CHAPTEI( VII

INTEREST ARTICULATION AND INTEREST AGGREGATION

224 CHAPTER - VII

INTEREST ARTICULATION Al';ll INTEHEST AGGREGATION

The function or converting demands into general policy

alternatives is called interest aggregation, Every political

system has certain ways o£ aggregating ~Jle 'interests, claims,

and demands which are articulated by _tJle- interest groups or the polity, Otten the functions of' articulation and aggrega­

tion overlap, just as do those of' aggregation,recruit9ent,and

rule-making, In some political systems, such as the authori­

tarian and the primitive ones, the thrie functions of' articula­

tion, aggregation, and rule making may be hajdly dit:ferentiated

from one another.

In other systems, such as the modern western ones,there

are a~parent partitions in the process; and separate structures

or sub-systems with obvious boundaries play a distinctive role.

In the Anglo-American democracies this three-told division in

functioru maintains the :flow from society to pali ty and from

polity to society ( ~rom input to output and again back to

input).

To assimilate and transform these interests into a

relatively small number of' alternatives of' policy and personnel,

a middle range of' processing is necessary, ~ these two

:functions a"'e per:formed in substantial paY't be~ore the authori­

tatige governmental structures awe reached, then the output

functions of' rule-making and rule-application are facilitated,

and the political and governmental processes become calculable

and responsible. The outputs may be related to and controlled

by the inputs. Consequently, the circulation becomes relatively

free by virtue of' good boundary maintenance or division ot

labour, But normally this does not happen in the Indian political

process.

Thus, the distinction between interest articulation and

aggregation is fluid one. Modern interest groups, particularly

the •peak• associations, viz, labour, agriculture, business,oarry

aggregation quite far, sometimes to the point of' speaking tor

all tb.e classes o£ the society.

225 In this study we reserve the term "aggregation"

ror the •ore inclusive levels o£ the combinatory process•••

In £act, the aggregative £unction may be per£ormed within

all or the eub-s.stems o£ the political system --legislative

bodies, political executives,bureaucracy, media o£ communica­

tion, party system, interest groups or the various types.

Parties, factions, lobbies in legislatures! cliques or

£'actions in political executives; and bureaucracies ,individual

parties 01· party coalitions outside the legislatures! and

individual interest groups or adhoc coalitions of' interest

groups -- all perform an aggregative runction, either by

£ormulating alternative public policies or by supporting or

advocating cbanges in political personnel.

POLITICAL PARTIES

AND AGGREGATION 1

But again it is the party system which is the distinc­

tively modern structure of political aggregation, In the

modern, developed democratic political system it regulates

or gives order to the performance o£ the aggregative function

by the other structures. As in France, so in India, tarti es

and interest groups do not constitute differentiated, autono­

mous political subsystems. They interpenetrate one another,

There are some parties which more or less,control interest

groups e. g. the ~mmu.,ist Party and the Communist - domina ted

trade unions and to a lesser degree the Socialist Party and

the Socialist trade unions,

Vhen parties control interest groups they may inhibit

the capacity or interest groups to formulate pragmatic speci£ic

demands; they impart a political-ideo-iogical content to

interest group activity.

parties t.,ey inhibit the

When interest groups control ._ the

capacity o£ the party to combine

specific interests into programmes with wider appeal, What

reaches the legislative process from the interest groups and

through tne political parties thus arl the 1 raw 1 unaggregated

demanus or specific interests, or the diffused, uncompromising

or revolutionary and reactionary tendencies o£ the right or the

226 lef't.Since no interest group is lnrge enough to have a

maJority, and the party system cannot aggregate dit"f'erent

interests into a stabLe majority or a coherent opposition, D

the elac~r<U and legislative processes f'ail to provide

alternative and e.ff'ectiva choicos. The result is a legislature

penett·:,tc'" by relatively narrow interests and uncompromising

idec.lo"ical tendencies. A legislature which can be used as an

arena f'oz· propaganda, or :for the protection or special interests,

by veto or otherwise, but not f'or the ef't'ective ru1d timely

f'ormulatian and su,~,>port of' large policy decisions. And without

a strong legislature, special interests and ideological

te"1dencies penetrate the bureaucracies, and undermine its

neutral aHJ instrUIDental character •

.!!!:,!'TERNS OF INTEREST AGGHEGATION IN INDIAN

POLITICAL SYSr&~l

Before independence, interests were usually aggregated

either by the colonial British Government or by the nationalist

movements. As the nationalist movement grew in size in India j

and attracted trade unions, peasantry, business, students, and

the like, its strength t'urther increased. So much so, that

by 1946 it appeared to be winning support t'rom within the

military services as well. By the late 1930's the Congress

Party, in its effort to reconcile diverse movements within it,

articulated an ideology emphasising a broad socialistic outlook

which still guides the party.

