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Description of document: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) research paper:
Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore, April 1980
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_AP..RJ98lL
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DECEPTION RESE RCH PROGR M
June
98
DECEPTION
MAXIMS
FACT AND FOLKLORE
Office of Research and Developmen
Everest Consulting Associates
Princeton Jct.
New
Jersey
and
Mathtech
Inc.
Princeton
New
Jersey
and
OAD/ClA
Analytic
Methodology
Research Division
J
/
Central Intelligence Ageflcy Washington
D
20505.
Telephone
703)
351-3458
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C 36554
This documenr
is
a research
paper
prepared
by
the 6ecept. on Research
Program staff of the Office of Research and Development
of
the Central
Intelligence Agency.
s
such, the views
and
conclusions contained herein are
those of the research
staff and should not
be interpreted as necessarify
representing the
official
position, either e)(pressed or implied, of the Centraf
Intelligence Agency.
The Dancing F
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DECEPTION MAXIMS FACT ND FOLKLORE
BSTR CT
T h ~ deceptions maxims discussed
in
th i s
repor t
represent
the
synthesis
of
a
number
o f
h is to r ica l case
s tud ies . These case s tudies are pa r t o f an ORD
exploratory research
program
on
deception
t
i s
ant icipated t ha t these maxims and other re su l t s
from
th i s
research wil l aid in te l l igence analysts in thinking
about
the problem o f deception and in detect ing
analyzing and
evaluat ing
foreign deception
schemes
relevant
to
curren t in te l l igence problems
Deception Research
Program
June 1981
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C 0 0 0 3 6 5 5 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
INTRODUC rION
AN ASIDE:
REMARKS ON THE DATA BASE
2
THE DECEPTION
MAXIMS
4
Maxim 1 :
Magruder•s
Pr inc ip l e - - t he
Explo i ta t ion o f
Preconcep t ions 5
Maxim
2:
Limita t ions to Human Informat ion
Process ing
1
Maxim 3: The M ~ l t i p l e Forms o f Surpr ise 5
Maxim 4: Jones Lemma 21
Maxim
5:
A
Choice
Among
Types
o f
Decept ion
22
Maxim
6: A x e l ~ o d s Contr ibu t ion : The
Husbanding
o f
Asse ts 2 7
Maxim
:
\
Sequencing
Rule 3 2
Maxim
8: The
Importance o f
Feedback 33
Maxim 9 The Monkey' s Paw 3 6
Maxim 10: Care in the Design o f
Planned
Placement of Deceptive Material 41
TURNING THESE AROUND: IMPLICATIONS FOR
C O U N T E R - D E C E ~ T I O N
A NEED TO BROADEN
THE
PERSPECTIVE
FOOTNOTES
PEFERENCES
46
6
48
51
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c o o 6 3 6 5 . s 4 · ~
1
2.
3.
4.
s.
Figures
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECEPTION,
PRECONCEPTION AND
SURPRISE
THE LORE OF SMALL NUMBERS: SOME
EVIDENCE IN THE POLITICAL MILITARY
D I M E ~ S I O N
12
D E S E ~ S I T I Z T I O N BY FALSE ALERTS--SOME
HISTORICAL
QUOTJ S AND
A TONQUE-IN-CHEEK
DECISION
RULE FOR
THEIR
ELIMINATION
17
DECEPTION, CRY-WOLF
SYNDROME
AND
SUR
PRISE:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
IN
SUPPORT
OF FOLKLORE
18
A C O ~ C I S E STATEMENT OF AXELROD S
GAME
31
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C 0 0 0 3 6 5 5 4 . . . ~ . . _
_ _
_______________
Introduction
The past several years have witnessed a
substantial
growth of in teres t in the
role
and e f f i c ~ y of deception
and
surprise
in military
and
pol i t ica l a f fa i rs . This
growth
has
been reflected in an increased number
of
scholarly
analyses
on the
subject
and spurred
by the
release
o f
some of the most cl ')sely held secrets of
World War I I .
2
As well , pol i t ica l sc ien t is ts ,
sociologiats, in tel l iqence analysts, and others
have
explored
and
codified
theory
and
hypotheses
relevant to
misperception, fa i lures and cognitive biases in
in tel l i9ence analyses, and other
re la ted topics.
3
I t
seems appropriate to explore, in tegrate ,
and summarize
t h i s
work into a unified ody of knowled9·e. To
help
catalyze th is synthesis, several
hypotheses
or maxims
relevant to deception and
surprise
are
offered
herein.
These
maxims
have
been
dis t i l l ed
from
histor ical
accounts, summarized from analyt ical exposi t ions, and
extracted from conversations with some of the
leading
deception
planners
of World War
II
vintage. They
are
ventured as
hypotheses
for further test in9
and
analysis,
much in the
sp i r i t
of Jerv is useful Hypotheses on
M:i.sperception
(14) a work which influer ced both
format
and
content of
this paper. The
wisdom of some
of
these
l
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•,-.-. ._._. ._._ _ .......___________________
maxims, however, can be supported from historical
evidence. Others emer9e from re levant social science
theory, decision analysis , and/or
game
theory.
Finally,
some
are· suggested by
anecdotal
r n a t ~ r i a . l
and,
though
plausible, are
untested
and of unknown generality.
An 1 .s
i de Remarks fi the Data
Elsewhere
in th is
paper,
reference
will
be
made
to
analyses based upon an historical data base.
This
data
base
was
prepared by Dr. Barton
Whaley
then
of
M.I.T.,
as
pa r t
o f an
ongoing research
ef fo r t
on
deception.
From Alam e l
Halfa to
Y\lgoslavia,
the
data
base
currently consists o f over f i f t y quant i ta t ive and
quali tat ive at t r ibutes o f
232
mili tary ~ n g a g e r n e n t s over
the
period 1914
to
1973. Data
elements
include
categorical attr ibutes (e.q. , was deception ~ m p l o y e d
was
surprise
achieved, did
the
attack
plan
ref lec t
the
opponent s preconceptions,
etc .
as well
as
quanti ta t ive
variables (e .q. ,
strengths, casualties,
etc. . For many
entr ies in th i s data
base, there is 9eneral agreement
among
the various source materials consulted. For some,
however, the
data were
more
ambiguous or even
contradictory. Finally,
there
are
cases
for which
some
data a re
missing
en t i re ly
and
reasonable
est imates
2
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inser ted and/or indirect evidence used as
a
surrogate.
Despite these diff icul t ies the evidence for m ny
of
the
conclusions
drawn
in
th i s
paper
i s
suff icient ly
strong
that
t he
analysis i s
robust
to even substantial
errors
of omission/commission.
Both strategic
and
tact ical
level engagements on
land,
sea,
and air
are
include-d.
In analyzing a subset of
these data
in his
manuscript, Stratagem, Dr. Whaley
presented
numerous
cross-tabulations, sor ts , counts,
trends,
etc.
as
raw
or
summarized
data
but
omitted
vari1.::ms
s ta t i s t ica l
tes ts
of
hypothesis. This oruission was je l iberate , reflecting
two
considerations;
First ,
the
major
batt les
consti tuted nearly an
exhaustive
sample.
4
I f
the
population
i s
viewed as
f ini te
i . e .
only those
bat t les
tha t actual ly took
place
in
th is
time
period, then
s ta t i s t i ca l
tes ts
are
unnecessary as
the variances
of
a l l
est imates
are
essent ial ly
zero. This was the assumption in
Whaley s
original
analysis.
However
i£ the
batt les themselves are
regarded as a sample from a
larger population
-
i . e . bat t le si tuat ions tha t
might
have occur.red, then s ta t i s t i ca l methods are
appropriate
and,
indeed, are necessary.
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Second, the t ac t ica l en9a9ements
contained
in the
data base const i tute what
i s termed
a convenience
sample
rather
than
a random
sample
in te r a l ia
a
function of data avai labi l i ty and may
not
be ful ly
representative. Thus,
s ta t i s t i ca l
tes ts o f
hypotheses
could be misleadinq - - but
then
so too
would
be counts,
cross-tabulations, e tc .
