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U.S. National Security Strategy in Yemen

The Weaponization of Water in Yemen: Water Security as an

Essential Tool for U.S. Regional Strategy & Stability

by

Branden Audet, M.A. candidate, the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies,

University of Washington

DECEMBER 2016

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“Them that has the gold makes the rules.” And in this case water is that gold…

- Charlie Wilson’s War

Situation: Water has become a weapon of war in Yemen, and it is turning into a major

humanitarian disaster, with upwards of half of its 24.4 million population in need.1 Al Qaeda in

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), locally referred to as Ansar al-Sharia, a stated enemy of the U.S.,

is the only legitimate group that has an effective control over water management and aid in

Yemen and unless there is an immediate intervention to enhance security in the region and

provide alternatives, AQAP will seize the opportunity to expand its regional presence and

recruiting.2 This is in direct conflict to U.S. foreign policy.3 The single greatest risk to U.S.

interests in Yemen lies in water supply and demand, and the underlying security to maintain it.

These problems – coupled with a weak and divided government, an expected doubling of its

population of 24 million in the next 20 years and drought and flooding due to climate change –

mean that water will only become more scarce, and more of a long-term threat to Yemen’s

stability; and the regional stability of its neighbors – our allies – Saudi Arabia and the United

Arab Emirates.4

1 Rori Donaghy. Half of Yemenis Suffering Malnutrition as Famine Looms: Middle East Eye.5 October 2016. Online. www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-humanitarian-crisis-outrageous-country-faces-famine-1273314193 2 Alessandria Masi. Al Qaeda Winning Hearts and Minds over ISIS in Yemen with Social Services: International Business Times. 7 April 2016. Online. www.ibtimes.com/al-qaeda-winning-hearts-minds-over-isis-yemen-social-services-2346835 3 Office of the President. National Security Strategy: The United States. February 2015. Print. Pg. 26. 4 Yemen Crisis: Who is Fighting Whom? BBC News. 14 October 2016. Online. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423

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The current civil war between the government and the Iranian-backed Shia Houthi rebel

group is complex and deeply layered; and the shortage of water – an estimated 16 million

people lack access to clean water – is a key ingredient in civil unrest.5 The active and growing

presence of AQAP only amplifies the security risks. An underling and increasing problem to the

water and humanitarian crisis – which challenge any sustainable plan – is the role of third party

actors in proxy wars being waged in Yemen, namely by Saudi Arabia (Sunni) and Iran (Shia).6

As of November 2016, the current U.S. National Security Strategy places a high priority

in combating terrorist such as Sunni AQAP and the Sunni Islamic State (ISIL); and U.S. Special

Operations Forces (SOF) and allied Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are currently conducting

counterterrorism (CT) operations in Yemen. The regional strategy for the U.S. aims to defeat

and contain AQAP and ISIL.7 Increased water security would aid in achieving the U.S. mission in

the region because whoever controls the water controls the outcome of the current unrest in

Yemen. If the U.S. and our GCC allies do not act with the initiative, AQAP will grow their base of

support by filling the ‘power vacuum’ in Yemen through controlling the water supply.

Background of Yemen

Current State: As it currently stands now, Yemen does not even have enough water to

sustain its current population. Yemen is located in a dry and semi-arid region of the Middle East

– on the southern tip below key U.S. ally Saudi Arabia – is facing a catastrophic water and

5 Martin Reardon. Saudi Arabi, Iran and the ‘Great Game’ in Yemen: Al Jazeera News. 26 March 2015. Online. www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/saudi-arabia-iran-great-game-ye-201492984846324440.html 6 Samuel Oakford and Peter Salisbury. Yemen: The Graveyard of the Obama Doctrine: The Atlantic. 23 September 2016. Print. 7 Colin McElhinny. Assessing U.S. Special Operations in Yemen: Small Wars Journal. 15 July 2016. Online. smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-us-special-operations-in-yemen

