8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
1/113
Africana: A Journal of Ideas on Africa and the African Diaspora
Volume 3, Number 1 2009
Editorial Coordinator Mr Yilma Tafere Tasew
Editor-in-Chief Dr Christopher LaMonica
Board Members Mr Thomas BandaDr Margaret ClarkDr Ramon DasDr Mourtada DemeDr Marron Maddox
Dr Victoria Mason
IT Consultant Ms Mariko Hemmingsen
AFRICANAVictoria University of Wellington
P.O. Box 600Wellington 6140
New ZealandPhone: +64 (4) 463-5760
Fax: +64 (4) 463-5414
www.africanajournal.org
© Africana: A Journal of Ideas on Africa and the African Diaspora. Allrights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any
form without permission in writing from the publisher.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
2/113
Vol. 3, No. 12009
ii
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
3/113
Vol. 3, No. 12009
iii
CONTENTS:
Introductory Note
Christopher LaMonicaYilma Tafere Tasew
5 Attractions and Limitations of Liberal Democracy in Africa J. Shola Omotola
32 Cultivating cultural change through cinema; YoussefChahine and the creation of national identity in Nasser’s EgyptBarrie Wharton
57 Growing Civic Awareness - Symptomatic Rehearsal ofTrue Democratic Dividend: Lessons from Nigeria’sGeneral Elections of 2007 Franklins A. Sanubi
73 The Niger Delta in Nigerian Nation-Building, 1960- 2005 John H. Enemugwem
91 Some Ethical Challenges in Media Advertising in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Zimbabwean Case Study
Fainos Mangena
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
4/113
Vol. 3, No. 12009
iv
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
5/113
Vol. 3, No. 12009
1
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
As several have astutely noted, publication and release of theDecember 2009 issue of Africana was delayed by several longweeks. This was due to the relocation of our journal fromVictoria University of Wellington, in New Zealand (with MasseyUniversity Printers), to the African Studies Center, at BostonUniversity, 232 Bay State Road, Boston, Massachusetts, in theUnited States. http://www.bu.edu/africa/ It is our firm beliefthat formal affiliation with this long-established and wellrespected institution, dedicated to the study of Africa, can onlyhelp the global recognition of our journal and our mission. Assuch, future editions of Africana will include formal references toand coordinates of our new home, as well as a newly establishedISSN. Being based in the relatively neutral state of New Zealanddid have its advantages and the growing number of Africanrefugees within that state made dialogue of African issuesparticularly appealing and interesting. Our Board continues toinclude participants from New Zealand and Australia. But wehave also taken on board a scholar of islamophobia, NorthAfrican & Middle Eastern Politics from Lancaster University inthe U.K., Dr Victoria Mason, and an Africanist scholar from theUniversity of Cergy-Pantoise in Paris, France, Dr Douglas Yates.As stated on our web-page http://www.africanjournal.org ourhope is to extend the dialogue on Africa and the AfricanDiaspora among interested parties throughout the world.
It is an atmosphere of some excitement but with the knowledge
that much work remains to be done that we present theDecember 2009 issue. In the months leading up to itspublication we received an ever-growing number of
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
6/113
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
7/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
3
among the Nigerian electorate that politicians should be electedsolely on the basis of commitments to the provision of publicservices (e.g. roads, health care facilities and education). Withina democratic context, politicians also play an important role atpromoting ‘civic awareness,’ which is instrumental to the proper
functioning of a democratic state. With references to the state ofliterature on the subject, Dr Sanubi cleverly uses data from theNigerian elections of 2007 to make his case. It is compelling andwe thank Dr Sanubi for his contribution.
The fourth article, by John H. Enemugwem, Senior Lecturerand Head of Department of History and Diplomatic Studies,University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, is entitled“The Niger Delta in Nigerian Nation-Building, 1960-2005.” DrEnemugwen’s aim is to demonstrate the crucial historical rolethat the peoples of the Niger Delta played in the creation ofthe modern Nigerian state. As is so often the case indiscussions of history, the involvement of certain peoples inparticularly important national moments is not always asadequately documented as it should be; we wish DrEnemugwem well in his efforts to document theaccomplishments of the peoples of the Nigeria Delta andthank him for his contribution to our journal.
Finally, Fainos Manenga, a journalist and a Senior Lecturer atthe University of Zimbabwe’s Department of ReligiousStudies, Classics and Philosophy, considers some of the ethicalissues tied to advertising in sub-Saharan Africa and in
Zimbabwe in particular. He reminds us of the potentialconflicts of interest between multinational businesses and thepublic at large. As is the case with other contributions to thisissue, Dr Manenga’s topic is timely and especially well-
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
8/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
4
argued. To him and to all of those who have made thisDecember 2009 issue possible our sincere thanks.
Christopher LaMonicaYilma Tafere Tasew
December 2009
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
9/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
5
Attractions and Limitations of LiberalDemocracy in Africa
J. Shola Omotola1
Abstract
Democracy is today one of the most popular concepts not
only in academic circles, but also in governmental as well
as non‐governmental domains. The New World
(Dis)Order has made its liberal version to acquire a fairly
standardized and universal connotation to the neglect of
1 J.
Shola
Omotola,
currently
completing
a PhD
in
Political
Science
at
the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, teaches political science at
Redeemer’s University, Redemption City, Nigeria. His research
interests are in comparative African democratization, oil and
environmental politics and identity politics, on which he has
published in reputable national and international journals, including
Representation , Africa Today , African and Asian Studies , Africa Insight
and South African Journal of International Affairs , among others. His
latest work, “ ‘Garrison’ Democracy in Nigeria: The 2007 General
Elections and the Prospects of Democratic Consolidation” appeared
in Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 47, 2(2009): 194‐220. He is
also completing a book length manuscript tentatively titled Trapped
in Transition: Nigeria’s First Democratic Decade, 1999‐2009 to be
published by the Canadian based publisher, Africa Reads.
Email: [email protected]
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
10/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
6
contextual variables that may impact on it for good or ill.
This paper questions the universalistic conception of
liberal democracy as one, whose character is fairly
standardized, arguing that such a conception represents
a major disservice to democratization in Africa.
Consequently, liberal democracy has not only become
subjective, but also theoretically ambivalent and
analytically vacuous. Its dispositions as a c̋elebrityʺ in
its own right, tend to propel undemocratic forces to
pretend as democrats to avoid coveting international
resentment. For this reason, the concept of liberal
democracy can be indicted of complicity in the level of
autocrats in civilian garbs across the globe particularly in
Africa. In its present form and character, the concept of
democracy does very little or nothing to illuminate our understanding of contemporary politics particularly in
the African context. Its main attraction seems the
advancement of Western interest especially the USA in
the consolidation of its Cold War victory, and that of
opportunistic African leaders in their quest for power
and accumulation of private capital. Critical questions
pertaining to its contexts of origin and metamorphosis
must, therefore, be interrogated if the concept would ever
be
useful
both
theoretically
and
analytically.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
11/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
7
Introduction The talk of democracy is very influential. Indeed,
democracy is today probably one of the most popular concepts
not only in academic circles but also in governmental as well
as civil society domains. While it has a long history in political
theory, the use of the concept of democracy does not belong to the category of concepts defined in universalistic terms, whose
character is fairly standardized within the context of its origin.
But, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent emergency of
a New World Order has, hypocritically indifferent to the
contexts of its origin and metamorphosis as it were, tends to
make democracy acquire a fairly acceptable, standardized and
universal connotation, to the neglect of contextual variables
that may impact on it for good or ill. Consequently,
democracy as a concept has not only become subjective,
difficult
as
it
is
to
operationalize
(measure),
but
also
theoretically ambivalent and analytically vacuous. As the
“hottest” bride in town, with its celebratory disposition as a
ʺcelebrityʺ in its own right, it often propels űndemocraticʺ
forces to pretend as democrats to avoid coveting international
resentment. In this sense, the concept of democracy can be
indicted of complicity in the level of autocrats in civilian garbs
across the globe particularly in Africa. The universalistic
conception of democracy as one, whose character is fairly
standardized, therefore, represents a major disservice to the
concept.
This paper attempts a critical evaluation of the
attractions and limitations of liberal democracy in Africa. The
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
12/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
8
paper’s analysis is underpinned by the central question: what
is the concept of liberal democracy good for? The main
purpose of the paper is to explore this question in the light of
inherent and apparent contradictions in the emerging
standardized conception of liberal democracy (see Saul, 1997a:
219‐236; 1997b: 339‐353; Shivji, 1991; Robinson, 1996; Ake 1995 etc). But, if democracy is a concept whose values are
standardized, why is it so markedly different in its level of
development across time and space? What sort of difference
do we refer to, and how does it impact on the usefulness of the
concept today particularly in Africa? These questions are, no
doubt, central to the substantive question of the study, either
of which cannot be satisfactorily answered without a good
knowledge of the meaning of the concept of democracy,
showing its metamorphosis.
The first
substantive
section
of
the
paper
addresses
the
meaning, origin and growth of democracy. The next section
conceptualizes democracy particularly its liberal version as an
ideology. The last major section evaluates the concept of
liberal democracy to ascertain its attractions and limitations in
the global and African contexts.
Democracy: Its Meaning, Origin and Growth
Democracy has been a concept of intense study. The
resultant body of literature is equally very extensive.
However despite the mass knowledge that has been
accumulated over the years, there is little appreciation of the
fact that its conception as an inevitable phenomenon whose
values are not only standardized but also universal is not only
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
13/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
9
theoretically faulty, but also practically unsupported by
reality. The global outlook of democracy that has emerged is
therefore pretentious and runs contrary to the logic of the
argument of this paper.
What then is democracy? This is certainly a difficult
question to answer. Yet it is pivotal to the distillation of our central question. Let us begin with a general definition.
Democracy is a system of government usually involving
freedom of the individuals in various aspects of political life,
equality among citizens, justice in the relations between the
people and the government and the participation of the people
in choosing those in government (Nnoli, 2003: 143). This is in
line with the c̋ommon good and the will of the peopleʺ thesis
of democracy. As Schumpeter (1950: 250‐283; 1967: 153‐188)
democracy entails that i̋nstitutional arrangement for arriving
at political
decisions,
which
realizes
the
common
good
by
making the people itself decide issues through the election of
individuals, who are to assemble in order to carryout its willʺ.
The second side of democracy, according to Schumpeter (1950;
cf Quinton 1967: 173), emphasizes the centrality of competition
to the emergence of political leadership. In this sense
democracy is an i̋nstitutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the peopleʹs
voteʺ.
What these general conceptions suggest is that
democracy as a system of government stresses the sovereignty
of the people (see Zack – William, 2001:213‐214; Osaghae,
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
14/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
10
1994). It is also reminiscent of Robert Dahlʹs t̋wo dimensions
of democracyʺ (Dahl, 2000:35 – 40). The first dimension sees
democracy as a̋n ideal, goal, aim, or standard, one that is
perhaps unachievable but nonetheless highly relevant not only
for classifying and judging political systems but also for
fashioning strategies of democratization, designing appropriate political institutions, and so onʺ. An ideal
democracy is therefore coterminous with a̋ political system
that might be designed for members of an association who
were willing to treat one another, for political purposes, as
political equalsʺ (Dahl, 2000: 37). Such a system requires
certain criteria for effective functioning. This include a set of
fundamental human right of citizens, democratic political
institution to boost citizensʹ participation in electing
representative, to freedom of expression, inquiry, discussion
and so
on.
One
important
thing
is
that
these
rights
and
opportunities must not just exist as merely abstract moral
obligations, but must be e̋nforceable and enforced by law and
practiceʺ (Dahl, 1989: 106 – 131; 1999: 35‐43, 83 – 99; 2000: 37‐
38).
This takes us to the second dimension of democracy. It
has to do with democracy in practice, as opposed to it theory.
This becomes the more pertinent because, as Dahl (2000: 38)
has also pointed out, h̋aving rights and opportunities is not
strictly equivalent to using themʺ. The mere fact that
democratic society concede certain rights, for example to vote
and be voted for, to their citizens, does not imply that all
qualified citizens will participate in these activities. In reality,
there is ample evidence to support this position. For example,
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
15/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
11
empirical studies have shown that citizens do not put much
value on actual participation themselves in political life, as
exemplified by the experience of European Community as a
whole. There, it was found out that a̋verage over the entire
period 1973 – 92 ̋, 1̋7 percent said they discussed politics
frequently, and 34 percent said they never do soʺ (Topf, 1995: 61; cf Dahl, 2000:39).
Lamentable this seeming contradiction marks a major
problematic about the concept of democracy, which may not
be unconnected with its context of origin. Within the context
of the Greek City State to which democracy owes it origin as
an ideal and a practice, it was for a very long time confined to
the borders of Athens. This was at a time when Athens was
sustained by the labour of its slaves, who incidentally were in
overwhelming majority relative to the free citizens. It would
therefore be
catastrophic
to
allow
for
egalitarianism
in
the
decision making process. This is because such would have
enabled the slaves to predominate over their economically
superior master but with limited number (see Nnoli, 2003:146).
Hence the Athenian democracy excluded the slaves, as
ʺequality, freedom and justice values were to be confined to
free citizensʺ. Democracy therefore, within the context of its
origin in Athens during the Greek era, was an exclusionary
phenomenon, where women and slaves were deprived of any
political rights (El‐Din, 2003: 5). In fact, it was such that in
another Greek State, Sparta to be specific, which existed about
the same time as Athens, the issue of egalitarianism in decision
making even among the so called free citizens was absent.
