Ye Men

Table of Contents

Introduction ___________________________________________________________ 4

Geography ____________________________________________________________ 5

Introduction _______________________________________________________________ 5

Area ______________________________________________________________________ 5

Geographic Regions and Topographic Features __________________________________ 6 Coastal Plains ____________________________________________________________________ 6 The Yemen Highlands _____________________________________________________________ 7 Eastern Plateau and Desert __________________________________________________________ 8 Islands _________________________________________________________________________ 9

Climate __________________________________________________________________ 10

Drainage _________________________________________________________________ 11

Bodies of Water ___________________________________________________________ 12

Major Cities ______________________________________________________________ 13 Sanaa _________________________________________________________________________ 13 Aden __________________________________________________________________________ 14 Ta‘izz _________________________________________________________________________ 14 Al Hudaydah (Hodeida) ___________________________________________________________ 15 Al Mukalla _____________________________________________________________________ 16

Environmental Issues _______________________________________________________ 16 Water Scarcity __________________________________________________________________ 16 Other Issues ____________________________________________________________________ 19

Natural Hazards ___________________________________________________________ 19

History ______________________________________________________________ 21

Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 21

Ancient Kingdoms _________________________________________________________ 22

The Advent of Islam ________________________________________________________ 24

Competing States __________________________________________________________ 26 North Yemen ___________________________________________________________________ 26 South Yemen ___________________________________________________________________ 27

Road to Reconciliation ______________________________________________________ 28

Unified Yemen ____________________________________________________________ 28

Recent Developments _______________________________________________________ 31

Economy _____________________________________________________________ 34

Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 34

Hydrocarbons _____________________________________________________________ 35 Oil ___________________________________________________________________________ 35 Natural Gas ____________________________________________________________________ 36

Agriculture _______________________________________________________________ 37

Manufacturing ____________________________________________________________ 38

Taxation _________________________________________________________________ 39

Banking __________________________________________________________________ 39

Foreign Investment ________________________________________________________ 40

Tourism __________________________________________________________________ 41

Society _______________________________________________________________ 42

Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 42

Ethnic Groups and Languages _______________________________________________ 43

Religion __________________________________________________________________ 43

Gender Issues _____________________________________________________________ 44

Qat Chews ________________________________________________________________ 47

Food _____________________________________________________________________ 48

Clothing __________________________________________________________________ 49

Arts _____________________________________________________________________ 50 Poetry _________________________________________________________________________ 50 Dance _________________________________________________________________________ 51 Architecture ____________________________________________________________________ 51

Sports ___________________________________________________________________ 52

Security ______________________________________________________________ 54

Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 54

Yemen: “Tribal Republic” __________________________________________________ 55

U.S.–Yemen Relations ______________________________________________________ 56

Relations with Regional Countries ____________________________________________ 57 Saudi Arabia ___________________________________________________________________ 57 Oman _________________________________________________________________________ 59 Iran ___________________________________________________________________________ 60 Somalia _______________________________________________________________________ 61

Terrorist and Insurgent Groups ______________________________________________ 61 Al Qaeda ______________________________________________________________________ 61 Houthi Rebellion ________________________________________________________________ 62 Southern Mobility Movement ______________________________________________________ 64

Water Security ____________________________________________________________ 65

Threats to Internal Security _________________________________________________ 66 Corruption _____________________________________________________________________ 66 Refugees and Economic Migrants ___________________________________________________ 67 Poverty ________________________________________________________________________ 68

Armed Forces _____________________________________________________________ 68

Looking Ahead ____________________________________________________________ 69

Introduction

The Republic of Yemen was established in 1990, when

the states of North and South Yemen merged. The

division was born of differing historical and cultural

influences. North Yemen comprised the Red Sea coastal

plains and much of the adjacent, isolated highland region

to the west. The Zaydi imamate, a Shi‘ite theocracy,

emerged in the highlands in the late ninth century.1 It

exercised some type of political control over shifting

portions of the region until 1962. From the 16th through early 20th centuries, the Zaydis

competed with the Ottoman Turks for power in the north. In 1962, the imamate was

overthrown and replaced by the government of the Yemen Arab Republic (1962–1990),

though Zaydism remains the dominant faith. South Yemen comprised not only the south,

but also what is now central and eastern Yemen. In contrast to the Zaydi-dominated

north, this region had for many centuries been populated by Sunni Muslims of the Shafi‘i

school. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the south was occupied by the British, who exerted

control over the port of Aden—an important commercial refueling, provisioning, and

trans-shipment port between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. After the

British withdrew from the south in 1967, a Marxist government was established which

became dependent on support from the Soviet Union. During this time, South Yemen

adopted the name People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen (1970–1990).

The two governments had engaged in unity talks since the 1970s with limited progress.

The merger was ultimately facilitated by economic necessity when South Yemen was on

the verge of losing its primary patron after it became clear the Soviet Union would be

disbanded. The new state, the Republic of Yemen (RY), promised to bring democracy to

the Arabian Peninsula. But a smooth transition to universal suffrage seemed unlikely

given that Yemen lacked good physical infrastructure and the impoverished population

was largely illiterate. Despite civil war, insurgency in the north, and a resurgent

secessionist movement in the south, successive elections have been deemed competitive

by outside observers and kept President Ali Abdallah Saleh in power. Saleh has been able

to create an extensive patronage network, with resources often funneled through tribal

shaykhs, who operate as local power brokers in regions that the central government does

not control. Thus, much decision-making takes place outside the formal institutions of

governance.2 This arrangement makes it difficult to diminish corruption and introduce

1 Zaidism is a branch of Shi‘a Islam, constituting the form of Shi‘a Islam that is closest to Sunnism. The

former rulers of Yemen, the Imams of Sanaa, were leaders of the Zaydi sect. The sect developed as a purely

political expression of support for the rule of the Prophet Muhammad‘s cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi

Talib, and his descendants. In Zaidism there is no veneration of Ali or any of his descendants as infallible

supernatural leaders of the Muslim community, unlike that found in some other Shi‘ite sects. 2 Norwegian Peace Building Centre. Saif, Ahmed Abdelkareem. ―Complex Power Relations in Yemen

Provide Opportunities for al-Qaeda.‖ February 2010.

http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/Noref_ComplexPowerRelationsInYemenProvideOppor

tunitiesForAlQaeda.pdf

transparency, which governments that provide the republic with foreign aid require. Saleh

has described governing Yemen as akin to ―dancing on the heads of snakes.‖3 His ability

to sustain this delicate balance is threatened by declining national revenue that is

generated from the country‘s oil reserves, which are expected to be exhausted by 2017.

Geography

Introduction

Yemen, in the Middle East (or Near East), occupies the

southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, across

from the Horn of Africa. It is a geographically distinct

region of the peninsula, which is better known for its

vast, inhospitable deserts than for mountainous terrain.

Yet western Yemen is marked by rugged highlands and

mountains, including several peaks that reach more than

3,000 m (10,000 ft)—the highest points on the peninsula.

For this reason, Yemen has been called the ―Roof of Arabia.‖4 The temperate climate and

relatively abundant rainfall enjoyed by the Yemeni highlands led the ancient Romans to

call it ―Arabia Felix,‖ meaning ―happy‖ or ―fortunate‖ Arabia.5 Yemen‘s coastal

lowlands, eastern plateau, and deserts display the hot and dry conditions that characterize

greater Arabia. Today, water is a precious and limited resource that is increasingly

strained by the needs of Yemen‘s fast-growing population.

The Republic of Yemen has existed only since 1990, when the Yemen Arab Republic

(North Yemen) and the People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) were

unified. The Yemen Arab Republic (1962–1990) comprised most of the western region of

the current country. Its territory bordered the Red Sea and encompassed most of the

adjacent mountain highlands, but was blocked from the southern coast by the People‘s

Democratic Republic of Yemen (1970–1990). South Yemen comprised what is now the

central and eastern portion of the country, extending west to the Bab el Mandeb strait.

The country‘s current borders reflect the unification of the two countries, including

boundary agreements with Oman and Saudi Arabia.6

Area

Yemen occupies a strategically important position on the

southern Arabian Peninsula, near vital shipping lanes. It

3 Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. Glosemeyer, Iris. ―Dancing on Heads of Snakes in

Yemen.‖ May 2009. http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Dancing%20on%20Snake%20Heads%20in%20Yemen.pdf 4 Yemen in Pictures. DiPiazza, Francesca Davis. ―Introduction [p. 7].‖ 2008. Minneapolis: Lerner

Publishing Group. 5 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabia Felix.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9008151

6 Yemen‘s boundaries with Oman and Saudi Arabia were settled in 1992 and 2000, respectively. Federal

Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ August 2008.

http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf

shares land borders with two countries: Saudi Arabia to the north and Oman to the

northeast. To the east and south, Yemen borders the Arabian Sea and its arm, the Gulf of

Aden, which separates the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa. Across the Gulf of

Aden lies the African country of Somalia and its autonomous region Somaliland. Off the

southwestern tip of Yemen lies the Bab el Mandeb, a strait that connects the Gulf of

Aden to the Red Sea. The small African country of Djibouti lies directly across the strait

from Yemen. Yemen‘s western border runs along the Red Sea; across the sea lies the

African country of Eritrea. Yemen‘s total coastline measures 1,906 km (1,184 mi).7

Yemen also possesses more than one hundred islands scattered throughout nearby

waters.8 These include the Kamaran and Hanish Islands (two island groups in the Red

Sea), and the island of Perim (Barim) in the Bab el Mandeb strait. Socotra (Suqutra),

Yemen‘s largest island, lies in the Arabian Sea off the tip of the Horn of Africa.9

Yemen‘s total land area, including the islands of Perim and Socotra, is 527,968 sq km

(203,850 sq mi), slightly larger than the combined area of Colorado and Wyoming.10

Geographic Regions and Topographic Features

Yemen‘s topography exhibits considerable variation. A rugged and fertile highland

region occupies the west. The east is dominated by a high, arid plateau dissected by

wadis, or valleys that seasonally flow with water. Desert covers areas of the north.

Coastal Plains

The extensive coastline is lined with plains that range

from 8 to 65 km (5 to 40 mi) in width.11

The western

coastal plain on the Red Sea is known as the Tihamah (or

Tihama). Hot and humid, this plain extends from Saudi

Arabia south to the Bab el Mandeb strait. Along the

water, the Tihamah features beaches and mudflats, while

inland are sand or stone plains and occasional salt flats

(sabkhas). Although the plain receives little rainfall,

wadis carry seasonal run off to the plain from the adjacent mountains. These wadis

support limited agriculture on irrigated plots that are interspersed throughout the large

7 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. ―Yemen.‖ 28 December 2009.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html 8 Yemen in Pictures. DiPiazza, Francesca Davis. ―The Land [p. 8].‖ 2008. Minneapolis: Lerner Publishing

Group. 9 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45252

10 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. ―Yemen.‖ 28 December 2009.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html 11

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land: Relief and Drainage.‖ 2010.

http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45252

network of sand dunes.12

On the plain‘s eastern edge, the terrain rises sharply into cliffs

and foothills that form the western escarpment of the mountainous interior.

The plains lining the southern and eastern coasts (on the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian

Sea) are narrower than those on the west coast. Like the Tihamah, they are bounded by

rugged escarpments, some of which reach to the sea. Unlike the Tihamah, the southern

and eastern coasts can be blanketed by dense fog as a result of the southwest monsoon.

This climate encourages thick woodland vegetation on the nearby foothills.13

Aquaculture

(primarily shrimp farming) and fishing-related industries are based on Yemen‘s coasts.

The major ports are Aden (on the southwestern coast), Al Hudaydah (on the Tihamah),

and Al Mukalla (on the southeastern coast).

The Yemen Highlands

Inland from the Tihamah, the terrain rises sharply to

highlands that extend north-south parallel to the Red Sea

coast and eastward parallel to the southern coast. The L-

shaped range is known as the Sarat Mountains.14,

15

This

region is the southern part of an upland rift along the

western coast of the Arabian Peninsula. The rift, which is

part of the Great Rift Valley system, is the product of the

separation of the Arabian Peninsula from the African

continent that occurred millions of years ago.16

The highland region consists of a large,

dissected plateau marked with rugged mountains and volcanoes. The western escarpment,

which forms a transitional zone between the Tihamah and the upland plateau, is steep and

rugged. Thousands of small villages are situated on rocky outcroppings of this slope,

which supports crop cultivation via an elaborate terracing system.17

Such features mark

the Haraz Mountains, for example, which have the city of Manakhah on their western

slope.18

The highlands culminate in intermittent mountain chains that contain the country‘s

highest points. The tallest peak, west of the Yemeni capital Sanaa, is known as Jabal an-

Nabi Shu‘ayb and reaches 3,760 m (12,336 ft). East of the western escarpment, the

12 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Tihamat al-Yaman.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9072460

13 World Wildlife Fund. ―Terrestrial Ecoregions: Arabian Peninsula Coastal Fog Desert.‖ 2001.

http://www.worldwildlife.org/wildworld/profiles/terrestrial/at/at1302_full.html 14

Yemen: The Bradt Travel Guide. McLaughlin, Daniel. ―Chapter 1: Background Information [p. 3].‖

2007. Buckinghamshire,U K: Bradt Travel Guides. 15

Yemen Tourism Promotion Board, Ministry of Tourism, Republic of Yemen. ―Yemen Profile.‖ No date.

http://www.yementourism.com/information/detail.php?ID=2712 16

Yemen: The Jewel of Arabia. Aithie, Charles and Patricia Aithie. ―The Highlands [p. 21].‖ 2001. London:

Stacy International. 17

The Yemen Arab Republic: Development and Change in an Ancient Land. Wenner, Manfred W. ―Chapter

1: The Land [p. 8].‖ 1991. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 18

Yemen General Tourism Development Authority. Yemen: Haraz Mountains: Nature, Culture, Trekking.

Kasparek, Max. ―Nature [p. 7].‖ 2007. Heidelberg, Germany: Kasparek Verlag.

upland plateau contains rolling plains and basins among hills and mountains.19

Settlements and agriculture here benefit from fertile soils, a temperate climate, and

moderate rainfall. Throughout the highlands, agricultural plots have replaced much of the

original woodlands and forests.20

Wadis cut throughout the region, carrying seasonal

runoff to lower elevations. The advantageous geographic and climatic conditions make

the highlands home to the majority of the Yemeni population and several of the country‘s

major cities. These include Ta‘izz, which is in the southern highlands, and Sanaa, which

is in the central highlands. The highlands gradually descend into the arid plateau of the

east, where the change in climate is pronounced.21

Eastern Plateau and Desert

From the highlands, the terrain slopes down to an arid,

upland plateau and desert. The Ramlat as Sab‘atayn, a

large desert of undulating sand dunes, occupies west-

central Yemen, just east of the highlands. The Jawl (Jol),

an expansive limestone plateau, covers much of central

and eastern Yemen.22

It is crossed by numerous wadis,

the largest and most well known of which is Wadi

Hadramawt.23

This extensive valley runs through the Jawl

from central Yemen, east of the Ramlat as Sab‘atayn, to the Gulf of Aden on the

southeastern coast. The greater region is also known as Hadramawt (Hadhramaut). The

seasonal runoff and fertile soils of the upper valley, which is intersected by additional

wadis, have long supported settlement and agriculture, including fruit plantations. The

valley‘s lower reaches, toward the sea, are sterile and mostly desolate.24

This lower

course is known as Wadi Masilah.25

19 ―Towards a Sociology of the Islamisation of Yemen [pp. 6–7].‖ Gochenour, D. Thomas. In

Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background. B.R. Pridham, Ed. 1984. New York: St.

Martin‘s Press. 20

World Wildlife Fund. ―Terrestrial Ecoregions: Southwestern Arabian Montane Woodlands.‖ 2001.

http://www.worldwildlife.org/wildworld/profiles/terrestrial/at/at1321_full.html 21

The Yemen Arab Republic: Development and Change in an Ancient Land. Wenner, Manfred W. ―Chapter

1: The Land [pp. 9–10].‖ 1991. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 22

King Saud University. Quaternary Research, No. 50. Lézine, Anne-Marie, et al. ―Holocene Lakes from

Ramlat as-Sab‘atayn (Yemen) Illustrate the Impact of Monsoon Activity in Southern Arabia [pp. 290–

291].‖ 1998.

http://faculty.ksu.edu.sa/archaeology/Publications/General/Holocene%20lakes%20from%20Ramat%20as-

Sab%E2%80%99atayan%20(Yemen).pdf 23

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabia: The Land: Relief, Drainage, and Soils: Yemen.‖ 2010.

http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45287 24

Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,

Ed. ―Chapter 3: South Yemen: Geography and Population [p. 223].‖ Krieger, Laurie, et al. 1986.

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 25

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Hadhramout.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-

9038736#261501.hook

South of Wadi Hadramawt, the Jawl reaches a highpoint of 2185 m (7,169 ft) in a series

of low mountains and hills that run parallel to the coast. The plateau‘s southern

escarpment descends sharply to the coastal plain. North of Wadi Hadramawt, the plateau

descends gradually to the southern reaches of the Rub al-Khali, or Empty Quarter, a

massive sand desert that covers some 650,000 sq km (250,000 sq mi) of the Arabian

Peninsula. Hot, dry, and extremely inhospitable, the Rub al-Khali is the largest sand

desert in the world.26

Except for Wadi Hadramawt and its related branches, the eastern

region is sparsely populated, with large expanses of unforgiving, uninhabited terrain.27

Islands

Yemen possesses more than 100 islands in the Red Sea,

the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea. (While estimates

have varied, recent figures place the number at 183.)28

Topography and climate vary from island to island. Those

in the Red Sea generally share the hot and humid

conditions of the Tihamah. Many are rocky, barren, and

without fresh water. Most of them remain undeveloped,

although efforts have been made in recent years to

harness their potential as tourism locales.29

Fishing is the primary livelihood of most

island inhabitants. Strategically, the islands are important for their location amid the busy

shipping lanes of regional waters.

Among the most important islands in the Red Sea are the Kamaran Islands, an

archipelago just off the coast of the northern Tihamah. The main island has a small

population, primarily composed of pearl fishers.30

Further south in the Red Sea, the

uninhabited Hanish Islands were the subject of a territorial dispute between Yemen and

Eritrea. Following armed conflict and international mediation, most of the islands were

officially awarded to Yemen in 1998. Jabal Zuqar, the largest of the Hanish Islands, has

the highest elevation of any island in the Red Sea: 624 m (2,047 ft).31

Perim (Barim)

Island is in the strategic Bab el Mandeb strait. In 2009, Yemeni and French officials

announced plans to construct an artificial harbor on the island for combating regional

26 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabia: The Land: Relief, Drainage, and Soils: The Rub‘ al-Khali.‖

2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45285 27

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. FAO Country Profiles and Mapping

Information System. ―Yemen: Population.‖ No date.

http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/Maps/YEM/10/pt/index.html 28

Business Intelligence—Middle East. ―NONAV—Yemen—Travel Leisure and Hospitality Report.‖ 21

December 2004. http://www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=158&t=1 29

Yemen Observer. Al-Qairy, Mohammed. ―Yemeni Islands: The Gate to Yemen‘s Future.‖ 4 December

2007. http://www.yobserver.com/environment/10013379.html 30

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Kamaran.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9044454 31

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Hanish Islands.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9039145

piracy.32

A proposal to build a bridge across the Bab el Mandeb strait would use the

island as a stopover point.33

Yemen‘s largest island, Socotra, is in the Arabian Sea, 340 km (210 mi) southeast of the

Yemeni coast. Measuring approximately 3,600 sq km (1,400 sq mi), Socotra has a

mountainous interior surrounded by coastal plains. It is known for its unique biodiversity,

including many species that are found nowhere else on earth. Local economic activity

includes fishing, animal husbandry, and small-scale agriculture.34

Travel to the island is

greatly hindered during the southwest monsoon.

Climate

Yemen‘s climate is determined by two major forces: dry

northerly winds dominate in winter, and moist monsoons

prevail in spring and summer.35

Although the alternating

strength of these forces makes for relatively distinct

seasons, climate conditions vary widely according to

region and elevation. In general, the highlands experience

a temperate climate with dry, mild winters, and warm

summers that see moderate to abundant rainfall. Sanaa, in

the central highlands, has an average temperature of 14ºC (57ºF) in January and 22ºC

(71ºF) in July.36

Occasional frosts and light snowfall may occur at upper elevations

during the winter. The spring and summer monsoons bring rain to the highlands in two

major cycles: March to May and July to September. The western escarpment and

mountains receive the most rainfall. Precipitation levels are lower on the upland plateau,

where rainfall is heavier in the south than in the north.37

Average annual rainfall in Sanaa,

for example, is about 51 cm (20 in),38

while to the south the highlands around Ibb and

32 Arab News. Agence France-Presse. ―Yemen Plans Port to Help Combat Piracy.‖ 22 February 2009.

http://www.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=119468&d=22&m=2&y=2009 33

The Herald (Scotland). ―Bin Laden‘s Brother Aims to Bridge the Red Sea.‖ 31 May 2008.

http://www.heraldscotland.com/bin-laden-s-brother-aims-to-bridge-the-red-sea-1.829714 34

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Socotra.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9068481 35

Sharecropping in the Yemen: A Study of Islamic Theory, Custom, and Pragmatism. Donaldson, William

J. 2000. ―Chapter 1: Introduction: 1.2: The Yemen: A Contextual Overview [p. 6].‖ Leiden, Netherlands:

Brill. 36

Yemen in Pictures. DiPiazza, Francesca Davis. ―The Land [p. 12].‖ 2008. Minneapolis: Lerner

Publishing Group. 37


Ed. ―Chapter 2: North Yemen: Geographic and Demographic Setting: The Physical Environment [p. 98].‖

Krieger, Laurie, et al. 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 38

Yemen in Pictures. DiPiazza, Francesca Davis. ―The Land [p. 12].‖ 2008. Minneapolis: Lerner

Publishing Group.