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humanitarian crisis.8 Yemen faces a dual complexity because of a dramatically growing

population beyond its current 24.4 million and its alarming rate of water loss.9 Yemen’s

population is expected to double in the next 20 years; reaching 48 million by 2025, and 102

billion by 2050.10 Approximately half of its population is under the age of 20 years old.11

The predominant majority in Yemen are Sunni, around 53%, with a minority Shia group

at approximately 45%. What complicates Yemen’s immediate stability are that Iran (Shia) and

Saudi Arabia (Sunni) are using these religious differences as political tools in a regional power

grab.12 Yemen is a country descending into civil war, with a potential humanitarian crisis on the

level of Syria.13 In previous years Yemen has been characterized as a fragile state, it is conflict-

afflicted, impoverished, and in a critical post-revolutionary stage.

Almost half of the country’s population of 25 million lives without access to safe water

and sanitation, and over ten million suffer chronic hunger. High unemployment and poverty

contribute to political tensions that are compounded by conflict with separate secessionist

movements in the north and south, and disruptive extremist operations of Al Qaeda Arabian

Peninsula (AQAP).14 The crisis in Yemen may soon reach catastrophic levels. Increased water

security is essential to mitigate the impacts of this crisis.

8 Frederika Whitehead. Water Scarcity in Yemen: the Country’s Forgotten Conflict: The Guardian. 2 April 2015. Online. theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/apr/02/water-scarcity-yemen-conflict 9 Facing the Hard Facts in Yemen: The World bank. 26 September 2012. Online. www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/09/26/yemen-talking-points 10 United Nations Population Fund: Yemen. 2016. Online. www.photius.com/rankings/world2050.html 11 Elizabeth Madsen. The Effects of a Very Young Age Structure in Yemen: Country Case Study: Population Action International. 2010. Print. Pg. 5. 12 Yemen 2012 International Religious Freedom Report. U.S. Department of State. 2012. Print. Pg. 1-2. 13 Crisis Watch: Yemen. 2016. Online. http://crisiswatch.webflow.io/ 14 Country Development Strategy: USAID. 26 October 2016. Online. www.usaid.gov/yemen/cdcs

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Key Causes to Yemen’s Water Crisis

1. Water Shortage: Yemen is one of the most “water-stressed” country in the world,

and scientists warn that within 10 years, Sanaa, Yemen’s capitol, is in danger of

becoming the first capital in history to run out of its already scarce water resources.15 In

areas such as Sanaa and the southern city of Taiz, tap water is only available every few

days. In Yemen 90 percent of the nation’s water supply is used for agriculture, with

major inefficiency and mismanagement.16

With climate change, weather patterns are expected to become more volatile, increasing

the likelihood of drought and flooding.17 Long term, water resources will only become more

scarce, and therefore a greater threat to Yemen’s stability.

2. Qat: Yemen’s water shortage is exacerbated by the widespread use of qat — a

popular mild stimulant.18 70% of Yemeni males use the narcotic, the sale of which is

critical to Yemen’s economy.19 However qat also requires five times as much water as

15 Water Stress Index: Risk Calculators and Dashboards: Verisk Maplecroft. 2011. Online. https://maplecroft.com/about/news/water_stress_index.html 16 Rola Tassabehji. Yemen Running Dry as Water Shortage Reaches Extreme Levels: Green Prophet. 12 July 2011. Online. www.greenprophet.com/2011/07/yemen-running-dry-as-water-shortage-reaches-extreme-levels-in-africa-and-the-middle-east 17 Understanding the link Between Climate Change and Extreme Weather. US Environmental Protection Agency. 2016. Online. epa.gov/climate-change-science/understanding-link-between-climate-change-and-extreme-weather 18 Andrew Butters. Is Yemen Chewing Itself to Death? TIME Magazine.25 August 2009. Online. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1917685,00.html 19 Socio-Economic Context and Role of Agriculture: Country Fact Sheet: Yemen. September 2014. Online. www.fao.org/3/a-i4127e.pdf

