FEWS NET YEMEN

fews.yemen@fews.net www.fews.net/east-africa/yemen

FEWS NET is a USAID-funded activity. The content of this report does not necessarily reflect the view of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States

Government

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

Significant populations continue to face large gaps in their basic food needs

KEY MESSAGES

A major food security emergency continues in Yemen. Currently, approximately seven to ten million people face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity or higher with roughly one-quarter of this population likely in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Although data is limited, it is possible that some populations could face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between October 2016 and May 2017 in areas where the impacts of conflict on livelihoods and humanitarian access have been most severe.

Worst affected areas of Ta’izz and southern coastal areas of Al Hudaydah are currently in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In these areas, poor households and IDPs are facing large food consumption gaps caused by severe conflict-related disruptions to their livelihoods. Elevated levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality are likely. There are also likely smaller populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in other western governorates.

Large-scale humanitarian assistance is playing an important role in preventing more severe levels of food insecurity in many areas. FEWS NET estimates that in Ad Dali’, Amran, Hajjah, Lahij, Sa’dah, and Shabwah governorates, food security outcomes would be at least one phase higher in the absence of current food assistance provided by WFP.

SEASONAL CALENDAR FOR A TYPICAL YEAR

Source: FEWS NET

Current food security outcomes, October 2016

Source: FEWS NET

All areas were classified at the governorate-level, with the exception of Al

Hudaydah where classifications were conducted at a district-level to better reflect localized, severe levels of food insecurity along coastal areas. This map represents acute food insecurity outcomes relevant for emergency decision-making. It does not

necessarily reflect chronic food insecurity. To learn more about this scale, click here.

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2

NATIONAL OVERVIEW

Current Situation

CONFLICT

After the expiration of a 72-hour humanitarian

ceasefire from October 19-22, fighting and

airstrikes continue across Yemen. According to

a recent UN OCHA bulletin, areas with intense

conflict include Al Jawf, Amran, Al Hudaydah,

Hajjah, Lahij, Ma’rib, Sa’dah, Sana’a, and Ta’izz

governorates.

DISPLACEMENT

As of August/September 2016, the Task Force

on Population Movement reports that there

were approximately 2,200,000 internally

displaced persons (IDPs) residing in Yemen,

with the highest number of IDPs residing in

Hajjah (485,000 persons) and Ta’izz (427,000

persons). The majority of IDP households are

residing with host families or in rental housing.

Reports from key informants in areas with large

IDP populations (ex. Hajjah) indicate that many

host communities are struggling with the

additional burdens of hosting these displaced

populations, as their limited resources are

currently overstretched.

MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Yemen’s foreign reserves have been rapidly depleting and were estimated by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to be approximately 987 million USD in September 2016, down from 4.7 billion in 2014 (Figure 1). As a result of this decline, the Central Bank has been unable to pay all government salaries, has ended lines of credit at the official exchange rate for fuel, rice, and sugar imports, and has readjusted its official exchange rate to 250 YER/USD in April 2016, compared to 215 YER/USD previously. On parallel markets, the exchange rate is much higher, varying from one location to another but estimated to be around 300 YER/USD, according to WFP’s October 2016 market bulletin. The Central Bank has also recently been relocated from the Houthi controlled capital, Sana’a, to the southern city of Aden.

FOOD IMPORTS

Imports are vital for food security in Yemen as over 90 percent of Yemen’s cereal supplies are imported from international markets in a typical year (FAOSTAT). According to data from FleetMon, there has been a normalization in the number of unique bulk ship arrivals in Yemen (a proxy for food imports) compared to pre-conflict levels, with 18 ships arriving on average between July and September, compared to an average of 14 ships per month during the 2014 year.

Projected food security outcomes, November 2016 to January 2017

Source: FEWS NET

Projected food security outcomes, February to May 2016

Source: FEWS NET

All areas were classified at the governorate-level, with the exception of Al Hudaydah where classifications were conducted at a district-level to better reflect

localized, severe levels of food insecurity along coastal areas. This map represents acute food insecurity outcomes relevant for emergency decision-making. It does not

necessarily reflect chronic food insecurity. To learn more about this scale, click

here.

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

Famine Early Warning Systems Network 3

However, despite this normalization, food import data from the Logistics Cluster, UN COMTRADE, and UNVIM1 all suggest a downward trend in food import levels during the 2016 year (Table 1). The levels of informal food flows across land borders is unknown although WFP’s October bulletin reports that these trade flows could be contributing to the price stability for key staple foods observed throughout the country at this time.

The Central Bank of Yemen has historically supported food and fuel imports by providing private import companies with lines of credit and access to foreign exchange at the official rate. According to recently published data, the Central Bank financed, on average, the importation of 782 million USD worth of wheat per year between 2013 and 2015, as well as 279 million USD worth of wheat between January and June 2016. While it is unclear whether the Central Bank has the ability to continue supporting wheat imports through the end of the year (some informal reports suggest that this support may have already ended), should its support continue at current levels, the Central Bank would likely finance roughly 558 million USD of wheat imports during the entire 2016 year, which is well below previous years’ levels.

Estimates from FAO indicate that Yemen requires approximately 233,000 to 250,000 MT of wheat each month. As of September 2016, in-country commercial wheat grain stocks are estimated to be approximately 749,000 MT. In the absence of additional imports from international markets or humanitarian assistance, these stocks would likely meet local requirements for somewhere between three to four months.