After independence, many of these diverse interests

were aggregated by the Congress Party leadership -- or, more

accurately by the Congress Yorking Committee 1the eon;ress

Parliamentary Party and the Council of' Ministers. The Congress

Party bas constantly been in power and those who wanted to

int'luence government policy bad to turn to the Congress.

Autonomous economic interest groups, such as business and

landlords, tried generally to work within the Congress told

especially after the 1952 elections.

227 Tl• dwwaada ot· varl0-.1!:1 1ln<&;uist.Lc grou1•11 tor linguistic

pra,.incea tucLullted an the Congroa:s l'arty

ment wne Caced ·.ci th waki .. ,; a docisiou ""

and when tlle govorn-s \t .,) (

to bow India's states,

be r•,OI'u.cdL~ud, tile decision wae let't to the Coagreaa Workin<.;

Com.nittoe. 1'1u• Cou.,;re11;, i''u1·ty has cluveluped a "lachinory f'ur

dealin,; with 'tile dive•·se intereste all<.l roconcilin~t, theru& t!le

Cougr.o;;~S i'arliamentary l'arty, wllicn managea af'i'aira in the

J.>arliou~><Jntf and the Centr ... l Eloction Coa.mi tt010e 0 which selects

candiclaLea Cor electiOHIII. lt triea to blilanoe the pl~rty ticket

with auffic.i.ent nU1Ubor111, Cor ex..wple 1 of ~lusl.:ims, other

minoritlelll 1 wow.-r1 0 aud untouchables, almost i.n tt<e e.ame way us

the Tam.•a.ny Ih.ll overatea in New York. Congre1111 Party gen!'ral 0

Suc:.·etariet~ and other ,Sbaervers serve as trouble shooters wbu ' rush to lJroviucial. 'fapitals when contlictot threaten to injure

tiH! loc ·1 or~.>nisationa.

Tb<JS, various J.inr;ual, re0ional,ca•te anu c01111nun.ity

interes1: .,;roupa aggre..,,,te in the Congress .i'arty. Tb.e rival

t'aeti ons, .:.li.C:forent :forUIIIs ,bureaucracy -- all acere6a te their

interest in tile ruliu;; party.

A.lllone; tile associatioual .Pre:ss~.&re groupe, it has already

be.,n pointed out tuat th.;, or.,; .. uised busine"o alwaya t'eels

pr~tected and .r~voured by a"gregatina its interest in ti~

Congres111. Ev.,n in t"" trade union"• ~he larcest membership

iJelou~:s to .l!'.!lJC 0 tile labour wintl ot' tae Congreea Party. Tho

workers al"" t'eel that their w.ienos can be carried and tnei~·

demands •ay ue easily t'ul1'illed i.f tbey aggree;ate their interest

in the ruliu.,. t--arty. It i• .;uaaaing that the diverse »res5ure

groups of capitalists ami wor~ers actively ac~rwgatiJ ln the

Con&ress Party, aa both are con1'ident that the op,position

parties would not come in power aud none of' ~;hetU wants to risk

tbeir intares•e.

Interest aggreaation occura at •nny points in the

lndian political ayatam. For exa~~~ple, it 18uy occur thrOU((h

tl•• expli d t tor•u.lation oC genwral policies or tbroUdb t !•e

recruit•ant or politic:..l personnel more or lese ooamtitted to

a particula. pattern of policy. The aaaociational interest

228 (As we have seen in Chapter IV, how the FICCI aggregates the

interest articulation of' the smaller business groups)

In a modern democracy associational interest groups

usually dominate interest articulation but in Indian political

system such groups are quite limited, and those too are

economic in nature. With the help of' the "distribution o£

resources" such groups finally aggregate in the ruling party

either by representation or by proxy. The ruling party may

regulate interest aggregation through policy tormation and

recruitment (as we have seen in Chapter IV, how the FICCI is

represented on the consultative bodies and legislatures £or

f'ormulating the Industrial Policy or the Five Year Plans and

how does it react if' neglected. Similar is the case with the

'peak' organisations of' the trade unions); and the Cabinet

and Parliament may engage in the f'inal rule making choices.

