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Kosta avoki MORE THAN AUTONOMY BUT LESS THAN INDEPENDENCE Summary This paper analyzes the meaning and the reach of the so-called solution for salvation, more than autonomy but less than independence, which was first proclaimed by the Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kotunica. Initially the meaning of the term autonomy of Kosovo and Metohia is examined in the key international acts which prescribe the establishment of that autonomy. These are the following: the Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations no. 1244 and the socalled Interim Agreement on Peace and Local Self-Government from Rambouillet of February 23, 1999. Following that, the paper shows that by this motto, more than autonomy but less than independence, Vojislav Kotunica does exactly what he decisively refused to do in January 2000: making concessions, writing off Kosovo and Metohia and internally reorganizing the country, leading to its internal (con)federalization, or disintegration. The author concludes that the real loss of Kosovo at the negotiation table can be signed only by those heads of states, as it was said by Vojislav Kotunica in January 2000, who are no longer Serbs. Key words: Kosovo and Metohia, autonomy, independence.