Table 1. Currently available data on food imports into Yemen

January to March 2016 (per month) April to June 2016 (per month) July to September 2016 (per month)

Levels Compared

to 2014 Compared

to 2015 Levels

Compared to 2014

Compared to 2015

Levels Compared

to 2014 Compared

to 2015

Logistics

Cluster

477,620

MT N/A N/A

345,271

MT N/A Similar

279,345

MT N/A

Down compared to 402,000 MT

UN COMTRADE

(Wheat, Maize, Milled Rice Only)1

310,737 MT

Down

compared to 445,188 MT

Down

compared to 405,264 MT

289,660 MT

Similar

Down slightly

from 319,445 MT

N/A N/A N/A

UNVIM2 N/A N/A N/A 373,869

MT N/A N/A

274,593 MT

N/A N/A

FleetMon3

16

unique

arrivals

Up from an average of 11

Up slightly

from an

average of 14

17

unique

arrivals

Similar Up from an average of 9

18

unique

arrivals

Up from an average of 11

Up slightly

from an

average of 14 1 July, August, and September were excluded due to limited data 2 UNVIM data only started in May 2016 so the April to June 2016 average only includes May and June 2016 3 Bulk ship arrivals used as a proxy for food imports

1 1 The United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) monitors imports into the following ports: Port Saleef, Al Mokha, Ras Isa, and Hudaydah.

Figure 1. Central Bank’s foreign reserves compared to official and

parellel market exchange rates (YER/USD)

Sources: FEWS NET estimates based on MPIC Yemen; WFP; Oanda.com; Al Monitor,

Reuters 2016, Al Arabiya 2016

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INTERNAL TRADE AND MARKET FUNCTIONING

According to the Logistics Cluster’s October 23, 2016 Access Constraints Map, current road conditions vary across Yemen from “open” to “difficult to access” and “closed”. Areas where roads are currently closed include southwest (Lahij and Ta’izz governorates), northwest (Al Jawf, Amran, Hajjah, Sa’dah, Sana’a, and Ma’rib governorates), and central (Shabwah governorate) areas. Although the status of access to some areas has evolved over the past two months, many areas with difficult access identified by the Logistics Cluster are the same as those identified by traders during FEWS NET’s recent rapid assessment in August 2016 (Figure 2). During FEWS NET’s assessment, many interviewed staple food traders reported that while they are able to move goods to markets, challenges included higher transportation costs (relating to security measures, high fuel prices, and bribes at checkpoints and to armed groups), and increased inspection processes.

FEWS NET’s August 2016 rapid assessment also found variations in market functioning throughout the country, although the only market where significant disruptions were reported was in Al Mahwit governorate (Figure 3).

COMMODITY AVAILABILITY

Wheat flour was either “plentiful” or “somewhat available” at all surveyed governorates in August 2016, according to FEWS NET’s rapid assessment (Figure 4). More recent data from WFP’s October 2016 market bulletin indicates that approximately a quarter of monitored markets reported that wheat flour was “available”, while roughly half reported “sparsely available” supplies and the rest reporting “widely available” supplies2. Socotra was the only governorate reporting “mostly not available” supplies due to recent rough seas that limited shipments. The WFP report also suggests that food availability at monitored markets has declined slightly over the past three months with numerous markets declining from “available” to “widely available” between September and October 2016.

2 WFP rates local commodity availability from, in order of highest to lowest, “available”, “widely available”, “sparsely available”, “mostly not available”, and “not available.”

Figure 2. Status of market corridors, August 2016

Source: FEWS NET

Figure 3. Status of market functioning, August 2016

Source: FEWS NET

Figure 4. Wheat flour availability, August 2016

Source: FEWS NET

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

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Unlike wheat flour, the availability of fuels (diesel, gasoline, and cooking oil) has been low on many markets. According to FEWS NET’s August rapid assessment, fuel availability was either “somewhat limited” or “very limited” in Sa’dah (diesel and cooking oil), Al Mahwit (diesel and gasoline), Ad Dali’ (diesel, gasoline, cooking oil), Aden (diesel) and Al Bayda’ (cooking oil). The only governorates were all three fuels were available at “plentiful” levels were Al Hudaydah and Ibb. Additionally fuel stations in Ta’izz were reportedly closed and thus, only fuel from black market sources were available in this governorate. This is in line with WFP’s October bulletin that suggested that most markets had “sparsely available” supplies of fuel.

PRICES

High food prices continue to limit household food access through market purchase throughout the country. According to WFP price data for October, wheat flour prices generally remained above pre-conflict February 2015 levels (on average, +24 percent3) but were either stable or fell compared to September 2016 levels (Figure 5). An exception, however, are the governorates of Ad Dali’, Al Bayda’, and Socotra where wheat flour prices increased by 11, 5, and 5 percent during the past month. Wheat flour prices in Ta’izz and Shabwah remain particularly elevated compared to the rest of the country at 51 percent and 47 percent, respectively, above the national average.

Despite indications of limited availability in many areas, fuel prices at most markets were either stable or in decline between September and October 2016 but remained above pre-conflict levels (national average: diesel (+31 percent), gasoline (+26 percent)). The highest fuel prices in the country were observed in the following governorates: Socotra for cooking oil, Ta’izz and Sa’dah for gasoline, and Ta’izz for diesel.

LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITIES

According to FEWS NET’s most recent rapid assessment, household incomes are down significantly compared to pre-conflict levels (Table 2), limiting purchasing power and food access through market purchase. Additionally, the same assessment found that difficulties accessing international remittances have increased compared to past months, including delays, lack of currency, closed offices, and banks often being unwilling to process remittances at official exchange rates. Key informant reports also indicate that some government salaries have not been paid for several months.