Ta‘izz receive more than 75 cm (30 in) each year.39

Precipitation takes the form of

localized storms and can thus vary considerably, even across short distances.40

The coastal plains are less affected by the dominant air current patterns. They experience

a tropical climate, with low rainfall and high heat and humidity. Temperatures in this

region range between 27ºC (81ºF) and 42ºC (108ºF).41

Average yearly rainfall is less than

13 cm (5 in).42

The eastern plateau and deserts are similarly hot and dry year-round.

Average temperature highs in Wadi Hadramawt range from 30ºC (86ºF) in the winter to

40ºC (104ºF) in the summer. This region receives around 5 cm (2 in) of rainfall each

year—typically in short, periodic downpours that occasionally cause floods.43

In the

deserts, rain may fall only once every several years. Daytime temperatures in these

regions can reach 50ºC (122ºF), although nights are cooler.44

Nationwide, rainfall is

erratic, frequently resulting in drought.45

Precipitation has reportedly decreased in many

regions over the last several years. Sandstorms and dust storms, fueled by strong

northwesterly winds known as shamal, can sweep through the region in winter and early

summer.46

Drainage

Yemen has no permanent rivers. Instead, wadis, which

are valleys and dry riverbeds, provide seasonal drainage

for rain fall run-off. Wadis run from the highlands and the

upper elevations of the eastern plateau to the coastal

plains and interior deserts and lowlands. They allow for

settlement and crop cultivation in otherwise inhospitable

areas. Because the highlands receive the majority of the

country‘s rainfall, the surrounding lowland regions

depend largely upon runoff.47

The most well known wadi is Wadi Hadramawt, which is

the longest wadi in Arabia and the lifeblood of the eastern plateau.48

Other major wadis

39 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land: Climate.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45253

40 Country Pasture/ Forest Resource Profiles, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Alabsi, Ali Abdulmalek. ―Yemen.‖ November 2001.

http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/Counprof/Yemen/yemen.htm 41

Aquastat, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. ―Yemen.‖ 2009.

http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/yemen/index.stm 42

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land: Climate.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45253 43


Ed. ―Chapter 3: South Yemen: Geography and Population [p. 223].‖ Krieger, Laurie, et al. 1986.

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 44

Yemen: The Bradt Travel Guide. McLaughlin, Daniel. ―Chapter 1: Background Information [p. 3].‖

2007. Buckinghamshire, UK: Bradt Travel Guides. 45

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land: Climate.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-45253 46

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabia: The Land: Climate.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-

45290 47

Sharecropping in the Yemen: A Study of Islamic Theory, Custom, and Pragmatism. Donaldson, William

J. 2000. ―Chapter 1: Introduction: 1.2: The Yemen: A Contextual Overview [p. 6].‖ Leiden, Netherlands:

Brill.

include Wadi Zabid and Wadi Mawr, which both run from the highlands down to the

Tihamah; and Wadi al Jawf, which flows down the eastern escarpment from the northern

highlands. From the southern highlands, Wadi Bana flows down to the southern coastal

plain, where it empties into the Gulf of Aden. On the eastern plateau, Wadi Doan

(Dawan) runs northward through the southern Jawl, where it connects to the Wadi

Hadramawt system. The lower course of the Wadi Hadramawt, which flows into the Gulf

of Aden, is known as Wadi Masilah.49

Many regions and towns carry the same name as

the local wadi that supports them.

While Yemen has no lakes, a dam at Marib, on the eastern escarpment, has a capacity of

some 400 million cubic meters. (Marib was the site of huge dam that allowed for the

development of the Sabaean culture in the 1st millennium B.C.E.) Hundreds of smaller

dams in the highlands store water for local use or channel it into depleted aquifers.50

Bodies of Water

Yemen‘s strategic importance is largely due its location

along vital shipping lanes. These bodies of water include

the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el Mandeb

strait, and the Red Sea. Together, they form a network

that links the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean.

This network is vital for global trade. It is a major route

for shipping goods between Europe and Asia, as well as

for transporting oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe and

the U.S.51, 52

This region has been increasingly affected by piracy in recent years. Many

of these pirates are based in nearby Somalia.53

Off the southeastern coast of Yemen, the Arabian Sea comprises the northwestern portion

of the Indian Ocean. Its inlet, the Gulf of Aden, begins near the point of the Horn of

Africa. The Bab el Mandab strait that links the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea is only 29 km

(18 mi) wide at its narrowest point. It is therefore a chokepoint for traffic in and out of

the Red Sea. The strait‘s name, which means ―gate of tears,‖ refers to the challenges that

48 Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Hadramawt [pp. 414–415].‖ 2004. Footscray,

Victoria, Australia: Lonely Planet Publications. 49

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Hadhramout.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-

9038736#261501.hook 50


http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/yemen/index.stm 51

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabian Sea: Economic Aspects: Transportation.‖ 2010.


Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy. ―World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Bab

el-Mandab.‖ January 2008. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Bab_el-

Mandab.html 53

Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service. Ploch, Lauren, et al. ―CRS Report

for Congress: Piracy off the Horn of Africa.‖ 28 December 2009.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf

it once posed to vessels navigating its passage.54

A company owned by Tarek bin Laden,

the brother of Osama bin Laden, has proposed building a bridge across the strait that

would link Yemen with Djibouti via Perim Island.55

It would be the world‘s longest

suspension bridge.56

North of the strait, the Red Sea ultimately links to the Mediterranean

Sea via the Suez Canal; it is one of the busiest transportation waterways in the world.

Ships from the Gulf and Asia that are bound for Northern Europe or the Western

hemisphere must pass through Bab el Mandab to reach the Suez Canal.57

Major Cities

Sanaa

Sanaa, the capital and largest city of Yemen, is situated in the central

highlands at an altitude of more than 2,200 m (7,200 ft). The city

sprawls across a fertile upland basin near the foot of a mountain

known as Jabal Nuqum. Yemeni legend attributes the founding of the

city to Shem, one of Noah‘s three sons. The city‘s name is thought to

mean ―fortified place.‖ Only in the early 1960s did an all-weather

road make the historically isolated city relatively accessible from the

Tihamah, via the rugged western escarpment. The city became the

capital of the Yemen Arab Republic, also known as North Yemen,

which existed from 1962 to 1990. The city has since expanded

rapidly, growing from approximately 35,000 in the early 1960s to 1.7

million, as of the 2004 census.58

More recent estimates place the city‘s population near 2

million. The influx of people has led to urban sprawl and a strain on infrastructure and

resources, most notably water. Amid a water crisis affecting the entire country, the city

could run out of water by 2025 if the depletion of local aquifers continues at the current

rate.59

The old quarter of the city is enclosed by a wall measuring 6–9 m high (20–30 ft). This

district retains multistoried tower houses that are over 1,000 years old. Historic mosques,

bath houses (hammam), and traditional marketplaces (souks) are also located in this

54 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Bab el-Mandeb Strait.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9050482

55 The Herald (Scotland). ―Bin Laden‘s Brother Aims to Bridge the Red Sea.‖ 31 May 2008.

http://www.heraldscotland.com/bin-laden-s-brother-aims-to-bridge-the-red-sea-1.829714 56

The total length would slightly exceed the 28 km (17.6 mi) Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel that connects

Virginia‘s eastern shore to the mainland. The Chesapeake waters, however, are only one-tenth as deep as

the Bab el Mandeb, which plunges to about 305 m (1,000 ft) at its deepest point. The Washington Post.

Whitlock, Craig. ―A Bin Laden Brother‘s Ambitious Bridge Project.‖ 28 May 2008.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/27/AR2008052702766.html 57

Geopolitics-Geoeconomics. Engdahl, William. ―Yemen: Behind Al-Qaeda Scenarios, a Geopolitical Oil

Chokepoint to Eurasia.‖ 4 January 2010.

http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/Geopolitics___Eurasia/Chokepoint_Yemen/chokepoint_yemen.html 58

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Sanaa.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9065400 59

Reuters. Lyon, Alistair. ―Water Crisis Threatens Yemen‘s Swelling Population.‖ 30 August 2009.

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57T0HK20090830

sector. The city‘s most important mosque is the Great Mosque, or Al-Jami‘ al-Kabir.60

As

the nation‘s capital, the city is home to government offices and civil servants. Its airport

is a major hub for travel in and out of the country.

Aden

The former capital of South Yemen, Aden is a large port

city on a small, volcanic peninsula on the southern coast.

Its natural deep-water harbor has long made it an

important shipping and trade center. According to legend,

Noah‘s ark set sail from this area. The port had become a

vital transit point between the Red Sea and the Indian

Ocean by the 14th century. Its importance for Yemen grew in the 18th century following

the decline of Al Mukha (Mocha), an ancient port located on the Tihamah.61

The Suez

Canal, opened in 1869, increased Red Sea traffic and greatly enhanced the port‘s

significance. Today, Aden remains the commercial capital of Yemen and one of its

strategic centers.

The city comprises several districts. Al-Tawahi is a business district on the northwestern

end of the peninsula. Just to the east, Ma‘alla comprises the natural harbor. Crater, the old

quarter, is on the eastern side of the peninsula, just below Aden‘s inactive volcano, which

is known as Jabal Shamsan. To the north, Khormaksar, the site of an international airport

(a former Royal Air Force base), is on the isthmus connecting the peninsula to the

mainland.62

Sheikh Othman, an industrial district, is located to the northwest, across the

Bay of Aden from the harbor district.63

Yemen‘s second most populous city, Aden has

approximately 589,000 residents (2004 census).64

Ta’izz

Ta‘izz is located in the fertile and rain-fed southern

highlands; it sits at an altitude of 1,400 m (4,500 ft). The

city served as Yemen‘s administrative seat from 1948 to

1962, when Imam Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid, the second-

to-last Zaydi imam, moved the imamate‘s capital south.65

Benefiting from a temperate climate, Ta‘izz lies within a

productive agricultural region where coffee and qat (a

60 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Sanaa.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9065400

61 The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East. Chaudry, Karen Aziz. ―Chapter 3:

Taxation and Economic Fragmentation [p. 113].‖ 1997. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 62

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Aden.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9003715 63

Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Aden [p. 401].‖ 2004. Footscray, Victoria,

Australia: Lonely Planet Publications. 64

City Population. Brinkhoff, Thomas. ―Yemen.‖ 17 April 2009.

http://www.citypopulation.de/Yemen.html 65

Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Ta‘izz [pp. 398–399].‖ 2004. Footscray,

Victoria, Australia: Lonely Planet Publications.

mild stimulant) are the main crops. It also features light industry, as well as a madrassah,

or Muslim theological school. The city is a regional transportation hub. It is linked via

highway to Aden (to the southeast) and the port of Al Hudaydah (to the northwest on the

Tihamah). Another highway runs northward from Ta‘izz through the highlands to

Sanaa.66

With a population of 467,000, Ta‘izz is Yemen‘s third-largest city.67

Al Hudaydah (Hodeida)

Al Hudaydah is a major port city on the central Tihamah coast. It grew to prominence

during the period of the Ottoman Empire, when it was a point of entry for Ottoman

troops. Over time it became known for its export of coffee and pearls.68

In the 1960s, Al

Hudydah and the surrounding region underwent extensive reconstruction and

development with the aid of the Soviet Union, which built a new deepwater port just

north of the city. At about the same time, Chinese engineers built an all-weather road

linking the city with Sanaa in the highlands. Today, the port remains vital for Yemeni

export trade in coffee, cotton, and qat. Fishing is an important local industry; the city is

known for its bustling fish market. While much of the city was built over the last several

decades, a small (Ottoman) Turkish quarter remains. Al Hudaydah‘s population is

approximately 403,000 (2004 census).69

Ibb

Ibb is in the southern highlands, north of Ta‘izz, in the

Jabal Ba‘adan range.70

It lies at an elevation of 2,050 m

(6,725 ft). The city and the surrounding territory benefit

from abundant rainfall and rich volcanic soils, making the

region green and agriculturally productive. Crops such as

grains, coffee, qat, and various fruits and vegetables are

grown in terraces ascending the hillsides. Animal

husbandry is also important to the local economy. The

region‘s rich agricultural produce and animal products are sold in the local souk, or

marketplace. The old city is walled, and filled with tower houses and mosques. Some

houses in Ibb reportedly receive running water from an aqueduct and its distribution

66 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Ta‘izz.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9070994

67 City Population. Brinkhoff, Thomas. ―Yemen.‖ 17 April 2009.


Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Al-Hudayday [p. 393].‖ 2004. Footscray,

Victoria, Australia: Lonely Planet Publications. 69

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Al-Hudaydah.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9041383 70

Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Ibb [p. 397].‖ 2004. Footscray, Victoria,

Australia: Lonely Planet Publications.

system—a rare service in Yemen.71

The city is home to approximately 213,000 residents

(2004 census).72

Al Mukalla

Al Mukalla is located on the Gulf of Aden, on the southern coast of the Hadramawt

region. Although it was made the capital of a sultanate (kingdom) in 1915, it did not

become a regional center of commerce until the late 1950s, when it grew in response to

rumors of oil in the Hadramawt region. The modern-day city has expanded along the

coast for 20 km (12 mi). A series of low hills surrounds and splits the city into three

distinct sections: an old city, and eastern and western suburbs.73

One part of the city‘s

waterfront boardwalk is reserved for women and the other for men.74

Al Mukalla is

known for its high-quality stone and marble, which support a mining and quarrying

industry. It is the primary port for southeastern Yemen, and is a center for the country‘s

fishing and fish processing industries. It is the region‘s administrative seat and largest

city, as well as its major commercial hub.75

Al Mukalla has a population of

approximately 182,000 (2004 census).76

Environmental Issues

Water Scarcity

Water scarcity is a pressing environmental concern in

Yemen. The country lacks permanent rivers and lakes, so

it is wholly dependent upon groundwater (aquifers) and

rainfall for its water supply. Yet water consumption has

rapidly outpaced the replenishment of Yemen‘s limited

renewable aquifers. The country‘s water deficit—the

difference between consumption and replenishment

levels—was around 900 million cubic meters in 2000. It

was estimated at 1.28 billion cubic meters in 2005, and is expected to grow in coming

years. This trend will be difficult to avert owing to rapid population growth, which has

already strained the country‘s limited resources. Estimates of Yemen‘s annual renewable

water resources per capita range from 125 to 200 cubic m (4,414 to 7,062 cubic ft); these

figures are substantially lower than the global average of around 6,750 cubic m (238,374

71 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Ibb.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9041882

72 City Population. Brinkhoff, Thomas. ―Yemen.‖ 17 April 2009.


Cities Alliance. ―Mukalla: Gateway to the Hadramout.‖ 2008.

http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/mukalla.pdf 74

Foreign Policy Research Center. Kaplan, Robert. ―A Journey to the Future.‖ 31 July 2003.

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030731.americawar.kaplankuehner.journeyintothefuture.html 75

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Al-Mukalla.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9054191 76

City Population. Brinkhoff, Thomas. ―Yemen.‖ 17 April 2009.

http://www.citypopulation.de/Yemen.html

cubic ft), and the international water poverty line of 1,000 cubic meters (35,314 cubic

ft).77, 78

Agriculture is the primary beneficiary of Yemen‘s water; it accounts for roughly 90% of

the country‘s annual water withdrawal, leaving only 10% for domestic and industrial use.

Notably, approximately 40% of annual water use goes to the cultivation of qat, which is

widely consumed in Yemen.79

Cultivation of this irrigation-dependent crop has been

discouraged by the Yemeni government, but it remains widespread due to its high profit

margin. The proliferation of wells drilled illegally to procure irrigation water for qat has

contributed to the rapid decline of groundwater levels. Recent reports indicate that these

levels are dropping by 6 to 20 m (20 to 65 ft) per year—an extraordinary rate. Erratic

rainfall, drought, and higher temperatures have hindered the replenishment of aquifers.80

Moreover, an estimated 20–30% of the country‘s rainfall is thought to be wasted by

faulty collection and poor maintenance of water conservation infrastructure.81

As a result of water shortages, rationing is in place in urban areas. In some cities, such as

Ta‘izz, water may be provided as infrequently as once every 45 days. At the current rate

of use and growth in population, Sanaa, the capital, is expected to run out of water by

2025 or even earlier. Throughout the country, public water supplies are limited, and

people often buy water from private sellers or hike long distances to tap it. Such water

may or may not meet basic health standards for drinking.82

As the price of water has

rapidly increased, more wells have been drilled illegally to meet demand. Water scarcity

has increasingly resulted in social unrest and conflict owing to population growth coupled

with unsustainable usage practices.83

The Yemeni government has made efforts to

address the crisis by implementing regulatory policies and developing wastewater

treatment plants.84

Yet the government‘s authority is weak outside of Sanaa, and it lacks

the financial resources to develop desalination plants—facilities that are used by its richer

77 IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Unprecedented Water

Rationing in Cities.‖ 16 August 2009. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85734 78

Intersecretariat Working Group on Environment Statistics, United Nations Statistics Division. Al-Asbahi,

Qahtan Yehya A.M. ―Water Resources Information in Yemen [p. 4].‖ June 2005.

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/envpdf/pap_wasess3a3yemen.pdf 79

IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Unprecedented Water


United Press International. ―Yemen‘s Water Crisis a Mideast Warning.‖ 29 October 2009.

http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2009/10/29/Yemens-water-crisis-a-Mideast-

warning/UPI-52511256844951/ 81

The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Thirsty Plant Dries Out Yemen.‖ 31 October 2009.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/middleeast/01yemen.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 82

Los Angeles Times. Edwards, Haley Sweetland. ―Yemen Water Crisis Builds.‖ 11 October 2009.

http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/11/world/fg-yemen-water11 83

The Christian Science Monitor. Kasinof, Laura. ―At Heart of Yemen‘s Conflicts: Water Crisis.‖ 5

November 2009. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1105/p06s13-wome.html 84


http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/yemen/index.stm

neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia.85

Moreover, it is hard to make water a top priority in a

country beset with so many other problems.86

85 The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Thirsty Plant Dries Out Yemen.‖ 31 October 2009.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/middleeast/01yemen.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 86

National Public Radio. Kenyon, Peter. ―Obscured by War, Water Crisis Looms in Yemen.‖ 20 November

2009. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120619082

Other Issues

Yemen also confronts the related environmental issues of

overgrazing, deforestation, soil erosion and desertification.

Overgrazing of the country‘s limited rangelands has reduced natural

groundcover and placed pressure on remaining pastures.87

The

unsustainable exploitation of woodlands and forests has contributed

to deforestation in the highlands. Many Yemeni households in rural

areas remain reliant on firewood as a source of cooking fuel, making

it difficult to curtail tree loss and rejuvenate forests.88

Soil erosion is

also pronounced in the highlands where some terraces, formerly used

to cultivate food crops, have fallen into disrepair. As a result, they have ceased to serve

―the twin functions of anchoring soil to the mountain sides and storing diverted rainfall

runoff from adjacent non-arable surfaces.‖ 89

In turn, erosion and water scarcity have

contributed to desertification. In 2009, government officials stated that 97% of the

country‘s land suffered from varying degrees of desertification. While the government

has developed strategies to combat the problem, it has been unable to widely or

effectively implement them.90

Lack of funding has been identified as the major obstacle

to doing so. The ongoing degradation of agricultural land is a serious threat to Yemeni

farmers, who comprise more than half the country‘s population.91

In addition, desert

locust infestation has proved a threat to crops.92

Natural Hazards

Yemen is susceptible to a variety of natural hazards. In

recent years, drought has been a common occurrence as

rainfall has decreased and temperatures have risen.

Droughts affect the livelihoods of farmers in particular,

but also contribute to a lack of food security for the

greater population.93

In 2008, drought was so severe in

the northwestern highlands that thousands of residents

87 International Livestock Research Institute. Global Agenda for Livestock Research. E. F. Thomson, et al.

Eds. Ahmed, S.H. ―Yemen Country Paper.‖ 1997.

http://www.ilri.org/infoserv/webpub/fulldocs/wana/Yemen.htm#TopOfPage 88

Country Pasture/Forest Resource Profiles, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Alabsi, Ali Abdulmalek ―Yemen.‖ November 2001.

http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/Counprof/Yemen/yemen.htm 89

International Development Research Centre. ―Projects in Yemen.‖ 1998-2000.

http://www.idrc.ca/awards/ev-83265-201_938604-1-IDRC_ADM_INFO.html 90

Yemen Times. Al-Ghabri, Ismail. ―97% of Yemeni Lands Suffer Desertification, Says Agriculture

Ministry.‖ 12 August 2009. http://www.yementimes.com/DefaultDET.aspx?i=1165&p=local&a=2 91

IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Land Degradation Threatening

Farmers, Says Senior Official.‖ 18 October 2007. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=74843 92

IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Desert Locust Infestation Has

Yet to Be Controlled.‖ 21 August 2007. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=73830 93

ReliefWeb. Yemen Times. Ismail, Salma. ―Drought and Floods in Yemen Affect Food Security.‖ 26

August 2009. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SHIG-7VBEQF?OpenDocument

abandoned their villages and migrated to urban areas.94

Floods periodically occur as a

result of torrential downpours. In 2008, more than 100 people were killed after heavy

rains caused severe flooding.95

Wadi Hadramawt was among the most affected regions,

with thousands of residents displaced by the disaster.96

Sandstorms and dust storms are

occasionally produced by shamal, or northwesterly winds that sweep into the region in

winter and early summer. These potentially dangerous storms can block out the sun, and

cause property damage and the destruction of crops. They also contribute to erosion.97

Yemen‘s location in a geologically active zone—the Great Rift Valley between the

Arabian and African tectonic plates—makes it susceptible to earthquakes and volcanic

activity. Indeed, Yemen and its nearby waters have experienced several major

earthquakes. One of the most well-known occurred in 1982, when a 6.0-magnitude

earthquake struck the Dhamar region of the southern highlands, causing landslides and

extensive ground ruptures.98

The quake killed approximately 3,000 people and devastated

many villages.

