Dharmakiirti's refutation of theismBy Roger JacksonPhilosophy East and West36:4 Oct. 1986 p. 315-348I. INTRODUCTION

Indian civilization, no less than that of the West, is haunted by the concept of God, and Indian philosophical writing, no less than the works of Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, or Hume, has as one of its important concerns the existence or nonexistence of an omniscient, eternal, independent, benevolent being who creates and/or designs the cosmos. Despite Lin Yutang's description of India as a nation "intoxicated with God,"(1) Indian skepticism about such a being goes back very far indeed,(2) and explicit arguments against theism find an important place in the writings of Buddhism, Jainism, and Miimaa.msaa (as they must have in the lost writings of Caarvaaka) , while God's importance or even existence for early Saa.mkhya, Nyaaya, and Vai`se.sika is at best moot.(3) Indeed, the only Indian philosophical systems that are explicitly theistic are Vedaanta, Yoga, and later, Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika. It undoubtedly is due to the overwhelming preference for Vedaanta among modern exponents of Indian philosophy that Indian tradition so often is presented through theistically-shaded lenses, and it is not incorrect to assert that, in general, Indian civilization has become more theistic during the same period in which the West has become less so. Still, this should not blind us to the fact that as recently as five hundred years ago thinkers like the Jaina Gu.naratna were adducing sharp and original arguments against theistic assertions, and that even today the unanimity of Indian belief in God may not be as thoroughgoing as most swamis and scholars would have us believe.(4)

As might be expected, arguments for the existence or nonexistence of the being variously called puru.sa, brahman, paramaatman, or ii`svara, or by the name of one or another sectarian deity, increased in sophistication as methods of philosophical discussion grew more complex and precise. Sometime around the middle of the first millennium A.D. a philosophical watershed was reached wherein the various Indian schools arrived at least at a broad consensus on the criteria for valid and invalid formal inferences, anumaana, and proper and improper argumentative modes, tarka. In principle, at least, this permitted

intersystemic debate on the basis of commonly accepted "logical" canons, and thus prompted the hope that arguments on fundamental philosophical issues might indeed be capable of resolution. In general, before the development of these canons, Indian philosophical arguments that were not simply dogmatic were analogical or dialectical in form; arguments after the canons were developed still employed illustrative analogies and dialectical dilemmas, but within the much more carefully articulated framework of what is sometimes called the Indian "syllogism."

Among those contributing greatly to the development of generally acceptable ------------------------ Roger Jackson is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Fairfie[d University, Connecticut. This paper was originally presented at the seventh conference of the international Association of Buddhist Studies, Bologna, Italy, July, 1985.

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logical canons was the seventh-century Buddhist aacaarya Dharmakiirti, who developed the seminal insights of his great predecessor, Dignaaga, into an epistemological and logical system that itself drew the attention of countless commentators (not to mention opponents(5)) and has served as the basis of epistemology and logic in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition right up to the present. The majority of Dharmakiirti's writings(6) are concerned with epistemological and logical questions, but he was not uninterested in matters of religious and metaphysical doctrine, for the chapter titled "Pramaa.nasiddhi," or "Establishment of Authoritativeness, " in his masterwork, the Pramaa.navaarttika, (7) is devoted almost entirely to a rational justification of Buddhist religious doctrines, such as the authoritativeness of the Buddha, the reality of past and future lives, and the validity of the Four Noble Truths. In the course of demonstrating these doctrines, Dharmakiirti attacks the positions of a variety of non-Buddhist opponents, including the Lokaayatas(=Caarvaakas), Saa.mkhyas, Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas, Miimaa.msakas, and Jainas. Although earlier Buddhist writers had criticized non-Buddhist systems, and Bhaavaviveka had subjected them to systematic scrutiny nearly a century earlier in his Tarkajvaalaa, Dharmakiirti was the first Buddhist to

criticize non-Buddhist doctrines with fully developed methods of inference and argumentation at his disposal.

Among the non-Buddhist doctrines criticized by Dharmakiirti in the "Pramaa.nasiddhi" chapter of the Pramaa.navaarttika was the assertion that an omniscient, permanent, independent entity, II`svara, is the creator of the cosmos. Although George Chemparathy remarks that "the systematic and thoroughgoing attack on the I`svara doctrine by Dharmakiirti" gave a great impetus to the theist-atheist controversy, (8) and Gopimohan Bhattacharyya notes that the "time-honored cosmological [sic] argument was for the first time subjected to scathing criticism by Dharmakiirti, `the central figure around whom all the creative minds in India revolved', " (9) Dharmakiirti's arguments themselves, pivotal as they may have been, have received surprisingly little attention; most writers on Buddhist atheism have focused either on the arguments of such earlier sources as the Paali Nikaayas, Naagaarjuna, A`svaghosa, and Vasubandhu, or the later, extended discussions in `Saantarak.sita's Tattvasa.mgraha and the Pa~njikaa upon it by Kamala`siila. The earlier arguments are less systematic than Dharmakiirti's, and the later ones are largely based on the discussion of ii`svara in the Pramaa.navaarttika, so it seems desirable to examine these crucial arguments, for without an understanding of them, our picture of the Indian theist-atheist controversy will be incomplete. This essay will sketch the pre-Dharmakiirti development of theism, outline earlier Buddhist refutations of it, contextualize and analyze Dharmakiirti's arguments in some detail, note some of the directions taken in the theist-atheist debate after Dharmakiirti, and conclude by examining problems inherent in attempting to "decide" the debate and compare it to similar debates in the Western tradition.

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II. PHILOSOPHICAL THEISM BEFORE DHARMAKIIRTI

Indian speculation about the cosmos, of course, goes back as far as the later sections of the.Rgveda, where the first cause is said to be, for example, vi`svakarman ("the all-maker"),(10) or puru.sa ("the person") , (11) or prajaapati ("the lord of

creatures"), (12) or tadekam ("the one") .(13) The divine power, or supreme puru.sa, first is referred to as ii`svara ("the lord") in the Atharvaveda,(14) while the Braa.hma.nas and AAra.nyakas continue Vedic speculations regarding prajaapati and vi`svakarman and introduce the concepts of brahman and brahmaa.(15) In most of these accounts, the discussion of the first cause is couched in mythological narrative; little real attempt is made to justify the concepts philosophically, though lurking in the background are unstated assumptions about limiting principles and simplicity of explanation. Discussions of the first cause in the various Upani.sads focus on the concept of brahman (also referred to as aatman or paramaatman), whose reality as the source and (most often) the substance of the cosmos is inferred usually through a reductive process that moves from change to permanence, multiplicity to unity, complexity to simplicity, materiality to spirituality, and grossness to subtlety.(16) The earlier, more "monistic" Upani.sads tend to regard brahman as an impersonal principle that simply becomes the cosmos (while at the same time remaining in some way transcendent to it); in later Upani.sads, such as the `Svetaa`svatara, brahman is personalized--at least to the point where it has a creative aspect that is responsible for originating the cosmos and that can be addressed as "lord" (ii`sa, ii`svara), or "deity" (deva),(17) or even as Rudra. The `Svetaa`svatara actually lists non-Vedic explanations of the cosmos, such as svabhaava (nature), kaala (time), niyata (fate), yad.rcchaa (chance), and so forth, but it rejects them out of hand, simply asserting that brahman, rather than any of these, is the true explanatory principle.(18) The Bhagavadgiitaa further personalizes the first cause by identifying its ultimate nature with the divine person of Vi.s.nu,(19) but, again, the fact is asserted rather than argued, and the appeal is aimed more at the imagination and emotions than at rationality.

It is only with the development of the classical dar`sanas in the last centuries B.C. or the first centuries A.D. that theism, widespread as it had become religiously, began to receive philosophical justification. If we take the term "theism" in the broad sense in which I am using it--comprising any theory that attributes the creation and/or ordering of the cosmos to one source, whether personal or impersonal--then there are three dar`sanas that can

be said to be "theistic": Vedaanta, Yoga, and Nyaaya.

The Brahmaasuutras of Baadaraaya.na did not receive their most important advaita commentaries until Gau.dapaada and `Sa^nkara, both of whom probably postdate Dharmakiirti,(20) but the suutras themselves have as one of their central concerns to establish that brahman is the source and substance of the cosmos.(21) Brahman is asserted to be that on which the world is dependent,(22) the material cause of all

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effects.(23) Baadaraaya.na's arguments rest primarily on scriptural statements that would not carry much force for a Buddhist, since the latter admits neither the validity of the Vedas nor the existence of an independent `sabdapramaa.na. This Vedaantin disinclination to proffer inferentially based arguments for its theistic beliefs is seen clearly in later commentators such as `Sa^nkara, who denies that brahman's origination of the cosmos ever can be established inferentially, since brahman is imperceptible and inferences must be perceptually based, (24) and Raamaanuja, who refutes various rational arguments for theism so as to pave the way for knowledge of God through scripture and devotion.(25)

The Yogasuutra of Pata~njali quite specifically asserts the existence of a "supreme puru.sa, " ii`svara, who is unaffected by affliction, action, or fruition, is omniscient, the eternal teacher, and the object of the syllable o.m, and devotion to whom is one way to achieve samaadhi.(26) The Yoga tradition generally is more concerned with psychological than philosophical matters, and its literature is far from being replete with rational discussions of the existence or nonexistence of ii`svara, but Pata~njali's fourth-century commentator, Vyaasa, does interpret the assertion that in ii`svara "the seed of the omniscient is not exceeded" as meaning that iisvara's knowledge and preeminence are knowledge and preeminence other than which none greater can be conceived.(27) If different degrees of knowledge or preeminence be admitted, then a supreme instance of these is not inconceivable-- and that supreme instance is ii`svara. It ought to be noted that the ii`svara of Yoga is not a creator-God like that of Vedaanta. Yoga arises within the context of

Saa.mkhya, according to which the cosmos is simply a transformation of insentient nature, prak.rti, from which individual puru.sas--and the supreme puru.sa--ever are utterly separate.

Lying midway conceptually between the immanent brahman of Vedaanta and the detached, inactive supreme puru.sa of Yoga is the ii`svara of Nyaaya, who is neither the material cause of the cosmos (like brahman), nor utterly noncausal (like the supreme puru.sa) , but, rather, the world's shaper and arranger--its efficient cause, as it were. It is Nyaaya (or, later, Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika) alone among Indian philosophical schools that seriously proposed to offer proof of the existence and creative activity of ii`svara. Ironically, the passage in Gautama's Nyaayasuutra that became the basis of later theological elaboration(28) is not unambiguously theistic--a number of scholars believe that, quite to the contrary, its discussion of the relation between ii`svara and the results of human action is intended as a criticism of theism, that is, that if ii`svara is posited, then human action is pointless.(29) Be that as it may, by the time of Vaatsyaayana's Nyaavabhaa.sya (fifth century(30)), the moot passage in Gautama is interpreted as a demonstration that ii`svara is the cause of all effects, and that human action could not have results without the action of ii`svara. Vaatsyaayana goes on to define ii`svara as belonging in general to the category (padaartha) of substance (dravya) , and in particular to the substance that is self (aatman), of which it is a special instance, powerful, meritorious, benevolent, and in control of both karman and the material elements.(31)

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Pra`satapaada (sixth century) advanced the discussion still further in his Padaarthadharmasa.mgraha by arguing that ii`svara is necessary as the conscious impeller of the unseen (ad.r.s.ta) force that regulates karman, and as that which impels atoms to movement and combination at the end of the universe's dormancy (pralaya).(32)

The last important pre-Dharmakiirti Naiyaayika (although by now it is possible to speak of Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika) was Uddyotakara, who probably flourished in the period between Dignaaga and

Dharmakiirti (late sixth or early seventh century). In his Nyaayavaarttika, he goes beyond arguing for ii`svara on grounds peculiar to Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika and seeks to establish his existence on more general grounds. II`svara, Uddyotakara asserts, is the instrumental cause (nimittakaara.na) of things, because he assists beings in reaping the fruits of their actions. ii`svara further is necessary as an adjunct to material results, because all results must be preceded by conscious action, as a hatchet requires a wielder in order to function, or the flow of milk to a calf requires the cow's intention. Further, although II`svara is a permanent, unaltering entity, he can cause impermanent entities, because we see that, for example, spun yarn, though unmoving, is the cause of a movable garment. II`svara is not the creator of the eternal atoms that comprise the material world; his "creation," therefore, is neither ex nihilo nor out of himself. Rather, he fashions the preexistent "material" into a cosmos in response to the necessary fruition of the dharma and adharma of beings. Finally, ii`svara's power and consciousness are eternal, omnipresent, and unlimited, for events throughout the entire extent of space and time require a conscious agent as their instrumental cause; since that cause, ii`svara, can effect all results, his power is unlimited, and since he is conscious effector of all results, he must, by definition, be omniscient.(33)

III. PRE-DHARMAKIIRTI BUDDHIST ATTACKS ON THEISM

Beginning with the great eleventh-century defender of theism, Udayana,(34) any number of Hindu writers have attempted to argue that Buddhism, with its worship of an omniscient tathaagata, actually is crypto-theism. The word "theism" undoubtedly can be twisted in such a way that certain aspects of Mahaayaana theory and practice fall under the term, but it is equally clear that theism in the sense in which I am using it--as the assertion of an omniscient, permanent, independent, unique cause of the cosmos--is rejected throughout the length and breadth of the Indian Buddhist tradition. Dharmakiirti's antitheistic arguments may have taken the Buddhist critique to a new level of sophistication, but he had behind him a millennium of refutations, with many of which he undoubtedly was familiar, and which ought to be borne in mind when we consider his discussion.