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other common crops such as grapes to grow. Therefore almost 40 percent of Yemen’s

agricultural water is utilized for growing qat.20

3. Famine: Yemen is the poorest Arab nation in the world and close to half of its

population lives with income under the poverty line.21 Ten million Yemenis — or 44

percent of the population — are undernourished and 5 million Yemenis have no access

to basic human needs.22

4. Refugees: The U.N. estimates that 366,000 Yemenis have been displaced due to the

Houthi rebellion and other tribal clashes in the north of the country. 52,000 Yemenis

civilians have already fled their homes in when the fighting first started in 2012; and it’s

only getting worse.23

160,000 Yemenis have been displaced by the fighting between government forces and Al

Qaeda and affiliated militants who took over parts of southern Yemen in 2015. The

southern port city of Aden alone has absorbed more than 100,000 people who have fled the

20 Hugh Macleod and John Vidal. Yemen Threatens to Chew Itself to Death Over Thirst for Narcotic Qat Plant: The Guardian. 26 February 2010. Online. www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/feb/26/yemen-qat-water-drought 21 Half of Yemenis Live Below Poverty Line: Al-Monitor. 6 January 2016. Online. www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/01/yemen-poverty-conflict-food-insecurity.html 22 Yemen on brink of Food Crisis: BBC News. Middle East. 23 May 2012. Online. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18169322 23 Edward Leposky and Leo Dobbs. Tens of Thousands Flee Tribal Clashes in Yemen in Past Three Months: The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). 9 March 2012. Online. www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&skip=63&docid=4f59e0ca9&query=YEMEN

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fighting, including aerial bombardments from drones and Yemeni army fighter jets.24 Yemen

is also grappling with 300,000 refugees from Somalia and the Horn of Africa, who are

believed to be more susceptible to joining terrorist group like AQAP based on economic

needs.25

5. Proxies: Even in internal war, the involvement of outside actors or proxies is

expected. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States participated in

many such conflicts. Today is no different, and tension remains high between the US

and the Iranians, while we simultaneously wage a war against AQAP. Outside actors are

often transnational organizations motivated by ideologies based on extremist religious

or ethnic beliefs. These organizations exploit the unstable internal conditions plaguing

failed and failing states. Such outside involvement however, does not change the fact:

the long-term objective for all sides remains acceptance of the legitimacy of one side’s

claim to political power by people of the stage or region.26

For years, former Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh relied on a vast patronage network to

mediate amongst competing social and tribal groups, but he failed to integrate and resolve the

issues of two disaffected factions that oppose the government: Hirak activists in the south and

24 Bayoumy, Browning, and Ghobari. How Saudi Arabia’s War in Yemen has made al Qaeda Stronger – and Richer: Reuters. 8 April 2016.Special Report Yemen. Online. www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/yemen-aqap 25 Yemen Struggles to Accommodate Refugees: UPI. 4 June 2012. Online. www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2012/06/04/Yemen-struggles-to-accommodate-refugees/UPI-64281338830026 26 Patraeus, and Amos. Counterinsurgency Field Manual: FM 3-24: MCWP 3-33.5: Aspects of Insurgency. December 2006. Chapter 1. Pg. 1-7.

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Houthi rebels in the north.27 This political movement was further manipulated by outside actors

such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.28

Jurisdiction Friction: Complicating matters, Saudi Arabia and Iran have pulled Yemen into their

expanding regional proxy war, a growing challenge for any Yemen strategy.29 Even more

problematic for the United States, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have picked sides in Yemen’s civil

war, and neither is fighting AQAP.30 Perceptions of the US role from both Saudi Arabia – an

important ally in the region – and Iran mean that most decisions made by the U.S. will appear

to be tipping the regional balance to one or the other player.31 The new Iran deal also

complicates matter, as any overt U.S. involvement in Yemen that challenges the Iranian-backed

Houthi movement may be viewed by Iran as a hostile act.