Evidence of volcanic activity is widespread in Yemen, including active hot springs and

volcanic vents.99

In 2007, a volcano erupted on the Red Sea island of Jabal al-Tair,

destroying a small Yemeni naval base and killing at least eight.100

Sparked by several

earthquakes, the eruption reportedly caused the western half of the island to collapse into

the sea and covered the eastern half in lava.101

94 IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Drought Displaces Thousands

in Mountainous Northwest.‖ 5 May 2008. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78048 95

CNN.com. ―Yemen Floods Kill ‗at Least 100.‘‖ 28 October 2008.

http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/10/28/yemen.floods/index.html 96

The Boston Globe. Taylor, Alan. ―The Big Picture: Storm-Battered Yemen.‖ 29 October 2008.

http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2008/10/stormbattered_yemen.html 97

Yemen (Cultures of the World). Hestler, Anna. ―Geography: Dust Storms [p. 13].‖ 2000. Tarrytown, NY:

Marshall Cavendish. 98

Earthquake Hazards Program, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior. ―Significant

Earthquakes of the World: 1982.‖ 5 January 2010.

http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqarchives/significant/sig_1982.php 99

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Land: Relief and Drainage.‖ 2010.


IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Red Sea Volcano Still Active,

Say Specialists.‖ 3 October 2007. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=74613 101

Reuters. Ghobari, Mohammed. ―Eight Killed as Volcano Erupts off Yemen.‖ 1 Oct 2007.

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN3020171320071001

History

Introduction

Ancient Yemen was the site of several prosperous and well-

developed cultures that benefited from the region‘s wealth of

frankincense and myrrh.102

The advent of Islam in the seventh

century C.E. profoundly shaped social and political development in

the region. Founded in the late ninth century C.E., the Zaydi

imamate—a Shi‘ite Muslim power—ruled portions of the highlands

for more than 1,000 years.103

Although Yemeni tribes in the interior

have long been relatively autonomous, Yemen was periodically

occupied by foreign powers, most notably the Ottoman Turks and the

British. In the 20th century, two competing states within the region

emerged. North Yemen was ruled under the Zaydi imam from 1918–

1962, and governed as the Yemen Arab Republic from 1962–1990. South Yemen, a

former British protectorate, was administered under the socialist government of the

People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen from 1970–1990. Following intermittent

conflict, the two states merged into the Republic of Yemen in 1990.

Today, Yemen is the only republic on the Arabian Peninsula where monarchies are the

dominant form of government.104

Since unification, a dynastic democracy has emerged in

which relatives of President Ali Abdallah Saleh (who came to power in 1978 and has

won successive elections since the late 1990s) hold key posts. The president‘s son,

Ahmed, is being groomed to succeed him. Critical to Saleh‘s longevity in office has been

his ability to balance various actors--tribes, political parties, the armed forces, and

Islamists--to maintain a stable coalition upon which his authority rests.105

Yet in reality

the government‘s authority is limited, because many parts of the country are under tribal

rule.106

The limitations of the central government are reflected in increased Al Qaeda

attacks, an insurgency in the north, and a resurgent secessionist movement in the south.

102 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: History: The Pre-Islamic Period.‖ 2010.



Ed. ―Chapter 1: Historical Setting: Islam: The Zayids [pp. 27–28].‖ Baynard, Sally Ann, et al. 1986.


Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Prados, Alfred

B. and Jeremy M. Sharp. ―CRS Report for Congress: Yemen: Current Conditions and U.S. Relations [p.

4].‖ 4 January 2007. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21808.pdf 105

Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service. Sharp, Jeremy M. ―CRS Report for

Congress: Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations.‖ 13 January 2010.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf 106

International Relations and Security Network, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of

Technology. Leahy, Elizabeth. ―Yemen: At the ‗Tipping Point.‘‖ No date.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Special-Reports/Demography-and-Development/Case-Study-

Yemen/

These factors have led some experts to conclude that Yemen as a state may be on the

verge of collapse.107

Ancient Kingdoms

Ancient Yemen was home to several kingdoms and city-states,

including those of the Sabaeans (Saba), Qatabans, Hadramis

(Hadramawt), Minaeans (Ma‘in), and Himyarites (Himyar).108

These

cultures, which coexisted and often competed for power, all depended

on trade to generate wealth. Among the most important commodities

were the aromatic resins of myrrh and frankincense, which there was

a nearly insatiable demand for in the ancient world. The trees that

produced these two resins grew almost exclusively in the highlands of

southern Arabia. The resins were greatly prized for their curative

powers and widely used in religious and funerary rites, most notably

as incense.109

In fact, ―[t]here was not a temple or wealthy home in

Babylon, Egypt, Greece, Jerusalem, or Rome [that] did not require these precious resins

to please their gods.‖110

The resins were shipped via camel caravans that traversed the

Arabian Desert.

The largest and most well-known of the early Yemeni kingdoms was that of the

Sabaeans. Archaeologists have approximated the emergence of Sabaean civilization to

the 10th–12th century B.C.E., although the Sabaeans peaked in power several centuries

later. Their most famous ruler was Bilqis, the Queen of Sheba, who is mentioned in the

Bible and in the Quran, the holy book of Islam. Sabaean culture was distinguished by its

architectural achievements, including large temples and monuments.111

It is best known

for the massive Marib Dam, which sources believe was constructed around 750 B.C.E.

and expanded at about 500 B.C.E.112

The dam was not only designed to store water but

also to divert it into a network of irrigation canals. According to some estimates, the

impressively engineered dam helped to irrigate some 10,000 ha (25,000 acres) of

107 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Foreign Policy. Johnsen, Gregory. ―The Well Runs Dry.‖

February 2009. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23061 108

―Pre-Islamic History [pp. 29–32].‖ Daum, Werner. In Insight Guide: Yemen, 2nd Ed. Hans Höfer, Ed.

1992. Singapore: APA Publications. 109

Institute for Traditional Medicine. Dharmananda, Subhuti. ―Myrrh and Frankincense.‖ May 2003.

http://www.itmonline.org/arts/myrrh.htm 110

The Muslim Empire and the Land of Gold. Phillips, Rodney J. ―Chapter 6: Trade with the Nations [p.

45].‖ 2008. New York: AEG Publishing Group. 111

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Saba.‖ 2010.

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/514881/Saba 112

The Hydraulics of Open Channel Flow: An Introduction, 2nd Ed. Chanson, Hubert. ―A Study of the

Marib Dam and Its Sluice System (BC 115 to AD 575) [pp. 533–534].‖ 2004. Oxford, UK: Elsevier

Butterworth-Heinemann.

cropland, enough to support tens of thousands of people.113

Local farmers cultivated

cereal grains such as wheat, barley, and sorghum.

Although irrigated agriculture enabled the population to

expand, trade was the primary source of Sabaean wealth.

Marib, the Sabaean capital, lay on the trail that connected

ports on the Arabian Sea with the desert caravan routes

that reached Mediterranean markets.114

Chinese silk,

African gold and ivory, Persian pearls, and Indian spices

and fabrics were carried via these camel caravans. At the

height of their power near the end of the fifth century

B.C.E., the Sabaeans ruled a federation of regional entities that constituted much of

southern Arabia.115

The Himyarites, a tribe within the Sabaean kingdom, gradually

overtook the Sabaeans and became independent about 115 B.C.E., consolidating control

over much of southern Arabia in the 3rd century C.E.116

They perpetuated Sabaean

culture, and improved and maintained the Marib Dam. Originating from the coast, the

Himyarites were sea traders, and their rise reflected the declining importance of overland

trade. They eventually moved their base to the highlands, where they wielded power until

the sixth century C.E.117

But in the first century C.E., the Romans, who had conquered Egypt, disrupted the south

Arabian economy by encroaching on Red Sea trade routes. By using maritime routes,

they effectively undercut Yemen‘s role as a transit point between Asia and the

Mediterranean. The Romans called south Arabia ―Arabia Felix,‖ or ―happy‖ or

―fortunate‖ Arabia, due to its prosperity and fertile terrain in the highlands.118

Yet the

prosperity of the south Arabian kingdoms was further threatened after the Roman

Emperor Constantine made Christianity the new state religion in 323 C.E. The limited

use of frankincense in Christian churches and a corresponding ban on traditional funerary

rights throughout the empire dealt a major blow to the region‘s economy. Meanwhile,

maritime commerce on the Red Sea sailed past Yemen. Economic insecurity contributed

to the decline of the south Arabian kingdoms, which were then left exposed to foreign

invasion and occupation. The Christian Aksum kingdom (Ethiopia) invaded in the fourth

and early sixth centuries C.E. The latter invasion, which occurred around 525 C.E., was

prompted by the massacre of local Christians by the last Jewish king of the Himyarite

113 Ancient South Arabia: From the Queen of Sheba to the Advent of Islam. Schippmann, Klaus. ―Chapter 2:

The People [p. 10].‖ 2001. Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner Publishers. 114

Nabataean Travel and Trade. ―South Arabia.‖ 2002. http://nabataea.net/sarabia.html 115


Ed. ―Chapter 1: Historical Setting: South Arabia in Pre-Islamic Times [p. 10].‖ Baynard, Sally Ann, et al.

1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 116

―Pre-Islamic History [pp. 33–34].‖ Daum, Werner. In Insight Guide: Yemen, 2nd Ed. Hans Höfer, Ed.

1992. Singapore: APA Publications. 117

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Himyar.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9040502 118

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Arabia Felix.‖ 2010. http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9008151

dynasty.119

The Sassanids of Persia took control of the region in the late sixth century,

after the declining Himyarite kingdom requested their assistance to expel the

Aksumites.120

The Advent of Islam

The Islamic era began in the seventh century. The potent

spread of the Muslim faith from Mecca and Medina in

neighboring Al Hijaz (the Hejaz), now part of Saudi

Arabia, resulted in a rapid assimilation of Yemenis.121

This wholesale conversion has been connected, in part, to

the rupture of the Marib Dam in the sixth century, which

marked the end of Yemen‘s ancient trading kingdoms.

The Quran states that the dam broke because people had

not given sufficient thanks to Allah. A Yemeni tale attributes the breach to burrowing

rodents. Regardless, it forced an exodus of farmers who lost the means to sustain

themselves, amid a period of great economic insecurity.122

Entire tribes migrated north to

Syria. More than 20,000 Yemenis joined the armies of Islam, which succeeded in

creating an empire from Spain to India.123

As Yemen was absorbed into the Islamic world, it fell under the control of various

Muslim caliphs in the Arabian Peninsula. The Damascus-based Umayyad dynasty, which

ruled from the latter part of the seventh century, was followed by the Baghdad-based

Abbasid caliphs in the early eighth century. Indigenous dynasties then emerged. In the

late ninth century, the Zaydi imamate was established in the far north of Yemen and

became deeply rooted in towns and villages in the northern highlands. The imamate was

a theocracy that followed a branch of Shi‘a Islam.124

A Sunni Muslim dynasty founded by the Rasulids repeatedly skirmished with the Zaydis

in order to counter their spreading influence. The Rasulids are thought by some to have

been professional soldiers who broke from the Egyptian Ayyubid dynasty in 1229 to

119 Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,

Ed. ―Chapter 1: Historical Setting: South Arabia in Pre-Islamic Times [pp. 10–12].‖ Baynard, Sally Ann, et

al. 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 120

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: History: The Pre-Islamic Period.‖ 2010.


College of Arts and Sciences, New Mexico State University. ―Ancient Yemen.‖ No date.

http://www.cs.nmsu.edu/~fmohamed/ancient-ye.html 122

Saudi Arabia World. ―A Dam at Madrib.‖ March/April 1978.

http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/197802/a.dam.at.marib.htm 123

Yemen in Pictures. DiPiazza, Francesca Davis. ―Chapter 3: History and Government [pp. 23–24].‖ 2007

Brookfield, CT: Twenty-First Century Books. 124

Shi‘a Muslims believe imams are descendents of the Prophet Muhammad and are therefore privy to the

thinking of Allah. Suite101.com. Gamso, Jonas. ―The Divisions of Islam.‖ 13 September 2007.

http://islamic-history.suite101.com/article.cfm/the_divisions_of_islam

establish their own sultanate.125

They took control of the coastal regions and the southern

uplands, where they reinforced the influence of the Shafi‘i school of Islam. Initially based

in Aden, the Rasulids controlled international trade through the Red Sea. This gave them

prestige in the Muslim world and in all states that traded in the region.126

Their capital,

later located at Ta‘izz, became well-known for its diverse artistic and intellectual

achievements, which were modeled on the Ayyubid ideal of a cultivated and learned

ruler.

Because of the mix of dynasties, three legal traditions co-

existed in Yemen—each of which developed its own

administrative bureaucracy. The northern Shari‘a courts

dispensed justice based on Zaydi jurisprudence while, in

the south, a class of Sunni sayyids (descendants of the

Prophet Muhammad) adhered to the Shafi‘i school of

Shari‘a law. In the hinterland, customary law (urf)

provided the framework by which tribal shaykhs

governed.127

This meant there was no agreement on a uniform code of justice or use of

force.

By the 15th century, the Rasulid dynasty was in decline. In the early 16th century,

Portuguese naval ships attempted to blockade the Red Sea trade routes but failed to take

the city of Aden. The Ottomans, in control of Egypt at the northern end of the Red Sea,

found it necessary to defend Yemen at the southern end against the Portuguese. The

Ottomans established their Yemeni base in the coastal town of Mocha (Al Mukha), from

which a thriving trade in coffee was conducted. Mocha replaced Aden as the area‘s chief

port. Ottoman authority was limited to cities, leaving the Zaydi imamate’s authority over

tribal areas undisturbed.128

The highlands, where myrrh and frankincense had been

cultivated, remained economically isolated from the world from the mid 17th century to

almost the mid 19th century.

The British wrested control of Aden from a local sultan in 1842.129

In the mid 19th

century, the Ottomans regained control of parts of northern Yemen. The Ottomans had

relied primarily on land to accumulate wealth, whereas British imperial wealth was

125 Ibn 'Arabi in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam. Kynsh,

Alexander D. ―Chapter 9: Ibn ‗Arabi in Yemen [pp. 227, 229].‖ 1999. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 126

Islamic Dynasties of the Arab East: State and Civilization During the Later Medieval Times. ―Chapter 4:

The Rasulids of Yemen (1229–1454) [p. 83].‖ 1996. New Delhi, India: MD Publications Pvt. Ltd. 127

The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East. Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz. ―Chapter 3:

Taxation and Economic Fragmentation [p. 106].‖ 1997. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 128

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State. ―Background Note: Yemen.‖ November

1995. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/nea/yemen9511.html 129

Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia. Carapico, Sheila.

―Chapter 2: Twentieth-Century States and Economies [p. 23].‖ 1998. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

University Press.

contingent on the control of shipping lanes.130

To this end, the British rebuilt the entire

seafront around Aden. They successfully warded off the Ottomans. Beginning in 1886,

Treaties of Protection were negotiated. This included an agreement between the British

and a local leader that placed nine tribes under British protection in which he pledged not

to alienate any of the territory to a rival foreign power without the crown‘s permission.

Subsequently the two imperial powers reached agreement to recognize each other‘s

territorial claims.131

Competing States

North Yemen

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Imam Yahya,

leader of the Zaydi community, took power in the north and

established a Zaydi government. The prominent northern tribal

confederations, the Hashid and the Bakil, supported the new

government. But the imams were unable to break the power of the

tribal shaykhs, and resorted to playing the tribes against each other to

maintain their power. Opposition to the imamate was centered in the

Shafi‘i community, where merchants chafed against the tax burden

imposed upon them and collected by Zaydi soldiers.

By the mid 1940s, opposition to Yahya‘s rule had widened to other

major elements of the population. Among them were Zaydis who

objected to the remote nature of the imperial government, which was staffed by officials

who seemed oblivious to Zaydi concerns. In 1948, Yahya was assassinated in a palace

coup, and opposition forces immediately seized power. His son Ahmad eventually

succeeded him and remained in power until his death in 1962. Imam Ahmad‘s reign was

marked by growing repression and renewed friction with the British over their presence

in the south. During this time, the imamate also faced increasing pressure, from both

domestic and regional sources, to support the Arab nationalist objectives of Egyptian

President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser represented a post-colonial alternative type of

leadership in the Arab world, bound together by language and religion, which proved

unsettling to traditional monarchical regimes in the region.132

From 1958 to 1961, North Yemen joined with Egypt and Syria to form the United Arab

States.133

Imam Ahmad‘s son Badr assumed power but his reign lasted only 1 week. He

130 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 27, No. 2. Khoury, Dina Rizk and

Dane Kennedy. ―Comparing Empires: The Ottoman Domains and the British Raj in the Long Nineteenth

Century.‖ 2007. http://cssaame.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/27/2/233.pdf 131

A History of Modern Yemen. Dresch, Paul. ―Chapter 1: Turkey, Britain and Imam Yahya: The Years

Around 1990 [p. 10].‖ 2000. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 132

The Wilson Quarterly. Ottaway, David. ―The Arab Tomorrow.‖ Winter 2010.

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=wq.essay&essay_id=603733 133

Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ August 2008.


was removed via a military coup whereupon he fled to Saudi Arabia, which did not want

another Arab nationalist regime, particularly one on its border. Yet this is exactly what

the group of young officers that overthrew the imamate had in mind: a senior military

leader to serve as figurehead, just as General Mohammad Neguib had done for President

Nasser in Egypt.134

Colonel (later Marshal) Abdullah al-Sallal was selected to lead the

newly named Yemen Arab Republic (YAR); he became both the president and prime

minister.

Civil war ensued between remnant supporters of the imamate, who received material

support from Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and republicans, who were bolstered by Egyptian

troops—as many as 85,000, according to some estimates.135

The conflict was later

referred to as ―Nasser‘s Vietnam.‖136

Neither side exercised effective control over much

of the country. Both attempted to court the support of tribes by providing guns and

money. Egyptian troops withdrew in 1967 and, by 1968, following a siege of Sanaa by

supporters of the imamate, Sallal was deposed and most of the opposing forces had been

reconciled. A negotiated settlement followed in 1970. Yet the prolonged war left the

tribal shaykhs more firmly in control of their domains, and enhanced their role in national

politics.137

South Yemen

Aden was governed as part of British India until 1937, when it

became a crown colony; the surrounding territory was designated a

protectorate. By 1965, Aden and most of the tribal states within the

protectorate had merged to form the British-sponsored Federation of

South Arabia. Anti-colonial resistance, active since the 1940s,

resulted in several failed coups.138

Each failure further radicalized

those opposed to colonial rule. After the establishment of the

federation, two rival communist groups—the Marxist National

Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied

South Yemen (FLOSY)—fought for power. By August 1967, the

NLF was in control of most areas. The federation had formally

collapsed by summer‘s end. The last British troops were withdrawn on 29 November,

134 The Independent. Bidwell, Robin. ―Obituary: Abdullah Sallal.‖ 18 March 1994.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-abdullah-sallal-1429912.html 135

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Pelletiere, Stephen C. ―Yemen and Stability in the

Persian Gulf: Confronting the Threat from Within [p. 12].‖ 22 May 1996.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub194.pdf 136

Cold War Studies Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science. Wieland, Alexander

R. ―At Odds in ‗Arabia Infelix‘: Anglo-American Relations and the Yemeni Revolution, September 1962–

February 1963.‖ 2009. http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/workingPapers/wieland.pdf 137

Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influences. Gause, F. Gregory. ―Chapter 2:

Social Structure and the State in the Yemen Arab Republic [p. 22].‖ 1990. New York: Columbia University

Press. 138

The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East. Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz. ―Chapter 3:

Taxation and Economic Fragmentation [p. 123].‖ 1997. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

after a Labour Party-led government decided that the commitment was too expensive to

maintain. The next day, 30 November 1967, the People‘s Republic of Yemen, comprising

Aden and South Arabia, was established. In June 1969, a radical wing of the NLF gained

power. The Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) became the only legal party and the country‘s

name changed to the People‘s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) on 1 December

1970.

Road to Reconciliation

By 1972, the respective governments of North and South Yemen were in open conflict,

and each side had outside backers. The YAR received aid from Saudi Arabia, while the

PDRY, the lone Marxist state in the region, received arms from the Soviet Union. The

Arab League brokered a cease-fire and both sides agreed to forge a united Yemen within

18 months, yet the union did not materialize. In both countries, large contingents of the

national armies occasionally dissolved when soldiers went on leave with their

weapons.139

In both countries, tribal loyalties to the leadership often proved fleeting, and the ensuing

years were plagued by continued unrest and conflict, which culminated in the

assassination of the YAR president in June 1978. A month later, Lieutenant Colonel Ali

Abdallah Saleh, head of the General People‘s Congress (GPC), was elected to replace

him by the Constituent People‘s Assembly. Fighting renewed in early 1979, but in March

the two heads of state signed an agreement in Kuwait reiterating their commitment to

unification. In May 1988, the governments of the YAR and PDRY agreed to withdraw

troops from their mutual border and establish a demilitarized zone to ease border

crossings. In May 1990, they settled on a draft unity constitution, which was approved by

referendum the next year.