The Paali Nikaayas contain a number of explicit rejections of theism, and some important implicit ones, as well. In the Brahmajaalasutta, one of the sixty-two views discussed by the Buddha is the claim that brahmaa is the creator of the

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cosmos; this claim is rejected on the grounds that it is based on a mistaken inference: at the beginning of a world cycle, brahmaa' is the first being to arise. Lonely, he wishes for other beings as companions, and they appear. He concludes that he has created them, but is mistaken, for by the Buddhist explanation the beings simply are arising due to their own karman--karman, rather than the will of a deity, being the true creative force in the cosmos.(35)

A second explicit rejection, made on the grounds of theodicy, or the "problem of evil," occurs at a number of places in the Nikaayas,(36) where it is claimed that the postulation of a God as creator of the cosmos and the regulator of karman undermines human moral responsibility, while at the same time vitiating claims that the God can be benevolent, since evils are his creation, too. Other explicit critiques include mockery of the "omnisicient" brahmaa for his ignorance regarding the sphere wherein all elements cease,(37) and skepticism regarding the claims of some brahmins to have seen brahmaa face-to-face.(38)

For the later Buddhist philosophical tradition, however, the most important early arguments are perhaps the implicit ones: those many passages in the Nikaayas where the concept of a permanent attaa or aatman is rejected, principally on the grounds that no permanent entity is or can be encountered in experience or justified by reason. It really is Buddhism's emphasis on universal impermanence that is at the root of its aversion to the concept of God, as became evident in the sorts of refutations offered in the post-nikaaya period (when the attributes of the creator, identified by the Buddhists as ii`svara, perhaps had become more clearly defined).

Poussin remarks that Buddhist refutations of ii`svara "ont le tort de se repeter."(39) It is true that certain points are stressed again and again, but the arguments do vary; indeed, their uniformity is more in style than substance: virtually all are couched in

the form of logical dilemmas, in which the predication of this or that attribute of ii`svara is shown to lead to unacceptable conclusions, no matter how it is qualified. Post-nikaaya, pre-Dharmakiirti arguments are thus broadly "logical," without being specifically inferential.

One of the earliest post-nikaaya rejections of ii`s- vara is found in the Buddhacaarita of A`svagho.sa (first-second century A.D.), where at one place the rhetorical question is posed: If ii`svara is the creator, then what point is there in human effort?(40) In a second passage, the Buddha is quoted as pointing out that if ii`svara, the cause, is perfect and unchanging, then the cosmos that is his effect must be perfect and unchanging, which it manifestly is not. Further, if it be argued that ii`svara creates with a purpose in mind, then he has not achieved all purposes, and his perfection is limited; whereas if he creates without a purpose, then he must be regarded as no more sensible than a madman or a child.(41)

A number of works attributed to Naagaarjuna--generally believed to belong to the same period as A`svagho.sa--reject the concept of ii`svara. The Suh.rllekha mentions in passing that ii`svara is nor to be accepted as the cause of the aggregates.(42) The Catu.hstava argues that ii`svara must either originate from another

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entity, in which case his uncreatedness is violated, or be self-originated, which is impossible, since an entity cannot at the same time be both the agent and object of an action.(43) The Bodhicittavivara.na notes that (a) if ii`svara is alleged to be permanent, then he cannot create, either simultaneously or gradually (since results are impermanent, and so cannot have a permanent cause); (b) if he is said to be efficient, then he must create the universe unaided all at once (since efficiency requires the immediate generation of a result); (c) if he requires assistance in creation, then he is not truly eternal or efficient; and (d) if he is alleged to be an entity (bhaava), then he cannot be permanent, since entities are observed to be impermanent.(44) Finally, the Vi.s.norekakart.rtva- niraakara.nam, (45) which is entirely devoted to a

refutation of ii`svara, argues that (a) he cannot create the existent, since it already exists, nor the nonexistent, since it cannot come to be; and (b) he cannot be self-originated, as that is a contradictory concept; or other-originated, for that would entail an infinite regress of creators, even one of whom exist before ii`svara, thereby vitiating his status as creator.(46)

Arguments against the concept of ii`svara also are found in the AAbhidharmika literature of succeeding centuries. The great compendium of Sarvaastivaadin thought, the Mahaavibhaa.sa, notes that (a) if ii`svara is the cause of everything, then he must create everything at once (since efficiency implies immediate causation); (b) if he requires help, then he is not the sole cause; (c) if he is undifferentiated and eternal, so must his effects be (since effect must resemble cause); and (d) since effects are known to be impermanent, their alleged permanent cause, ii`svara, has no more "existence" than space.(47)

Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako`sa and Abhidharmako`sa- bhaa.sya reject ii`svara at a number of places, most extensively in the Bha.sya to II,, 64d, which asserts that the various dharmas do not arise from a unique cause like ii`svara, because dharmas are successive and ii`svara is not. Among the points made by Vasubandhu in his dialogue with a theist are that (a) if ii`svara is said to will the successive generation of dharmas, then he must have multiple desires; if he is single, he must have a single desire, hence create dharmas all at once; (b) if ii`svara requires assistance, then he is not the unique cause, and his assistant causes would require further assistant causes, in infinite regress; (c) if ii`svara wills the creation of some dharmas in the present and some later, then he must be incapable of creating the later dharmas now, and if he cannot create them now, he cannot in the future, since his nature does not change; and (d) if the observed causes of various effects are said to be auxiliaries to ii`svara's causation, then it must be asked whether ii`svara can prevent the effects from arising--he cannot, and therefore is both impotent and irrelevant, for the observed impermanent causes are perfectly adequate explanations for effects.(48) Vasubandhu also argues that since karmic results are multiple, their cause cannot be single,(49) and that, similarly, suffering cannot be originated by a cause that is single,

nonsuccessive, or guided by intelligence.(50)

Among Mahaayaana AAbhidharmika texts that include refutations of ii`svara, we

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will mention only the Yogaacaarabhuumi of Asa^nga, which argues that (a) if ii`svara has a reason for creation, then that reason is the real cause, whereas if he has none, then he cannot be motivated to become a cause; (b) if ii`svara is immanent in the cosmos, then he cannot stand outside as its creator, whereas if he is not immanent in it, then he has no relation to it, and so cannot create it; (c) if ii`svara creates intending some purpose, then it must be admitted that there is a purpose he has not yet fulfilled; and (d) if creation depends on ii`svara's will alone, then everything must arise simultaneously, while if it depends on an ii`svara who is assisted, then he is not the unique cause.(51)

One final pre-Dharmakiirti text worthy of brief mention is the Tarkajvaalaa of Bhaavaviveka, or Bhavya (sixth century) , whose discussion of ii`svara(52) shows at least a rudimentary awareness of attempts to prove ii`svara inferentially and of the pitfalls entailed by those attempts. Bhaavaviveka recites a number of the standard refutations, noting that the multiple events we observe in the world cannot be asserted to arise from a unique cause, but rather must be explained as proceeding from a multiplicity of karmic conditions, and that ii`svara cannot be held to be any more real than a sky-flower or a barren woman's son. He does note that one possible argument for ii`svara is the syllogism, "The eye and so forth exist as accompanied (that is, caused) by a maker, because they are arranged like a pot." To this Bhaavaviveka's response is that the syllogism is invalid because it proves what is already proven for the Buddhist, namely, that events have causes--for the Buddhist, however, the causes are multiple (karman, the elements, parents, and so forth), not a single arranger. A second syllogism, namely, "II`svara is the maker of the eye and so forth because he is permanent, unique and unproduced, " is rejected as unproved (asiddha) because of the absence of any corroborative example of such an entity. Finally, the syllogism, "(The eye and so forth have) ii`svara (as a maker preceding

them) because (they are shaped), just as a pot has a potter as its maker," is rejected on the grounds that a potter is (a) embodied and (b) impermanent, neither of which is applicable to ii`svara.(53)

IV. DHARMAKIIRTI'S CRITIQUE OF THEISM: CONTEXT

As noted in the introduction, Dharmakiirti's refutation of theism is found in the Pramaa.nasiddhi chapter of his Pramaa.navaarttika. The Pramaa.navaarttika is loosely constructed as a commentary on Dignaaga's Pramaa.nasamuccaya, and the Pramaa.nasiddhi chapter-- regarded as the first by modern editors and the second by the Tibetan tradition(54)--is itself an elaborate gloss on just one verse of the Pramaa.nasamuccaya, the first, wherein Dignaaga salutes the Buddha as One Who Has Become Authoritative (pramaa.nabhuuta), One Who Desires to Benefit the World (jagaddhitai.sin), the Teacher (`saast.r), the Sugata, and the Savior (taayin). The basic purpose of the Pramaa.nasiddhi chapter is to demonstrate the Buddha's authoritativeness for those who desire spiritual liberation, through demonstrating that it is reasonable to regard him as the Benevolent One, the Teacher, the Sugata, and the Savior.(55) These, in turn, are proven through a series of extended philosophical

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arguments, the most important of which revolve around (a) defining authoritativeness and giving negative and positive examples of beings who embody it, (b) proving that positive mental qualities such as benevolence can be developed infinitely, through demonstrating that the mind-body relation is an interactionist dualism that permits the existence of past and future lives, and (c) showing that the Four Noble Truths taught by the Buddha are in fact true, and, especially, that acceptance or rejection of a self (aatman) is the key to sa.msaara and nirvaa.na. As the nineteenth-century Tibetan commentator Mi pham notes, the proof of past and future lives paves the way for proving that the Buddha has the causes for being regarded as authoritative, while the proof that the Four Noble Truths are true shows us the reason why he is authoritative.(56)

It is in the first general division of the chapter, that which defines and exemplifies authoritativeness,

that the rejection of ii`svara is to be found. After defining pramaa.na (authoritativeness) in the first six verses(57) as uncontradicted, fresh cognition, Dharmakiirti asserts in verse 7 that the Buddha fulfills this definition. Before demonstrating generally (as he will in verses 29-33) that the Buddha is authoritative because he knows what is to be rejected and what accepted (heyopadeya) by those intent on liberation, Dharmakiirti provides a "nonaccordant example" for his definition of authoritativeness. This, of course, is ii`svara, whose authoritativeness, creatorship, and existence are rejected in verses 8-28. The argument can be broken down into three general sections: (1) verses 8-9 reject ii`svara's authoritativeness; (2) verses 10-20 are a refutation of a theistic syllogism purporting to prove that worldly effects must have a conscious cause, and that cause is ii`svara; and (3) verses 21-28 question the possibility that ii`svara could be a causal agent, through a comparison between the characteristics attributed to ii`svara and the reality of the causal process. We will consider each of these arguments in turn, relying primarily upon Dharmakiirti's own words. Where necessary, we will turn for interpretive help to one of the greatest of Tibetan Pramaa.navaarttika commentators, rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen (1364-1432), (58) and, on occasion, to Dharmakiirti's own disciple, Devendrabuddhi (or -mati).(59)

V. DHARMAKIIRTI'S REJECTION OF I`SVARA'S AUTHORITATIVENESS

Dharmakiirti already has established (in verses 3b-4b) that authoritativeness is cognitive (dhii), an act of consciousness. Can one then posit the authoritativeness of a being whose nature is permanent (nitya)?