The Alternative Provider

Why Yemenis are Supporting al Qaeda: Millions in Yemen rely upon humanitarian aid to

meet their basic water needs. For many communities, fuel shortages make it impossible to

27 Joana Cook. Yemen’s Patronage Problem: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 30 July 2015. Online. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/60899 28 Katherine Zimmerman. Signaling Saudi Arabia: Iranian Support to Yemen’s al Houthis: Critical Threats: Yemen. 15 April 2016. Online. http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman 29 The Saudi-Iran Powerplay behind the Yemen Conflict: The Guardian. 28 March 2015. Online. www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/29/iran-saudi-arabia-yemen-conflict 30 Robert Fisk. Saudi Arabia: Can’t Pay Its Bills, Yet Funds War on Yemen: Strategic Culture Foundation. 14 September 2016. Online. www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/09/14/saudi-arabia-cant-pay-its-bills-yet-funds-war-yemen.html 31 Muhammad Lila. US Missiles Just made the War in Yemen Even More Complicated: CNN. Politics. 14 October 2016. Online. www.cnn.com/2016/10/14/politics/yemen-us-role-in-war

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pump water and treat raw sewage.32 Instead, residents are forced to rely on water truck

deliveries; there are reports of children being bombed by Saudi jets or shot by rebel groups

while waiting in line to fill water cans and fighting and sieges delay or restrict water deliveries.33

The UN has alleged that all parties in the conflict have targeted humanitarian shipments,

including trucks carrying water and food aid.34 For many Yemenis, AQAP – who has greatly

benefited in terms of organizational support from the conflict within Yemen - brings some

semblance of stability.35

AQAP is one of the U.S.-designated terror organization’s most powerful divisions. Since

the beginning of 2016, the group has quietly seized vast swaths of Yemen – and therefore

undercutting its rival, the Islamic State group, which has been another main focus of the U.S.

counterterrorism (CT) strategy.36 ISIL’s rapid uprising and expansion – as well as extreme

violence – may have dominated international media coverage, but in Yemen, AQAP has

overshadowed the growing ISIL with its grassroots approach, providing essential public services

to gain the trust of the local population. The group has also been willing to share power with

local governing institutions before it establishes its own caliphate.37

32 Jacquline Lopour. Yemen, Water and Conflict: Centre for International Governance Innovation. 22 March 2016. Online. www.cigionline.org/articles/yemen-water-and-conflict 33 Yemen: Children Among Civilians Killed and Maimed in Cluster Bomb ‘Minefields’: AMNESTY International. 23 May 2016. Online. www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/yemen-children-among-civilians-killed-and-maimed-in-cluster-bomb-minefields 34 Amid Ongoing Access Constraints, UN Convoy Moves Vital Aid into North-West Syria: UN News Centre. 16 May 2014. Online. www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47811#.WEjomLIrKUk 35 Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian Federation Abstaining: United Nations. Press. 14 April 2015. Online. www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm 36 Daniel Byman. Comparing al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets: Brookings Institute. 29 April 2015. Online. www.brookings.edu/testimonies/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets 37 Ellsabeth Kendall. How can al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula be Defeated? The Washington Post. 3 May 2016. Online. www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/03

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“ISIS and al Qaeda [have] different [approaches]. ISIS thinks that [it] will brutalize [a population]

into submission. Al Qaeda knows that some people are turned off by this brutality,” argues

Thomas Joscelyn, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and senior

editor of the Long War Journal. “The entire al Qaeda model is to get as local as possible and

embed with the local population.”38

Under the cover of Yemen’s complex civil war, AQAP, has made major gains against the

Houthis; who along with Saudi Arabia is the group’s common enemy. AQAP has expanded its

hold across four of Yemen’s 21 provinces and now controls the country’s third-largest port city,

al Mukalla. And their expansion has been rapidly increasing: Since December, militants affiliated

with AQAP seized five cities and two provincial capitals in Yemen’s southern provinces.39

