ST/DPI ORAL HISTORY (02)/L3
Yale-UN Oral History Project
Ambassador Jacques Leprette James S. Sutterlin, Interviewer
8 April, 1991 Paris, France
NOTICE This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the United Nations. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken,
rather than the written word.
RESTRICTIONS This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes
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fARIS, FRANCE~- . APRIL 8, 1991INTERVIEWER, JAMES SUTTERLIN NOV
Table of Contents
I. The Selection of Secretaries-General
Attitude of French Government in the electionof Waldheim
Qualifications for Secretary-General
Attitude toward the UN of General de Gaulle
Election of Perez de Cuellar
Comments on election procedure
II. The 1973 Middle East War
outbreak of the war
French attitude toward peace-keeping
III. French Participation in UNIFIL
1
1-3
4-6; 12-13
6
7-10; 14
10-12; 14-18
18
19-20
21-
~1f_/ ........... _
¥UN INTERVIEWAMBASSADOR JACQUES LEPRETTE
PARIS, FRANCEAPRIL 8, 1991
INTERVIEWER, JAMES SUTTERLIN
JSS Ambassador Leprette, I want to first thank you very much
for agreeing to participate in this Yale Oral History
Project on the United Nations and if we might I'd like to
begin by discussing with you the procedure through which
Secretaries-General of the United Nations are chosen. I
believe that when Kurt Waldheim was selected as
Secretary-General, you at that time were in the Foreign
Ministry in Paris, is that correct?
JL Yes.
JSS And what was your position at that time?
JL I was in charge of the United Nations and International
organizations in the French Foreign Office.
JSS And let me just start with a general question on that.
In the French government - and particularly in the Quai -
is the selection of the Secretary-General of the united
JL
Nations considered an important matter?
Yes, right or wrong.
JSS Right or wrong? And does it involve the highest levels
of the French government?
JL Yes
JSS So could you describe the situation as you saw it from
the perspective of Paris at the time a new Secretary-
1
JL
General needed to be elected to take U Thant's place?
Yes, well the initiative came from the Austrian
government. I remember that I was invited at a luncheon
party by the Austrian ambassador in Paris who wanted me
to meet with a candidate of their country by the name of
Kurt Waldheim. We were in all something like twelve
people around the table and not important people - I
mean, people of my level - and discussions started with
gentleman who was introduced to me and who was Kurt
Waldheim. I think that Mr. Waldheim made a number of
trips in Europe and elsewhere in the world. When the
election day came the Austrian ambassador kept calling me
on the phone after each tour de scrutin - how do you say
that in English? - I don't remember how many ballots were
cast but what struck me was that his question which was
always the same - "You told me that France would vote for
Mr. Waldheim - did I understand you correctly?" And my
answer was "yes".
JSS Was France consistent then in supporting Waldheim' s
candidacy from the beginning?
JL Yes.
JSS Because there were a number of other candidates at that
time. So what you are very clearly suggesting is that
there was strong electioneering, you would say, in order
to gain support for Waldheim - it was a real campaign.
JL I have forgotten who were the others - but you might
2
remind me.
JSS Prince Sadruddin Khan was one. I believe he was vetoed,
well, one doesn't know.
JL I see. Well I don't remember exactly the criteria that
were selected by France.
JSS Now in favoring Waldheim, what was this decision based
on? Simply the approaches of the Austrians, or an
analysis of the strength of the potential Secretary-
General?
JL Well, in those days we felt that after somebody from Asia
we would welcome a good professional coming from another
section of the world and since there was a European, we
had a tendency to favor a European. But that didn't mean
at that time that we were against the others.
JSS And the inevitable question - was anything done in Paris
to look into the background of Mr. Waldheim given the
fact that it was known that he had been in the German
army?
JL I don't remember anything on that particular point.
Waldheim had served in Paris, first during the war - we
knew that. He never concealed that, that he had been an
officer in Paris. Second, he had served as a diplomat in
Paris and I think that was considered (having served in
Paris) good credentials •.
JSS As clearance •••
JL Pardon?
3
JSS From the French point of view then - perhaps it has
changed now - what did you see and what did other people
in the French government see as the desirable qualities
of a Secretary-General?
