillhappenafter2022,however,isnotatallclear.
Therearemajorquestionstobeanswered:
• Shouldfarmsubsidiescontinue?
• Shouldfarmersbesupportedonthebasisofthepublicgoodstheyprovidebeyondfood–theirinputtolandscapemanagement,biodiversity,soilandwaterquality,andcarbonstorage?
• Ifso,shouldthatbeviapublicsubsidy,privateinvestmentorboth?
• Finally,whatkindofagriculturalgovernanceisneeded?
WhilethereislittledoubtthatUKagriculturewillsurviveandcouldevenprosperwithoutCAPsupport,thetransitionmaybepainfulandwillaffectallfarmersandrelatedbusinessesinruralBritain.
by Carmen Hubbard, David Harvey and Anne Liddon
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thatinformationcontinuestobefullyavailableinthepublicdomain.However,thereseemstobelittleappetiteingovernmentforsuchlegislationorforawide-rangingdebateaboutthefutureofenvironmentalgovernance.The25-yearplanontheUK’sNaturalEnvironment,firstpromisedin2015,isstilltoappear,althoughitremainedamanifestocommitmentfortheConservativePartyin2017.
What will happen?
ThereisasignificantpossibilitythatUKenvironmentalpolicywillbeweakerpostBrexit.Takeairquality.ThereisanongoinglegalactionagainsttheGovernmentforitsfailureproperlytoimplementEUlawsonairquality.TheactivistlegalgroupClientEarthhastakentheGovernmenttocourtovertheissue.OutsidetheEU,suchgroupswillhavelessleverageovertheGovernment.TheConservative2017manifestohassomevaguementionsofairqualitybutfewconcretecommitmentstoimplementthecurrentplanortomaintainEUstandardspostBrexit.
Brexitraisesother,equallyprofound,questionsaboutthegovernanceoftheUKenvironment.Forexample,thereisscopeformuchgreaterfragmentationofUKenvironmentalpolicyastheenvironmentisafullydevolvedmatter.Currently,EUdirectivessetaminimumlevelofprotectionbutmemberstates–ordevolvedbodies–cansethigherstandardsiftheysochoose.Thus,ScotlandandWaleshavemoreambitiousclimatepoliciesthanEngland.PostBrexit,differentpoliciesaremorelikelytoemergeacrossthefournationsoftheUK–unless,thatis,anagreementisstrucktoestablishminimumstandards.Determiningwhodecidesthosestandards,andtheirlevel,willbepoliticallychallenging.
Brexit,therefore,hasprofoundimplicationsforenvironmentalpolicy.Theimmediateoutlooksuggestssomepolicycontinuity,notleastbecausemuchenvironmentalpolicyisunderpinnedby
Introduction
TheEUhashadaprofoundimpactonUKenvironmentalpolicy.Inthe1980s,theUKwasderidedasthe“dirtymanofEurope”.Today,itisaglobalclimateleaderandhassuccessfullyexporteditsownpragmatic,evidence-informedstyleofpolicymakingtotheEUlevel.Yetdespitethis,theenvironmentbarelyfeaturedasanissueduringtheEUreferendumcampaign.Aftersustainedpressurefromthelargenon-governmentalorganisations(NGOs),PrimeMinisterCameronbelatedlymadeanenvironmentalcaseforvotingRemain,butVoteLeavesteeredclearoftheissue.Consequently,eventhoughtheDepartmentforEnvironment,Food&RuralAffairs(DEFRA)stoodtobeamongtheMinistriesmostheavilyaffectedbyavotetoleave,theenvironmentwasoneofthecampaign’s“Cinderella”issues,gaininglimitedpublicormediaattention.
What has happened since the referendum?
Sincethereferendum,therehasbeenagrowingrealisationintheenvironmentandbusinesssectorsthatBrexitwillhaveprofoundimplicationsforenvironmentalpolicies,includingthoseonagriculture,fisheries,climateandenergy.TheGovernmenthascommittedto“cuttingandpasting”EUenvironmentalrulesintotheUK
statutebookviatheGreatRepealBill(seethesectionontheGreatRepealBill)topreventanyregulatoryholesemergingwhentheUKleavestheEU.TheGovernmentclaimsthatonceoutsidetheEU,individualpolicieswillbereviewedanditwillbeuptoParliamenttodecidewhichtoremove,amendorleaveastheyare.
However,itwasacknowledgedbyAndreaLeadsom,formerSecretaryofStatefortheEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs,thatathirdofEUenvironmentalpolicycannotsimplybecopiedintoUKlaw.Inmanycases,EUlawmakesreferencetoEUinstitutions(suchasprovisionsforreportingtotheEuropeanCommissiononwaterquality).ItremainsunclearwhethertheUKwilldevelopalternativegovernancearrangementsandwhether,indevolvedareassuchastheenvironment,thesewillbecentralisedordevolved.
TheHouseofCommonsEnvironmentalAuditCommittee(EAC)hasalsounderlinedtheriskof“zombielegislation”,aliveonthestatutebookbuteffectivelydeadforwantofmechanismstosecureitsupdatingandimplementation,withpossiblynegativeconsequencesforenvironmentalquality.TheEAChascalledforanewEnvironmentalProtectionActtoensurethattheenvironmentisadequatelymonitored,thatpolicyisenforcedand
productstandardsthatarelikelytoremaininplacetoenableUKfirmstocontinuetotradewiththeEU.However,whilsttheGovernmenthaspaidlipservicetomaintainingtheEU’senvironmentalrules,itsgeneralstateofreadinesstocopewithBrexithasbeendescribedas“worryinglycomplacent”bytheHouseofLords.TheirLordshipswereparticularlyexercisedbytheGovernment’sapparentunwillingnesstoengagewithdeeperquestions,suchashowruleswillbeproperlyimplementedandenforcedoutsidetheEU’senvironmentalgovernancestructures.ThereducedcapacityofDEFRA,coupledwiththeclosureoftheDepartmentforEnergyandClimateChangefurthersuggeststhatenvironmentalpolicyinnovationislikelytoberatherlimited.Forexample,opinionpollsshowthatthepublicsupporttheadoptionofaCleanAirAct,butonlyLabourandtheGreenPartywerecommittedtointroduceoneintheirelectionmanifestos.OnepossibleoutcomeofBrexit,then,isincreasedpartycompetitionoverenvironmentalissues.
Anotheroutcomeisincreasedmobilisationonenvironmentalissuesbypubliccampaigninggroups.Forexample,theGreenerUKcampaignhasbroughttogetherenvironmentalNGOstocampaignfornew,post-BrexitnationallegislationthatismoreambitiousthancurrentEUenvironmentalprotections.Thereiscertainlyscopeinapost-Brexitworldtodeveloppoliciesthataremoresensitivetolocalconditions,andtobuilduponBritain’sreputationforleadershipinkeyfieldslikeclimatechange.Deliveringthesegoalswill,however,requireambitionandvision.
By Charlotte Burns, Viviane Gravey and Andrew Jordan
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Introduction
TheBrexitvotewasabouttakingbackcontrol.IthadbeengivenupatUKlevelbytheelegantbutterseEuropeanCommunitiesAct(ECA)1972.ThisActgavesupremacytoEUlawwhereitconflictedwithUKlaw(i.e.EUlawtookprecedenceoverUKlaw)andmandatedBritishjudgestofollowjudgmentsoftheCourtofJustice.BrexitrequiresthisActtoberepealed.ThiswillbedonebytheGreatRepealBill(GRB),whichwillalsomakeprovisionforthemanythousandsoftechnicalchangesthatdeliveringBrexitwillrequire.TheGRB,inotherwords,aimstodeliveratthedomesticleveltheresultsoftheArticle50negotiationsinBrussels,aswellasthechangestoUKconstitutionallawneededtogiveeffecttoBrexit.MostlawyersacceptthataBillalongthelinesoftheGRBisnecessary,althoughJeremyCorbyn,theleaderoftheLabourparty,hasindicatedthatthePrimeMinister’splanstocompleteBrexitthrougha“GreatRepealBill”were“history”andwouldhavetobedropped,withoutprovidingclarityastowhathewoulddoinstead.