Th
Js, the
view taken in
th i s paper
is tha t
s ta t i s t i ca l
tes ts are
appropriate provided the resu l t s
are in te rp re ted with due
caut ion
considering the
inherent
data
l imitat ions .
The analyses
here should be
termed exploratory rather than adjudicatory. Absent
the
select ion
and
analysis
of a
t ruly
ra:idom
sample, an
act ivi ty
perhaps impossible
in principle,
th is data
base
i s sui generis,
one
of
a kind. I t would
be
imprudent
to
fa i l
to consider such conclusions as
may
follow
from
analysis
of
these.data.
The
~ c e p t i o n
Maxims
The
following
section contains
ten
principles or
maxims
tha t
are relevant
to
deception. No claim
is
offered tha t th i s is
a
minimal, suff ic ien t se t , tha t
these
~ r i n i p l e s are
ent i rely
self-consistent
or
tha t
4
Lili
·
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I
I
I
I
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I
they are a l l
a t
the
same
level of genera l i ty .
In
formulating these , severa l
balances had
to be
s t ruck -
-
balances
between
generality
and
usefulness,
l eve l
of
abstraction nd
i n t e re s t ,
br1adth versus deta i l nd the
l ike. Doubtless other observers or analysts would
phrase these somewhat
differently and/or
sh i f t the
balance
o f
emphasis
among
them. Nonetheless ,
t i s e l
t h a t these serve
as
a
useful
f i r .s t
approximation
to
bui ld
theory
upon.
axim LMagruder s Princ ip le- - the Exploi ta t ion
o f
Preconcept ions
•
I t is generally easier
to
induce an opponent
to maintain a preex i s t ing
b e l i e f t han
to
present not ional evidence to change t h a t
bel ief . Thus, t may
be
more f rui t ful to
exo.mine how an opponent s exis t in9 bel iefs
can
be tu rne
to
advantage than
to at tempt to
a l t e r these views.
Perhaps
the most str iking
application
o f
th is
principle
in
mili tary
deception
is tc be found in the
select ion of the invasion s i te and cover plan for the
D
Day invasion
a t
Normandy. I t
i s wel l es tab l i shed t h a t
Hit le r and most (but not al l ) of his senior mi l i t a ry
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I
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I
I
I
I
advisors
believed
that the most
l ikely place
for the
All ied invasion
o f Europe
would be in the
Pas de
Calais
region
(see,
for
example,
El l i s
(16)t .
Moreover,
the
All ies were
aware of
t h i s be l i e f . According to Cave
Brown ( 17) , they knew--from Ultra , and pa r t i cu la r ly
from the in te rcep ts
o f
Baron Oshima' s ( the Japanese
ambassador
a t
Berlin)
t ra f f ic - -what
l i t le r
expected
the
Allies to do. He expected
them to
land a t the Pas de
Calais
which
he considered the logical
p¢int
o f
a t tack .
11
Indeed,
so
s t rong
was th is
preconception,
tha t
for
several days af ter
the
invasion
a t Normandy (see, Speer
(18 ) ) :
• . . Hit le r remained
convinced tha t the
invas ion
was
merely feint whose purpose was to t r ick him into
deploying his defensive forces wrongly
. . • . The
Navy,
too, considered the terrain unfavorable for
large-scale
landings,
he declared. For
the
time
being he expected the decis ive assau l t to
take
pl&ce
in
the
v ic in i ty
of
C a l a i s ~
though he
determined the
enemy,
too,
would
pr9ve him :Q,
have been
r ight . For
there , around
Calais, bet tad
ever Sinee 1942
been
emplacing
the
heaviest model
9'\lM
under man1• fee t o f concre te to destroy
an
er..emy
landing f lee t ." (Emphasis added)
This
preconception formed
the bas i s for an
elaborate deception
plan
keyed to reinf?rcement
of th i s
be l i e f . I f ,
accordinq to Jerv i s (hypothesis No.
1
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(19)), actors tend to
perceive what
they expect,
then
these expectations
furn:i.sh
qreater
leverage
to
a
deception plan--a form
of
mental ju j i t su. Such a maxim,
termed
Magruder's
Principlc
5
by Lewin,
appears to be
well appreciated y
deception
planners, and
i s
c ~ n s i s t e n t
with numerous
studies
on the psychology
of
perception. David
Mure
(23), for
example, recal led that
one of Brigadier Dudley Clarke's inf lexible
rules for
development
of
cover
plans
was
tha t
al l
cover
plans
should e based
on what
the
enemy
himself
not only
believes
t >ut hopes
for.
Clarke
was
one
of the leading
deception
archi tee ts for t.he
Brit ish
in North Africa
and
the
Middle
East
and,
according to some, the
bes t
deception planner in WWII
(63).
There
is a m ~ l e
historical evidence
to
confirm
the
eff icacy
of
Magruder's
Principle. Figure 1 contains
entries
from
the historical data
base
deGcribed
previously.
These entries (including both strategic
and
tac t ica l cases) are
categorized
accordin9 to whether or
not
deception
was employed,
whether or not plans
were
keyed to enemy preconceptions and
whether
or
not
surprise
was
achieved. Analyses of these data,
shown
also
on i ~ ~ r e l , enable two conclusions to be drawn.
Firs t ,
·his torically,
deception schemes have more often
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C00036554
I
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I
I
I
I
I
•
FIGURE 1:
WA> DCCC '? lotir
~ ~ = - w ~ : i : ; - :
I
I
U:lkr.'"°n
Ti:it.•l•
I
r
\ l b t q t ah
RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN
DECEPTION,
PRECONCEPTION, AND SURPRISE
A .
AAW
OATA
l f f l •r.
rL,Mf i
l';f:V'Cl.I
WAS
StlRNUSf. ACJUT."JCOl
r
1.J f;N•-' Y ;.LS
--
-
-
- - · :'
• 1C6
•
D
llO
17
•
•
21
V:nl\:n¢'Vf
•
I
0
I
- -
t•
•
0
•
I
•
.,
l
6
Unl.noow-n
12
0
,.
• •
I
l
0
0
l
I
Ont.novn
0
0
'
I
l
lS<
I
•
U l
B.
ANO S O ~ E C O ~ C L U S I O N S
Mistor ica l ly ,
deception
schemP.s
have more
o ~ t e n
been keyed
to
enemy preconceptions •••
. • . and when deception
i s keyed
to
enemy
p r e ~ < I Q c e p t i o n s the proba
bi l i ty of s ~ r p r i s e
i s
g r ~ a t e r
Supportin9 Data:
C••oe•
'ott'.ue:
d t : ~ ~ ~ t i o n .
U
k;\()lroi?\
s Q h a ~
ht / \
•mplo,r•_c -..
t::J:'TLO : '() tSP' 't
J p z c Q ~ C : t f ' ' : ' . J O ~ S J '01'.\L
111
100
R e l e v a ~ t Sta t i s t ic :
(otiSt:,,_\'ID
t:KP£C"f£0
COOHT
C O C ~ : ' f
UN;JC:P ~ l J U .
KYP;:::H£SIS
Yet
110
H. i
1;0
I
H.5
'J"ot,•J.I
lll
U L I
c o ~ ; u t . • d \l'a:ue
o f
s ~ • t i . t t i c
2 (11 . 6 5 . ~ - . 5 1 • (U ·U - ' - . »
2
• t• • l
lt
• IS.S tS+'S • ,,..,
).: (.01) • J .U
Support ing Data :
C atn tr.l.e.re -:
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I
I
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I
I
than not
been
keyed
to
enemy preconceptions--according
to the
data in 110
out of
131 or 84
percent)
o f
the
cases.