Reports from a variety of organizations (including FEWS NET’s rapid assessment) suggest that agricultural activities and related labor activities are down as high fuel prices and scarcities have limited irrigation agriculture. According to FSIS, 2016 agricultural production for cereals (sorghum, maize, millet, wheat, and barley) is likely to be similar to 2015 levels

3 The national average is based on data from six markets where price data is available prior to February 2015: Aden, Al Hudaydah, Amran, Hajjah, Sa’dah and Sana’a.

Figure 5. Average national wheat flour price (YER/KG)

Source of data: WFP

Table 2. Household income levels compared to

2014 levels

Governorates Average Change in Income

August 2016 compared to 2014

Abyan No change

Ad Dali’ 20-50%

Aden No change

Al Bayda’ 10-20%

Al Hudaydah No change

Al Mahwit > 50-100%

Ibb > 50%

Lahij 10-20%

Sa'dah to 0

Ta’izz > 50%Source: FEWS NET’s August 2016 Rapid Assessment

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but down compared to 2014 levels by between 25 and 35 percent, depending on the crop. Since poor households frequently own very little land, labor work is an important income source for many households. While information on current labor opportunities is limited, price data from CARE International suggests that August 2016 daily wages for unskilled labor has remained stable compared to pre-conflict levels in Aden but had declined moderately in Amran (-16 percent) and Hajjah (-5 percent).

In many areas, the sale of livestock, particularly small ruminants and chickens, are also important income sources. While information on these activities are limited, data from FSIS suggest that prices for live goats, sheep, and chickens have generally increased or been stable across monitored markets between January 2016 and October 2016, which would be favorable for households selling animals4. Additionally, FEWS NET’s rapid assessment in August 2016 found mixed reports about whether livestock supplies on local markets had increased, which could have been suggestive of distressed sales had this been observed.

According to 2004 estimates, the Yemeni fishing industry employs approximately 60,000 to 70,000 artisanal fishermen. Estimates from FAO/FSIS indicates that the number of fisherman in Yemen has declined by approximately 50 percent, due to the combined effects of strong winds and storms, conflict, atypically high fuel prices, and reduced access to cold storage facilities. FAO/FSIS also reports that fishing activities have completely stopped in coastal areas of Ta’izz. Similar reports that fishing activities have ended have also come from key informants along southern coastal areas of Al Hudaydah. This issue, in particular, has been flagged by multiple partners as a potential contributing factor to very poor food consumption and nutritional outcomes observed in the districts of Al Khawkhah and Al Tuhayta in Al Hudaydah governorate. However, according to FSIS price data for Baghta fish – a cheap variety of fish – there are no clear changes in prices since December 2015 that would suggest a major shock in the availability of fish on local markets.

FOOD ASSISTANCE

FEWS NET’s August 2016 rapid assessment found that across surveyed governorates, humanitarian assistance was becoming an increasingly important source of income compared to before the conflict, and FEWS NET’s analyses suggest that large-scale food assistance programs are likely playing an important role in preventing deteriorating food security outcomes in many areas. On average, WFP distributed 36,045 MT of food assistance to 3.37 million people per month during the months of June, July, and September 20165. The largest number of beneficiaries during these three months were located in the governorates of Ta’izz (562,000 people), Hajjah (311,000 people) and Amanat Al Asimah (262,000). FEWS NET’s analyses also suggest that food assistance programs from WFP are likely changing the IPC phase classification in the governorates of Ad Dali’, Amran, Hajjah, Lahij, Sa’dah, and Shabwah6.

In addition to WFP, many other actors (NGOs, Middle East/Gulf Countries, etc.) are running food distribution or cash transfer programs throughout the country. As the magnitude of this assistance is not entirely known at this time, this assistance is not included in FEWS NET’s analysis. However, given these programs, the true impacts of humanitarian assistance are likely larger than what is shown on FEWS NET’s maps.

ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE AND WATER/CHOLERA OUTBREAK

The ongoing conflict in Yemen limited household access to health facilities and clean water in many areas, with negative implications for child health and nutrition. For example, according to the World Health Organization’s recent Health Resources Availability Mapping System assessment, only 45 percent of health facilities are fully functioning, while an additional 38 percent are partially functioning and 17 percent are closed. Additionally, FEWS NET’s rapid assessment conducted in August 2016 found that many surveyed households are drinking water from streams, springs, rainwater, and sabeel water tanks (free water provided by charitable organizations or individuals) as high fuel prices have driven up the price of safer, filtered water. Multiple key informants interviewed by FEWS NET also reported that poor access to clean water is likely one of multiple drivers contributing to elevated levels of acute malnutrition currently observed in coastal areas of Al Hudaydah.

4 Pre-conflict price data is not available for livestock. 5 August 2016 distribution data was not available at the time of this analysis. For this reason, FEWS NET’s humanitarian assistance analysis is based on per month average distribution levels for June, July, and September 2016. 6 FEWS NET’s criteria for humanitarian assistance possibly changing the area classification of a zone are: 1) humanitarian assistance is reaching at least 50 percent of FEWS NET’s population of concern, and 2) humanitarian assistance covers at least 20 percent of kcal requirements (or the cash equivalent) for beneficiary households.

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

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These health, water, and sanitation issues are likely contributing factors to the ongoing cholera outbreak in Yemen, which was announced by the Ministry of Public Health and Population on October 7th. As of November 13, WHO reports that there have been 86 confirmed and 4,119 suspected cases of cholera in Aden, Ad Dali’, Al Bayda’, Al Hudaydah, Amran, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahij, Sana’a City, Sana’a, and Ta’izz.