TheGRBhasnotyetbeenpublished.However,awhitepaperisavailableandwhatfollowsistakenfromthat.ItisprimarilyaboutpreparingtheUK
legalsystemforBrexit.Itisnotavehicleformajorpolicychanges(whichwillbedeliveredbyotherpiecesoflegislation).ThewhitepapermakesclearthattheintentionoftheGRBistoensurea“smoothandorderlyBrexitthatcommandstheconfidenceofall”.Inotherwords,toreassureemployers,workersandconsumersthat,asfaraspossible,thesamelawsandruleswillapplythedayafterBrexitdayasthedaybefore.Specifically,theGRBhasthreeaims:
• RepealtheECA
• ConvertEUlawintonationallaw
• CorrectUKlawtodeliverafunctioningstatutebook
Repeal
ThefirstandmostimportantaimoftheGRBistorepealtheECA,thusmakingUKlaw,notEUlaw,supreme.ThispartoftheGRBwillcomeintoforceonthedaytheUKleavestheEU.TheGRBwillendthegeneralsupremacyofEUlaw:“newerlegislation[passedbyParliamentpostBrexit]willtakeprecedenceovertheEU-derivedlawwehavepreserved”.Butif,afterexit,aconflict
arisesbetweentwopre-exitlaws,oneofwhichisEU-derivedandtheothernot,thentheEU-derivedlawwillcontinuetotakeprecedenceovertheotherUKlaw.Inotherwords,adegreeofsupremacyispreserved,albeitonethatcanbecorrectedbyanActoftheUKParliament.
Convert
ThesecondaimoftheGRBistoconvertthewholecorpusofEUlawintonationallaw.Inessence,theGRBwilltakeasnapshotofallEUlawandensureitallbecomespartofUKlawonBrexitday.Thisiswhysomerefertoitatthe“GreatCutandPasteBill”.
Infact,therealityissomewhatmorecomplex.TakeDirectives,forexample.TheUKhashadtoimplementDirectives,usuallywithintwoyearsoftheiradoption.SomeDirectiveshavebeenimplementedbyanActofParliament,liketheEqualityDirectives,whichwereimplementedbytheEqualityAct2010.TheywillbeunaffectedbytheGRB.Others,liketheWorkingTimeDirective,havebeenimplementedthrough“StatutoryInstruments”(SIs)–secondarylawintheUK–usingpowersconferredontheexecutive(thegovernmentandthecivilservice)byprovisionsintheECA.OncetheECAisrepealed,alltheseSIswoulddisappear.However,theGRBwillensuretheycontinuetohavelegaleffect.
AnothertypeofEUlaw,Regulations,ofwhichtherearearound12,000,willalsohavetobeincorporatedintoUKlaw.ThiswilllargelybedonesimplybyreferringtothemintheGRB,ratherthancopyingandpastingthemintoit.
ThecaselawoftheCourtofJusticeisalsoakeypartofEUlaw.TheGRBwillensurethatpre-BrexitcaselawwillcontinuetobebindingontheUKcourts.ItwillhavethesameprecedentstatusasdecisionsoftheUK’sownSupremeCourt.Inexceptionalcircumstances,theSupremeCourtcanreversethosedecisions.AfterBrexit,Parliamenttoowillbeabletoreversethosedecisions.When
itcomestopost-Brexitcaselaw,theGRBwill“notrequiredomesticcourtstoconsiderCJEU’sjurisprudence”.Butitislikelytohave“persuasive”effect(i.e.thejudgeswilltakeitintoaccount).
Correct
ThethirdandmostcontroversialaspectoftheGRBwillbethepowersto“correct”theUKstatutebook.Thesewilltaketheformof“HenryVIIIpowers”.ThesearepowersgiventotheexecutivetoamendUKprimaryandsecondarylawusingStatutoryInstruments.TheuseofthesepowersisnecessarytodeliverBrexitinthetwo-yeartimeframe(andsowillhavetobebroughtintoforcepriortoBrexitday),butarecontroversialbecauseParliamentdoesnothavemuchchancetoscrutinisethelegislation.Thesepowerswillbeusedtomaketechnicalchangestothelaw(e.g.removingreferencestoEUlawandinstitutions),buttheywillalsobeusedtodealwithissuesthatariseduringthenegotiations.Inotherwords,theHenryVIIIpowersintheGRBwillbeusedtofixtheplanewhileitisstillflying.Holdontoyourhats.
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a“hardBrexit”.Andthisisdespitethefactthatitwas,andis,farfromclearthatthispositioncommandedamajorityeitherinParliamentorinthecountry.Whilepublicopinionisbroadlyhostiletofreemovement,itremainssplitonwhetherornotfreemovementisanacceptablepricetopayforpreservingotheraspectsofSingleMarketmembership.
Paradoxically,theclarityofthisspecificdecisionhasthrownalmosteveryotherelementoftheUKimmigrationsystemintodoubt.AmongthefundamentalquestionsonwhichtheUKGovernment(andtheofficialopposition)currentlydoesnothaveanythingresemblingaclearpolicyare:
• Whenwillfreemovementend?
• ShouldEUcitizenscontinuetoenjoypreferentialstatusinthenewsystem?
• Willthenewsystemhavepreferentialorspecialtreatmentforspecificsectors(orindeednationsorregions)?
• WillpolicybesetprimarilywithrespecttotheeconomicneedsoftheUKorbyreferencetoanarbitraryandlargelydiscreditednumericaltarget?
Meanwhile,oneissuethathasrisensharplyuptheagendasincethevoteisthestatusofEUnationalsresidentintheUK(andBritslivingelsewhereintheEU).ItquicklybecameapparentthatthepromisesfromVoteLeavethatthesegroupshadnothingtoworryaboutwereeitherignorant,deceptiveorboth.Equally,theprimeministerclaimedthatthisissuewouldbeeasilyresolvedoncetheEU27setouttheirposition.Theyhavenowdonesobut,beforetheelection,weremetwithadeafeningsilencefromtheUKside.
What next?
Intheshortterm,themostsalientpoliticalissueislikelytobecitizens’rights,sinceanacceptable
Introduction
IftheUK’svotetoleavetheEUwasavotefor,ormorespecificallyagainst,anything,itwasavoteagainstfreemovementofworkerswithintheEU.Pollingevidenceshowedthatapproximately80%ofthosewhothoughtthatimmigrationwasmostlyaforceforgoodvotedtoRemain,whileasimilarproportionofthosewhothoughtitwasaforceforillvotedtoLeave.
Theslogan,“VoteLeave,TakeControl”,summeduptheentireLeavecampaign.However,itwasparticularlyeffectivewithrespecttoimmigrationpolicyandbordercontrol,becauseitcontainedalargeelementoftruth.Freemovementofworkersisoneofthefoundational“fourfreedoms”oftheEU.Consequently,theRemaincampaignfounditextremelydifficulttocounterthesimpleargumentthattheonlywayfortheUKto“control”immigrationwastoleave.
