Monica Graham 1683 Tamarron Drive

Corona, CA 92883

June 10, 2014 Hon. Chief Justice and Associate Justices California Supreme Court 350 McAllister Street, Room 1295 San Francisco, CA 94102

Re: Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corporation et al

Case No. B247188, Decision Filed 4/25/13, Publication order 5/22/14

REQUEST FOR DEPUBLICATION OF OPINION

Dear Honorable Justices:

Pursuant to California Rules of Court (“CRC”), Rule 8.1125, I write to request

depublication of the above referenced opinion in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage

Corporation et al. (Yvanova). My interest in this request is that of a real estate broker/business

owner, criminal justice major and legal advocate with a heightened regard for the accurate

application, interpretation, and adherence to California laws in the interest of justice.

The Court of Appeal’s opinion should be depublished because it never met the standard

for publication as authorized by CRC, Rule 8.1105(c) and more importantly, as an unpublished

case, better serves its purpose to the public as what not to do when fighting a wrongful

foreclosure. The recent publication of this case follows in the footsteps of the controversial

denied depublication request under Glaski. In reading the one request for publication from

Houser & Allison that the Court of Appeal received for Yvanova, the attorney’s main priority is

to use Yvanova in order to overcome Glaski, which does not serve the public and should not be

the underlying reason to publish it.

I. There are Enough Failed Cases That Serve Public Interest

Yvanova has followed in the footsteps of three years’ history of homeowners and

attorneys that, simply put, “don’t get it.” They don’t get longstanding California law, Civil Code

Section 2924, and the terms of the note and deed of trust. These individuals have obviously

failed to research the foregoing necessary elements, which common sense reveals is best sourced

from briefing recent decisions. Vehemently defective pleadings from unprepared and vigorous

pro se homeowners and attorneys have berthed the ill-fated case law we recognize today as

Gomes, Fontenot, Jenkins, and now Yvanova. These cases serve no purpose when published as

they immediately become part of the proverbial defense attorney’s arsenal of summary

judgment-style demurrers, even when these cases do not apply. And just when some courts were

beginning to understand how one case was distinguishable from Gomes, along came Fontenot,

then Jenkins, behind it. All of these cases were mishandled in that they were either initiated by

misinformed and uneducated pro se homeowners and/or taken over by attorneys that did a

serious disservice to their clients in not taking California laws and statutes seriously. For

instance, when the Gomes original complaint was demurred, his attorney could have made a

formal attempt to research the deficiencies called out in the demurrer and then by filing a first

amended complaint could have eliminated a majority of the defects that were obviously brought

to light under appeal. Gomes contained a non-existent cause of action labeled “wrongful

initiation of foreclosure” and declaratory relief, which is clearly preemptive, and the notorious

reason for its failure. If after adequate research, the Gomes attorney realized there was no claim

that could be stated, his client could have sought a different remedy. Fontenot was completely

litigated pro se and did not plead prejudice and failed to prove the foreclosure was invalid. On

appeal, Fontenot was represented by an attorney and after proper research, had it been apparent

that a claim could be stated, then an amended pleading should have been proposed at the

appellate level. Fontenot also used a cause of action that didn’t exist – wrongful foreclosure

[negligence per se]. Jenkins was initiated pro se but when her attorney stepped in to file the

second amended complaint on July 20, 2011, there were a good number of appellate cases that

her attorney could have researched in order to better serve her client. Jenkins also consisted of

non-existent causes of action, including violation of Civil Code 2932.5 and California Penal

Code §115.5, which is a criminal charge, and can only be prosecuted by the State. Jenkins also

contained a declaratory relief cause of action, which is again, preemptive in nature. Notably,

each appellate opinion in Gomes, Fontenot, and Jenkins did produce substantive reasoning in

how to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure, but unfortunately, the attorneys that are tormenting

the courts with defective pleadings are not aware of such vital and relevant information. These

cases have clearly demonstrated a pattern of irresponsibility and lack of experience among the

attorneys that are litigating them.

II. Deeper Issues Plague Glaski and the Public Interest

This Court should be more concerned with the deeper issues that plague the Glaski

decision, in addition to the recent publication of Yvanova. In conjunction with their defense,

foreclosing parties’ attorneys habitually cite Jenkins as a basis for dismissal. Regardless of the

underlying facts and whether or not Jenkins may even be distinguishable from the case at hand, a

substantial amount of Superior Court judges are cutting and pasting nonsensical reasoning for

finding Glaski as a “minority view.” What should dishearten this court is that these rulings

include usage of the following (as found in Yvanova): “…no California court has followed

Glaski on this point, and many have pointedly rejected it. (See, e.g., Apostol v. Citimortgage, Inc.

(N.D.Cal., Nov. 21, 2013) 2013 U.S.Dist. Lexis 167308, 23-24; Dahnken v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., C 13-2838 PJH (N.D.Cal., Nov. 8, 2013) 2013 U.S.Dist. Lexis 160686; In re Sandri

(Bankr. N.D.Cal., Nov. 4, 2013) 2013 Bankr. Lexis 4663.) And as discussed above, Jenkins is

directly to the contrary. We agree with the reasoning in Jenkins, and decline to follow Glaski.”