Thus, the functions of' articulation, aggregation, and rule -

making of'ten overlap. If' this conversion process is carri<>d

out by dif'f'erentiated and specialized structures, the function

of' interest aggregation be located and analysed(as it has been

done in Chapter IV). But even otherwise an hypothetieal

analysis can be made. To illustrate this point a case study

of' the land ceiling Act has been made in Chapter x. In the

course of' its enactment the autonomous economic interest

group of' the big landlords pertormed the f'unctions of' interest

articulation, aggregation ( in the legislatures, bureaucracy,

and Party caucus of' the ruling Congress) and finally the rule

making (in the .f'orru of' repeated aJBendments f'rom 1971 to 1 74).

POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND INTEREST AGGREGATION!

Interest aggregation may be performed within all the

sub-systems of' the political system. In £act, some degree ot

aggregation is almost inevitably carried out at all levels

from individual interest articulation to the final decision

•aking. But here we have to see1 what structures play the

major role in aggregating the articulated interests into •ajor

policy alternatives? From these alternatives the authoritative

policies f'or the political system are subsequently produced.

229 The nature of the articulated demand• usually

determines the structure performing the interest aggregation

function as aleo its consequences, In the Indian political

culture, which is still an &nalgam of traditions and moderni­

zation, the articulation is quite limited, The majority of'

the population, being politically inert and sluggieh 0does not

formulate autonomous goals or particularietic demands. Secondly,

more o:ften than not, the articulation of' demands is controlll.ed

from the Centre( because the single ruling party aggregates most

o:f the diverse interests). Consequently, the process or aggregating these demands is usually managed successfully by

a small elite,

In the political culture of' India as also of Madhya

Pradesh all the various types of structures performing interest

articulation may also perform interest aggregation, Since

they perform the two functions simultaneously, tbeir mode-cues

are often ambiguous, "In more modern

aesociational interest groupe such ae

societies, large

the Federation of' German

Industries in West Germany, or the British Traders Union

Congress, may represent a great variety o:f associated organi-

zations and aggree;ate diverse

policy alternatives to present

and cont' li cting demands into

before party and Cabinet" ( 1 )

But in India such affective roles are played only by the

institutional and political interest groups. The organised

business and the trade unions also have their significant say,

in the decision making through their aggregation in the Congress

and bureaucracy. But they suffer from the oon£licting attitude

of the competing groupe.

Thus, it is clear that the fuling party and the

governmental bureaucracy are the two aost powerful aggregating

linke whidR operate between the large numbers of interest groupe

and the decision makers.

articulated interest Groups

F<.aure No.6. -.J----

[eongres•) ~

/Bureaucracy[

aggr~gation ~

* ---------[1) G,A,Alwond and G,il,Powell, Jr,

Op, Cit. P,1JO

Decision making

230 BUREAUCUACY AND AGGREGATION&

The role of bureaucracy in interest articulation

has been discussed in Chapter III, Although, it is

subordinate to the formal rule makers, it is formally

organised and linked in elaborate bierachy, They are at

a vantage position oi' performing rune tiona of' aggrega ti ~n

and rule-making by virtue of' their specialization of ta3k,

formal responsibility for set duties, and formal and

standardized rules or procedure. The Indian bureaucracy

generally aggregates the interest articulation outside

its domain, For example, in the event of the taking-over

of the whole-sale trade in wheat, it aggregated the interest

of the traders and the lower officialdom and transmitted it

to the decision makers,

this case, "Colonized"

who were their clients.

Particular agencies became in

by the powerful interest groups

The bureaucracy may become incapable of reconciling

and balancing those dominating groups whose demands may

press directly upon the decision makers, In the political

process of Madhya Pradesh it is characteristic that the

articulated interests particularly business often aggre~ate

in the bureaucracy for the Rule-application function.