OtherclaimsmadebytheLeavecampaignwithrespecttofreemovement–inparticular,thatEUmigrantsdrovedownwages,reducedemploymentprospectsforBritishworkersorwereresponsibleforreducedaccesstopublicservices–wereatbestexaggeratedandoftensimplyunsupportedbytheevidence.However,becauseoftheperceived
advantageoftheLeavesideontheimmigrationissue,theRemaincampaignlargelyavoidedthetopic.
Meanwhile,oneissuethatreceivedlittlehigh-levelpoliticalattentionduringthecampaignwasthefutureofEUcitizensresidentintheUK,andofBritonselsewhereintheEU(seethesectiononthelatter);broadly,VoteLeave’sclaimsthat“nothingwillchange”forpeopleinthesituationwasnotchallenged,exceptbylegalexperts.
What has happened since the referendum?
Afewlinesinonespeech–TheresaMay’sspeechtoConservativePartyconferenceinOctober2016–settheparametersofthepoliticaldebatenotjustonimmigrationbutonBrexitmorebroadly.Bysaying“wearenotleavingtheEuropeanUniononlytogiveupcontroloverimmigrationagain”,sheessentiallydecided,unilaterally,thatBrexitmeantnotonlyleavingthepoliticalstructureoftheEU,butalsotheSingleMarket,giventheEU’sinsistencethatthereisnoscopefor“cherry-picking”differentelementsoftheSingleMarket.
So,theprimeminister’spositiononimmigrationhas,upuntilnow,beenbyfarthemostimportantfactorbehindtheUK’scurrentcoursetowards
resolutionisanessentialelementofanArticle50deal.Alongsidethe“divorcebill”,theextenttowhichtheUKGovernmentispreparedtocompromiseonthisissue–which,fortheEU,mustinvolvesomecontinuedelementsof“European”lawholdingswayintheUKforanextendedperiod–willbeakeysignalofwhetheranultimatedealispossible.
Assumingthisisresolved,thefocusofpoliticaldebateislikelytomovebacktothetrade-offbetweenfreedomofmovementandtheSingleMarket,whichTheresaMaythoughtshehadresolvedlastOctober.Paradoxically,despitethefactthatbothmainpartiescommittedinprincipletoendingfreedomofmovement,theinconclusiveresultoftheelectionmeansthatthegovernment’sapproachtoBrexitiscalledintoquestion.Labour’sstance–supportingboththeendoffreemovementandthecontinued“benefitsoftheSingleMarket”–wasbothconfusedandcontradictory,butdoesnotentirelyprecludethepossibilityofcontinuedmembershipoftheSingleMarket,perhapswithsomemodestamendmentstothecurrentfreemovementrules.Morebroadly,theelectionresultalsocallsintoquestiontheConservativeParty’s(uncosted)pledgetoreduceimmigrationtothe“tensofthousands”,whichishighlyunpopularwithbusiness.
Muchwilldependoneconomicdevelopments.Upuntilnow,thedebateaboutBrexit,freemovementandimmigrationhasbeenagainstthebackgroundofarelativelyrobusteconomyandlabourmarket,andhighimmigration.If,asseemsplausible,theeconomyslowssignificantly,andnetmigration–particularlyfromtheEU–fallssharply,thenthetrade-offsnotedabovewillappearverydifferent,andthepoliticaldynamicsmaychangesignificantly,openingupspaceforamoreeconomicallyliberalapproachtoimmigrationbothfromwithinandoutsidetheEU.
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thisfoundationalrightofEUmembershipwillalsohaveconsequencesforEUnationalsmakingBritaintheirhome.October2016sawtheestablishmentoftheAll-PartyParliamentaryGrouponFreedomofMovement,aforumemphasisingthevalueoffreedomofmovementtotheBritisheconomyandBritishsociety,aswellastherightsofEUcitizenslivinginBritainandBritonsresidentinotherEUmemberstates.
ThegeneralelectionhascausedfurtherdisquietamongBritishoverseasresidentsabouttherighttovote.TheGovernmentissuedawhitepaperinOctober2016outliningitsplanstolegislatetograntlifetimevotingrightstoindividualBritishcitizenswhohadpreviouslybeenregisteredtovote.However,thishadnotbecomepolicybeforethegeneralelection.
Britishpensionerslivingabroadhavealsocontinuedtomaketheheadlines.WhileclaimsaboutwhattheirreturnmightcosttheNHScontinuetobemade,concernsaboutwhatmighthappentopensionspaidabroadhavealsosurfaced.Simplyput,whilecurrentarrangementsallowforBritonslivingintheEUtoreceivepensionincreasesinlinewithinflation,withdrawalfromtheEUmightentailtheendofthisreciprocalarrangement.Thiscouldresultinthefreezingofpensionsandhenceareal-termreductionintheincomesthesepensionersreceive.
ThelackofclarityaboutwhatBrexitmightmeanforBritainalsoaffectsBritishpopulationsabroad.Thisuncertaintyisprofoundandiscausingsignificantunease.
The future for Britons abroad
Theendoffreemovementwillundoubtedlyimpactonwhocanmigrateto,andwhocancontinuetoliveandworkinEUmemberstates.ItispossiblethatoneresponsetoBrexitmightberepatriation,particularlyofthosepopulations
Introduction
Freedomofmovement–therighttolive,workandaccesswelfarearrangementsinanotherEuropeanUnionmemberstate–isoneofthefoundingprinciplesoftheEU.FreedomofmovementbecameacentralthemefortheLeavecampaign.Playingtopublicconcernsabouthighlevelsofmigration,theyarguedthatstoppingfreedomofmovementwascriticaltocurbingtheseflows.
Anestimated3millionEuropeancitizensareresidentinGreatBritain,whilethelatestfiguressuggestthatthereare1.2millionBritonslivingelsewhereintheEU.Thelatterrepresentadiversepopulationthatincludesthoseworking,studyingandretiringabroad.JustasfortheirEUcounterpartslivinginBritain,BrexitmightbringaboutasignificanttransformationinthelivesoftheseBritishmigrantsastheirpoliticalrightsandsocialandfinancialentitlementsarerenegotiated.
Britons abroad and the EU referendum
Intherun-uptothereferendum,Britain’sexpatriatesfeaturedintwoprominentways.First,inthatthosewhohadlivedoverseasfor15yearsormorefoundthemselvesineligibletovote.Second,becauseofthepotentialconsequences
oflarge-scalerepatriation.TheinabilitytovoteinareferendumthatcouldhavesuchprofoundconsequencesfortheirdailylivesreinvigoratedthequestionofoverseasvotingrightsforBritishcitizens,sparkingpoliticalmobilisationandcampaigningamongBritonslivingabroadarounda“voteforlife”.Ontheotherhand,Britain’sexpatriatesweredepictedasasocialproblemwaitingtohappen.TheprospectthatelderlyBritishpensionerscurrentlylivinginotherEuropeancountriesmightbeforcedtoreturnpromotedconcernsthatBrexitmightplacefurtherpressureonanalreadystrainedNationalHealthService.
Theseheadlinespaintonlyapartialpicture.TheBritishpopulationslivingelsewhereintheEUareamorediversegroupthanafocusonpensionerssuggests.Similarlyvariedarethemotivationsfortheiremigration.Theseincludework,studyandfamilyreunion.Freedomofmovementmayfacilitatesuchmigrations,butisnottheonlythingthatenablesthemigrationandsettlementofindividualmigrants.
One year on…
FreedomofmovementdoesnotunilaterallyaffectBritishpopulationslivinginEurope;theremovalof
mademorevulnerableasaconsequence.Ifthistranspires,properplanningwillbenecessarynotmerelyintermsofthepotentialcostsinrelationtohealthandsocialcare,butalsowithregardtohowthereintegrationofthesepeopleintoBritishsocietywillbefacilitated.Absentrepatriation,itisimportantthatclarityisprovidedassoonaspossibleastowhatBritonslivinginotherEUmemberstateswillneedtodotocontinuetheirresidence.
