Case 40Garcia v. DomingoG.R. No. L-30104July 25, 1973.

Facts:

In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by appropriate information eight (8) criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana. The accused wanted for the speedy trial so they requested to hold the trial even on Saturday on the chamber of Judge Gamboa. The petitioner granted the request. The trials of the cases in question were held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia. During all 14 days of trial, spanning a period of several months, the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on 23 September 1968 but was postponed. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon and supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings.

On 1 October 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the CFI a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, alleging jurisdictional defects. After proceedings duly had, Judge Felix Domingo (CFI Manila) issued an order declaring that the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused had been violated, and ordering the city court Judge (Garcia) "to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases in question pending in his Court, until further orders of the CFI.

Issue:

Whether the conduct of the trial inside the Judge’s air-conditioned chambers, rather than the usual open court, render the proceedings violative of the constitutional mandate for public trial

Held:

When the trial was held on Saturdays and in the air-conditioned chambers of the City Judge for the convenience of the parties and of the Judge, the proceedings were not violative of the right to public trial. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. It suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." Reference may also be made to the undisputed

fact at least 14 hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of policemen.

When it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the persons in court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.

G.R. No. L-21741 January 25, 1924

AURELIA CONDE, petitioner, vs.PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner herein faced by five various charges of misdemeanors and crimes. She had appeared with her witness 8 times only to find out that it was postponed, had come before the Supreme court for protection twice and after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.

Issue:

What leverage does an accused have should there be an unjust delay in the delivery of justice?

Held:

We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

G.R. Nos. L-34756-59 March 31, 1973

MANUEL MATEO, JR., ROBERTO MARTINEZ alias RUBEN MARTINEZ, ENRIQUE CONCEPCION and ESMERALDO CRUZ, petitioners,

vs.HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District,

Facts:

Petitioner was an accused for the crime of robbery, the hearing was done in the sala of the respondent judge. When petitioner file for the dismissal of the case on due insufficiency of evidence for failure of prosecution (1) to prove the existence of conspiracy, and (2) to identify the accused by competent evidence in reply respondent judge said that the motion to dismiss will be resolved until the prosecution against Rolando Reyes has presented their evidence. Rolando Reyes who was actually tried separately, made extra judicial statement before the respondent judge that implicated the petitioner. Pending the motion to dismissed prosecution against petitioner filed petition for additional evidence which was granted by respondent judge even with opposition of the petitioner. The evidence presented was the statement of Rolando Reyes who repudiated the statement saying that he was threatened by a government agent. Petitioner did filed that respondent judge should disqualify himself.

Issue: Should the judge disqualify himself?

Held: Yes, Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought. Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later declaration that there was intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. That was hardly flattering to respondent Judge. It is not only that. His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted. The absence of the requisite due process element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance even more telling. It was he who attested to its due execution on October 1, 1971 wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in the crime and in addition implicated petitioners. At that time, their motion for dismissal of the charges against them was pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until after the prosecution had presented and rested its evidence against affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same offense, but in a separate proceeding. It cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in effect ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed freely. With its repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into the picture there is apparent the situation of a judge having to pass on a question that by implication had already been answered by him. Such a fact became rather obvious. For respondent Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he had previously given his opinion. It is this inroad in one's objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the law on disqualification. The misgivings then as to the requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not being met are more titan justified. Hence the conclusion reached by us.