WFP’S MVAM SURVEYS7

Between July and September 2016, WFP’s mVAM surveys found that, on average, more than 20 percent of households reported poor food consumption scores in eleven governorates (Ad Dali’, Al Bayda’, Al Jawf, Al Mahwit, Hajjah, Lahij, Ma’rib Sana’a, Shabwah, Raymah, and Ta’izz) (Figure 6)8. Only one governorate, Al Maharah, saw more than 80 percent of the population reporting acceptable food consumption. WFP’s mVAM report from September also indicates that a higher proportion of IDP respondent reported poor food consumption in comparison to non-displaced populations. Preliminary October data suggests an increase in the percentage of households reporting poor food consumption between September and October, with the exception of Al Maharah, Hadramaut, Ma’rib, and Ta’izz (where the percentage decreased) and Al Jawf, Hajjah, and Sa’dah (where the percentage was stable).

On average during the months of July, August and September 2016, between 22 and 61 percent of respondents in all governorates reported a reduced coping strategies index (rCSI) of over 20, roughly in line with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or higher food insecurity (Figure 7). The highest percentages of respondents with a rCSI of over 20 were observed in Al Jawf (51 percent), Al Mahwit (54 percent), Amran (59 percent), Dhamar (58 percent), Hajjah (61 percent), Ibb (51 percent), and Ta’izz (52 percent). The lowest percentages were reported in Aden (27 percent) and Al Maharah (22 percent).

7 Since August 2015, WFP has been collecting food consumption score (FCS) and reduced coping strategies index (rCSI) data through cell phone-based surveys in Yemen. Cell phone based surveys are not statistically significant and are likely biased towards better-off and urban populations who have access to cell phones. However, the size of this bias is unknown. 8 WFP defines “Poor” food consumption in Yemen as a food consumption score of less than 28. A household with a food consumption score of 28 may be consuming cereals, vegetables, oil and sugar every day. Therefore, while a score of less than 28 is likely to indicate a poor quality diet, it is more difficult to assess whether “Poor” food consumption, as defined, is associated with an inadequate quantity of food given that three of these food groups provide substantial energy (kcal). Therefore, an analysis of household level food deficits, the key input to IPC classification of acute food insecurity, should consider a range of other data in addition to food consumption scores.

Figure 6. Percentage of respondents reporting poor food consumption

scores

Source of data: WFP

Figure 7. Percentage of respondents with an rCSI of greater than or

equal to 21

Source of data: WFP

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

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NUTRITION

Recent data on nutritional outcomes in Yemen is limited. According to the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation’s October 2016 Yemen Socio-Economic Update, a recent UNICEF SMART survey conducted in August 2016 in Ad Dali’ found a global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence of 14 percent. While elevated, this rate is not statistically different from the results of a November/December 2011 assessment, which found a GAM prevalence of 12.1 percent (95 percent CI: 9.2 – 15.8 percent) in the governorate. However, according data on severe acute malnutrition (SAM) admissions to community-based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) programs from January 2014 to August 2016, admissions have been on an upward trend, though trends are mixed at the governorate level. More specifically, across most governorates, there has been an increase in admissions, with the exception of Abyan, Hadramaut, Lahij, Sa’dah, and Tai’zz where cases have been declining and in Al Jawf and Raymah where they have been stable. The largest number of SAM admissions cases, both before and after the start of conflict, have been in Al Hudaydah. Additional information, however, is needed to tease out how the availability of treatment programs (ex. the opening or closing of programs/clinics) could have contributed to these observed trends.

CURRENT FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES

A major food security emergency continues in Yemen. Currently, approximately seven to ten million people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food security outcomes or higher and roughly one-quarter of this population, or 25 percent, are likely in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Additionally, data is very limited but it is possible that some populations are in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in areas where the impacts of conflict on livelihoods and humanitarian access have been most severe.

In Ta’izz governorate, as well as southern coastal areas of Al Hudaydah, at least 20 percent of households are estimated to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In these areas, poor households and the displaced are facing large food consumption gaps due to severe conflict-related disruptions to their livelihoods. Elevated levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality are also likely. In many other western governorates, populations are also in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity although these populations are not large enough to drive an Emergency (IPC Phase 4) area classification.

Large-scale humanitarian assistance is currently ongoing in Yemen and FEWS NET estimates that it currently playing an important role in preventing worse food security outcomes in many areas. More specifically, FEWS NET estimates that in Ad Dali’, Amran, Hajjah, Lahij, Sa’dah, and Shabwah, current food security outcomes would have been at least one phase higher in the absence of ongoing food assistance provided by the World Food Programme.

In the governorates of Hadramaut and Al Mahrah, the impacts of conflict on household livelihoods have been less severe than in western areas. As a result, based on currently available food security indicator data and information on contributing factors influencing food availability and access, FEWS NET estimates that poor households in these two governorates are minimally meeting their basic food needs but may not be able to afford essential non-food expenditures, in line with Stressed (IPC Phase 2).

Assumptions

The most likely scenario for the October 2016 to May 2017 period is based on the following national level assumptions:

Conflict: For the purpose of this most-likely scenario, FEWS NET assumes that fighting and airstrikes will continue at current levels, which will maintain IDP population at high levels, similar to those currently being observed.