CONGRESS AS THE AGGREGATING FORCE&

Next to bureaucracy is the political party{in Indian

political system it is often the ruling Congress party)

which may be dnnsidered the specialized aggregation structure

of the entire political process. In a two-party competitive

system like Britain and the u.s.A,, the p•rty aggregate•

certain interests into a set of policy proposals and then

attempts to score a victory at the polls to install such

decision makers who would use the previously aggregated

policy structure as a basis for rule-•aking, But in non­

competitive systems such as India "the party may aggreg.te

interests in a manner similar to that of a large bureaucracy,

althouch its structure and activities •ay enable it to

perform other functions •ore effectively than a bureaucracy"(l)

( 1 ) .J Almond&: Povell1 Op, Cit, P,102 '

231 CONGRESS PARTY AS AN OMNlBUSa

It is amazingly true that the Congress Party aggre­

gates myriad diverse interests more effectively than other

parties oC the world, It is just like an omnibus in wh~ch

various sections ot' people are joyfully riding and getting

down at convenience whenever their ends are not served,

The desire to seek wide spread electoral support compel,. it

to include in its policy package those demands which have

very broad popular support, and to avoid alienating the

most prominent interest groups •. In a political culture where

the parties aggregate in terms ot' certain general considerations,

the policy alternatives are likely to be more clear cut

and consistent. But in India as also in Madhya Pradesh,where

a chie£ objective is the election ot partisan candidates

the ruling party has a strong incentive toward aggregating

atleast the most prevalent patterns ot' demands.

Since the ruling party has the means ot "distribu­

tion o£ resources" at its command the articulated interests

teel spontaneously inclined to aggregate their demands in

the party. In tne foregoing Chapters it has been discussed

at length how the party utilises the bureaucracy as its

agent tor aggregating the various interest groups, and as

a consequence the bureaucracy starts dominating over the

party and political executive. We have also seen that when

there is an interaction between party and bureaucracy( as in

the case o£ the state trading in wheat), the latter was

almost sure to wino The Central and State leaderships

found themselves completely helpless to detect the corrupt

officers and to punish them e££ectively.

It is because ot this micro tedency ot interest

aggregation that the healthy structure ot interest articula­

tion and aggregation is often defeated in the Indian political

11ystem, It cannot emulate a totalitarian state like USSR

where the bureaucracy is really subordinate to party, and

it cannot become either, the consistent and clear-cut

aggregator like the two party ayste• oC U,K, or the U,S,A,

The pre11ence ot a large number o~ fairly small parti11s makea

232 it more likely that sach party msrely transmits the interests

..,__ of a special sub-culture or client~le with a minimum or

" aggregation. It has already been discussed as to how in

Madhya Pradesh the 1 toutism 1 is responsible ror the interest

articulation and aggreaation.

AGGkEGA'f ION OJ!' AGGREGATOti.S 1

Both the associational groups of organized business

and trade unions aggregate their interests in the Congress

Party. In Chapter IV it has been shown how the FICCI

influences the rule making and rule application pertaining

to industrial policy. At first the articulated interest of' the

lower level units aggregate in the 'peak' organizations and

thence it is transmitted to tbe decision makers. The aggrega­

tion takes place by stages; The district and regional

business organisations aggregate their interests in two waysr

( 1) in their peak associations and (2) in the party organi­

sation at district and regional level. Similarly, the state

l10vel organisation viz. M.P. Cbamber of Co11111terce and

Industries aggregates tl1e interest of its constituent chambers

and deposits it with tohe State government on tbe one hand,

and aggregates it with the peak organization oa the other.

Tims, the aggr'egation in such cases is o£ a pyramid type as

sho~ in tile diagram;

FlCCI ~///

In the peak Aaso.o£ State t: Ul India lsvel

Decision Makers

~

Aggregation

Local and regional unite.

F.:~unNo.'7.

State Govt.Factional heads higher Bureau & Party caucus

In tbe party org.of' respective area and

1 Bureaucracy,

233 The individual pre>;sure groups and strong lobbies

penetrate in the decision •aking even directly ignoring

the pyramid or rormal aggregation as their channel or access

is much moree stronger than the oruinary ones.