JL It is very difficult to answer. The position is a very
difficult one and I had later on occasions to see that
more closely. In France the united Nations is the world
organization; everybody knows that all the miseries of
the world, one day or another, are put forward to the
United Nations, the Security Council, other organs, other
bodies, and this is why we consider that it is
indispensable to have a good professional. To that
extent it seemed to us that Kurt Waldheim had the
training of a diplomat and since he was a European,
probably we came to the conclusion that he would serve as
a good high civil servant to the organization. But we
never considered that the Secretary-General of the United .
Nations had the stature of a head of a state, for
instance. He is what the Charter says - the most
important official of the organization. I don't remember
exactly the provisions of the Charter ...
JSS The chief administrative officer, I think it says. But
in the background of this question is what I believe to
have been considerable dissatisfaction in France, at
least on the part of General ·De Gaulle, with Dag
Hammarskjold. Was there any sense when this new
4
opportunity to select a new Secretary-General came along,
that France at least would not want another person of
such strong and independent character as Dag
Hammarskjold?
JL When you use the word "strong" my reaction is, "What do
you mean by 'strong'?" Because I'm afraid that Dag
Hammarskjold, who was highly respected, very active, very
able, very intelligent, highly cultivated, whom I
remember I met within the OECD in those days - Dag
Hammarskjold probably missed the occasion to enjoy the
support of the most important members of the
organization. And then he lost his strength. I don't
know whether I make myself clear but what I am trying to
say is that an active Secretary-General is somebody who
dares to make reference to Article 99 of the Charter, for
instance. They have to perform their duties, they have
also to use their privileges when they are in that high
position. But they have also to remember that, after
all, they serve the countries, the member countries.
When, due to an excess of activity, they lose the support
of important quarters of the United Nations, they become
weak - that's all. It's up to them to see where is the
invisible line.
JSS So you're suggesting that really one important
qualification for a Secretary-General is a man or a woman
who can maintain tolerable relations, especially with the
5
Permanent Members of the Security council.
JL It seems to me essential. Dag Hammarskjold, I am afraid,
although he was a man of good faith and he wanted to do
all in his power for the benefit for the community of
nations lost, at a time, the trust of some members. They
were difficult times, I remember it well, because in 1960
I was in the French Foreign Office in charge of African
Affairs - that period when we were trying, not always
successfully, to transfer independence to former
colonies. It was such a delicate operation that we were
not eager to see too many people interfere, and since you
refer to General De Gaulle and his reluctance, first I
must say that what has been reported, that General De
Gaulle treated the United Nations as "Ie machin", has to
be qualified and I am ready to say something about that.
What I want to point out is that in some difficult
political situations, when member states have lots of
problems to solve, or are trying to solve them, the
activity of an international organization may not be as
welcome as some people think, that's all. But once the
Algerian question was solved, once the African states
became members of the organization, you will remember
that General De Gaulle entertained good relations with U
Thant. The United States also felt at times that the
united Nations didn't live up to its reputation.
JSS That raises an interesting question, both from the past
6
and for the future. At the time of the choice of the
next new Secretary-General, that is, Perez de Cuellar, if
I'm not mistaken, you were in New York and you were the
Permanent Representative of France and actually serving
on the security Council.
JL . Before that there was the reelection of Waldheim in '76.
JSS That was relatively uncontroversial - did you find it
necessary to make any decision ?
JL Well, on that particular instance we were faced with a
decision to make which was a difficult one.
JSS Can you elaborate on that?
JL No. (laughter on both sides). I'll tell you the story
later on.
JSS Well, let's go ahead then .•
JL And then we come to '81.
JSS '81. And before going into some of the details there,
I'd like to connect it with your previous comment which
is an interesting one - and that is, the change between
the period when decolonization was still taking place and
when it had been completed. Would this suggest that from
the French point of view then, in '81 or for that matter
now, a candidate from the Third World, from the former
colonial world, would be acceptable?
JL I'm speaking personally. I have no official
responsibility now and my answer is "yes" and I think
that there are a number of well-qualified personalities
7
who could highly, fill the job.
JSS Going now to the election at the end of which Perez de
CUellar was elected, could you describe how you saw that
procedure, how did that work?
JL I don't remember now how many ballots there were - maybe
you can?
JSS I think there were quite a few, over 20.
