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The Desecuritisation of Illegal Migration:
The Case for a European Belonging Without Community
Paper prepared for the PhD-seminar/EUROPA workshop,
Department of Political Science and Public Management,
University of Southern Denmark,
Odense, 26 October 2004
Rens van Munster
PhD-student
University of Southern Denmark
Dpt. of Political Science and Public Management
Campusvej 55
5230 Odense M
Email: [email protected]
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There is a certain joy in listening to [security] stories. But what
is joy on closer reflection than our hidden sorrow unmasked.
Perhaps we listen, read, and believe security stories only to
alleviate a deeper pain managing somehow to live
meaningfully, more comfortably, and even with a smile, within
our boundaries of violence
Costas Constantinou
What we need more is a certain violence against ourselves
Slavoj iek
1 Introduction
Since the introduction of the internal market and, more recently, the establishment of the EU as an
area of freedom, security and justice the topic of illegal migration is increasingly interpreted as a
security problem.1 Over the last two decades the issue of illegal has been gradually but consistently
uncoupled from humanitarian and economic frames and has instead been re-inscribed as a stake in
the administrative field of security.2
In this latter field
the phenomenon of illegal migration is not
first and foremost considered in the utilitarian terms of economics or in the cosmopolitan terms of
humanitarianism but as a highly charged socio-political risk to the functioning of the EU and its
member states. Conceptually as well as institutionally, the issue of illegal migration is now viewed
as a risk on a European security continuum that also includes transversal issues such as organised
1
See for instance Bigo (1994), den Boer (1995), Huysmans (2000b), Albrecht (2002), Green and Grewcock (2002),Berman (2003) and Geddes (2003).2 See Bigo (1996), Carr (1996) and Benyon (1996).
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crime, terrorism, drugs trade and human trafficking. Moreover, the issue of illegal migration has
started to function as the point of convergence or the common currency with which politicians,
policy-makers, security professionals and the (sensational) press communicate their misgivings and
fears to each other and the wider public.3
As a consequence, the view of illegal migrants as a threat
to security is now largely taken for granted and security measures taken by the EU to control the
inflow of illegal migrants are considered to be neutral policy responses to this objective threat. If
one accepts such a view, the obvious research question for security analysts is a problem-solving or
instrumental one: how best secure or defend the EU against the inflow of migrants? This paper
resists such a problem-solving perspective, however. It is not so much interested in the instrumental
question of how best to manage illegal migration. Instead, it focuses on the more explicit ethico-
political question of the ways in which the securitisation of illegal migration organises and
structures the ways in which the EU relates to itself and to outsiders. In doing so, this paper hooks
up with the linguistic turn in social theory in general and IR-theory more specifically. Departing
from the by now well-known insight that language is not merely a neutral medium that mirrors an
extra-discursive realm but also has a constitutive bearing upon that reality, this paper claims that the
enunciation of security mediates a specific form of belonging that constructs the antagonistic
identities of friend and enemy.4 In this view, the enunciation of illegal migration as a security
problem is a practice that seeks to settle the question of belonging and inclusion and exclusion.
In addressing the securitisation of illegal migration, the purpose of this paper is to show that
security is not a necessary response to the question of illegal migration but a particular way oforganising belonging that integrates society around the construction of a dangerous other. In an
attempt to move away from a politics of belonging that functions by turning the other into a threat,
3 As a result, illegal migration is increasingly made visible in public discourses as the cause for all social anxieties such
as unemployment, the deterioration of the quality of life in urban areas, petty crime, prostitution and concerns about
national and cultural identities images which often rely on shaky but nevertheless popular and sticky presumptions.
See Wacquant (1999), Bigo (2002), Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002), Albrecht (2002), Bigo (2002), Ceyhan and Tsoukala(2002) and Pickering (2004).4 See, inter alia, Wver (1995), Campbell (1998b) and Weldes et al. (1999).
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this paper seeks to open up for alternative ways of politicising illegal migration and the question of
belonging in the emerging European polity. That is, it seeks to undo the representation of illegal
migration as a threat against which the emerging EU community should be defended.5 In an attempt
to outline a strategy of desecuritisation, this paper turns to deconstruction. Whereas the realm of
security is essentially a conservative discourse that seeks to defend the status quo through control
and policing, deconstruction has always been explicitly concerned with opening up what is
generally taken for given in an attempt to bring marginalised and excluded voices into the picture.
Insofar as desecuritisation is about the unmaking of security by re-imagining the question of
illegal migration, there is indeed a close resemblance in the objectives of deconstruction and
desecuritisation.6 Critically evaluating the deconstructivist strategy of desecuritisation (section 3),
this paper moves on to formulate a strategy of desecuritisation that rethinks the boundaries of
belonging from the point of the securitised other as most excluded (section 4). In the more concrete
context of the securitisation of illegal migration in the EU, this requires a restructuring of belonging
on behalf of the illegal migrants as the abject of the emerging European polity (section 5). What this
may entail more concretely will be illustrated by referring to the sans-papiers struggle for the
regularisation of all undocumented migrants in Europe. However, before inquiring deeper into the
possibilities of a desecuritisation of social relations and what such a desecuritisation might entail for
5 From a constructivist perspective, this begs the obvious but essential question whether one in criticising the
securitisation of illegal migration does not implicitly contribute to these securitising processes. The reason behind this is
that referring to the issue of illegal migration in terms of security (even critically!) re-enforces and re-inforces the social
perception of the latter as a security issue (cf. Constantinou, 2000; Wver, 1999). For instance, Guiraudon (1998) has
warned that it can be difficult to untie the migrant from its strong negative connotations and, hence, trying to do so
would only help sustaining the social image of migrants as a force corroding the social edifice. But if speaking is a
problem, silence is not an option either once confronted with an issue that is already heavily securitised. Although the
normative dilemma of writing security seems inescapable, Huysmans (2002) has argued that it nevertheless can be
mitigated if one focuses on the governing work on security and its structuring effects on social relations. While this
does not solve the dilemma, it at least opens up the possibility for unmaking security by pointing out the political workthat security performs.6 On the connection between deconstruction and desecuritisation, see also Huysmans (1995) and Hansen (1997: 377).