This
supports
the
asser t ion
tha t
deception
planners
subscribe to the principle. Second, these data
support
the
conclusion
tha t when deception is keyed to
enemy preconceptions, the probabi l i ty o f surprise is
greater . Though the overal l degree ~
success
(measured
y the
fract ion
o f cases
resul t ing
in surprise)
usinq
deception
i s large, 123 out
o f
131
(or
94
percent)
of
the cases,
a
more
disaggregated analysis
i s
possible.
Specifically, when deception was keyed
to
exis t ing
be l i e f , surprise
resul ted
in 106
out o f 110
or 96
percent)
o f
the
bat t les , w:i1ereas, when th i s was
not
the
case, surprise
resul ted
in
only
17
out
of 21
(or
81
percent)
of the ba t t l e s - -a s t a t i s t i ca l l y s igni f icant
difference (but
recal l
ea r l i e r
disclaimers)
i f th i s were
a
random sample.
puzzl ing
aspect o f
the raw
data
concern.S those s i tua t ions where deception was
not
employed and plans
were
consis tent
with preconceptions.
t would be expected
tha t
th i s would have a
low
incidence
of surprise ,
ye t a l l eight
cases bewarP. o f
small
sample s izes)
resulted in surprise--weak support
for what some observers have
termed, the
inevi tab i l i ty
o f surprise.
The
next principle suggests
some reasons
tha t
help
explain the
prevalence of
surprise .
9
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Maxim
2:
Limi ta t ions to Human Informat ion ~ r o e s s i n g
• There are
severa l
l imi ta t ions to human
information
processing
t h a t
are explo i tab le
in the
design
o f decept ion schemes--amon9
these1 the
law of
small
numbers and
susceptabi l i ty
to
condit ioning.
Ma: iy barriers
or l imi t s
to
human
information
processing
and decision
making
have
been
explored
in
the
literat1Jre (see, Kirk 15 ) and
Slovic
(24) for
useful
surveys).
Thou9h a
confusin9,
sometimes
ambiguous and
overlapping
wel te r
o f names for various
defects /character is t ics
o f information
processing
e .g . ,
pounded
rat ional i ty ,
percep tua l readiness,
premature closure , 9roupthink,
11
evoked se t ,
anchor
and
adjustment , and
a t t r i b u t i o n theory
to c i t e only a few
examples) may serve to
coruplicate
a clear understanding
of
the
matter , t i s pos s ib l e to e x t r a c t
several
concepts which may explain an almost universal
v u ln e rab i l i t y
to
decept ion . Firs t in tui t ive
p ro b ab i l i s t i c judgments of ten show subs tan t ia l biaf ies .
Equally,
sub jec t ive
s tanda r ds
fo r
analyzing the adequacy
of evidence
are
poor and
sometimes i l l -def ined .
11
.fhe law o f small numbers i s
the
name given
y
Tversky
and Kahneman
(25)
to describe one pathology in
10
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00036554•nm-.
. . . . . _ . . .
_. . ._ . ._
. . .
______________
intuit ive
inference.
Originally
adduced from an
analysis of the deficiencies in research design of the
experiments o f psychologists which showed t h a t these
scient iets
had seriously incorrect notions about
the
amount
o f
error and
unreliabil i ty
inherent in
small
samples
of
data
(24),
th is cognitive bias appears to
be
quite widespread.
I t i s not
diff icul t
to f ind instances of
the
same
phenomenon in
poli t ical /mil i tary
decison
making. Fi9Ure
2 provides three interest ing examples.
the
lack
of
alertness of German
troops on
the eve
of
the Normandy
invasion, Sta l in s be l ie f tha t the
Germans
would issue
an ultimatum
prior
to any invasion of Russia, and the
view expressed y
some
analysts
that
Krushchev
would
not
place offensive missi les in Cuba.
In
each example a
c r i t i c a l
inference
was
drawn
on the basis
o f a
very
small
sample
s ize .
Later
in
th i s
discussion,
the
resu l t s
o f Axelrod
will
be
summarized
which
cal l to
question whether
any
inference can
be
drawn from the
data in
these
examples. I t is suff ic ient in this
context to note
the
imprecision of binomial estimates
from
small
sample
s izes .
6
Another
l imitat ion
of human
information processing
relevant to
deception planning
is
the
frequent
inabi l i ty
11
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-
- - - - - -
-
- - - -
-
- - - -
FIGURE
2: THE 'LORE'
OF SMALl NUMBERS:
SOME EVIDENCE
D.l.MENSION
. . . . . . . ea
J n; .n.y,
tM
fl'l:•••lO'l'I at
tlOTMtMlf,
1'0
C l ~ 1162
Clprratlo"'
MtlNU"OfH,
Utfl Ciff'tuft
l 'rtNakcm tJf
llt.1••0:,, l t41
IN THE
POLITICAL
MlLITARY
(Emphasis
added.)
OUOH ,
All
.tlo119
t. •
cl\aift
Oil
Gt',,,..,, COl•4UUI t lut
Ct;11tl\\t1UllWJ '6t l ¥Ht l ' t • r •et-
l t k •
* ~ r • f t o f l ' l . * l l
i T1'a
Yarletw• ) l .ea•qu•UH• , . , . , .
cruh•
eenHltfN'lt t.l'\&t
l" ll l 'Ut
--..i• .....D
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Ut . 1--mtat• futY:1'•t. "'l\IPit ' r • • t o f t l ~ w••
b l l e i ~
or1
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,.,, e"'·i"lt::"-
tu:ma
t.hel
fi.:ed h11e" ~ ' c l d e - o
U g l t r. f't.
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..
ctt
c . . . co t "'" ' ttor•
c•_og:t.ta 11' . •
Stelle aM ._,. te'-L•f '" aitr1u1,
or. ••T l soa"t••· MO
N O t ~
t ' · ~
t.Pttl
AH•••
Poad
n.ver •tl P9pt.4k' "
l • " d ~ ~ ' l l • t ~
rro·
ta of favorable
~ " ' u e r w . r ~ . t .
• paf cu •t
y ot
~ ' ' "9 a _ < > ~ r •
t.lorui.
Tu t.M ,..tl ' IOdkal Ger...afl 11th-'
.,.,
.
..
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• ~ M
•• • U
; ; . ;n if i ' or• ul\d•tt.ll'lliAl
~ [ i ( \ . < 1 1 l
ffnvht·-:i'l
iJ'.tel
I.,
t ; ~ • t ;
(a r-• ...
tl"11e 1• tk C.ituir•
:::.
~ d = r : · : a . ~ - .
19,._I, PP• 7' . el, ...
&lM
,, ,., ' •" • , rorff1•t
OV.rloH.,
• ~ w
W ~ ·
~ i n u ,...o,us._
, , . . , ~ •rt•Ml-... d:•nl'UOtt. ~ t ' • • l e u w . f l t • . . . , , . , , . ,
•t
t1Q,,._11f}y,. t.,._ 'U •\ ... tl t 'M lllllWltiO ft ¥•• l tOt lftel.,a11J4 lft
t M • •
plamm.. l n -
•1 11ir•
d\• 0.l'WlllM
8/20/2019 CIA Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore
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C00036554
of
actcrs
to detect small changes in
observables,
even
i the
cumulative
change over time is
large.
This is
the
counterpart
to
Jervis '
Hypothesis
tt3
(26),
actors
can
~ o r e easi ly
assimilate
into
their
established image
of
another
actor
information
contradict in9
that
image i
the information
is transmitted ~ n d considered b i t by bi t
than i it comes a l l
a t
once.
n This is
the basis for the
use of conditionin9 as a deception technique.
Conditionin9 or gradual acclimatization
has
an
important
place
in
the
design
of
deception
schemes.
There are numerous
instances
of
i t s
succcessful
application.