Thesearejustsomeofthequestionswemightconsider.Lookingforward,itisimportanttocarefullyattendtohowBritain’swithdrawalfromtheEUvariouslyimpactsonBritonslivingandworkingelsewhereintheEU.
By Michaela Benson
TWENTY-TWO
4948
PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES
Introduction
ImmigrationwascentraltotheEUreferendum.Inparticular,theprincipleoffreedomofmovement,oneofthepillarsoftheEU,becameakeytargetoftheLeavecampaign.ThepromisetocurbtheflowofEUnationalsintoBritainprovedparticularlyeffectiveinmobilisingLeavevoters.FarlessattentionwasgiventotheimpactofBrexitonoverthreemillionEUcitizensleavingintheUKandonemillionBritonsresidingintheEU.Theissueoftheirlegalstatuswasputaside,andafterayearitisstillunresolved.
AttemptstogetbothsidestopledgesupportforarapidresolutionconcerningthelegalstatusofEUnationalslivinginBritainreceivedcrosspartysupportbeforethereferendumbutevaporatedsoonafter.Todate,callsforaunilateralgestureofgoodwillfromtheprimeministertowardsEUnationalshavefallenondeafears.However,therearesignsthatthepoliticallandscapeemergingfromthe2017generalelectionmayforcetheGovernmenttosoftenitsposition.
A year of uncertainty
AyearofuncertaintyovertheirrighttoremaininBritainistakingitstollonEUnationals,withsome
evidencepointingtoanincreaseinmentalhealthandanxietydisordersamongEUresidents.Anumberofonlineandofflinediscussionforahaveemerged,offeringlegaladviceandmutualsupportinthefaceoftheeverydayandbureaucraticchallengesthereferendumhascreatedforEUnationals,especiallywithregardtosecuringlegalstatusintheUK.Tomanyofthem,thereferendumresult,andtherealisationthattheirpositioninBritainwasnowbothlegallyprecariousandsubjecttothefluctuationofpartypolitics,cameasaprofoundshock.
TheoptionsopentoEUnationalsvaryprimarilyaccordingtothelengthoftheirstayinBritain.ManylongtermresidentsareapplyingforpermanentresidenceandBritishcitizenship.OthersarecontemplatingleavingtheUK,especiallythosewho,becauseoftheirage,workingstatus,familyarrangements,orlengthofstay,feelexcludedfromexistingpathwaystosecuretheirstatus.Othersmaybedoingboth,securingtheirlegalpositioninBritain,whileconsideringoptionselsewhereinEurope.
AccordingtotheOfficeforNationalStatistics’latestquarterlyreleaseofprovisionallong-terminternationalmigrationestimates,netmigrationisatitslowestlevelfornearlythreeyears.The
dropispartlydueto25,000fewerPolesandotherEasternandCentralEuropeanscomingtoworkinBritain,andanincreaseof16,000inthoseleaving.UncertaintyovertheirfuturelegalstatushasalsotriggeredariseinthenumberofEUnationalsandtheirfamilymembersapplyingtotheHomeOffice forpermanentresidence–fivetimeshigherthanlastyear–andBritishcitizenship,whichisup35%inthepastyear.DetailedHomeOfficedataonnaturalisationshowthatthesurgeincitizenshipapplicationsisparticularlynoticeableamongthecitizensofolderEUmemberstates,withanincreaseincitizenshipsapplicationsamongItalian,French,andGermannationalsinthemostrecentperiod.Inthatsameperiod,someofthelargestnumberofapplications,however,camefromPolishnationalswho,since2010,havesubmittedapplicationsforcitizenshipinlargenumbers.
Forty years of EU membership
Thefocusduringthereferendumonrecentarrivals,particularlyfromEasternEurope,hasovershadowedrecentandpastimmigrationfromolderEUmemberstatesand,moregenerally,thefactthattheUKhasbeenamemberoftheEUfor40years.Forexample,whiletheinflowofCentralandEasternEuropeans,whoselevelsofimmigrationhavebeenrelativelyhighsincethosecountriesenteredtheEUin2004and2007respectively,hasreceivedextensivemediacoverage,farlesscoveragewasaccordedtothemobilityofEUnationalsfromGermany,France,Spainandtheotheroldermemberstates.ThesehavemadeupanincreasingshareofEUmigrationtotheUKinrecentyears;mostrecentestimates for2016showthat53%ofthemostrecentimmigrantsestimatesfromtheEUcomefromEU14countries(memberstatesjoinedin2000s).
Besides,thisattentiononlatestarrivalhasalsoobscuredaninconvenienttruth.ThroughoutfourdecadesofEUmembership,therehasbeeninterminglingofpeoplewhichcanbemostclearlyseeninthegrowingnumberofmixed-nationalityEUfamiliesintheUKandtheiroffspring,many
ofwhomwerebornintheUKandholdaBritishpassport.Datafromrecentbirthstatisticsshowthatalmost12%ofchildrenborninEnglandandWalesin2015hadatleastoneEU-bornparent(thefigurerosefrom8.1%in2009),pointingtotheirpotentiallyincreasingdemographicimportance.
ThisisagrowingbutasyetunderstudiedandunderreportedsegmentofBritishsociety.Inthepost-EUreferendumcontext,inwhichtherhetoricaboutcurbingEUimmigrationhaspermeatedpolitical,media,andpopulardiscourses,producingastark“usandthem”narrative,thequestionleftunaskedandunanswerediswhatthehumanandemotionalcostsofthiswillbeif,foralargesectionoftheBritishpopulation,“usandthem”arethesame.
By Nando Sigona and Laurence Lessard-Phillips
TWENTY-THREE
5150
PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES
Introduction
DuringtheEUreferendumcampaign,muchwasmadeoftheUK“takingbackcontrol”oflaw-makingpowersfromBrussels,andtheissuecertainlyresonatedwithmanyvoters.BeingpartoftheEUhasmeantthatalotoftheUK’slawsoriginateinBrussels.EUlawmakinginvolvesEU-widestandard-settinginareasasdiverseasbankingregulation,agriculture,theenvironment,consumerprotectionandemploymentrights.WiththeUK’swithdrawalfromtheEU,thesepowerswillberepatriatedtotheUK.HowmuchflexibilitytheUKwill,infact,havetosetitsownlawsafterthisremainstobeseen,andmuchwilldependonthetermsofourexistingandfutureinternationalagreements.
Butthereisanotheraspectofthisrepatriationofpowersthatiscausingconstitutionalheadaches.Brexitmaymeantakingbackcontroloverlawmaking–butwhereisthiscontrolbeingtakenbackto?TheUKhasnowexperiencednearly20yearsofdevolution.Scotland,WalesandNorthernIrelandhavetheirowngovernmentsandparliaments,andhaveprimarypolicyresponsibilityforareasincludinghealth,education,environmentalprotectionandagriculturalpolicy.BlockgrantsfromtheTreasurytothedevolvedadministrationshavebeensupplementedbyimportantEUfundingstreams,especiallysignificantforthedevolvednations’agriculturalsectors,aswellasfortheiruniversities.
meanstofinancethem.NorthernIreland,WalesandScotlandshouldthenberecognisedasbeingabletodeterminetheirownpoliciesoverdevolvedareas,includingfisheries,agriculture,andtheenvironment.TheSupremeCourtintheArticle50Miller caseagreed,sayingthat“removalofEUconstraintsonwithdrawalfromtheEUTreatieswillalterthecompetenceofdevolvedinstitutionsunlessnewlegislativeconstraintsareintroduced.Intheabsenceofsuchnewrestraints,withdrawalfromtheEUwillenhancedevolvedcompetence”.