Since tl1e Congress Party is an aggregator o£ diverse

interests u~ besides business it also aggregates the

interest of' the trade unions, it acts like its counterpart

in Me~ico 1 by perrorming a mediatin~ role to achieve a

bdlanced aggregatiou. For example, in the Bonus Act the

government had to invite displeasure or the Mill-owners who

in turn had to be recompensed elsewhere in the f'orm of

various concessions {already discussed in ~ Chapter IV)

at the 1'ule-application stage. An empirical analysis o£ the

llonus Act has revealed that the Government had aggregated

the interest o£ all such political parties(mainly the Congress

and the C.l' • .r.) which had aggregated and articulated the

interest o£ the various peak trade unions.

The trade unions again per:formed the .f'tmctions o:f

hoth, articuLttion and aggregation by combining the interest

of' thei.r Con'3ti tuen t Union" and aggregating the same to

thoir parent poli tlc;~l parties. Thus, 1'rom interest articula _

t.; on t > the rtlle-mo)dng and rule-ap.f·licatj_on, viz., ttoo input

"'' .1 tho e>ut,ut !'unctions were c1osely related through a

sharp line o£ political commnnication, a function per:formed

by the trade •mion leaders who at the top participated in

the rule-making (as m9mbers o£ the Consultative Committees

and as legislators ) and trans.f'o:nned it to the bottom

(the Constit;uent affiliated labour unions) where the political

communication in the :form o:f strikes and "bandhJi!s"

precipated the aggregation runction.

Fi9uy" No, 'a witt -('><\~1'a<~ -lh• P' oC.<'S2 ·

FL~~-Je_No. ~· J nt. O.S9Ye. of T. U.

+ 'Pol.· t>a'it(f: Ci-'av<At)

+ 0

234

Soc l.o.L Syst-em.

ootpvt

(!ha_Yl'h€lS

c~ C..~(.c ss-

C!o,.solt. Colnh'lll(t:c

'

~----------------F~~b~~--------------~

DIFFEHENT lATIUN AND FUNCTIONAL

SPECIALIZATION OF ASSOCIATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS!

It is thus cllear that the organized busine•s and

trade unions not only perform the functions of interest

articulation and aggrecation but also participate in rule

making. Some times tnese structures of political process

overlap each other as indicated in the rormulation or

the Industrial policy and the Bonus Act. The development

of specialized structures for the aggregation or a wide

range or interests into a limited number of policy

alternatives ten~s to increase system capability in several

waYS I

(i) It becomes easier for the decision makers

to dlak:e account of' all el em en ts in the Society and to

respond them.

(ii) A wide range or voices can be heard without

ovurwhulwin,_; thu decision making structures by th&' sheer

volUlJie or demands and thus rendering them helpless to

construct ef't'ective and consistent policy.

-

235 The development or specialized interest aggregation

structures thus creates a potential ~or ereater system of

responsiveness and effectiveness. The heavy load or raw,

unstructured and unorganised demands may bring policy making

to a halt or to a confused decision-making. Further, in the

emergence of specialized structures for interest aggregation

there is a two-fold differentiation -- (i) Aggregation

structures(e.g. the peak associations and the party) must be

differentiated from the Central decision-making structures

(such as the Cabinet and the bureaucL'acy) (ii) They must also

be differentiated ~rom the maJor interest articulation

structures (such as trade unions and smaller business organi­

sations). But this differentiation is properly maintained

only in the competitive two-party system. In the Indian

political system these differentiations are often mixed up,

because the rulino;~ Congress Party aggregates almost all the

diverse interests. Consequently, the :functions of various

structures often overlap. The problems of the s.v.n. in the

case of multi-party systems,and the difficulty of rem,ining

open to, but differentiated :from, important groups in the

one-party system,a,·e apt to make e~:fective and responsive

aggregation somewhat more difficult.

LACK 0 F' CO !-!E£10N 1

Whlle analysing the political and factional groups

operating witi1in the Congress party we have seen in the last

Chapter t~.1t the internal cohesiveness of' the party is hardly

maintained. The political culture Z. tinged with regional,

caste, community and lingu!stic considerations creates groups

within groups. The ideological differences give birth to

antagonistic factions in the institutional groups. The battle

of left and right constantly disturbs the homogeneity of the

political system. Tilted to the left, the government enacts

a spate of progressive legislation, and succumbing to the

right the rule-application is retarded in the same vein. The

aggre 6 ation becomes inconsistent, hazy, blurt and incongruous.