One
now-classic
application of this
principle was made
in
the breakout of the German ships
SCHARNHORST GNEISENAU and PRINZ EUGEN from Brest
on
12
February
1942. The breakout was
fac i l i ta ted by
jamming
the Brit ish radar. ordinar i ly th is would have been a
s i q n i f i ~ n t t ip off
that
somethin9
was
amiss,
but
the
Bri t ish radar
operators dismissed
it as
caused by
atmospheric
disturbance. This error
was
the resu l t
of a
carefully orchestrated German ruse
directed
by
General
Wolfgang
Martini, the
ead
of
the Luftwaffe
Signals
service. As Potter (27) observed:
J\t
dawn each day
durin9
Janum.ry English radi. '
stat ions
had
a few
Jninutes
or jam.ming deliberately
13
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made to appear
l ike
atmospherics.
Every
day the
length of the
jamminq increased sl ight ly.
y
February
Bri t i sh radar operators were weari ly
aecustomed
to
th is
in terference.
They
reported
it
as
caused by atmospher ic condi t ions . u
Nor
did
the
Germans
have any monopoly on the concept.
t was frequently employed by
the
R F
for fe in ts
o r
diversionary
opera t ions . one
s ign i f i can t
example was
in
the
Bri t i sh
a t tack
on
Peenemunde
on
17
August 1943.
As
Irving
(28) recounted:
l 'he
• • •
ser i es o f
minor
at tacks on Ber l in
demonstrdted
the
thought
and
preparat ion
~ h i h had
gone in to t.he a t tack on Peenemunde. Si r
Arthur
Harcis had been
dispatching
seven or
e igh t
Mos qui toes
almost every
night to
attack
Berl in . . •
each
night the
Mosqui
toes fo l lowed the
same nor the r ly t rack
into Berlin; each
night
the
sirens
a t Peenemunde
howled; and each night the
hundreds o f sc ien t i s t s
and engineers clambered
frenziedly in to
the i r
she l t e rs . This was what
bomber
command
in tended .
This
ruse was
s ingu la r ly successfu l .
At t.he
co s t
o f one a i r c r a f t
l o s t
to a German f i g h t e r , the e ig h t
Mosquito bombers used in the divers ion lured 203
e n ~ m y
f ighters to Berlin.
Of
97 Brit ish bombers dispatched
to Peenemunde, 40 (6.7%)
were
l o s t
and
32 damaged
and
a l l but 26
managed
to
at tack
the t a rge t .
Except for
faul ty t iming by
the
l a s t bomber wave, few would have
been l o s t over the
t a rg e t i t se l f ,
a
savin9 o f
almost
14
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...
half . And except for
the
Bri t ish ruse,
t
i s quite
possible, as
one German
post-mortem claimed, tha t
an
additional 160 bombers would have been shot down (29,
30) .
A £inal
remark re la t ive
to the f r ~ i l t i s
of
human
informat ion
processing; a reading o f the
l i t e ra ture
suggests the
hypothes i s tha t ac tors
te:nd
to dismiss
unlikelx events as
impossible
events .
• such a concept
favors
bold
and imaginative strategies such
as
Hannibal
crossing
the
Alps
or
the landing
a t Inchon.
A
s imilar
thought
prompted Handel's second paradox re levant to
se lf -decept ion
(31):
Paradox 2: The
greater the
r i sk ,
the l e s s l i ke ly
t
seems, and the less risky t actual ly becomes.
Thus, the
g r ea t e r the
r i sk ,
the
smal ler t
becomes.
Maxim
3:
Multiple Forms
of Surprise
•
surprise can be achieved in many forms.
In
mil i tary engagements, these forms include
locat ion, s t rength, intent ion,
style , and
t iming. Should t not prove a t t rac t ive or
f eas ib l e to achieve
su r p r i s e
in · a l l
dimensions,
t
may
s t i l l
be
possible
to
1 5 .
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0 0 0 3 6 5 5 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
achieve
surprise
in
a t
leas t
one of these.
Thus, for example, i intent.ions
cannot
be
concealed, it may
still
be possible to conceal
timing
cry-wolf syndrome), place, strength
or s ty l e .
This
asser t ion
i s for
the most part
self-evident.
n
in te res t ing aspect of the closing sentence which
re la tes
to the
phenomenon
of
conditioning i s
the
debi l i ta t ing effec t .
o f the
cry-wolf
syndrome.
Figure
3
provides several quotes tha t i l lus t ra te the
desensitizing
effect
of false alerts; a t Pearl Harbor,
Darwin, Korea, Vietnam,
and
Is rae l 1973. The
parallel ism of
the quotations
i s s t r ik ing.
There can be
no
doubt tha t
cry-wolf
is an
established element in the folklore of indications and
warning. Equally, there
should
be
no
doubt tha t such
concern
i s jus t i f ied
by
his tor ica l
evidence. Figure
4
shows various cross
tabluations and
a
s ta t i s t i ca l
analys:l.s o f the
his tor ica l
data
involving deception,
fa l se a le r t s
and
result ing surpr ise . In part icular , the
data
show tha t when one
or
more false
a ler ts
preceded
th
mili tary engagement described in the
case
the
defini t ion of cry-wol f
in the
table) , surprise
resu l ted
in
9 percent of the cases.
\ ere th is
was not
16
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- - -
D
s
t
"
t
I
I
I O ~ " '
lUO
T
t
0
•
....
•
v t'T Ult
l9H
....
T
"
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E
.
L
UJU.£1. ltll
E
T
s
•
-
- -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
FIGURE
3: DESENSITIZATION BY FALSE ALERTS--SOME HISTORICAL
QUOTES
AND
A
TONGUE-IN-CHEE <
DEG SION
RULE
FOR THEIR
ELIMINATION
'Aut.tratla••
ttatbD&"•
nw , l \ t tadl
on
f'J.atwlA
o . t.rtttk ol
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o f
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Ttftt
OU•nsi'Ylt
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u n
...,,
OUOTE
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r 1-h•l'lOnll'lftton.
l d " ' i r a l S t • t ' ~ ~ t ~ • l l y
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h111
* '
ee•" of w11r11in9• which t ~ i t ' \ out
to be
C • h •
.al11nif ll alVl l i f t . induces
.,.
k ind
ot
hl; .L9u•t
•
lc1si0-nl"q of • ~ l l i t L v l . : y , 11\datr•l ~ i . , . . , • 1
elld
h h
.ttdf
~ r e tLred et C : ~ C l t l t \ q : o u ~
Jdpanc•ct
5lJb"4dft• T"ep0rt11 ht
the
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11 1
t.114
, _ . , . . , ~ t:tree.dln•
the
At.lack
tf'Hey l \ad cMdetS
ov t
• • ~ n , .
611.
o f vh ich
wnt'fl 'USAf'Uy ?} iPl r• .
•t>:O:n•• •n
ruu•Utt f
tH:rnlfWJ.
Th• e
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C00036554
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FIGURE 4:
C - : C t P ~ tON t
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OR
StJ.&':'O:';.LS
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x2
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DECEPTION,
CRY-WOLF SYNDROME
AND SURPRISE:
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C00036554
the case, surpr ise resul ted
in 67
percent of the cases,
a difference s igni f icant in both
pract ical
and
s ta t i s t i ca l terms--and indeed,
i s
comparable,
though
of
somewhat
less
magnitude
than
the ef fec t o f
deception
on
surprise.
The empirical evidence i s also consis tent with
(though
t
does not prove in
a s t a t i s t i ca l sense)
the
hypothesis t h a t the combined effec ts of
fa lse
aler t s and
ct.her deception are grea te r than i t h ~ r fac tor taken
singly-- leading to surpr ise in 3
out
of 3 cases.
In view
of
th is finding, t i s an in te res t ing
curiosi ty tha t
del iberate
desensit izat ion
by
false
aler t s was
only rarely
an
in tegral
par t
of the
deception
plan. That i s , in
almost
a l l those
cases
involving
false a le r t s and deception, the genera t ion o f fa lse
alerts was not an explici t par t of the plan (though the
architects of
the
plan
were sometimes
aware o f the
vict im's
false a ler ts .