Economy: For the mostly likely scenario, FEWS assumes that the current macroeconomic crisis will continue. More specifically:

o Central Bank: The Central Bank’s current split in management will continue. The Central Bank will also not receive any major funding from external donors during the scenario period. The Central Bank is not expected to continue to provide credit for importation.

o Oil exports: Although media reports indicate that oil production and exports may have recently started up again at low levels, oil exports will not return to pre-conflict levels.

o Foreign reserves: Given the assumptions of significantly reduced oil exports and no additional funding from external donors, foreign reserves within the country will continue to decline compared to current levels.

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

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o Exchange rate: Given the decline in foreign reserves, the Central Bank is not expected to be able to maintain the official exchange rate at its current 250 YER/USD level. Consequently, a moderate depreciation of the Yemeni rial against the US dollar on both official and parallel markets is expected.

o Liquidity constraints: Liquidity constraints at banks within Yemen will continue to worsen and will limit general economic activities and complicate import activities.

o Staple food imports: FEWS NET assumes that at some point during the scenario period, Central Bank will no longer have the resources to continue providing wheat importers with lines of credit at the official exchange rate. While large traders will continue to find alternative methods of accessing foreign currency to continue operations, import levels will likely continue to decline and transaction costs associated with these imports will increase. Informal food flows across land borders will also continue at status quo levels but will be limited by civil insecurity in many border areas.

o Government salaries and the Social Welfare Fund: Similar to the current situation, many government employees will continue to not receive salaries due to the Central Bank’s lack of adequate financial resources. Similarly, the Social Welfare Fund will not start up again during the scenario period.

Internal trade flows: Active fighting, damaged transportation infrastructure, high fuel prices, and additional security and transaction costs (ex. bribes at checkpoints) will continue to limit food trade flows within the country. In the absence of additional information about the evolution of conflict, FEWS NET assumes that areas where trade flows will be particularly constrained will be the same areas where roads are currently closed, as shown by the Logistics Cluster’s most recent access constraint map.

Market demand: Demand from consumers will remain atypically low during the scenario period due to weak household purchasing power caused by below-average incomes.

Wheat flour prices: Despite the expected decline in wheat import levels and increasing transaction costs for traders/importers, FEWS NET anticipates only moderate price increases compared to current levels during the scenario period given the impacts of below-average incomes on household purchasing power and market demand. Prices will remain above pre-conflict levels, however, through the scenario period.

Agricultural production: Depending on the zone, many agricultural households will harvest cereals at times between November 2016 and June 2016. Key periods of production will include November and December for the second season harvests of sorghum and coffee and June for the first season harvest of wheat, millet, and sorghum. In many areas, there will also be a vegetable and fruit harvest during the first quarter of 2016. However, production will likely be below average due to a lack of availability and/or access to inputs and limited access to fields in conflict zones. Related agricultural labor opportunities will also be atypically low. Additionally, according to FAO, locusts will likely be present in Ma’rib, Shabwah, Hadramaut, and the coastal plains (FAO) and in these localized areas, locust-related damages will reduce crop production. Qat production, however, will continue to be relatively average.

Remittances: Although remittance service offices will remain open in most urban areas, significant difficulties (ex. delays, closed offices, lack of liquidity) will limit the ability of households to receive remittances from abroad. This will result in below-average incomes from this source.

Fishing: Fishing activities along coastal areas will increase seasonally starting in March/April but will remain well below average due to high fuel prices and civil insecurity. On the Gulf of Aden coast, lobstering will also follow seasonal trends, peaking between October and December, declining between January and May, and then stopping in June.

Incomes from other sources: The deteriorating macroeconomic situation and conflict will disrupt household livelihoods across much of the country, resulting in below-average household incomes. The largest declines in incomes will be amongst IDP populations and households residing in intense conflict zones, such as Ta’izz.

Nutrition: Given expected food consumption gaps during the scenario period, acute malnutrition is expected to rise and remain above seasonally normal levels across much of the country. Based on historically data, SAM admissions to treatment programs are usually at their highest levels sometime between November and January. Excess mortality is expected in worst affected areas.

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

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Humanitarian assistance: FEWS NET assumes that cereal and pulse distributions by WFP will continue through December 2016. However, given an absence of information on planned, funded, and likely humanitarian assistance data for the 2017 year, continued assistance is not assumed for the second half of the scenario period.

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

Given that food security data is very limited and both the security and macroeconomic situation are uncertain, future food security outcomes in Yemen are difficult to project. However, under the assumption that import levels will continue to decline, causing higher food prices, FEWS NET expects that household purchasing power will deteriorate during the scenario period. This, along with very limited capacity to cope as many households have lost or depleted their assets over the past year, will likely drive a continuation of severe levels of food insecurity for many poor households between October and May 2017. During the remainder of 2016, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in Ta’izz and southern coastal areas of Al Hudaydah. Additionally, smaller populations of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are expected in other governorates, particularly amongst IDP populations and poor households in active conflict zones. Amongst these populations, large food consumption gaps, elevated levels of acute malnutrition, and excess child mortality are expected.

Given that WFP’s humanitarian assistance for the period of January and May 2017 has not yet been confirmed as planned, funded, and likely and as such, continued assistance is not assumed for the second half of the scenario period. In the absence of continued assistance, FEWS NET expects that food security outcomes would deteriorate in many other governorates (Ad Dali’, Amran, Hajjah, Lahij, Sa’dah, and Shabwah) to Emergency (IPC Phase 4). IDP populations would continue to face some of the most severe outcomes.

Although information is limited, it is possible that some worst affected populations could face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Although it is difficult to project where these populations could be located, food security outcomes of this magnitude would be most likely in the western half of the country in localized areas with very poor humanitarian access and amongst populations whose livelihoods have been severely constrained by conflict.