JL Over 20 - what I remember, is that at one time Kurt
Waldheim passed me a message and told me that he wanted
to have a private conversation on what was going on
because the first ballots hadn't been favorable, although
he had enjoyed the votes of four permanent members out of
the five. And since there were intermissions from time
to time between the ballots, I went to see him and his
question was, "what kind of advice would you give me -
should I stay on, or what?" And of course I said, "I
have no advice to offer because you have more information
than I have. The French government has collected
information on the chances of Mr. so-and-so, your chances
and so forth and so. But we have just a limited point of
view whereas I'm sure that with all your connections, and
since you have been here for 10 years as Secretary-
General, you know much better than I." But he insisted,
he insisted in such a way that I told him that I'm not
speaking for the French government but as an individual.
"My feeling is that one Permanent Member is voting
8
against you," and he interrupted me and said, "It is
China". "This situation will go on," and he looked
surprised and said to me, "but I don't follow you, I
don't understand. What is the reason? I was invited by
the Chinese last summer, I got a red carpet treatment.
They were extremely friendly. They had no grievances, no
reproach to make to me. This is why my conclusion is
that they wanted, for a number of ballots, to vote "no",
to show that they are not following necessarily the other
big powers. They have their own judgment, but maybe not
the next ballot, but the following one, they will just
either abstain or vote in favor." I kept silent for a
while, then answered, "This is not what I think, I'm
sorry to say." And once more he looked surprised and
wanted to know more, and I told him "the Chinese want to
appear as the 'defendeur' and porte parole of the Third
World. It is one occasion where they can send a message.
But if they change their mind, they demonstrate nothing
except their lack of will. What they want, according to
our own analysis is to show to the outside world that
there was one big country against the Europeans in favor
of a representative of the Third World, that country was
China". He said to me, "well, fine, maybe, I think
you're wrong" and this is how our conversation ended.
JSS Looking back at that experience, do you feel that the
President of the Security Council - Ambassador otunnu,
9
became the President during this, at this stage - can
make a significant difference in the outcome of the
selection of the Secretary-General? Was it your
impression then, for example, that otunnu really made the
difference in terms of the election?
JL Mr. Otunnu was presiding over it?
JSS Yes.
JL I don't think so, although through awkwardness, (Which
was not the case because I hold Mr. Otunnu as a very good
diplomat) or lack of expertise, a President may
complicate the proceedings. I remember other occasions
when a president of the Security Council, unfortunately
following the advice of somebody else, made mistakes and
regretted it, of course. A good president, knowing the
procedure and keeping his "sangfroid", can carry the task
without influencing one way or another the ballots.
Because, as far as I know, members of the Security·
Council with few exceptions follow their instructions.
JSS Now there were •••
JL May I ••••
JSS Surely•••
JL On another occasion, I remember that I felt it necessary
to go to Paris to get the oral instructions of my Foreign
Minister. I got them, I went back,
JSS On this question?
JL Yes, a similar question - I went back to New York,
10
because I didn't want to embarrass my staff, amazing as
it is. I trusted them all, they were perfect, very good
assistants, but I knew that there is always a curiosity
about how France is going to vote. I had arrived at the
conclusion that my staff didn't know the position, they
couldn't answer. And I remember that once the whole
thing was over, I dictated a cable to Paris, "1 voted
according to your instructions." Actually I spared mu
assistants some embarrassment. They had to answer all
those who were questioning them, the junior officers very
often, "well, amazing as it is, I don't know".
JSS Well this is an interesting indication of the importance
that France attributes to the election of the Secretary-
General.
JL Indeed.
JSS Now, I think at this point when the Waldheim' s third term
was being considered, there were quite a few informal
consultations on. the part of members of the Security
Council. My question here is, during these
consultations, was there any real discussion of the
qualifications of the various candidates? Sadruddin Khan
was again a candidate, I think, and so was Salim Salim,
as a matter of fact.
JL Good, they had good credentials, good qualifications.
JSS But did the members of the Council in their informal
consultations, sit down and say, "well, it appears that
11
from his curriculum vitae Sadruddin Khan may be a good
administrator, a good manager and this is a plus in his
case" or was it a far more informal political process?
JL All considerations are taken into account, but there are
things we don't know. Whether Mr. So and So is a good
administrator or not for example. Some know but others
don't. What I remember is that we always wanted to know
whether the candidates had good political and diplomatic
experience, whether they had traveled, whether they had
been posted to Europe, for instance, things like that,
which looks trivial, are of minor importance, but we feel
that somebody who has lived in another country, who knows
the languages, who has travelled a lot, who has had big
responsibilities, will appear safer.