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European belonging, it is first necessary to specify in some detail the ways in which security orders
belonging.
2. The EU and Illegal Migration: Security as a Politics of Belonging
Security is a specific way of politicising an issue: to put illegal migration on the security agenda
means that migrants become staged as actors in a security drama. Security politics does not simply
function by pointing out pre-existing threats. It is a performative activity that renders societal issues
such as illegal migration visible as a threat: The process of securitization is what in language
theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the
utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). But
what does it mean more precisely to securitise issues such as illegal migration? What exactly is
done when issues are framed as security issues? And in which ways does a security drama differ
from other dramas?
Arguably, these questions have been addressed most explicitly in the research of Ole Wver
and the Copenhagen school of security.7 In the view of the Copenhagen school, a security story
differs from other types of stories because it is structured by the logic of war, which Wver views
through the lens of national security: To the extent that we have an idea of a specific modality
labelled security it is because we think of national security and its modifications and limitations,
and not because we think of the everyday word security (Wver, 1995: 48-9, emphasis inoriginal). Thus while the notion of war is generally restricted to the realm of national security,
Wver proposes to study the ways in which the national security problematique is present outside
the immediate context of military conflict between states: [T]he logic of war of challenge-
7 One sympathetic critic of the Copenhagen school refers to their research as possibly the most thorough and
continuous exploration of the significance and implications of a widening security agenda (Huysmans, 1998b: 186).
Also, many of the current debates on the nature of the security drama are framed in relation to the Copenhagen school.See for instance Huysmans (1998a; forthcoming), Doty (1998/99), McSweeney (1999), Hansen (2000), Aradau (2001),
Eriksson (2001) and Williams (2003).
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resistance (defense)-escalation-recognition/defeat could be replayed metaphorically and extended
to other sectors ... When this happens, however, the structure of the game is still derived from the
most classical of classical cases: war (Wver, 1995: 56). In accordance with the traditional
Clausewitzian view of war, then, security can be defined as the end point of politics. When normal
politics fail, it gives way to security politics, which inserts issues with a sense of priority and
urgency that legitimise politicians and policy-makers to take extraordinary measures to secure the
survival of a political community: When a specific issue is turned into a test case, everything
becomes concentrated at one point, since the outcome of the test will frame all future questions
(Wver, 1995: 53). In the extreme case of war, a government is not longer bound by the rules that
govern normal social relations (e.g. political transparency, public decision-making and respect for
civil rights), but free to take the decisions that can guarantee the survival of the community (without
which there would be no politics).8
While there is little doubt that acts of securitisation can take the exceptional character of war,
the securitisation of societal issues in the EU and liberal democracies in general rarely (if ever)
takes such an extreme form. Although the EU considers illegal migration a threat to the internal
market, the securitising process to which illegal migrants are subjected is less intense than the
metaphor of war suggests. In fact, to focus too narrowly on securitisation as an act runs the risk of
ignoring processes of securitisation that stop short of this extreme point (Williams, 2003). For this
reason, Hansen suggests that one should not just focus on the exceptionality of a security discourse
but also on the ways in which these discourses inscribe subjectivity and identity: Security is notonly a speech act, but embedded in the production of particular subjectivities which then form the
basis for what can be articulated as threat and threatened (Hansen, 2000: 306). In a similar critique
Bigo has argued that it would be better not to distinguish too strictly between politics and security,
8 Hence the Copenhagen school argues that securitisation is an exceptional discourse in which an actor by means of an
argument about the urgency of an existential threat breaks free of the normal political procedures (Buzan et al., 1998:
26, 25; see also Wver, 1995). Hence, various authors have observed that there are certain intellectual similaritiesbetween the Copenhagen school of security on the one hand and Carl Schmitts work on the other. See Huysmans
(1998a), Williams (2003) and van Munster (2005).
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normalcy and the exception. Rather, he points at the importance of determining the positions of
authority from which a security continuum of different risks and threats are constructed and, in
doing so, close off for alternative ways of framing the issue (Bigo, 2001).
Nevertheless, the metaphor of war can still function as a useful analogy even for less intense
forms of securitisation. For whether or not a securitising process reaches the limit point of war,
security always refers to a situation in which the existence of the self is politicised as being
dependent on the neutralisation of a dangerous other. Thus, while security need not always take the
extreme form of war, the ordering function security performs is still the sovereign power of
exclusion through which friends are delineated from enemies (even if their dangerousness is a
matter of degree).9 Although the degree of exclusivity and the measures to counter societal dangers
thus may vary, security discourses are united insofar as they mediate a politics of belonging that
separate a sphere of trust between friends from the enemy who is thought to introduce fear, chaos
and instability into the social order.
