Download - CitySpeak XII: The Water We Drink - Carlos Lo of Polytechnic University

The Political Economy of Water Resources Conservation in China:

Reconciling Bureaucratic Conflicts in Conserving Dongjiang’s Water Resources

Carlos LoDepartment of Marketing and ManagementThe Polytechnic University of Hong Kong

May 2010

“Fragmented authoritarianism” model

CityA

City B

Conflicts

Provincial Government

Bargaining BargainingConsensus

Reform: complicates bargaining relations

- reform decentralization of authority

central: coercive means central: ideology local units: resource autonomy local units: bargaining position

Water and bargaining

- water decisions: best reveal bargaining process

scarce resource multiple users (one use precludes another) transboundary (administrative)

Drainage area:

35,340 km2

Mainstem:

562 kmAnnual average discharge:

32.66 billion m3

Population served:

30+ million

Upstream zone

Midstream zone

Downstream zone

Hydrologists’ perspective:

Upstream zone

10% drainage area

6% annual discharge

Downstream zone

90% drainage area

94% annual discharge

Jiangxi’s perspective:

Upstream zone

Midstream zone

Downstream zone

Guangdong’s perspective:

215

1,501

3,7115,9019,206

10,21129,900

per capita GDP2008US$

Upstream zone:

- water resources conservation

shut down polluting ind. refuse polluting investment

1973

1961

1984

Upstream zone:

- water resources conservation

reservoirs> migrants

conservation forest> forest farmers

Upstream zone:

- unfair distribution of burden intra-basin disparity

- development restricted underdevelopment

- priorities “ecological compensation” supportive policies

Downstream zone: - resist direct compensation higher authorities to handle

- priorities clean & sufficient water

- bargaining actions plead w/ higher-ups

1.763

2.5332.0950.553

1.6631.100

Guangdong water allocation plan:

10.66 billion m3

Dongjiang River Basin compensation:

- targets reservoir migrants conservation forest farmers Heyuan City Government

Compensation for Xunwu?

- none from downstream

Conclusion

- new bargaining strategies direct, bottom-up extra-bureaucratic channels

- grievances: unresolved undermine long-term conservation efforts