This was due to the threats of revolution from the slaves to
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
16/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
12
upturn the table against the citizens. This led to the
emergence of a strong military machine to thwart such a
revolution. It was also necessary to be able to crush it if it
materialized. Under such a circumstance, as Nnoli (2003:146)
has rightly observed, s̋ome, if not most, of the citizens
necessarily lose their freedom ʺ and S̋parta was reputed as a military dictatorship or oligarchy.ʺ
Following the dialecticism that characterizes the
history of human society, from the slave through the feudal to
the capitalist epoch, nowhere has egalitarianism, fairness and
justice have ever prevailed. The ascendancy of bourgeois
democracy following the industrial revolution in Europe and
the subsequent colonization of colonies particularly in Africa
attest to this (El‐Din, 2003: 6). But following the
marginalization of the bourgeois by the nobility in the decision
making process,
their
focus
shifted
from
securing
favourable
conditions of international trade to that of removing the
priviledges of the nobility at the political and economic realms
so that they could assert their growing influence in society.
Thus such concepts as freedom, equality and justice were
conceptualized as inherent to man, sanctioned by arguments
of natural law, and found expression in doctrines of natural
and human rights (Nnoli, 2003:148).
During the Cold War, the concept of democracy
became a part of the propaganda arsenal of both ends of the
ideological spectrum – the West led by the United States of
America (USA) and the East led by the Soviet Union. Why the
former champion a kind of democracy built on liberal
philosophy of individual freedom and equality the latter
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
17/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
13
emphasizes what it called socialist democracy where the state
calls the shot. Following this classification, the USA
reportedly worked assiduously to overthrow the
democratically elected working class government of Salvador
Allende of Chile in 1973, and supported all forms of anti –
democratic regimes in the name of fighting communism (see Nnoli, 2003: 149). The Cold War era also witness the rise of
what was called African socialism in Africa as champion by
African leaders such as Kwame Nkuruma of Ghana, Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania and so on. Thus the concept of
democracy assumed some ideological underpinnings that
were inimical to theory building and the universalization of
knowledge on democracy.
With the end of the Cold War in favour of the West,
there has been the ascendancy of liberal democracy on a
universal scale,
with
no
competing
values
(see
Fukuyama,
1991). It values include pluralism and multi‐party system,
including free and fair competitive politics; popular
participation; the rule of law, respect for human rights, and
equality of access to all citizens and groups to the state power
and resources; gender balance; and constitutionalism, among
others (see Osaghea, 1999: 7; Ayoade, 1998: 1‐8). The
universalization of this values, with little or no contest from
any quarters, would appear to be of a moderating influence on
ʺthe clash of civilizationsʺ as espoused by one of the most
articulate, influential and original thinker and writer of our
time, Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1996). But, this may
not be so, if we interrogate further the concept of liberal
democracy as an ideological category, which may still possibly
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
18/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
14
recede with time, like all other previous waves of democracy
(see Huntington, 1991), considering the level of criticism that
has attended it.
Liberal Democracy as Ideology
Our understanding of democracy in its current form and character will be enriched if we treat it (liberal democracy)
as an ideology. This requires that we first of all have a
working definition of what an ideology is all about, as well as
its defining character. Basically, an ideology is a̋ systematized
and interconnected set of ideas about the socio‐economic and
political organization as a wholeʺ (see Lane 1962; cf Nnoli,
2003: 178). Essentially, it serves to provide collective
legitimization of governmental actions and/or inactions, as
well as a basis for popular mobilization in support of such
actions.
Characteristically, an
ideology
often
tends
to
arise
in
conditions of crisis, is exclusive, absolute and universal; and in
the extreme, may be personalized and turn into a sacred belief
similar to religious beliefs (Nnoli, 2003: 177 – 183).
If we situate liberal democracy within the context of
the foregoing description, one finds that it is largely an
ideological phenomenon. For example, the rise of liberal
democracy on a universal scale was as a result of the crisis and
contradiction of the Cold War era, for the battle of dominance
between the West and the East. And since its victory at the
end of the Cold War, its waves have continued to spread in an
unprecedented manner, such that no region, not even the once
impregnable Eastern Europe, is free from its hegemonic
penetration. It was so much that the ascendancy of liberal
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
19/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
15
democracy, following the end of the Cold War, has been
labeled as t̋he end of history ̋, portraying it as t̋he final form
of governmentʺ (Fukuyama, 1991). It has therefore become
hegemonic and universal, and fast assuming the status of a
ʺglobal religionʺ for the mobilization of citizens internally, as
well as citizens and states, in addition to other actors at the international level. This is exemplified by the fact that donor
states and institution have now come to link their
development assistance/aid to democratization. The same
condition has equally been set for any form of concession on
the Third World quest and clamour for debt
forgiveness/cancellation (see Diamond, 2001; Baylies, 1995:
321‐337; Allen, 1997: 329‐337).
Generally the hegemony of liberal democracy has not
been without criticisms. As far back as 1984 when the Cold
War was
still
alive,
Barber
(1984:
4;
cf
Saul,
1997a:
230)
has
forcefully argued that:
We suffer, in the face of our eraʹs manifold crisis, not from
too much but from too little democracy… from the time of
Toqueville, it has been said that an excess of democracy can
undo liberal institutions. I will try to show that an excess
liberalism has undone liberal institutions. For what little
democracy we have had… been repeatedly compromised by
the liberal institutions with which it has been underguided
and the liberal philosophy from which its theory and
practice
has
been
derived…
Liberal
democracy
is
…
a ʹ
thinʹ
theory of democracy, one whose democratic values are
prudential… means exclusively individualistic and private
ends. From these precarious foundations, no firm theory of
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
20/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
16
citizenship, participation, public good or civic virtue can be
expected to arise.
Earlier, Huntington (1975; cf Barber, 1984: 95 and Saul,
1997b: 341) has argued that the problems of governance in the
United States
then
stemmed
from
an e̋xcess
of
democracy
ʺ.
For him t̋he effective operation of a democratic political
system usually requires some measure of apathy and non‐
involvement on the part of some individuals and groupsʺ.
Still in the same tradition, Manfred Bienefeld powerfully
argues:
Unfortunately genuine democracy is hard to reconciled
neoliberalismʹs mystical belief in the magic of disembodied
markets, it fierce hostility to the notion of state and society as
organic entities capable of defining and pursuing a common
interest and its insistence on pervasive deregulation. Under such conditions, the state loses the capacity to manage the
economies in accordance with democratically determined
social, ethical or political priorities. Only the shallowest and
most meaningless democracy will survive in a ćowboy
capitalismʹ where property rights became virtually absolute
because states and electorates are disempowered by the
mobility of capital … (Bienefeld, 1995: 17; cf Saul, 1997b:
343).