ButfortheUKGovernment,suchnewlegislativeconstraintsarerequired.Powersindevolvedpolicyareaswillnotflowdirectlytothedevolvedlegislatures,butwillcomebacktoWestminster.Asafirststep,asforeseenintheGreatRepealBillWhitePaper,thelegalframeworkssetatanEUlevel,withinwhichtheUKanditsdevolvednationscurrentlyoperate,willberetained.Thisisintheinterestsoflegalcertainty,andtoensurethereislegalcontinuityafterBrexit,withnoblackholesemerging.Subsequently,andfollowing“intensivediscussions”withthedevolvednations,furtherdecisionsmaybetakenondeterminingwhereUK-wideapproachesareneeded,andwherepowersmaylieatadevolvedlevel,includingthelocalgovernmentlevel.Itisexpectedthatsomecommonframeworkswillemergeonagriculture,environment,fisheriesandregionalpolicy–areasthataredevolved,butwhichhavebeensubjecttoEUlaw.TheUKGovernmentarguesthatthisapproachisnecessarytoensurethereisnodisruptiontotheUK’sowninternalmarket–onthebasisthatdivergencesinlawcreateunnecessaryandcostlyobstaclestocross-UKtrade.Additionally,itissaidtobeneededinorderfortheGovernmenttoundertakeinternationaltradenegotiations,withthesepowersfallingtoLondontoexercisefortheUKasawhole.Forthedevolvednations,however,thisapproachistantamounttoapowergrabthatunderminestheexistingdevolutionsettlementandforwhichtheirsupportiscertainlynotguaranteed.
What happens next?
Whatthatmeansinconstitutionalterms,anditssignificanceforthelong-termfutureoftheUK,remainstobeseen.Pre-election,theGreatRepealBillwassettostartitslegislativejourneythroughtheHousesofParliamentbeforethesummerrecess.Whilstthisisstillexpected,theGovernment’splansforthedevolvednationsmaycomeupagainstoppositionthere.Yettheopportunitiesforthedevolvedparliamentsandgovernmentstofeedintothislaw-makingprocessareverylimited,despitethecriticalsignificanceitwillhaveforthemandtheirpowers.Thisreflectsthelackofexperienceof“shared”rulemakingamongstthedifferentlevelsofgovernmentintheUK.OppositionfromthedevolvedparliamentscanbesignalledthroughtheirrefusaltograntLegislativeConsentMotions.Byconvention,thesearerequiredwhenWestminsterlegislatesondevolvedmattersortochangethescopeofdevolvedpowers.AccordingtotheSupremeCourtintheMiller case,however,thisconventionisnotlegallyenforceable,operatingonlyasapoliticalconstraint.AnyresultingconstitutionalclashoverpowersmayprovokefurthermovestowardsindependenceinScotland.InWales,theGovernmenthascalledforaconstitutionalconventionandaredefinitionoftheUKmachineryalongmorefederallines,creatinganewsystemformakingcommonpolicies.Inanycase,theUKGovernmentwillbegoingintotheBrexitnegotiationswithdisunityathome,whichmayultimatelyprovemorethananunwelcomedistraction.
By Jo Hunt
WhilsttheUKhasbeenpartoftheEU,thepowersheldbythedevolvednationshavebeenexercisedwithinthelimitsofEUlaw.TheyhaveimplementedcertainEUlawsthemselves(resultinginsomedifferenceacrosstheUKintherulesoneligibilityforagriculturalpayments,forexample),aswellasensuringthattheirownpoliciescomplywiththedemandsofEUlaw.So,forexample,Scotland’splansforminimumalcoholpricingranintotroublewiththeEU’sinternalmarketlaws,constrainingtheScottishGovernment’sactions.AstheheadoftheScottishVoteLeavecampaignannouncedaheadofthereferendum,BrexitwouldlifttheserestrictionsandleadtoScotlandgaining“majornewpowers”.Devolution,accordingtothisargument,wouldbeenhancedasEU-derivedconstraintsinpolicyareasdevolvedundertheScotlandAct,GovernmentofWalesActandtheNorthernIrelandActfallaway.
What has happened since the referendum?
Howmuchsaliencethisdevolutionargumenthadwithvotersinthereferendumisunknown.However,wedonowknowthatthesuggestionmadebysomecampaignersthatBrexitwouldleadtoanexpansioninthepowersofthedevolvednationsisprovingconstitutionallycontroversial.Forthegovernmentsofthedevolvednations,thematterthoughisstraightforward.Thecurrentdevolutionsettlementsmustberespected,andpowersoverthoseareaswhicharedevolvedthatcomebackfromBrusselsmustgotoBelfast,CardiffandEdinburgh,alongwithappropriate
TWENTY-FOUR
5352
PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES
Introduction
DiscussionofforeignanddefencepolicywaslargelyconductedintermsofgeneralitiesduringtheEUreferendumcampaign.KeythemesweretheEU’shistoricroleinbringingpeacetotheEuropeancontinent,andclaimsthatitwasontheroadtocreatinga“Europeanarmy”.
RemaincampaignersarguedthattheprosperitycreatedasaconsequenceofEUmembershipwasintegraltonationalsecurity.Brexit,theyargued,wouldunderminebothUKandEUsecurityandstability.Theseclaimswereechoedbykeyinternationalfigures,includingPresidentObamaandNATOSecretaryGeneralJensStoltenberg.
Brexitcampaigners,incontrast,madetheargumentthatBrexitwouldprovidetheUKwithgreaterfreedomtofullyutiliseitsdiplomatic,militaryand“softpower”capabilities,andhenceachieveenhancedinternationalinfluence.TheyalsosoughttodownplaytheEU’scontributiontosecurity,insistingthatNATOandtheUnitedStates,nottheEU,havekeptthepeaceinEuropesinceWorldWarII.ThesecampaignersalsoemphasisedthedangersinherentinsupposedEUmovestocreatea“Euroarmy”inplaceofnationalarmedforces.
TheBrusselsbombingsofMarch2016gavedifferentsecurityissuesgreaterprominence.Itfocusedattentionontheissueofborderand“homeland”security,andwhethertheUK’ssecurityisenhanced,orcompromised,throughitsmembershipoftheEU.ThisissuegainedrenewedattentionmorerecentlyfollowingtheterroristattacksatWestminster,ManchesterandLondonBridge.
What has happened since the referendum?
ThefutureoftheEU-UKforeignandsecurityrelationshiphasbeenthesubjectofrelativelylittlepublicdebatesincethereferendum.Thisispartlybecausenoneofthealternativemodelsforafuturetradingrelationshipcomewithapredefinedmodelforforeignandsecuritypolicycooperation.Inaddition,foreignpolicy,andespeciallysecuritypolicy,areareasinwhichMrsMay’sgovernmenthasindicatedthatitwantstomaintainclosecooperationwiththeEU.TheBrexitWhitePaperandspeechesbytheprimeministerhaverepeatedlystressedadesireforacloseEU-UKsecuritypartnership.
TheGovernmenthasalsopromotedtheideathatBrexitgivestheUKanopportunitytoreshapeitsplaceintheworld.“GlobalBritain”,asloganfirst
usedbyPrimeMinisterMayinherConservativePartyconferencespeechinOctober2016,isintendedtosignifya“reboot”ofUKforeignpolicy–activelypromotingfreetradeandcooperatingcloselywithalliestobuildasafeandjustworld.Howtheseprioritieswilldifferfromexistingcommitmentsisstillunclear.
