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CHAPTER - ONE

SUB-REGIONAL ASSERTIONS A THEORITICAL PERSPECTIVE


CHAPTER- 1 SUB--REGIONAL ASSERTIONS · A THEORITICAL PERSPECTIVE

1

Ethnic conflict is a significant reality of our time. Ethnicity as a form of a political

behaviour continues to be a significant aspect of modern nation-state. The term

ethnicity is encumbered by a plethora of meanings resulting in apparently

opposing connotations. Thus a review of the term and its meanings is an

essential precursor to our discussion.

Ethnicity as a form of political concept has been primarily seen as opposed to

the concept of 'Nationalism'. The term etymologically means, "pertaining to

race or racial stock". Ethnic power largely focuses on safeguards of interests of

dparticular group and does not necessarily lay a claim to 'territoriality'. Though

there are nations, which are ethnic in origin, 1 the context for the study of

ethnicity is only provided within the conceptual boundaries of modern nation-

state. The modern nation state is an outcome of various conflicting forces, the

seeds of which often sprout at the juncture of social oppression and political

turmoil. A study of modern nation state thus provides us with a vantage point to

understand the complexities surrounding ethnicity.

1 A.D.Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Natioris, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987.

SUB-REGIONAL ASSERTIONS A THEORITICAL PERSPECTIVE 2

Nationalism in its various forms inhibits simplistic explanations and requires us to

focus on three distinct, but related, facets of society- politics, economics and

culture. We are especially interested in the nature of the polity (the state,

principality, sub-region, etc.). and how it relates to the various fragments within a

region. We are also interested in exploring the relationship between cultural ·

identity and politics by taking specific cases into account.

Culture is about identity and status in terms of birth, family, language, religion,

and so on. Ethnicity and nationalism are usually considered to be more clearly

related to culture than anything else, but most theories of nationalism seek to

determine that particular relationship between politics, economics and culture

which brings about the transition from ethnicity to nationalism.

The discussion on the relationship between politics, economics and culture

could be situated in time frame. Historically, some thinkers believe that the

condition of nationalism grew out of period when the state was only a loose

assembly of power centres. The economy was pre-industrialist and mainly

agrarian. When the concept of 'nation' could be seen as in the form of

ethnicity-as loyalty to clan, king, tribe etc. These thinkers trace the roots of

modern 'nationalism' to the primordial loyalties. But the transition to the nation

state is altogether a different story. We can only reflect in hindsight about the

possibilities of the nature of change that this pre-nation state society underwent.


The transition from ethnicity to nationalism is most evident in the sphere of

culture. Some theorists see this process as a fairly self-contained process. For

them. nationalism develops from 'ethnicity' ·through the articulation of the idea

of the 'nation' and the ideology of 'nationalism', and the rise of a national

culture through printed language, literature, religion and education. etc.

The case studies such as Kosal and Jharkhand, that constitute the tocus of our . work, are not stories of nationalism. Like most nationalism, they do not wart to

secede from the existing 'nation' and form their independent and sovereign

states. Yet, more often than not, the arguments that they use for popular

mobilisation fall into a nationalist mould. This is another reason for which besides

the notion of 'ethnicity' we have also taken up different explanations

concerning nationalism for analysis in this chapter.

There are two funda'mental but opposing ways in which scholars tend to

understand and explain ethnic politics and nationalist mobilisation. First,

according to some, ethnic politics arises in a society primarily because people

are divided on ascriptive grounds. The 'natural' and irreconcilable differences

among people, as this argument goes, create the fertile ground for ethnic

mobilisation to take root. In the literature on nationalism and ethnicity, this


position is usually defined as 'primordialist'. Often the hardcore nationalists tend

to employ this argument to justify their politics and endow it with a degree of

naturalness that it does not possess. 'Primordialist' argument, in spite of the

power of its rhetoric, is deeply flawed on two counts. It fails to explain as to why

in" spite of the ascriptive differences people do not always get mobilised along

ethnic lines. In other words the relationship between the 'naturai markers' such

as race, colour, language and so on and ethnic mobilisation is never direct and

unmediated. The primordial argument fails to capture this. Second, the

primordial argument can hardly explain the timing of an ethnic mobilisation and

as a result can not explain the variations or changes that it goes through.

Opposed to the 'primordialist' argument is another point of view that treats

ethnic mobilisation as a product of historical circumstances and political

conjunctures. Ethnic politics, like all other mobilisational forms, is not something

natural but created by people under complex and contingent conditions.

Unlike the previous argument, it can explain the rise as well as the decline of

ethnic politics. It is this point of view that has contributed a great deal to our

understanding of ethnicity and nationalism in recent times. With the help of

sqme of its influential articulators such as Karl Deutsch, Michael Hechter, Gellner,

Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson we have tried to frame the problem of

our work.


Karl Deutsch's, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the

Foundations of Nationality is a classic as far as the study of nationalism is

concerned. In the words of Karl Deutsch, a people or nation is "community of

social communication" based on a common culture.2 Deutsch was unusual in

seeking to quantify and measure the elements of nationality, looking particularly

at 'social communication' (common language and interpersonal

communication of all kinds). A people or nation is defined by the

'complementarity or relative effiCiency of communication among individuals.' 3

Behind the reasoning of this theory was the then-fashionable systems theory'

derived from cybernetics, with its measurement and use of 'messages' which

sustain a system.

Deutsch believes that nationalism is the product of 'modernisation'. The social

mobilisation of the people and the growth of markets, industries, towns, and

eventually of literacy and mass communication go simultaneously. The trends in

this underlying process of social mobilisation could do much to decide whether

existing national trends in particular countries would be continued or reversed.

Deutsch, drew attention to the basis of the nation as being a pattern of

transaction which marked it off from other nation, thus broadening the focus

from language to all kinds of social and economic data.

2 Kart W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, An Inquiry into the Foundation of

Nationality, Massachusetts, 1966.


When one looks at how particular examples of nationalism are treated by

Deutsch, one sees the difficulty of relating such data to political movements.

Thus, while Deutsch correctly plots the decline of the Gaelic-speaking and

agricultural population of Scotland, he entirely fails to relate this convincingly to

Scottish nationalism, which was based on other considerations. Nevertheless, an

analysis of communication networks in· Scotland, marking it off from England,

would have been a good way to measure the functioning of the Scottish

political system and its potentiality for nationalism.