Mediating belonging through practices of security thus impinges upon how a community
acts towards itself and outsiders. Two things stand out. First, security radicalises the opposition
between self and other by transforming this relation into a dialectics between friend and enemy.
Although it is true that different group can exist alongside each other and interact in a meaningful
way, the drama of security turns the other party into a threat or enemy with which there is no shared
understanding or common symbolic ground. Indeed, when viewed through the lens of security, the
relation between self and other looses its multiple dimensions and is reduced to an antagonisticrelationship of enmity. The transformation of the self/other relation into the friend/enemy relation
turns the discursive space into two camps in which interaction turns into a zero-sum struggle for the
good life (cf. Wver, 1995). To a large degree, this dynamic also underpins the EUs relationship to
9 This is also illustrated by the war-related metaphors invasion of migrants, Fortress Europe, flankingmeasures,
warorfightagainst illegal migration that are often deployed. Also, metaphorical links to other wars (e.g. Cold Warand Trojan War) are replayed in public discourses on illegal migration. For instance, migrants have been called a fifth
colon and a Trojan horse.
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illegal migration since the abolishment of internal borders and the development of the EU as an area
of freedom, security and justice (see, amongst others, Huysmans, 2000b; Geddes, 2003; Boswell,
2003). Here, illegal migration is mainly portrayed in negative terms as something that disrupts the
proper conduct of freedom within the EU and, for that reason, needs to be restricted, controlled and
deterred.10 This is well-captured in article 2 of the EU-treaty which defines that one of the core
objective of the EU is to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and
justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures
with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of
crime.
Secondly, framing migration in the negative terms of security increases the distance between
self and other to the point where the very visibility of the other is enough to trigger a security
response from the community that feels insecure. As Huysmans observes: Since the migrant is a
threat because he/she is an alien, increasing the visibility of his or her alienness increases the
presence of the threat (Huysmans, 1995: 64). Framing migration as a security problem thus risks
becoming a self-sustaining dynamic in the sense that the production of security knowledge about
migration renders the latter more visible, which means that new security measures are needed,
which in turn will increase the visibility of the threat and so on. Looking at the EU, the framing of
migration as a security problem seems indeed to have become something of a self-sustaining
dynamic where the visibility of a threat triggers new security measures that in turn make the threat
more visible. For instance, Boswell argues that despite more intensive attempts to control externalborders, the problem of illegal entry is in many ways far more of a popular concern in many EU
countries than it was in the first half of the 1990s, before EU and Schengen cooperation had really
gained momentum (Boswell, 2003: 102). Also, the continuous decrease in immigration since the
10 Also, representing migrants as an urgent problem to the proper functioning of the internal market and the stability of
the EU-polity more generally indirectly sustains the more openly xenophobic discourses on the far right (cf. Huysmans,2000b). While the European Union actively fights racism and xenophobia, the casting of migrants as a security problem
can have the opposite effect, as it adds to the radicalisation of the self/other relationship.
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1990s has not led to less control. To the contrary, at recent meetings in Tampere, Laeken and
Seville the EU and its member states agreed to step up the fight against illegal migration, amongst
others by making the question of illegal migration a key policy issue in the Unions external
relations with non-member states.11
Generally, these security policies are not articulated as a choice but as a necessary and
inevitable response to the abolishment of internal borders. In this view, cooperation on migration
and border control was born out of necessity, as what one could term a spillover from another
area of EC cooperation: the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, which set the goal of achieving the
freedom of movement of goods, capital and workers between EC states by 1992 (Boswell, 2003:
100). However, what at first sight may seem a question of security and necessity is in the end also a
political question of who is allowed access to the social fabric of society and how society should be
structured (Huysmans, 1998a: 570). To speak of migration in security terms is also to articulate a
particular politics of belonging that risks imposing an organic conception of society in which there
is no place for difference and alternative ways of imagining the good life. As a way of mediating
belonging, security measures are by definition reactionary and conservative insofar as they always
seek to restore the normal order of things. However, to bring things back to normal implies that
political imagination is confined to the status quo as the benchmark against which other forms of
political identification are judged deviant or even subversive. Security mediates belonging by
distributing trust within society, but it does so at the expense of difference and ambiguity. As
Constantinou argues:
Securitization as a discursive practice works by synchronizing security, safety, and certitude. It
depicts all three as co-temporal occurrences. To be secure is to be safe is to be sure. To secure is to
protect from danger is to know the danger and how to go about doing the protection. This
constitutes the security problematique automatically and exclusively a question of providing safety
11 For example through readmission agreements, liaisons officers, VISA policy and the introduction of transit camps at
the outer borders of the EU.
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and producing knowledge. Thus [security] experts are able to continue with these totalizations,
identifying threats in uncertainty, and confidently naming the enemy, assuming the endangered,
and prescribing the deterrence (Constantinou, 2000: 288).