In
some
1ses the
cry-wolf
ef fect
was a byproduct
of the
deception
e f fo r t . Thus,
in
the Peenemunde raid described
ea r l i e r , the
sc ient i s t s
and enginee=s a t Feenemunde were as much the vict ims of
the condit ioning as the German a i r defenses, as revealed
y th i s ext rac t of Professor Werner von Braun's diary
(32) ; At
t h a t
moment the a i r
ra id
s i rens
sound
••• f i r s t
19
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C00036554
of
al l I go to
my
room;
there s
no
hurry,
th is
i s
not
the
f i r s t
t ime, i t ' s only
been
a warning
•••
a number of
men
. • . are standing around, looking up a t the sky and
cracking jokes .
But
the
purpose
0£
the
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above, though the Axelrod analysis
did
not
address
explici t ly the cry-wolf
syndrome.
Maxim 4;
Jones'
Lemma
• Deception
becomes more
di f f i cu l t
as the number
of
channels
of
information available to the
victim
increases.
However within l imits , the
greater the number
of o n t r ~ l l e d channels the
greater the
l ikelihood
of the deception being
believed.
This maxim
i s
christened Jones' Lenuna because t
has
been bes t and
of t -a r t i cu la t ed by Professor
R. V.
Jones, one
of the key figures in Brit ish
scienti
f ie
intel l igence during
World War II .
Jones'
remarks (35)
fu r ther i l l u s t r a t e the idea:
The ease of detecting
counterfeit.s
i s much
greater
when
different
channels
of
examination
are
used
simultaneously. This is why telephonic
hoaxes are
so
easy-- there
i s
no accompanying visua l appearance
to be counterfeited.
Metal
st£ips were most
successful
when only
radar and t h a t
o f one
frequency, w s employed.
Conversely
the most
successful naval mines were those which would only
detonate when several di f fe ren t
kinds
o f
s ignal
magnetic, hydrodynamic, and acoustic, were
received simultaneously. A decoy which simulates
a l l these
signals is 9ett in9 very l ike a
ship.
From these
considerations, incidental ly,
we
can
draw a ra ther
important
conclus ion about
the
detection
of targets in defense
and attack:
that
as
many
dif ferent
physical
means
of
detection
as
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C00036554
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
pcssible should be used in para l le l . I t may
t he re fo re ,
be b e t t e r i n
some
ci rcums tances
to
develop two or three
independent
means
of
detec t ion, instead
of
putt ing the
same to ta l
e f fo r t
in to
the
development
of
one
alone.
Maxim
5: _ Choice
mong TYPes
o Deception
• Where
possible the object ive
of
the
deception
planner
should
be to reduce the
ambiguity
in
the
mind
of the
victim1
to
force
him
to seize
upon a notional
world view
as being correct -
not
making
him
less
cer ta in o f
the t ruth,
but
more
cer ta in o f
a
p ar t i cu l a r falsehood.
However,
increasing the
range of a l ternat ives
and/or the evidence
to support
any
of many
incorrect al ternat ives- - in
the
jargon
' increas ing
the noise• --may
have par t icula r
use when the victim already has
several
elements of t ru th in
his
possession.
At
the
r i sk
of
burdening
the
world
with
further
nomenclature, t
is
convenient (as
suggested y
Daniel,
e t . a l . (36))
to
classify deception into two
types:
A
( fo r
ar.ibiguity)
deception,
and M ( for
misdirection)
deception. A-deception
increases the ambiguity in the
vic t im s
mind
and
lowers the probabi l i ty of
a correct
perception y dilut ion o r mult ipl icat ion of
22
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0 365 54
I
I
I
I
I
I
alternatives . M-deception
reduces
the
ambiguity in
the
vict im's
mind
by
having him become
convinced
of a
p ar t i cu l a r
falsehood.
(Either
form of
decept ion
can be
accomplished, incidental ly,
by
te l l ing
only the t ru th-
as
Lewin (
9)
quoted one of the A Force deception
experts ,
t ruths do not
consti tute the t ru th . )
A-deception can
function
by
al ter ing
the
probabil i t ies attached
to various
outcomes in the mind
of the
opponent,
dilut ing or burying useful information
in
noise
and/or
y
al ter ing
the
perceived range
of
options and outcomes available
to
the opponent. Roberta
Wohlstet ter 's
(5)
classic
analysis
of the Pearl Harbor
surprise o r ~ o w e d
the
concepts
o f
s igna l and noise from
communications theory. Her dictum, nto understand the
fac t of
surpr ise t is necessary to
examine
the
characterist ics of the noise
as
well
as
the signals tha t
af ter
the
event,
are
clearly
seen
to
herald the
at tack ,
has
a corollary to
the
effec t tha t noise can be created
y the decept ion- archi tect
to overpower
or
swamp the
signal . Jervis (37)
also
remarks on the advantages of
ambiguity in
i n t e rna t iona l
re la t ions .
Eric
Ambler, in
a
recent novel
ent i t led ,
Send No
More Roses,
1
(38) stated
the principle of
A-deception elegantly
and simply by
having
one of the
s tory ' s protagonists muse: we gave
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00036554.
him a Kaleidoscope to
play
with and he used
t
as a
looking gla5s.
A simple example
o f
an
at tack/defense
game wil l
show the act ive principle . suppose the
at tacker
has
a
choice
between
two
locations.
Likewise,
the
defender
can choose
to
defend ei ther location
for i l lus t ra t ive
purposes,
the option
of al locat ing some o f his
forces to
each location i s
omitted).
Success i s defined as an
at tack
against
an
undefended
location. I t i s apparent
from
thir:;
construct
t ha t
c e t e ~ i s
paribus, the
at tacker
has a 50/50
chance
of choosing an undefended location.
But, what
i f
the a t tacker could convince the
defender
tha t
there
were
three possible loca t ions for the at tack?
Here
t
follows tha t the success probabi l i ty climbs to
2/3,
and
so forth,
reaching
unity as a mathematical
l imi t when the number o f
threatened
s i t e s grows
a r b i t r a r i l y
lar9e.
I t
i s
o f
course,
necessary
t ha t
the opt ions
in troduced
be both individual ly and
col lec t ive ly credible
to
the vict im.
As a pract ica l
matter
the
number
o f threats cannot grow
a rb i t ra r i ly
large. Cruickshank 39),
for
example, recounts how th i s
was appreciated y deception planners in connection with
the invasion o f Sic i ly :
? 4
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C00036554
8
____________
I t
was
decided, very wisely, t.hat
to mount
so
m ny
threats in the Mediterranean would s tretch t he
Germans•
credul i ty
too
far .
Moreover,
the fact
that Sici ly
was
almost
the
only
objective not
threatened
might
lead
them
to
guess
the
t r u th . To
prevent th i s
the
simulated threats to nor th and
west France,
Pa,ntel leria and
Lampedusa were
abandoned.
Though the foregoinq
discussion i s
del iberately
(over)simplified1
it
clearly i l lustrates
the
principle
o f
A-deception.
As
an
aside
to
those readers with
a
mathematical
bent, it is
temptin9
to use concepts from information
theory
in order to
character ize or quantify the
uncertainty/ambiguity produced by A-deception.
Though
it
may
be
a
convenient
mental
shorthand, it
lacks
operational
significance, as Vazsonyi (40) has shown in
a
decision-theoretic
context. Specif ical ly ,
he
shows
via
a
eimple (and
highly readable)
example
tha t
the
benefi ts
(value
or ut i l i ty} of information
systems
. . £
not d h e c t l ~ related
to
~ o n c e p t s of uncertainty,
reduction of Wiener-Shannon ~ n c e r t a i n t y Qf_ ent ropy . t
i s
in fact ,
t r iv ia l ly
easy to construct decision
theoret ic
examples where
the entropy i s high yet the
value of information
i s zero, as well as problems
where
the
entropy
is
low
and
the
value
o f
information
i s
high.