Michael Hechter' s Internal Colonialism~ The Celtic Fringe in British National

Development is another landmark contribution to the study of nationalism,

especially in the British context. Like Deutsch, he views that commonality will

come from interaction and ethnic homogenisation.4

Hechter, however, reacted against the diffusion theory, and posited 'internal

colonialism' as an explanation for ethnic mobilisation. He maintained that

modernisation has increased the contact among the ethnic groups within a

state, but it has not necessarily brought about ethnic unity. This is because the

inequalities between the regions in a country will relegate peripheral regions to

an inferior position, leaving the core region dominant. The reaction in the

peripheral regions will be hostility to the core,· and if these regions are also

3 Ibid., p. 188


national in character, this will take the form of nationalism. Thus Hechter saw

Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalism's as the product of and perpetuated by the

'internal colonialism of the English core.

Hechter's book was published (in the late 1960s) much before the strong

articulation of Scottish and Welsh national.ism surfaced in United Kingdom. Since

the publication of his first book, he has modified his position on "Internal

colonialism thesis". The noticeable changes between the early and later writings

. lies in his understanding of cultural division of labour theory, which states that in

a situation of internal colonialism, there will be a social stratification of ethnic or

cultural groups. Where the core group will occupy the best class positions and

the peripheral groups the inferior positions. This corresponds to a 'colonising'

nation and 'colonised' nations.

Unfortunately, the facts seem to be at variance with such a division of labour.

For example, Scots are not in practice relegated to inferior social positions in

Britain, Scotland has been as much an industrialised and imperial nation as

England from the eigh.teenth century. Due to 'uneven economic development'

and government and commercial policies the south of England has progressed

more than the other part of the United Kingdom. All this has contributed

towards the identity politics in Scotland and Wales.

4 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism, The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1~66, 1975, p.7 .


Hechter took account of the criticisms levelled at his theory and revised the

'cultural division of labour' thesis (a hierarchical stratification). As regards to a

'segmental cultural division of labour' (a vertical stratification) in which Scots

occupy 'occupational niches deriving from the distinctiveness of their national ;

institutions, such as law, land, education. These may not be inferior positions to

those found in England, since they include high-class occupations. So the

group solidarity of the 'colonised' nations and their assumed conflict with the

colonisers is now called into doubt. By 1985 Hechter saw the capacity of

nationalist organisations to attract , support to the structure of internal

colonialism. Nevertheless, his model remains a compelling one in many contexts

(if not clearly in Scotland). Yet, the recurrence of a 'cultural division of labour' in

most multiethnic societies is particularlystriking.

While not strictly a theory of nationalism, Stein Rokkan's work on regionalism in

Europe with Derek Urwins is relevant to 'understand nation-building' and the

problems of core-periphery relationship. It also deals extensively with 'the

politicisation of 'peripheral predicament' and the central response'.

Rejecting the 'diffusion' model of Deutsch, but not endorsing 'internal

colonialism' model of Hechter, Rokkan and Urwin conclude that

SUB-REGIONAL ASSERTIONS A THEORITICAl PERSPECTIVE

There is no simple centre-periphery polarity across culture, economics and politics. Peripheral predicaments and politicisation emerge out of the incongruity between cultural, economic and political roles, an· incongruity, which has existed on the continent as long as there have been, states. While this remains unresolved, the potential for territorial problems remains, irrespective -of the waxing and waning of individual parties or movements.6

- 9

It ·appears then, that it is a matter of degree whether the 'incongruity between

cultural, economic and political roles' will lead to nationalism in a particular

situation. Rokkan has shown that students of nationalism ought to measure the

degree of harmony between such roles in a state. They should then be able to

explain the relationship between these roles and nationalism.

Ernest Gellner's Nations and Nationalism7 represents a type of theory which

stresses the primacy of modern conditions/modernity in shaping political

thought and social change. He proposes sociological reasons for the rise of

nationalism. That is, the development of 'industrial society', which took place in

certain parts of Europe at the end of the 18th century, and then during the 19th

and 20th centuries throughout most of the world.

5 S. Rokkan, and D.W. Urwin, Economy, Territory, Identity, Politics of West European Peripheries,

London, Sage, 1983 6 1bid., p.1922 7

Earnest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Basil Blackwell, England, 1983,


. Ill feudal or agrarian societies, with its diversity of languages, cultures and ethnic

'

groups, the efforts for homogenisation could only come through an educational

system. This education would train people in 'high culture'. It was necessary to

have one common language in a modern industrial society, for the mobility and

division of labour would follow suit.

Gellner, unlike many other writers on nationalism, does not believe that

nationalism was invented and thrust upon a society. Rather, nationalism 'has

very deep roots in our shared current condition, is not at all contingent, and will

not easily be denied.' 8 This means that nationalism achieved its successes

because it was responded to the needs of the time, rather than as an ideology,

which could be accepted or rejected intellectually in competition with other

ideologies.

At one point, in the early industrial age, he says wide social chasms and the

uneven diffusion of industrialisation produced social conflicts, especially when

cultural differences sparked off these chasms. When cultural differences did not

correspond to class divisions, 'nothing much happened'.9

8 Ibid., p. 56 9 ibid., p.121

Classes, however oppressed and exploited did not overturn the political system when they could not define themselves 'ethnically'. Only when a nation became a class, a visible and unequally distributed category in an otherwise mobile system, did it become politically conscious and activist. Only when a class


happened to be (more or less) a 'nation' did it turn from being a class-in-itself into a class-for-itself or a nation-for-itself. Neither nations nor classes seem to be political catalysts: only nation-classes or class-nations are such.10

11

The main difference between Gellner's theory and that of most Marxists is that

Gellner sees nationalism as the concomitant of any type of industrialisation,

while most Marxists make nationalism dependent on capitalism or capitalist

mode of production as such. With the arrival of proletarian rule, according to

Marx, nationalism becomes redundant. Gellner, on the other hand, does not

see any future situation without nationalism.11

Gellner's discussion on the matching of class and national divisions has a clear

parallel in Hechter's theory of internal colonialism, with its 'cultural division of

labour'. For him, a homogeneous culture at least at the level of high culture is

necessary for modern states, although there may be room for innocuous folk

. r~ cultures 'in a token and cellophane-packages form'. The interaction between

f~r cultural pluralism and 'constitutional democracy', which tries to combine

different national cultures within one state is not adequately theorises by

Gellner.

We can accept much of Gellner's historical analysis of how nation-states and

notionalism emerged strongly at the time of industrialisation in Europe, when the

10 James G. Kellas, Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Macmillan, Houndmils, 1991. P.43


breakdown of feudalism had taken place. It is more difficult to find in Gellner an

explanation for the emergence of nationalism in pre-industrial societies (e.g.

