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Firdausi Abbas et al vs The SenateElectoral Tribunalon January 22, 2012

Political LawInhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal

On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22

candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987

congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3)

Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the

disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the

ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations

of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass

disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the

following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5)

members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature- is a proviso that where more

than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if

not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote

with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for

disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the

contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose

disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of

the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral

Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral

Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and

qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine

Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the

Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of

Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional

representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the


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party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its

Chairman.

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and

Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative

components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the

election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be

totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without

doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in

saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in

judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his

conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely

feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and

impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot

legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment

of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication

of a senatorial election contest.


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Bondoc vs. Pineda Case DigestBondoc vs. Pineda201 SCRA 792 G.R. No. 97710

September 26, 1991

Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and EmigdioBondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the FourthDistrict of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in theHouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members,3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House ofRepresentatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP).Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and CongressmanCerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, CongressmanCamasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP forallegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedlyinviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of thepromulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing theTribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representativesdecided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasurato the HRET.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominantpolitical party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart thepromulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pendingtherein

Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commissionwas to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests tolegislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge theirfunctions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independencefrom the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach ofparty discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. Inexpelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote infavor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of theballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representativescommitted a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Itsresolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.


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Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representativesis that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of theHRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure

just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution.

Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause,such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death,permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A membermay not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proofthat he has formally affiliated with another.


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Codilla vs. de Venecia

G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002

If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, theproclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to

review its validity

Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate

FACTS:

Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent

Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the

position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for

disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus

Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City

Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the

residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing

or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still

pending so Codillas name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In

fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner

was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he

was found guilty and ordered disqualified.

Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly

elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed atimely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment

of Locsins proclamation.

ISSUES:


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Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a

Representative

Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the

legally elected Representative

RULING:

First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion

for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.

xxx

Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of

the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the

COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the

said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet

unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for

reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the

assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th

legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has nojurisdiction in the instant case.

xxx

(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has

not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of

the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the

petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume

jurisdiction over the matter.


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In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a

proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this

Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the

House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the

issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.

This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of

the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent

Locsin.

xxx

A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and

disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility

of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in

question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume

office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly

elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose

eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident thatrespondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET.

She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a

patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th

legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity

for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her

via a quo warranto proceeding.

Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but

nevertheless unproclaimed candidate

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a

verified petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically

enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes

another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is


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entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary

course oflaw. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the

subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely

discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has

a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A

purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given

state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal

authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety

or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and

gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is

discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of

the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in

the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative

district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public

respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350

votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001

elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of

respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside

the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The

Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by

respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district

of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body

with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed

by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign

of chaos and confusion.


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Pimentel, et al. v. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal

GR 141489, November 29, 2002

Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments

GR 141490

Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in

accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included,

for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations

whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14

party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q.

Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from

party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang

Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO

Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse!

Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives

to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also

elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently,

the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these

two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the

political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA).

From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the

party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the

CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with

prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA

were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political

parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters

addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate

Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET.

The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring

of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to

Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January

2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator

Pimentels letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the

same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date,referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno.

On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition,

Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order)

against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and

Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,

party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in
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the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in

refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February

2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11

February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to

implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as

Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both

motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions

on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his

capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list

representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-

petitioners.

Issue:

[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the

constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list

representatives in the HRET.[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include

party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Held:

[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the

prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and

party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the

HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the

Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would

fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on

Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber ofCongress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who

among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective

electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of

the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the

House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to

the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the

doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the

House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution

or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise,

the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left

alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what

action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for

membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that

respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the

election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11

May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking


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membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the

party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the

election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up

to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not

consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary

recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the

Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in

response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the

1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power

to reconstitute themselves.


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Raul Daza vs Luis Singsonon November 25, 2010

Tribunal and its Composition

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political

realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on

Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the

new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA

which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza

questioned such replacement.

ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the

composition of the Commission on Appointments.

HELD:As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments

consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected

by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political

parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it

that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures,

not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT

the court.