Overseasvisitsandmajorinternationalsummitssincethereferendumofferlittleindicationofmajorshiftsinprioritiesbeyondstressingtheimportanceofnewexportopportunities.Further,theelectionofPresidentTrump,andtheUKgovernment’sdesiretoseekacloserelationshipwithhisadministration,haveattractedunfavourablecomparisonswiththemorecriticalstanceofotherEuropeangovernments(notablyChancellorMerkelandPresidentMacron).TheUKhasgiventheimpressionofdownplayingPresidentTrump’sambiguousstanceonmattersofkeyimportancetotheUK,suchasthestabilityofNATOandglobalfreetrade.
What might happen?
TherelativelyunderdevelopednatureoftheEU’sforeignandsecuritypolicymeansthatBrexitwillhavelessobviousimpactsfortheUKthaninotherpolicyareas.TheUKhasnotintegrateditsmilitarycapabilitiesoritsdiplomaticinfrastructurewiththeEUand,consequently,detachmentpost-Brexitdoesnotrequiremajorinstitutionalreform.
However,theUKwillloseitsparticipationandthecapacitytodirectlyinfluenceEUforeignpolicymakingprocesses.Further,itwillhavediminishedinfluenceonthedirectionofdevelopmentoftheEU’snascentdefencepolicyasanon-member.ThereferendumhasalreadyhadadirecteffectonthebehaviouroftheEU’sothermemberstates.ItcoincidedwiththepublicationofthenewEUGlobalStrategy(EUGS)thatsetsouthowtheEUintendstobroadenanddeepenitsroleinglobalpolitics.OneaspectoftheEUGSwastofurtherdeveloptheEU’sroleinthesecurityanddefencefields.UKsupportfortheEUGSwaspredicated,inpart,onitsambitiontodeepentheEU-NATO
relationship(subsequentlyagreedattheJuly2016WarsawSummit).
AsindicativeofthediminishedinfluenceoftheUKpriortocompletingtheformalitiesofBrexit,somememberstateshavealreadymadeproposalsfordeepeningEUdefencecollaborationinadirectionthattheUKhasresisted.TheFrenchandGermangovernmentshavejointlyproposedaseriesofmeasuresthatincludeapermanentmilitaryheadquartersforEUmissions,andthecreationofacommonbudgetformilitaryresearchandjointprocurementtoberunthroughtheEuropeanDefenceAgency(aninstitutionthattheUKhasresistedgivingasubstantivebudgetoramajorroleindefenceprocurement).Finally,theyhaveadvocatedreinforcingexistingmilitaryformations,suchastheEU’sBattlegroups,usingEUtreatyprovisionsthatallowforsmallergroupsofmemberstatestoundertakedeeperdefencecollaboration.
TheseideashavegivenenergytotheambitionsoftheEUHighRepresentativeforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyforboostingtheEU’scapabilities.TheyhavealsogivenimpetustotheEuropeanCommissiontoearmarkpartoftheEUbudgetforspendingondefenceresearchsupportedbyallmemberstates.
ProposalsforgreaterEUdefenceintegrationhavelargelyfailedinthelasttwodecades,partlybecausethesehavebeenresistedbytheUK.Brexit,incombinationwithaUSadministrationthatappearslesscommittedtoEuropeansecurity,hasgivenimpetustoEUsecuritydevelopmentsthattheUKisnowinlessofapositiontoinfluence.Asanon-member,theUKfacestheprospectofbeingabystandertodecisionsonthefutureofEuropeandefencethatdirectlyimpactontheUK’snationalsecuritybutoverwhichithasminimalinfluence.
By Richard G Whitman
TWENTY-FIVE
5554
PART FIVE: BREXIT AND PUBLIC POLICIES
Introduction
Britain’srelationshipwiththeEUhasbeenafruitfulonewhenitcomestohighereducation.ByoperatingwithinalargerEuropeannetwork,UKuniversitieshavebecomeincreasinglycompetitiveinworldterms.TheUKattractsthesecondlargestnumberofinternationalstudentsand,bymostcounts,hasthesecondstrongestresearchsystemintheworldaftertheUnitedStates.TheUKaccountsfor3.2%ofglobalresearchanddevelopmentexpenditurebut9.5%ofscientificpapersdownloaded,11.6%ofcitations,and15.9%ofthemosthighly-citedarticles.SharedEuropeanideas,resourcesandtalentplayakeyroleinthisremarkableglobalperformance.
TheUK’sresearchstrengthrestspartlyonitsleadingroleinEUprojects,whichprovideaccesstocollaboratorsacrossthecontinent.From2007to2013,theUKcontributed€5.4billiontotheEUforresearch,developmentandinnovation,whilereceiving€8.8billioninresearchgrants.Ofthis,€6.9billionwasfromtheUK’sFramework7Programme,inwhichUKuniversitieswerethemostsuccessfulrecipientswitha71%shareofprojects.
ThisimmersioninEuropeisequallystrikinginrelationtopeoplemobility.In2015-16,127,440EUstudentsenrolledinUKhighereducation,5.6%ofallstudents.Non-UKEUcountriesmadealargercontributiontostaffing.In2015-16,31,635EUstaffworkedathighereducationinstitutionsintheUK,16%oftheworkforce.Thefiguresarehigherintheresearch-intensivesector,including37%ofacademicstaffatLSEandmorethanoneinfourinOxford,CambridgeandUniversityCollegeLondon.Inthelasthalfdecade,morethan40%ofnewacademicstaffappointedonmerittoRussellGroupuniversitieswerefromtheEU.
Inthereferendumcampaign,theargumentinrelationtohighereducationwasstraightforward.UniversitiesUKandothersectorbodies,andindividualVice-Chancellors,arguedvigorouslyforRemain,thoughtheissueneverachievedmuchpublicprominenceandenteredtheofficialRemaincampaignonlymarginally,inrelationtoresearch.TheLeavecaseacceptedtheneedfortheUKGovernmenttocompensatescienceresearchfunding,butignoredtheextenttowhichfreemovementwithintheEUbenefittedhighereducationandresearch.UniversitytownsvotedstronglyforRemain,asdidstaffandstudents.
What has happened since the referendum
Onlyoneoftheissuestriggeredbythereferendumhasbeenresolved,onatemporarybasis.TheUKgovernmenthasruledthatin2017-18EUcitizenstudentscanenterBritishuniversitiesonthesamebasisasUKstudents,asbeforethereferendum.EUstudentswillcontinuetopaya£9,000perannumfeeforfull-timecourses,supportedbyincomecontingentloanspayableaftergraduation.However,thepositionforstudentsenteringin2018-2019isunclear,anditseemsalmostcertainthatafterBrexitEUstudentswillpayfeesonthesamebasisasnon-EUinternationalstudents—thatis,theywillpayup-frontfeesintheyearofstudywithoutthebenefitoftheincomecontingentloans.Thosefees,determinedbytheuniversities,willrangefrom£12,000peryearto£20,000andmore.
ThefutureUKresidencyandcontributionofallnon-UKEuropeanshasbeenfundamentallyplacedindoubtbythereferendum.TheFebruary2017WhitePaperonBrexitindicatedthattheGovernmentwantsto“securethestatusofEUcitizensalreadylivingintheUK”buttherehasbeennoresolutionofthis.ATimesHigherEducationpollofacademicsinMarch2017foundthat53%ofnon-UKnationalswere“activelylookingtoleavetheUK”and88%saidthatBrexithasmadethemmorelikelytodosointhemedium-termtolong-term.Thisisacrucialissue,andthelongeritisunresolvedtheworsewillbethelong-termeffects.