Scotland in the Middle Ages, or England in Elizabethan times), and in non-

inp.ustrialised countries in the Third World. Moreover, nationalism arising out of

'post-materialist values' in 'post-industrial societies is clearly different from

nationalism resulting from industrialisation. In all these contexts the conditions are

different from that of those in 19th century. 'nationalist' Europe. Many forms of

nationalism are found in countries, which are largely agrarian, non-industrialised,

and non-centralised. A very important determinant of nationalism in the Third

World is the legacy of colonialism, and the independence movements directed

against it. I

..

Benedict Anderson's book, Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin

and Spread of Nationalism, 12 is another rec~nt major contribution to the study of

the evolution of nationalism. Unlike Gellner, Anderson is concerned with

exploring the psychological appeal of nationalism: 'What makes people love

and die for nations as well as hate and kill in their name?' Obviously, a purely

functional approach such as Gellner's will not explain the emotions

engendered by nationalism, yet Anderson does not go to the other extreme of

a socio-biological or primordial interpretation. He takes a historical, rather than a

timeless, universalist approach, so that nationalism is seen as emerging at a

11 Ibid., p. 44


specific period in European history. Anderson's originality lies in his explanation of

how and why people in certain circumstances 'imagine' themselves as part of

a nation, and why such an 'imagined community' has a powerful attraction for

them.

He first builds up a set of necessary conditions for the emergence of nationalism.

T~ese are partly material, and partly psychological. He analyses the

'pilgrimages' which people make in their social and economic lives. It is these

pilgrimages which define the boundaries of the nation, and lead people to

identify with it and not with another social or political entity. Such pilgrimages

may thus be taken to be the sufficient condition for particular nations to be

' 'imagined' and thus form' the focus of nationalism.

The principal material precondition for nationalism, according to Anderson, is

what he calls 'print-capitalism', meaning commercial printing on a wide scale. It

is this, which spreads the idea of the nation and the ideology of nationalism, not

only within one 'nation', but also throughout the world. Through print capitalism,

vernacular languages and literature are strengthened and a sense of

community emerges in the minds of the people. In this way, nations are

'imagined' by many people, and linguistic nationalism takes root.

12 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,

Verso, London, 1992.


Printing standardises languages, and also aids the development of capitalism

and the centralised state. A sense of nationality flows from the common

-language and education which printing facilitates. But the emergence of

nationalism is dependent on some other ' modernising' processes, such as

scientific discoveries and the exploration of the world. These broke down old

ways of looking at soCiety, and also the unity of Christendom and the Moslem

world, with. their associated international languages, Latin and Arabic. The

monarchical state too, with its 'divine right of kings' and hierarchical authority

structure, gradually gave way to rule 'by the people'.

At this point, Anderson links up with Gellner by connecting nationalism with

modernisation and the needs of the industrial state. He goes further by

explaining the roots of emotional power of nationalism and draws attention to

nationalism's appeal as a faith in an everlasting life through membership of a

continuing nation. The nation represents the continuity of the extended family

from one generation to the next. In an age of declining religion, with its belief in

an offer-life, nationalism has a special appeal as a 'secular transformation of

fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning'.l3 Anderson stresses the

character of nationalism, not as a political ideology self-consciously followed,

but as s cultural system comparable to kinship and religion.


By pursuing the notion of 'pilgrimage'.,.essentially the pattern of social

communication and 'life chances' of different peoples, Anderson is able to

explain why nationalism has been found in certain societies in the modern

world. The nation is often the social grouping, which represents the boundary for

mobility, both geographic and economic. This may be a matter of sharing a

common language, or of being the object of differential treatment by the state.

If an individual is identified as the member of a particular nation, this may give ..

him access to power and wealth, or conversely, discrimination and deprivation.

In the first instance, it is the state, which determines which 'pilgrimages' can be

made by members of different cultural groups within it. Indeed, the state may

decide who the members of the nations are. It does this to protect the interests

of the powerful, and to keep other groups in a subordinate position.

Nationalism in any society, pre~industrial or not, can be analysed wherever a

system of status and power divisions is based on nationality exists. This was the

case in the multinational Empires of Europe, and in the European colonies in

America, Asia, and Africa. In these areas, the imperial system confined the life

chances or 'pilgrimages' of natives (including Europeans born there, known as

'Creoles' in Latin America) to the colonies. Eventually these natives saw

themselves as members of a nation in rebellion against the imperial country. In

this way, nationalism was born in the colonies. It was led by two groups, called

by Anderson, "pilgrim. creole functionaries" and "provincial Creole printmen".

13 James G. Kellas, p.46


The former was administrators and businessmen of native of Creole origins, and

the latter native/Creole intellectuals and writers whose publications inspired

national consciousnes~. Because of the politics ofimperialism, they were cut off

from advancement in the imperial home country and followed their

'pilgrimages' or careers in the colonies, which they came to perceive as

separate nations in rebellion against the imperial country.

A; later refinement of the concept of 'pilgrimages' relates to 'official

nationalism', which reacts against the new vernacular nationalism. Fearing the

break up of the state through nationalist separatism, the old dynastic states

began a form of nationalism of their own. They tried to impose a particular

national culture on the whole state, and make that the condition for

advancement, socially, politically and economically. Thus, the Russian Empire of

the Czars instituted. the policy of 'Russification', making the use of the Russian

l~nguage obligatory throughout the Empire (this policy was also followed by the ' .

communists in the USSR). In the ex-colonies in Africa and Asia which gained

independence after the second world war, similar official nationalism can be

found, linking successful 'pilgrimages' in their societies to the adoption of a

national language and culture sponsored by the state.


The title 'Imagined Communities' points to the mental processes involved in

nationalism. Members of even the smallest nation can never know most of their

fellow nationals, 'yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' .14

This is not a question of 'false consciousness', for t~ere are, Anderson says, no

't~ue' communities larger than face-to-face primordial villages. All other

communities are imagined.

Anderson introduces new perspectives into the s.tudy of how nationalism has

evolved. But there are ambiguities in conditions (that he projected) for the

emergence of nationalism. Printing could destroy nations as well as create

them. Many languages and nations (or ethnic groups) have died or been

weakened in competition with literary languages and nations possessing printing

resources.

As for religion, it seems that it is not always replaced by nationalism, but may go

hand-in-hand with it. We have seen that churches have reinforced nationalism

in countries such as Ireland, Poland, Armenia, Israel, and Iran. It is difficult

therefore, to relate the rise of nationalism to the decline of religion, except

perhaps in some advanced industrial societ1ies. In some cases, religion and .

nationalism thrive together; in others, where a church is strongly supranational

(as the Roman Catholic Church, or Islam),· there may be tension between

loyalty to religion and loyalty to the state or nation. However, even

14 Benedict Anderson, p. 47

SU~-REGIONAL ASSERTIONS A THEORITICAL PERSPECTIVE 18

supranational churches can underpin nationalist movements against oppressive

s·tates, which deny nationalism its free expression. Thus the Roman Catholic

Church and Islam are closely involved with nationalism in Eastern Europe and

Asia.