JSS And now that you have had the experience of observing the
results and now with a new election approaching, would
you still think that this is the important question to
raise about a potential candidate - this diplomatic
experience, the experience of having traveled, of knowing
languages in your opinion is still a maj or
qualification - perhaps the first qualification?
JL It is very difficult to establish a hierarchy among all
the criteria, and it is not because somebody would speak
fluent French that I would necessarily say "he's the
best", no. But .•..
JSS If I may just interpose here - suppose he didn't speak
12
JL
fluent French - would that be a disqualification?
Not for France only but for a number of countries,
France, which consider that it's easier to express one's
self in one's language and therefore to avoid
misunderstandings. It is not only for, I would say,
chauvinistic reasons that for instance, French
representatives insist on this question of language. It
is because the literature in English when received by a
government which doesn't use English, this literature is
not considered as seriously as it deserves. And that
applies to France. Of course there are now a greater
number of young people who speak the languages - more
particularly, English - but it is a fact that if you sent
a memo to a French administration, since there is a
barrier of language the memo will not be considered. And
then in New York they will wait for an answer and never
get it. So if for all those practical reasons we feel
that someone fluent in several languages - I don't insist
upon French - but several languages, first has an
"ouverture d'esprit", an open mind, and second, will be
in a better position to make himself understood. It's
alright to have a good translator, it's alright to have
a good interpreter, but I have realized that in the
caucus of francophone heads of state the conversation is
much more lively, much easier, much simpler, goes to the
point much more easily than [in a multilingual group].
13
JSS Just to continue with Perez de Cuellar, did you consider
him first of all a candidate? Was he really a candidate?
JL Perez de CUellar was not in New York but I remember very
well the Peruvian delegation and the gentleman who was
the head of this delegation and had been Permanent
Representative of Peru carried on a very active campaign.
I may say that several times a day he managed to have a
talk with me and just made certain whether I knew who Mr.
Perez de CUellar was, and of course I knew him very well,
Perez de Cuellar having been the special representative
of Kurt Waldheim on a number of occasions, and I had had
many opportunities many occasions to talk with him on a
variety of topics. So there was a very active Peruvian
delegation which didn't lose a moment and which was eager
to canvass the whole spectrum of the influential
delegations.
JSS So would you say there has to be some campaigning for a
person to have a chance at success?
JL Yes, at least for one reason. A good candidate must not
appear to be indifferent. In order not to appear
indifferent you've got either to have a spokesman or to
do the job yourself, whether in the lobbies or elsewhere.
JSS There are no written rules of procedure for the election,
or for deciding on a recommendation in the Security
Council for a Secretary-General. In your experience how
were most of the candidacies put forward? Was it
14
possible.for a person to become a candidate without his
government's support?
JL I don't think so. But there are peculiar situations.
There were, I remember, very good candidates who were
considered as nationals of two countries, or who were
considered as not having a specific nationality. It
happens very rarely but it happens.
JSS That would have been the case with Sadruddin Khan.
JL For instance, who was and is a very strong personality •.•
JSS I believe that there was a Filipino who became one of the
candidates without the sponsorship of his government. He
was the head of the Population Fund at that time.
JL Yes, I remember.
JSS But it would be your view that it would be a very
difficult disadvantage for anybody
JL I think so.
JSS I have just one final question in this series and that
is, from your experience and your wisdom, what do you
think is a desirable procedure for selecting a secretary-
General, what could be better than the procedure which
has been followed until now, the very informal
procedure •••
JL You mean, whether it could be improved?
JSS Yes
JL I am hesitant, because there is nothing that really
strikes me, I don't see any kind of measure or
15
initiative which would really improve the selection
process. It's very difficult to say.
JSS Let me pose one specific question in that regard. Brian
Urquhart, whom you know, has written some recommendations
which have been receiving wide attention on the sUbject
and one of these recommendations is that what we would
call a search committee should be established by the
Security Council well in advance. This committee should
actually go out and search for persons who would be well
qualified for the position and their names would then be
put forward by such a committee.
JL It seems to me a good suggestion. I don't know whether
it would prove very efficient but I'm all in favor of
anything which can offer the community of nations the
largest amount of information. It is true that we don't
know everybody and the French government never boasts of
knowing well in advance who would be necessarily a good .
Secretary-General. Maybe we don't know enough. If
through that procedure of Brian Urquhart we could enlarge
the information of the member countries then I think it
would be good.