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COSETENG V MITRA

13MAR

Facts:

Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives

under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the

Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal a request backed by nine

congressmen.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen

to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the

Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a

party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political

realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary

Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the

Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members

null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of

proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats

and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that

she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the

Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question,

hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonancewith the proportional

representation clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the

Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

Issue:

W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Held:

Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a

political question but because revision in House representation in CAwasbased on

proportional representation.

The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in

the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up

10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties.

KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices.
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Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than

1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats

in CA.

Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not

members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong.Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in petitioners contention that CA members should have been

nominated and elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their

floor leaders and elected by the House.

Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled inDaza vs Singson in that the

Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave

abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by

the other government branches.


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Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzaleson November 25, 2010

HRETs Composition Rounding Off

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC

senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement

that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the

traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators

elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for

NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the

majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8

and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is

also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the

elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and

one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He

alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the

CoA.

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional

membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political

parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other

manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which

each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half

membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be

able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was

correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on

Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a

violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that

membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political

parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced

the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC.A party

should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where

there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot


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constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each

other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may

have affiliations with the other party.


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Tio Vs. Videogram Regulatory Board Case DigestTio Vs. Videogram Regulatory Board151 SCRA 208G.R. No. L-75697June 18, 1987]

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operatorsadversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the VideogramRegulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended theNational Internal Revenue Code provided that:

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tapecassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided,That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding anyprovision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) ofthe purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or dispositionof a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.

Fifty percent(50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, andthe other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by theCity/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulatedcirculation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or anytechnical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations ofmovie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline

in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in thecollection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting insubstantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum fromrentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been


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subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million intaxes each year.

The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of

the movie industry.

Issue:

Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.

Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional .

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need forregulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrantviolation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes.

And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the taxremains a valid imposition.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncingPresidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlyingobjective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no questionthat public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competitionposed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public broughtabout by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containingpornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in governmentrevenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that theactivities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor'spermit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business."

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.


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Lidasan v Comelec

G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

Sanchez, J.:

Facts:

1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voterfor the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's

resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in

two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This

brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality ofBuldon in the Province of Cotabato, and

that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and

Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality ofParang, also in

theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the

operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared

unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in

the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province

Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is torefrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the

bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those

concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The

subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement


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"breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution

does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In

fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its

introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of suchprecision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It

suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the

legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and

consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body

of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise

or fraud upon the legislators.

3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy isnot essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from

the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be

informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is

misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really

embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the

act, is bad.

4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" projectsthe impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Notthe slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are

incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read

without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the

legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of

Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the

province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province

different from Lanao del Sur.

5.

Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did notapprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato

itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the

adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and

provinces were actually affected by the bill.


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Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Parason November 23, 2010

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the TitlePolice Power Not Validly Exercise

De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No.

84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz

averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the

said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are

healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO

he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for

it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND

COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND

OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police

power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived

of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise

of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such

clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not

prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed

reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations,

as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a

sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term

reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be

attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on

its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been

attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the

title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of

cabarets.


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Tobias vs Abalos - A case digest

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

Facts:

Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675

with title An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to

be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality

by the petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the

conversion of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in

effect.

Issues:

WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill

rule".

2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress

to 250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.

Ruling:

Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality

pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical

construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses

the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced

justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill

reapportioning the legislative district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
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CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. CaragueG.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831,otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18,entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered FourThousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), byPD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalizethe Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An

Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the

Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and GuaranteedLoans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automaticappropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education,therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution whichmandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it

being higher than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the ConstitutionCongress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, itdoes not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as todeprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and forthe attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to

provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt isnot only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. Moreespecially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the processCongress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the shareallocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriationcannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional


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PHILCONSA vs Enriquez

9MAY

GR No. 113105, August 19, 1994

FACTS:

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed

and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed

conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget

previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to

propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their

respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the

Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and

approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to

have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR

THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY

ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR,

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered

his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on

which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:

1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be

validly done through the 1994 GAA. Andthat appropriations for payment of public

debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the

Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,

Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.

2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and

maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges

(SUCs),

3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the

Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).

5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the

modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which

requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
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modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific

Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for

payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150

armored personnel carriers

5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augmentpension and gratuity funds.