Anderson's use of the idea of ipilgiimage', points to the pattern of

communication and social mobility ·. as a powerful binding force in the

consciousness and action of social groups {as Karl Deutsch did earlier). But it is

' important to ask the following question here: why do people seem to prefer

their fellow nationals as companions on their pilgrimages, and why do states use

nationality as a method of dividing power? Can there be something special

about nationality, which is not present in other social, economic and political

divisions?

Anthony D. Smith's book, The Ethnic Origins of Nations 15 focuses on ethnicity as .

tlie precursor of nationalism, and gives an explanation of the transition from

ethnic identities and loyalties to those relating to nations. For Smith, "modern

nationals simply extend; deepen and streamline the ways in which members of

ethnie {Smith's term for ethnic groups) assoCiated and communicated. They do

not introduce startlingly novel elements, or change the goals of human

association and communication."16

15 .A D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986. 16 'Ibid., p. 215.


Hy is thus concerned to emphasise the continuity between ethnic identities and

loyalties on the one hand and nationhood and nationalism on the other. In

contrast. both Gellner and Anderson stress the essential novelty and modernity

of nationalism. Smith does acknowledge the changes, which made ethnicity

into nationalism, and his explanations are similar to Gellner's and Anderson's. For

example, the decline of religion, the rise of the centralised and bureaucratic

state, as well as the pressures of the industrial economy is necessary for 'ethnie'

to be mobilised and politicised into nations. But the 'new imaginings' and new

thoughts (clearly a reference to Anderson's Imagined Communities) which lead I . .

people into national consciousness and nationalism are not really so new. Their

essence can be found in pre-national communities at least as far back as

Ancient Greece and· Rome, although there was ambivalence at that time

about 'the masses' and their claim to be included in the 'ethnie'.

Smith moves the study of nationalism back to the pre~modern: period, as Hans

Kohn did in The Idea of Nationalism 17 (1944). But Smith sees more in common

bytween that modern nations and their precursors than Kohn did. At the same

time, Smith talks of 'continuity but not identity' between 'ethnicism' and

nationalism. Nationalism is more concerned with statehood or some form of self

government than 'e'thnicism', which is less clearly political. Nevertheless,

nationalism does more effectively what pre-modern ethicists tried to do, that is,

keep out foreigners and diffuse to their kinsmen the traditions and myths of their

ancestors, using the modern mass education system.

17 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, New York, Macmillan, 1944.


Smith here echoes Gellner's theory of nationalism, where the latter speaks of

the nation's education system and 'high culture' engendering cultural -

homogeneity. But Gel.lner saw this in functional terms: the means to economic

efficiency in a developed industrial state. Smith, on the other hand, dwells on

the traditional or pre-modem content to national culture, which has little to do

with industrialisation. National myths, old languages, etc., are the substance of

nationalism as much as modernising communications and education, and

Sr;nith's theory is petter able to cope with these than Gellner's. Where Smith

seems to leave questions unanswered is regarding the transition from ethnicity

to nationalism, and in the strength or weakness of particular nationalism.

'Continuity, but not identity' between ethnicity and nationalism opens up as

many problems as it solves, similar to those involving the connection between ·

human nature and nationalism, or betwe'en ethnocentrism and nationalism.

""'/ J - ;/

T~e theories discussed here are important for understanding nationalism, • '

because they seek to explain how nationalism came to dominate politics in the

modern period. In comparison to the study of human nature and the study of •

political ideas, they stress the periodisation of history, and the particular contexts · ·

in which nationalism arose. They locate nationalism in time and place, rather

than in the universals of 'ethnocentrism' and the 'idea of nationalism'. In the

theories discussed in this chapter; it is apparent that developments in history are

closely related to the emergence of nationalism in different parts of the world at

different periods.


The idea of nationalism and the ideal of the 'nation-state' were not necessarily

based on ethnicity. Rather they stressed the voluntary coming together of

people in a state with a shared culture. That is how Gellner analyses the

character of 'nation-states'. For him, ethnicity is not a 'given', but a construct of

the state itself.

Yet in modern times, especially in the twentieth century, ethnicity has come to

play a more important role in politics. In essence this proposes an exclusivist form

of nationalism, participation in which is determined by criteria other than human

abilities.

A more open form of nationalism is what is called social nationalism. This is based

on a shared national culture. It is'inclusive' in the sense that anyone can adopt

that culture and join the nation, even if that person is· not considered to be a

member of the 'ethnic nation'. 'Social nationalism' can thus be distinguished

from 'ethnic nationalism' on the one hand and 'official (or state) nationalism'

on the other, the .latter being essentially based on patriotism, with no necessary

ethnic orcultural basis.

There are several factors responsible for ethnic resurgence. According to some,

ore of the most important factors is primordial loyalty among the people. For

the primordialist, culture is the main factor of ethnic identity. According to them,


ethnic identities are not 'chosen 1 but are 'given 1 i.e., these identities proceed

inexorably froin the cultural past. Looked this way, they perceive ethnicity as

immutable.ls There is no doubt that such afflictions provide i-mpetus and

impulses for social and political mobilisation.

Furthermore, the premise of primordialists being particularistic they are

perceived as potential hindrances in the process of national cohesion. It is also

argued that since ethnic attachments pertain to the non-national domain of ; ;

human personality, they lead to social turbulence and violence and thereby·

tend to be dysfunctional in the development processes of the civil society.

The primordialist view limits ethnicity to ()ctual primordial ties. But some of these

ties can be changed· or acquired; For instance, sectarian and even linguistic

affiliation can be changed during the lifetime of an individual and can form the

basis of ethnic identity. Secondly even the ascriptive identity of caste can also

be acquired through appropriating mythologies; Thirdly, it is incorrect to argue

that eth.nic identities and boundaries remain fixed. On the contrary, they wax

ahd wane according to context. Further, the mere presence of ethnicity does

not necessarily mean ethnic formation. The latter are the result of cohesive and

concerted political ac.tion.J9

18 M.S.A. Rao, and Francine R. Frankel, (eds.) Dominance and State Power in Modern India, vol. I, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, p. 38 19 Paul R. Brass. Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia, in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds.). Political Identity in South Asia, Curzon Press, London (1981). pp. 35-43.