Unified Yemen

The Republic of Yemen (RY) was officially established

on 22 May 1990. Despite the milestone, it was not

universally viewed as a turning point. Prior to unification,

South Yemen‘s government was disintegrating and on the

verge of losing its primary patron, the Soviet Union—

which was itself in the process of dismantling. South

Yemen‘s socialist government had not permitted private

enterprise, which had compelled huge numbers of

citizens to seek work abroad.140

The remittances from workers who had been sent to

Eastern Bloc countries had been critical to the economy, but were drying up.141

As a

139 Asia Times. Zunes, Stephen. ―Yemen Left with Little Wiggle Room.‖ 13 January 2010.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LA13Ak05.html 140

Eternal Yemen. ―History of Yemen.‖ No date. http://www.eternal-yemen.com/history.htm 141

Yemen in the 1990s: From Unification to Economic Reform. Enders, Klaus, et al. ―Chapter II: External

Environment: Politics, Oil, and Debt.‖ 2002. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

scholar observed several years later, ―[I]n contrast with Germany, [the two Yemens‘]

marriage was more merger than takeover‖ between two quasi-functioning

governments.142

Saleh moved into the presidency; Ali Salim al Baydh, secretary general

of the Central Committee of the YSP, was named vice president; and PDRY President al

Attas was named prime minister. Al Attas led a transitional coalition Council of Ministers

whose membership was divided between the GPC and the YSP.

From late 1991 through early 1992, the newly unified country experienced unrest as a

result of deteriorating economic conditions. The situation was exacerbated by the return

of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States who

were deported after the new government supported Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of

Kuwait. Nevertheless, previously planned legislative elections were held in early 1993. In

August, Vice President al Baydh embarked on a self-imposed exile to Aden, alleging that

the south had been marginalized by the elections, which gave the YSP only 69 out of 301

parliamentary seats.143

Moreover, southerners were unable to secure their share of

government jobs due to the relocation of government departments to the north. Power-

sharing broke down and, by May 1994, the country had fallen into civil war. International

efforts to broker a cease-fire proved unsuccessful.

On 21 May 1994, al Baydh and other leaders of the

former South Yemen declared secession and the

establishment of a new Democratic Republic of Yemen,

with its capital at Aden. But the new republic was not

recognized internationally. The ensuing combat took

place mostly in the south, despite air and missile attacks

against northern targets.144

The civil war ended on 7 July

1994, when President Saleh‘s troops captured Aden. In

August, Saleh unveiled a reorganization program to preclude another secession

movement. Party membership was prohibited from then on for members of the armed

forces. This was intended to undercut the strength of the southern military units that were

still loyal to the YSP. Universal suffrage was also introduced. Saleh was reelected to

another presidential term in October. He named GPC members to key cabinet posts and

gave several ministerial posts to members of the Yemeni Islah Party (YIP), which had

supported him during the civil war.145

142 Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford. Ismail, Sharif. ―Unification in Yemen: Dynamics of

Political Integration, 1978–2000 [p. 12].‖ 2008. http://users.ox.ac.uk/~metheses/Ismail%20Thesis.pdf 143

Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Zimmerman,

Katherine. ―Yemen‘s Southern Challenge: Background on the Rising Threat of Secessionism.‖ 5 November

2009. http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemens-southern-challenge-background-rising-threat-

secessionism 144

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State. ―Background Note: Yemen.‖ January 2010.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35836.htm 145



It was only after the war that the government turned to urgent economic reforms that had

been postponed since unification. A large debt that the south owed to the former Soviet

Union, along with high deficits, required the government to cut spending. The price of

fuel doubled and the government withdrew food subsidies. Access to water and

electricity diminished. This prompted public demonstrations that the government failed to

address with a coordinated response. The YIP could not find common ground with the

GPC over reforms that had been mandated by the World Bank. In parliamentary elections

in April 1997, the GPC won 187 seats and the YIP only 53 seats.146

A new Council of

Ministers, comprised primarily of GPC members, was named in May. In September

1999, the country‘s first direct presidential election was held. Saleh was reelected to

another 5-year term by an overwhelming margin. Constitutional amendments adopted in

2000 extended his term by 2 years. Yet the security situation continued to deteriorate, and

there were several well-publicized abductions of foreign tourists by Islamic

fundamentalists.

In 2004, the Houthis, a Zaydi-led rebel group in the Sa‘ada governorate of northwest

Yemen, launched an insurgency against the Yemeni National Army. The sustained

conflict has involved several periods of fighting and occasional cease-fires.147

Although

the Houthis have lacked a coherent agenda, they claim to be defending Zaydi Islam from

the central government, which they perceive as ―too dependent on its northern neighbor,

Saudi Arabia, and its partner in the war on terrorism, the United States.‖148

Some tribal

leaders who are disinterested parties to the conflict have nonetheless thrown their support

behind the Houthis, as a means of reducing central government influence in their areas.149

146 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ August 2008.

http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Yemen.pdf 147


Congress: Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations [pp. 1–17].‖ 13 January 2010.


Foreign Affairs. Hiltermann, Joost R. ―Disorder on the Border: Saudi Arabia‘s War inside Yemen.‖ 16

December 2009. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65730/joost-r-hiltermann/disorder-on-the-border 149

The Jamestown Foundation. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 12. Overton, Shaun. ―Understanding the

Second Houthi Rebellion in Yemen.‖ 17 June 2005.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=508

Recent Developments

Saleh was reelected in September 2006, in an election considered fair

by outside observers.150

Yet he has filled important positions with

family members. For example, three nephews (by his late older

brother) serve as the deputy director for national security, head of the

central security forces and the counterterrorism unit, and head of the

Presidential Guard.151

His half-brother is head of the air force. He is

positioning his son Ahmed, currently the head of the elite Republican

Guard (modeled on that created in Iraq by the late Saddam Hussein),

to succeed him as president.152

His style of governance relies on the

age-old system of informal bargaining to balance competing interests.

In short, the provision of services and patronage jobs is used to exact

compliance and loyalty from local actors.153

As a journalist observed,

―The aim of a ruler in Saleh‘s position is less to accomplish great things than to rule for a

long time and then die peacefully in bed.‖154

Knowing that the squeaky wheel gets the grease, tribal leaders resort to such actions as

kidnapping visitors to wrest concessions from the government. Yet ―these appear to be

integral and accepted parts of Yemen‘s political equation rather than threats to it.‖155

In

one incident, a Chinese engineer was kidnapped by a beekeeping tribe that had been

raided by the police. The foreign national was abducted to bring attention to the fact that

the hives‘ owners had not been compensated for damages

done by the police.156

There are signs that the system is breaking. Parliamentary

elections scheduled for April 2009 were postponed after

the Joint Meeting Party (JMP), an alliance of opposition

parties and the only competitor to the GPC, threatened to

150 National Democratic Institute. ―Yemen.‖ No date. http://www.ndi.org/yemen

151 The New York Times. Erlanger, Steven. ―In Yemen, U.S. Faces Leader Who Puts Family First.‖ 4

January 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/world/middleeast/05saleh.html?hp 152

Al Bab. School of Oriental and African Studies. Daair, Omar. ―Authoritarian Rule in a Plural Society:

The Republic of Yemen.‖ MSc dissertation. September 2001. http://www.al-

bab.com/yemen/pol/daair1.htm#SALEH 153

The Majalla. Heydemann, Steven. ―Saleh‘s Tipping Point.‖ 11 December 2009.

http://www.majalla.com/en/geopolitics/article11920.ece 154

The Atlantic. Kaplan, Robert D. ―A Tale of Two Colonies.‖ April 2003.

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200304/kaplan 155

International Crisis Group. Middle East Report, No. 86. ―Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb [p.

7].‖ 27 May 2009.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/86_yemen___def

using_the_saada_time_bomb.pdf 156

Independent. Cockburn, Patrick. ―Threats to Yemen Prove US Has Not Learned from History.‖ 31

December 2009. http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/threats-to-yemen-prove-us-has-not-learned-

from-history-1994696.html

boycott them—casting doubt on their legitimacy.157

The JMP perceived the rollback of

elections until 2011 as a victory that provides time to implement electoral reforms for

leveling the playing field.158

Yet discontent has moved far beyond the point where

campaign promises are enough to placate the population. Moreover, the government‘s

ability to buy off opponents is increasingly in question as Yemen runs out of oil, which

provides 70% of the budget. Oil revenues of USD 4.2 billion for January through October

of 2008 plummeted to USD 1.5 billion for the same period in 2009.159

Over half of all

Yemenis are farmers, yet water scarcity and soil nutrient depletion—due largely to the

extensive cultivation of qat—threaten their livelihood.160

In the former South Yemen,

which claims most of the country‘s oil, a secessionist group known as the ―southern

mobility movement‖ (al-harakat al-janubiyya) formed in 2007 to support demands from

southern military officers who complained of discriminatory pension differentials.161

Western governments, particularly the U.S., have watched this breakdown in

governmental authority with mounting concern, given the ability of terrorist groups to

operate in failed states and the known presence of Al Qaeda in Yemen. Other observers,

such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have focused on the government‘s use

of lethal force to silence its critics in the north and the south. The government has made

its intentions clear by naming a 2009 campaign in the Houthi conflict (also known as the

Sa‘ada War) as ―Operation Scorched Earth.‖162

The conflict in Sa‘ada has also been

referred to as ―Yemen‘s Darfur‖ due to alleged government efforts to prevent food and

medical aid from reaching civilians.163

The Saleh government does not allow foreign

reporters into the area to investigate allegations. Saleh‘s inability to put down this

rebellion in the north has emboldened southern secessionists.164

In early 2010, yet another

157 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Arab Reform Bulletin. Johnsen, Gregory. ―Yemen:

Electoral Game of Chicken.‖ February 2009.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=downloadArticlePDF&article=22699 158

The Middle East Institute. Middle East Institute Viewpoints, No. 11. Phillips, Sarah. ―Politics in a

Vacuum: The Yemeni Opposition‘s Dilemma.‖ June 2009.

https://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/Yemen.pdf 159

Real Clear World. Associated Press. Keath, Lee. ―US Takes Risk on Yemen President to Fight al-

Qaida.‖ 4 January 2010.

http://www.realclearworld.com/news/ap/international/2010/Jan/04/us_takes_risk_on_yemen_president_to_

fight_al_qaida.html 160

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 6. Fakir, Intissar.

―Yemen: Economic and Regional Challenges.‖ July 2008.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/fakir2.pdf 161

Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Zimmerman,

Katherine. ―Yemen‘s Southern Challenge: Background on the Rising Threat of Secessionism.‖ 5 November

2009. http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemens-southern-challenge-background-rising-threat-

secessionism 162

The National. Johnsen, Gregory D. ―The Sixth War.‖ 12 November 2009.

http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091112/REVIEW/711129992/1008/ART 163

Wordpress. Jane Novak‘s Yemen Articles. Novak, Jane. ―Aid Won‘t Fix the Crisis in Yemen.‖ 27 July

2009. http://janenovak.wordpress.com/2009/07/27/aid-wont-fix-crisis-in-yemen/ 164

Christian Science Monitor. Kasinof, Laura. ―Yemen Used Lethal Force to Quell Southern Secession

Protests, Says Report.‖ 15 December 2009. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-

East/2009/1215/Yemen-used-lethal-force-to-quell-southern-secession-protests-says-report

cease-fire in the northern conflict led Saleh to declare the war over, despite the fact that

several previous truces had failed. Observers postulated that the truce was unlikely to

persist, due to the failure to resolve the problems underlying the conflict.165

While the southern movement cannot yet be characterized as an insurgency, unrest on

two fronts may force the regime to focus on survival at all costs rather than the ―war on

terror.‖ Some argue that Western aid should focus on economic development, because a

higher standard of living would stabilize the country more effectively than military

assistance that Saleh could use against his enemies.166

The U.S. intends to provide USD

63 million in development aid to Yemen in 2010, up from USD 40.3 million in 2009 and

USD 8.4 million in 2008.167

Yet the government of Yemen has had little means to absorb

and account for past aid, which typically fueled patronage networks and corruption. As

Francis Fukuyama, a well-known political economist, observed, ―The international

community knows how to supply government services [e.g., medicine], what it knows

much less well is how to create self-sustaining indigenous institutions [e.g., healthcare

clinics].‖ 168

165 The New York Times. Reuters. ―Yemen Declares End to War with Shi‘ite Rebels.‖ 19 March 2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/03/19/world/international-us-yemen.html 166

International Affairs Review. McGee, Ron. ―Yemen: The U.S. Partnership‘s Flawed Approach.‖ 15

February 2010. http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/137 167

IPS News. Fromm, Charles. ―Yemen: US Poised to Increase Aid.‖ 6 January 2010.

http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49896 168

State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Fukuyama, Francis. ―Chapter 1: The

Missing Dimensions of Stateness [p. 42].‖ 2004. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Economy

Introduction

Yemen is the poorest nation in the Arab world, with unemployment

estimated at 35%.169

The country‘s population growth rate of 2.9%

(average 2005–2010) is one of the highest in the world.170

Job

creation is therefore an urgent priority because the population of 23.6

million is expected to double over the next two decades.171

Yemen

was historically a source of labor for surrounding countries, as well

as for Eastern Europe before the Soviet Union was disbanded. The

fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 eliminated the need for migrant

laborers in Eastern Europe where socialism had created an artificial

labor shortage.172

South Yemeni nationals were forced to return to a

country that had become dependent on their remitted wages. This

contributed to economic insecurity in the south, which played a role in the reunification

of North and South Yemen in 1990. Soon, the newly unified government backed Iraq‘s

invasion of Kuwait, an unpopular move with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, which

retaliated by expelling Yemeni workers.173

It is estimated that within a few months some

880,000 people were repatriated to Yemen.174

In most cases they had no land to return to

or much chance of replicating the standard of living that they had achieved abroad.

Official channels that would allow Yemenis to again seek work in those neighboring

countries have never been re-opened.175

Nor is there any prospect for Yemenis to work in

Europe legally.

Yemen is the first country with a democratically elected government on the Arabian

Peninsula. The longstanding Yemeni social contract, in which citizens legitimize the

government in exchange for a modest social safety net, has eroded under the weight of

169 Counterterrorism Blog. Winer, Jonathan. ―Testing a Dangerous Yemen.‖ 1 January 2010.

http://counterterrorismblog.org/2010/01/testing_a_dangerous_yemen.php 170

United Nations Population Fund. State of the World Population 2009: Facing a Changing World:

Women, Population and Climate. ―Demographic, Social and Economic Indicators [p. 90].‖ 2009.

http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2009/en/pdf/EN_SOWP09.pdf 171

Counterterrorism Blog. Winer, Jonathan. ―Testing a Dangerous Yemen.‖ 1 January 2010.

http://counterterrorismblog.org/2010/01/testing_a_dangerous_yemen.php 172

Citizens of the former socialist bloc countries were assigned jobs and received generous social welfare

benefits. Since it was difficult to place anyone in an undesirable manual labor job, migrants from poorer

socialist countries were brought in to fill those positions. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, citizens had to

take any job they could in the transition to capitalism. Migrants represented competition and were sent

home. 173

The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East. Chaudry, Kiren Aziz. ―Chapter 7:

Beyond the Paradox of Autonomy [p. 302].‖ 1997. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 174

Yemen into the Twenty-First Century: Continuity and Change. Mahdi, Kamil et al. ―Chapter 3: Political

and Economic Realities of Labor Migration in Yemen [p. 69].‖ 2007. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. 175

Guardian. Black, Ian. ―Yemen: Discontent and Poverty Simmer in West‘s New Frontier Against Al-

Qaida.‖ 24 January 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/24/yemen-al-qaida-terror-threat

population growth and declining oil revenues.176

During the first 10 months of 2009, oil

revenues garnered USD 1.5 billion, down nearly two-thirds from the USD 4.2 billion

earned over the same period during 2008.177

The capital-intensive nature of the oil

industry does not translate into job creation commensurate with growth of per capita

GDP.178

In other words, although oil production brings wealth to the country, the

revenues are not equitably distributed as either government services or income from

industry-related jobs. Moreover, Yemen‘s oil is predicted to run out by 2017, and the

government has few sustainable post-oil options to create growth.179

Having operated as a

rentier state, in which the revenues that fill state coffers overwhelmingly originate

abroad, the government is now hard-pressed to create a domestic economy from which it

can generate tax revenues.180

Hydrocarbons

Oil

Oil was discovered in commercial quantities in Yemen in

1984.181

The oil is situated in what was formerly South

Yemen, while the government that collects the revenues

has its capital in Sanaa, in what was North Yemen.182

In

contrast to much of the rest of the oil-producing Middle

East, petroleum extraction in Yemen is heavily reliant on

foreign firms.183

Oil reserves have been divided into 97

onshore and offshore exploration and production blocks,

176 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Nakhleh, Emile. ―Testimony on Yemen and Al-Qa‘ida:

Turmoil in Yemen: How Understanding the Challenges Can Help Us Undermine al-Qa‘ida and the Radical

Paradigm [p. 3].‖ 20 January 2010.

http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2010/NakhlehTestimony100120a.pdf 177

Real Clear World. Associated Press. Keath, Lee. ―US Takes Risk on Yemen President to Fight al-

Qaida.‖ 4 January 2010.

http://www.realclearworld.com/news/ap/international/2010/Jan/04/us_takes_risk_on_yemen_president_to_

fight_al_qaida.html 178

Global Security. Pike, John. ―Oil.‖ 3 January 2010.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/yemen/oil.htm 179

Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Boucek, Christopher. ―Yemen:

Avoiding a Downward Spiral [p. 5].‖ September 2009.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_downward_spiral.pdf 180

Religion and Politics: Islam and Muslim Civilization, 2nd Ed.. Lane, Jan-Erik and Hamadi Redissi.

―Chapter 9: The Modernization of Arabia. [p. 139].‖ 2009. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing. 181

Adelphi Energy Limited. ―The Republic of Yemen and its Oil and Gas Industry [p. 4].‖ July 2005.

http://www.adelphienergy.com.au/projects/documents/Yemen%20Country%20Summary%20July%202005

.pdf 182

Global Research. Engdahl, F. William. ―The Yemen Hidden Agenda: Behind the Al-Qaeda Scenarios, A

Strategic Oil Transit Chokepoint.‖ January 2010.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?aid=16786&context=va 183

Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen [p. 10].‖ August 2008.


only 12 of which actually produce oil.184

After security issues compelled several major

international oil companies to withdraw in the mid- to late-1990s, the government

identified smaller, independent oil companies as potential partners for Production Sharing

Agreements (PSA). A number of state-owned companies are also involved, but all

companies report to the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources (MOMR). It is

responsible for initiating contracts with foreign oil companies, although parliamentary

approval is still required.185

Oil production in Yemen dropped to 300,000 barrels per day

(bpd) in 2008 after peaking at 457,000 bpd in 2002. Analysts anticipate that Yemen will

become a net oil importer by 2011.186

This does not bode well for the future given the

country‘s heavy dependence on oil, which accounts for approximately 70–75% of

revenues and 90% of export earnings.187

Natural Gas

Yemen has approximately 479 billion cubic m (16.9

trillion cubic ft) of proven natural gas reserves.188

Yemen‘s late entry into the natural gas industry enabled

the country to bypass the earlier pipeline dependent stage,

in which gas could not be easily redirected outside of

established pathways to new markets. This was the case

in landlocked Central Asia, where the expensive and

time-intensive construction of new pipelines was required

to increase export options and volume. Now, newer technologies make it possible for

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to be shipped by truck or ship to any end market, making

pipelines less important. In July 2005, after significant delays, the Yemeni government

approved contracts to supply LNG in partnership with Total Oil (a French company),

Hunt Oil, and various South Korean firms. In November 2009, Yemen joined the ranks of

LNG exporters. Yet the global recession has reduced demand for energy, resulting in

declining prices.189

Moreover, there is a high opportunity cost to international sales.190

Yemen‘s natural gas

could alternately be used to augment domestic electrical generation and distribution

184 Middle East Program, Carnegie International Endowment of Peace. Boucek, Christopher. ―Yemen:

Avoiding a Downward Spiral [p. 4].‖ September 2009.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_downward_spiral.pdf 185

Oil and Gas Directory Middle East. ―Republic of Yemen: Research Profile.‖ 2009.

http://www.oilandgasdirectory.com/2009/research/Yemen.pdf 186

Reuters. Fuchs, Martina. ―Analysis—Gas Probably Not Enough to Buoy Yemen.‖ 24 August 2009.

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLL63161320090824 187

Energy Bulletin. ASPO-USA. Andrews, Steve. ―Yemen‘s Oil-Deadly Decline Rate.‖ 18 January 2010.

http://www.energybulletin.net/node/51227 188

U.S. Energy Information Administration. ―Country Analysis Briefs: Yemen: Natural Gas.‖ March 2010.

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Yemen/NaturalGas.html 189

Stratfor Global Intelligence. ―The LNG Trade: A Surge of Supply with Few Buyers.‖ 30 March 2009.

http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/134594/analysis/20090328_lng_trade_surge_supply_few_buyers 190

When economists use the term ―opportunity cost,‖ they are referring to the value of the activity which a

resource is not spend on. If, for example, you decide to spend an afternoon and your remaining disposable

capacity, to better meet internal needs. Less than one third of Yemeni households have

access to electricity from the national grid. Desalinization of water, which has been

proposed as a means to increase the country‘s dwindling water supply, would require

substantial electricity. With the government selling 90% of the country‘s energy reserves

(under conditions that are not fully transparent), energy will have to be imported to meet

rising domestic demand. As an American blogger who writes on Yemeni affairs

observed, ―Twenty years of oil production in Yemen have done little to raise the standard

of living for the Yemeni people. The coming 20 years of gas production may do little

more.‖191

Agriculture

Yemen was historically self-sufficient in food production.