While these assertions may be general, the African
condition is certainly more pathetic. For example, even in the face of glaring possibilities of pervasion and abuse, Africans
had had to continue to support the struggle for democracy the
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
21/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
17
continent as a s̋econd independenceʺ movement. Their hopes
of material improvement and political empowerment were
recklessly shattered because of the divorce between public
policies and social needs. Even where the two converges, poor
implementation due to massive cronyism has always been a
clog in the wheel. The result is the general atmosphere of democratization of disempowerment prevalent in Africa. As
Claude Ake has poignantly pointed out:
Democracy is been interpreted and supported in ways that
defeat these aspirations and manifest no sensitivity to the
social conditions of the ordinary people of Africa. Generally
the political elites who support democratization are those
with no access to power, and they invariably have no feeling
for democratic values. They support democratization
largely as a strategy of power… the people can (only) choose
between oppressors and by the appearance of choice legitimize what is really their disempowerment (Ake, 1995:
39 – 40; cf Saul, 1997b: 349).
African resignation to fate is understandable. It was
due to their helplessness. For, as Miliband (1994: 190 – 191) has
observed, virtually all g̋overnment in the T́hird Worldʹ have
accepted the hegemonic role of the West and adapted their
economic and social policies to it. The price for not doing so is
beyond their capacity and their will.ʺ Perhaps, this
helplessness explains the fragility of democracy and
development across the continent. This is a semblance of what
John Saul (1997b: 339 –353) refer to as the f̋ear of being
condemned as old fashioned ̋, which has made Africa to
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
22/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
18
follow the path of liberal, at the expense of people/popular
democracy. Despite it inherent tendencies towards popular
disempowerment, liberal democracy has continued to gain
popularity and recognition as the final form of government the
world over.
Even as scholars continue to talk about too much or too little of democracy, there is yet the problem of measurement.
Onyeoziri(1989: 80) has pointed out, to say that a political
system is democratizing is a theoretical statement. This is
because at the level of phenomenal reality, we cannot
physically point at the political system and say, t̋his is
democratization going on.ʺ Measurement therefore bridges
the gap between a theoretical concept and observational
reality. To adequately measure democracy however requires a
multiple indicator approach that will capture the entire
domains
and
dimensions
of
democracy.
While
such
dimensions have engaged scholarly attention (for example,
Bollen, 1990; Cutright, 1963: 253‐264; Dinneya, 2003: 137‐177),
the problem is still far from being over. It should be noted that
these dimensions are institutional, processoral and
behavioural, and any good measure must capture all these
dimensions. The breakdown of these would include element
such as participation, competitiveness, inclusiveness,
openness, civil liberty, level of toleration of political
opposition, succession credibility, legitimacy standing of
government, independence of electoral bodies, mass media
and judiciary, quality of governance, level of democratic
dividend and the general environment of politics. Again there
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
23/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
19
is also the problem of how to assign numerals to, and scale
these indices.
Yet, every country of the world today claims to be
democratic, even if its democratic credential is not beyond the
level of teleguided elections, with little or no chances of
leadership alternation, as has mostly been the case in Africa (see Jinadu, 1997; Bratton, 1998; Adejumobi, 2000; Omotola,
2004a). In most cases, this has been partly responsible for the
high level of legitimacy deficit among African governments
(see Omotola, 2004b) with the protection offered by such
façade election it is therefore not difficult to come across
several leaders especially in Africa who, except for the simple
fact that they assumed office through the ballot of the box,
whose results were at best suspect and questionable, are by all
standard autocratic in their style of governance. Basic human
rights as
simple
as
that
of
freedom
of
expression,
right
to
vote
and be voted for and the like are not only being violated with
impunity, the economic rights of the people particularly the
peasants have been effectively mortgaged through the
elevation of the capitalist component of liberal democracy to a
dizzying height. This is usually done through economic
reform agenda built on chronic opportunism and political
patronage that made the accumulation of private capital
dependent on the state, to the disempowerment of the masses
(see Omotola, 2005; 2004c). The argument that democracy is a
precondition for development therefore stands defected at
least in the African context (see Ake, 1996; 1995; 1994).
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
24/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
20
Flowing from the foregoing, liberal democracy can be
described as an ideological category, which despite its
contradiction and criticisms, has continued to enjoy universal
practice. It has continued to be a rallying point within the
context of socio‐political and economic mobilization at all
levels of governance. Yet there is more to it than meet the eyes. This questions the very usefulness of democracy as a
concept.
Attractions and Limitations of Liberal Democracy What then is the concept of democracy good for with
reference to Africa? From the preceding analysis, democracy
as a concept can be said to serve two useful purposes and
interests. First is that of the developed democracies and
advanced economies of the West particularly the USA, which
emerged as
the
victor
from
the
Cold
War.
To
consolidate
its
victory, the USA has to strengthen its values especially liberal
democracy that constituted one of the core issues of the Cold
War. This was necessary to prevent any possible reversal and
by extension erosion of its pyrrhic victory. Democracy is
therefore a useful concept for the preservation of Western
(American) hegemony across the world. This hegemony is
mostly demonstrated through the so‐called democracy aid
industry, through which liberal values such as elections and
election monitoring are emphasized (Omotola, 2009; 2006;
Carothers, 2009).
Second, liberal democracy is also useful for the African
countries not only because it has become one of the major
conditions for development assistance by donor states and
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
25/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
21
agencies, but also because it serves the interest of African
leaders in their quest for power and accumulation of private
capital. In order to achieve both development assistance and
accumulation of private capital at a minimum cost, the surest
bet is for African leaders to be seen as being d̋emocracy
compliant ̋, no matter how pretentious such may be. The most prevalent example of this tendency in Africa relates to the
conduct of ritualistic elections, just to fulfill all righteousness,
without meeting internationally acceptable standards of
democratic elections (Omotola, 2009; 2008; Roth, 2009). These
standards can be measured in terms of popular competition,
participation and legitimacy (Lindberg, 2004). Assessed
against these indices, African elections are far from being
democratic. With the notable exception of Ghana, Botwana
and South Africa (Gyimah‐Boadi, 2009), African elections are
nothing more
than
the
fading
shadows
of
democracy
often
adopted by autocrats to masquerade as democrats (Roth, 2009;
Adejumobi, 2000).
Beyond these, liberal democracy is completely emptied
of any meaningful relevance. It is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for development especially in Third World
countries in general and Africa in particular. This is because,
as Allen etal (1992: 10; cf Saul, 1997b: 348) have pointed out,
ʺmuch more commonly, democracy serves as a system
through which class domination and various forms of
systemic inequalities are perpetuated and legitimized.ʺ In
Africa, for example, the Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs) of the 1980s through the 90s represented an example of
World Bank and IMF dysfunctional policy prescriptions for
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
26/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
22
Africa. As the SAPs turned out, it further pushed Africa down
the margin towards total collapse. These manifested in the
form of political, economic and social dislocations, including
rising unemployment, urban unrest, poverty, inflation and
general decline in the standard of living of Africans. the end
result was the excruciating debt burden it inflicted on most African economies and the widening of the developmental
gap between Africa and the developed economies (Omotola
and Saliu, 2009; Omotola and Enejo, 2009).