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C00036554
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
The value of information
(and/or
costs of
.misinformation)
i s a composite functic-n
o f
the a pr io r i
probabil i t ies of
chance
events
in
the
decis ion
t ree
and
the ut i l i ty or value attached to
these
outcomes--a
re la t ion
that
is not captured by the usual information
measures.
In contrast to A-deception, ~ d e c e p t i o n (or
misdirection)
reduces
uncerta inty--after Whaley,
the
ult imate
9oal
of stratagem
i s to make
the
enemy
quite
certain,
very
decisive,
and
wrong
(emphasis
in
original) .
In
the
attackjdef 'ense
game,
M-deception
would involve convincing
the
vict im to defend
one s i te
then
attack the
other. To
the extent
th is
can
be
achieved, the value of the game also approaches
unity.
Deception schemes used in pract ice are typical ly
composites of
the
two variants , usually
with
one or
the
other
type
dominant.
such
was
the
case
a t
Normandy,
for
example, The multiple at tack location threats in the
in i t i a l stages
are evidence
of
A-deception. In
the
end.
phases howeve:c, Normandy \fas predo::ninently an -
deception. w know of no data tha t direct ly address the
re la t ive
efficacy _of these t)'pes, though there
are
normative arguments in favor of M-aeception ( 4 .
DecepHon
professionals
seem
to
pre er
M-deception,
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though t
can
be
alleged
tha t
th i s
ref lec ts s t y l i s t i c
motives. Who can re s i s t t.he ult imate triumph of uthe
st.ing:?
Maxim 6: Axelrod's Contribution: The Husbanding of
Assets
• There
are circumstances where
deception
assets should be
husbanded
despi te the costs
of maintenance
and r isk
of
waste,
awaiting a
more
f ru i t fu l
use.
Such
decisions are
often
susceptible to rat ional
analysis.
WINDOW
la te r r e n m e ~
CHAFF by the Americans. was
eas i ly
the most
cost effect ive ECM/deception device
introduced
in
World
War
II 29) .
I t
was
developed
independently by the Brit ish, the Germans who ca l led t
DUppel) , and the Japanese who
cal led t
Giman-shi,
meaninq
deceiving
paper
(41).
There
was
i n i t i a l l y
a
9reat debate amongst the
Bri t i sh
as
to
whether and/or
when t should be used. This
concern
arose because the
Bri t i sh did
not
have a
countermeasure and
feared German
repr isa l . The same
concern
was f e l t in Germany where,
under
Go rin9
1
s
orders, a l l
the relevant reports
concerning German developments were
destroyed.
The
Brit ish debate, which
lasted
some 16 months, culminated
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C00036554•
in C h u r c h i l l s d e c i s i o n to Open t.he Window (42) .
Shortly thereafter , t
was
used by the RAF to 9rea t
e f f e c t
on
the
n igh t
o f
24/25
J u l y
1943
i n
a
ra id
on
Hamburg.
Whether
th i s delay in
deployment was an
enlightened
decision
(as
has been arqued by Price (43)
and by
Watson-Watt
(44) or, (
l ike tt.e Colonel
on
the
River
Kwai
some
of
our own author i t ies
[a reference
to
Watson-Watt] most closely associated with radar could
hardly
bring themselves to
face
a
c o u ~ t e r m e s u r e . .
a] . • .
system
they
had
b u i l t up
(4
5))
a
case
o f
emotion
dominating
reason as
Jones has
arqued,
t furnishes
a
concrete i l lus t ra t ion
of
a more 9eneral dilemma.
That
i s ,
h o ~
and when
to
employ a
depreciable
asset
tha t is
perhaps
costly to
maintain.
I t
i s
also
interest ing to note
that
concern over
whether an asse t
w i l l become
valueless once used or
tha t ,
upon
compromise
an
effective
countermeasure can
and
will be developed
are
often
overly
pessimis t ic .
In
spite o f
the
agonizin9 over the f i r s t use of
CHAFF
t
i s
s t i l l
considered effect ive in
today 's
sophist icated
electronic
warfare environment. Similarly, in
the
use
o f double agents,
a
ref usal
to
bel ieve the asset i s
other
than
genuine
has been
observed to continue
in
the
f ace
o f
strong
evidence of h o s t i l e control .
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Axelrod 1)
furnishes other cx1JJnples of
this
same
type; ~ p l o y m n t of Ultra in World war II the Syrian
decis ion
to
withhold use
o f
i t s
new
S M
a i r
defense
despite
losses
unt i l
the opportune
t ime
in the
1973
war and
the use o f double agents by Sri
t a in
in
connection with the Normandy
deception.
He
a lso
presents a
simple
yet
useful mathematical
model to gain
quan t i ta t ive ins igh t in to the
problem. A
concise
technical statement o f t h i s
model and
solut ion
i s
provided
in
Figure
5.
The
essence
o f
the
problem
examined
by
the model i s th i s : should
a
given
opportuni ty be
taken
~ · l
an
immediate gain
achieved
even
though the
asse t may subsequently
be
valueless o r
should the
asse t be
saved
in expectat ion o f be t t e r gains
to
come?
If the asset is saved rather than
used,
there
i s
a
cQst o f maintenance
and
r i sk o f compromise. The
optimal
solut ion
t >
t h i s
problem
takes the
form:
i f
the
value of the oppor tuni ty
exceeds
a threshold t ha t
can be
calculated, in pr inc ip le use
the
asse t otherwise save
it he optimal threshold i s
a function o f the
dis t r ibu t ion
o f
opportuni t ies
r i sks
o f compromise, and
costs of maintenance.
Cete r i s
Paribus, the optimal
threshold
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C00036554
•
FIGURE 5:
A
CONCISE
STATI:;;.t;.;NT OF ~ E L R O D S \;Ai·iE
1. The
player
is
presented with an in f in i te s e q u e ~ e
of opportuni t ies ,
i= l ,2 , •••
2
When
an
opportuni ty
i s
presented the pla je r
can e lec t t o
use the
re
source,
and receive a value, E x ~ where E i s a known
constant
{the en-
I
enhancement factor)
and x i
i s tne outcome or
value
of the i t h opportun
i ty .
Alterna t ive ly ,
the player can
wait
and d ~ f e r
a decision
unt i l the
I
next
opportuni ty,
in which
case
a
cost ,
-x i , must be
paid.
J ,
the
resource i s •used
0
on
any
oppor tuni ty , there
i s a
probabi l i ty ,
Q
that
t survives and
can
b e used
again,
and l •Q
t ha t the game
wi l l
terminate .
• · I f the resource i s •savedQ on any t r i a l , there i s
a
probabi l i ty , 0 ,
tha t the game wil l terminate , and
1-0
that
t
wil l
continue
unt i l the
next
t r i a l . Equivalent ly,
D can
be viewed as
a
discount fac tor from
t r i a l to t r i a l .
S. The
•.ralues
n
successive
t r i a l s
are
independer.t
' i th
known
and
common
dens1ty function, f(x}.
6.
The
opt imal
policy is to
define
a
threshold, t , and
use the
resource i f
r . i ~ t .
otherwise to
save
t
7. ' 'he ·.ralue of the 9arr.e, V t • ) , and the optima1threshold, t* , can be
d e t e ~ m i n e d
y
univariate optimizat ion of the
funct ion:
v ~ { t )
D+(l-D)( l-Q)p(t)
where p(t)=f
f(x)dx,
t:
'
S ( t ) ~ J xf(x)dx and
t
t
~ { t ) = J
x f ( x } d x
0
for
continuous
distribution or appropriate sums
for
d i sc re t e dis t r ibu
t ions .
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C00036554
•
increases as the l ikel ihood of
compromise
given
use increases- - i . e . ,
i
the asset i s
less
l i ke ly
to
be
able
to
be used
aqain,
b i99er stakes are required to jus t i fy i t s use,
and
• decreases as the
discount:.
factor increases
and/or
the
cost of maintenance
increases .