Terrace cultivation has been employed for 3,000 years,

enabling farmers to catch rainwater on slopes and to

control soil fertility.192

During the 1960s, cheap grain

began to flood the country, making food crop cultivation

unprofitable while, simultaneously, jobs in oil-rich

neighboring countries attracted labor migrants. Many

terraced slopes fell into disrepair and suffered soil

erosion. Despite this, today over half the population remains engaged in agriculture and

animal husbandry.193

The low profits and wages generated through farming, coupled with

population growth, contribute to underemployment and poverty. Much of the country‘s

limited fertile land has been planted with cash crops, which are more lucrative than

subsistence food crops. The major cash crop is qat (Catha edulis), a shrub whose leaves

are chewed as a mild stimulant. It requires much less labor than coffee, another important

cash crop, but it is water-intensive and thus heavily reliant on irrigation. Motorized

pumps were introduced in the 1970s, enabling farmers to extract water from underground

aquifers much faster than it could be naturally replenished. Although the pumps were

outlawed in 2002, they remain in use.194

Most Yemeni men and many women chew qat on a daily basis, often in the afternoon in a

communal setting. It is grown at elevations above 1,000 m (3,281 ft). Harvested leaves

have a shelf-life of only 24 to 48 hours and therefore must be marketed quickly, in a

country not otherwise known for efficient distribution. As an agronomist observed, ―the

income to go to the movies, you cannot spend that money to go to a restaurant for a meal or allocate the

time to read a book. The Concise History of Economics. Henderson, David. ―Opportunity Cost.‖ 2008.

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OpportunityCost.html 191

Wordpress.com. Jane Novak‘s Yemen Articles. Novak, Jane. ―Yemen‘s Natural Gas: Who Benefits?‖ 7

August 2006. http://janenovak.wordpress.com/2006/08/07/yemens-natural-gas-who-benefits/ 192

Soil and Water Conservation Society. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, Vol. 42, No. 1. Vogel,

Horst. ―Terrace Farming in Yemen.‖ 1987. http://www.jswconline.org/content/42/1/18.extract 193

Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Republic of Yemen. ―Sector Background Info.‖ No

date. http://www.mpic-yemen.org/new1/strategies.asp?contantmain=6&key=17&stratigy=67 194


http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/middleeast/01yemen.html

transportation and distribution of qat around Yemen…might well rival in efficacy the

ancient frankincense trade routes on which the Yemeni kingdoms thrived in past

times.‖195

Yemenis purchase their leaves at the local market around midday. The

afternoon qat chew ritual has the effect of ending the work day.

Qat consumption not only disrupts work and carries adverse health affects such as oral

cancer, qat production has serious environmental implications for the country. It accounts

for approximately 40% of the country‘s annual water use while water supplies are rapidly

diminishing.196

Yet cultivation and distribution of qat employ approximately 14% of the

population. Banning the use of qat would have serious economic implications in a

country where jobs are already scarce.197

In fact, the government indirectly subsidizes the

cultivation of qat through low-cost diesel fuel used to extract water and provide daily

marketing transportation.198

Finally, Yemenis, including government officials, generally

do not consider qat to be a harmful drug.199

It is illegal in the U.S., where it is a

controlled substance.200

The expanded cultivation of qat at the expense of food crops has contributed to severe

food insecurity in Yemen. Drought and conflict are also responsible for food shortages.

Although much of the Yemeni population works in agriculture, the majority of Yemen‘s

food supply is imported, due to insufficient domestic food production and the availability

of grain which has been subsidized through farm supports by industrialized countries on

the international market. In 2008, 95% of cereals and 85% of other food stuffs were

imported.201

Even most rural households are net food buyers rather than sellers. High

prices for food imports often prevent poor families from purchasing other necessary

supplies since they have little cash income.202

Manufacturing

Aside from oil refining, almost all manufacturing businesses in

Yemen are small-scale operations with one to four employees. They

195 College of Agriculture, University of Arizona. Development. Milich, Leonard and Mohammed Al-

Sabbry. ―The ‗Rational Peasant‘ vs. Sustainable Livelihoods: The Case of Qat in Yemen.‖ 1995.

http://ag.arizona.edu/~lmilich/yemen.html 196



Financial Times. Fielding-Smith, Abigail. ―Yemen Economy Hooked on Qat.‖ 20 January 2010.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ff20aeee-05e3-11df-8c97-00144feabdc0.html 198


http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/world/middleeast/01yemen.html 199

Yemen Observer. Ghanem, Suzan, and Jowhara Zindani, Zinadine Zindani. ―Qat: The Plague of

Yemen.‖ 26 February 2008. http://www.yobserver.com/sports-health-and-lifestyle/10013815.html 200

National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice. ―Khat Fast Facts: Questions and

Answers.‖ No date. http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs5/5116/5116p.pdf 201

IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Food Insecure Face Double

Whammy.‖ 2 February 2009. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82687 202

IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: ‗The Most Food-Insecure

Country in the Middle East.‘‖ 17 February 2009. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82966

mostly produce goods for the domestic market.203

Construction materials, daily use

consumer goods, and processed food and beverages are among their primary products.

While Yemen has a tradition of entrepreneurship dating back millennia, there are

currently significant obstacles to expanding private business. Transportation

infrastructure is poor and many economic inputs are under monopoly control by

politically connected groups. These conditions make it difficult to turn a profit.

Moreover, banks typically do not extend loans to the politically unconnected.204

Yemen

lacks an informal money lending market, such as those in other Muslim countries despite

the Islamic prohibition on charging interest. In an effort to promote manufacturing, in

2004 the government announced the establishment of three industrial zones in Aden, Al

Hudaydah (Hodeida), and Al Mukalla, respectively. Since that time, little development

has transpired and many Yemeni businessmen remain wary of the perceived heavy hand

of the government. The zones still lack significant investment in the basic services

required, including power, to become functional sites for business.205

Taxation

There is no standardized system of personal income tax

collection in Yemen. Implementing such a system would

require not only detailed information about household

wealth, but the political will to determine who should pay

what portion of their income. Because most Yemenis

work in the informal, cash economy, it would be difficult

for tax collectors to know how much people are earning.

Instead, governments in Yemen have historically relied

on taxing trade and, more recently, hydrocarbon revenues and customs duties on

remittance-funded imports. These revenue sources have proved sufficient during boom

times, but do not fund public services—such as administration and law enforcement—

when revenues fall. The government is not able to plan on future income streams, given

price volatility in the international energy market and the fact that other governments can

expel Yemeni workers at a moment‘s notice. This has inevitably led to balance of

payment problems, because of the country‘s reliance on fluctuating oil revenues and

remittances for foreign exchange. Both are needed to cover the steadily escalating costs

of imported food for a growing population. These conditions have contributed to

Yemen‘s plight as a ―failed state‖ that is unable to provide basic public services and

security for its citizens.

Banking



Yemen Post. ―Yemen Banks Unwilling to Credit Small and Medium Enterprises, IFC Study Finds.‖ 21

November 2009. http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=1609 205

Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State. ―2009 Investment Climate

Statement—Yemen.‖ February 2009. http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2009/117168.htm

Few Yemenis have access to formal banking services.

Cash is therefore the medium of commercial exchange.

The country has 15 commercial banks, the majority of

which are fully or partially government-owned. Some of

the others operate as Islamic banks, a separate

classification of banks that do not charge interest.

Privately owned banks overwhelmingly make loans on

the basis of the political connections of the borrower

rather than on a business plan.206

All banks are saddled

with large numbers of non-performing loans which impedes the flow of credit. Yemeni

banks are developing their own ATM networks that will not recognize each other‘s cards.

The ATM system is extremely limited in coverage. In addition to banks, there are more

than 300 licensed exchange houses in Yemen. They handle remittances from abroad as

well as domestic money transfers. Their services, which are well established throughout

the Muslim world, are cheaper and preferred by Yemenis needing to transfer money.

Foreign Investment

Until 1995, foreign investment in Yemen was minimal. It

was even negative in some years when more funds left

the country than entered it. The hydrocarbon sector

accounts for the majority of foreign investment, in the

form of PSA. Efforts have been made to expand

investment into other sectors (such as tourism), which

have elicited interest mainly from Gulf State investors. In

2002, Yemen‘s investment law was revised to accord

equal treatment to foreign and Yemeni firms. Yet because connections are more

important than legal rights for those seeking to do business, the revision means less in

practice than on paper. Corruption has been identified as a major impediment to

profitability.207

Yemen must address additional problems in order to attract investment outside the

hydrocarbon sector. Pressing issues include poor security, erratic energy supplies,

tolerated non-compliance of law enforcement, and an impoverished, low-skilled

citizenry. The last factor is particularly significant. Since Yemenis are poor, it is unlikely

that an investor would want to produce goods for the domestic market because few

people could afford them. At the same time, owing to the population‘s lack of skills,

206 CGAP. Lyman, Timothy R., Thierry Mahieux, and Xavier Reille. ―Report of CGAP Multi-Donor

Mission: Microfinance in Yemen [p. 4].‖ June 2005. http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-

1.9.2831/diagnostic_Yemen.pdf 207

Economic Growth in the Republic of Yemen: Sources, Constraints, and Potentials. ―Chapter 3:

Developing the Private Sector and Improving Governance [p. 59].‖ 2002: Washington, DC: World Bank.

foreign investors are not likely to view Yemen as an attractive place to assemble goods

bound for markets in North America and Western Europe.208

Tourism

The Yemeni government has promoted tourism as an

industry that could reduce its reliance on oil revenues.

Yemen possesses numerous sites of historic, religious,

and cultural interest. The old city in Sanaa, for example,

is a UNESCO World Heritage site. Aden, a centuries-old

port city, could also attract visitors.209

Yet the

development of a thriving tourism industry is unlikely in

light of security issues, including recent high-profile

kidnappings and murders of foreign nationals by Al Qaeda.210

Tribal groups also

routinely kidnap visitors in order to draw government attention to their needs and

demands. The victims of these kidnappings are typically released unharmed after the

government has addressed the tribe‘s concerns, but this is not always the case. Safety

concerns stemming from the separatist activity in the south deter the use of the scenic

Sanaa-Aden road via the mountainous city of Ta‘izz. The northern city of Sa‘ada, also

famous for its old city, has been affected by sustained conflict between government

forces and Houthi rebels over the last several years. Hadramawt, in the southeast, is home

to the 16th-century towers of Shibam, the oldest high-rise structures in the world. (The

town is sometimes referred to as the ―Manhattan of the desert.‖) Yet Hadramawt is also

plagued by security issues. Other attractions include Sabaean ruins near Marib, on the

eastern escarpment. On a trip to the ruins with an armed escort of Yemeni soldiers, the

journalist Robert Kaplan noted that the site ―should be overrun by tourists,‖ yet ―even the

souvenir stand [t]here, built before a wave of kidnappings of Westerners, and before the

region‘s infiltration by al Qaeda, is just another ruin.‖211

Overall, the lack of security has

hurt private businesses looking to provide goods and services to foreign visitors.212

208 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, UN. ―Foreign Direct Investment Report.‖ August

2008. http://www.escwa.un.org/information/publications/edit/upload/edgd-08-tech1-e.pdf 209

Business Intelligence Middle East. ―NONAV-Yemen-Travel and Leisure Hospitality Report.‖ 21

December 2004. http://www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=158&t=1 210

AlertNet. Reuters. Laessing, Ulf. ―Tourism Slump Compounds Yemen‘s Economic Problems.‖ 4

February 2010. http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LAE434968.htm 211

The Atlantic. Kaplan, Robert D. ―A Tale of Two Colonies.‖ April 2003.

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200304/kaplan 212

The New York Times. Friedman, Thomas L. ―Postcard from Yemen.‖ 6 February 2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/opinion/07friedman.html

Society

Introduction

Yemeni tribes have long regarded territory and lineage as

distinct markers of identity and solidarity. Today, tribal

affiliation remains strong in the northern highlands and

adjacent eastern mountain slopes. Tribal identity is

weaker in the south, where the British—and later, the

socialist government of the People‘s Democratic

Republic of Yemen—undermined tribal structures.213

Since unification in 1990, the administrative apparatus of

the central Yemeni government has remained limited in coverage and capacity. In many

areas of Yemen, tribes operate independently of the central government, whose

effectiveness is mostly confined to the Sanaa region.214

Tribal areas of Yemen are not

ungoverned or lawless places, however, because tribal governance and customary law

(urf) organize the society—often rigidly.215

For example, tribes have traditional

approaches to managing resources, and to preventing, mediating, and resolving

conflict.216

Some tribes acknowledge the central government, while others oppose its authority.

Many tribal leaders are recognized and supported by the government through formal and

informal channels. Their cooperation with the government is secured through a patronage

network, in which the government distributes resources (e.g., oil revenues, jobs, political

appointments).217

This network has been integral to the stability of the central

government, which is still led by Ali Abdallah Saleh, president of the Republic of Yemen

since unification. The patronage system has weakened local tribal leaders‘ roles in

maintaining order and equity. Shaykhul power is now directed at securing outside

resources for the tribe. Thus the incorporation of shaykhs into the central government has

changed the relationship between tribal leaders and ordinary villagers.218

213 The World Bank. ―Republic of Yemen: Country Social Analysis [p. 13].‖ 11 January 2006.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BOLIVIA/Resources/Yemen_CSA.pdf 214

Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ―Country Profile: Yemen [p. 19].‖ August 2008.


Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Yemen on the Brink: A Carnegie Paper Series. Middle

East Program, No. 107. Phillips, Sarah. ―What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-

Building [p. 3].‖ March 2010. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribes.pdf 216

Council on Foreign Relations. Patrick, Stewart M. ―Are ‗Ungoverned Spaces‘ a Threat?‖ 11 January

2010. http://www.cfr.org/publication/21165/are_ungoverned_spaces_a_threat.html 217

Center for Global Development. Egel, Daniel. ―Tribal Diversity, Political Patronage and the Yemeni

Decentralization Experiment [pp. 7–8].‖ 12 January 2010. http://www.cgdev.org/doc/events/Post-

Doc%20Seminars/Daniel_Egel.pdf 218

The World Bank. ―Republic of Yemen: Country Social Analysis [p. 38].‖ 11 January 2006.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BOLIVIA/Resources/Yemen_CSA.pdf

Ethnic Groups and Languages

The Yemeni population is predominantly Arab. Many residents of

coastal communities, especially along the Tihamah (Red Sea coast),

are Afro-Arab, a heritage that reflects the region‘s proximity to

Africa. Yemen‘s legacy of foreign trade and foreign occupation is

reflected in the presence of small communities of Europeans and

Indians.219

They are concentrated in urban areas, especially Aden,

where the British colonial presence was strong. Yemen is also home

to a large population of Somali refugees, who commonly undertake

the dangerous journey across the Gulf of Aden to escape the conflict

in their country.220

Yemen‘s residents of African ancestry, called

Akhdam (poor, low-class ―servants‖ and sanitary workers)221

or abid

(the descendents of slaves), face discrimination and persecution.222

Arabic is the official language of Yemen and the first language of most Yemeni citizens.

There are several regional dialects, including Sanaani (northern and central highlands),

Hadrami (Hadramawt), and Ta‘izzi-Adeni (southern highlands and southeastern coast).223

Two small ethnic groups speak other languages. The Mahra live in the eastern

governorate of Al Mahrah, which borders Oman. They speak Mahri (Mehri), an ancient

South Arabian language. Socotrans, the residents of the island of Socotra, speak Socotri

(Soqotri), another South Arabian tongue. Members of both of these ethnic groups are said

to also speak Arabic,224

although some reports indicate that many Socotrans speak only

Socotri.225

Religion

Almost all Yemenis are Muslims belonging to either the Zaydi order of Shi‘a Islam or the

Shafi‘i school of Sunni Islam. Zaydis, who comprise an estimated 45% of the population,

are concentrated in the northern and central highlands. The Zaydi imamate, or theocratic

state led by an imam, ruled portions of the highlands from the late ninth century until

1962. Because of its rationalist and relatively orthodox nature (relative to other Shi‘ite



Yemen Times. Jubran, Walid. ―The Crisis of Somali Fugitives to Yemen.‖ 12 August 2009.

http://www.yementimes.com/DefaultDET.aspx?i=918&p=report&a=2 221

The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Languishing at the Bottom of Yemen‘s Ladder.‖ 27 February

2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/world/middleeast/27yemen.html 222


Ed. ―Chapter 2: North Yemen: Social Class and Tribe [pp. 123–124].‖ Krieger, Laurie, et al. 1986.


Ethnologue.com. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th Ed. M. Paul Lewis, Ed. ―Languages of

Yemen.‖ 2009. Dallas: SIL International. http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=YE 224

The World Bank. ―Republic of Yemen: Country Social Analysis [p. 13].‖ 11 January 2006.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BOLIVIA/Resources/Yemen_CSA.pdf 225

Ethnologue.com. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th Ed. M. Paul Lewis, Ed. ―Soqotri.‖ 2009.

Dallas: SIL International. http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code=sqt

sects), the Zaydi order has been called the ―fifth school‖ of Sunni Islam.226

Shafi‘is, who

comprise 55% of the population, are predominant in the Tihamah, the southern highlands

(from Ta‘izz to the southern coast), and central and eastern Yemen.227

Unlike the Zaydis,

who reject any mystical or folk interpretation of Islam, Shafi‘is tolerate Sufism, a

mystical practice of Islam. Overall, the differences between Zaydi and Shafi‘i doctrine

are minor, particularly in comparison to the broader Shi‘a–Sunni relationship, which

causes conflict in many areas of the Muslim world.228

Islam shapes not only the daily lives of Yemenis but also

the country‘s social organization, politics, and

government. It is the state religion of Yemen, and

Shari‘a, or Islamic law, is the basis of the country‘s legal

system. Although these references to religion are decreed

by Yemen‘s constitution, it neither restricts nor protects

religious freedom. Citizens and foreign nationals are free

to practice a religion other than Islam, but it is illegal for

Muslims to convert to another religion and illegal for others to attempt to convert them.

Conversion of some from Zaydi to Shafi‘i Islam has created tension in the north, though

it is not illegal.229

Regardless of sect, Yemeni law requires all elected government

officials to be Muslim.

Gender Issues

Men are associated with public spaces, while women are associated

with private spaces in Yemen. Moreover, roles within the family

correspond with traditional views and practices that enforce the

distinct responsibilities and separation of the sexes. This has the

effect of marginalizing female participation in society, where males

claim decision-making authority inside and outside the home.230

As

the heads of household, men are expected to be strong-willed family

providers and protectors. They make the important decisions for the

family and represent its interests within the community. Men are

responsible for protecting their children and female relatives, who by

tradition are seen as weak and vulnerable. Men are the

226 Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F. Nyrop,

Ed. ―Chapter 1: Historical Setting: Islam: The Zaydis [p. 25].‖ Baynard, Sally Ann, et al. 1986.


The Yemen Arab Republic: Development and Change in an Ancient Land. Wenner, Manfred W.

―Chapter 2: People and Culture [p. 29].‖ 1991. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 228

Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen. Dresch, Paul. ―Chapter 1: Introductory: A Sketch of

Physical and Conceptual Geography [p. 11].‖ 1993. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 229

Middle East Report, No. 204. Weir, Shelagh. ―A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen.‖

July-September 1997. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer204/weir.htm 230

―Strategies and Approaches to Enhance the Role of Men and Boys in Working for Gender Equality: A

Case Study from Yemen.‖ Elsanousi, Magda Mohammed. In Gender Equality and Men: Learning from

Practice. Sandy Ruxton, Ed. 2004. London: Oxfam.

disciplinarians, ensuring family adherence to social codes, which focus on clear gender

roles and segregation of the sexes. Women are expected to be good Muslims, and good

mothers, preferably of sons. They are expected to be chaste and modest.231

The practice of purdah, or female seclusion, is one means by which women maintain

their modesty. When in public, most women wear abundant, concealing clothing,

including expansive cloaks, shawls, hoods, and/or veils.232

Women‘s participation in the

public workforce is limited, because strict adherence to purdah prevents many females

from receiving an education or pursuing a career outside the home. In 2009, Yemeni

women comprised only 23% of the official workforce, leaving most women to work in

unpaid jobs, either in the home or elsewhere in the informal sector.233

Girls are reared to

accept male authority, and gender stereotypes are reinforced outside the home. At the

most basic level, women who fail to comply with the social code—for example, by not

wearing the appropriate clothing in public—may face verbal harassment from men.

Domestic abuse is considered a private family affair, and thus mostly goes

undocumented. The stigma of shame cloaks this practice.234

Women may also view

domestic violence as acceptable due to social conditioning and lack of education.

Sons are highly valued because they carry on the family name, inherit

its assets, and accommodate their elderly parents. Daughters are

viewed as an economic burden so they are often married off to other

families early in life. This is a means for parents to reduce the

number of mouths they must feed.235

Over half of Yemeni brides are

under the age of 18.236

The presumption that conjugal relations will

wait until the bride has reached puberty—around age 15—is

routinely ignored.237

A bill that would have set a higher minimum age

for marriage was debated in parliament in February 2009. Passage

was blocked by those who cited social precedent and Islamic law,

which sanctions marriage for girls as young as 9. Marriage often

231 ―Islam, Custom and Revolution in Aden: Reconsidering the Background to the Changes of the Early

1990s [pp. 340–342].‖ Dahlgren, Susanne. In Yemen into the Twenty-First Century: Continuity and

Change. Mahdi, Kamil A., and Anna Würth, Helen Lackner, Eds. 2007. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. 232

Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed. Richard F Nyrop,

Ed. ―Chapter 2: North Yemen: Gender Roles [pp. 125–127].‖ Krieger, Laurie, et al. 1986. Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office. 233

Yemen Post. Al-Omari, Moneer. ―Most Yemeni Women Work in Unpaid Jobs; Women‘s

Unemployment on Rise.‖ 5 July 2009.

http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=100&SubID=1006&MainCat=5 234

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State. 2009 Country Reports on

Human Rights Practices. ―2009 Human Rights Report: Yemen.‖ 11 March 2010.