AQAP’s strategy has been to ‘fill the political vacuum’ and gain support through providing

essential social services such as water to ‘win hearts and minds’.40 Yemenis are not in a position

to reject what AQAP are offering, notably water. More than half of Yemen’s population lives

below the poverty line. Today, 20 million people — 80 percent of the population — are in need

of humanitarian assistance.41

Policy Recommendations

38 Thomas Joscelyn. Analysis: Foundation For Defense of Democracies. 2016. Online. www.defenddemocracy.org/about-fdd/team-overview/thomas-joscelyn 39 Katherine Zimmerman. AQAP Expanding behind Yemen’s Frontlines: Critical Threats. Yemen. 17 February 2016. Online. www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-aqap-expanding-behind-yemens-frontlines-february-17-2016 40 Steve Ferenzi. Al-Qaeda Does Governance Too: Modern War Institute. 6 march 2016. Online. http://mwi.usma.edu/al-qaeda-does-governance-too 41 Crisis Overview: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2016. Online. www.unocha.org/yemen/crisis-overview

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Current U.S. Policy for Yemen: As of February 2015, the formal U.S. National Security

Strategy regarding the Middle East and Yemen seeks stability and peace in the Middle East and

North Africa. Specifically, U.S. strategy clearly states “we will dismantle terrorist networks that

threaten our people, confront external aggression against our allies and partners, ensure the

free flow of energy from the region to the world, and prevent the development, proliferation,

or use of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we remain committed to a vision of

the Middle East that is peaceful and prosperous, where democracy takes root and human rights

are upheld.” Lastly, with respect to Yemen the U.S. objective is to “Support efforts to

deescalate sectarian tensions and violence between Shia and Sunni communities throughout

the region.” As well as to seek “a stable Yemen that undertakes difficult structural reforms and

confronts an active threat from al Qaeda and other rebels.”42

43

42 Office of the President. U.S. National Security Strategy – the White House. 2015-2016. Online. Pg. 26. www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf 43 Yemen Country Development Cooperation Strategy (GDCS) 2014–2016: USAID. Results Framework. Pg. 22. Online. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAE322.pdf

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Proposed Policy: Given the current state of Yemen’s water crisis and threat from terrorism,

it is evident that current U.S. policy is failing.44 In light of recent political events and changes in

administration in the U.S., the collapse of the Yemenis government in the capitol of Sanaa, and

the resulting withdrawal of State Department and diplomatic officials from Yemen, the current

situation is a humanitarian disaster.45 With how the current operating environment in Yemen is

shaping, the U.S. should consider investing in a strategy mitigating conflict by investing in a dual

strategy of increased water security on the demand side; as well as water availability and

sustainability on the supply side.

The end-goal of this approach is to assist U.S. National Security Strategy with respect

towards seeking “stability and peace in the Middle East” and “a stable Yemen”. Additionally,

key partners such as U.S. State Department, USAID46 and Special Operations Forces (SOF) would

all potentially benefit from investment in a water security strategy as this simultaneously aligns

with their own objectives.47 While I recognize there are many layers to ‘security’, in this paper I

will be focusing on the aspects of water and security to help achieve the broader U.S. strategy.

44 Ivan Eland. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty, The Independent Institute. Yemen: Another Failed U.S. Military Intervention: Huffington Post. 13 June 2013. Online. www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-eland/yemen-another-failed-us-m_b_7053522.html 45 Yemen Travel Warning: U.S. Department of State. 6 October 2016. Online. https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/yemen-travel-warning.html 46 Yemen Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2014–2016. USAID. July 2014. Online. Pg. 5, 9, 11. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAE322.pdf 47 2011–2016 Strategic Plan Addendum for the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development: US Department of State: State and USAI Joint Strategic Goals. 12 March 2012. Pg. 1. 1. Online. www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/185613.htm

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Strategic and Tactical Recommendations: The U.S. State Department and USAID set its Joint

Strategic Goals with the number one priority being “countering threats to the United States and

the international order, and advancing civilian security”. The impetus of U.S. regional strategy is

focused on defeating and containing al Qaeda (AQAP).