At the time o£ elections it articulates and aggregates a lot

o£ unort'!alliaed, anomie interests, but when saddled in power,

, )I I

236 it :tails t () auc;regate all o~· them in the wake o£ preeauree and

counter prea~uras. One interest cancelle the other. Since

moat ot' the interes t.B are inart.i culated and unspeciali:&ed •

the Government does not bold any pin-point responsibility

to t bem.

Secondly, the rulin,s party itself shifts the responsi­

bility oi' aggre,;atiou to some other channels often the

power£ul !'actions within the party fold. For example, in the

case of' the takia,;; over ot' the wbolesale trade in whl'at, tl1e

government meant to a"._;re;;. te the interest" of' the farmers ·

A speci1d ceil '"""' creat"d in the Consres.e Working Committee

with the prvmised co-ope&·atlon of' the c.P.I. to launch a

countrywide cam.,aign to articulate and aggregate the interests

or tile ftuwers. But nothing substantial could be done in the

face or the stroue:;er articulatiun of interest by the rood

grain traders duly aggregated in t :w bureaucracy and the

party or,;anis tio·• 1 vhi cb reeul ted in the revocation or the

s tap talum by the Government.

lihile considering the etf'ect of dif£1oreut interen

aggregution structures upon tile political syetew, we need

to beer tn rnind two otbex· characteri .. tics of: 118t:re,:ation

per~onnance; (1) Style and, (2) degree o:C' :C'rasmentation.

Dy style we wean to su,;jSest tl•e way in which the etructure

perf'orms the function. According to Almond, ( 1 ) there are

atlcast thr"e dii'ferent etylee of" interest aggc•gation,

correspc•ndi•lg roughly to the secularised politl cnl eubcultures

of' the interest aggregation structures. These 'three etyles

are 1 (1) pragruatic bnrF,ainiag, (2) absolute-value

oriented (J) and traditioualietico Let u .. apply these etyl<·ll

to analyse the intereet aggre._.ation structures in the

political process of' India and Maclhya l'radesh collectively

as more or l""s th" procees ie tile eame.

BAI<G,\L\LNG STH.Ea

It ia a>•plicable in a political system where the

associational intereat grouva at·e fairly large in number,euch

as in tne Un1ted States of ~erica, Grfat IJritain and tt1e

l'hilii>pines. In theae cow1tr1ee a wide variety of interest e

(1) , }, Alraond t. Yowell' 1 o.,. Cit, 1'.108

237 are of'ton combined into a limited number of' alternative

policies. The a~~re~ution is so~etimea guided by more

General ideolo._ical perspectives, but the accommodation

oC diverse interests is its most notable characteristic.

In the .Indiau po.U. tical proceas such style of' ag~J:rega tion

is t'ounu ir. c he ox·gauised bueiness d.n4 the i:ra.de unions.

The vurioua ideolo~ical groups and cliquos f'ormed within

in:.> ti tutiona.J. grou~s also make use of' such a style. In

such C<illias 1 ( "s soan in Cnapter III) compromise between

tae di.f.fez·ent interests dominate tile aggret;l'ltion process,

wnettler the .tunction is pert'ormed by party, legislature

or tile C<lbinot •

.I\IIIOfi6 the non-a,sociational and anomie aroupa this

st,le is also adhered to 7though aparing 1when the cause of'

articulation is quite particularistic. The students; the

traderel dlld otner pro:teuional jJroUpti usually take recourse

to su h a tyle of' ato:~re,.;ation, This style :tacili tates

responeiveness :trom the decision makers.

T '''· .. ~ $

It A'ef'usee to camprooni>~e tlle principles of policy

for the sai<.P ot· accoll!lllodatind dl.veree interests. This style

111ay appeat' as a very rigid rati onal.t'-, Generally, t lle

ag;;regator works out the 'loaJ.cH1 1 solution to a problem

and develop policy to correspond to it. Interests are

eggre,;ated atrictly in accordance with the theoretically

perf'•et solution. For example, in Chepter III we have

di scussod how the 'lo~i cal aolution 1 wae evolved by the

decision m·,ken; to docide;l' tbe auccessors af'ter ftebru and

Shastri. In the drama of eucceesion various diverse

intereeta were a.;greg.-.ted to reacll a aolution.