(8-9a:) There is no permanent authoritative (being), Because authoritativeness cognizes (functioning) entities; Because, since objects of knowledge are impermanent, That (which cognizes them) is unstable; Because that which is generated consecutively Cannot be accepted as generated from a permanent (cause); (And because) it is unsuitable that (a permanent cause) depend on conditions.(60)

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Note that the explicit object of refutation here is simply a permanent authoritative cognition, which could define not only ii`svara, but such other non-Buddhist concepts as aatman, puru.sa, and so forth. In fact, the term ii`svara does not appear until verse 28. Still, ii`svara is probably the primary object of refutation throughout this discussion, for (a) ii`svara is the only "permanent authority" mentioned anywhere in the verses, (b) ii`svara is clearly indicated as the object of refutation by Dharmakiirti's commentators, and (c) ii`svara had been singled out by pre-Dharmakiirti Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas as a permanent being who was the creator of all effects, hence, by definition, authoritative regarding all effects (omnisicient).

Taking ii`svara as the permanent authoritative being who is being rejected, then, we see that Dharmakiirti's argument is as follows. That which any authoritative cognition cognizes are the functioning entities (vastu) that are what is "real" in the world. Functioning entities are known to be impermanent, that is, to exist only momentarily. Any entity, therefore, actually is a succession of momentary events, each following the other with inconceivable rapidity, and constituting a "thing" only insofar as there is a certain similarity from one moment to the next. Since it is objects that (conventionally, at least) generate cognitions, a cognition of an object only can arise where an object exists. If an object exists only for a moment, its cognition must be similarly momentary, generated successively. Indeed, a permanent authority said to cognize all entities only could cognize them simultaneously, for it does not change from one moment to the next. This would mean that all objects in fact exist simultaneously, which manifestly is not so. If it is maintained that ii`svara himself remains permanent, but that his cognitions are impermanent in accordance with the succession of objects, then at least two consequences ensue: (a) ii`svara is being qualified with contradictory properties (permanence and impermanence) and (b) he is being accepted as dependent on conditions (the succession of objects), which a permanent being cannot be.(61)

It ought to be noted, before we continue, that Dha- makiirti's argument here presupposes the validity of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, whereby "existence" only is predicated of efficient (arthakriya) entities, and efficiency only can be

predicated of momentary entities--since an entity that is not inherently and instantly destructible cannot be destroyed, hence is immutable, and what is immutable cannot interact with what is successive, as entities manifestly are. Buddhist arguments for momentariness were highly controversial,(62) being open to criticism for (a) vitiating causality by denying continuity and (b) begging the question by defining existence in such a way (as a particular type of efficacity) that only momentary entities could fulfill the definition. It is not my intention to enter into these fundamental arguments here, but simply to point out that the debate between Dharmakiirti and his opponents is not necessarily self-contained, but constantly opens out onto the broader metaphysical issues dividing them (and these issues, in turn, are inextricably intertwined with questions of the religious psychologies of different traditions(63) ).

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To continue, having shown that a permanent authori- tative cognizer is a contradictory concept, Dharmakiirti goes on to reject the notion that ii`svara could be regarded as impermanent:

(9b:) Because (a permanent cognizer)has not been helped in any way, There cannot be an impermanent authoritative (being). (64)

According to rGyal tshab, who follows Praj~naakaragupta here, (65) "Because (a permanent cognizer) has not been helped in any way" is intended as a proof that ii`svara cannot be impermanent (hence a cognizer, since cognizers must be impermanent), for ii`svara is said to be self-sufficient and eternally liberated, while what is impermanent may or may not exist, may suffer or be liberated, in accordance with helping or hindering conditions. Thus, even if ii`svara is defined as impermanent, other characteristics attributed to him vitiate that definition.(66) As rGyal tshab rightly notes, Devendrabuddhi takes the line in question as further proof that a permanent authoritative cognition is impossible; indeed, he takes it as the reason why a permanent cognizer cannot depend on conditions, that is, because he cannot be helped in any way (being, by definition,

permanent and self-sufficient).(67) If ii`svara's not being helped is taken in this way, as further proof that he cannot be a permanent cognizer, then the line, "There cannot be an impermanent authoritative (being)," stands alone, as a simple assertion that a being defined as permanent simply cannot be impermanent--although impermanence is the nature of objects, and so of cognitions, too.

VI. DHARMAKIIRTI'S REFUTATION OF A THEISTIC SYLLOGISM

Dharmakiirti next addresses himself to a specific formal inference that is alleged to prove the existence of a creator. First, he sets out the syllogism:

(10a:) (Because of) intermittence, particular shape, Efficiency, etc., (a creator exists).(68)

The unnamed opponent here may be the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika, for, to our knowledge, of all the Hindu theistic schools, only the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika had, by Dharmakiirti's time, sought to justify the creatorship of ii`svara through formal inference. Furthermore, the syllogism here phrased in rather skeletal form by Dharmakiirti bears a close similarity to the arguments proffered by Uddyotakara, who insisted that worldly results required a conscious motivator, like a hatchet, whose fashioning and use both point to the intervention of a conscious agent.(69) The syllogism also recalls Bhaavaviveka's unnamed opponent, who argued that all results require a creator because they have a specific arrangement, like a pot, whose arrangement informs us of the existence of a potter.(70)

Commentarial glosses on Dharmakiirti's presentation of the theistic syllogism make it clear that, in fact, three different reasons are being offered as probative of

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a creator. rGyal tshab, thus, restates the syllogism more fully as follows: "Worldly environs, bodies and enjoyments are preceded by the mind of a maker, (a) because they act intermittently, like a hatchet, (b) because they have a particular shape, like a pot and (c) because they

are efficient (in fulfilling beings' aims), like a battle-axe." From these and other such statements, it is proven that (abodes, bodies and possessions) have a maker whose mind has preceded them, and also that that (maker) is ii`svara.(71)

The argument from intermittence makes the claim that because entities sometimes function and sometimes do not, their existence must be due to action by a conscious agent. The argument from particular shape makes the claim that, quite simply, design implies a designer, and there is a design to entities, so there must be a designer. The argument from efficiency makes the claim that the observed efficiency of entities requires that they be preceded by an efficient maker who foresaw the purposes they could fulfill. Dharmakiirti does not turn to the arguments from intermittence and efficiency until later in his discussion, where he will reject them as part of his refutation of the causal agency attributed to ii`svara. He will address himself first and in most detail to the argument from particular shape.

Dharmakiirti's first move in refuting the syllogism, however, is to state generally the problems it entails:

(10b:) (Here,) either (a) the assertion is already proven, or (b) the example is uncertain, Or (c) the statement issues in doubt.(72)

According to rGyal tshab, (a) the assertion is already proven because the syllogism simply states that "environs, bodies and enjoyments are preceded by the mind of a maker," and this general concomitance will be accepted by the Buddhist, too, since, according to the Buddhist, environs, bodies, and enjoyments are preceded by mental karman, hence by "the mind of a maker." One of the requisites for posing a formal inference is that it seek to prove something not proven before, so the theistic syllogism is, in its general form, redundant. Furthermore, if ii`svara in particular is posited as the conscious creator, then (b) the example is uncertain, because all three examples--the hatchet, the pot, and the battle-axe--are impermanent entities, which must, therefore, be made or employed by impermanent beings, whereas the entity to whose existence they are supposed to point, ii`svara, is permanent. The examples, thus, may be probative of impermanent causes, but not of a permanent one.

Finally, (c) the statement issues in doubt, because even if environs, bodies, and enjoyments are preceded by a maker, there is no guarantee that that maker is ii`svara, for ii`svara is simply one possible explanation for the way things are--and not a very promising one, given that, for example, the entities whose explanation is sought are impermanent and intermittent, while ii`svara is permanent, and so cannot be intermittent.(73)

Dharmakiirti now turns to an analysis of the argument from particular shape,

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that is, that environs, bodies, and enjoyments have preceding them the mind of a maker(ii`svara), because they have particular shape, like a pot, or a mansion:

(11:) (If) shape, etc., are proved such as to be Positively and negatively related to a designer, An inference from that (shape to that designer) Is reasonable.(74)

Much of the force of this statement is derived by implication. According to rGyal tshab, the main point is this: if, and only if, environs, bodies, and enjoyments are shaped just as a pot is, can we infer that they are preceded by a single conscious designer, as a pot is. "Shaped as a pot is" can have two different meanings here: the arrangement of the material of the pot, and the process whereby that arrangement was achieved. By either interpretation, "particular shape is found to be a reason that is unproven in the subject ("environs, bodies, and enjoyments") . First of all, it is perfectly self-evident that environs, bodies, and enjoyments do not have the same shape as a pot (or a mansion), and so we cannot necessarily infer that they have a maker in the same way that a pot does, for it is entirely possible that different particular types of shapes may have different particular types of causes generating them. Indeed, a Buddhist will argue that such things as environs, bodies, and enjoyments actually have preceding them a multiplicity of mental karmans, not a single creator-designer. Secondly, the mere fact that a particular shape, a pot, arises from a single conscious designer does not mean that different shapes or different types of shapes need

necessarily arise in the same way; again, the Buddhist will posit mental karmans as the cause and will claim that, although consciousness may be involved in producing karmic effects, conscious design is not. Thus, unless the theist wants to claim, absurdly, that all entities are shaped just as a pot is, he cannot make inferences about them that are based on the particular circumstances of the pot.(75)

Dharmakiirti turns now from an examination of "part- icular shape" to "shape in general," to see whether it may be probative:

(12:) (A quality) is proven in an entity by a particular (reason), (But that) a term similar (to the reason is probative) because of its (alleged) nondifference (from the reason) Cannot reasonably be inferred; (That would be) like (inferring) fire from a grey substance.(76)

Here, the theist's problem is that if he tries to claim the term "shape" in general (rather than the particular shape of, for example, a pot) as probative, he has provided a reason that is too general, and thus unproven in the subject. Granted, we legitimately apply the term "shaped" to environs, bodies, and enjoyments, but whereas we are able to infer that a pot or a mansion has preceding it the mind of some person, because we have observed positive and negative concomitance

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between these objects and a maker, we have not observed such concomitance in the case of, for example, the particular realms into which we are born, the bodies we have, and the environment that we share, with its mountains, seas, and forests. Thus, a particular designer is proven in the cases of some particular shapes, but one cannot generalize from this that any object to which the word "shaped" applies necessarily must have a similar designer, for the sources of the shapes of differing shaped objects may very well differ. Thus, just as the term "grey substance" (of which smoke is only one type) is too general to be the basis of a legitimate inference of the presence of fire in a particular place, so the term "shape" alone is too general to be the basis of

a legitimate inference that all shaped objects must arise in the same way that some shaped objects do.(77)

Dharmakiirti draws out the extreme consequences entailed by the probative value of "shape" by pointing out that:

(13:) If that is not the case, then a potter May be proven to have made an ant-hill, Because it has some (similarity) to the shape Of clay in a pot, etc.(78)

The example is an interesting one, because it can be read as refuting the probative value of either a particular shape or the general term "shape," the particular aspects of shape analyzed in the two preceding verses. First, an anthill--at least of the Indian variety--has the same shape as a pot. We ought, therefore, to conclude on the basis of this similarity that it was made by a potter, whereas we know quite well that it was made by ants. Thus, a similarity in shape does not imply a necessary similarity in origin. Second, even if an anthill were nor shaped like a pot, the general fact that it is "shaped" has no probative value for the theistic syllogism. Indeed, if anything, the anthill is a counter-example to the pot, since it is an instance of a shaped object, yet it is one that we know by observation to be positively and negatively concomitant with causes that are (a) multiple rather than single and (b) very possibly unconscious rather than conscious.(79) In short, then, the term "shape" cannot be probative, because specific inquiries into its meaning and relevance show that a particular shape (for example, a pot) cannot be probative because not all objects have that particular shape, while shape in general cannot be probative because different shapes may arise under different circumstances, as an anthill arises in a different manner from a pot.