TheTreasuryhasundertakentocompensateuniversitiesforanyearlylossofresearchfundingunderHorizon2020andotherEuropeanschemes.ThegovernmentincludescontinuedUKmembershipofEuropeanresearchschemesasanobjectiveinBrexitnegotiations.WhiletheimportanceofEuropeanresearchlinksforUKscienceisclearlyunderstood,perhapsmoresothantheimportanceofretainingEUstaff,itisnotgenerallyrealisedthatthetwoareasarepartlyinterdependent.Further,researchisasecondorderpublicissueatthisstage.
What might happen in the years to come?
AhardBrexit,andparticularlyanodealoutcome,constituteseriousthreatstothenationalviabilityandglobalcompetitivenessofUKuniversities.Underthesescenarios,accesstothebulkofEuropeanresearchfundingwillbelost,anditishighlyunlikelythatUKuniversitiesandsciencecouldbeadequatelycompensatedinthelongrun.Itisnotjustamatterofmoney,thereisalsothelostaccesstonetworksofsharedexpertise.Anyreductioninthenationalsciencebasealsonarrowsthescopeforindustryinnovation.
TheendofdirectEUaccessrightswilltriggeranewskilledmigrationschemeinUK,withincomersfromallcountrieshandledonanequivalentbasis.Theoutcomehereisambiguous.AschemethatfavouredhighskillresearchersandeducatorscouldmaintainmuchofthepresententryfromEuropewhileenlargingthescopeforentryfromotherpartsoftheworld.However,iflargescalecutsininternationalstudentnumbersgoaheadasplanned,thiswouldnarrowtheflowoftalentfromonesource(internationalstudentgraduates)whilediscouragingtalentfromanother(academicstafffromEuropeandelsewhere).MuchinhighereducationdependsonwhetherinthefraughtclimateofBrexitthegovernmentandthecountrycanmaintaintheUK,especiallyitsuniversities,asmeritocratic,internationallyengaged,andaboveall,open.
By Simon Marginson
TWENTY-SIX
5756
PART SIX: BREXIT AND THE EU
Introduction
DespitetheUK’swell-earnedreputationasan“awkwardpartner”,noneofthememberstateswantedtoseeitleavetheEU.TheyhavebeenperenniallypuzzledbytheUK’sdomesticdebateabout“Europe”,especiallygivenLondon’ssuccessingettingitswayinsuccessivetreatynegotiations,aswellasinday-to-daypolicymaking.Morerecently,theyhavebeenfrustratedbytheUK’slackofsolidarityovertheeurozoneandmigrationcrises.Still,thememberstatesrecognisedthevalueoftheUK’smembershipandtheassetsitbroughtasamajorEuropeaneconomy,withstrongsecurityanddefencecapabilities,aseatontheUNSecurityCouncil,andglobaltradinglinks.TheyalsoadmiredtheprofessionalismwithwhichtheUKargueditscaseinBrussels,aswellasthepragmaticapproachitbroughttothetable.
Moreover,forsomememberstates,theUKwasanimportantally.ItisfirmlyrootedintheliberaleconomiccampalongsideDenmark,Finland,Germany,theNetherlands,Sweden,andtheBalticstates.ItwasrespectedbythecountriesofCentralandEasternEuropeforchampioningenlargement,aswellasfordecidingnottorestrictmigrationupontheiraccessiontotheEUin2004.ForFrance,theUKhasbeenacounterweightto
Germany;forGermany,ithasplayedthesameroleinrelationtoFrance.TheUK’srelationshipwithIrelandisespeciallyintimate.Aswellasacommonborder,thetwocountriesshareclosehistorical,culturalandeconomicties.
Forthesereasons,membergovernmentsrespondedpositively,ifwarily,toPrimeMinisterDavidCameron’sdemandin2015foranewbargainforBritain,eveniftheUKtooktimetospecifywhatitwanted.Yet,althoughtheywerewillingtodoadealtokeeptheUKinsidetheEU,theywerenotpreparedtocompromisetheEU’sfundamentalprinciples,especiallythefreedomofmovementofworkers.
Post-referendum
TheresultsoftheEUreferendumweregreetedwithdisappointmentacrossthenationalcapitalsoftheEU.“Weregretthisdecisionbutrespectit”,saidPresidentTusk,PresidentJuncker,PresidentSchulzandtheNetherlandsPrimeMinisterRutteintheirjointstatementthedayafterthereferendum.Atthesametime,agitatedbytheUK’srepeatedclaimthat“theydependmoreonusthanwedoonthem”,nationalleadershavecautionedthat,althoughBrexitwillhurttheEU,theUKwillsufferevengreaterharm.
TheEU27werequicktoadoptacommonposition.AswellascallingontheUKGovernmenttonotifytheEuropeanCouncilofitsintentiontowithdrawfromtheEUasquicklyaspossible,theleadersoftheEU27underlinedtheircommitmenttotheEUandagreedthreeprinciplesfortheconductoftheBrexitnegotiations:
• thatnegotiationsshouldnotbeginwiththeUKuntilafterLondonhadtriggeredArticle50;
• thattheUKwouldneedtoacceptobligations,notablyconcerningEUcitizensresidentintheUK,aswellasrightsvis-à-vistheEU;
• thattheUKcouldnotexpectaccesstoEurope’sSingleMarketunlessitacceptedthefourfreedomsofmovementofgoods,capital,servicesandworkers.
Subsequently,theEU27havemaintainedtheircollectiveposition.Althoughpreparedtocommitthemselvestoaconstructivebilateralrelationshipinthepost-Brexitera,theyhaverefusedtoenteranydiscussionsthatmightpre-empttheArticle50negotiations,particularlyregardingfuturetraderelations.Atthesametime,theyhaveemphasisedthat,whiletheaimisnottopunishtheUK,thenegotiationswillbehard,andtheUKcannotexpecttoretaintheadvantagesconferredbyEUmembership.
AnyhopeinotherEUcapitalsthattheUKwouldchangeitsmindaboutBrexitquicklyreceded.Indeed,thetoneofUKrhetoric–notablyinthespeechesmadebyTheresaMayandHomeSecretaryAmberRuddatthe2016ConservativePartyconference,whichappearedtothreatentherightsofEUcitizensintheUK,MichaelHoward’scommentsaboutgoingtowartodefendGibraltar,aswellasForeignSecretaryBorisJohnson’srepeatedreferencestoWorldWarIIandtheNaziregime,tocitebutafew–provokeddismayandbewildermentamongtheUK’spartners.
Moreover,alarmaboutLondon’sexpectations(“havingourcakeandeatingit”),itsthreattowalkawayfromnegotiations(“nodealisbetterthan
abaddeal”),andtheunwillingnessoftheprimeministertooutlinetheUK’sobjectives,hasledtovolublecriticismthatisunusualamongallies.Mostnotably,inthewakeofEuropeanCommissionPresidentJuncker’sinfamousdinneratNumber10,ChancellorMerkelwarnedtheUKaboutharbouring“illusions”abouttheoutcomeitwouldachievefromthenegotiations.Inaddition,Ireland,whichwillbemoreaffectedthananymemberstatebyBrexit,fearsitsconcernshavenotbeentakenseriouslyinLondon,andhassoughttoensurethatitscircumstancesareunderstoodinotherEUcapitals.