Democracy is also both an exclusionary and elitist
phenomenon, which marginalizes, nay excludes the masses
especially at the economic realm. This is best exemplified by
rising official corruption, increasing inequalities between the
rich and the poor, and the privatisation of the privatisation
process, or what Omotola (2005) calls ‘deregulation of
disempowerment’, etc.
In
fact,
democracy,
be
it
liberal
or
not,
is not a necessary attribute of human life because it has not
existed from time immemorial. Its origin and growth were
embedded in a Western historical context, grounded on the
economic and social development of Western societies and to
that extent entrenched in capitalist theories (see El‐Din, 2003:
6; Nnoli, 2003: 146 – 149). The fact that it has passed through
many waves whereby its contents vary from one epoch to the
other, having been known in the Athenian city states system
only to disappear and reemerged in a different shape after the
industrial revolution (El‐Din 2003; Huntington, 1991) is an
eloquent testimony. The Cold War was to later have profound
impact on its definition from ones spectrum of the ideological
continuum to the other, in addition to its transformed
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
27/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
23
meaning and virtues in post‐Cold War order. Today, main
emphasis is placed on elections and related institutional
parameters, without adequate attention to more substantive
issues of human well‐ being and development. This trend, in a
sense, reflects what Carothers (2009) calls the political
approach to democracy assistance at the expense of the developmental approach. Although he did not call for the
abrogation of the political approach, Carothers seems to
privildge the developmental approach over the political
approach, but calls for a careful merger of the two in a
mutually reinforcing manner.
In the final analysis, therefore, the attempt to portray
liberal democracy as a universal and inevitable phenomenon,
whose character is fairly standardized and perhaps a
necessarily attribute of human life is largely unfounded. This
development negates
the
fact
and
lesson
of
history.
The
messianic connotation attributed to it as a precondition for
development assistance and by extension development, has
not only made it subjective, but also contributed to the high
level of autocrats in civilian garbs across the globe especially
in Africa. Conceptually, therefore, democracy is analytically
vacuous and theoretically ambivalent, difficult as it were to
adequately define and measure. In its present form and
character, the concept of democracy does very little or nothing
to illuminate our understanding of contemporary politics
particularly in the Third World. Critical questions pertaining
to its contexts of origin and metamorphosis must therefore be
raised if the concept would ever be useful both theoretically
and practically.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
28/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
24
Conclusion What I have done in this paper is to interrogate the
usefulness and otherwise of the concept of liberal democracy
in the African context. It would seem, as suggested by the
preceding analyses, that the universalistic conception of liberal
democracy as one with a fairly standardized values and possibly inevitable to human existence, is not supported by
the fact of history and a body of empirical evidence and well‐
constructed theory. Rather, it is merely an ideological
category, whose character and form have been everything but
constant under its various waves over the years. Thus apart
from its usefulness in advancing the interest of the West in
propagation of its values, and that of it dependant for foreign
aid of various kinds from the Third World, the concept of
democracy, to all intents and purposes, serve little or no useful
purposes.
Indeed,
it
is
a
major
source
of
disservice
particularly to the developing countries, which pathetically
have had to live with it due to their helplessness. With
democracy as the only game in town, what these countries
need to do is to situate their democratization process within
their particularistic and systemic contexts to accommodate
their political culture. But as a concept, it is too ideologically
laden, analytically vacuous and theoretically ambivalent to
illuminate our understanding of contemporary politics in the
Third World and beyond.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
29/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
25
References Adejumobi. S. (2000) ʺ Elections in Africa: A fading shadow of
Democracy ̋, International Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21, No. 1,
pp. 59‐75.
Ake
C.
(1996)
Democracy
and
Development ,
New
York:
Brooking
Institute.
Ake, C. (1995) T̋he New World Order: A view from Africa ̋, in hans‐
Henrik, H. and George S. (eds) Whose World Order? Uneven
Globalization and the End of the Cold War, Boulder: Westview Press, pp
30 – 48.
Ake, C. (1994) Democratization of Disempowerment in Africa, Cass
Monograph Series, No. 1.
Allen, C. (1997) W̋ho Needs Civil Society? R̋eview of African Political
Economy, (ROAPE), No. 73, p 329 – 337.
Allen, C. et al (1992) ʺSurviving Democracy?ʺ ROAPE, No. 54.
Ayoade, J.A.A. (2000) W̋hat is Democracy?ʺ in Ayoade J.A.A. (ed.)
Democracy: Its Meaning and values, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers Ltd. Pp
1 – 9.
Barber,, B. (1984) Strong Democracy: participatory politics for a New Age,
Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Bienefeld, M.
(1995) S̋tructural
Adjustment
and
the
Prospects
for
Democracy in Southern Africa ̋, in Moore D.B and Gerald, J.S. (eds.)
Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and popular perspectives,
London: Macmillan.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
30/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
26
Bollen, K. (1990) P̋olitical Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement
Trapsʺ Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 25 (1),
pp. 7 – 24.
Bratton, M. (1998) ʺSecond Elections in Africa ̋, Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 9 (3), pp: 51 –66.
Carothers, T. (2009) “Democracy Assistance: Political Versus
Developmental?”, Journal of Democracy , Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 5‐ 19.
Cutright, P. (1963) N̋ational Political Development: Measurement
and Analysis ̋, American Sociological Review Vol. 28 (2), pp. 253 – 264.
Dahl, R.A. (2000) A̋ Democracy Paradox?ʺ Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. 115 (1), pp 35 – 40.
Dahl, R.A. (1999) On Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dahl R.A (1989) Democracy and its Critics, New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Diamond, L. (2001) I̋nternational Relations: Debt for Democracy ̋,
http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/011/diamond.html ,
Retrieved 18 March, 2005.
Dunneya, G.E. s(2003) ʺ Constructing a Cardinal Measure of
Democratic Development in a Transition Polity: The Nigerian
Example ̋, Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 29 (1 & 2), pp.
137 – 177.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
31/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
27
El‐Din, I.N. (2003) I̋n Criticism of the Western Mind and Practices:
Towards a New Vision for African Development, African Perspective,
Vol. 4 (15).
Fukuyama F. (1991) The End of History and the Last Man, New York:
Freedom Press.
Gyimah‐Boadi, E. (2009) “Another Step Forward for Ghana”, Journal
of Democracy , Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 138‐ 152.
Huntington, S.P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of
World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster.
Huntington S.P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in late
Twentieth Century , Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Jinadu, A. (1997) M̋atters Arising: African Elections and the problem
of Electoral Administrations ̋, African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2 (1), pp 1‐11.
Lane, R. (192) Political Ideology, New York: Free Press.
Milliband, R. (1994) Socialism for a Sceptical Age, London: Verso.
Nnoli, O. (2003) Introduction to Politics, Revised Second Edition, Enugu:
PACREP.