II

India, with a vast and complex labyrinth of religious, linguistic, racial, tribal and

caste allegiances has given rise to a complex political identity. No general and

abstract understanding and uniform political solution to the problem of ethnic

discontents seem possible in such a situation. For example the policies suitable

fdr the tribal dissidence of the Naga are not applicable to the caste-based

disaffection of landlords in Andhra. So far as ethnic issues are concerned,_ it is

worthwhile to look the. responses of Indian ·states towards the communatrian

mobilisation and its interaction with the protagonists of identity politics in the

country.

To sum up, it can be said that each problem has its specialities and demands

specific solution. Second the primordial affiliation of individual can be changed

during the life of an individual and can form the basis of ethnic identity.

In 1960s the modernisation the<j>rists predicted that with the_ process of j

economic and political development, ascriptive identities of people would

become redundant. For better or worse, this has not happened. In fact some

' scholars argue that the procesg -of modernisation has sharpened ethnic


identities and has enhanced their political potential.20 To put differently,

modern technology and knowledge have increased mobilisation potential of

ascriptive identities. It is also argued that social and political mobilisation has

outpaced the growth of political parties and modern institutions.21

Advances in communication and transport have increased the cultural

awareness of communities. Modernisation tends to create considerable

awareness of separ~te identities, and the situation calls for considerable

ingenuity in creating new patterns of federal association. For instance, the

secessionist demands in the Naga region are being managed · by the

establishment of an independent Naga province and the adoption of a flexible

attitude in New Delhi towards ,the Naga rebels which has resulted in ;

c9nsiderable dissension and divisions among the rebels.

During the colonial era, government employment was often the critical factor in

the growth of ethnic rivalries between ·groups, because it provided the

authorities with a means, both to reward the collaborationist aristocracy and to

create new collaborationist groups by distributing patronage discretely. If

government employment expands rapidly enough and other employment

opportunities keep apace, while literacy and urbanisation are kept relatively '

low, then such a system of authority. may perpetuate itself for some time without

20 Sajal Basu, Politics of La~guage, Ethnicity, Identity, JIAS, Shimla, Manohar, New Delhi, 1992.


much ethnic conflict: However, usually, the social mobilisation of backward

ethnic groups begins to move more rapidly than the creation of new job

opportunities.22 At this point, the classic problem of a developing or modernising

society occurs: that of the discontent of the educated unemployed.

Where caste, tribal, or linguistic differences exist to separate ethnically the

relatively disadvantaged aspirant elite groups from their competitors in the

dominant group, these differences will be the basis for a special claim for jobs

and other advantages. Such demands are usually associated with the efforts to

mobilise the disadvantaged ethnic group and to create a new sense of identity

among its members. A disadvantaged caste group may claim in this context to

sharpen its identity that the dominant group is really culturally different and

descends from alien intruders and that it alone represents the true and

indigenous culture.23 A tribe or linguistic group might do the same and strive to

assert the distinctiven~ss of their mother tongue and try to demonstrate its

greatness. If the speakers of the language are geographically concentrated,

then a claim would naturally be made for the dominance of the language as

the medium of education in the sc;hools and the administration in the relevant ;

territory.

21 Rajni Kothari, Ethnicity in Kumar David and _Santsilan Kadirgamar (eds.), Ethnicity Identity Conflict Crisis, Arena Press, Hong Kong, 1989, p.15. i 22 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Theory and Comparison, Sage, New Delhi, 1991, p. 33. 23 For example, In Madras, during the British rule, the non-Brahmin caste leaders who resented the Brahmin dominance in the public sphere and in other aspect Of life developed a myth the Brahmins were intruders from north India, Marguerite R. Barnett, The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 1976.


Although elite conflict and job competitions are common in modernising

societies, they do not always impel distinctive cultural groups towards ethnic

differentiation. The process of modernisation may produce so great an

imbalance between one group and another that many ethnic groups may

become assimilated in one. another. This can happen, however, only if

government policy also works in favour of one group over another, particularly

with regard to the medium of education in the schools. Such a situation may

arise when speakers of an unstandardised local dialect or of an old, but non-

modernised language are concentrated in a backward region of a modernising

country. Urbanisation and industrialisation in the region being minimal,

educational opportunities are only available in the official language of the

' . state, which is different from the local language. Where there is no local

religious elite and relatively few socially mobilised people within a distinct

linguistic group, a gradual process qf assimilation to the language and culture of

that dominant group can take place. When modernisation and industrialisation

begin to significantly affect this area, new elite groups may arise to mobilise the

r~mnants of the group more or less successfully, but. the size and shape of the

group would have been affected permanently by the earlier period of .

assimilation. 24

24 Paul R. Brass, op.cit, p. 34.


An alternative situation also favourable to assimilation and decline in ethnic

identity occurs when differential modernisation so favours a minority ethnic

group that it chooses to assimilate with the language and culture of the ruling

ethnic group. As education and industrialisation penetrate more deeply into the

society, such a process of assimilation may not save an ethnic group from being

the target of the next group to rise. The assimilated group may remain

distinguishable enough by cultural or religious markers, even when its members

do not choose to use such markers to build communal consciousness. Such was

the case in Hungary when 'a. new intelligentsia' arose 'from the ranks of the

peasantry and Christian small bourgeoisie' to compete for a shrinking number of

government jobs and for economic opportunities with the Jewish middle

classes.25

Thus, differential social mobilisation in modernising, multiethnic societies may

favour the differenti.ation or . assimilation of particular groups and the

transformation of ethnic boundqries. But it always leads at some stage to some

forms and degrees of ethnic conflict and competition, arising out of elite

competition for control over the local society or for new opportunities in the

modern segments of a developing society. It affects only groups that either

contain threatened traditional elite or those that benefit by modernisation and

industrialisation sufficiently to produce an educated intelligentsia or an

entrepreneurial class to compete for prestige positions and economic

25 George Branny, Magyar Jew or Jewish Magyar, Canadian -American Slavic studies, Vol. VIII, No.1 Spring, 1974), p.36.


advantages. Most of the members of such ethnic groups in societies at _early

stages of modernisation may, remain for decades a relatively unmobilized rural

peasantry or occupy lower class positions in the cities and towns. They are

mobilised over time, manipulated by contending elite groups, and taught the

language and culture that the predominant elite determines they should learn.

These are some of the contexts in which a mobilised elite uses the regional

sentiments for promoting its interest.

Regional forces have been active in different parts of the country for quite

some time either in the form of a demand for a separate state within the union

(e.g. Jharkhand) or in the form of a demand for a separate state with

sovereignty (e.g., the demand for Khalistan). Separatism may be defined as an . . ..

instance of political disintegration wherein political actors in one or more sub

systems withdraw their loyalties, expectations and political activities from a

jurisdictional centre and focus them on centres of their own26. Looking at the

Indian scenario one scholar has defined four different types of separatism in

India, namely linguistic separatism, cultural separatism, regionalist separatism

based on economic and political grievances and son of the soil separatism.27 In

the following pages we attempt to capture the growth of nationalism in India

since the pre-colonial period in order to have a deeper and clearer

understanding of the problem of regionalisation.