Si111ila1·l; 1 a£te1· the great SA'lit the Con~reaa( R)

o.~_,re.;o.ted tue int6reeta of tt1e left ving

includint; u.., youn~ tur.l<a and the a.x-c~Ard

o•· ....... Congress

holders or the

C.i',L., l..l,M,;,. gro":k in the Lok Sabha a. also the powerf'ul

rightists aml tho Capitalieta. Theoretically, all poasible

·pc)liciee vere f'ramed 1 aocia.l.i a tic p1·ocrsDnea vera enacted 1

238 even tite Constitution was liberally amend&d, Dut nothing

concrete h:,ppened at the rule- application and rule-­

adjudication stage, because ot' tbe 1 pragmati o bargaining'.

The rationale could not prevail due to ideological stakes.

In the S,V,D, Government of Madhya Pradesh a very

rigid rat.i.onal--f:sm- was observed while aggregating the

interests o£ the defectors from the Congress, the Jan Sangh,

the ex-ruling Chiefs and the big land lords of the State,

The absolute value oriented style turned into a value-free

~to;gregation of interests, Consequently, the S.V,D. was

broken. Similarly, the ideologies of Jai Prakash Narain

and his Chambal Valley Peace Mission could not reconcile

wi til the Sta1e Government of' Madhya Pradesll af'ter the

surrender or Jacoii-"s.

Thus, it is clear that in the Indian political

process this style may be used in the initial stages,

mainl.y by the ideal.istic political groupsl but in due course

of time the trend of style is changed to suit their vested

J.n teres ts. r:owev .. z·, many 0 tiler groups manifest sn

J.deol.ogical style und,;r certain circUlllstances, particularly

when tney :f'eel inser.uro and frightened o£ their political

instability,

TP. • ..DITIO!U.L.i.SriC S'l'YLES!

This style of aggregation usually relies upon the

patterns of the past in suggesting policy al.ternatives £or

the future. Such style •manifests both rigidity and diffuse

societal role Orientations~. It is typical of the Indian

political system in which the resources and energies o£

the people are committed by the social and economUc patterns

of the traditional culture to long established and pre -

determined goals. The demands articulated apart £rom these

traditional goals are not easily assimilated by the tradi­

tional political elite. But now the traditional system o£

the Indian political process is gradually getting oriented

to the new styles observed in the western countries. Although

the traditional forces are still alive in the process of

239 articulation, they are not heeitating to embrace the

modernizing trends, We are in fact passin* through a

transition of political development,

The traditional groupe of cas tee and communi ties

have started assimilating the business and other economic

groups within tkem, Consequently, the community, caste,

regional, and lineage groups have in:riltrated into the

organised business and the institutional groups. The

amalgam is so much confusing that the political culture

has become hetrogeneous and complex,

Since the political parties are the major structure

perf'orming the :function of' the :Lntereat aggrec;ation,

traditionalistic style is •ainly responsible for the

emergence of" the eecterian, religious and caste-ridden poli­

tical parties, The political culture teeds such aggre­

gators. For example, the Shiromani Akali Dal is a politico~

religious organisation conf'ined to the State of Punjab -

a :fact that reveals its parochial character. It aggregates

the interests of" the Sikh Community alone. Similarly , the

D,!l.K, is a regional party aggregating many Tamil pressure

groups sustaining the sentiments and wishes of the local

people. It apprehends

in the long run, ruin

in the same vein that ('

the Tamil <'lul ture and I

Hindi shall,

language,

The R.s.s. and the Muslim Majlia are the other

power:f"ul aggregat6~s of interest of Maharaahtrian Brahmins

and Muslims respectively,

The modernizing role of interest aggregation is

being performed by the C,P,I, and its allies which aggregate

the interest of the working class and helpJi them t'ight ~~- _( ''

against the Government, il:t- provide,J f'orums and platforms ' ' .

to the masses or the proletariat~ petty-bourgeo._ cla5s, "t ' • '' (" ' ' ' -'(_

such as Post and Te1egrapq 0 Central Government Employees,

Railway•, L,r.c. Employees, Students and the like,

P'RAGMENTAT ION IN AGGREGATION PATTEUNS!