Omotola, J. S. (2009) “ ‘Garrison’ Democracy in Nigeria: The 2007
General Elections
and
the
Prospects
of
Democratic
Consolidation”,
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics , Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 194‐220.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
32/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
28
Omotola, J. S. and K. E. Enejo (2009) “Globalization, World Trade
Organization and the Challenges of Sustainable Development in
Africa”, Journal of Development Alternatives in Africa , Vol. 10, No. 2,
pp. 520‐538.
Omotola, J. S. and H. A. Saliu (2009), “Foreign Aid, Debt Relief and
Africa’s Development: Problems and Prospects”, South African
Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 16, No. 1, pp.87‐102.
Omotola, J. S. (2008) “Political Globalisation and Citizinship: New
Sources of Security Threats in Africa”, Journal of African Law , Vol. 52,
No. 2, pp. 268‐283.
Omotola, J. S. (2006) “The Limits of Election Monitoring: Nigeria’s
2003 General Elections”, Representation , Vol. 42, No.2, pp. 157‐167.
Omotola, J.S (2005) G̋lobalzing in Poverty: Deregulation of
Disempowerment in Nigeria ̋, Mimeo, Department of Political Science, Kogi State University, Anyigba, Nigeria.
Omotola, J.S. (2004a) T̋he 2003 Nigeriaʹs Second Election: Some
comments ̋, Political Science Review, Vol. 3 (1 & 2), pp. 126 – 138.
Omotola, J.S. (2004b) E̋xplaining Succession and Legitimacy Crisis
in Africa: Colonialism Revisited ̋, Research for Development, Vol. 20. (1
& 2).
Omotola, J.S. (2004c) E̋conomic Reform and Sustainable
Development: The Tragedy of Nigeriaʹs Simultaneous Transition ̋, in
Fadeyi, African Perspective
on
Globalization
and
Sustainable
Development,
Lagos: Faculty of Social Sciences, Lagos State University.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
33/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
29
Osaghae, E.E. (1999) D̋emocratization in Sub‐Saharan Africa:
Fautering Prospects,New Hopes ̋, Journal of Contemporary African
Studies, Vol. 17 (1),. pp. 2‐ 20.
Osaghae, E.E. (1994) T̋owards Sustaining Democratic Stability in
Africa: The Moral Imperatives ̋, in Omoruyi, O. etal (eds.)
Democratization in Africa: African Perspective, Vol. 1, Benin City: Hima
and Hima.
Onyeoziri, F. (1989) Őperationalizing Demoocratization: A Multi –
Dimensional and Configurative Approach ̋, proceeding of the 16th
National Conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association; pp. 80 –
93.
Quinton, A. ed. (1967) Political Philosophy, London: Oxford
University Press.
Robinson, W.L. (1996) Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Roth, K. (2009) “Despots Masquerading as Democrats”, Journal of
Human Rights Practice, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 140–155.
Saul, J.S. (1997a) L̋iberal Democracy Vs. Popular Democracy in
Southern Africa ̋, ROAPE; No. 72 pp. 219 – 236.
Saul, J.S. (1997b) F̋or Fear of Being Condemned as Old Fashioned:
Liberal Democracy Vs. Popular Democracy in Sub‐Saharan Africa ̋,
ROAPE, No.
73
pp.
339
– 353.
Schumpeter J. (1950) Capitalism Socialism and Democracy, London:
Allen and Unwin.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
34/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
30
Schumpeter, J. (1967) T̋wo Concepts of Democracyʺ in Quinton, A
(ed.) Political Philosophy, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 153 –
188.
Shivji I. (1991) State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on
Democracy, Harare: SAPES.
Topf, R. (1995) B̋eyond Electoral Participation ̋, in Hans‐Dieter, K.
and Dieter Fuchs (eds.) Citizen and State, Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, pp. 52‐79
E‐mail: [email protected]
Department of Political Science and Public Administration.
Redeemer’s University, Redemption City,
Mowe, Ogun State, Nigeria.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
35/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
31
Cultivating cultural change through cinema;Youssef Chahine and the creation of nationalidentity in Nasser’s Egypt
Barrie Wharton2
Egypt has long been considered by most commentators as the
birthplace of Arab cinema and many of the seminal milestones
in Arab cinematic history such as the shooting of the first full‐
length feature film, Layla (1928)3 took place along the banks of
the Nile. The golden era of Egyptian cinema began in the late
2 Dr Barrie Wharton, from the University of Limerick, Ireland, is
currently a Visiting
Fellow
at
the
National
Centre
for
Research
on
Europe at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. He has
lectured widely throughout Europe ( Portugal, Greece, etc) and the
Islamic world (Egypt, Iran, etc) and he has published widely in
refereed journals throughout Europe, the Middle East and North
America. He is a regular contributor to the international press and
media on questions relating to Europe and Islam. 3 During the article, all films will be referred to in the first instance in
italics by their Arabic title in an English alphabet form followed by
an English translation and the year of film release. Subsequent
referrals to the same film will be in italics but in English translation
form only. In the filmography at the end of the article, all films are
referenced in their Arabic language version in English alphabet form
followed by an English translation and year of release. All
translations are in standard Egyptian Arabic. Any Arabic terms used
in article are highlighted in italics and bold script.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
36/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
32
1940’s and continued through the 1950’s and early 1960’s, an
era which coincided with the coming to power of Col. Nasser
after the Free Officers Revolution of 1952 and the subsequent
establishment of Egypt as the cultural fulcrum of the new
emerging pan‐Arab doctrine. During this period which ended
with the death of Nasser in 1970, Egyptian cinema moved from being a simple entertainment tool for the masses to a role
as an instrument of socio‐cultural change. As such, Egyptian
cinema became almost a blueprint for the new Nasserist
societal vision and the cinema screen brought this vision to a
population where high rates of illiteracy hampered written
efforts.
Although much more famous internationally for his
post‐Nasser work, one of the foremost directors of this period
was the recently deceased Egyptian director, Youssef Chahine
and this
neglected
period
of
his
career
may
in
fact
prove
to
be
his most important legacy. This neglect is perhaps
understandable as Nasser’s sudden and premature death in
1970 led to a rapid demise in what had become perceived as
Nasserist cultural policy and in a rapidly changing Egypt,
both cultural commentators and Chahine himself shied away
from the discussion of his role in what had been perhaps the
most important project of national identity creation in modern
Egyptian history.