However, unlike in pre-modern times the endangered can no longer be assumed. In the words of
Rawls: We must abandon the hope of a political community if by such a community we mean a
political society united in affirming a general and comprehensive doctrine (quoted in Mouffe,
1993: 64). The Dutch political theorists Herman van Gunsteren speaks in this context of a
community of fate, meaning that different groups with different historical, religious, cultural and
political backgrounds have no choice but to live together and negotiate in a pragmatic sense the
practical terms of their coexistence (van Gunsteren, 1998). This, however, presupposes a common
ground between different groups and it is exactly this ground that the exclusionary logic of security
denies to the other. Instead, security starts from the assumption that a harmonious society can be
created if threats are hold at bay: The discourse reproduces the political myth that a homogenous
national community or western civilization existed in the past and can be re-established today
through the exclusion of those migrants who are identified as cultural aliens (Huysmans, 2000b:
758). If one agrees, then, that securitisation is undesirable because it is a violent ordering practice
that integrates a community through staging an existential threat, the question becomes one of how
to challenge, re-order or simply desecuritise a society premised upon the exclusionary logic of
security.
3. Deconstruction and the Impossible Ideal of Desecuritisation
Deconstructivists generally analyse security practices not as managerial responses to threats but as
core practices through which units construct their identity. Insofar as desecuritisation seeks to
unmake the security representations and the forms of belonging they give birth to, its objective is
similar to that of deconstructivism, which is concerned with articulations of belonging that express
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responsibility towards otherness. Therefore, from a deconstructivist perspective securitisation is
considered an undesirable way of mediating belonging, because it contributes to the closure and
naturalisation of a community at the expense of plurality and difference. The starting point of a
deconstructivist strategy of desecuritisation would therefore be to argue for ways of identity
formation that do not turn other human beings into a threat. In doing so, deconstructivists usually
proceed from the assumption that binary divides such as friend/enemy, inside/outside,
native/migrant, trust/fear, and Europeans/non-Europeans that structure Western metaphysical
thought are not so much oppositions as hierarchies in which the first term is privileged over the
second. The critical move of deconstructivism exists in taking sides with the marginalised side of
the opposition in an attempt to overturn and transgress these hierarchies. It is important to notice
that deconstructivists do not simply seek to reverse the hierarchy (as this would just lead to a new
hierarchical relationship) but want to point out that the first term of the hierarchy can only exist and
is always already contaminated by the presence of the second term. In other words, they seek to lay
bare that the existence of the self depends on the negating presence of the other.
The deconstructivist insight that identity requires difference has enabled them to expose an
important paradox of security policy, namely that security policy seeks to secure the survival of a
community by eliminating the dangerous other upon which the very identity of that community
depends. In an oft-quoted passage Campbell eloquently expresses this paradox:[T]he inability of
the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the states continued success as an
impelling identity. The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat toa states identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility (Campbell, 1998b: 12-3). Because of
this paradox inherent to security policy, transcending a security problem cannot happen through
framing the issue in terms of security. Both security and insecurity share the same logic and are cast
in terms of the threat-defence sequence. As Wver remarks: Security signifies a situation marked
by the presence of a security problem andsome measure taken in response. Insecurity is a situation
with a security problem and no response. Both conditions share the security problematique. There
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are obviously situations other than these, characterized by a-security or non-insecurity (Wver,
1995: 56, emphasis in original).12 By pointing out that security politics cannot be the answer to a
security problem, deconstructivists have sought to show that the critical task of security analysts it
point out, in concrete situations, that only if it is recognised that security cannot be the answer to
insecurity it will be possible to imagine less exclusive ways of mediating belonging.
There is one crucial problem with the deconstructivist position, however. For while
deconstructivism embraces the objective of desecuritisation, its theoretical maxim that identity is
always constituted in the dialectics between two opposing terms which function as each others
negation hampers them in reaching this goal. For if one accepts, if only tacitly, that identity is
always constituted through an antagonistic relationship with the other, it becomes unclear how one
can envisage desecuritised ways of mediating belonging between self and other (cf. Fierke, 2001;
Hansen, 1997).13 Indeed, the theoretical maxim that identity always requires a constitutive outside
logically entails that only the particular contents of a specific friend/enemy figuration can be
questioned, but never the antagonistic logic itself (see e.g. Norval, 2000). If identity presupposes
otherness, then every positive articulation of identity will automatically lead to the
institutionalisation of a new, yet equally absolute, difference. Thus although deconstructivists are
right to stress the principle openness of all articulations of belonging, they have so far not
adequately theorised the reverse move from deconstruction to the decision as an ethical act. But
without a theory of how to break free from the us/them dichotomy, there is nothing to guarantee that
the deconstruction of a security story will contribute to political forms of identification that are less
12 In his excellent 1985 novel The New York Trilogy. City of Glass, Ghosts, The Locked Room, Paul Auster makes a
similar comment with regard to food (security) and eating (insecurity): Quinn learned that eating did not necessarily
solve the problem of food. A meal was no more than a fragile defence against the inevitability of the next meal. Food
itself could never answer the question of food: it only delayed the moment when the question had to be asked in
earnest.13 Ole Wver (1996: 122; cited in Fierke, 2001: 119) observes in this context that [m]any [poststructuralist] authors
including Campbell balance between, on the one hand, (formally) saying that identity does not demand an Other, doesnot demand antagonism, only difference(s) that can be non-antagonistic and, on the other, actually assuming that
identity is always based on an antagonistic relationship to an other, is always constituted as an absolute difference.