JSS And the really final question on this particular subj ect.
In your experience, which was quite long in observing
very closely the performances of secretaries-General,
did you reach any conclusions - or for that matter, did
the French government reach any conclusions - on changes
16
JL
in the organization in the Secretariat or in other
aspects of the organization - which could enhance the
effectiveness of the secretary-General? Is there
something lacking as far you have observed?
Well, I'm a great supporter of the UN system and for that
reason I always welcome suggestions for improvement of
the organization. I think that much depends on
personalities and this is where and why the selection is
so important. With a small group of good people you can
perform much better than with a bigger structure with
less qualified assistants of the Secretary-General. On
the other hand we all know that there must be a balance
of representation within the system. This in itself
doesn't mean that we have to welcome less qualified
people but when you consider that there are only, on the
one hand, two working languages and, on the other one,
six official languages - you cannot expect, except for
very brilliant agents, you cannot expect that those who
are requested to work in another language than their own
as well as the others. For that single reason there is
a lack of balance which reflects the lack of balance of
the international community. I think that we've got to
live with that. I think that those who hold high
responsibilities within the Secretariat have to perform,
to make sure that everybody is qualified and working
well. For that reason I think what is very important is
17
to recruit people who believe in the organization. Once
you believe, once you accept that there are a number of
shortcomings, that it is unavoidable, then you get the
strength to perform your duty.
JSS Thank you now, I'd like to change the SUbject entirely.
Very briefly, to just go to the Middle East War which
began in October of 1973. Where were you in the French
service at that particular time?
JL I was in New York. I was a member of the French
delegation to the GA and I remember very well, I was in
the office when the Secretary-General called the
ambassador, the French ambassador in those days, and told
him that war had broken out and that he wanted to consult
with him. This is how it started and there we were, as
all our other colleagues, following the dispatches and
the messages coming, I mean, during the whole week.
JSS I jUdge from what you say that, on the French side, like
on most other sides, you had not really anticipated the
outbreak of war at that time?
JL No, we had not.
JSS Even though President Sadat had clearly indicated that he
was thinking of it?
JL Yes, which shows that one can be wrong, (laughter) along
with many others.
JSS As the war developed very quickly, was there any
inclination on the French side to take any initiative, or
18
JL
was there (as there apparently was on the part of
Waldheim) an inclination to let the Americans take the
lead in dealing with the situation?
Well, in that particular part of the world, we always
feel that whenever the Middle East is concerned, France -
the French people I would say - are interested. I mean,
for one reason or another because probably of Lebanon,
they feel that they cannot be indifferent, that something
is happening, that something has to be done and so forth.
And on the other hand we got the feeling that the
Americans, whenever the Middle East is concerned, feel
that they cannot be indifferent and they have to take the
lead and to take some initiative. I think that the
British are in the same situation for similar reasons and
of course, the Soviets cannot get too far away. So in
this question of leadership, I think that we would need
another interview to develop this idea. But the US has
demonstrated that when they wanted to take the lead, they
can.
JSS I did want to pursue a related question there and that is
the French attitude at that time (and for that matter,
earlier) toward peacekeeping as a technique, followed by
the UN. Just this afternoon Mr. Pineau was commenting to
me that actually he had very early thought of the idea of
a UN force and had suggested it to Dag Hammarskj old. Was
the French support constant (if I may use that word) for
19
the concept of peacekeeping, including in 1973 when the
war was finally brought to a ceasefire through a UN
resolution?
JL You mean a UN force?
JSS Yes.
JL Well I have a distinct recollection (as far as this issue
is concerned) which relates not necessarily to the events
of 1973 but to developments which took place later on.
In 1971 the President of the French Republic mentioned
that if things in Lebanon became more difficult then
France would consider helping militarily in Lebanon. In
1976 a new French president, Giscard d'Estaing was making
a trip in the US and somewhere (I think it was in New
Orleans) he said vaguely, because the situation was not
good in Lebanon, "if something happens in Lebanon France
would consider sending military troops to the area."