Water security can have a major impact on this objective, because if our allies – the

legitimate Yemenis Government – can effectively provide water to civilian populace it

will erode the base of support of AQAP; and this in itself better accomplishes the U.S.

mission.

If the U.S. and our Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies do not act with the initiative of

securing the water, we will allow AQAP to grow their base of support by filling the gap in

the ‘vacuum of power’ by controlling the water supply; and Yemen will further descend

into chaos.

A Foreign Internal Defense (FID) approach: This should encompass both counterterrorism

(CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) best practices would need to be implemented to prevent

the Yemenis government from a full collapse. This strategy allows for adaptation but should

be viewed and understood as a long-term plan:

The Houthi movement: Can be mitigated by utilizing a COIN and FID strategy to contain

and neutralize. The Houthi insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the

overthrow of the legitimate Yemenis government. The Houthi movement relies on the

use of subversion and armed conflict which become intensified by the government’s

ability to respond with force and legitimate security.

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Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): Can be targeted through a FID strategy with

weight on CT. AQAP is a well-organized and funded terrorist group who uses force,

intimidation, and violence against the government, civilian population, or other groups,

in furtherance of its own political and social objectives. A terrorist group like AQAP often

relies on ideologues as well as a sympathetic and vulnerable population. A strategy of CT

and FID eliminates the ‘true believers’ and leadership of the organization, while the FID

and COIN approach seeks to fix the root causes of why the local populace are joining or

supporting the group; which in Yemen’s case is largely water and resource based.

Threats & Risks: The on-going war in Yemen has destroyed the country’s water

infrastructure, and the Yemenis government and military lack the capability to stop the conflict.

Without proper security measures and stability in place, the unintended consequences of

increased humanitarian aid, or international water development could be potentially

catastrophic. In February 2016, there were reports that Saudi planes bombed and destroyed a

reservoir that held the drinking water for 30,000 Yemenis; roughly 5,000 cubic meters of

water.48

Water and aid could be seized by AQAP, ISIL or rebel Houthi groups for use as a weapon

against the populace, as was documented in Somalia in the early 1990’s when Mohamed Farrah

Aidid’s militia captured UN aid and used it as a resource to finance and grow its army. Somalia

48 Collin Douglas. A Storm Without Rain: Yemen, Water, Climate Change, and Conflict: Center for Climate & Security. 3 August 2016. Online. https://climateandsecurity.org/2016/08/03/a-storm-without-rain-yemen-water-climate-change-and-conflict

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serves as a warning for humanitarian aid without adequate logistics, security and support. The

conclusion in Somalia asserted “Problems of distribution within the country continued to

hamper the relief effort. In the countryside, lawless gangs seized relief supplies and used them

to buy local loyalties while letting thousands starve. In the cities, the warring political factions,

supported by their private armies, amassed food stockpiles as bargaining chips and signs of

their power.”49 The similar factors in both Somalia and Yemen suggest there are enough

warning signs for Yemen to go a similar way.

Furthermore, without a sustained and adequate security presence any fixed water

infrastructure, such as a desalination plant or reservoir could become an easy, unguarded

target for AQAP. Ill-managed, over-burdened and under-secured water infrastructure would

leave even more Yemenis without sustainable water – with the rise in Power of AQAP and the

Houthis – and without the proper weapons, resources and methods to defend or sustain them.

Conclusion: The vastly growing water crisis and humanitarian disaster creates an

environment in which AQAP finds support. The lack of security and governance allows AQAP to

train and prepare for attacks against the U.S. and our allies. For any water security policy to be

effective we ultimately need buy in and joint-support from the major regional players – Saudi

Arabia, GCC, and the international community – and a more comprehensive approach then just

tactical superiority such as direct action raids by SOF, and bombings by Saudi forces.

49 John Brown, Brigadier General, USA. The United States Army in Somalia 1992–1994. CMH Pub 70.81.1. Pg. 8. Online. www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-81-1/cmhPub_70-81-1.pdf

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