In the next six verses (numbers 14-20) Dharmakiirti digresses in a direction that is more of logical than theological interest, and I will pass over this discussion relatively quickly. Against an opponent's suggestion that the analysis to which he has subjected the reason in the theistic syllogism is an instance of kaaryasama, an overly specific refutation that can rebound upon or have "equal results" for the

refuter, Dharmakiirti points out that kaaryasama occurs only when a legitimate general reason is illegitimately undermined by an overly specific

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analysis of its details,(80) as when the generally valid inference "A conch-sound is a result, because it arises from effort" is undermined by posing a sophistic dilemma whereby a sound cannot arise before the effort or as a result of a new, unprecedented effort.(81) The refutation of the theistic reason, on the other hand, has rested on the principle that a reason may be probative of a predicate for a particular class of objects, but that a term lexically similar but semantically different from that reason cannot thus be probative; one cannot, for instance, maintain that words have horns simply because there exists a term, gotva, that denotes both "cowness" and "wordness"(82)--any more than one can maintain that environs, bodies, and enjoyments are preceded by the mind of a creator, ii`svara, simply because they have "shape."(83) Dharmakiirti drives home the consequences of the theistic syllogism by pointing out that if words alone were probative, then simply by uttering a word one ought to attain its object, and all goals would be achieved, and all syllogisms proved, simply through the manipulation of words--which, in fact, arise not from the existence of their referents, but simply from a speaker's or writer's desire to express them.(84)

This same type of refutation, Dharmakiirti adds, can be applied to the syllogisms of other schools. For instance, the Saa.mkhya assertion, "Buddhi is nonsentient, because it is impermanent," is refuted on the grounds that the Saa.mkhya is using a reason, impermanence, that he himself cannot really accept, since impermanence only is admitted of momentary entities, which buddhi and the other evolutes of prak.rti are not. The Jaina assertion, "A tree is sentient, because it dies when its bark is stripped," is refuted on the grounds that the definition of death being applied by the Jaina is too broad to be admissible by his opponents, and thus cannot be adduced.(85) In both cases, words ("impermanence," "death") are used improperly, and so the syllogism is vitiated.

In the next three verses (and a supplemental verse

found in Tibetan but not Sanskrit), Dharmakiirti goes on to draw from these considerations some general conclusions about logical reasons. In the first place, the validity of a reason depends on whether it is generally relevant to the subject and positively and negatively concomitant with the predicate. If the reason is generally correct, then it cannot be undermined by overly specific critiques, as, for instance, the fact that "sound is impermanent because it is a product" cannot be refuted by attempting to show that sound's relationship to space is unaccounted for.(86) Further, even if a particular term is unproven, if the meaning of the term is proven then the syllogism is valid, as, for instance, the Buddhist syllogism "Atoms are impermanent because they have aspects (muurti)" will be accepted for discussion by a Vai`se.sika, who does not admit the wording of the reason "have aspects," but can supply from his own system a term with equivalent meaning, "is tangible."(87) Conversely, even if a word is unmistaken, if the meaning is inappropriate, then the term cannot be probative, for entities are proven from other entities, not from Words.(88) The Tibetan version here adds an example illustrating this last point: one cannot argue that either (a) "A colored cow is a cow because it is a `goer

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(jagat)'," or (b) "A baby elephant is an elephant because it is an `hand-possessor' (hastin)'," for in each instance the reason is merely an expression used colloquially to refer to the predicate, a cow or an elephant; in fact, there are "goers" that are not cows and "hand-possessors" that are not elephants.(89) By the same token, there are shapes that presuppose a single, conscious shaper, but there are shapes that may not. Hence, the theistic syllogism is invalid.

VII. DHARMAKIIRTI'S REJECTION OF II`SVARA AS CAUSAL AGENT

In the final eight verses of his discussion, Dharmakiirti directly attacks the idea that ii`svara can be considered a causal entity, exposing the logical difficulties involved in the theistic belief in a permanent creator-God. In the course of his analysis, he refutes the two other reasons that formed part of the theistic syllogism, that is, the argument from intermittence and the argument from efficiency. He does not refute them in as much detail

as he did the argument from specific shape, but they are central to his concerns. We will signal those passages in which they are addressed, since the refutation of the arguments from intermittence and efficiency will complete the refutation of the theistic syllogism posed in verse 10.

Dharmakiirti first attempts to show that the argument from intermittence entails a logical contradiction:

(21:) How, if an entity is a cause, (But is said) sometimes to be A non-cause, can one assert in any way That a cause is a non-cause? One cannot so assert.(90)

The argument from intermittence states that the fact that entities sometimes arise and sometimes do not, that is, are occasional or intermittent in nature, requires the postulation of a conscious being that serves as their cause at those times when they arise, and that that being is ii`svara. Dharmakiirti points out, however, that a being that serves as the cause of intermittent entities must, by definition, be a noncause, too, since (a) an intermittent entity has times of nonproduction, when its eventual cause is actually its noncause, and (b) at the time when the cause is generating the intermittent entity, there still are other intermittent entities that it is not generating, so it serves as the noncause of some entities at the same time as it serves as the cause of others. (a) Successive causality and noncausality poses a problem because the causal entity posited by the theist, ii`svara, is permanent. He cannot, therefore, change from moment to moment, and if he is asserted to be causal, then he must always be causal, and can never become noncausal, for that would entail a change in nature, an impossibility for a permanent entity. (b) Simultaneous causality and noncausality poses a problem, because ii`svara is a single entity, yet is being furnished with contradictory qualities at one and the same time. Contradictory properties cannot be predicated of a single, partless

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entity at one and the same time, and if these properties are reaffirmed, then ii`svara cannot be single, but must be multiple.(91) II`svara cannot, thus, be a creator of intermittent entities.(92)

Dharmakiirti next turns to a series of problems that revolve around the theistic contention that ii`svara is the actual empowering cause that gives to the causes we observe the ability--or efficiency--whereby they yield their results. The first dilemma entailed by this is that:

(22:) (If ii`svara is an unseen cause, then) when Caitra is healed By connection with a weapon or medicine, Why could not an unconnected post, Although not cognized, be the cause (of healing)?(93)

Dharmakiirti's attack here is directed at the postulation of an extra causal entity in situations where we already can provide an adequate account of the causal process. For instance, it is to Dharmakiirti a well-attested fact that a knife wound can be healed by medicine or by the knife itself, the latter being an instance of what Nagatomi calls "homeopathic magic."(94) If we are to posit a further unseen cause behind the observed causes, then why not claim that an unseen, irrelevant post be involved in the process?(95) One invisible entity, Dharmakiirti implies, is really no more absurd than another, and the postulation of any such entity tends to make a mockery of our attempts to understand causality, for the implication is that anything may be posited as the cause of any result.

Dharmakiirti presses the attack, pointing out further problems in the concept of ii`svara:

(23:) One whose nature does not vary Is unsuitable as a creator; Since a permanent (entity) never is absent, Even if it has the ability (to be a cause), it is difficult to see.(96)

The first half of the verse is, in a sense, a reiteration of a fundamental and recurring argument, namely, that a permanent entity cannot be posited as the cause of impermanent entities, since (a) the entity is asserted sometimes to be a noncause, and its nature cannot change, so it cannot become a cause;(97)(b) causality is a process that involves intermittence, and a permanent entity cannot be intermittent, since intermittence involves a change in nature; and (c) if a permanent cause is posited,

then causality cannot be an intermittent process, but must occur all at once, since a permanent cause could not alter so as to produce entities in a second moment. The second half of the verse raises still another basic objection, namely, that if ii`svara is the unseen cause of every result, then he must be ubiquitous and can never be absent. A cause, however, is defined as that in the absence of which a result does not arise, so an entity that never is absent cannot meaningfully be described as a cause. Indeed, whether ii`svara is only intermit-

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tently present (as argued earlier) or ubiquitous (as his nature would seem to dictate) seems to have little actual bearing on our analyses of causality, which, in fact, turn on the presence or absence of certain observable factors. One may, if one wishes, posit an extra entity such as ii`svara as the cause behind observable causes, but positive and negative concomitance can only be observed with regard to the observed causes. Since observed positive and negative concomitance is an adequate basis for the explication of any causal situation, the extra "behind-the-scenes" cause (whether principal or assistant) must be either redundant or impotent.(98)

There is a further consequence of the postulation of an invisible cause-behind-the-scenes, namely:

(24:) When some (cause) exists, some (result) comes to be; If some cause other than that Is supposed, then there will be no end To the causes of any result.(99)

rGyal tshab sums up this point succinctly by remarking that:

There would follow an infinite regress of causes for every result, because then it would be acceptable to think that when some cause assists a result, the cause of the result is something else, which we do not see as being able to generate some result.(100)

Once again, then, the postulation of an unseen cause destabilizes our notion of causality, for the admission of unseen and unseeable causes opens the door to an infinity of such causes, which is

tantamount to causal chaos. Here, it ought perhaps to be added in all fairness that the Buddhist notion of karman can be subjected to the same general critique as ii`svara. Karman is certainly neither permanent nor ubiquitous in the way that ii`svara is, but it is an unseen causal factor that is operative in virtually every situation in which sentient beings are involved. In those instances where other causes can be adduced, karman is superfluous, unless we insist that there be a moral explanation for everything; while in those instances where we do not have adequate explanations, karman serves somewhat the way the "God of the gaps" does in Western theology, that is, as a stop-gap explanation where observable concomitances have not yet been established. Karman, like ii`svara, explains so much that it threatens to explain nothing at all.

In the final four verses of the section, Dharmakiirti responds to some possible objections to his arguments, thereby clarifying his notion of the causal process and ii`svara's unsuitability for participation in it. The first objection, as supplied by rGyal tshab, claims that, "... according to you, when soil, etc., do not generate a sprout, they cannot change their nature, so there will be no generation of a sprout." (101) In other words, if entities cannot change their nature from that of noncause to cause, then soil, moisture, sunlight, and the seed itself, which are

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not at this moment generating a sprout, will never be able to. Dharmakiirti's response is that:

(25:) In the generation of a sprout, the soil and other (conditions) Do change their nature And become causes, for when we see that (cultivation) Is done well, (the harvest) is excellent.(102)

The implicit point here is that it is only a permanent entity, such as ii`svara, that cannot become a cause once it has been a noncause; such causal conditions as soil, moisture, sunlight, and the seed are all impermanent, momentary entities, so there is no contradiction in asserting that at one moment they are noncauses and at another moment they

are causes. Indeed, such must be the case, for we observe that soil and the other conditions do serve as noncauses at one time (early in the season) and as causes at another, later time (harvest).(103)Conversely, it might be added, the fact that it clearly is the case that entities can change from noncauses into causes is a further demonstration of their necessary impermanence, since a permanent entity could not thus change.