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exclusive towards the other (Wyn Jones, 1999; Wver, 2000). Thus while it is no doubt true that
the deconstruction of security stories is a necessary precondition for desecuritisation and the
repoliticising of belonging, it does not in itself provide a guarantee against totalising discourses of
closure. Hence Derridas claim that deconstruction is, in itself, a positive response to an alterity
which necessarily calls, summons or motivates it makes little sense as long as it is not
supplemented theoretically with an account of how to bridge the gap between undecidability on the
one hand and the actuality of a decision on the other (cited in Campbell, 1998a: 182). For without
such a theory, deconstructivism risks getting caught on the abstract level of meta-politics in which
its philosophical preferences for opening up and transgression are translated as something equally
desirable on the less abstract level of politics (see also Wver, 2000: 283). Which is why Moran
rightly objects that deconstruction runs the risk of appearing either as a critical Puritanism or as a
series of empty, if largely unobjectionable platitudes (Moran, 2002: 125).
Hence the deconstructive emphasis on the importance of undecidability as the necessary
precondition for every decision needs itself to be supplemented with a theory of the decision if it is
not appear either as substanceless cant or a new moral absolutism (Moran, 2002: 129). For if
without the radical structural undecidability that the deconstructive intervention brings about,
many strata of social relations appear as essentially linked by necessary logics, Laclau correctly
observes that deconstruction in turn requires hegemony, that is, a theory of the decision taken in an
undecidable terrain: without a theory of decision, that distance between structural undecidability
and actuality would remain untheorised (Laclau, 1996: 59-60). In a similar critique, Critchley who agrees with Laclau that deconstruction is a necessary move againstclosure andforpolitics
has pointed out that making politics possible is not the same as providing a politics. For him, the
gap between undecidability and actuality points to the limits of deconstructivism as a political
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strategy: Decisions have to be taken. But how? And in virtue of what? How does one make a
decision in an undecidable terrain? (Critchley, 1992: 199).14
Prozorov comes to similar conclusions. For him, the idea that any decision presupposes
contingency and undecidability is not just lamenting the obvious; it is also problematic from an
ethical point of view. For if it is true that every decision requires undecidability, 15 alldecisions are
responsible and hence ethical in Derridean terms. Yet, since all decisions effect a closure of the
radical openness of the perhaps, they are all equally irresponsible and hence unethical. As a result,
deconstructivism remains frustratingly caught above the abyss of undecidability in the desire to
refrain from the closure that every decision inaugurates (Prozorov, 2004: 13). What is needed,
therefore, is not only a position (i.e. deconstruction) that highlights the impossibility of a decision,
but also a theory that can affirm the decision as an ethical act in a radically undecidable terrain. In
other words, the problem is that deconstructivism pays too much attention to the substance of the
decision and less to the ethicality of deciding as such. Thus to move beyond deconstructivism, it is
necessary not focus too narrowly on the impossible attempt to establish the fact of ethicality of
decision, but on affirming the decision itself as an ethical act, whose authenticity is conditioned by
going through both the traversal of undecidability and its closure. The ethical injunction
concerns not the substance of the decision, but the responsibility for the decision as an act
(Prozorov, 2004: 13). But what, more precisely, constitutes responsibility for desecuritisation as the
act? If nothing conclusive can be said about the substance of such an act, then what does such an act
look like? What form does it assume? In short, what does it mean to propose that a strategy of
14 It is important, though, not to confuse undecidability (the term used by Derrida) with indeterminacy. Whereas the
latter insinuates a relativist stance in which no decisions are taken at all, the former functions as the condition of
possibility for decisions. Thus, Morans (2002: 127) comment that Derrida must constantly be amazed that anything at
all happens is somewhat off the mark. It should however be emphasised that the value of deconstruction is located
mainly in its ability to intervene in decisions that are already taken (and which are of course taken all the time) in order
to interrupt attempts at totalisation and not in its ability to provide for an anti-foundational politics that does not need to
fall back on safe ontological and epistemological grounds for its ethicality.15 According to Derrida {, #@}, even if a decision seems to take only a second and not to be preceded by any
deliberation, it is structured by this experience and experiment of the undecidable.
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desecuritisation should not just mark undecidability but also affirm and embrace the decision as an
ethical act?
4. Supplementing Deconstructivism: Desecuritisation as an Ethical Act
In contrast to deconstructivist thought which explicitly separates the ethical (the unconditional
injunction of undecidability) from the domain of politics (the domain of practical interventions
which always fail to live up to this ethical injunction), the move towards desecuritisation as an act
requires that we accept the inherently political character of every ethical act. An essential step
towards a theory that can affirm the decision as an ethical act that nevertheless recognises the void
behind every decision requires, first of all, a move away from the deconstructivist view of
antagonisms as the concrete mediation between friend and enemy. The notion that there is a certain
nothingness, void or undecidability that functions as the structural background for all decisions
suggests that there in fact is a more central antagonism one that is not so much the result of some
blockage by the other but of a radical negativity that is at the heart of the social order as such. The
everyday security problem of mediating between friends and enemies masks the fact that real
security is always an illusion. Insecurity is not a temporarily blockage to be overcome but
constitutes the very core around which the symbolic order is structured (Edkins, 2003; cf.