Indeed, when one analyzes the considerable literature
available on culture, and more specifically on cinema, in
Nasserist Egypt, there seems to exist an almost avowed and
deliberate playing down of Chahine’s role in Nasserism. On
the contrary, there has been a vast range of academic studies
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
37/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
33
on the role in Nasserist Egypt of his contemporary and
sometime collaborator, Naguib Mahfouz4 while the influence
on Nasserism of the legendary singer and actress, Um
Kolsoum has also been widely documented.5
There are various reasons for this academic obfuscation
of the relationship between Chahine and Nasser but foremost amongst them is undoubtedly the contemporary academic
obsession with Chahine as an anti‐establishment maverick
director whose themes of cosmopolitanism, liberalism and
homosexuality mark him out as an anti‐regime figure in Arab
society. This obsession was exacerbated by his attack on
Islamic fundamentalism in Heya Fawda..?/Chaos (2007) and
increasingly, one sees Chanhine posthumously lauded in an
erroneous manner as a “Western” director . Admittedly, the
aforementioned themes do exist in his most famous work in
the
West,
his
Alexandrian
quartet, Iskandariyah...
lih?
/Alexandria…Why ?(1978), Hadduta Misriyah /An Egyptian Tale
(1982), Iskandariyah Kaman wa Kaman/Alexandria Again and
Again (1989) and Iskandariyah‐New York/Alexandria‐New York
(2004) but they do not predominate in these films and play no
part in much of his work. In fact, closer examination of
4 Mahfouz won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988 and this
spawned a huge wave of research on his work with the bulk of it
concentrating on his work during the Nasserist perios when he
wrote his classic Cairo Trilogy and perhaps his best‐known work,
Midaq Alley. 5 Indeed, the Institut de Monde Arabe in Paris dedicated a full
exhibition in 2008 to Um Kolsoum with much of the exhibition
concentrating on her relationship with Nasser and Nasserism.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
38/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
34
Chahine’s complete oeuvre reveals a cinematic master who
was far more a poet of marginalization and social inequity
than a chronicler of dilettante life in modern Egypt and it is
noteworthy that by the time Chahine released the first of this
mainly autobiographical quartet of films which is often cited
as spanning his career, he had already directed twenty‐eight films and as this article will argue, his most significant
cinematic work, albeit not his most celebrated, was already
behind him.
In particular, this article will concentrate on three of
Chahine’s films which were produced during the Nasserist era
and which had in different ways, a profound effect on a
national culture and identity which was still in the throes of
formation. The first is the seminal Bab al‐Hadid/Cairo Main
Station (1958), a film which recreates and distills the upheaval
of Col.
Nasser’s
new
Egypt
through
a series
of
interwoven
and
fraught personal relationships in the symbolic location of the
country’s largest train station. Second is Al Nasser Salah Ad‐Din
/Saladin (1963), the quintessential Arab epic of the Crusades
and a thinly‐veiled allegory of the expected triumph of pan‐
Arab nationalism, a paean to the moral certainty of the new
regime and almost a hymn to Nasser himself. Finally, this
article will examine the daring and ground‐ breaking Al‐
Ard/The Land (1969), Chahine’s sadly neglected neo‐realist tour
de force which captured the soul of rural Egypt and still stands
today as one of the most powerful testaments to social
injustice in the annals of world cinema.
To understand the problematic position with the work
of Chahine and its role and influence in Nasserist Egypt, one
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
39/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
35
must look primarily at the reception which has been afforded
to pan‐Arabist and Nasserist‐era cinema and intellectuals in
the post‐1970 period. First and foremost, one must mention
that the legacy of this period has been primarily associated
with Col. Qaddafi in Libya, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and to a
lesser extent, Hafez al‐Assad in Syria, the late father of the current Syrian president. The association between Nasserism
and these authoritarian and dictatorial figures has done much
to discredit Nasserism as an innovative cultural project and by
extension, those that were heavily involved in its creation.
Some such as Naguib Mahfouz, the winner of the
Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988, managed successfully to re‐
invent themselves in a new post‐Nasserist Egyptian cultural
environment without having to overtly disassociate
themselves from or deny their past. Others such as
Abderrahman Cherkaoui,
who
had
worked
with
Chahine
and
Mahfouz on the script of Saladin, were not as successful and
found themselves intellectually marooned in President Sadat’s
new infitah capitalist society6 where they were tainted, albeit
often wrongly with the stigma of servants of the Soviet Union
and intellectually demeaned and debased as mere reactionary
mouthpieces of the culturally redundant Nasserist ideology of
pan‐Arabism.
6 Infitah or open door policy was a policy initiated by Sadat which
was originally economic but quickly had wide‐ranging socio‐cultural
and political ramifications. It involved the opening up of Egyptian
society to capitalism and the rejection of Nasser’s socialism. It
brought Egypt closer to the United States and away from the Soviet
sphere of influence.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
40/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
36
Youssef Chahine circumvented this danger when after
a three year hiatus from feature films after Nasser’s death, he
released El Ousfour/The Sparrow (1972), a film which clearly
points the finger of blame for the calamitous defeat of Egypt at
the hands of Israel in the Six Days War of 1967 at the Nasserist
political establishment. Indeed, the film was so provocative in its attack on state corruption that Nasser’s successor, Sadat
had it banned for two years after its release. However, the film
was successful for Chahine as an individual in that he
managed to clearly draw a line in the cultural quicksand
between his Nasserist past and his future career and as such,
The Sparrow becomes a watershed not only in Chahine’s career
but also in the trajectory of Egyptian film as its release marks
the end of Nasser’s pan‐Arabist cinematic dream as a new
generation of Arab directors and producers followed
Chahine’s
lead
and
moved
towards
more
introspective,
microcosmic visions of their societies in stark contrast with the
avowed pan‐national didactic nature and universality of
theme and structure which had characterized Arab cinema in
the Nasserist era. Highly ironically, The Sparrow was itself an
Arab co‐production between Egypt and Algeria but such co‐
productions would be few and far between in the following
decades.
However, it is Chahine’s pre‐The Sparrow work which
is of principal concern to this article and despite its powerful
condemnation of Nasserism, the reality is that Chahine’s
career was forged in and helped to forge Nasserist culture and
by logical extension, contemporary Egyptian identity. It may
have been possible to detach and remove the stigma and yoke
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
41/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
37
of Nasserism from Chahine after 1970 but it will never be
possible to remove Chahine from Nasserism.
Born in 1926 in Alexandria into a Christian family,
Chahine attended the prestigious and elitist Victoria College
from where he progressed to Pasadena Film School in
California. As such, Chahine was not a member of the different opposition political groups such as Young Egypt or
the Muslim Brotherhood7 but to suggest that he was
ambivalent to or ignorant of the great political change that was
on the horizon in early 1950’s Egypt would be foolish.
His first three feature films were shot when Egypt was
still under British colonial rule but his career really took off
after the Free Officers Revolution of 1952 which brought Col.
Nasser to power with his accompanying vision of a new
Egyptian culture and society. This vision called for a total
bouleversement
of
the
hitherto
existent
class
and
societal
structure through a socialist programme of nationalization and
education for the masses in order to create a new, more just
society.