AREAS OF CONCERN

Al Hudaydah

GOVERNORATE-LEVEL

The Task Force for Population Movement’s 11th report indicates that, as of August/September 2016, there were 104,000 IDPs residing in Al Hudaydah, representing approximately 3 percent of the total population. Most of these IDPs have been displaced for over 12 months and reside with host families (41 percent), rural or urban settlements (31 percent), rental accommodations (14 percent) or isolated settlements (12 percent). Approximately one third of IDP households reside in the highland district of Az Zuhrah, bordering the governorate of Hajjah.

The port of Al Hudaydah and Salif are a major point of entry for imported food into Yemen. According to FleetMon data, the number of bulk carriers arriving at these ports during the months of July to September 2016 was, on average, 11.3 ships per month, which compares to an average of 10.6 ships per month arriving during the 2014 year. However, according to both FleetMon and the Logistics Cluster data, there was a drop in arrivals during the month of September due to a temporary issue of ships not being allowed to arrive at the Al Hudaydah port, which has since been resolved according to the Logistics Cluster. Ships traveling to these ports require inspection from the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) and according to their reports, ships cleared to travel to ports in Al Hudaydah governorate were carrying, on average, 274,593 MT of food per month during the July to September 2016 period, in comparison to 373,869 MT of food during the April to June 2016 period.

According to the Logistics Cluster’s October 23 Access Map, all roads in Al Hudaydah are open. This is generally in line with the results of FEWS NET’s August 2016 rapid assessment although interviewed traders reported that transportation costs had increased along certain corridors due to rising fuel prices, the need for additional security, and fees at certain checkpoints.

WFP reports that wheat flour is currently available in Al Hudaydah. Additionally, wheat flour prices were 138 YER/kg, which is stable compared to both September and pre-conflict February 2015 levels (Figure 8). Despite these relatively low prices, food access through market purchase is reportedly limited for many poor households due to below-average

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

Famine Early Warning Systems Network 11

incomes. FEWS NET’s rapid assessment conducted in August 2016 found that surveyed households reported that their incomes were down 10 – 20 percent compared to pre-conflict levels.

According to humanitarian assistance data from the World Food Programme, approximately 231,000 beneficiaries in the governorate received 2,600 MT of food assistance per month during the months of June, July, and September 20169. At a local level, this assistance reached less than 20 percent of the total population in most districts, with the exception of Al Hajjaylah, Jabal Ra’s, and Al Khawkhah districts where assistance reached between 20 to 40 percent of the population. Additionally, many other international and local NGOs are active in the zone, providing various food and non-food assistance, as well as nutritional support, though the exact magnitude of this assistance is unknown. However, based on FEWS NET’s analysis of WFP’s assistance programs, FEWS NET estimates that ongoing humanitarian assistance is not likely large enough to be changing the area phase classification in the governorate.

Between July and September 2016, WFP’s mVAM surveys found that, on average, 18 percent of respondents in Al Hudaydah reported poor food consumption scores, with an additional 19 percent with borderline consumption. During this same period, 45 percent of respondents reported a reduced coping strategies index (rCSI) of over 20. While rCSI data broken down by the suggested IPC thresholds are not yet available, both food consumption score and median rCSI data for October suggests a deterioration in food security outcomes in October compared to previous months.

Based on available food security indicator data (Table 3) and contributing factor information on household food available and access, FEWS NET estimates that poor households in most areas of Al Hudaydah are likely facing elevated levels of food insecurity, including food consumption gaps, in line with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity.

SOUTHERN, COASTAL AREAS

Media and partner reports indicate that particularly along southern coastal areas, poor households are currently unable to fish, and to a lesser degree participate in agricultural activities, due to civil insecurity. According to a 2004 study of Yemen fishing communities conducted by FAO and the World Bank, the peak season for fishing in the zone runs from April to September, followed by an off-season from October to March when strong winds make fishing difficult. Additionally, within these communities, poorer households do not usually own boats but instead work as laborers on wealthier households’ boats to generate income. This report also noted that in some fishing communities, saltpan mining is another key livelihood activity though FEWS NET is not aware of any information on the status of saltpan mining given the ongoing conflict.

Media reports are reporting high and increasing levels of acute malnutrition in some areas of Al Hudaydah although quantitative data to support these statements are currently limited. A SMART survey conducted in March 2016 by UNICEF and the MoPHP found a prevalence of global acute malnutrition in lowland areas of 21.7 percent (95 percent CI: 18.1 to 25.8 percent). While quite high, this GAM prevalence was found to be lower than the previous SMART survey, conducted in August 2015 (possibly due to seasonality) and in line with GAM levels observed prior to the recent startup of conflict in 2015. While these high rates are very concerning, partners in the field report that access to clean water and health care are significant issues, which makes it difficult to tease out the role of food consumption gaps in driving these high malnutrition rates. However, according to data on severe acute malnutrition (SAM) admissions to community-based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) programs, total admissions in Al Hudaydah have been on an upward trend since January 2014.

9 Assistance data from August 2016 was not available at the time of publication.

Figure 8. Wheat flour prices in Al Hudaydah (YER/KG)

Source of data: WFP

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

Famine Early Warning Systems Network 12

Partner and media reports suggest the possibility of a very severe food security situation in southern, coastal areas of Al Hudaydah, particularly in the districts of Al Khawkhah and At Tuhayta. Reports suggest that local households have already depleted their very limited assets and are significantly cutting the quantity and quality of their meals. Additionally, qualitative observations by partners suggest that excess child mortality is occurring. Given this information, FEWS NET estimates that these communities are likely facing more severe outcomes than other parts of Al Hudaydah and are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Since recent media reports on these areas, various organizations have reported scaling up food assistance. FEWS NET has no specific information, however, about the degree to which these programs are potentially offsetting food deficits.