When I took over my position as ambassador I called in
the Minister of Defense, our Secretary of Defense, and I
told him, "Two French presidents have said that. Now I
don't want to interfere but although no Permanent Member
of the Security Council has sent troops as part of the
peacekeeping forces of the UN in recent years (with the
exception of the UK in Cyprus), our duty, considering the
commitments of our heads of state, our duty is to
envisage a possible involvement of France within such a
UN action." The defense minister listened to me and said
20
"You've got to talk to our Joint Chiefs of Staff", which
I did. In 1978, March, I was in Paris. We had a
legislative election, and the second vote was due on
March 18, or something like that, on a Sunday. I called
on my foreign minister. The situation had been
deteriorating after the invasion of Lebanon by Israeli
forces and I asked Mr. Louis de Guiringaud who had been
my predecessor in New York and who was extremely open to
everything coming from the UN, I asked him, "Do you think
that we might be involved?" and he said "Yes, I'll give
you an answer tomorrow, Sunday," (after the second ballot
of the elections which shows that the government was
working business as usual even under those
circumstances). Back in New York, I went directly from
the airport to the Security Council chambers. There my
American colleague and my Lebanon colleague took me by
the hand. In a remote place they told me, "Is France
ready to send troops?" I looked astonished and said,
"But this has never happened." They said "true, but the
situation is different. It is different because we are
expecting Mr. Begin on an official visit next Wednesday,
and we want something to happen in between. We want this
military move to stop and we don't know how to do it
except through the UN." "Oh", I said, "well, this is new
to me. II I turned to my assistants, who had attended the
first speeches in the Security Council and I noticed that
21
my German colleague had taken the floor and said: "we
support the idea of sending immediately peacekeeping
forces to Lebanon, southern Lebanon. Of course those
would be troops coming from non-Permanent Members of the
security council. II I turned to my American friends,
"This is the true doctrine, he was right." He said, "no,
we've got to correct that." Then I had a long talk with
Waldheim who said to me, "The situation is now very
serious. What we need is somebody to take initiative
with the support of the Council and at the request of the
Secretary-General. If you do that I trust that two or
three contingents from other member countries of the UN
might become unable??" Then I got in touch with my
foreign minister: in the middle of the afternoon I knew
that our answer would be, "We are ready to send a
battalion provided that first we are not alone and
second, it will be temporary." I remember that you were.
present during those days: I don't want to rewrite the
story but I want to add, to close on that matter, that I
had suggested to my government to limit the presence of
French troops to six months. I kept on that point until
in September we had to, as we say in French, "couper la
poire en deux." Instead of six months it was four
months. Then I wrote to my government that we had
accepted another four months, but that should be the last
time because our mission, the one which was requested,
22
had been to send a contingent immediately, in order to
facilitate the gathering of a stronger force. That now
has been done." The situation is not perfect, but the
situation is better and we should now, after having given
a decent advance notice, withdraw. That would be in
accordance with our commitment and that would save on
embarrassing situation later on." When I gave my
feelings to Waldheim he listened, didn't answer, flew to
Paris, had a private conversation with our President and
came back apparently reassured. The French contingent -
twelve years later - is still there. This is my
confidential conclusion.
JSS That's interesting, but it does show that an initiative
on the part of the Secretary-General can have an effect.
JL Right, and that an ambassador plenipotentiary is not as
powerful as the credentials say.
JSS Those are all the questions that I'm going to ask about
the '73 War unless there's any other point that you
wanted to make, that comes to your mind, in terms of the
French attitude at that point.
JL No, not particularly. I've been now away from New York
and following what is happening, the new developments and
the new life in the organization. I'm gratified at what
is happening. I don't think that it is a new UN; it is
a new environment. Let's hope that this new environment
will stay on for a long time.
23
JSS One thing that has happened just this past week that is
relevant to what you were talking about is a decision of
the five Permanent Members to participate in the observer
mission in the Gulf.
JL Yes, it's very interesting. I'm not against new
initiatives provided that it serves the peace, safeguards
the peace.
JSS Thank you very very much for participating.
24
Begin, Menachem
Giscard, Valery d'Estaning
Guiringaud, Louis de
Hammarskjold, Dag
Khan, Sadruddin Aga
Perez de Cuellar, Javier
Pineau, Christian
Sadat, Anwar
Salim, Salim
Thant, U
Urquhart, Brian
Waldheim, Kurt
Name Index
2, 22
21
22
5-7, 20
4, 12, 13, 16
1, 8, 9, 15
20
19
12
3, 7
17
1-5, 8, 9, 12, 15, 20, 23, 24
25
Leprette 8 April 1991Subject IndexTape 1ATape 2AName Index
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