Dharmakiirti next entertains and answers a related objection:

(26:) If you say, "Just as object and organ, Meeting without alteration, cause cognition, So, too, (ii`svara is a cause without alteration,)" it is not so. Because there is alteration (of organ and object) from when (they have not met).(104)

The objector here evidently is a Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika, for the account of cognition being offered derives from the Nyaavasuutra,(105) where it is said that cognition results from the contact between an organ and an object. The claim is made that just as organ and object do not perceptibly change from one moment to the next, and yet in the first moment there is no cognition while in the second there is, so ii`svara, although he does not change, can be a noncause one moment and--our nonperception notwithstanding--a cause the next. The Buddhist has two possible responses, one doctrinal, the other logical. The doctrinal is that the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika account of the cognitive process is incorrect, and that there is a third factor that determines a cognition, namely, a previous cognition, whose presence or absence and particular qualities must be posited to explain the evident fact that--even if organ and object are admitted not to vary--cognitions do vary.(106) Alternatively, if the opponent be taken as accepting the Buddhist postulation of three conditions for cognition, then the logical objection can be made that, at the very least, the organ must vary, for otherwise we could not explain the relative clarity or dullness of cognitions.(107)

A further logical objection, of course, is simply that the postulation of an entity's noncausality at one time and causality at another requires that there be

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an alteration, because between a cause and a noncause there is a difference, a difference that can only be explained by positing an alteration in nature. Thus, Dharmakiirti adds:

(27:) (Factors) that are individually powerless (as causes), If they do not change their nature, Will be powerless even when they meet. Thus, alteration is proved.(108)

In the instance of the organ, object, and cognition, the three factors are considered individually unable but collectively able to generate a cognition. Dharmakiirti's point, however, is that regardless of whether they are functioning individually or collectively, the three factors cannot be causally potent if it is not admitted that their nature changes--for the simple reason that previously they have been a noncause, and in order to be efficacious, they must change in nature so as to become a cause. Thus, according to rGyal tshab:

...it is proven that the three conditions have different natures when they have met and when they have not met, because we see the difference that they generate or do not generate sense-cognition when they have met or have not met.(109)

Dharmakiirti concludes his refutation with a final observation of the incompatibility between the concept of cause and the concept of ii`svara--here named for the first time as the object of refutation:

(28:) Thus, those (factors) that are individually powerless (But bring about) the existence of the quality (of the result) when they have met Are causes; ii`svara, etc., Are not (causes), because they do not alter.(110)

Causality, then, is a process entailing not only the presence or absence of certain factors (whereby, as we saw, ii`svara could not be considered a cause), but also the alteration of those factors in such a way that they change from being noncauses to being causes. Thus, the generation of a sprout requires (a) the presence of certain factors that might not be

present, that is, the seeds, soil, moisture, sunlight, and so forth, and(b) the alteration of the nature of each of these so that their individual causal nonefficacity becomes their collective efficacity. Similarly, a sense-cognition requires (a) the object, organ, and preceding cognition and (b) an alteration of each of these such that individual nonefficacity can become collective efficacity. Now, this alteration is not some superadded process beyond the meeting of the conditions, but it must be specified as part of the causal process, for without such specification, one might overlook the ontological difference that is entailed by causality. Difference, in turn, requires impermanence, for entities are known sometimes to be causes and sometimes to be noncauses of particular events, but it is contradictory that they be both at the

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same time, while a permanent entity, like ii`svara, cannot alter its nature, and so it must always be a noncause or always a cause. If it is always a noncause, then the discussion is academic; if it is always a cause, then it must be ubiquitous, and it cannot be accepted as a cause, because its presence or absence cannot be observed to make a difference in the generation of a result.

Before leaving Dharmakiirti, we ought to note that he adduces one additional argument against ii`svara, later in the Pramaa.nasiddhi chapter, when he insists (following the line of reasoning of such predecessors as Vasubandhu(111) ) that the cause of the various sufferings experienced by beings cannot be a unique cause, because the variety among results permits us only to infer a variety of causes, and because, as has been demonstrated, a permanent cause cannot be proven to exist.(112) rGyal tshab, finally, adds his own version of the argument from evil, at the end of his discussion of the vital and trivial characteristics of omniscience that may be attributed to "authoritative" beings: "If someone who can make anything because of his knowledge of the sciences is omniscient, then he also has made the sufferings of the lower realms...." With this in mind, rGyal tshab concludes, we should turn not to such a being, but to "someone who, having accomplished the elimination of every last fetter, is omniscient regarding how all objects really exist."(113) The latter sort of being

is one who truly is authoritative for those intent on liberation, and is, of course, exemplified by the Buddha, who has not made the world, but knows it, and knows the way out of it.

VIII. THE THEIST-ATHEIST DEBATE AFTER DHARMAKIIRTI

Dharmakiirti's attack on theism was a stinging one, but it did not end the debate between theists and atheists any more than did Hume's critique in the West. Indeed, as noted earlier, Dharmakiirti's discussions had the salutary effect of raising the discussion to a new level of sophistication, and in the centuries following him the issue was joined not only by Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas responding to his attacks, but by still other Buddhists, as well as by Miimaa.msakas and Jainas. These debates have been covered well elsewhere,(114) and we have neither the need nor the space to outline them in detail. We will, however, survey them briefly.

The Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika response to Dharmakiirti's critique was far from immediate. Indeed, it was nearly three centuries after Dharmakiirti, in the Nyaayama~n- jarii of Jayanta Bha.t.ta, that a counterattack finally was mounted. In the meantime, further critiques of theism had been forthcoming, not only from Buddhists, but from Miimaa.msakas and Jainas, as well. The first important post-Dharmakiirti Buddhist attack on theism is that of `Saantideva (eighth century) , who criticizes a number of non-Buddhist views of causality in the ninth chapter of his Bodhicaryaavataara. Among these is the Naiyaayika claim that ii`svara, a divine, pure, permanent, single creator, is the source of everything. But, notes `Saantideva, if ii`svara is identified with the elements that are accepted as the material causes of material things, there is a contradiction, because these elements are neither pure nor permanent nor single. On the other hand, if he is said

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to be the creator of the permanent padaarthas that constitute the world according to Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika, then there is a problem, because permanent entities cannot have an origin, while if worldly phenomena are granted impermanence, then they cannot be accounted for by a permanent, single entity.(115) The remainder of `Saantideva's argument recapitulates earlier

Buddhist analyses of the problems entailed by ii`svara's permanence, his need for assistants, and his creation with or without a desire to do so.(l16)

A century later, in the Tattvasa.mgraha, `Saantarak.sita criticized creation theories centering on both ii`svara and puru.sa(117)--though the characteristics of puru.sa are not those of the Saa.mkhya puru.sa, but of the Vedaantin brahman. Together with Kamala`siila's Pa~njikaa, the Tattvasa.mgraha probably is the most detailed extant Buddhist critique of theism. Much of the section on ii`svara recapitulates and expands upon Dharmakiirti's refutation of the theistic syllogism, although `Saantarak.sita does add points of his own. For example, to Aviddhakara.na's claim that the simultaneous functioning of two senses must be explained by recourse to a conjunctive substratum and that, by analogy, so must the combinations of the world be explained by the concept of ii`svara, he replies that it is unproven either that there can be two simultaneously functioning senses, or that the category of "conjunction" (sa.myoga) is admissible.(118) `Saantarak.sita also points out that ii`svara cannot be the source of a verbal revelation, for the simple reason that he has no body, hence no mouth, and verbal communication is dependent on the existence of a mouth.(119) The critique of puru.sa centers on the dilemma posed by puru.sa's (a) motives (if he is motivated by another, he is not self-sufficient; if he is motivated by compassion, he must create a perfect world, while if he cannot create a perfect world, he is not powerful; and if he is motivated by "amusement," then he is both cruel and dependent on the instrument of amusement, namely, the cosmos)(120) and (b) potency (if he is able to create all things, he must do so immediately, for potency entails immediate generation).(121)

Attacks on theism also were launched by the two great theoreticians of Miimaa.msa, Prabhaakara and Kumaarila (seventh-eighth centuries). Motivated in part by their idiosyncratic concern to show that the Vedas are without an author (which ii`svara sometimes was said to be) , the Miinaa.msakas adduced some refutations that overlapped those of the Buddhists, and others that were unique. Of note among the latter were arguments that raised questions of whether ii`svara can be said to have a body or not: we know that creative agency within the world requires a body. If ii`svara is to be proved by analogy to

worldly creativity, he must have a body, yet he is claimed by Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika tradition to be bodiless-- although we know that will alone cannot generate results: some physical agency is required. If ii`svara is admitted to have a body, then various consequences ensue: for instance, if ii`svara has a body, whence has that body come? If it is from another creator, then that creator's body must have a creator, and so on, in infinite regress; if from himself, then he must have had a body with which to create that body, which must have had a preceding body--again, there is an infinite regress.

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Further, of what could ii`svara's body be made? It cannot be made of material elements, because they have not been created yet, while it cannot be immaterial, because the immaterial cannot be the cause of the material.(122) Jaina critiques of theism, as in the eighth-century .Sa.ddar`sanasamuccaya of Haribhadra, the thirteenth-century Syaadvaadama~njarii of Mallisena and the fifteenth-century Tarkarahasyadii- pikaa of Gu.naratna, are easily as sophisticated as those of the Buddhists and Miimaa.msakas, and open some interesting areas of discussion, but cannot detain us here.(123)

As noted above, the first concerted Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika counterattack is contained in the tenth-century Nyaavama~njarii of Jayanta Bha.t.ta, who states the theistic syllogism in the following form: ii`svara exists because he produces a result (the cosmos) of a type that presupposes a maker who knows the process and motive of production, like a potter. Jayanta considers at least twelve different arguments against the existence of ii`svara, most of them familiar, such as the inadequacy of the potter analogy, the problems entailed by ii`svava's embodiment or bodilessness, questions of motive, and the superiority of "impersonal" explanations, such as karman. Jayanta sets out to demonstrate that his various opponents' disproofs are themselves riddled with logical flaws. The assertion, for instance, that natural objects do not necessarily have a conscious designer is itself uncertain, and thus cannot be adduced as a good logical reason refuting the theistic reason, while the theistic argument by analogy is valid because in those instances where we have observed an object's source of design, that

source has been a conscious designer. Thus, all effects can be deduced to arise from a conscious designer, including the world itself. Jayanta reasserts ii`svara's noncorporeality, maintaining that his will can activate physical results in the same way that the human will can activate the body; in either case, an immaterial agency does have material effects. II`svara's compassion is justified by explaining that he creates, for example, hell only as a sort of "holding-cell" for beings until their karman permits their salvation. Finally, the view, for example, that "collective" karman rather than a single designer is the cause of the natural environmt is rejected on the grounds that human responses to the environment are too varied (some people love the mountains, others do not) to enable us to posit such karmic "cooperation."(124)

Other Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika defenses of theism included those of Vyoma`siva's tenth-century Vyomavatii, which reiterates the point that an effect presupposes an intelligent designer, and reaffirms that the cosmos presupposes a powerful and omniscient designer,(125) and Vaacaspatimi`sra's tenth-century Nyaayavaarttika- taatparya.tiikaa, where it is argued that the law of parsimony (laaghava) requires that the creation of the various entities of nature be attributed to one, rather than a multiplicity of, divinities, and that such a divinity must be inconceivably powerful and knowledgeable to be able to effect such a creation.(126)

The Buddhist position was reaffirmed in the eleventh century by J~naana`sriimitra, whose II`svaravaada is in part an expanded commentary on some of

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Dharmakiirti's discussion, and by J~naana`srii's disciple, Ratnakiirti, in his II`svarasaadhanaduu.sa.na. (127) It was in response to J~naana`sriimitra's attack, described by Chemopathy(128) as the most thorough since Dharmakiirti, that the last great Nyaaya- Vai`se.sika defense of theism, Udayana's Nyaayakusu- maa~njali, was composed. Udayana's work is complex and sophisticated enough to have been the subject of a number of scholarly monographs,(129) and I will not discuss it here, pausing only to note that it includes detailed attempts to refute other schools' attacks on ii`svara, and sets out two series of

positive proofs, the first (consisting of nine proofs) demonstrating ii`svara's existence, and the second (also nine proofs) demonstrating his authorship of the Vedas. The first series of arguments, though a brilliant synthesis, does not add a great deal to earlier Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika discussions; the second series is quite original, but is directed primarily at the Miimaa.msakas, and would be considered irrelevant by a naastika such as a Buddhist or Jaina. The Nyaayakusumaa~njali itself stimulated counterattacks, from the Vedaanta school of Raamaanuja and, eventually, in the last great classical work of the theist-atheist debate, Gu.naratna's Tarkarahasyadiipikaa.(130)

IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS

By way of conclusion, I want to address myself briefly to two somewhat broader questions that naturally emerge from our considerations of the theological disputes engaged in by Dharmakiirti and other Indian philosophers. The first question is: To what degree are the arguments of Dharmakiirti (or, for that matter, any of his supporters or antagonists) philosophically conclusive within an Indian frame of reference? The second question is: To what degree can these Indian theological discussions be transposed onto the atheist-antitheist debate as it has unfolded in the West?