Table 3. Available food security outcome data for Al Hudaydah governorate Outcome Evidence Type Indicator Results IPC Phase

Food Consumption1

WFP mVAM – Avg. from July to September 2016

FCS 18 percent “poor” FCS, 20 percent “borderline FCS

Phase 3

rCSI 47 percent had an rCSI >=21 Phase 3+

FEWS NET Rapid Assessment – Average of May/June 2016 and August/September 2016 rounds2

HDDS 5 percent had HDDS between 0 and 2; 78 percent between 3 and 4

Phase 3

HHS 28 percent had HHS between 4 and 6; 20 percent had HHS between 2 and 3

Phase 4

Livelihood Change

No available data

Nutrition

UNICEF/MoPHP SMART survey of lowland Al Hudaydah – March 2016

GAM 21.7 percent (95% CI: 18.1 to 25.8) Phase 4

SAM admissions into CMAM programs Proxy for GAM

Rising number of admissions compared to 2014 and 2015

N/A

Mortality

UNICEF/MoPHP SMART survey of lowland Al Hudaydah – March 2016

Crude death rate

0.13 (CI: 0.08-0.21) Phase 1

UNICEF/MoPHP SMART survey of lowland Al Hudaydah – March 2016

Under 5 death rate

0.00 (CI: 0.00-0.00) Phase 1

1 rCSI and HDDS thresholds used are from recommendations provided in the study “Comparing Household Food Consumption Indicators to Inform Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification”. 2 FEW NET’s rapid assessment included 40 respondents surveyed in either May/June or August/September 2016. Enumerators were asked to select worst-off households. The survey is not statistically representative.

Ta’izz

Intense fighting over the past year in the governorate of Ta’izz has significantly restricted household livelihoods, market functioning, and humanitarian access in many areas. According to the Task Force for Population Movement’s estimates, approximately 15 percent of the population (427,000 people) is currently displaced, mostly residing with relatives in the governorate’s rural highlands region.

Household incomes in Ta’izz are significantly below pre-conflict levels. According to FEWS NET’s rapid assessment conducted in August 2016, interviewed households reported that incomes were over 50 percent below 2014 levels. Additionally, according to FAO/FSIS, fishing has completely stopped in coastal areas of the governorate.

Most roads in the governorate are closed. Currently, the only open route to Ta’izz City is from Ibb, according to the Logistics Cluster’s October access constraints map. Despite these closed roads, food is flowing into the governorate and according to WFP’s October market bulletin, wheat flour has been “sporadically available” over the past three months. According to FEWS NET’s rapid assessment conducted in August 2016, traders in Ta’izz reported that their wheat flour was primarily coming from Al Hudaydah, similar to before the conflict but that various transportation issues have complicated their business operations. More specifically, they reported that goods would frequently sit for several days outside the city as traders waited to be able to enter the city and that transportation costs have increased as goods are now transferred off large trucks to smaller four-wheel drive cars in order to pass through the difficult terrain of open roads.

Due to market disruptions, market prices for wheat flour and fuels remain elevated, according to WFP’s October bulletin. For example, the price of wheat flour was 255 YER/kg, which was the highest amongst all markets monitored by WFP. Compared to past months, the price of wheat flour was stable compared to September 2016 but was up 86 percent compared to the pre-conflict national average. Diesel prices in Ta’izz were also 53 percent above the national October 2016 average and was up 100 percent compared to pre-conflict levels.

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

Famine Early Warning Systems Network 13

Between July and September 2016, WFP’s mVAM surveys found that, on average, 30 percent of respondents in Ta’izz reported poor food consumption scores, with an additional 27 percent with borderline consumption. During this same period, 52 percent of respondents reported a reduced coping strategies index (rCSI) of over 20. WFP’s humanitarian assistance in Ta’izz has been increasing and reached about 562,000 beneficiaries, on average during the months of June, July and September 2016. Although this assistance does not yet appear to be large enough to result in a lower IPC area classification, mVAM data does suggest that food security outcomes are no longer deteriorating, which may be due to this increased assistance (Figure 9).

FEWS NET estimates that poor households and IDPs in Ta’izz are likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food security outcomes, based on currently available information from food security surveys and contributing factors relating to household food availability and access (Table 4). However, within the governorate, variations relating to food security outcomes are likely, depending on the severity of impacts of conflict on household livelihoods and markets, as well as humanitarian access. More specifically, IDPs throughout the governorate, poor households in inaccessible parts of Ta’izz City, and poor households in lowland areas, where malnutrition rates have historically been high and have increased in 2016 compared to pre-conflict levels (25.1 percent GAM in May 2016 compared to 17.4 percent GAM in May 2014), are likely facing more severe outcomes than households in highland areas.