The dying question here is why are California courts looking to federal opinions that

follow Glaski? The aforementioned federal cases cited are merely decisions on motions to

dismiss and not well-reasoned appellate decisions. Rather, federal decisional authority is

neither binding nor controlling in matters involving state law. (9 Witkin, Calif. Procedure,

Appeal, §943.) A cursory reading of the decisions in Apostol, Dahnken, and In re Sandri reveals

a plethora of fatal errors within their respective pleadings, thus they should bear the burden of

their own errors and failure to research, as the plaintiffs in these cases have had years of case law

to study and take advantage of. For example, Apostol was time-barred due to res judicata which

has absolutely nothing to do with Glaski. Returning to the question as to why the trial courts are

hanging their hats on federal decisional authority with such black-letter law air of confidence

about them contrary to California procedure, there are trial courts that have borne no trouble with

citing Glaski in their [tentative] rulings (See Morgenson vs Aurora Bank FSB, Burt v. Bank of

New York Mellon). So, should these cases then be referenced in lieu of the inapplicable federal

decisions since they are essentially more persuasive at the state level? It is apparent this cut and

paste or similar methodology of bootstrapping Glaski to such false authority has circulated

throughout the system in an epidemic manner, which this Court should find troubling. In sum, if

this Honorable Court, and additionally, Houser & Allison are truly concerned with public

interest, these issues of public interest should be resolved, as there is a serious injustice taking

place within the judiciary.

III. Yvanova Does Not Involve a Legal Issue of Continuing Public Interest and Does Not

Explain an Existing Rule of Law Criticized by Other Courts

Although Houser & Allison in its publication request would like the Court of Appeals to

think otherwise, Yvanova does not involve a legal issue of continuing public interest. The public

interest is for the requisite California laws and foreclosure statutes to be followed, and for the

courts to be fair and adhere to those laws. The best service to the public can be done with a

decertified opinion, and ultimately, the ability to gleam from the Yvanova case what not to do

when pleading wrongful foreclosure. There is a laundry list of defects that this pro se plaintiff

alleged, and this case does not address an apparent conflict in the law by following the earlier

decision in Glaski because her pleadings are so defective, it is easily distinguishable. The

Yvanova case has no less than 20 fatal errors that contributed to her dismissal and affirmation on

appeal. Obviously, the ultimate plan here is that the bank defendants intend to use Yvanova

against homeowners in ongoing cases, but it will be quite a feat to prove that said future cases

are not distinguishable, as Yvanova is speculative and riddled with preemptive challenges, wildly

contradictory with conclusory allegations that amount to pure nonsense. Here are the defects of

her second amended complaint:

1. Pleadings made on information and belief, no facts stated.

2. Yvanova alleged that an assignment should have been recorded to Carrington since they

acquired servicing rights after the New Century Mortgage Corporation bankruptcy filing. This

allegation fails entirely as servicers do not receive assignment of the debt.

3. Yvanova confused Deutsche Bank as trustee with the substitution of the foreclosing trustee

Western Progressive, LLC which is contradictory, confusing, and baseless.

4. Yvanova is overwhelmingly conclusory in all allegations. She never disputed the debt and

she specifically failed to plead allegations to excuse her from tender.

5. Yvanova claimed that the trustee’s sale violated Cal Civ Code 1812.6 which does not apply

and is baseless.

6. Yvanova claimed transfer of her note in blank from New Century to the Morgan Trust

terminated the security interest in the deed of trust. This is conclusory and nonsensical.

7. Yvanova never identified all the defendants named on the face of the complaint, and she

never alleged what each defendant was charged with. The second amended complaint just does

not state a claim whatsoever.

8. Yvanova preemptively challenged defendants to establish possession and/or proper transfer of

the note.

9. Yvanova claimed the substitution of trustee was “ante-dated.” This is conclusory, baseless,

and not supported by sufficient facts.

10. Yvanova claimed the deed of trust was notarized 17 days after signing but she never denied

signing the deed of trust, yet claimed the deed of trust is void. This is based on nonsensical legal

conclusions and this allegation fails.

11. Yvanova claimed that the assignment of deed of trust must reflect the bankruptcy trustee’s

approval on its face. This is a mere conclusion and not based on any facts, bankruptcy law, or

California statute.

12. As of 8-1-08 New Century had no corporate officers or board of directors so it could not

assign the deed of trust and although this is about the only significant allegation in the entire

complaint aside from non-compliance with the pooling and servicing agreement, she makes the

fatal mistake of not stating clear and concise facts after making this finding to state a claim.

13. Yvanova made preemptive challenges for defendants to show that a transfer took place

before the bankruptcy or with the bankruptcy court’s approval. Again, plaintiff cannot bring a

preemptive action in connection with non-judicial foreclosure.

14. Yvanova made a preemptive demand that defendants must provide proof of validity of Ryan

Dierdorff's statements (that he was authorized as Saxon's attorney-in-fact to execute documents).

15. Yvanova made a preemptive demand that Deutsche Bank "is on title as Beneficiary ..."

16. Yvanova challenged usage of the Ocwen mailing address in Florida - completely irrelevant

and does not support a claim.