But all these political parties in turn aggregate

their interests in the Congress Party and its Government-.1

240 institutional groups. This tendency is caused by the fragmen­

ted pattern of interest aggregation which is generally

associated with a feagmented political culturef a fundamental

fragmentation in the values and aspirations of different

groups in the society. However, the aggregation pattern is

not determined by t be cultural pattern. The Congress Party

and the Central decision-makers generally aggregate tba demands

mediating through these parties -- tbe fragmented aggregators

of interests. It combines the traditional and modernizing

interest aggragators by adopting a synthesized poliey

mitigating the significance of the opposition parties and

reducing them to ~ne mara pressure groups. Hartmann's

following estimate about the prospects of the socialist

parties of India appears to bold truth for all the opposition

parties with differing patternst

"The re-creation of the Congress monolith has created

a political atmosphere in which a policy of building up a self•

reliant and independent party of democratic socialism can

hardly bring dividends, but only lead to acute discomfort

among the party members"{ 1 )

But when the parfor.ance of the aggregation function

fails to bridge such differences, and particularly when

fragmented aggregation appears together with other sources

of strain, the political system begins to face very severe

problems, The Congress is the victim ot these tendencies of

different and diverse aspects of aggregation. The fragmented

multi-party system transmits conflicting and ideologically

rigid d .. ands into a fragmented legislature and a diversified

cabinet. Illportant and povertul institutional interest

groups also articulate interests directly to t be decision

•akers. Such aggregation, as we have discussed here and in

the last Chapters, is undertaken by the relatively weak and

multi-centrad decision-making structure. It ie hampered by

( 1 ) ' f ~ •i' ,·,Hartmann I •Tbe Socialist parties of India•

(Journal of' Const. aDd Parl. Studies) Oct. to Dec. 1971 - P.6,1

241 ideo~ogical differences provoked by the different rorume

based on left and right leanings. Imrnobi~ism and ineffective­

ness in policy have tended to be the result.

INTEREST AGGREGATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTt

Man~ or the considerations suggested while discussing

the environment and interest articulation, app~y to patterns

o£ aggregation as well. Factors or political communication,

resource distribution, and political culture which intensify

or ease the number of articulated interests, also affect the

prob~em of aggregating those interests. In the Indian

politic~! development, the tendency of social and economic

modernization to expand communication levels to increase

inclinations towards participation, to wider.. the gap between

rich and poor, and generally to increase the number of

autonomous demands arising from the complex society, places

growing stress upon tbe aggregation structures.

This burden has further intensified as the politica~

system has been involved in a vast number o£ social institu­

tions and activities. All the d .. ande ranging from students

to organised business may become po~itical d .. ands. Protests

over social problems also become political protests -- partly

because in the name of welfare state,the Government has

involved itself directly in so many :facets o:f social li•e.

Myron Weiner has rightly suggested that decentralization may

insulate India's regime £ram sa.e o:f its aggregative burdens{l)

However, the need to agggrgate 1 or control, a large

and diverse number of articulated demands presents itself

to a •odernizing system. Er:forts o:f modernizing systems to

create a controlled form of participation and a hierarchical

and unified aggregation represent tne authoritarian st~ce

towards the process of political develop.ent. In the Indian

political system the Congress party and bureaucracy ha:t-been

( 1 ) Myron Weiner 1 •Poli tics of Scarcity • P.P. 220 ff

242 uti1ized to accommodate and assregate the increasing number

of' demands. This tendency "enerally overloads the centralize,

system and the unprocossed demands either block the politica1

process or cause conflict in the policy aaking. The party

caucus and the institutions such as the National Development

Counci1 serve to sonte degree to ba1anoe con:t'1i.cting interests

and shape coherent policy in response to nationa1 needso The

decision makers are always anxious to suppress new demands

unless they become so well articulated that their aggregation

becomes rather imperative.

ASPIRATIONS OUTSTRIP CAPABILITIESt

It is, thus, clear that there is no simple solution

to the problem of' aggregation in meeting the challenges of

participation and distribution. Ev~n in cases of' "authori­

tarian" solutions, the divisions and conflict o:t'ten reappear

in new :t'orm within the ruling party or the elite 1 tsel:t',

as we saw in the creation of' the two forums within the

Congress fold, or the many :t'actional antagonistic political

groups of Madhya Pradesh(disoussed in Chapters III to VI),

The Congress party has the aspiration of aggregating all the

articu1ated interests, single handed! but aspirations often

outstf~p capabilities in the initiation of' •oderniaation,

and an almost intolerable burden is coanonly placed upon the

aggregative :t'unction.

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