Table 4. Available food security outcome data for Ta’izz governorate Outcome Evidence Type Indicator Results IPC Phase

Food Consumption1

WFP mVAM – Avg. from June to August 2016 FCS 30 percent “poor” FCS Phase 4

rCSI 52 percent had an rCSI >=21 Phase 3+

CARE International Rapid Assessment – February 20162

rCSI 9 percent had an rCSI >=21; 74 percent had an rCSI between 5 and 20

Phase 2

HHS 15 percent had HHS between 4 and 6; 58 percent had HHS between 2 and 3

Phase 3

FEWS NET Rapid Assessment – Average of May/June 2016 and August/September 2016 rounds3

HDDS 13 percent had HDDS between 0 and 2; 74 percent between 3 and 4

Phase 3

HHS 3 percent had HHS between 4 and 6; 67 percent had HHS between 2 and 3

Phase 3

Livelihood Change

No available data

Nutrition

UNICEF/MoPHP SMART survey – May 2016 GAM

17 percent in Ta’izz City - No historical data for comparisons

Phase 4

25 percent in lowland areas – In May 2014, GAM was 17 (95 percent CI: 15 – 21 percent)

Phase 4

14 percent in highland areas – In May 2014, GAM was 12 (95 percent CI: 10 -14 percent)

Phase 3

SAM admissions into CMAM programs Proxy for GAM

No clear trend as admissions during the first six months of 2016 were higher than in 2015 but similar to 2014

N/A

Mortality No available data 1 rCSI and HDDS thresholds used are from recommendations provided in the study “Comparing Household Food Consumption Indicators to Inform Acute Food Insecurity Phase Classification”. 2 CARE International’s rapid assessment covered 96 respondents in Al-Mawaset, Al-Shematen, and Al-Maafer. While respondents were randomly selected, the survey is not statistically representative. 3 FEW NET’s rapid assessment included 61 respondents surveyed in either May/June 2016 or August/September 2016. Enumerators were asked to select worst-off households. The survey is not statistically representative.

Figure 9. Percentage of households with poor food consumption

compared to WFP beneficiaries in Ta’izz

Source of data: WFP

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

Famine Early Warning Systems Network 14

EVENTS THAT MIGHT CHANGE THE OUTLOOK

Table 5. Possible events over the next eight months that could change the most-likely scenario

Area Event Impact on food security outcomes

National The Yemen Central Bank receives external assistance to replenish its depleted reserves or it gains access to its foreign reserves currently frozen in overseas accounts

The Yemeni rial to US dollar exchange rate would stabilize and the Central Bank would continue support, through lines of credit, to wheat flour importers. This would stabilize import levels, local food availability, and food prices.

Food imports stop due to the destruction of key port infrastructure or major changes in macroeconomic policies that prevent traders from accessing currency to fund their imports

Although informal trade across land borders would be likely, food availability of local markets would quickly decline. Food security outcomes would likely deteriorate with the possibility of additional households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

Intensification or reduction in conflict levels, or a change in the location of fighting/airstrikes

Changes in conflict could lead to either a deterioration or improvement in household livelihoods, market functioning, and humanitarian access. Food access would likely worsen if conflict became worse and would improve if a medium to long-term ceasefire were to occur.

Increased humanitarian assistance levels Additional humanitarian assistance could prevent food consumption gaps, reduce malnutrition, and child mortality for poor households in areas of intervention.

ABOUT SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT To project food security outcomes over a six-month period, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes those assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to develop scenarios estimating food security outcomes. Typically, FEWS NET reports the most likely scenario. To learn more about this approach to scenario development, visit www.fews.net/scenario_development.

YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

Famine Early Warning Systems Network 15

The Evolution of Food Insecurity in Yemen

Although food security data is limited, currently available data suggests that food consumption indicators have neither significantly improved nor drastically deteriorated over the past year, although nutritional outcomes may be deteriorating. For example, WFP’s mVAM data indicates that nationally, the percentage of the population with poor food consumption has remained relatively stable while the median rCSI has slowly increased (Figure 10). Meanwhile, data on severe acute malnutrition (SAM) admissions to community-based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) programs from January 2014 to August 2016 shows that, at a national level, the number of SAM cases admitted per month has grown (Figure 11). However, variations in the availability of malnutrition treatment programs during this period need to be kept in mind when interpreting this admissions data. At a sub-national level, trends for both food consumption (shown by mVAM data) and nutrition (shown by SAM admissions) varies considerably from one governorate to another (Figure 12 to 19).

Figure 10. The evolution of “poor” food consumption

scores and median rCSI over time at a national level

Figure 11. The evolution of severe acute malnutrition

(SAM) admissions into community-based management of

acute malnutrition (CMAM) programs over time at a

national level

Figure 12. The evolution of “poor” food consumption

scores and median rCSI over time in Abyan

Source of data for all mVAM graphics: WFP

Figure 13. The evolution of severe acute malnutrition

(SAM) admissions into community-based management of

acute malnutrition (CMAM) programs over time in

Abyan

Source of data for all CMAM graphics: UNICEF

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YEMEN Food Security Outlook October 2016 to May 2017

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The Evolution of Food Insecurity in Yemen (cont.)

Figure 14. The evolution of “poor” food

consumption scores and median rCSI over time in

Al Hudaydah

Figure 15. The evolution of severe acute

malnutrition (SAM) admissions into community-

based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM)

programs over time in Al Hudaydah

Figure 16. The evolution of “poor” food

consumption scores and median rCSI over time in

Ta’izz

Figure 17. The evolution of severe acute

malnutrition (SAM) admissions into community-

based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM)

programs over time in Ta’izz

Figure 18. The evolution of “poor” food

consumption scores and median rCSI over time in

Aden

Source of data for all mVAM graphics: WFP

Figure 19. The evolution of severe acute

malnutrition (SAM) admissions into community-

based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM)

programs over time in Aden

Source of data for all CMAM graphics: UNICEF

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