Both
of
these r e su l t s
are in
accord with
i n tu i t i on .
What i s
somewhat
unexpected,
however, i s
tha t ,
for
opportunity
dis t r ibu t ions
that
are
highly
skewed
many
opportunit ies
of
low
value and
progressively fewer
of
hi9h value)
as
might
be
expected in
prac t ice , the
opt imal thresholo i s not highly
sens i t ive
to the above
factors . Moreovert
for highly
skewed dist r ibut ions of
future opportunity the analysis shows t h a t it pays
to
wait for high stakes (bi9 opportunit ies) despite
r i sks
of compromise and/or costs of maintenance. This l a t t e r
f inding i s
pa r t i cu la r ly
intriquinq as,
according
to
Axelrod
46) ;
uTurning the perspect ive around, one
can see tha t
it
would
be a
mistake
to evaluate the opponent's
resources
for surprise y what you have seen
when
the stakes were low or moderate. e may be
ra t ional ly waiting for
an
event with sufficient ly
large stakes
to
jus t i fy
the
exploi tat ion
of
whatever resource
for
surprise he has.
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Thus ( reca l l the discussion re9ardin9 the law
of
small
numbers), not only i s t
hazardous
to draw
inferences
£rom
l imited data,
9iven
an
assumed
constancy
in
stakes,
but
also
ra t ional analysis su99ests
t ha t
an opponent's
behavior may well be di f fe rent when the stakes
are
high.
That
i s ,
pr ior
experience m y simply be i r relevant .
Maxim 7:
sequencing Rule
•
Deception ac t ivi t ies shouJd be sequenced so as
to
maximize
the
persistence
of
the
incorrect
hypothesis(es) for as long
as
possible. In
other
words,
Red-handed
a c t i v i t i e s
should
be deferred to the l as t possible
ins tant .
This
principle follows from Je rv i s Hypothesis No.
14,
a-ctors
tend to overlook the
fac t
t ha t evidence
consis tent with
the i r theories
may
also be
consis tent
with
other
views. (47) .
Jervis
i l l u s t ra t ed th i s
With
an
example from World
War
I I - - the All ied
surpr ise a t
the
German at tack on
Norway.
According to his sources, the
Allies had detected German ships moving towards Norway
but m is in terpreted
the
fac t
because they had
expected
an
attempt to
break through the
All ied
blockade in to the
At lan t i c .
The
poin t i s ra i sed
in
Je rv i s
paper as a
fa l lacy in
the
in te rpre ta t ion of
evidence.
In t h i s
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context, however,
it
i s an active principle designed to
exploi t
th i s tendency to misperception.
Successful deception planners have always
understood
th is
principle in tu i t ive ly . While
discussing
a deception
operation which
took
place
short ly af te r
Anzio in the I ta l ian campaign, Sir David
Hunt
observed
almost
as an
aside
(48),
This shows, incidental ly , one of the reasons why
we decided
a9ainst
l ead ing
with
the
l e f t
handed
punch from Aazio: tha t the enemy reserves
were in
tha t neighborhood. I t also shows t ~ e advantage o f
the deception
plan
in tha t
an
at tack in
st rength on
the
Rapidq front would
e x a c ~ l X what the
enem1
would expect as
the f i r s t
move
in an at tack even i
the main mov w s to be
a
seaborne landing or
~ p T O n
from the bndgeheaq. Af t e r
a l l we h ~ d
done exactly
the
same
a t
the
time of
the
Anzio
l anding in January. Accordingly he might be
expected
to
be slow to
put
in h i ~ reserves against
it
unt i l
we
had
shown
our hand. (Emphasis
added)
Deferrin9 the r iskier
poLtions
of a deception may
also have the
advantage
tha t even i f the deception
plan
i s
compromised,
the opponent wil l
have
i n su f f i c i en t time
to
recover and
take appropriate act ion.
Maxim B:
The Importance 2 Feedback
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•
A scheme to ensure
c c u r ~ t e
feedback increases
the chance of success
in
deception.
The
above principle is logical ly
vi r tua l ly
se l f -
evident. Such an idea has evolved independently in many
discipl ines. I t pervades most of control theory, has a
counterpart termed
11
the value
of perfect information° in
decision theory, and
i s
a
central
idea in the
theory
of
9 ames
(par t icular ly extended games). As
Comebacks t
is
a
Bri t ish
contr ibut ion to
the
jargon of
the
espionage/covert
action trade
(49).
Perhaps the most dramatic
example
of the
role
of
feedback
in wartime
deception was
the
in te l l i9ence
provided by ULTRA the
top
secre t espionage and
cryptographic breakthrough tha t enabled the
Bri t ish
to
read
the German Codes. In the view of many, ULTRA
information was
a key
element in the success of the
.Allied
invasion
o Normandy.
As
Lewin
SO)
remarked:
ti [Colonel .John] Bevan, head of LCS, and [Lt .-Col .
T.A.]
Robertson, head of Bia
section
of MIS, have
joint ly t e s t i f i ed to the author t ha t without ULTRA
the grea t o f d e c e p t i o ~ ~ p u n round Germans
could
never
have
been
devised .
Yet
without the i r
effor ts , OVERLORD
might
have been a disaster .
(Emphasis added.)
Even
a t
the simplest
operat ional
level ,
feedback
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answers
the
quest ion , Is anybody l i s t en ing?
( i . e . ,
i s
this channel effective) , a s i _ } ~ 9:.1: .< to the design of
effective
deception.
I t
i s an
in te res t ing
footnote
to
the overall success of
the
Allied
D-Day
deceptions that
those directed a t orway
were
not successful . According
to Kahn
(51):
most of the energetic Al l i ed
radio
deception
in
the
north of Bri ta in to simulate the
preparations
o f
an
invas ion force
went unheard y the Germans.
The reasons seem to be
tha t not one
of
the
radio
reconnaissance
uni
t s
o f the
German
20th
Army,
occupyin9
Norway, was
paying
the l eas t b i t
o f
at tent ion: al l were far away
in
Finland, facing
eas t
and i s ten ing hard to the Russians. The
consequence
was t ha t
Roenne
concluded t ha t
any
landings in
orway
would be secondary;
Meyer
Detr inq concurred. Hitler believed the same thin9,
s ince
he
thought
the
main
invas ion
would
come
in
F ~ a n c e
Yet he never withdrew a
single
soldier
from
orway
to oppose th is main assault . Why?
Because
i t
was hi s
zone
o f dest iny in
the
war owing
to
i t s ab i l i ty
to protect
his shipments
o f
Finnish
nickel ore,
his
northern f lank, and
his
U-boat
departures. But All ied deception had nothing
to
do
with
a l l this .
Hit le r
kept
major
forces
in Norway
en t i r e l y on
his
own
vol i t ion .
This
i s an interest ing example of how deceptions
can
seem to fa i l , yet
succeed. In
pract ical terms, such
m i s i n t ~ r p r e t t i o n s o f
our
observed
response, or lack
thereof, often resu l t from
less
than perfect
understanding and modeling of the
deception
t a rge t .
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I ron ica l ly the All ies knew through
ULTR
tha t German
t roops remained in Norway and
concluded on the bas is o f
th is
feedback
t ha t
the
deception
was
successful .
s Lewin
(52) noted:
On
Sherlock Holmes famous
principle
about
the
importance
o f
the dog t h a t did
not bark in the
night, the significant fac t for the deceivers in
London was that no
such
major movement of troops
from
Norway
was
disclosed on Ult ra up
to
and beyond
the tirne of
D-Day. Here
was cl inching evidence
tha t the
deception
plans were
working.
--evider.ce cons is ten t with
one hypothesis
rnay
also
be
consistent with
other
views (where have you read th i s
before?).
Maxim 9:
The
o n k e ~ Paw
• Deception effor t s
may prod1.:.ce
subtle
and
unwanted
side ef fects .