7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR,

the Congress

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi

2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of

1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)

Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units

(CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service

and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.

HELD:

Locus Standi

We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that

matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition

imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member

thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of thatinstitution (Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d

1307 [1973]).

Veto of the Provisions

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative

process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is,

therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden

shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the

Constitution.

The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of

P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt

payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done

in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.

In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when

the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other

government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income


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and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been

enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as

exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D.

No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the

Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is

unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision

which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road

maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended

70% by administrative and 30% by contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should

strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the

Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and

inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, thespecial provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item

(Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP

modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military

equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative

veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the

validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the

issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate

provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for

payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been

contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of

laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered

into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the

pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits

System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in

the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the

President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000

CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation

law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and

manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-

Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.


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On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to

appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the

DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures

shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be

determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful ExecutionClause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into

execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the

ones to be embodied in the guidelines.


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TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE Case DigestARTURO M. TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THECOMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE1994 Aug 25G.R. No. 115455235 SCRA 630

FACTS: The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goodsand properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% ofthe gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered orexchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic ActNo. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance itsadministration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that theimposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into prior to theeffectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment ofcontracts.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the contractclause under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition of theVAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to theeffectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment ofcontracts, is only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to saythat the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment,fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws readinto contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation ofessential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate ofthe legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the

maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace andgood order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as alimitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a taxexemption has been granted for a valid consideration.

Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not understand it tomake this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its taxexemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law.

Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal andsubstantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before it. To sum up,the Court holds:

(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with byCongress in the enactment of the statute;

(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes -beyond those prescribed by the Constitution - have been observed is precluded by theprinciple of separation of powers;

(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor


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interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to aneducation; and

(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law isregressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected underthe Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective

relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.


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Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City [GRNo. 144104 June 29, 2004]Post undercase digests,TaxationatTuesday, March 20, 2012Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock

and non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No.1823. It is the registered ownerof the land on whichthe Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is erected.

A big space in the ground floor of the hospital is beingleased to private parties, for canteen and small storespaces, and to medical or professional practitionerswho use the same as theirprivate clinics. Also, a big

portion on the right side of the hospital is being leasedfor commercial purposes to a private enterpriseknown as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.

When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessedboth its land and hospital building for realproperty taxes, the Lung Center of the Philippines

filed a claim for exemption on its averment that it is acharitable institution with a minimum of 60% ofits hospital bedsexclusively used for charity patientsand that the major thrust of its hospital operation is toserve charity patients. The claim for exemption wasdenied, prompting a petition for the reversal of theresolution of the City Assessor with the Local Board of

Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which deniedthe same. On appeal, the Central Board of

Assessment Appeals of Quezon City affirmed thelocal boards decision, finding that Lung Center of thePhilippines is not a charitable institution and that its
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properties were not actually, directly and exclusivelyused for charitable purposes. Hence, the presentpetition for review with averments that

the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitableinstitution under Section 28(3), Article VI of theConstitution, notwithstanding that it accepts payingpatients and rents out portions of the hospital buildingto private individuals and enterprises.

Issue: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a

charitable institution within the context of theConstitution, and therefore, exempt fromrealproperty tax?

Held: The Lung Center of the Philippines is acharitable institution. To determine whether an

enterprise is a charitable institution or not, theelements which should be considered include thestatute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes,its constitution and by-laws, the methods ofadministration, the nature of the actual workperformed, that character of the services rendered,the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries and the use andoccupation of the properties.

However, under the Constitution, in order to beentitled to exemption from real property tax, theremust be clear and unequivocal proof that (1) it is a


32/39

charitable institution and (2)its real properties areACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used forcharitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are

used for treatment of patients and the dispensation ofmedical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being leased toprivate individuals and enterprises.

Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to theexclusion of others, debarred from participation or

enjoyment. If real property is used for one or morecommercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for theexempted purposes but is subject to taxation.


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Tan vs Del Rosario

9MAY

G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994

FACTS:

These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No.

109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the

Simplified Net Income Taxationn Scheme (SNIT), amending certain provisions of the

National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293, promulgated by public respondents

pursuant to said law.

Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional

requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable in that the law would now

attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it

imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. Petitioners claim to be taxpayers

adversely affected by the continued implementation of the amendatory legislation.

ISSUES:

1. Is Republic Act No. 7496 a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled,

Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals

Engaged in the Practice of their Profession (Petition in G.R. No. 109289)

2. Does Republic Act No. 7496 violate the Constitution for imposing taxes that are not

uniform and equitable.

3. Did the Secretary of Finance and the BIR Commissioner exceed their rule-making

authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships?

HELD:

The Petition is dismissed. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal

protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are

to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs.

Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the

standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization

is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal,

to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all

those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs.

PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 771).

What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative

intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the
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income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global

treatment on taxable corporations. We certainly do not view this classification to be

arbitrary and inappropriate.

Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea of petitioner to have the law declared

unconstitutional for being violative of due process must perforce fail. The due processclause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or

constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power.


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Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretaryon November 16, 2011

Political LawCongress Authorizing the President to Tax

On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in addition to any

other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines,

an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on

all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines.

In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed

reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be

taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are

unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: All

appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local

application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but

the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that since the

Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not

assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of

revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,

revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative

rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive

Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are

prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the

Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: (2) The

Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to

such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,

tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the

national development program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional

permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and

restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and

other duties or imposts . . . .


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John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim

[GR 119775, 24 October 2003]

En Banc, Carpio-Morales (J): 9 concur, 2 took no partFacts:

Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accellerating the Convetsion of MilitaryReservations into other Productive uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and

Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for other

purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of

1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992. The law set out the policy of the government

to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of

the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America

Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as well

as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in the City of

Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority' (BCDA),

vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the

ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with the declared

government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free

Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to be delineated in a

proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines; and granted the Subic

SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of

businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized

financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave authority to the President tocreate through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local

government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas

covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San

Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd.

(TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private

corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to

the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and

Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. 4 months

later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint

Venture Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture

company known as the Baguio International Development and Management

Corporation which would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the

purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as


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originally envisioned by the parties under their AZemorandmn of Agreement. The

Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to

the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By

Resolution of 29 September 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City

officially asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or totally located within

Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its

development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19 January 1994, the sanggunian

sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the

home lots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the military

reservation. Still by another resolution passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian

adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp

John Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other things, a kind of

development that affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist destination, priority in employment opportunities for

Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed participation of the

city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the

previously named nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for

local taxes of businesses to be established within the camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and

ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the

sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition

precedent to its full development in accordance with the mandate of RA 7227. On 11

May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the

determination of realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties

of Camp John Hay. The resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian

in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, the

sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camp's

property and the economic activity therein from local or national taxation. More

than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution 255, (Series of

1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then

President Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectaresof the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of RA 7227. Together with

this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for

consideration by the President. On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued

Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating and designating a portion of the area

covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone

pursuant to Republic Act 7227." The John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, et. al.


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filed the petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a

temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction on 25

April 1995 challenging, in the main, the constitutionality or validity of Proclamation

420 as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture

Agreement between the BCDA, and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.Issue: Whether the petitioners have legal standing in filing the case questioning the

validity of Presidential Proclamation 420.Held: It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the

court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are

present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and

substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise

of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutionalquestion is the lis mota of the case." RA 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of

the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas

in the country.'" The grant by the law on local government units of the right of

concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on

them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or

surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of

petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation

420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct

injury as a result of the government act being challenged." Theirs is a material

interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an interest

in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the

enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social existence of the

people of Baguio City. Moreover, Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G.

Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in the local

governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of

their constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a

portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, Claravall andYaranon, as city officials who voted against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255

(Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation 420,

have legal standing to bring the present petition.


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Teresita Fabian vs Honorable AnianoDesierto & Nestor Agustin

on November 16, 2011

Political LawAppellate Jurisdiction of the Court

Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development

Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin

was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the

offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the

Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and

when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts

to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Sheeventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him. A case ensued which

eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to

the deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is

final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of

Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective November 17, 1989.]

pertinently provides that -In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or

decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a

petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,

directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45

of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore,

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from

decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It

consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a

law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has

been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That

constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases

placed under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation

enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court