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136083.htm 235

Child Rights Information Network. AlertNet. ―Yemen: Early Marriage a Challenge to Development.‖ 26

March 2006. http://www.crin.org/violence/search/closeup.asp?infoID=7834 236

The Washington Times. Murdock, Heather. ―Yemen Still Wedded to Child Marriages.‖ 24 December

2009. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/dec/24/yemen-still-wedded-to-child-marriages/ 237

BBC News. Sekkai, Rachid. ―Yemeni Child Bride Gets Annulment.‖ 16 April 2008.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7351336.stm

renders girls ineligible to attend school since they must take on the duties of a wife, and

presumably possess sexual knowledge that could corrupt their female classmates.

Because a mother‘s education level is inversely proportional to family size, it is difficult

to reduce Yemen‘s birth rate of 6.5 children per woman—among the highest in the

world.238

The value of education for girls, whose lives will likely be relegated to the

home, is seen as minimal by many Yemenis.239

As a result, the literacy rate for Yemeni

females (39%) is significantly lower than that of men (76%).240

Women‘s prisons in Yemen are reportedly full of inmates who have violated social

conventions rather than committed crimes. For example, if an unmarried couple has had

pre-marital sex, the girl‘s parents will most likely not accept a marriage proposal. Instead,

they will press rape charges against the man despite the fact their daughter will face legal

consequences for being alone with him. Women can be charged with ―fornication‖ or

prostitution, even if they were raped.241

The family must take these actions to preclude

the implication that they condoned pre-marital sex. This implication would place a stigma

on the whole family, in keeping with the tradition of shared familial honor.242

An inmate

who has served her sentence can nonetheless only be released to a male family member

who has agreed to take her back into the family—in accordance with a law that, in theory,

was overturned in 2006.243

Alternately, she can be married off to a man who has bribed

prison administrators.244

Without a home, and lacking job skills, women who have served

prison time confront a bleak future. These circumstances may force them into

prostitution, making it likely that they will end up back in prison.

238 Yemen Observer. Almasmari, Hakim. ―Yemen‘s Fertility Rate Remains One of the Highest.‖ 26 June

2007. http://www.yobserver.com/reports/10012478.html 239

IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Female Education Remains

Key Challenge.‖ 6 September 2007. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=74159 240

World Economic Forum. Global Gender Gap Report 2009. ―Country Profile: Yemen.‖ 27 October

2009. http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap2009/Yemen.pdf 241




The Women‘s International Perspective. Sohlman, Eva. ―Yemen‘s Women Behind Bars for Love or

Rape.‖ 15 November 2007.

http://www.thewip.net/contributors/2007/11/yemens_women_behind_bars_for_l.html 243

Oxfam Great Britain. ―Yemen: Advocacy on Violence Against Women.‖ June 2008.

http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/FP2P/FP2P_Yemen_%20adv_on_viol_ag_women_CS_EN

GLISH.pdf 244

RefWorld, UNHCR. ―Women‘s Rights in North Africa and the Middle East-Yemen.‖ 14 October 2005.

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,FREEHOU,,YEM,47387b712f,0.html

Qat Chews

Yemeni social life includes communal qat chews. The

use of qat, a mild stimulant, was introduced in the 14th or

15th century by Sufi Muslims,245

who chewed the leaves

during prayer and meditation.246

Today the use is

widespread and habitual. Daily afternoon qat chews

provide an opportunity for friends, acquaintances, or even

strangers to socialize and discuss a wide range of issues,

including business and politics.247

Participants may settle

disputes, or exchange lore and poetry. Like most social events, qat chews are segregated

by sex. For men, these gatherings are known as maqil.248

For women, who consume the

drug less often, qat chewing may be a part of afternoon, female social gatherings known

as tafrita.249

Participants bring their own qat and congregate in private homes, which

usually have a mafraj, a special room for such gatherings. Seating is not random; it

corresponds to social status among the persons attending. The stimulant reportedly has

the effect of relaxing social inhibitions. The qat equalizes the participants, who are then

freer to express their opinions.250

The drug suppresses the appetite but provokes thirst.

Drinking water or soda is therefore common. Smoking also frequently accompanies qat

chewing. Beginning after lunch in the early afternoon, these gatherings typically last until

early evening.251

Although qat use has a long history in Yemen, widespread and heavy daily consumption

of the plant has been identified as a serious medical and social problem. Short-term side

effects include sleeplessness and loss of appetite; heavy long-term use has been tied to

kidney and liver disease. Yemenis, even government officials, do not consider the plant

to be a drug. The chewing of qat can be an everyday habit that absorbs much of a

Yemeni‘s time and income. In a country with high poverty and unemployment levels,

some observers have viewed qat chewing as a significant waste of potential productivity

245 The Republic of Yemen: Developmental Challenges in the 21st Century. Colburn, Marta. ―Glossary: Qat

[p. 78],‖ and ―Glossary: Sufi [p. 78].‖2002. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations. 246

Poverty News Blog. Seattle Post Intelligencer. Associated Press. Garwood, Paul. ―Chewing Qat Blamed

for Yemen‘s Poverty.‖ 30 November 2005. http://povertynewsblog.blogspot.com/2005/11/yemen-chewing-

qat-blamed-for-yemens.html 247

The University of Chicago Chronicle. Harms, William. ―Lisa Wedeen, Professor in Political Science and

the College, Chair of Political Science.‖ 12 June 2008. http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/080612/wedeen.shtml 248

Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen. Dresch, Paul. ―Chapter 1: Introductory [p. 20].‖ 1993.

Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 249

Foreign Area Studies, American University. The Yemens: Country Studies, 2nd Ed.. Richard F. Nyrop,

Ed. ―Chapter 2: North Yemen: Geographic and Demographic Setting: Qat [pp. 106–108].‖ Krieger, Laurie,

et al. 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 250

Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen. Wedeen, Lisa. ―Chapter 3: The Politics

of Deliberation [p. 129].‖ 2008. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 251


Ed. ―Chapter 2: North Yemen: Geographic and Demographic Setting: Qat [pp. 106–108].‖ Krieger, Laurie,

et al. 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

and precious income.252

Some poorer Yemenis may be spending as much as half their

income on the plant. But it is widely used among all levels of society.253

Food

Meat, vegetables, rice, and bread are the core components

of the Yemeni diet. Yemenis use distinctive spices that

reflect both Middle Eastern and Indian cuisine.254

Cardamom, caraway, saffron, and turmeric are used in

Yemeni cooking, as they are throughout the Middle East.

Culinary experts have also noted the similarities between

Yemeni and African cuisine.255

For example, Yemenis

commonly make a puffy, light bread akin to Ethiopian

injera. Hilbah, or fenugreek, is a particularly popular spice. Saltah, the country‘s

signature dish, is a hot and spicy stew of meat, potatoes, and various vegetables such as

tomato, eggplant, and onion. Flavored with hilbah, saltah is a characteristic Yemeni

lunchtime meal, and is regarded as the best dish to eat before the afternoon qat chew.256

For those who can afford it, meat is eaten daily. Commonly consumed meats are chicken,

goat, sheep, and lamb; the latter is the most prized. Pork is strictly avoided in accordance

with Islamic custom. Because meat is a luxury for many Yemenis, no part is wasted.

Flavorful broths and soups (shoubra) are made by boiling meat or bones with vegetables

and spices.257, 258

Dinner dishes, which are typically small, include fasouliya (beans) and ful, a bean paste

made with spices and vegetables.259

Asid (asit) is a sorghum porridge commonly eaten by

rural Yemenis. Yogurt and honey are popular condiments. Honey also drenches desserts

such as bint al-sahn, which is a layered pastry. Tea (shay) is usually served sweetened.

Yemen was famous for its Arabica coffee, known as mocha, but few Yeminis now can

252 Yemen Observer. Ghanem, Suzan, and Jowhara Zindani, Zinadine Zindani. ―Qat: The Plague of

Yemen.‖ 26 February 2008. http://www.yobserver.com/sports-health-and-lifestyle/10013815.html 253

Reuters UK. Noueihed, Lin. ―Qat Draws Water and Life from Impoverished Yemen.‖ 29 May 2007.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKNOA93814520070529?sp=true 254

Brooklyn Botanic Garden. ―A Taste of Herbs.‖ 2010.

http://www.bbg.org/gar2/topics/kitchen/handbooks/gourmetherbs/2a.html 255

New York Magazine. ―Yemen Cafe and Restaurant.‖ No date.

http://nymag.com/listings/restaurant/yemen-cafe-and-restaurant/ 256

In Mama‘s Kitchen. Serbe, Diana and Elinor Moore. ―Dining with the Queen of Sheba: Ethiopian

Cooking and Yemeni Cooking.‖ No date.

http://www.inmamaskitchen.com/FOOD_IS_ART/mideast/ethiopia_yemen.html 257

Things Asian. ―The Exotic Cuisine of Yemen-The Ancient Happy Arabia.‖

http://www.thingsasian.com/stories-

photos/3576/21395059/1/brt0_art;jsessionid=EE2EE202BBA243721EEA5202DB23DBE6 258

Things Asian. Salloum, Habeeb. ―Recipe: Shoubra—Meat Soup.‖ 29 March 2006.

http://www.thingsasian.com/stories-photos/3580 259

Arabian Peninsula, 1st Ed. Gordon, Frances Linzee, et al. ―Yemen: Food [p. 371].‖ 2004. Footscray,

Victoria, Australia: Lonely Planet Publications.

afford it. Instead, Yemenis today drink a beverage called qishr, which is made by

steeping ground coffee husks with ginger.260

Clothing

In contrast to mandates in other Muslim countries,

Yemeni women are not required by law to wear the veil.

Yemeni women traditionally wore shawls (maswan) but

did not cover their faces. But in conservative quarters

even today, a woman whose attire is considered

immodest by local norms may be subject to social

censure and harassment.261

Since a person‘s outward

aspect is considered a reflection of character and honor,

most Yemenis carefully manage their personal appearance. In northern Yemen, the

sharshaf, which is a black, hooded outer garment, is popular. Of Turkish origin, the

sharshaf is a sign of urban sophistication for it may reveal or conceal in a variety of

ways. The wearer may adjust it for a conservative or a modern look.262

Since 1990,

returnees from Saudi Arabia, who face a marginalized existence in their impoverished

homeland after being repatriated, have promoted the Saudi female dress ensemble. It

consists of an overcoat (abaya, known as a balto in Yemen), a headscarf (hijab), and a

face veil (niqab). In the words of one scholar, ―This clear expression of their adherence to

Saudi style covering…can be interpreted as a way to show their ‗modernity‘ and to

distance themselves from other Yemeni women who were in their eyes less strict and

therefore less civilized and modern.‖263

Often adorned with beading and embroidery, a balto and matching hijab, imported from

the Gulf States, are considered high fashion. While the hijab can be tied, the use of

colorful pins to secure it is more desirable. Baltos have displaced the traditional sitara

(setarrah), which is a large, often colorful cloth that women wear draped from the head

to near the ankles. Today, the sitara is only worn by elderly Yemeni women, although

some young women have baltos made using sitara designs.264

260 Caravan-Serai. ―Foods of Yemen.‖ No date. http://www.caravan-serai.com/countries/yemen/hb-

foods.html 261

Refworld. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. ―Yemen: Information on Whether There Is a

Dress Code in Aden According to Official Government Law or Policy, and on Restrictions on Women‘s

Employment.‖ 1 November 1995.

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,IRBC,,YEM,3ae6ab5c34,0.html 262

―Dance: A Visual Marker of Qabili Identity in Highland Yemen [pp. 187–188].‖ Adra, Najwa. In Color

of Enchantment: Theatre, Dance, Music, and the Visual Arts of the Middle East. Sherifa Zuhur, Ed. 2001.

Cairo, Egypt: American University of Cairo Press. 263

Pioneers or Pawns? Women Health Workers and the Politics of Development in Yemen. De Regt,

Marina. ―Chapter 9: Dreaming of a Better Future: Women in New Squatter Areas [p. 262].‖ 2007.

Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 264

Yemen Observer. Al-Jarady, Eman. ―The Seterrah: An Endangered Species.‖ 28 August 2007.

http://www.yobserver.com/news-varieties/10012842.html

For men, traditional dress consists of a futah, or a pleated kilt that reaches below the

knees, and a shirt. In the highlands, where temperatures are cooler, sport coats and vests

are also worn. Another traditional garment for men is the thawb, which is a long, loose-

fitting robe, often worn over pants. Turbans are the most common headgear, although

some men wear a traditional kofia, a short, conical hat woven of bamboo. It carries

formal significance.265

The jambiya, or curved dagger, is the most important

accouterment for Yemeni men. It is worn in a scabbard on a wide belt. The type of handle

and the position of the knife indicate the social status of the bearer. A jambiya carried in

the center front of the belt is the mark of a tribesman. Government workers are prohibited

from wearing a jambiya to work and at official functions, although shaykhs, members of

parliament, and judges are exempt. The jambiya is often a family heirloom passed down

from father to son.266

Arts

Poetry

Poetry (qasida) is a significant component of Arab

culture.267

Cassette recordings of popular poets circulate

throughout Yemen.268

Poetry is more than just an art form

because it also serves as a conflict resolution

mechanism.269

For example, a shaykh mediating a dispute

will call the parties together and invite representatives of

other tribes who have no stake in the dispute. The

delegations will express their positions through poetry.

The shaykh will assess the disagreements and determine if a consensus can be reached.

―At various points in the dispute mediation, people can weigh in with the moral force of a

poem very effectively,‖ explains a scholar who has studied Yemeni poetry in relation to

political power.270

During the civil war (1962–1970), republicans and supporters of the

Zaydi imamate alike were given voice through poetic exchanges.271

More recently, the

265 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: Cultural Life: Daily Life and Social Customs.‖ 2010.


Yemen Post. Al-Shawthabi, Abdul Rahim. ―Jambiya: Deep-Rooted Tradition.‖ 12 March 2009.

http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=100&SubID=170&MainCat=5 267

The Michigan Daily. McGovern, Ashley. ―Poetry Sheds Light on Arab Culture.‖ 15 November 2002.

http://www.michigandaily.com/content/poetry-sheds-light-arab-culture 268

The Moral Resonance of Arab Media: Audiocassette Poetry and Culture in Yemen. Miller, Flagg.

―Chapter 1: Folk-Poetry Cassettes: Between Community and Conflict [p. 78].‖ 2007. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press. 269

The Harvard University Gazette. Shen, Andrea. ―Poetry as Power: Caton Studies Complex Role of

Poetry in Yemen Society.‖ 9 December 1999. http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/1999/12.09/caton.html 270

National Endowment for the Humanities. Humanities, Vol. 23, No. 1. Galvin, Rachel. ―Of Poets,

Prophets, and Politics.‖ January/February 2002. http://www.neh.gov/news/humanities/2002-01/poets.html 271

Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen. Wedeen, Lisa. ―Chapter 1: Imagining

Unity [p. 46].‖ 2008. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

government has utilized poets to urge the citizenry to combat terrorism.272

In these

circumstances, Yemeni poems serve as tailored rhetorical appeals to secure the support of

their audience.

Dance

Yemeni dances are performed at rite-of-passage

ceremonies such as weddings. Dancers are segregated by

gender. Women use the word raks for dances that

originated outside the country, but refer to their own

dances as play (laeb). Men use the word laeb for

recreational dance and bara for the special, martial

dagger dance.273

The bara has become a symbol of

Yemeni culture and national identity. It is performed in

cities as well as in rural communities, where it originated. Tribes have each developed

distinctive movement and costume variations.274

In the northern highlands, the leader

dances in the center rather than at the head of a procession, reflecting his equality among

the others. All segments of society dance the bara, but it is essential to reinforce the

honor of a tribesman.275

The bara entails the coordination of as many as 20 dancers, who

must dance in horseshoe formation and carry jambiyas. Four different rhythms are played

on a large drum (tasa), and the tempo becomes progressively faster. The finale with the

fastest tempo conveys the dancers‘ fighting spirit and their readiness to go into battle.276

Architecture

Yemeni cities lack a ―hyper-modern skyline…with

mismatched skyscrapers‖—an urban architectural style

that is seen in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, and

elsewhere in the Middle East.277

The country‘s isolation

over centuries has influenced its approach to

contemporary architectural development. Until 1962,

portions of north Yemen had been ruled for almost a

millennium by xenophobic imams who had attempted to

272 The Christian Science Monitor. Brandon, James. ―In Poetry Loving Yemen, Tribal Bard Takes on Al

Qaeda—With his Verse.‖ 12 May 2006. http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0512/p01s02-wome.html 273

Gilded Serpent. Jalilah. ―Dancing in Yemen, Part 2: El Arous.‖ No date.

http://www.gildedserpent.com/articles13/dancingyemen2jalilah.htm 274

Yemen (Cultures of the World). Hestler, Anna. ―Arts [p. 96].‖ 2000. Tarrytown, NY: Marshall

Cavendish. 275

Persee Scientific Journals. Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée, Vol. 67, Issue 67. Adra,

Nawja. ―Tribal Dancing and Yemeni Nationalism: Steps to Unity.‖ 1993.

http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/remmm_0997-1327_1993_num_67_1_1595 276 The Arab Cultural and Community Center. ―15th Annual Arab Cultural Festival.‖ 2009.

http://www.arabculturalcenter.org/cultural_festival.html 277

The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Yemen Finds Dreamland of Architecture.‖ 15 November

2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/world/middleeast/16yemen.html

repel outside influences. Thereafter, Yemen was preoccupied while it experimented with

various types of governments in an effort to achieve stability and lay the foundations for

economic growth. A focus on internal matters meant the country was largely excluded

from the social and intellectual dialog shared by the rest of the Arab world. As a result,

the urban renewal movement bypassed Yemen, in contrast to its expression in

neighboring countries. There, monarchical and republican governments alike razed

ancient neighborhoods and markets to bring their nations into the modern age. Yemen

began to engage the outside world only in the 1980s, when the benefits of preservation of

indigenous structures had come to be appreciated.

Distinctive Yemeni architecture is characterized by the use of stone and sun-dried brick.

Where stone is scarce, zubur houses, resembling a layer cake, are made entirely from clay

laid in horizontal segments.278

These buildings are now celebrated for their environmental

sustainability. Solid clay walls keep the interior temperature constant through the

seasons. The capital city of Sanaa, whose historic quarter has been named a UNESCO

World Heritage site, contains ancient tower houses. These buildings, some of which rise

30 m (100 fit) above street level, were constructed from ―locally quarried stone, hand-

mixed plaster and a naturally waterproof insulating material, qudad, made of volcanic

cinders and lime.‖279

In the words of one architect, ―This dense, walled city projects the

urban character typical of traditional Arab cities and contains many building types unique

to Southern Arabia.‖280

Sports

Camel racing, or al-hagen (literally, ―breeds of fine

quality‖), is an ancient Arabian sport that originated with

nomadic Bedouin tribes. Camels are revered for their

ability to survive in the harsh desert and are essential to

the livelihood of the desert nomads. The Yemeni

government began promoting camel racing in 1987 by

sponsoring a festival in the town of Al-Husineah, in Al-

Hudaydah governorate, where camel racing was a

longstanding tradition. Competitions consist of races and other events, such as a contest

in which participants jump over rows of camels.281

But the festival has not been held

every year. The government‘s attempts to promote camel racing as a national spectator

sport are unlikely to be widely successful, given that it is a better funded sport in the

278 Yemen (Cultures of the World). Hestler, Anna. ―Arts [p. 91].‖ 2000. Tarrytown, NY: Marshall

Cavendish. 279

Global Post. Edwards, Haley Sweetland. ―Green Technology—It‘s Older Than You Think.‖ 11

December 2009. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/global-green/091210/green-yemen-houses 280 University of Arizona. Jeffery, Richard Brooks. ―Architecture, Modernity, and Preservation: The Tower

House of Sana'a, Yemen.‖ Arid Lands Newsletter, No. 28. Spring-Summer 1989.

http://ag.arizona.edu/oals/ALN/aln28/jeffery.html 281

eLanguages. ―Camel Racing: A Yemeni Historical Sport.‖ No date.

http://www.elanguages.org/view_pagecontent.php?resourceid=86745;id=r86745#r86745

wealthy Gulf States. Their ability to invest heavily in stadiums, and in breeding the best

camels for competition, has made them the center for camel racing.282

282 JSTOR. Ethnology, Vol. 39, No. 3. Khalaf, Sulyaman. ―Poetics and Politics of Newly Invented

Traditions in the Gulf: Camel Racing in the United Arab Emirates.‖ 2000.

http://www.jstor.org/pss/3774109

Security

Introduction

Yemen is the focus of international security concerns

owing to its connection to acts of terrorism against high-

profile targets. In October 2000, while refueling in the

southern Yemeni port of Aden, the U.S.S. Cole was

rammed by a small boat laden with explosives. The

resulting explosion ripped a hole in the naval destroyer

and killed 17 sailors. More recently, on Christmas Day

2009, the attempted bombing of a U.S.-bound jetliner was

attributed to a Nigerian who reportedly had trained for his mission in Yemen. This

incident renewed attention on the impoverished country as a breeding ground for Islamist

extremists. Of the approximately 200 remaining detainees at Guantanamo Bay in January

2010, 90 were Yemeni nationals.283

That month, the Obama administration froze the

release of Yemeni detainees because of longstanding concerns that the Yemeni

government, which is saddled with a host of serious problems, could not adequately

supervise the detainees‘ rehabilitation.284

Yemen faces a number of pressing concerns, including ―disappearing oil and water

reserves; a mob of migrants, some allegedly with Al Qaeda ties, flooding in from

Somalia, the failed state next door; and a weak government increasingly unable to keep

things running.‖285

It is widely understood that the Yemeni government, headed by

President Ali Abdallah Saleh, lacks the capacity both to exert authority in many tribal

regions and to secure the country‘s borders.286

Analysts have noted that, in order to

prevent a total breakdown in state authority, not only the central government must be

strengthened, but also the lives of the Yemeni people must be improved.287

The deep-

seated grievances of many Yemenis toward their government, which provides neither

security (aman) nor stability (istiqrar), make Yemen a fertile recruiting ground for

insurgent groups.288

Because Al Qaeda does not seriously threaten the Saleh regime‘s

survival, however, the government accords it less attention than the secessionist

283 Time. ―Yemen: The Most Fragile Ally.‖ 7 January 2010.

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1952142,00.html 284

Los Angeles Times. ―U.S. Suspends Transfer of Gitmo Inmates to Yemen.‖ 5 January 2010.