Planners
should be
sens i t ive to such
poss ib i l i t i e s
and, where
prudent, take s teps to minimize these counter
productive aspects.
Deception secur i ty
is one
of
the causes of
such
s ide-e ffec ts .
One o f
the
card ina l principles o f
deception folklore i s
that
deception security
is
of
the
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highest importance.
I t
is generally
acknowledged
tha t
the
number of
witt ing
personnel should be
minimized,
even
to
the
point
of
misleading
your
own forces.
Professor
R.V.
Jones,
with a keen eye o f irony
recounts
one example
where concern over securi ty as
well
as .
uncertainty
of
success
o f
a
deception
operation resul ted
in an
unnecessary
mobi l iza t ion of forces.
Ci
t ing
an
example from World War I Jones writes (53):
[another
fe in t took place in
August
1916]
•• . with
the
object of
re l ieving pressure on the
Bri t ish
front l ine
by diver t ing
German t roops
to
prepare
fol . a
Bri t ish invasion
o f
North Belgium.
Hall
bui l t
up
the
in tel l igence picture for the Germans
by providing clues tha t would lead
them
s tep by
s tep
to
the desired conclusion. Besides care ful ly
spread
rumors,
Hall arranged for
signals to be
sent
to
ships in the bogus code ins t ruc t ing
them
for
the i r tasks
in
conveying the
invasion f lee t in the
qroups s tar t ing
from
Harwich, Dover, and
the
mouth
of the Thames,
where
a f l ee t of ~ o n t o r s and tugs
was being concentrated. As the f inal touch, he
orranged
for
a bogus
edi t ion
of
the
Daily
Mail to
be
printed
and withdrawn,
allowing
a few
copies
to
be sent
to
Hollandi
some
of these appeared to be of
a l a te r
censored edi t ion, the others
uncensored.
The censored copies had one item missing, of
which
the
headline
ran, East
Coast
Ready. Great
Mili tary Preparations. Flat
Bottom
Boats, and the
ar t ic le
reported the large concentrat ion
o f
troops
in
the
eastern and southeastern counties. Can
we
see
here
the ancestor of the deception plan for
D-
Day in
1944?
The
ruse
was
successful,
and
the Germans
moved
a
large
number of troops to
the
Belgian
coast ; but
t had an
awkward
consequence.
Sr i
t i sh
agents
began to repor t
German troop movements,
and
our
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554
aut.hori t i e s
who
were unaware of Hal l s e f fo r t s
concluded tha t the
Germans must be
intending
an
invasion of England, 9ivin9 r i se to the worst
scare
in 8ri ta in in World War
I .
Hall could not
be
absolutely
certa in
tha t
his
ef for ts
were
the only
cause o the
Ge1 man movements
and so he had to
watch
in s i lence.
11
Another example of a possible unwant. d side
effec t
of
a
deception operation occurred
fa i r ly
frequently in
World War I
I .
As Cruickshank notes ( 61};
When
the propagandists
implemented
a
deception
plan they had
to
s teer a d i f f i c u l t middle course
between convincing the Germans tha t an Allied
a t tack was imminent, and encouraging resis tance
groups
to
90 into act ion in
support
of an at tack
tha t
would never mater ia l ize , who would then find
themselves
exposed
to the fu l l weight of German
repr isa ls . In any case, it
was
bad for morale i
hopes of l ibe ra t ion were
raised
by
the
voice of
London' only to be dashed
.••
But in France PWE had
already
cried
'Wolf' twice . . . and there was a
rea l
danger tha t French
res is tance
would
cease
to
believe anything London said.
Fortunately,
th i s problem was
ant ic ipated
and elegant ly
countered,
In
connection
with the
otherwise
unsuccessful operation
STARKEY for instance,
the
BBC
broadcast
the
sub t l e
message (62);
Be careful of German
provocation.
We have learned
tha t the
Germans
are
c i rcula t ing inspired rumours
t h a t
we
are
concentrat ing
armies
on
our
coasts
with
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fr.tentions
of
invading
the continent. Take no
not ice
as these provocat ions
are
intended
to
create among you manifestat ions and d i so rder s which
t ~ Germans wil l use s
an
excuse
for repressive
measures
aga ins t
you.
Be
discipl ined1
use
dis
cret ion,
and maintain order,
foe when
the
time
comes
for
action
you wil l be advised in advance.
thus leaving t
to
the
Germans
to
decide the
significance
of
the message and the poss ib i l i ty t might
be a clever
ruse
while
ensuring
tha t
the resistance
leaders had
no
basis for
action
whatever inference
they
drew vis-a -vis the
imminence o f invasion.
Another example
of
the Monkey's Paw phenomenon
concerns the unanticipated consequences o f
an otherwise
successful
German use of
decoy
V-2 s i tes . As
recounted
by
Jones (54):
Here the
Germans,
perhaps following the i r
e..
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
es t imate the number o f rockets
s ~ o r e eas t
o f the
Seine,
and
hence to es t imate the intended monthly
ra te o f
f i re . The
answer
came out a t about 800;
af te r the war we found t h a t
the
in tended ra te o f
f i r e
had
been
900
a
month.
e
had
therefore
managed
to
achieve
a
12
percent
accuracy
in our
est imate, which would not have been possib le
had
the Germans not t r i ed to
deceive
us .
A f inal example offered in t h i s connect ion
dates
from 1940 / l in Eas t Afr ica . Gen.
Wavell
wanted the
I ta l ians to
bel ieve t ha t he was planning
to
a t tack them
in Abyssinia from the south o f a posi t ion. In t h i s
way
he hoped to diver t I t a l i an forces from t he point of
in tended a t tack in the nor th .
But,
according
tQ Mure
(64
emphasis
added):
"The deception went
very
well and the
I ta l ians
f e l l
for the s to ry o f the a t tack in
the
south, with a
r esu l t which was exact ly the r e v e ~ s e o f what Wavell
wanted.
They
draw back in the
south,
presumably
in
the expectat ion t ha t the a t tack
there
was
bound
to
succeed and
the damage
to t he i r forces would be
l es s
i
a
withdrawal
was
made
perhaps
to
a
shor te r
l i n e and no pitched ba t t l e was jo ined. At the same
t ime,
they sen t what
they
could spare to re in force
the
Northe1-n
Flank where they did
not expect an
at tack but which was
the
t rue Bri t i sh object ive.
The valuable lesson learned was tha t the decept ion
plan
must
be
based
£
you want the
enemy
Q
~ · never
£
what ~ O l f him Q
th ink.
Next
t ime,
a l so in
Abyss1n1a, Dudley arranged for the
I ta l ians to f ind out exac t ly
where
the Bri t i sh
a t t a c k
was
to be made
and
th i s
ensured t h a t
there
was no opposi t ion "
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The point to
be
drawn
from the fore9oin9
examples
is tha t
there
may
be subtle
costs to a deception which
should
e n t e ~
in to
the
deceiver 's
cos t /benef i t calculus.
I t i s
unreal is t ic
to expect tha t a l l
o f these
possib i l i t ies can
be
foreseen b
in i t io . Nonetheless, a
sensi t iv i ty
to such possib i l i t ies
i s
desirable.
Maxim 10:
care in
the
Design o f Planned Placement
of Deceptive Material
•
Great
ca re
must
be
exercised
in
the
design
of
schemes
to
leak notional plans. Apparent
windfalls
11
are subject to close scrutiny
and
often
disbelieved.
Genuine leaks often occur
under circumstances
thought
improbable.
l wo incidents can serve to
i l lus t ra te
th i s
pr inc ip le .
Ear ly
in
World
War I I a
Cerman a i rc ra f t
heading for Cologne became los t and made a forced
landing
near
Malines
in
Sel9iu.m. The
three passengers,
two
Wehrmacht officers
and a
Luftwaffe Major, were soon
arres ted
by Belgian author i t ies .
Taken to
the police
stat ion
and l e f t alone brief ly they made an attempt to
burn some documents
they