In principle, the various Indian philosophers who argued back and forth about the existence of ii`svara accepted a common set of rules for their discussions, and so deciding who was right and who was wrong ought to be a simple matter of seeing who begs the fewest questions and who constructs syllogisms with the most care. Such decisions only can be simple, however, if (a) the rational structures devised for discussion are themselves foolproof and (b) the disputants do not import any idiosyncratic doctrinal notions into intersystemic discussions. In point of fact, however, (a) the reliability of formal inference--either in principle or, at least, for deciding metaphysical questions--was attacked even from within the Indian tradition, by such thinkers as Naagaarjuna, `Sa^nkara, Jayaraa`si and Purandara, who claimed either that the positing and structuring of pramaa.nas could not themselves be supported by any pramaa.na without begging the question, or that inference, even if accepted as provisionally valid, could not inform us on matters forever beyond

perceptual ken. Further, (b) very real differences in the ways in which different schools approached philosophical problems tended invariably to color even the most carefully "depersonalized" of

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arguments. Indeed, I think that discussions of the existence or nonexistence of ii`svara serve as a good example of the inevitability of such coloration.

If we strip away the almost bewildering variety of arguments we have reviewed, we find at bottom two basic issues on which--to take our two main antagonists--the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas and Buddhists have disagreed: (1) the existence of a permanent entity and its relation to the impermanent and (2) the requirement that causal action entail a conscious agent. Many complex philosophical discussions turn on these two issues, yet it might be argued that the attitudes toward each entertained by each of the schools is, in fact, prephilosophical, and thus not essentiaIly amenable to revision on the basis of rational considerations.

(1) The permanence-impermanence issue is one that goes very far back and very deep in the Indian tradition. Much of the religious and philosophical search that produced both the Upani.sads and Buddhism was geared toward the discovery of an immutable state that was free from the vicissitudes of sa.msaara, yet in searching for and explicating this state, Hindu and Buddhist schools arrived at very different conclusions. Hindu schools, of which Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika is one, concluded on the basis of religious experience and logic that the impermanent entities we see around us must in some way be subsumed or limited by an eternal substance that provides their continuity, the continuity that we know to be the basis of order in the cosmos. Buddhists, on the other hand, concluded on the basis of their empirical and logical explorations that there is not, nor could there possibly be, a permanent substance, for such a substance can neither change itself nor interact with the impermanent. Thus, the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika (or Vedaantin) insistence on the necessity of permanence to explain continuity, and the Buddhist insistence on the necessity of impermanence to explain change are deep-seated and seemingly irreconcilable positions,

and, much like a Kantian antinomy, each seems logically to exclude the other and yet, when taken alone, to lead to insuperable difficulties. To the degree that the dispute over permanence and impermanence is one of the core issues in discussions of ii`svara, those discussions may be impossible to resolve.

(2) The question whether cause-and-effect requires a conscious agent also seems rooted in prephilosophical decisions that commit the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas and Buddhists to irreconcilable positions. Here, I think the problem may be the source for the model of causality that each school constructs. Buddhist meditation and Buddhist logic tend to be radically depersonalized, that is, to deconstruct personal notions into impersonal processes much like those we observe among nonsentient entities. Thus, causality is not even a "personal" process on the level of the sentient individual, who actually is a nexus of impersonal forces, some material and some mental; and, needless to say, nonsentient entities do not require a personal agent, either. The Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas, on the other hand--their "atomism" notwithstanding--tend to draw their model of causality from human

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activities: movement of the body is preceded (usually) by a conscious intention, a pot by a potter, a house by an architect and builders. By analogy, then, we conclude that other objects in nature--whose sources we do not know--must also arise through personal agency, and so, by extension, must the overall arrangement of the world; an agent responsible for the overall arrangement of the world must be a vastly powerful and knowledgeable being, such as ii`svara. Once again, the antagonists seem to have arrived at completely antithetical positions by beginning from different places, and it is difficult to see where a common ground could be found.

Thus, Indian arguments over the existence or nonexistence of ii`svara have their inherent fascinations, and yet we must remain aware that they may not be finally soluble, for the simple reason that, despite their agreement on the meanings of many terms, the disputants have vastly different approaches to some basic problems, and this disparity

of approaches threatens to render the arguments on which they are based forever inconclusive.

Let us turn, then, to the second general question with which we began this section, that of the applicability of the Indian discussion to the Western debate over the existence of God. One must, needless to say, be very cautious in entertaining such comparisons, for concepts that seem identical in two different cultural-philosophical traditions more often than not are revealed on closer examination to be quite different, both in denotation and connotation. Certainly, the frequent translation of ii`svara as "God" seems at first blush to be legitimate, for are not the basic characteristics of ii`svara--permanence, omniscience, independence, creatorship, compassion--very much like the attributes of the Christian God? A closer examination, however, reveals that there are considerable differences between the Christian God and most of the Indian models. The brahman of most Vedaantin schools, for instance, transforms itself into the world, is the world's material cause, whereas the Christian God does not become the world, but, rather, creates it ex nihilo, and remains forever transcendent to it. The paramapuru.sa that is ii`svara in the Yoga system does not create the world, or arrange it, or relate to it in any way, whereas the Christian God does all three. The ii`svara of Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika does not create the eternal padaarthas that constitute the world, although he does arrange them into the cosmos that we know, whereas the Christian God creates both the "raw material" and the arrangement of the cosmos.

These considerations,in turn, must be weighed when we decide whether or not to describe the Nyaaya- Vai`se.sika syllogism rejected by Dharmakiirti as simply an Indian version of the "argument from design" (or teleological argument) for God's existence.(131) The Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas, after all, were talking about one type of "God," while the God asserted by, for example, Aquinas and Newton and rejected by, for example, Hume are, in fact, very different; furthermore, the arguments arise in different contexts and are conducted in different philosophical languages.

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All these points are well taken, but they do not

totally undermine the comparison. To begin with, the "languages" of Indian and Western philosophy are different, but that does not mean that there is not a fair degree of translatability across traditions: the inductive and deductive processes generally accepted to be the basis of sound reasoning are found in both, as are many of the same notions of the types of flaws that may vitiate arguments. Secondly, even if there are differences between ii`svara and God, they are not so great as to obviate all comparison between their roles and the arguments for their existence. The argument from design, after all, simply attempts to show generally that the order we perceive in the cosmos presupposes a single conscious designer and/or sustainer of that order. It really is a secondary matter (pace Kant) whether the being responsible for the cosmic order creates ex nihilo or arranges preexistent raw material; in either case, it is not mode of ordering that is at issue, but the existence of a single eternal being who is the conscious agent of that ordering.

Thus, I think it is fair to call the Nyaaya-Vai`se.- sika syllogism rejected by Dharmakiirti an "Indian argument from design, " just as I think it is relarively fair to call ii`svara "God." Therefore, T think that the sorts of arguments proffered by Dharmakiirti and his opponents can be of interest to Western theologians. The precise ways in which the Indian arguments overlap or deviate from the Western ones must be the topic of another study, as must detailed considerations of whether the Indian tradition has arguments that could serve either theists or antitheists in the West.(132) Hume, Kant, and others have given fairly thorough treatment to the problem of conscious agency, and it is my suspicion that it is on the permanence-impermanence issue that the Indian tradition may have the most to contribute. The Buddhist critique of a God believed to be immutable seems to me an acute one, and the price of accepting God's mutability a high one, that is, his susceptibility to conditions, hence loss of omnipotence. There are: of course, currents in modern Christianity, represented by, for example, Hartshorne, or Kazantzakis (in his The Saviors of God), that do not require the omnipotence of God, and admit his dependence on his creatures for the fulfillment of his ends. These would escape the objections raised against a permanent, independent God, though whether they could evade criticisms aimed at the concept of divine teleology (especially those

regarding the admissibility of extraneous causes), I am not so certain. It also is my suspicion, alas, that cross-cultural debates may in the end be no more conclusive than intra-cultural ones have been, and that the arguments, if examined carefully enough, will be seen to rest on prephilosophical choices and assumptions that cannot really be questioned, and yet which vitiate the certainty to which philosophers forever aspire.

This final note of uncertainty can, if we permit it, grow into a more general uncertainty about the "order" we perceive and discover in the cosmos, an order, incidentally, that was assumed by both theists and atheists in India, their only disagreement being over how to account for it. Is it not, in fact, possible that this order simply is not there, that it actually is conceived and invented rather than

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perceived and discovered? This is the possibility entertained in a modern masterwork from Bologna, Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose. At the end, the monk-detective protagonist, William of Baskerville, bemoans to the book's young narrator, Adso, that his "solution" of a series of crimes has been purely accidental, and implies thereby a sort of "argument from no-design":

"I arrived at (the killer) pursuing the plan of a perverse and rational mind, and there was no plan, or, rather, there began a sequence of causes, and concauses, and causes contradicting one another, which proceeded on their own, creating relations that did not stem from any plan. Where is all my wisdom, then? I behaved stubbornly, pursuing a semblance of order, when I should have known well that there is no order in the universe."

"But in imagining an erroneous order you still found something...."

"What you say is very fine, Adso, and I thank you. The order that our mind imagines is like a net, or like a ladder, built to attain something. But afterward you must throw the ladder away, because you discover that, even if it was useful, it was meaningless...."

"You have no reason to reproach yourself: you did your best."

"A human best, which is very little. It's hard to accept the idea that there cannot be an order in the universe because it would offend the free will of God and His omnipotence. So the freedom of God is our condemnation, or at least the condemnation of our pride."

I dared, for the first and last time in my life, to express a theological conclusion: "But how can a necessary being exist totally polluted with the possible? What difference is there, then, between God and primogenial chaos? Isn't affirming God's absolute omnipotence and His absolute freedom with regard to His own choices tantamount to demonstrating that God does not exist?"

William looked at me without betraying any feeling in his features, and he said, "How could a learned man go on communicating his learning if he answered yes to your question?"(133)

NOTES

1. Lin Yutang, ed., The Wisdom of China and India (New York: Modern Library, 1942), p. 11. 2. Compare such "skeptical" Vedic passages as. Rg (.Rgveda) II, 12, 5; IV, 18, 12; and VIII, 100, 3; and their discussion in Depibrasad Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism (Calcutta: Manisha, 1969), pp. 32-43. Chattopadhyaya's book, while occasionally straining for evidence that one or another ambiguous passage is atheistic, presents overall a compelling picture of the pervasiveness of atheism in Indian philosophical (if not religious) 3. Compare Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism, chaps. 9 and 16. 4. Compare, for example, ibid., chap. 14; and Narendranath Bhattacharyya, Jain Philosophy: Historical Outline (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1976), pp. 93-108. 5. Compare, for example, Nagin J. Shah, Akala^nka's Criticism of Dharmakiirti's Philosophy: A Study, L. D. Series no. 11 (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1967); and D. N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism: A Study of the Conflict Between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist Dignaga School (Agra: Agra University, 1964). 6. The Tibetans attribute seven works to him:

Pramaa.navaarttika (hereafter cited as PV) , Pramaa.navini`scaya, Nyaayabindu, Hetubindu, Sambandhapariiki.saa, Samtaanaantarasiddhi and Vadanyaaya. Only the PV and Nyaayabindu are completely extant in Sanskrit; the others exist in Tibetan translation. For a list of editions and translations, compare A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, 2d ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980) ,pp. 539-540.