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/dcnow/2010/01/us-suspends-transfer-of-gitmo-inmates-to-yemen.html 285

Foreign Policy. ―The Failed States Index 2009.‖ 2009.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index 286

Council for Foreign Relations. Stewart, Patrick. ―Are ‗Ungoverned Spaces‘ a Threat?‖ 11 January 2010.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/21165/are_ungoverned_spaces_a_threat.html 287

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard

University. Robbins, Michael. ―The Overlooked Threat in the Middle East.‖ 23 March 2009.

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/middleeastnews/?tag=failed-state 288

Voice of America News. Grosshans, Todd. ―Is Yemen the Next Failed State?‖ 16 February 2010.

http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/Is-Yemen-The-Next-Failed-State-84475967.html

movement in the south or the Houthi rebellion in the north.289

In the eyes of many

Yemenis, their government‘s collaboration with U.S. counterterrorism initiatives—for

example, by allowing U.S. missile strikes in Yemen—is unwelcome.

Yemen: “Tribal Republic”

While Yemen is frequently described as ―the next

Afghanistan,‖ it is important to note that Yemen‘s central

government has not offered direct support to Al Qaeda.290

Yet the government lacks control over most of the

country, which has been described as a ―tribal

republic.‖291

Tribal groups in control of their territory

have sheltered militants, including those affiliated with

Al Qaeda, for tactical domestic reasons rather than to

further the strategic objectives of the militant groups. The tribes near Marib, in particular,

have established a precedent of accepting support from outside parties seeking to further

their own agendas. Patrons have included the then Marxist People‘s Democratic Republic

of Yemen (South Yemen); Saddam Hussein‘s Ba‘athist regime; the government of Saudi

Arabia; and, most recently, ―radical elements linked to al Qaeda.‖

The Yemeni national armed forces are disproportionately comprised of tribesmen. They

typically hesitate to fire on fellow tribesmen—an act that would likely provoke a tribal

feud. Such feuds can quickly attract additional participants, and soldiers may become

targets. In 2003, government security personnel intervened in a dispute between two

tribes and killed one man in the process. In retaliation, three government soldiers were

killed by members of the deceased man‘s tribe.292

The government‘s typical response to

tribal demands is to placate them through patronage, which in turn encourages further

demands. Such demands are more effective when the tribes are supported—in reality or

appearance—by outside groups.293

Tribes who are excluded from patronage, or find their

payoffs reduced due to declining oil revenues, may be particularly tempted by appeals

from radical groups as a means to increase their leverage with the Saleh government.294

289 International Affairs Review. McGee, Ronan. ―Yemen: The U.S. Partnership‘s Flawed Approach.‖ 15


International Crisis Group. Middle East Report No. 8. ―Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in

a Fragile State.‖ 8 January 2003. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1675 291

Center for Global Development. Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Engel,

Daniel. ―Tribal Diversity, Political Patronage and the Yemeni Decentralization Experiment [p. 7].‖ 12

January 2010. http://www.cgdev.org/doc/events/Post-Doc%20Seminars/Daniel_Egel.pdf 292

Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism.

Phillips, Sarah. ―Chapter 4: Tribalism in a Weak State [p. 97].‖ 2008. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 293

Jamestown Foundation. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 7. Katz, Mark. ―U.S.-Yemen Relations and the

War on Terror: A Portrait of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih.‖ 19 May 2005.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=404 294

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Yemen on the Brink: A Carnegie Paper Series. Middle

East Program, No. 107. Phillips, Sarah. ―What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-

Building.‖ March 2010. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribes.pdf

U.S.–Yemen Relations

While Yemen is ostensibly a partner of the U.S. in

international counterterrorism efforts, there are

significant differences between the two governments

regarding the identification of terrorists. For example,

Yemen-based Shaykh Abdul Majid al-Zindani was a

spiritual adviser to Osama bin Laden. Many Yemenis

regard him as a patriot.295

According to a U.S.-based

scholar, ―He is now widely respected around the

[Muslim] world, and one can argue that he is currently one of the most powerful four

men in Yemen…. Yemeni politicians and tribal leaders revere him and seek his advice on

national matters.‖296

Al-Zindani is the president of Al Iman (Eman) University, the

second-largest university in the capital, which trains Sunni religious scholars in the

Wahhabist form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. The school is viewed by the U.S. as

an Al Qaeda recruiting ground, and U.S. officials have designated al-Zindani a

terrorist.297

There is concern that the Saleh government is unprepared to address the

propagation of radical views that create Al Qaeda sympathizers.298

Saleh‘s successive electoral victories are based on the ability of pro-government shaykhs

to mobilize voters within their respective tribes after they have been bought off through

patronage. However, he has also used his power to prevent the formation of viable

opposition political parties.299

Washington‘s need for cooperation from Saleh requires

that criticism of his regime be downplayed. His willingness to cooperate with the U.S.

reduces the prospect of unilateral American military action in Yemen; any such action

would likely undermine his rule. The U.S. currently provides intelligence, equipment, and

tactical support to Yemen. In exchange, the U.S. has been allowed to conduct dozens of

raids on Yemeni soil, during which members of Al Qaeda have been killed or

295 Los Angeles Times. Edwards, Haley Sweetland. ―Yemen: Clerics Condemn Foreign Intervention,

Threaten Global Jihad.‖14 January 2010. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/01/yemen-

clerics-condemn-foreign-intervention-threaten-global-jihad.html 296

Office of News and Communications, Duke University. ―News Tip: U.S. and Yemen Should Adopt

Clear Definition of ‗Terrorism.‘‖ 8 January 2010. http://news.duke.edu/2010/01/al_qaeda.html 297

Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Prados, Alfred

B. and Jeremy M. Sharp. ―CRS Report for Congress: Yemen: Current Conditions and U.S. Relations [p.

3].‖ 4 January 2007. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21808.pdf 298

The Wall Street Journal. Coker, Margaret. ―Yemeni Sheik Courts, Warns Foreign Governments.‖ 12

January 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126321683002124521.html 299



http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136083.htm

apprehended.300

Yet claims that civilians have wrongfully been killed have placed Saleh‘s

government in a situation that can be exploited by opponents of the regime.301

In April 2010, the Obama administration authorized operations to capture or kill Anwar

al-Awlaki, a radical Muslim cleric born in the U.S. but now based in Yemen. Al-Awlaki

is believed to have mentored Maj. Nidal Malik Hassan, accused of the Fort Hood

shootings in November 2009, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who allegedly attempted

the Christmas Day 2009 bombing of a U.S.-bound jetliner.302

Claiming a lack of

evidence, Yemeni officials initially refuted the U.S. designation of al-Awlaki as a

terrorist with ties to Al Qaeda.303

However, they later agreed to seek him out ―…for

questioning so that he can clear his name…or face trial….‖ He is thought to be hiding in

southern Yemen under the protection of his tribe, but the Yemeni government has

complained that it lacks U.S. intelligence to confirm that fact.304

Relations with Regional Countries

Saudi Arabia

Yemen‘s longest land border is with Saudi Arabia. The boundary was

long a source of dispute between the two countries. In 1934,

following a territorial war, the Saudi kingdom and the Zaydi imamate

of North Yemen signed the Treaty of Taif, which drew the western

segment of their land border in Saudi Arabia‘s favor.305

Border

clashes flared in the 1990s, after the discovery of oil in Yemen and a

sharp downturn in Yemeni–Saudi relations. Tensions stemmed from

the Yemeni government‘s refusal to support the U.S.-led coalition

against Iraq in the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991). Yemen‘s stance

led Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States to cut foreign aid and to expel

several hundred thousand Yemeni workers. This move greatly

300 Washington Post. Priest, Dana. ―U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on

Strikes.‖ 27 January 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/AR2010012604239.html 301

International Affairs Review. McGee, Ronan. ―Yemen: The U.S. Partnership‘s Flawed Approach.‖ 15


Newsweek. Johnsen, Gregory D. ―An Act of Futility.‖ 13 April 2010.

http://www.newsweek.com/id/236292 303

The Christian Science Monitor. Topol, Sarah A. ―Yemen Balks at Possible US Strike on Cleric Anwar

al-Awlaki.‖ 12 April 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0412/Yemen-balks-at-

possible-US-strike-on-cleric-Anwar-al-Awlaki 304

The Washington Post. Reuters. ―Yemen Says Seeks Cleric, Yet to Get U.S. Intelligence.‖ 11 April 2010.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/11/AR2010041104056.html 305

Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy

Dimensions. Cordesman, Anthony H. ―Chapter 2: Foreign Relations and External Security [p. 64].‖ 2003.

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

contributed to economic insecurity in Yemen, which relied heavily on remittances from

foreign-based workers.306

Conflict along the border erupted in 1994, after Saudi Arabia provided support to

southern secessionists in the Yemeni civil war. The Yemeni and Saudi Arabian

governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1995, which paved the way for

border demarcation talks in the following years. Despite additional clashes along the

border and on disputed islands in the Red Sea, the two sides came to a final border

agreement in June 2000.307

The agreement signaled that Yemeni–Saudi relations had

improved, including the possibility that Saudi Arabia would reopen its labor markets to

Yemeni workers.308

Yet, as of early 2010, Saudi Arabia remained reluctant to do so,

primarily due to security concerns.309

The border area remains difficult to patrol because

of its rugged and inhospitable terrain. It is therefore susceptible to smuggling and militant

infiltration. Saudi efforts to address these issues include constructing a security fence

along portions of the border.310

Some portions of the fence are electronically

monitored.311

A previous effort in the early 2000s to build such a fence created tension

between Yemeni and Saudi officials.312

The Houthi rebellion, which began in 2004, is of interest

to the Saudi government, since the conflict‘s center in the

northwest Yemeni governorate of Sa‘ada adjoins the

Saudi province of Najran. Najran is home to Ismaili

Muslims, who belong to a different sect of Shi‘a Islam

than the Shi‘ite Yemeni Zaydis. Thus, Shi‘ite minority

communities abut both sides of the border in this region.

Saudi Arabia, which is predominantly Sunni Muslim, has

provided Saleh‘s government with materiel to crush the Houthi rebellion. In November

2009, Saudi warplanes bombed Houthi positions in the border area, both within Saudi

territory and inside Yemen. This marked Saudi Arabia‘s first cross-border military

operation since the Persian Gulf War in 1991. In addition to its potential to incite Saudi

Shi‘ites, the unrest in Yemen concerns the Saudis because it offers Iran, a Shi‘ite Muslim

306 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: History: Unification of Yemen.‖ 2010.


Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy

Dimensions. Cordesman, Anthony H. ―Chapter 2: Foreign Relations and External Security [pp. 65–68].‖

2003. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. 308

Encyclopædia Britannica Online. ―Yemen: History: Territorial Disputes.‖ 2010.


Reuters. Laessing, Ulf. ―Saudi-Western Interests in Yemen not Identical.‖ 25 January 2010.

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60O2HT20100125 310

Gulf News. Reuters. ―Saudi to Build Border Fence to Stop Militants.‖ 24 December 2009.

http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-to-build-border-fence-to-stop-militants-1.557433 311

World Tribune. ―Saudis Urgently Erect New Border Fence to Block ‗Massive‘ Immigration of Shi‘ites.‖

15 December 2009. http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2009/me_saudis0966_12_15.asp 312

The Independent. Bradley, John R. ―Saudi Arabia Enrages Yemen with Fence.‖ 11 February 2004.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-enrages-yemen-with-fence-

569574.html

state, the opportunity to intervene on behalf of another Shi‘ite group. Yet the Saudis have

engaged in similar behavior in Yemen. In June 2008, the Saudi government allegedly

began funding pro-government tribal militias in Yemen. The influx of funds contributed

to a war economy in which major players—army officers, tribal shaykhs, and arms

dealers—had a vested interest in maintaining the conflict, which has an impact on the

country as a whole.313

The Saudi government‘s involvement in the Houthi conflict follows a precedent of

influencing Yemeni affairs. Saudi Arabia provided substantial support to the remnants of

the Zaydi imamate in their battle against republicans in the civil war in North Yemen

(1962–1970). Its support of the Zaydis, who ultimately deferred to the republicans, was

thereafter a source of tension with the government of the Yemen Arab Republic (1962–

1990). More recently, Saudis have invested heavily in promoting their conservative brand

of Islam, known as Wahhabism, in Yemen and other Muslim countries. They have done

so by funding mosques, religious schools, and charities that promote Saudi-style Sunni

Islam.314

This promotion has been associated with the spread of religious extremism in

Yemen and elsewhere.315

It also has been cited as one of the Houthis‘ primary sources of

complaint because Wahhabi influence has been pronounced in the Sa‘ada governorate of

the north. The Zaydis have therefore ―claimed…to be defending their own specific

branch of Shia Islam…from a Yemeni regime they say is too dependent on its northern

neighbor, Saudi Arabia….‖316

Although exact figures are unavailable, Saudi Arabia is

thought to provide USD 200 to 300 million in annual security aid to the Saleh regime.317

Oman

Yemen‘s neighbor to the east, Oman is a monarchy that

has been ruled by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said since

1970.318

From 1962–1975, Oman was plagued by an

insurgency in the southwest region of Dhofar, bordering

Yemen. The socialist government of the then People‘s

Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) provided aid to

the Dhofar rebels‘ attempt to topple the sultanate. In

313 Foreign Affairs. Hiltermann, Joost R. ―Disorder on the Border.‖ 16 December 2009.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65730/joost-r-hiltermann/disorder-on-the-border 314



Federation of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Blanchard,

Christopher M. ―CRS Report for Congress: The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya [p. 5].‖ 24

January 2008. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf 316


Congress: Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations [p. 17].‖ 13 January 2010.




Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. ―Oman.‖ 1 April 2010.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mu.html

1983, South Yemen and Oman established diplomatic relations. In 1992, the unified

Republic of Yemen and Oman agreed to their border, which passes through desolate,

sparsely inhabited terrain.319

In 1994, after Yemen‘s Vice President al Baydh had

declared secession, Oman hosted President Saleh and al Baydh to mediate the conflict.

The Omani government supported a unified Yemeni state but still offered asylum to

fleeing southern leaders at the end of the civil war.320

Oman is much wealthier than

Yemen because it has roughly double the oil reserves but one-tenth the population.321

Oman has sponsored Yemen‘s bid to join the Gulf Cooperation Council, an economic and

security alliance comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab

Emirates, and Oman; however, Saudi Arabia has blocked it.322

This owes to fears

Yemen‘s accession could destabilize the alliance given its internal problems.323

Iran

The Yemeni government has persistently claimed that Iran supports

the Houthis, despite a dearth of hard evidence to support such

accusations.324

Exactly how Iran benefits from the civil strife in

northern Yemen is a matter of conjecture. Some analysts think it is

unlikely that Iran has provided anything more than rhetorical support

to the Houthis, another Shi‘ite group, because there are few obvious

benefits. There is no oil in that part of Yemen, and the conflict does

not resonate in the greater Arab Muslim world—in contrast, for

example, to the situation in Israel, where Iran has supported Hamas

and reaped favorable publicity in Arab nations. Moreover, the

religious ties between Iran and the Houthis are nominal because the

Houthis‘ brand of Zaydi Islam is more similar to Sunni Islam than to the ―Twelver‖ form

of Shi‘a Islam in Iran.325

But there may be secondary benefits to Iranian involvement.

The Houthi rebellion long proved unamenable to a military solution, despite several

cease-fire agreements. This increases the likelihood that a brokered settlement will be the

only way to create sustainable peace. In this case, Iran may be a party at the negotiating

table, and therefore increase its stature throughout the region as an advocate of Shi‘ite

319 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State. ―Background Note: Oman.‖ March 2010.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35834.htm 320

Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy. Kechichian, Joseph. ―Chapter

10: Trends in Omani Foreign Policy [p. 255].‖ 1995. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. 321

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. ―Bodine, Johnsen

Testify to US Senate on Yemen, Challenges Ahead.‖ 20 January 2010.

http://wws.princeton.edu/news/Bodine_Johnsen_Senate/ 322


Congress: Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations [p. 24].‖ 13 January 2010.


European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation. ―Gulf Cooperation

Council (GGC).‖ No date. http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=2&lang=en&doc=32 324

Time. Hauslohner, Abigail. ―Yemen‘s Hidden War: Is Iran Causing Trouble?‖ 18 December 2009.

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1947623,00.html 325

The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Saudis‘ Efforts to Swat Rebels from Yemen Risk Inflaming

Larger Conflict.‖ 12 June 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/world/middleeast/13saudi.html

rights. Although the Houthi rebellion has been cast only as a ―proxy war‖ between Saudi

Arabia and Iran, both governments do share an interest in preventing the resurgence of Al

Qaeda in Yemen.326

Somalia

Somalia, as a failed state, is unable to curtail the rampant

piracy based on its shores. Somali pirates have attacked

passing tankers and Yemeni fishing boats. Such activity

has hurt the Yemeni economy because some of the nearly

20,000 ships that annually pass through the Gulf of Aden

have been rerouted, bypassing Yemen‘s refueling

facilities and other services at Aden.327

Yemen also is a

main destination and transit point for Somali refugees

from that country‘s ongoing civil conflict. Most of them undertake a dangerous journey

across the Gulf of Aden, often with the assistance of ruthless smugglers who require

payment for their services but offer no guarantee of safe and successful passage.328

Once

in Yemen, some Somali refugees who fail to cross the border into Saudi Arabia have

reportedly been pressed into military service by the Houthis.329

Terrorist and Insurgent Groups

Al Qaeda

Yemen has a complicated relationship with Al Qaeda.

Osama bin Laden‘s father was born in Yemen, and bin

Laden remains a popular figure in his ancestral homeland.

The so-called Afghan Arabs who fought alongside him in

Afghanistan against the Soviets were often not welcome

back to their home countries, and instead took up

residence in Yemen in accordance with the Prophet

Muhammad‘s hadith: ―When disorder threatens, seek

326 The Jamestown Foundation. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 35. Rahimi, Babik. ―Iranian Leaders

Weigh Support for Houthi Rebellion in Yemen.‖ 19 November 2009.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35755&tx_ttnews[backPid]=61&cHa

sh=a364ab8e6d 327

Yemen News Agency. ―Somali Pirates Trail [sic] in Hadramout Started.‖ 8 March 2010.

http://www.sabanews.net/en/news208068.htm 328

Yemen Times. Jubran, Walid. ―The Crisis of Somali Fugitives to Yemen.‖ 12 August 2009.

http://www.yementimes.com/DefaultDET.aspx?i=918&p=report&a=2 329

BBC News. ―Somali Refugees ‗Forced to Join Yemen Rebel War.‘‖ 16 December 2009.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8416285.stm

refuge in Yemen.‖330

Al Qaeda operatives were responsible for the attack on the U.S.S.

Cole in 2000. Yet an affiliated and fully operational group was formed in Yemen only

after 2005.331

In January 2009, Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia merged to

create a new organization called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

AQAP represents what some analysts refer to as Yemen‘s second generation of Al

Qaeda. The group has some ties to the parent organization but acts with considerable

autonomy.332

It is under the leadership of Nasser al-Wahishi, a Yemeni who broke out of

a Sanaa detention center in February 2006. Yemeni security forces may have aided his

tunnel escape.333

His deputy, Saeed al-Shihri, is a Saudi national who was released from

detention at Guantanamo Bay in 2007. Al-Shihri is suspected of having played a role in a

deadly attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa in September 2009.334

AQAP is said to have

approximately 100 core operatives, most of whom are in their 20s and 30s. Yet it

reportedly has an untold number of sympathizers and strong tribal support in the southern

and eastern governorates.335

AQAP has been able to operate while the Yemeni government‘s attention has been

focused on the Houthi rebellion in the north and the secessionist movement in the south.