26 E.Ha~s. The Uniting of Europe, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968, p. 16.


One notices the development of different regions of the Indian subcontinent

between the eighth and fourteenth centuries. The establishment of several

ruling dynasties followed the collapse of the Gupta Empire, each with its cultural

distinctiveness. This was also the period during which flourished the cultural

variety of India in terms of art, literature, theatre, architecture and oral traditions.

The hitherto common denominator of Indian art was replaced in varying

degrees by various regions, by local or regional schools of art. The fourteenth

century poet Amir Khusro, listed various languages spoken in India. The religious

preachers sang devotional songs in regional languages such as Bengali

(Chaitnya), Awadhi (Kabir), Braj (Surdas), and Punjabi (Nanak). Clearly, by the .

fourteenth century nearly all-modern languages had been formed.28 This was

how the linguistic basis of nationality was being prepared for the emergence of

nationalities during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

The historical experience of the British rule in India and the struggle of the Indian ·

people initiated the process of formation of the Indian nation state. But the

Indian nationalism ever since its birth, had assumed a twin character29. At the all

lddia level the anti-imperialist struggle broke down the barriers of caste, religion

and language but at the local I regional level the. linguistic consciousness of

27 See J.R, Wood, Separatism in India and Canada: An OveNiew, Indian Journal of Political Science, July- December 1981. · . · 28 Prabhat Datta, Regionalisation of Indian politics, Sterling publishers, New Delhi, 1993. 29 Atul Guha, Nationalism: Pan-Indian Regionalism in Historical perspective, Social Scientist, 1984, p. 45.


different nationalities sharpened further. The British rule provided the umbrella of

common cause to different nationalities. The British rule turned a hitherto

heterogeneous society into a single political entity, preparing thereby the

ground for the growth of national consciousness. The colonial rulers favoured a '

policy of administrative divisions for the purpose of containing growing

resistance against the British rule. To this end, tension between nationalities was

aptly exploited. Added to this was the principal concern of the colonial policy

makers to subordinate the interest of India to those of the Empire. This resulted in

a retarded growth of the colonial economy and society.30

Linguistic reorganisation of the provinces received very little attention during the '

rule of the British rule. Administrative convenience was the overwhelming

concern of the imperial rulers. The British had in fact used language as a tool for

promoting the cause of the imperial regime~ Yet this was not taken into account

in the division of Bihar and Orissa areas from Bengal Presidency for political

reasons in 1903.31 The Montegu-Chelmsford report preferred small

homogeneous states on the basis of language.

During the days of the freedom movement the Indian National Congress lent its

support to the linguistic nationality principle by opposing the partition of Bengal.

The Nagpur session of the Congress held in 1920 resolved to reorganise the

30 Prabhat Datta, op. cit.,p. 6. 31 Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, New Delhi, 1981, p. 111

.. SUB-REGIONAL ASSERTIONS A THEORITICAL PERSPECTIVE 31

Pradesh Congress Committees (PCC) on linguistic basis.32 It was certainly an

organisational innovation, which laid stress on homogeneous linguistic units

ignoring the existing administrative demarcation of provinces in accordance

with the colonial policy. The significance of language as a principle for.

provincial reorganisation was further accepted at the Calcutta session of the

AICC in 1937.33 In the 1_945-46 election manifesto, the Congress firmly committed

itself to linguistic reorganisation.34 Throughout the nationalist struggle, the

Gandhian leadership conceded the principle of linguistic reorganisation of

states as a' valid and legitimate demand, but pushed it to the back seat till

independence was achieved. It may be relevant here to mention that when

t~e Simon Commission was condemned everywhere, and boycotted by the

Congress, the Orissa Congress leaders, viz. Gopabandhu Das, Godavarish

Mishra, Sarat Das etc. welcomed the commission which recommended the

establishment of Daniel Committee for considering the formation of new states,

viz., Orissa and Bihar.35

During the formation of the Constituent Assembly a commission was set up

under the Chairmanship of Dar. It suggested that "the formation of provinces '

exclusively, on linguistic considerations is not in the larger interest of the Indian

nation,. and should not be taken in hand.36 The presence of various linguistic ~

32 Ibid, po 7 o 33 See Meenakshi Jain, The Congress Party, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi; 1991, po 240 34 Sajal Basu, Regional Movements Politics of Language, Ethnicity-ldentity, liAS, Shimla, 1992, Po 290 35 Ibid, ppo 28-29° 36

0 R Gopal, Linguistic Affairs of India, Asia publishing House, London, 1966, po73


groups demanding demarcation of the state boundaries and dissolution of

princely states was sought to be avoided by this commission. From within the

Congress the pressure was mounting. In order to assuage their feelings a three

man committee was set up with Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabh Bhai Patel and

Pattabhi Sitaramaiah as members (JVP Committee). This committee, though

recognised the rising ·aspirations of the linguistic nationalists, made it clearly

known that at the present juncture it could not be considered.

The refusal by the constitution makers to recognise the principle of linguistic

nationality caused consternation among the congressmen at the provincial

level. The Vishai-Andhra movement gathered immense momentum during the

late forties. The death of veteran Gandhian, Petti Sriramlu, following a fifty nine

days of fasting in 1952:-53 forced Nehru to announce the formation of Andhra.37

This decision stimulated the demand for the reorganisation of states· in India,

especially in the southern part of the country as an offshoot of which came the

States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) in 1953-54.38

The SRC report generally accepted the linguistic principle for the reorganisation

of the states. But linguistic reorganisation by itself was not a panacea for the ills

of regional aspiration and consequent divisive tendencies. It was a means, not

an end in itself. The principle of the matter remained unresolved. The Indian

State had always taken the position that there was only one nation-India. The

37 Sajal Basu, op. cit, p. 31.


creation of linguistic states strengthened the hands of the regional bourgeoisie.

They now began to establish close ties with the dominant linguistic, communal

and caste groups in order to strengthen· and consolidate their position in the

field of decision-making and power politics at the provincial level. This resulted in

a shift in the country's political life from an all India to a regional orientation

facilitating the growth 'of reorganisation of Indian politics.