Huysmans, 1998c). Hence, the absolute closure of social structures is impossible not because social
totalities are dependent upon the exclusion of the other but because of a central lack or void thatprecedes every attempt at positive identification:
The big Other, the symbolic order itself, is barr, crossed-out, by a fundamental impossibility,
structured around a central lack. Without this lack in the Other, the Other would be a closed
structure and the only possibility open to the subject would be his radical alienation in the Other
The thesis of Laclau and Mouffe that Society doesnt exist, that the Social is always aninconsistent field structured around a constitutive impossibility, traversed by a central
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antagonism this thesis implies that every process of identification conferring on us a fixed
socio-symbolic identity is ultimately doomed to fail (iek, 1989: 122, 126-127).16
If the void is the domain of the political (the constitutive exteriority of the social order), politics
consists of those discourses that compete with each other to hegemonise or fill this gap. Here
security enters the picture as a particular way of filling the gap. The way a politics of security
performs this function is through displacement. Security displaces the constitutive impossibility at
the heart of society upon something outside it. In other words, processes of securitisation turn the
original antagonism or void into a concrete antagonistic relationship between the sound social
texture on the one hand and the enemy as the force corroding it on the other. Or as iek puts it:
[I]t is not the external enemy who keeps me from achieving identity with myself, but every
identity is already in itself blocked, marked by an impossibility, and the external enemy is simply
the small piece, the rest of reality upon which we project or externalize this intrinsic, immanent
impossibility (iek, 1990: 251-2).17 As a consequence, the elimination of an enemy does not
bring about a more harmonious society free from the disturbing presence of the other. Rather, it is precisely in the moment when we achieve victory over the enemy in the antagonistic struggle in
social reality that we experience the antagonism in its most radical dimension, as a self-hindrance:
far from enabling us finally to achieve full identity with ourselves, the moment of victory is the
greatest loss (iek, 1990: 252).
16 Lacan usefully likens society to a vase that by creating a hole also creates the possibility for filling the hole, for
making it whole: it creates the void and thereby introduces the possibility of filling it if the vase may be filled, it is
because in the first place in its essence it is empty (quoted in Stavrakakis, 1999: 44). As any axiom, the notion that
society is constitutively lacking can of course not be proved in any positivist sense. On the usefulness of this axiom for
political theorising in general and critical theory more specifically, see iek (1989), Laclau (1990), Stavrakakis (1999)
and Glynos (2001).17 The idea of an original antagonism also serves as the starting point for ieks (1999a: 29) critique of Carl Schmitts
notion that the political is defined by the decision on the friend/enemy constellation: Far from simply asserting the
proper dimension of the political, [Schmitt] adds the most cunning and radical version of the disavowal The clearest
indication of this Schmittian disavowal of the political is the primacy of external politics (relations between sovereignstates) over internal politics (inner social antagonisms) on which he insists: is not the relationship to an external other as
the enemy a way of disavowing the internal struggle which traverses the social body?
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16
The ethicality of an act of desecuritisation, then, consists of a double movement. First, and
this is the deconstructive moment present in the act, it requires that one comes to terms with the
original void at the heart of all societies, which means that we need to accept that we never had
what we were supposed to have lost. Hence we need to get to terms with the fact that the
securitisation of illegal migration
is an ideological fantasy about a society that still exists. Its logic is this: if society were not
threatened or destroyed by the mobile immigrant, we would have a consistent, cosy, and non-
antagonistic one is tempted to say happily fascist society. Is not this fantasy the kernel of the
whole immigration debate? I wonder what would be left in the immigration debate if this fantasy
were taken away. One is tempted to say: nothing! Though, if this fantasy is taken away, what is
left is of course a series of social problems (Diken, 2002: 9).
To face the nothingness behind every attempt to articulate a social order thus requires that one
abandons the idea that the abject other is the positive cause of all social problems. It is a radical act
in which one comes to acknowledge that there is nothing behind the ideology of security: security is
just a screen covering the void behind it.18 Instead, it entails one identifies with the abject as the
point of the political that reveals the truth about the social order. Rather than repressing the other as
the abject that makes society impossible, we should, in a desecuritising move, identify with the
abject. Or as Balibar puts it: [W]e must attack the obsessive question of collective insecurity by
beginning precisely with the situation of the most insecure, the nomadic populations who are thesource of and target of the obsession with law and order that is so closely intertwined with the
obsession with identity (Balibar, 2004: 177). A desecuritising act thus requires us to take sides
with the point of negativity and to recognise in this point the true, concrete embodiment of the
18 Hence iek argues that [t]he duty of the critical intellectual is precisely to occupy all the time, even when the
new order stabilizes itself and again renders invisible the hole as such, the place of this hole, i.e., to maintain a distancetoward every reigning Master-Signifier The aim is precisely to produce the Master Signifier, that is to say, to
render visible its produced, artificial, contingent character (quoted in Edkins, 1999: 118).
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universal. In other words, in the current European context illegal migrants should not be considered
a threat to be hold at bay but as representatives, the stand-ins, for the Whole of Society, for the true
Universality (we the nothing, not counted in the order are the people, we are All against
others who stand only for their particular privileged interest) (iek, 1999b: 188). The true
measurement for the universality of a belonging lies thus not in an abstract ideal (a European
citizenship in the name of freedom, security and justice) but in the way in which a community
relates to its lowest part, i.e. the illegal migrant which is securitised and excluded as something
abject. The only way to be effectively universal is not by imposing a Universal scheme, but by
taking sides, by locating a concrete universality at the level of the abject that represents the void that
subverts the positive social order.