President Saleh is obligated to some of its elements, who aided his security forces in

suppressing the southern secessionists in the 1994 civil war.336

The consequences of his

reliance on such parties remain, since Islamic fundamentalists are in the ranks of the

Yemeni armed forces and government.337

Houthi Rebellion

The Yemeni government has been battling an insurgency since 2004 in its mountainous

north, along the border with Saudi Arabia. The conflict began as a law enforcement

operation to arrest Hussein Al Houthi, a former parliament member. Several rounds of

330 The Jamestown Foundation. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, Issue 4. Johnsen, Gregory D. ―Yemen‘s Passive

Role in the War on Terrorism.‖ 23 February 2006.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=686 331

BBC News. ―Profile: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.‖ 3 January 2010.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8437724.stm 332 The New Republic. Shephard, Michelle. ―Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: A Primer.‖ 1 January

2010. http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/al-qaeda-the-arab-peninsula-primer 333

CBC News. ―Al Qaeda is Almost the Least of Yemen‘s Problems.‖ 29 January 2009.

http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2010/01/28/f-indepth-yemen.html 334

The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Freed by the U.S., Saudi Becomes a Qaeda Chief.‖ 22 January

2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/world/middleeast/23yemen.html 335

The Washington Post. Raghavan, Sudarsan. ―Al-Qaeda Group in Yemen Gaining Prominence.‖ 28

December 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2009/12/27/AR2009122702022.html?sid=ST2009122800703 ―Al-Qaeda group in

Yemen gaining prominence.‖ 336

National Public Radio. Flintoff, Corey. ―Can the U.S. Trust Yemen to Fight Al Qaeda?‖ 5 January 2010.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122250796&ft=1&f=1001 337

Stratfor Global Intelligence. ―Yemen: Intensifying Problems for the Government.‖ 7 May 2009.

http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/137547/analysis/20090507_yemen_intensifying_problems_governm

ent

fighting ensued and the conflict expanded, enjoining local tribes and other regional and

foreign actors.338

The insurgents, known as Al-Shabab Al-Muminin (―the Young

Believers‖) or simply the Houthis, were estimated to number 6,000 in 2006.339

Their

strength is augmented by the fact that ―[they] know the geography, they know how to do

guerrilla warfare, and they have tribal connections.‖340

Much about the group remains contested. Although they have espoused anti-America and

anti-Israel rhetoric, the Houthis (unlike Al Qaeda) have not targeted Westerners within

Yemen. The Saleh government has claimed that the Houthis want to re-establish the

Zaydi imamate, which ruled portions of northern Yemen until 1962. It has also accused

them of receiving assistance from Iran and other Shi‘ite sympathizers.341

The Houthis

have accused the government of trying to marginalize their religion by ―installing Sunni

fundamentalists in mosques and official positions in some Zaydi areas.‖ They have also

decried Saudi Arabia‘s support of the Yemeni government, led by Saleh, whom they

regard as a pro-Washington tyrant.342

Local observers have stressed that although the

Houthis consider themselves descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and the rightful

rulers of Yemen, the insurgency is driven by frustration over their economic and social

marginalization.343

The Houthis have garnered tribal support in the north by working to

resolve local conflicts. Such efforts contrast with those of the government, which has

often pitted groups against each other to keep them from uniting against it. At the same

time, the Houthis have dealt ruthlessly with tribes that have sided with the government.344

The majority of the elites in Sanaa, including President Saleh, are of Zaydi origin but,

having embraced republicanism, they no longer base their political identity on their Zaydi

affiliation. In August 2009, the government launched ―Operation Scorched Earth,‖ an

aggressive military campaign that destroyed entire Houthi villages, displacing tens of

thousands of inhabitants. Some observers have asserted that, from the government‘s

perspective, the war is less about controlling territory than reinforcing the Saleh regime‘s

338 International Crisis Group. Middle East Report No. 86. ―Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb.‖ 27

May 2009. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6113&l=1 339 The Jamestown Foundation. Horton, Michael. ―Back From the Grave: The Re-emergence of Houthi

Rebel Leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi.‖ 1 April 2010. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36219&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHa

sh=05fd607dbe 340

The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―Saudis‘ Efforts to Swat Rebels from Yemen Risk Inflaming

Larger Conflict.‖ 12 June 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/world/middleeast/13saudi.html 341

Foreign Affairs. Hiltermann, Joost R. ―Disorder on the Border.‖ 16 December 2009.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65730/joost-r-hiltermann/disorder-on-the-border 342

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. ―Interview: Conflict in Yemen Widens Amid Charges of Iran

Involvement.‖ 20 November 2009.

http://www.rferl.org/content/Interview_Conflict_In_Yemen_Widens_Amid_Charges_Of_Iran_Involvemen

t/1883769.html?page=1#relatedInfoContainer 343 IRIN, UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Analysis: Yemen‘s Rebellions Fuelled by

Economic Meltdown.‖ 4 February 2010. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87996 344

Human Rights Watch. ―All Quiet on the Northern Front: IV. Huthi Conduct and International

Humanitarian Law.‖ 7 April 2010. http://www.hrw.org/en/node/89288/section/9

strength in the face of multiple insurgencies.345

In February 2010, the sixth ceasefire

since the conflict began was negotiated between the government and the Houthi rebels.

Although it remained unclear whether the truce would hold, there was speculation that

the Houthis may have been attracted by an arrangement that would enable them to play a

role in Yemeni politics akin to that of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Under such an arrangement,

the Houthis would theoretically be part of the Yemeni political process but not

completely under the control of the government.346

Some observers have postulated that

the truce was unlikely to hold because of a failure to resolve the problems underlying the

conflict.347

As of April 2010, the Houthis had ―not yet implemented the most important

condition [of the truce], which is going down from the mountains, and handing over their

weapons.‖348

Southern Mobility Movement

The southern mobility movement (al-harakat al-

janubiyya) is an umbrella opposition movement of groups

who feel that the south has been marginalized since

unification. This assertion is partly rooted in the country‘s

Cold War history, when the south was a socialist state.

After unification, the 1993 parliamentary elections swung

power decisively to northerners. Southern leadership

retreated to Aden and declared secession, sparking the

civil war of 1994. At that time, the conflict was primarily between government elites on

both sides; few southerners wished to secede only to be ruled by a reconstituted Marxist

leadership. Since that time, discontent has spread.

Among motivating factors is the lack of an equitable allocation of national resources.349

Yemen‘s oil is mostly located in the area of the former South Yemen, yet the income

accrues mostly to Sanaa, in the north, the seat of the central government. There is no

revenue-sharing arrangement. Businessmen in the south must cultivate connections in

Sanaa if they wish to receive state services, such as import licenses. In the absence of an

impartial judiciary to resolve commercial disputes, few are willing to risk the necessary

capital to raise the standard of living. Governors (who are appointed, not elected) and the

majority of high-ranking military officers in the south are northerners. They are not

accountable to local residents. Southerners complain that these elites have created

345 The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―In Yemen, War Centers on Authority, Not Terrain.‖ 24

October 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/world/middleeast/25yemen.html 346

Yemen Post. ―Houthi Ceasefire: Reality or War Tactic?‖ 31 January 2010.

http://www.yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=1&SubID=1825 347

The New York Times. Reuters. ―Yemen Declares End to War with Shi‘ite Rebels.‖ 19 March 2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/03/19/world/international-us-yemen.html 348

Yemen Observer. Arrabyee, Nasser. ―Yemen Releases al-Houthi Supporters.‖ 8 April 2010.

http://www.yobserver.com/front-page/10018491.html 349

Critical Threats, American Enterprise Institute. Zimmerman, Katherine. ―Yemen‘s Southern Challenge:

Background on the Rising Threat of Secessionism.‖ 5 November 2009.

http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemens-southern-challenge-background-rising-threat-secessionism

patronage networks that exclude locals from access to resources. In short, economic

decentralization would be in the interest of the south.350

While the Yemeni government

has taken a few steps in that direction, the lack of cohesive leadership within the southern

mobility movement, which includes both Islamists and socialists, complicates the

prospect of negotiating new national policies. As of February 2010, more than 100 people

had been killed in outbursts of unrest, which have included protests, demonstrations, and

violent clashes with security forces.351

Water Security

The water situation in Yemen is dire. Because the country

lacks permanent rivers and lakes, it is wholly dependent

upon groundwater (aquifers) and rainfall for its water

supply. Yet water consumption has rapidly outpaced the

replenishment of Yemen‘s limited renewable water

resources. Estimates of Yemen‘s annual renewable water

resources per capita range from 125 to 200 cubic m

(4,414 to 7,062 cubic ft), which is well below the

international water poverty line of 1,000 cubic m (35,314 cubic ft).352, 353

Because of the

absence of regulatory oversight over water extraction, the country‘s natural aquifers are

being depleted at rapid rates for unsustainable irrigation and large-scale private

exploitation. A contrast with India is instructive: The large, South Asian country has

more than 50 times the population of Yemen. Yet India has less than one-eighth the

number of private water-drilling rigs.354

In Yemen, there is easy access to drilling

equipment, some of which was imported to drill for oil.355

The appearance of a new

drilling rig can cause tension within a community.356

In neighboring Oman, new wells

350 The Middle East Institute. Longley, April and Abdul Ghani al-Iryani. ―Fighting Brushfires with Batons:

An Analysis of the Political Crisis in South Yemen.‖ 11 February 2008.

http://www.mei.edu/Publications/WebPublications/PolicyBriefs/PolicyBriefArchive/tabid/539/ctl/Detail/mi

d/1611/xmid/157/xmfid/17/Default.aspx 351

The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―In Yemen‘s South, Protests Could Cause More Instability.‖ 27

February 2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/world/middleeast/28yemen.html?scp=1&sq=southern%20seccesion%

20movement%20yemen&st=cse 352



Intersecretariat Working Group on Environment Statistics, United Nations Statistics Division. Al-

Asbahi, Qahtan Yehya A.M. ―Water Resources Information in Yemen [p. 4].‖ June 2005.

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/envpdf/pap_wasess3a3yemen.pdf 354

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Foreign Policy. Boucek, Christopher and Gregory

Johnsen. ―The Well Runs Dry.‖ February 2009.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23061 355

Yemen Observer. al-Montaser, Mansour. ―A Race for Drilling Water Wells.‖ 16 March 2010.

http://www.yobserver.com/reports/10018348.html 356

Middle East Report No. 254. Lichtenthaeler, Gerhard. ―Water Conflict and Cooperation in Yemen.‖

Spring 2010. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer254/lichtenthaeler.html

can not be drilled without the sultan‘s approval, a law the government seems able to

enforce.357

Yemen has not even ventured this far.

For the government to prevent a national water crisis, it would need to enforce laws

related to extraction. Since 99% of water extraction is currently unauthorized, regulation

is a formidable administrative challenge that the government is unlikely to meet.358

The

country‘s primary cash crop, qat, requires more water than food crops, making it difficult

to reduce usage. Water scarcity is exacerbated by the rapid growth of the population,

which is expected to double over the next two decades. The water crisis may lead to

―water refugees,‖ where Yemenis would seek refuge in other countries as life in Yemen

became intolerable. Competition over water rights has already been identified as the

source of many of Yemen‘s internal conflicts. According to Yemeni researchers, in rural

areas some 70–80% of conflicts are water-related.359

Threats to Internal Security

Corruption

The lack of oversight within the central government

means that the allocation of business licenses and the

execution of government contracts inevitably entail hefty

bribes to government officials. Any citizen who comes

into contact with an official will have to make an under-

the-table payment to procure a service that should be free

or provided at nominal cost, such as routine paperwork.

Once such a practice becomes the norm, it impedes the

development of a transparent administrative structure. Those with access to officials—

government or tribal—utilize them. Those without access seek to develop such ties.

Anyone who lands in a position of power will be expected to provide for family members

as well as for those who can claim other convincing connections. Smuggling of

practically any commodity for which there is a demand has become a big business that

government officials, military officers, and tribal shaykhs all participate in. The end

buyer may be a terrorist group.360

The government‘s policy of subsidizing diesel fuel,

which consumes almost one-third of the national budget, also enables smuggling and

357 Relief Web. Reuters AlertNet. Laessing, Ulf. ―Yemen‘s Water Crisis Eclipses Al Qaeda Threat.‖ 17

February 2010. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACIO-82RDZP?OpenDocument 358

Los Angeles Times. Edwards, Haley Sweetland. ―Yemen Water Crisis Builds.‖ 11 October 2009.

http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/11/world/fg-yemen-water11?pg=2 359

The Christian Science Monitor. Kasinof, Laura. ―At Heart of Yemen‘s Conflicts: Water Crisis.‖ 5

November 2009. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1105/p06s13-wome.html 360

Human Security Gateway, HSRP, Simon Fraser University. Norwegian Peacebuilding Center. Noref

Report No. 4. Saif, Ahmed Abdelkareem. ―Complex Power Relations in Yemen Provide Opportunities for

Al Qaeda.‖ February 2010.


tunitiesForAlQaeda.pdf

bribery.361

Eliminating diesel fuel subsidies, however, forces consumers to pay more and

has led to riots in the past.362

Refugees and Economic Migrants

The government of Yemen is a signatory to the 1951

Refugees Convention, which accords the UN High

Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) the exclusive right

to determine which non-host country nationals are

eligible for asylum. Since the central government of their

country collapsed in 1991, Somalis have been entitled to

automatic refugee status in Yemen, as long as they

register with authorities. According to the UNHCR,

150,000 Somali refugees were living in Yemen as of December 2009.363

Once registered,

they are eligible for government-issued ID cards that they will likely have to pay bribes

for.364

Many more choose not to register; instead, they seek to use Yemen as a transit

point to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. These, in turn, have exerted diplomatic

pressure on Yemen to close the refugee pipeline. The Yemeni government is considering

revising its policy by reviewing refugee status on an individual basis, since they expect

the influx to continue. Furthermore, incoming boatloads of fleeing Somalis may also

contain insurgents.365

Ethiopians, whose country has been suffering a multi-year drought,

must demonstrate evidence of persecution there to gain refugee status. If apprehended by

Yemeni security forces, they risk deportation before they can make their political case to

the UNHCR. The Yemen government views them as ―economic migrants‖ in search of

jobs and therefore ineligible for asylum.366

In 2009, more than 74,000 Somalis and

Ethiopians arrived on Red Sea beaches, up from 50,000 in 2008.367

For the first time,

Ethiopians outnumbered Somalis.368

In early 2010, Sanaa announced it would ―close all

its main waterways‖ to prevent militant infiltration—a policy that would affect Somali

361 The New York Times. Worth, Robert F. ―U.S. to Join Talks on Helping Yemen.‖ 26 January 2010.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/world/middleeast/27yemen.html 362

BBC News. ―Dozens Dead in Yemen Fuel Riots.‖ 22 July 2005.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4707145.stm 363

UN High Commissioner of Refugees. ―Some 74,000 Africans Cross Gulf of Aden to Yemen in Record-

Breaking Year.‖ 18 December 2009. http://www.unhcr.org/4b2bac179.html 364

Forced Migration Review. Forced Migration Review, Issue No. 34: Urban Displacement. Morris, Tim.

―Urban Somali Refugees in Yemen.‖ February 2010. http://www.fmreview.org/urban-

displacement/FMR34/36-38.pdf 365

Relief Web. Yemen Times. Al-Hilaly, Khaled. ―Yemen Examining Its Policy of Offering Somalis

Automatic Asylum.‖ 24 December 2009. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SNAA-

7Z356G?OpenDocument 366

Voice of America News. Murdock, Heather. ―Tougher Times Ahead for Yemen‘s Somali Refugees.‖ 25

January 2010. http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Tougher-Times-Ahead-Yemens-Somali-

Refugees-82625192.html 367

Los Angeles Times. Edwards, Haley Sweetland. ―Somali Refugees Risk Passage to Yemen.‖ 15

February 2010. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/15/world/la-fg-yemen-refugees15-2010feb15 368

IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen-Horn of Africa: African

Arrivals in 2009 Up 55 Percent.‖ 17 January 2010. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87759

refugees attempting to reach Yemeni shores. Yet Yemen‘s Coast Guard lacks the

resources to enforce this policy.369

Poverty

One of the biggest predictors of social conflict is the

proportion of young men ages 15 to 24 in a society. The

median age for males in Yemen is 16.7 years.370

Most

face bleak job prospects in a country where 45% of the

population already lives on less than USD 2 per day.

Given the country‘s steeply declining oil wealth, there is

little prospect of an improvement in the job market, since

few other sectors of the economy have been developed.

In rural areas, land is often inequitably divided, leaving many unable to support

themselves. Since Yemen imports almost all its food, poor Yemenis must reduce

consumption when international prices rise.371

Although global food prices have declined

after reaching unprecedented heights in 2008, the prices of basic commodities remain too

high for many families. Malnutrition is widespread and presents a serious social

problem.372

If the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia were to allow Yemenis to again work in their

countries, as they did prior to the Persian Gulf War, unemployment in Yemen would be

reduced. Yet to re-establish this practice would also open the door to militants posing as

guest workers, a prospect that makes recipient governments nervous.

Armed Forces

When North and South Yemen were unified in 1990, their respective

armed forces were only nominally merged. The civil war in 1994

pitted the two armed forces against each other. It was not until March

1995 that a full merger of the two occurred. The number of

uniformed personnel is high, and the military budget is believed to

consume about 50% of the national budget. Military officers are in

control of key positions within the government. There are an

unknown number of fictitious soldiers on the payroll, which enables

369 The National. ―Yemen Moves to Leave Somali Militants High and Dry.‖ 22 February 2010.

http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100223/FOREIGN/702229846/1135/WEEKEND

ER 370

Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. ―Yemen.‖ 1 April 2010.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html# 371

IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. ―Yemen: Soaring Food Prices Force

More People Below Poverty Line.‖ 29 April 2008. http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=77965 372

Eurasia Review. Cirri, Giancarlo. ―Humanitarian Relief for Yemen in Jeopardy.‖ 3 February 2010.

http://www.eurasiareview.com/2010/02/31576-humanitarian-relief-for-yemen-in.html

their salaries to be spent in other ways.373

In 2007, active duty troops were spread among

the three branches of service as follows: Army: 60,000; Navy: 1,700; and Air Force:

5,000. Although the troop levels are high, a draft was still implemented in 2007 to reduce

unemployment and ensure a ready supply of recruits.374

Yemeni troops are poorly

equipped relative to other militaries in the region. Moreover, there is a formidable turf-

based bureaucracy governing their use. For example, the anti-terrorism unit (established

in the wake of the U.S.S. Cole bombing) under the Ministry of the Interior must request

helicopter support from the Air Force, which falls under the Ministry of Defense.375

The

Air Force may choose not to respond, which would likely impede the timeliness and

effectiveness of an appropriate response. Even as the Yemeni anti-terrorism unit is

receiving training from U.S. and UK troops, it remains to be seen if the Yemeni

bureaucracy is able of executing a coordinated response to a national threat.

In addition, there are tribal militias, sometimes referred to collectively as the ―tribal

military complex,‖ which do not want the national armed forces strengthened. The central

government has limited authority over tribal areas and does not control their militias;

therefore, it may not meet the definition of statehood.376

For example, unofficial prisons

exist in tribal areas. Detainees may have offended a shaykh or simply may need

protection from retaliation during a dispute. There is no regulation of these informal

facilities, which may simply be part of a shaykh’s residential complex rather than an

independent facility.377

Finally, the country is awash in arms. Male members of urban

households likely own a pistol, while rural Yemenis carry a rifle, typically an AK-47.378

Looking Ahead

In addition to the growing population, and depletion of

water and oil resources, a generational leadership change

could also bring instability to Yemen. Those who fought

for the Republican Revolution in the north and secession

in the south will pass from positions of power during the

373 Human Security Gateway, HSRP, Simon Fraser University. Norwegian Peacebuilding Center. Noref

Report No. 4. Saif, Ahmed Abdelkareem. ―Complex Power Relations in Yemen Provide Opportunities for

Al Qaeda.‖ February 2010.


tunitiesForAlQaeda.pdf 374



The Wall Street Journal. Coker, Margaret and Charles Levinson. ―Bureaucracy Hampers Yemeni

Military Effort.‖ 11 January 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126316582583323587.html 376

Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern

Europe. Thomson, Janice. ―Chapter 1: The State, Violence and Sovereignty [p. 1].‖ 1994. Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press. 377




BBC News. ―Yemen‘s Weapon Culture.‖ 22 January 2002.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1775938.stm

next decade.379

In Yemen, leadership positions are typically filled on a hereditary basis.

President Saleh is grooming his son Ahmed to succeed him. So far, Ahmed has kept a

low public profile. He is viewed in some quarters as a leader capable of holding the

country together.380

Yet in promoting his son as his successor, Saleh has been forced to

weaken potential rivals in the next generation, including the kin of key, longstanding

supporters, such as Shaykh Abdallah Al Ahmar, the leader of the important Hashid tribe.

Thus, ―with Saleh increasingly working to ensure that the presidency is transferred to his

own son, Ahmed, President Saleh has, as [scholar April] Alley pointed out, increasingly

marginalized Abdallah‘s son, Hamid—who retaliated by actively supporting Saleh‘s

electoral rival in 2006.‖381

With the loss of this important family‘s support, Ahmed‘s

potential to hold the country together in light of declining oil revenues is in doubt,

particularly since he is untested as a leader. The brunt of the unfolding economic crisis

will likely hit about the same time Saleh steps down after decades in power, forcing his

successor to confront hard choices in a country where the majority of people are already

only eking out a subsistence-level existence.382

379 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Bodine, Barbara K. ―Beware of False Analogies: Why

Yemen is Not Iraq, Afghanistan or Somalia…It‘s Yemen.‖ 20 January 2010.

http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2010/BodineTestimony100120a.pdf 380

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sadiki, Larbi. ―Like Father, Like Son: Dynastic

Republicanism in the Middle East.‖ No date.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/dynastic_republicanism.pdf 381

Middle East Strategy at Harvard. Katz, Mark N. ―Whither Yemen?‖ 18 November 2009.

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/11/whither-yemen/ 382

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Foreign Policy. Boucek, Christopher and Gregory

Johnsen. ―The Well Runs Dry.‖ February 2009.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23061

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