"Linguistic redistribution of provinces has been an integral part of the Indian national movement. Having sponsored the linguistic principle for nearly forty years, it is impossible for the leaders of political thought now to . reverse the current"39

1~ the subsequent phase linguistic regionalism was as disturbing as '

communalism. On the recommendations of the S.R.C.,. the States were re-

organised mainly on linguistic basis except that of Bombay and Punjab, which

were made bilingual. But following prolonged agitation's there, they were later

re-organise.d. Bombay was bifurcated into Gujarat and Maharashtra in 1960.

Nagaland was constituted in 1963 and Punjab was divided into Punjab and

Haryana in 1966. All these changes completed the process of re-organisation of

states on linguistic basis and set a trend in favour of formation of smaller States.

Such changes had important repercussions in Indian politics. The re-organisation

so far undertaken has not made the States linguistically homogenous. For

example, Bihar had two major linguistic zones, Mdithili and Bhojpuri, Maharashtra

38 K.V.N Rao, The Emergence of Andhra Pradesh, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1973. 39 .Sajal Basu, op. cit, p. 25.


had Konkani and Kannada, linguistically different from the rest of the

community, and there are substantial differences between Telugu spoken in

T~lengana, the ceded districts and the delta, the three distinct regions of

Andhra. And there are pockets of substantial linguistic minorities and tribals in

other States. It is not likely that they would remain content with being neglected

politically, socially and economically without· claiming for some form of

autonomy.40

Linguistic considerations apart, there were other forces at work which creeped

into consideration later on. The creation of five States viz. Nagaland, Manipur, I

Tripura, Meghalaya and Assam was definitely • in negation of the cardinal

principles, which have generally governed the establishment of any new State.

It marked a departure from the policy of forming linguistic State on the basis of

the Eighth Schedule alone. "At the level of articulation the creation of the hill

States was based on grievances against the exploitation of the 'plainsmen'

particularly the Assamese." 41

The failure of planning was another important factor, which helped the

emergence of the trend towards smaller States. One of the most striking

experiences of planned development in India has been that economically

backward areas have gained little from planning. In many States though the

40 Ashok Chandra, Under the Indian Sky, Bombay, Nachiketa Publication, 1971, pp. 54-55


development effort has increased in every successive plan period, its benefit

has percolated more to the already developed areas. The failure of planning

in:creased economic imbalances between States, and between regions and

sub-regions. A number of big States today conceal a good deal of regional

disparities which have been the source of serious problems of varying

proportions in socio-economic and political spheres. The T elengana agitation,

the language riot in Assam, agitation of the Vidharba region of Maharashtra,

the Chatisgarh region of Madhya Pradesh, the eight hill districts of l,Jttar Pradesh,

Jammu and Ladakh regions of Kashmir, the Jharkhand movement, the conflict

between the people of old Mysore and the integrated part of Karnataka and · '

the local patriotism of the Shiv Senas are only a few examples of manifestation

of such tendencies which are pressing for a fresh look at the existir\g scheme of

re-organisation of the constituent units of the Union of lndia.42 The demands

made in these cases are not based on linguistic considerations though dialectal

affinities in some cases have served the purpose of binding a group together

atong with ethnic, historical, cultural or sub-cultural and above all economic

ties.

Assam furnishes the classic example. Undivided Assam had three distinct

regional linguistic divisions. Assamese was the language of the Bramhaputtra

41 S.K. Chaube, The Ethnic and Social Bases of Indian Federalism. Calcutta, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences. Occasional paper No. 17. 1978, p.20 . 42 For the demands made by K. C. Soshit, Secretary, Uttarkhand Rajya Parishad for the eight hill districts of Uttar Prdesh. see The Indian Express. August 24. 1977. The demands supported by Balraj Madhok


Valley, Bengali of Cachar, while the hill districts had a large number of dialects.

The demand made by the Congress in 1960 to recognise Assamese as the

official language of the state gave rise to the worst linguistic riots in May 1960.43

This had occurred primarily because the people of Upper Assam and the

Bengalis of Cachar opposed the move. As it was rightly observed then in a

policy statement of the state government:

"While these riots were apparently the result of language agitation, they are the manifestation of a deep-seated social and economic malady which unfortunately have afflicted the people of Assam."«

The relative prosperity of the Bengali-speaking people in Assam provoked the

Assamese to launch a movement to drive them out.45 Assam is one of the most

economically backward areas of India. With tea gardens occupying a major

part of the State's total cultivable land, Assam is more of a primary commodity

producing economy than most other parts of tndia. After the partition of India in

1947, not only did the flow of economic migration from East Pakistan continue,

but also added to this flow were large number of political migrant-Hindu

re:fugees. During . 1979-85 protest against what was claimed to be illegal

migration and a de facto government policy of enfranchisement of these

immigrants led to five years of political turmoil and major outbreaks of violence

who favoured separate state for Vidharva Braj, Oudh, Jammu and Kashmir Valley see The Indian Express, August 28, 1977. 43 Sushil Kumar, Panorama of State Politics, in Iqbal Narain (ed.) State politics in India, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1967, p. 3. 44 Ibid, p. 3. 45 Quoted in Sushil Kumar, Panorama of State Politics, Iqbal Narain (ed.), State Politics in India, Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967, p.41.


in· the state. Earlier subnationalist political mobilisation had focused on cultural

demands such as the use of Assamese as the official language and as the

language of education, and on economic front, for projects such as Bridges

over Bramhaputra, refineries and railway lines.46 Thus when the Untied Liberation

Front of Assam (ULFA) 1n the late 1980s described India's relationship with Assam

as colonial and demanded that multinational and lndian~owned tea

companies do more for the development of the State, it intervened in a long

debate within Assamese subnationalist intellectual life. In some ways, if

Assamese subnationalism before ULFA was shaped by orthodox ideas on what it .

tdkes to achieve development and progress, the rise of ULFA marks the advent

of critical ideas about development and progress, not unlike, say the

relationship between. the dependency and other critical paradigms of

development.