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7. Complete editions include: Dwarikas Shastri, ed., Pramaa.navaarttika of Acharya Dharmakiirti, with the Commentary "Vritti" of Acharya Manorathaanandin (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968) ; and Y. Miyasaka, ed., Pramaa.navaarttika-Kaarikaa (Sanskrit and Tibetan) , in Acta Indologica 2 (1971-1972), 3 (1973-1975), and 4 (1977). Various parts of the Svaarthaanumaana chapter have been translated; compare Warder, Indian Buddhism, and Leonard Zwilling, Dharmakiirti on Apoha (Unpublished diss., University of Wisconsin, 1976) . The Pramaa.nasiddhi chapter (PS) was translated by Masatoshi Nagatomi in A Study of Dharmakiirti's Pramaa.navaarttika: An English Translation and Annotation of the Pramaa.navaarttika, Book I (Unpublished diss., Harvard University, 1957). I translated rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen's tibetan commentary on the PS chapter as part II of my dissertation, Is Enlightenment Possible? An Analysis of Some Arguments in the Buddhist Philosophical Tradition, With Special Attention to the Pramaa.nasiddhi Chapter of Dharmakiirti's Pramaa.navaarttika (Unpublished diss., University of Wisconsin, 1983). This annotated translation, revised, will be issued in 1986 as Mind, Body, Selflessness, Freedom: Dharmakiirti's Defense of the Buddhist World-View as Expounded in rGyal tshab's "Elucidating the Path to Enlightenment According to the `Pramaa.navaarttika' " (London: Wisdom Publications). 8. George Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology: An Introduction to Udayana's Nyaayakusumaa~njali, Publications of the DeNobili Research Library, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1972), p. 28. 9. Gopimohan Bhattacharyya, Studies in Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika Theism, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, no. 14 (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1961), p. 44. 10. .Rgveda, X, 82, trans., for example, by

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, in Radhakrishnan and Moore, eds., A Source Book in Indian Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 18. 11. .Rgveda, X, 90, in Source Book, p. 19. 12. .Rgveda, X, 121, in Source Book, pp. 24-25. 13. .Rgveda, X, 129, in Source Book, pp. 23-24. 14. Atharvaveda VII, 102, 1 and XIX, 6, 4. Compare Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism (San Francisco, California: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 120; and M. D. Sastri, "History of the Word II`svara and Its Idea," All India Oriental Conference VII (Baroda), pp. 492 ff: 15. Cf. David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 17-18. Kalupahana's summary of pre-Buddhist causation theories is a good one. 16. Compare, for example, B.rhadaaraa.nyaka II, 1, 2-13, and 20; III, 6, in Source Book, pp. 79, 85-86. 17. Compare, `Svetaa`svatara III, 7-10; TV, 1, 1, and so forth, in Source Book, pp. 90-91. 18.`Svetaa`svatara I, 2, in Source Book, p. 89. 19.Bhagavadgiitaa X, 21; XI, 9-35, in Source Book, p. 136, 138-141. 20.Ibid., p. 506; Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), vol. 1, p. 418. Dasgupta notes (pp. 420-421) that most of the early commentators on the Brahmasuutras were quasidualistic Vai.s.navas. Compare also Hajime Nakamura, A History of Early Vedaanta Philosophy, trans. Trevor Leggett and others, Religions of Asia Series, no. 1 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), section IV. 21.Brahmasuutras (hereafter cited as BS) I, i, 2, in Source Book, p. 511. 22.BS I, iv, 3, in Source Book, p. 515. `Sa^nkara's comments here, and at II, i, 6 (ibid., p. 522) indicate that this may be a variant of the cosmological argument, with the existence of the cosmos as a whole pointing to the existence of a cause on which it is contingent. 23.BS I, iv, 23, in Source Book, p. 521. 24.Commentary to BS I, iv, 23, in Source Book. 25.Cf., e.g., Ninian Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), pp. 156-158. 26.Yogasuutra (hereafter cited as YS) 23-28, in Source Book, pp. 458-459.

27.YS 25 and Bhaa.sya, in Source Book, p. 458; Smart(p. 157) argues that this is a modified form of the ontological argument. 28.Nyaayasuutra (hereafter cited as NS) IV, 1, 19-21, trans., eg., by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Nyaaya Philosophy (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1973), IV, pp. 21-26. 29.Compare, for example, Chattopadhyaya, chap. 16; and Karl H. Potter, ed., Encyclopedia of

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Indian Philosophies: Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika up to Ga^nge`sa (Princeton, New jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 100. 30.Compare Potter, Encyclopedia, p. 239. 31.Compare Gangopadhyaya, Nyaava Philosophy, and Potter, Encyclopedia, p. 263. 32.Padaarthadharmasa.mgraha 40; compare Potter, Encyclopedia, p. 285. 33.Nyaayavaarttika IV, 1, 19-21,summarized by Potter, Encyclopedia, pp. 331-333. 34.Nyaayakusumaa~njali, I, 3; compare, for example, Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism p. 21; Potter, Encyclopedia, p. 558. 35.Diighanikaaya (hereafter cited as D) I, 17; compare, for example, Kalupahana, Causality, pp. 20-21; and Helmuth von Glasenapp, Buddhism--A Non-Theistic Religion, trans. Irmgard Schloegl (New York: George Braziller, 1966), pp. 40-41, 144. 36.For example, Majjhimanikaaya II, 222; A^nguttara I, 173; Jaataka V, 238, and so forth; compare, for example, Kalupahana, Causality, p. 22; Glasenapp, Buddhism, pp. 39-40. 37.D II, 11, 81-83; compare Glasenapp, Buddhism, p. 146. 38.D II, 13, 14-20; compare Glasenapp, Buddhism, pp. 146-148. On Nikaaya discussions of God, compare also Gunapala Dharmasiri, A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God (Colombo: Lake House Investments, 1974), passim. 39.Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1928), I, p. 30. 40.Buddhacarita IX, 63; compare E. H. Johnston, The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha (Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), II, p. 136. 41.Buddhacarita XVI, 18 ff.; compare, for example,

Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism, p. 103. 42.Suh.rillekha 50; compare, for example, Geshe Lobsang Tharchin and Artemus B. Engle, Nagarjuna's Letter (Dharamasala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979), pp. 84-86. 43.Catu.hstava II, 33-34; compare Chr. Lindtner, Nagarjuniana, Indiske Studier 4 (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982), pp. 150-151. 44.Bodhicittavivara.na 7-9; compare Lindtner, pp. 186-189. 45.Lindtner, in Nagarjuniana (p. 16), maintains that its attribution to Naagaarjuna is "most probably" false. 46.Compare George Chemparathy, "Two Early Buddhist Refutations of II`svara as the Creator of the Universe, " Wiener Zeitschrift fur Kunst und Orientalische Studien, 22-23, pp. 89-94, 97-99; and Th. Stcherbatsky, Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky, trans. H. C. Gupta, ed. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Soviet Indology Series no. 2 (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1969), pp. 1-16. 47.Mahaavibhaa.sa, TTXXVII, 993b, summarized in Nakamura, History, pp. 147-151. 48.Abhidharmako`sa (hereafter cited as AK ) and -bhaasya II, 64d; compare Louis de la Vallee Poussin, L'Abhidharmako`sa de Vasubandhu (hereafter cited as AV ) (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923-1931), I, pp. 313-315. 49. AK IV, 1. 50.AK VII, 13a; AV VII, pp. 38-39. These characteristics are the last three of the four aspects of the truth of origination, namely, samudaya, prabhava and pratyaya. 51.Yogaacaarabhuumi, pp. 144-5; compare Chemparathy, "Two Early Buddhist Refutations," pp. 86-89,94-96. 52.Bhavya, Madhyamaka-h.rdaya-v.ritti-tarkajvala, III, 9, in Daisetz T. Suzuki, ed., The Tibetan Tripi.taka, Peking Edition (hereafter cited as PTT ) (Tokyo, Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1957) , no. 5256, vol. 96, pp. 49/3/6-50/2/2/. 53.Ibid., pp. 49/5/2-7. 54.For a discussion of this much mooted point, compare Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic (Reprint, New York: Dover, 1962) , 1, pp. 38-39; and Masatoshi Nagatomi, "The Framework of the Pramanavarttika, Book I," Journal of the American Oriental Society 79 (1959): 263, note 1. 55.For a discussion of the way in which these epithets structure the chapter, compare Nagatomi, "The Framework, " and compare also Ernst

Steinkellner, "The spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism, " Nanto Bukkyo 49 (1982): 1-18. 56.Mi pham, Tshad ma rnam `grel gyi gzhung gsal por bshad pa legs bshad snang ba'i gter (Blockprint, Dehradun: Nyingma Monastery, n.d.), p. 257. 57.I am following Miyasaka's numbering here. Shastri numbers two introductory verses that

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Miyasaka does not, so the Shastri number is found by adding 2 to the Miyasaka number. Compare previous note 7, for references. 58. rGyal tshab rje, Rnam-Agrel-Thar-Lam-Gsal-Byed (hereafter cited as GT) (Sarnath: Tibetan Monastery, 1974), vol. i, pp. 238-248. The section on ii`svara is, according to rGyal tshab (p. 239), part of Dharmakiirti's attempt to show the meaning of the word "became" (bhuuta) authoritative: a permanent entity like ii`svara always has been authoritative, and so cannot "become" so. 59. The PV pa~njikaa, or -v.rtti (hereafter cited as PVV) is extant only in Tibetan: PTT no. 5717(b), vol. 130; and sDe dge no. 4217. found at, for example, The Nyingma Edition of the sDe-dge bka '- 'gyur and bsTan-'gyur (Oakland, California: Dharma Press, 1981), vol. 94, fols. 732-746, pp. 184-188. The section on ii`svara is at the end of chapter 11 and the beginning of chap. 12. 60.nitya.m pramaa.na.m naivaasti pramaa.nyaad vastusa^ngate.h / j~neyaanityatayaa tasyaa adhrauvyat kramajanmana.h // nityaad utpattivi`sle.saad apek.saya ayogata.h / (tshad ma rtag pa nyid yod min / dngos yod rtogs pa tshad phyiir dang / shes bya mi rtag pa nyid kyis / de ni mi brtan nyid phyir ro / rim bzhin skye ba can dag ni // rtag las skye ba mi `thad phyir / ltos pa mi rung pa yi phyir /). 61.GT, pp. 239-240; Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible? pp. 564-566. 62. Compare, for example, Shah, chap. 2; and D. N. Shastri, passim. 63.Compare the concluding section for remarks on this issue. 64.katha~ncin nopakaaryatvaad anitye'py apramaa.nata- // (rnam 'gas phan gdags bya min phyir / mi rtag na yang tshad med nyid //). 65. Praj~naakaragupta, Pramaa.navaarttika-bhaa.sya or Vaarttikaala^nkaara of Praj~naakaragupta, ed.

Rahula Sankrityayana (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953), p. 34. 66. GT, p. 240; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 566. 67. PVV, Nyingma sDe-dGe, vol. 94, fols. 733-734, p. 185. 68. sthitvaa prav.rttisa.msthaanavi`se.saarthakriyaadisu / sdod 'jug dbyibs kyi khyad par dang / don byed pa la sogs pa dag /). Cf Tattvasa.mgraha (TS) 46 (for full references, compare note 117 following). 69. Preceding, p. 6. Prof. Karl Potter has disagreed with me that the syllogism being refuted is Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika, noting (a) that no such exact syllogism is found in Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika works and (b) that no later Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika works specifically defended the tradition against Dharmakiirti's attacks. Prof. Potter has suggested that Dharmakiirti's opponent may, in fact, be a lost Saa.mkhya work. This may well be, but it must be argued from silence, and it seems to me that (a) while the syllogism refuted by Dharmakiirti is not precisely like those found in Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika works, there is a significant overlap and (b) later Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika works may not have specifically addressed Dharmakiirti's objections because by the time they were written, Dharmakiirti's arguments perhaps had been overshadowed by those of Saantarak.sita, Kamala`siila and J~naama`srii. Prof. Potter also has pointed out--and in this I quite agree with him--that Dharmakiirti's opponent may be unidentifiable for the simple reason that Dharmakiirti has distorted the theistic position in recasting it for discussion. Thus, the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas may have been the intended target, but not recognized for their own position as restated by Dharmakiirti. Alternatively, Dharmakiirti may be combining the ideas of more than one theistic school into the syllogism. 70.Preceding, p. 10. 71.GT, p. 241; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 567. This does not depart substantially from the interpretation of Devendrabuddhi, who differs only in describing that which must be created as bodies, environs, and products, and cites as an example of "particular shape" not a pot, but a mansion, PVV, fol. 734, p. 185. 72.i.s.tasiddhir asiddhir vaa d.r.s.taante sa.m`sayo 'thavaa // ('dod pa grub pa 'am dpe ma grub / yang na the tshom za ba yin //). 73.GT, p. 241; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 567-568. 74.siddha.m yaad.rg adhi.s.thaat.rbhaavaabhaavaanuv.rttimat/

sa.mnive`saadi tad yukta.m tasmaad yad anumiiyate // (byin rlabs yod med rjes 'jug can / dbyibs sogs ci 'dra rab grub pa / de las rjes su dpog gang yin / de ni rigs pa nyid yin no //). 75.GT, pp. 241-242; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 569; compare TS 63. 76.vastubhede prasiddhasya `sabdasaamaanyaad abhedina.h/ no yuktaanumiti.h paa.n.dudravya~divad dhutaa`sane // (tha dad ngos la rab grub pa / sgra mtshungs tha dad med pa'i phyir / rjes dpog rigs pa ma yin te / skye bo'i rdzas las me bzhin no //). 77. GT, p. 242; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 570.