17. Yvanova preemptively demanded factual proof that the substitution of trustee was valid.

18. Yvanova preemptively challenged the Morgan Trust to prove that the pooling and servicing

agreement requirements were met.

19. Yvanova claimed New Haven Financial had its license revoked as of 1-1-12 and therefore

had no legal right to authorize a “trust sale” and sign a trustee's deed. She never identified this

defendant and she never mentioned what license was revoked or how that could support a claim.

20. Yvanova requested title to be quieted as of the date of the deed of trust and for a

determination of the validity of the assignment, "trust deeds," substitution of trustee, notice of

trustee’s sale and trustee’s deed upon sale. This is not how to plead quiet title under statute and

California law and does not state a claim.

Accordingly, this case was fervently defective and litigated by a pro se whose first

language is not English, with little to no understanding of California laws and statutes, which

understandably is a recipe for disaster. Upon reviewing the foregoing list of deficiencies, for a

licensed attorney to find conviction here in publishing this case to serve “public interest” is akin

to a heavyweight champion defeating a ping pong player in the ring and feeling the inherent need

to brag about his victory. There is nothing to be proud of here. Instead, this Court should be

more concerned about the licensed attorneys that are litigating these cases, taking money from

homeowners, that are clearly not researching or applying the very basic skills and knowledge

they should have acquired in law school such as standing, necessary elements of a cause of

action, and to fight the urge of fabricating causes of action. Further, this Court should be

concerned with the judges and commissioners in the Superior Courts that reject Glaski on the

basis of federal decisional authority, which lacks merit and is a complete mockery of the court

system. If the case fails to state a cause of action, the trial court should specify the defects.

Pursuant to applicable California laws, provided an amendment is plausible, the plaintiff should

be entitled leave to amend. However, in cases as poorly written as that of Yvanova, she was not

entitled to another swipe of the paw. The trial court was correct in sustaining her demurrer and

the Appellate Division was correct when it affirmed, but, nonetheless, this case is not in the

interest of public. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request this Honorable Court grant this

depublication request of the above referenced Opinion.

Sincerely,

Monica Graham

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, Erwin Graham, am over the age of eighteen and not a party to this action. My

business address is 1683 Tamarron Drive, Corona, CA 92883. On the date set forth below, I

served the foregoing REQUEST FOR DEPUBLICATION OF OPINION for the above

referenced case, by placing a copy of the document in a sealed envelope with first-class postage

fully prepaid placing the envelope for collection and mailing with the United States Postal

Service in Corona, California during regular business hours, addressed to:

Tsvetana Yvanova

22054 Crespi Street

Woodland Hills, CA 91364

Houser & Allison

3780 Kilroy Airport Way Suite 130

Long Beach, CA 90806

District Court of Appeal

California Supreme Court

350 McAllister Street, Room 1295

San Francisco, CA 94102

New Century Mortgage Corp.

Chris Hunker, Esq.

Haahn & Hessen

488 Madison Ave

New York, NY 10022

Second Appellate District – Division 1

Ronald Reagan State Building

300 S. Spring Street

2nd

Floor, North Tower, Rm. 2217

Los Angeles, CA 90013

I declare under penalty under the laws of the State of California that the information

stated above is true and correct.

Dated: June 10, 2014

By: _____________________________________

RULINGS ON LAW & MOTION MATTERS

JUDGE FREDERICK P. HORN

DEPT C-31

Date: March 26, 2014

2013-00640132

Morgenson vs Aurora Bank FSB

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the court’s ruling on defendants’ demurrer is

DENIED.

A motion for reconsideration must be “based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law.”

See Code Civ. Proc. §1008(a). The court has broad discretion whether to reconsider a prior

ruling. See Monroy v. City of Los Angeles, 164 Cal.App.4th 248, 265-266 (2008).

Defendants raise no new or different facts, circumstances, or law which would require the court

to reconsider its previous ruling. Defendants contend that, since the reply brief was filed,

numerous federal court decisions have taken issue with the ruling in Glaski v. Bank of America,

N.A., 218 Cal.App.4th 1079 (2013), and that no court has followed Glaski’s holding.

None of the federal court decisions cited by defendants are binding upon this court, and to the

court’s knowledge, the Glaski opinion has not been expressly overruled by the California

Supreme Court. Thus, the purported “new law” cited by defendants does not warrant

reconsideration of the court’s order.

Moreover, the court notes that defendants’ arguments regarding Glaski here are not substantially

different from the arguments made regarding Glaski in their reply brief in support of demurrer.

In the reply brief, defendants argued that Glaski’s holding constituted a minority view that had

been viewed with disfavor by several federal courts. Defendants also noted that no court had yet

followed Glaski. As such, defendants are simply rehashing arguments already made and

considered on demurrer. Section 1008 is designed to avoid such duplicative arguments. See

UAS Mgmt., Inc. v. Mater Misericordiae Hosp., 169 Cal.App.4th357, 367 (2008).

The court’s ruling on defendants’ demurrer remains in effect, and defendants have 10 days to

file an answer to the First Amended Complaint.