Indeed, to identify with the securitised other means to recognize in the excesses, in the
disruption of the normal way of things, the key offering us access to its true functioning (iek,
1989: 128). Whereas the objective of security is to establish a sense ofimmunity vis--vis the abject
and excluded other, a politics of desecuritisation takes instead point of departure in the abject as the
point from which to articulate new forms ofcommunity. Thus, in contrast to the security view of
migration as an emergency that requires extraordinary measures, desecuritisation conceptualises
migration as the advent oremergence of new political structures (cf. Edkins, 1999: 10). A politics
of desecuritisation views the symptom as the point where the truth of that particular order is located.
Hence the illegal migrant should not be understood as responsible for all ills of the polis or as the
apocalypse on the move but as a symptom that precisely turns we into a problem, perhapsmakes it impossible (Kristeva, 1991: 1). By recognising that the securitised abject is the (w)hole
that subverts the frame that sustains our understanding of a particular society as a whole, a
desecuritising act is able to articulate new forms of belonging in an ethical way.
5. Desecuritising European Belonging: Undocumented Migrants as the Point of the Political
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An act of desecuritisation in the context of the EU, then, entails the identification with the
securitised, undocumented migrant as the part that is considered to make the full constitution of a
society impossible. The desecuritising move exists in turning the excluded, securitised illegal
migrant to the place of the political figure per se, that is, as a constitutive force that can move the
institutional scheme of belonging beyond the status quo. The desecuritisation of illegal migration
does consequently not just address the particular demands of a group of people but concerns the
metaphorical universalisation of their particular interests: the restructuring of the emerging
European order itself. To desecuritise illegal migration is to link the question about the correct or
responsible treatment of illegal migrants to the broader question of the way in which EU-identity
and EU-belonging are constituted (cf. Huysmans, 2000a: 157). In contrast to discourses of security
which seek to define illegal migration mainly in terms of a managerial problem to the functioning of
the internal market, desecuritisation politicises illegal migration with the aim of renewing the
fundament on which political struggle unfolds in the European polity. It is a political activity that
seeks to constantly (re)articulate public space on behalf of the excluded.
The struggle of the sans-papiers movement can illustrate this. Originally started as a
particular French phenomenon, thesans-papiers movement took on a wider European dimension
when the movement started to demand the regularisation of all the sans-papiers in Europe (cf.
Hayter, 2004: 142-149). As Madgigune Ciss, one of the leading delegates of the sans-papiers
movement argues: We demand our regularisation. We are not in hiding. We have come out into the
daylight (Ciss, 1997). Through identifying with their position as undocumented migrants, thesans-papiers left behind their illegality to claim their place in the social order. In this sense, the
sans-papiers struggle is not just about the responsible treatment of illegal migrants, but seeks to re-
imagine the very foundations upon which European belonging is founded. For the political force of
thesans-papiers movement lays not so much in its demand for the legalisation of illegal migrants;
rather, the desecuritising force of the sans-papiers movement is located in their demands to be
granted those rights precisely as undocumented migrants. In contrast to usual forms of resistance
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and protest that claim that Nobody Is Illegal,19 the sans-papiers explicitly identified with their
abject position (we, the illegal migrants, are the true point of universality!). Thus Ciss argues that
the struggle taught us first of all to be autonomous:
There were organizations which came to support us and which were used to helping immigrants in
struggle. They were also used to acting as the relay between immigrants in struggle and the
authorities, and therefore more or less to manage the struggle. They would tell us, Right, we the
organizations have made an appointment to explain this or that; and we had to say, But we can
explain it very well ourselves. If we had not taken our autonomy, we would not be here today,
because there really have been many organizations telling us we could never win, that we could
not win over public opinion because people were not ready to hear what we had to say (Ciss,
1997).
Confronted with a strict policing of the boundaries of European belonging, the sans-papiers fought
thus not only for their inclusion, but also for their illegality to be embraced as the point of inherent
exception/exclusion, the abject, of the concrete positive order, as the only point of true
universality (iek, 1999b: 224, emphasis in original). In this sense, the struggle by the sans-
papiers provides an important counterweight to the current organisation of belonging within the
EU. Basically, the institutionalisation of European belonging is a top-down process in which
European citizenship is assigned from above on the basis of belonging to one of the EU nations
and on the basis of belonging to the European culture under construction (Martiniello, 1995: 46).
Explicitly distinguishing between EU nationals (citizens) and non-EU nationals (also referred to as
denizens or margizens), European citizenship contributes to the exclusion and securitisation of
19 See for example the No One Is Illegal initiatives in the United Kingdom (www.noii.org.uk), Canada
(http://www.web.apc.org/~ara/OTP/OTP20/noii.htm, http://www.ocap.ca/immigration/legalaid.html) as well as the
Kein Mensch ist illegal initiative in Germany (http://www.kmii-tuebingen.de), the geen mens is illegaal initiative inthe Netherlands (www.defabel.nl/gmii) and the aden czowiek NIE jest nie legalny initiative in Poland
(http://www.zcnjn.bzzz.net).