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78. anyathaa kumbhakaare.na m.rdvikaarasya kasyacit / gha.taade.h kara.naat sidhyed valmiikasyapi tatk.rti.h // (de lta min na rdza mkhan gyis / bum pa la sogs 'jim pa yi / rnam 'gyur 'ga' zhig byed pa'i phyir / grog mkhar yang des byas grub 'gyur //). 79. GT, p. 242; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 570; compare TS 65. 80. "When a general result is probative / Because it is concomitant with the predicate, /(Then,) when one (over-)differentiates the relator, / That differentiation is asserted to be the flaw called kaaryasama." saadhyenaanugamaat kaarye saamaanyenaapi saadhane/sambandhibhedaad bhedoktido.sa.h kaaryasamo mata.h // (bsgrub bya'i rjes 'gro phyir 'bras bu / spyis kyang sgrub par byed pa la / 'bral ba can nyid the dad phyir / tha dad skyon brjod 'bras mtshungs 'dod //) (verse 14). 81. GT, pp. 242-243; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 570-573. 82. "(Although) one proves (a thesis) in regard to a particular class, / It is not reasonable to prove (a similar thesis) just from seeing / That there is a general term (that is similar to the reason); as if / Words could be horned because (there is a term, ) gotva." jaatyantare prasiddhasya `sabdasaamaanyadar`sanaat/ na yukta.m saadhana.m gotvaac ccha`saadiinaa.m vi.saa.nivat// (rigs kyi khyad par la grub pa / sgra yi spyi ni mthong pa las / sgrub byed mi rigs ngag la sogs / go nyid phyir na rva can bzhin //) (verse 15). 83. GT, p. 244; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 573.

84. "Because(words) are controlled by a desire to express, / There is nothing for which there is not a word; / If one attained (objects) through the existence (or words for them), / All people should attain all objects." vivak.saaparatantratvaan na `sabdaa.h santi kutra vaa / tadbhaavaad arthasiddhau tu sarva.m sarvasya sidhyati // (brjod par 'dod pa'i gzhan dbang phyir / sgra rnams gang la 'ang med ma min / de yod pas ni don grub na / thams cad kyis ni thams cad grub //) (verse 16). See GT, p. 244; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 573-574. 85. "Through this (approach) one can also investigate (and refute) such Saa.mkhya (and Jaina syllogisms as, respectively,) / `Buddhi is non-sentient, because it is impermanent,' / And '(A tree) is sentient, because it dies/ When its bark is stripped."' etena kaapilaadiinaam acaitenyaadi cintita.m / anityaade`s ca caitanya.m mara.naat tvagapohata.h // ('dis ni ser skya la sogs kyi / mi rtag sogs phyir yang sems med / sogs dang shung pa bshus na ni / 'chi phyir sems ldan dpyad pa yin //) (verse 17). GT, p. 244; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 574. 86. "If a general entitative (reason) is unproven, (then the syllogism is invalid,) / Whereas if the (general reason) is proven, then even if particular (details) / Are unproven, (the syllogism) is not invalidated, / As (whether or not) sound "depends on space" (does not affect the permanence or impermanence of sound) . "vastusvaruupe 'siddhe 'yam nyaaya.h siddhe vi`se.sa.na.m /abaadhakam asiddhaav apy aakaa`saa`srayavad dhvane.h // dngos po 'i ngo bo ma grub na / tshul 'di grub na ma grub kyang / khyad par gnod byed ma yin te / sgra yi nam kha' la brten bzhin //) (verse 18). GT, pp. 244-245; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 574-575. 87. "Even if a word is unproven, if the entity/ Is proven, then (the reason) will be proven, as / The Buddhists explain to the Aulukyas / "(Atoms are impermanent, because) they are physical." asiddhaav api `sabdasya siddhe vastuni sidhyati / auluukyasya yathaa bauddhenokta.m muurtyaadisaadhana.m // (sgra ma grub kyang dngos po ni / grub na grub par 'gyur te dper / 'ug pa da la sangs rgy as pas / lus sogs sgrub byed bshad pa bzhin //) (verse 19). GT, pp. 245-247; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 575-577. 88. "if the (entity) is mistaken, / Then even if the word is unmistaken, / The proof must be known as

flawed, / Because an entity is (only) proven from an entity." tasyaiva vyabhicaaraadau `sabde'py avyabhicaari.ni / do.savat saadhana.m j~neya.m vastuno vastusiddhita.h // (de nyid 'krul la sogs yin na / sgra ni 'khrul pa med na yang / sgrub byed skyon Idan shes bya ste / dngos las dngos po grub phyir ro // (verse 20). GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 577. Note the strong element of"realism" here: though the connection between words and entities may be tenuous, it still is assumed by Dharmakiirti that there is a definite and discernible nature to entities, which may serve as the foundation for valid reasoning. 89. "'Because it is a "goer"' and 'because it is "hand-possessing"' /(As reasons) proving (a colored cow) is a cow and (an elephant calf) is an elephant / Are not (validly) asserted, for these are verbal expressions / That are merely common (sayings)." "'gro ba 'i phyir dang lag Idan phyir / rva can glang po zhes sgrub byed / 'di yi sgra yi brjod bya ni / grags pa yin gyis brjod 'dod min // (verse 20a). G T, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 577-578. 90. yathaa tat kaara.na.m vastu tathaiva tadakaara.na.m / yadaa tat kaara.na.m kena mata.m ne.s.tam

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akaara.nam // (ji ltar dngos de rhyu yin pa / de lta de nyid gang gi tshe / rgyu min gang gis de ni rgyur / 'dod la rgyu ma yin mi 'dod //). 91. GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 578-579. 92. Compare preceding, p. 16, alternative (c). 93. `saastrau.sadhaabhisa.mbandhaac caitrasya vra.naroha.ne / asa.mbaddhasya ki.m sthaano.h kaara.natva.m na kalpyate // (mtshon dang sman sogs 'brel ba las / nag pa 'i rma dang 'drubs yin na / 'brel med sdong dum ci yi phyir / rgyu nyid du ni rtog mi byed //). 94. Nagatomi, A Study of Dharmakiirti's Pramaa.navaar- ttika, p. 33. 95. GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 579. rGyal tshab probably was unfamiliar with the instance of"homeopathic magic" cited by Dharmakiirti, and glosses the verse as having the weapon inflict the wound and the medicine heal it. Devendrabuddhi (fol. 742, lines 6-7) supports the reading we have given. Incidentally, an instance of homeopathic magic is cited in Dante's Inferno

(XXXI, 4-6), where the poet recalls the lance of Achilles and his father, which could both wound and heal. 96. svabhaavabhedana vinaa vyaapaaro 'pi na yujyate / nityasyaavyatirekitvaat saamarthyan ca duran- voya.m//(rang bzhin khyad par med par ni/byed par yang ni mi rung ngo/rtag la ldog pa med pa'i phyir/ nus pa nyid kyang rtog par dka' //). 97. GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 579. 98. Ibid. 99. ye.su satsu bhavaty eva yat tebhyo 'nyasya kalpane / taddhetutvena sarvatra hetuunaam anavasthiti.h // (gang dag yod no gang 'gyur nyid / de dag las gzhan de yi rgyu / rtog pa yin na thams cad la / rgyu rnams thug pa med par 'gyur //). 100.GT, pp. 247-248; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 579-580. 101.GT, p. 248; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 580. 102.svabhaavapari.naamena hetur a^nkurajanmani / bhuumyaadis tasya sa.mskaare tadvi`se.sasya dar`sanaat // (myu gu skyed la sa la sogs / rang bzhin yongs su gyur nas ni / rgyu yin de legs byas pa na / de yi khyad par mthong phyir ro //). 103.GT, p. 248; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 580. 104.yathaa vi`se.sena vinaa vi.sayendriyasa.mhati.h /buddher hetus tatheda.m cen na tatraapi vi`se.sata.h (gal te ji ltar yul dbang po /tshogs pa khyad med b1o rgyu yin/ de ltar 'di yin zhe na min/ de las khyad par yod phyir ro//). 105.NS, I, 1,4. 106.This is the import of Devendrabuddhi's reading at PVV, fol. 745, line 2, p. 188. 107.GT, p. 248; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 580. 108.p.rtak p.rtag a`saktaanaa.m svabhaavaati`saye 'sati / sa.mhataav apy asaamarthya.m syaat siddho 'ti`sayas tata.h // (so so so sor nus med rnams / rang bzhin khyad par med pas na / tshogs kyang nus pa med 'gyur bas / de phyir khyad par grub pa yin //). 109.GT, p. 248; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 580-581. Emphasis mine. 110.tasmaat p.rtag a`sakte.su ye.su sa.mbhaavyate gu.na.h / sa.mhatau hetutaa tesaa.m ne`svaraader abhedata.h // (de phyir so sor gang nus med / tshogs na yon tan srid 'gyur ba / de dag rgyu yin dbang phyug sogs / ma yin khyad par med phyir ro //). 111.Compare preceding, p. 9. 112.Verse 183; GT, p. 219; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 713-714. The verse is found in the discussion

of the aspect of origination (samudaya) of the truth of origination. 113.GT, p. 251, Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 586. 114.Compare, for example, the writings of Chattopadhyaya, N. Bhattacharyya, and Potter mentioned in this article (preceding, notes 2, 4, and 29). 115.Bodhicaryaavataara IX, 118-123. It ought to be noted that `Saantideva is misrepresenting the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika view, whereby II`svara is not the creator of the padaarthas, but their arranger. 116.Ibid., IX, 124-125. 117.II`svara is rejected at TS 46-93, puru.sa at TS 153-170. Compare Ganganatha Jha, trans., The Tattvasamgraha of `Saantarak.sita with the Commentary of Kamala`siila (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1937), vol. 1, pp. 68-101, 132-139. 118.TS 47-48 and 56-60; Jha, Tattvasamgraha, pp. 69-71 and 75-79. 119.TS 85; Jha, Tattvasamgraha, p. 92

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120.TS 155-161, Jha, Tattvasamgraha, pp. 133-135. 121.TS 162-167; Jha, Tattvasamgraha, pp. 135-137. 122.Compare Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism, chap. 15, for a good summary of Miimaa.msaka arguments. 123.For references, compare preceding, note 4. 124.Nyaayama~njarii 125-133; summarized in Potter, pp. 371-373. 125.Vyomavatii 40; summarized in Potter, Encyclopedia, pp. 435-436. 126.Nyaayavaarttikataatparya.tiikaa IV, 1, 21; summarized in Potter, Encyclopedia, pp. 481-482. 127.The works of both J~naana`sriimitra and Ratnakiirti have been edited by Anantalal Thakur in the Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959 and 1957, respectively). 128.Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology, p. 28. I have not as yet studied J~naana`sriimitra's or Ratnakiirti's arguments. 129.Compare preceding, notes 8 and 9. 130.Compare preceding, note 4. 131.Indeed, there is not even agreement on whether the syllogism corresponds to the argument from design: G. Bhattacharyya (p. 44) calls it the "cosmological argument," while Potter (p. 102)

considers it "cosmoteleological." In fact, the syllogism refuted by Dharmakiirti--which seeks to prove that entities are preceded by a conscious designer because of intermittence, particular shape, and efficiency--seems most like the argument from design, while the later syllogism proposed by Jayanta--in which the existence of ii`svara follows from the world's being an effect--seems a bit more "cosmological"--although the focus there still is on the analogical appeal to design. 132.The most concerted attack on Western theism by a Buddhist is that of Dharmasiri (preceding, note 38), who does not, however, often directly relate Buddhist arguments to Western ones, but, rather, criticizes modern Western arguments directly, interspersing his discussion with passages from and reflections upon the Theravaadin tradition. Theravaada does not develop a rational a-theology to anywhere near the degree that the Sanskritic "Pramaa.na" tradition does. 133.Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose, trans. William Weaver (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), pp. 492-493.