Economic and historical considerations divide Maharashtra into four regions viz.,

Vidarbha, Marathwada, Konkan and Western MaharashtraY The

recommendations made by the S.R.C. favoured a separate unit for the Marathi-

speaking districts of Madhya Pradesh known as the Vidarbha region,48 but the

Government of India overlooked the recommendation. Vidarbha was a

Zamindari area while Maharashtra proper was Royatwari. In comparison to

Western Maharashtra, the other three regions were undeveloped and

46 .sanjib Baruah, Politics of Subnationalism: Society Versus State in Assam, P. Chatte~ee (ed.), State and Politics in India, Oxford University Press. New Delhi, 1997. P.499


backward, a fact which had received the recognition of · the State

Government.49 This had led to the formation of Madhya Vidarbha Sangharsha

Samiti, which has been pressing the Union Government tc concede the

demand for a separate Vidarbha State. The Samiti has warned the Government

a number of times that it might resort to violence in case the demand for

statehood was over looked.50

The main regional divisions of Madhya Pradesh are Mahakoshal, Vindhya

Pradesh, Madhya Bharat. Bhopal and Chhatisgarh come under the Mahakoshal

region with a history of exploitation, backwardness, cultural richness, dialectical

affinity and concentration of tribal people, which have all together put forward

the demand for a separate state for the Chhatisgarh region. 51

A feeling of discrimination persist among the people of Jammu and Ladakh

regions in the state of Jammu and Kashmir who nourish certain grievances

against the State Government that is dominated by the people of the Valley. A

decade back, the agitation in Ladakh by the Buddhists demanding more

autonomy, was the result of a "regional outlook" of the Government of

Kashmir. 52 In the same way, the people of Jammu complain that the "numerical

superiority, political importance, cultural homogeneity and easy communication

47 Development of Vidharba: A Review. Directorate of Publicity, Government of Maharastra, p. 2 48 Report of the States Reorganisation Commission. Government of India, New Delhi, 1955, pp.124-125. 49 Development of Vidharva: A Review p. 1-2 · 50 The Hindustan Times, June 18, 1969. 51 Sushil Kumar, op.cit., p. 35.


of the valley has put Jammu on a comparative disadvantage."53 Now the

ethnic resurgence in Kashmir has taken a disastrous turn. The militants of the

valley are virtually on warpath to achieve their goal. This resurgence is a

product of a long drawn out process of underdevelopment, gradual

encroachment of autonomy, which was . granted to Kashmir through the

Instrument of Accession and political myopia of the union government. This

dissent has been amply exploited in international sphere an India and Pakistan

have had a live problem in their midst.54

In Karnataka, there are problems of adjustment, between old Mysore and

integrated part of Karnataka. The Vokkaligas are dominant in old Mysore and

the Lingayats in the Karnataka region, the latter dominating in the fields of

politics, economy, administration and education in the State.55 The minority

communities, "every where from Vidhan Sabha to village Panchayat, are

pushed out and feel frustrated."S6 This has given rise to separatist demand on the

part of the leaders of old Mysore who argue that the economic exploitation of

the old Mysore region can be put to an end only when it is allowed to develop

separately .s7

52 The Times of India, March 7, 1969. 53 Balraj Puri quoted in H. D. Suteri, Regional Autonomy or Small States, p.128 54 Prabhat Datta, Regionalisation of Indian Politics, Sterling publishers, New Delhi, 1993, p.90. 55 K.S. Mune Gowd, Mysore: Caste based Factions' Regionalism, Link, 15th August 1969, p.49. 56 Gourish Kaikini, Integration in Action in Mysore State,1956-1966, Bangalore, The Directorate of Publicity, Government of Mysore, Vidhan Sabha 1966, p.49 57 H.D.Suteri, op. cit, p.128. ·


The rise of militant Senas and voluntary organisations championing the "son of

the soil" rationale, and their violent agitation may also be attributed to

grievances relating to lack of economic opportunities, imbalances in the

economic developm~nt of different regions and inadequacy of employment

opportunities.58 These Senas fight against the immigrants, reflect the severe

resentment of the 'domination of the local by the outsiders.' 59

When India became independent, not only the British administrators, but also

sqholars, commentators and general intelligentsia both Indian and Western,

gave India a few short years before the whole edifice would crumble to bits.60

This point of view has a dominant presence even today. Which is why every time

there is a conflict over caste, or religion, or language, the cry goes up that this is

the beginning of the end. It is this threat that inhibits a proper understanding of

communal and ethnic conflicts in India. In the past fifty years India has faced

many storms. The demand for linguistic provinces, movements like the Shiv Sena,

frequent caste and communal riots, the Punjab crisis and Ram Janmabhoomi . '

'

and Babri Masjid are some of·the flash points of India's brief, but turbulent history

as an independent country. Between ethnic and communal mobilisations,

ethnic hysteria and jingoism according to Gupta hold greater potential for . .

damage in future. In most instances communal demands have been largely

58 Johari, J.C. Reflections on Indian Politics, New Delhi, S. Chand & Co. 1974, pp.170-192. 59 Mohan Deep, Shiva Sena, Is it a Spent Force, Caravan No. 616, January 2, New Delhi, 1978, pp. 15-16. 60 See Dipankar Gupta in The Hindustan Times (Special Feature), August 15, 1998 Ethnic Conflict: Can the fires be doused.


satisfied, as with linguistic demarcation and caste reservations. In cases where

the matter is still on the boil the combatant seem to have found their niche in

the political firmament and are quite adept at using the system.

• ..

The emergence of the ethnic option is not an independent factor but largely

depend on the health and vibrancy of the other available political options. As

ethnic passion is rarely ever limited to a locality or a region, the extent of its

attraction is linked to how other national ideologies are faring.

Due to growing urbanisation, a large number of poor castes are now migrating

for a variety of reason~. With an urban foothold these castes have much greater

confidence, and con~equently, · become much more difficult . to randomly

victimise. Over the next fifty years there is a tendency towards a phenomenal

increase in urbanisation which will somewhat reduce the sway of pure caste

based ideologies in the public realm. This spurt in urbanisation, without

concomitant economic developments, has a greater potential for increasing

crime and civil violence, but not necessarily of a communal character.

In disputes between states, language is always not a potent symbol of discord

as many states in India have overlapping linguistic boundaries (for example

Uttar Prdesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana and Himachal

Pradesh). The danger, however, is that these disputes could be ethnicised by

irr~sponsible politicians, as happened in Punjab, by playing on the latent fears of '


a weak nation state. If we believe that we are about to come to pieces as a

country then we are encouraging those who play precisely on these fears. Such

ethnic jingoistic elements are interested in casting certain communities as

enemies of the nation so that they can bask in the glory of self proclaimed

patriotism.

The problems of ethni~ conflict or regional disparities in the States, which have

failed to draw the national headlines, have mostly gone unstudied. Keeping this

fact in view the present study relates to the problem of two sub-regional

movements in Orissa, Kosal and Jharkhand. In view of the vastness of the size of

the Union of India and its manifold diversities, students of comparative politics

con study each one of its constituent parts as a total system in order to explore

its special characteristics and to focus attention on the political aspects of

modernisation. This study seeks to bring to the fore the social, economic and

political forces which go on to the making. of a sub-regional identity formation.

Further it seeks to delineate the interplay between the forces in their operation

in a specific context. Both the movements studied here have their origins in the ·

colonial past. With independence the charges in the body politic and the

l~nguage of politics underwent a massive reversal. This is an attempt to map I

these changes.