One year on
SinceJune2016,thesentimentinthecapitalsoftheEU27hasmovedfromdisappointmentanddisbelieftoimpatience.Whilethereisstillregretabouttheoutcomeofthereferendum,aswellasahopethattheUKwillonedayreturn,membergovernmentsareirritatedaboutthelengthoftimeittookLondonfirsttotriggerArticle50andthentocommencenegotiations.TheUK’spartnershavealsobeenunimpressedbyUKdiplomacysince23June2016.
Ontheeveofnegotiations,theUK’sobjectivesremainlargelyunknown.ThereisconcernthatLondonentertainsunrealisticexpectations,andanxietythattheUKwillstageawalkout.Tomakemattersworse,asnapelectionthatwascalledtodeliverastrongerpersonalmandatefortheprimeministerhasdeliveredahungparliament,introducingstillfurtheruncertaintyanddiminishingtheprospectsofaconclusionofbusinesswithinthetwoyearsforeseenbyArticle50.
HavingcommittedthemselvestoafuturewithintheEU,theUK’sEUpartnershaveheldfirm,resistingallattemptsbyLondonto“divideandconquer”.FromtheNetherlandsPrimeMinisterMarkRuttetoFrenchPresidentEmmanuelMacron,Europe’sleadershaveunderlinedthat,whiletheyaredisappointedattheUK’sdecision,theyrespectit.However,theyalsowarnthattheforthcomingnegotiationswillbetough.
By Hussein Kassim
TWENTY-SEVEN
5958
PART SIX: BREXIT AND THE EU
Introduction
TheEUdependsonitsmemberstatesforitslegal,financialandpoliticalexistenceandsoisusuallywillingtotrytoaccommodatetheir“localdifficulties”.IntheUK’scase,thismeantJean-ClaudeJuncker(PresidentoftheCommission)andespeciallyDonaldTusk(PresidentoftheEuropeanCouncil)tryingtofindanaccommodationintherenegotiationthatwouldallowCamerontotakebacksomethingvaluableinthecomingreferendumcampaign,butalsorespectingtheinterestsofothermembers.
FromtheEUperspective,theresultant“newsettlement”wasasincereefforttogiveCameronaleg-up,albeitonepointedlydrapedinlanguagethatremindedeveryonethatthetreatiesalreadyallowedformuchmoreflexibilitythanpublicdebateseemedtosuppose.However,theoverblownrhetoricthatCameronhadtakenintotherenegotiationmeantthatanyadvantagehemighthavegainedwaslostinthehowlsoftheBritishpressaboutbeingshort-changed.
Unsurprisingasthiswas,itconfirmedthedominantviewinBrusselsthatthebestsubsequentcourseofactionwastomaintainaverylowprofile,asanyinterventioninthereferendumwaslikelytoback-
fire.Eitherthevotewouldbewon–inwhichcasethenewsettlementwouldcomeintoeffectandnormalservicewouldresume,orlost–inwhichcasecontingencyplanswouldkickin.
Post referendum
Theoutlineoftheseplanswasalwaysclearbeforethereferendumitself,butwasexpandeduponveryquicklyafterwards,notablyinthestatementson24and28JunefromEUleaders.
Inessence,theEU’spositionwas,andcontinuestobe,thatiftheUKwantstoleavetheorganisation,thenitshoulddoso,followingtheprocedureestablishedforjustsuchaneventuality:theinfamousArticle50.
WhileitissimpletostatetheUnion’sview,itcarrieswithitanumberofkeyconsequences.
First,itfitswiththeEU’straditionoftryingtobalancelocalneedswithcommoninterests.IftherenegotiationwasnotenoughtoconvincetheBritishpublic,thentheirviewsmustberespected.However,thisimpliesrespectingtheviewsofothermemberstatesthatwerenotwillingtoofferfurtherconcessionstotheUK:hence,nopost-referendumrenegotiations.
Second,andlinkedtothis,theUKwillnotgetspecialtreatment.Therenegotiationtextitselfappliedtoallmemberstates,withthesoleexceptionfortheUKbeingaconfirmationthatitalreadymetthethresholdtolimitbenefits.Likewise,theEUhasaprocessfordeparture,andaprocessforestablishingthird-countryrelations,bothofwhichwillbeusedtoestablishanewrelationshipwiththeUK.
Thirdly,theinsistenceonArticle50placestheEUinastrongnegotiatingposition.ThedynamicofthenegotiationswillbeoneoftheEUmakinganoffertotheUK,ratherthanviceversa.WehavealreadyseenthiswiththepublicationofdetailedEUnegotiatingguidelines.WhiletheEUisfreetomakewhateverofferitwishestotheUK,theUKwillbelimitedtoworkingaroundthatagenda,respondingratherthandefining.
ThisimbalanceofpowerpartlyexplainsthelongdelaybetweenthereferendumandthenotificationthattheUKwantedtotriggerArticle50.AslongastheBritishGovernmentdidnottriggertheprocedure,therewasnotimepressure,andanopportunitytotryandinfluencethecontentanddirectionofnegotiations.However,intheabsenceofanycoherentBritishpolicyonhowtoapproachthenegotiations,andinthefaceofevidentdeterminationonthepartoftheEUinstitutionstoavoidanypre-notificationtalks,thisopportunityultimatelycametonothing.
One year on
AstheUKbeginssubstantivenegotiations,itfacesanEUwithaverywell-developedorganisationalstructureandanegotiatingpositionthatenjoysahighlevelofbuy-infromallsides.
Importantly,anypotentialforconflictbetweentheEuropeanCouncil,CommissionandEuropeanParliamentwasaddressedearlyon.EuropeanCouncilPresidentDonaldTuskquicklytooktheleadasthemaincontactpointatthelevelofheadsofgovernment,whiletheCommissionbuiltadedicatednegotiatingteamaroundMichelBarnier.
Meanwhile,theEuropeanParliamentwasabletoinfluencetheformulationofthenegotiatingmandates.Itsroleunderits“leadnegotiator”GuyVerhofstadtmightbebestthoughtofasthatofa(notvery)badcopalongsidetheCommission,promisingtovetoanyagreementthatdoesnotsecurecitizens’rights.ClosecoordinationbetweentheEUinstitutionswillalsolimittheUK’sabilitytoplaythemoffagainsteachother,somethingthatmightpotentiallyhavecomplicatedratificationofthe deal.
Theunityoftheinstitutionswillbeseverelytestedintherestof2017,asoneofthemainprinciplesofthemandateischallengedbytheUK,namelysequencing.Whilethemandatedoeshavesomeflexibility,itessentiallyassumesthatliabilitiesofmembership–includingfinances–mustberesolvedbeforeanydiscussionofthenewrelationship.GiventhepoliticallytoxicnatureofthemoneyquestionfortheUKGovernment,itisunderstandablethatitwouldprefertobundleeverythinguptogether,ifonlytodistractattention.Asever,theEUissympathetictothis–henceitsclearfocusonprinciplesforcalculatingliabilities,ratherthanusingactualfigures–butitsneedtocoverthegapsinfinancingforothermemberstatessuggestthatitwillstanditsgroundonthisissue.
WhethertheEUinstitutionswillbewillingorabletomaintaintheirpositionsthroughtotheendofArticle50remainstobeseen;givendevelopmentstodate,itlooksmuchmorelikelythatitwillbetheUKthathastocleavetotheEU,ratherthantheotherwayaround.Indeed,theunityoftheEUhasanintrinsicvalueasasymbolofEuropeancooperationthatwillmakeitthatmuchhardertocompromiseorshiftitsposition.
By Simon Usherwood
TWENTY-EIGHT
60
Credits for front cover photographs and for images used in the running header on odd numbered pages:(inalphabeticalorder)
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Photograph of Theresa May on page 16:
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BankofEngland
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