Nasser’s utopian vision involved the formation of a
new national identity and culture and emissaries were enlisted
throughout the respective spheres of Egyptian cultural
production and entrusted with the dissemination of the new
Nasserist creed. Cinema was one of the principal spheres and
from the early days of the revolution onwards, Egyptian
7 Young Egypt was a neo‐fascist group with sympathies towards
Nazi Germany while the Muslim Brotherhood which still exists
today sought to islamicize Egyptian society and was the breeding
ground for many offshoot Islamic radical groupings.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
42/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
38
cinema enjoyed huge government subsidies and production
support as long of course as it served the aims of the
revolution. Chahine was one of the first directors to benefit
from this support and early films such as Sira` Fi al‐Wadi
/Struggle in the Valley/The Blazing Sun (1954), in which Chahine
discovery, Omar Sharif enjoyed his first main role and Sira` fi el‐ Minaa /Dark Waters, Struggle in the Port (1956) stand the test
of time as almost propaganda documents of early Nasserist
doctrine.
However, it was Cairo Main Station (1958) which would
cement Chahine’s reputation as Nasserism’s greatest director
and bring his work and by extension, Nasserism to a wider
Arab and international audience. Cairo Main Station is a
complex and above all, visually rich film, a veritable feast for
the eyes. Its frequent long shots echo the influence of Italian
neo‐realism
as
the
principal
characters
are
juxtaposed
against
the tumult and chaos of the real railway station of the title.
Such contrasts mirror the cultural upheaval and radical
change which characterized early Nasserist Egypt and perhaps
the most moving scenes are occasional ones of complete
silence which contrast starkly with the usual incessant noise of
the station. One of the most striking and famous images from
the film is the shot of the giant statue of Ramses II which
stands outside the station with the masses swarming around it
and the impact of this shot, which represents the creation of a
society of the masses, a dominant theme in pan‐Arabist
ideology, remains as powerful and effective today as when the
film was first released.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
43/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
39
Cairo Main Station is the story of a simple‐minded man,
Qenawi, a disabled newspaper seller in the railway station, a
rural peasant cast adrift in the new metropolis. Chahine
himself plays the role of Qenawi and despite his privileged
upbringing, he imbues his character with an ibn‐al‐balad8
quality which endears him to the audience who identify with his character from the very beginning. Qenawi cuts pictures of
women from magazines for the station hut he lives in but the
real object of his sexual desire or more correctly, frustration is
Hanouma, the beautiful lemonade seller, played by the
popular Egyptian actress, Hind Rostom. However, Hanouma
is engaged to the handsome Abou Serib, a station porter and
trade union organizer, played by Farid Chawqi.
Hanouma playfully but innocently flirts with Qenawi
and the confusion this provokes unleashes a wave of tragic
violence. This
violence
results
in
the
death
of
an
innocent
girl
whom Qenawi kills during a rage in a case of mistaken
identity as he attempts to kill Hanouma who has resisted his
advances and when he attempts to kill her again, this act
inevitably leads to Qenawi being taken away to a lunatic
asylum. This allegory for the consequences of the inability to
accept and embrace change in Nasser’s Egypt was shocking
for Egyptian audiences and after its release, it was shelved for
almost twenty years in Egypt but it had succeeded in breaking
8 ibn‐al‐balad , literally a son of the neighbourhood, is one of the
greatest compliments one can pay to an Egyptian. In dialect, it varies
from area to area but in Irish English, the term “salt of the earth”
would be used. The term is used to describe somebody who
embodies inherent decency, a type of everyman.
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
44/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
40
new ground in Egyptian cinema and its positive portrayal of a
“fallen” woman as a heroine was the first time the issue of
gender inequality had really been portrayed on the Egyptian
cinema screen.
The power of Cairo Main Station is its ability to portray
complex political, social and cultural issues in a simple yet always didactic manner. For this purpose, Chahine employs
all the classic stereotypes of Egyptian society in the familiar
setting of the Cairo railway station, a location familiar with
almost all of Egyptian society. Sounds of people greeting and
parting, eating and drinking, buying and selling permeate the
film and almost lull the audience into a sense of ease and
familiarity which makes the end all the more shocking.
Parallel stories permeate the film as we see a selection
of vignettes of a changing Egypt which reinforce the film’s
message. Porters
try
to
set
up
a trade
union
while
a feminist
gives a speech. A family of rural peasants wander through the
station completely lost and adrift akin to aliens in a brave new
world while two young lovers arrange a secret rendezvous.
Above all, we see the repeating vignette of the uprooted and
isolated Qenawi, an existential loner and silent voyeur,
emasculated and doomed by his social condition.
A tale of failed socio‐economic determinism and socio‐
cultural fatalism, Cairo Main Station is a cry for change in
Egypt for only radical change can alter the destinies of the
protagonists. The final scene in the film, when Qenawi is taken
away in a straitjacket through the teeming crowds after he has
been persuaded to dress up for a wedding which will never
take place, is almost overly melodramatic but indeed, highly
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
45/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
41
emotive and it quickly became seen as a leitmotif for the
programme of social justice and reforms which Nasser sought.
If Cairo Main Station linked Chahine to the new
Nasserist creed, he became interminable intertwined with its
fortunes through Saladin (1963). Ostensibly, a historical epic
charting the twelfth‐century defence of Jerusalem by the Arab hero, Saladin against the Christian crusaders, the film is a
thinly‐veiled allegory for the yearned for triumph of the pan‐
Arab nationalist ideology of Nasser.
Scripted by Naguib Mahfouz and Abderrahman
Cherkaoui, the film was originally titled El Nasser; Saladin but
to avoid accusations of overt propaganda, the title is usually
shortened. However, the inferred parallel between Saladin and
Nasser is glaringly obvious. Saladin is a paragon of peace and
religious tolerance, an educated ruler who gives clandestine
medical assistance
to
Richard
the
Lionheart
and
guarantees
religious freedom for all. A three hour epic, Saladin remains
one of the few authentic post‐colonial cultural productions
which attest to the glory of ancient Egypt. Indeed, the film is
often as cited as the great historical epic of Egyptian cinema
with Saladin, the Sultan of Egypt and Syria uniting Arabs
across Western Asia and North Africa in order to ward off the
Christian crusaders and its appearance in the wake of the Suez
crisis was widely interpreted as echoing Nasser’s
contemporary harnessing of Arab society against the Zionist
enemy.
Chahine never discussed at length Saladin in later years
but its interpretation and appropriation of Egyptian history for
propaganda purposes cannot be denied. Saladin had already
8/18/2019 Africana, 3, Dec. 2009
46/113
Africana
Vol. 3, No. 12009
42
been the protagonist of an Egyptian film by the Lama brothers
in 1941 but in colonial times, he had been reduced to a mere
action hero in an adventure. Yet, Chahine’s production, in
which he appears himself, brings Saladin to a new plane as a
symbol of justice and chivalry with the omnipresent slogan of
unity resonating throughout the film, striking a direct chord with contemporary Nasserist ideology of the time.
Arab identity is constantly placed above religious
affiliation a
Top Related