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those who reside in the EU without documents.20 Indeed, insofar as European citizenship
contributes to confinement of (especially) illegal migrants in their cultural alterity, Martiniello
argues that only a successful mobilization of the denizens and margizens, together with the full
citizens, that is a significant pressure from below for a new European citizenship, could bring
about an extended breach in the nationalist logic and open the way towards post-nationalism in
Europe (Martiniello, 1995: 49). A desecuritising act does exactly this: it seeks to create a space for
the unrepresentable within presentation through the admission of negativity into the field of
normality. To desecuritise illegal migration and to repoliticise European belonging does thus entails
that one starts from outside the community, i.e. from those whose interests are not accounted for:
Insofar as it expresses the movement of collective emancipation, the criterion of political
citizenship is the ability of a polity to free itself from the forms of distribution and redistribution
(accounting). It does not take as its objective the balance of profit and losses among those who
already possess something but the constitution of a people (or dmos) that begins as
nonexistent on account of the exclusion of those who are considered unworthy of the status of
citizen (depending on the epoch and the circumstances: slaves or servants, workers or paupers,
women, foreigners, and so on) (Balibar, 2004: 72).21
20 There is of course a close interplay between restrictive immigration laws, increased border control and other security
practices on the one hand and the illegal entry of migrants on the other. As Andreas (2000) shows in his empirical study
of the American-Mexican border, policing in fact helps to create the very conditions (organised crime and the drugs
trade, human smuggling, illegal immigration, etc.) it seeks to suppress.
21 In his bookLa msentente, Rancire (1995) argues that the core of a democratic ethos is not just about the
development of democratic institutions and procedures but, perhaps even more crucially, the suspension and subversion
of these procedures on behalf of those who are not represented in the social order. According to him, the first true test
for democracy appeared in ancient Greece where members of the dmos (those that fell outside the hierarchical matrix
of society) demanded as those who are part of no part to be regarded as the point in which truth and universality
were located. iek refers to another example: in the demonstrations against the communist regime in East Germany
protestors shouted Wir sind das Volk!, thereby performing the gesture of politicisation at its purest they, the
excluded counter revolutionary scum of the official Whole of the People claimed to stand for the people, for all; a
couple of days later, however, the slogan changed into we are a/one people [Wir sind ein Volk!], clearly signalling theclosure of the momentary authentic political opening (iek, 1999b: 189). A last example this time from popular
culture can be found in the animation movieAntzabout a colony of ants. Whereas normally every ant has its fixed
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Balibar refers to such a citizenship as a citizenship without community, meaning a form of
citizenship that develops in conjunction with what is outside (with + out) the community. As such,
the implications of the sans-papiers struggle have the potential to impinge upon the very
exclusionary foundations upon which the scheme of European belonging is constituted. Their claim
is not a claim for an extension of belonging by widening the circle of citizenship and the rights and
duties that follow from it; rather, it asks for a post-national form of citizenship that is not based on
the principle of nationality but on residence and the freedom of movement for all people: We
struggle for freedom of movement in its most concrete meaning, such as the ability to travel and to
settle, wherever we wish to, without hindrance; because this struggle concerns also the refusal of
social control which afflicts us all; whether or not we have papers (quoted in Hayter, 2004: 146).
In contrast to the idea of a European citizenship as an abstract prerequisite for political
rights, desecuritisation thus refers to the process whereby belonging is mediated in a continuous
political process that recognises those who have been subjected to securitising processes as part of
the public sphere of existence. What starts out as a particular struggle for a particular group can,
through an act of desecuritisation, be politicised as a struggle about the future of Europe itself. For a
Europe that is still in the process of becoming, the identification of the people with illegal migrants
can radically redefine the universal scheme of belonging from above in favour of mediating
belonging from below in the practical confrontation with the securitised other. It is to articulate a
space in which belonging is not passively imposed upon an already present population; rather,
belonging is negotiated in the concrete struggle for desecuritisation through which individuals
actively contribute to the constitution of a European public space.
6 Conclusion
place in a colony, the film ends with a successful uprising of the worker ants against the soldier ants, while the workers
exclaim: We are the colony!
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This paper has sought to outline the contours of a strategy of desecuritisation within the context of
the emerging European order. Moving beyond the deconstructivist writings on security, it was
argued that the antagonistic relationship between friend and enemy is not so much an inescapable
result from processes of identity formation, but a secondary move in which the void at the heart of
society is displaced upon something outside it. Whereas security is by definition impossible due to
the inherent openness of all social structures, security politics was represented as a politics of
belonging that is structured around the fantasy that the other (the symptom of the symbolic order) is
responsible for the disharmony and anxiety experienced by members of that community. Arguing
that security is an undesirable form of mediating belonging, this paper has suggested a politics of
desecuritisation as identification with the symptom. Rather than viewing migrants as responsible for
all social ills, it was argued that they represent the point that gives body to the failures of the
symbolic order. Within the context of discussions about European belonging, this paper ended with
a plea for a European belonging without community, which implies to rethink the question of
belonging from the point of the most excluded, i.e. the abject of the social order who are denied the
status of citizenship. Because desecuritisation defined as identification with the symptom cannot be
legitimised by the rules of the social order itself, it is by necessary subversive and transgressive.
The point, however, was not so much to argue in favour of subversion and transgression for the
sake of revolution. Rather, the aim is to illustrate that a more ethical relation between self and other
can only come about if a community is able, from time to time, to incorporate the revolutionary
moment, to put itself at stake and rethink itself from the point of the abject. Whereas democraticprocedures are important, perhaps the true test for a democracy is its ability to question itself and
put itself at stake. Desecuritisation does exactly this and, at a very minimum, it makes us aware that
sometimes true change can only come about as the result of a shattering experience of self-denial.
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