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Rising Powers and International Society: Lessons from the Past

David Armstrong

The Coming Wars

The last fifty years have seen numerous predictions of imminent war between major powers as a consequence of fundamental shifts in the balance of power amongst them leading inevitably to conflict as the declining power tries to protect its position in the global order by resorting to force or the rising power decides the time has come to impose its rightful place upon its rivals. In 1969 Harrison Salisbury predicted “The Coming War between Russia and China”, in 1992 George Friedman did the same in his 400 page thriller, “The Coming War with Japan”. More recently there have been numerous predictions of wars between the US and either China or Russia or Iran or, more vaguely, “Islam”. Just three years ago Australian academic Des Ball claimed to have evidence of Burma’s development of nuclear weapons, which would make it yet another rogue state to add to the lengthening list of states against which American power would shortly need to be deployed.

While enough time has passed for us to be able to laugh at most of these scenarios, what all of them have in common is an interpretation of the underlying nature of international politics that is drawn from their understanding of what they perceive to be fundamental and recurring features of the way states interact with each other. Whether or not these writers have ever heard the term ‘realism’, they are, of course, employing what is still the dominant set of IR theories, albeit a set with many prefixes (classical, traditional, neo-, defensive, critical etc.) and variants like bargaining theory in security studies. They –and realist theories- are also working from an understanding of history as involving a ceaseless struggle for power amongst all states that leads inexorably to war, especially in a situation where one or more powers are declining and others are ‘rising’ in the sense that the growth in their economic and military power is outstripping the established great powers.

One of the high priests of such scenarios, Mearsheimer, cites in evidence the following changes in ‘shares of European wealth’ since 1860:

1860: UK 68%, France, 14%, Prussia 10% (when the latter unified the German states this figure had increased to 16% in 1870)

1890: UK 50%, Germany 25%, France 13%, Russia 5%

1903: Germany 36.5%, UK 34.5%

The message is clear enough: shifts of this magnitude in the overall balance of power lead to war. Similarly, in the somewhat more complex case of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the fact that the values of national self determination and liberalism

represented by the Revolution posed a threat to the old dynastic regimes, together with the way in which first the revolution, then Napoleon were able to transform the nature of war by issuing a call to arms to ‘the nation’ rather than the mercenaries involved in other 18th century wars combined to throw the balance of power into disarray. Finally, in the realist world, ever since the Peloponnesian war whenever one state appears to have achieved an overwhelmingly powerful position, others will inevitably combine against it. This is especially the case where clear distinctions may be drawn between ‘satisfied’ and ‘dissatisfied’ states: those –like Britain at the peak of its imperial days- with a more than ample share of the world’s resources and those like ‘new’ arrivals Japan, Italy and Germany at the end of the 19th century or the same three states in the 1930s whose underlying power is not matched by what they perceive as a sufficient share of the normal rewards of power.

New World of Globalisation –or still The Great Illusion?

From this view of history we should, therefore, anticipate major conflict between the established and the rising powers sooner rather than later. Given the effectively unipolar position of the United States combined with economic weaknesses there and in Europe, that means, in reality, conflict between the US and one or more of the rising powers, most notably China. There are of course alternative scenarios even if we accept the underlying truth of the realist arguments about the inevitability of competition amongst the powers, with a balance of power offering the only prospect of a (temporarily) stable order. For example, the authors of The Balance of Power in World History (Kaufman, Little and Wohlforth eds 2007) argue that there was ‘a basic hierarchical logic’ in the East Asian system over time so that ‘evidence of balancing processes over six centuries is hard to find’. China’s neighbours essentially accepted Chinese preponderance, with stability enhanced by trading links and ‘a complex set of norms about international behaviour that was generally observed by the main political units’. This gives rise to another possible future, with three hegemonial regional orders, dominated by China, the USA and Germany, with a more complex range of possible futures for Africa, depending on the degree to which that continent’s current phase of economic growth can be maintained and be accompanied by greater political stability.

A far more fundamental alternative perspective on the future world order focuses primarily on economic factors. There are several variants on this particular theme. In 1986 Richard Rosecrance, in The Rise of the Trading State argued that the emphasis on territorial control and military preparedness that went alongside the emergence of the modern state was being displaced by a new ‘trading world’ in which ‘the benefit of trade and cooperation greatly exceeds that of military competition and territorial aggrandisement’. He accepted that ‘a tolerable balance in world military politics is necessary to permit a trading system to function’ but claimed that ‘international “openness”, low tariffs, efficient means of transport and abundant markets offer incentives to many nations that have only to find a niche in the structure of world commerce to win new rewards’. Ever-increasing economic interdependence becomes the dominant feature of such a world order. Although Rosecrance does not put it in quite these terms, his future world would eventually come to resemble a kind of global European Union –a possibility to which I will return.

Susan Strange reaches similar conclusions in The Retreat of the State, amongst other works. In an attempt to find an alternative to the state-centric understandings of world politics she finds so limited she develops a more complex explanatory model based on the interaction between three variables: technology, markets and politics, with different actors and processes at work in each. Prophetically, she suggests that ‘one of the most important questions for international political economists today (writing in 1996) is how to create that kind of authority for the integrated world financial system and thus for the good of the world economy’.

Countless studies of globalisation make similar points about how the world of competing states is being displaced by something much more complex, seen by some as ‘neo-medievalism’, by others as ‘cosmopolitanism’: a world in which the internet, global finance, common cultural referents, transnational corporations, international civil society, postmodernism and other forces combine to produce a world in which the interplay between ‘rising’ and ‘declining’ powers is of only marginal significance.

One problem with such arguments is that we have been here before –most notably with Norman Angell’s The Great Illusion (1909). Angell’s book was written as a counter to ‘one of the universally accepted axioms of European politics, namely that a nation’s financial and industrial stability, its security in commercial activity –in short, its prosperity and well-being, depend upon its being able to defend itself against the aggression of other nations, who will, if they are able, be tempted to commit such aggression because in so doing they will increase their power, prosperity and well-being at the cost of the weaker and vanquished’. This he regarded as ‘a gross and desperately dangerous misconception, partaking at times of the nature of a superstition’. His reasoning was, in essence, very similar to that of the globalisation and cosmopolitan theorists: in an age when economic activity had reached such a highly developed level and, given the ‘delicate interdependence of the financial world’ political and military power was ultimately futile. Trade could not be ‘captured’ nor destroyed. Of course Angell was simply putting what he saw as a rational case against the many who were arguing the opposite but ‘irrationality’ won through in 1914 and again in 1939 and several decades were to pass before the world’s economic and financial interactions were to reach their 1909 levels.

It is, nonetheless, reasonable to take the line of cautious optimism and argue that –whatever the future does have in store- another great power war is a fairly low possibility. A key reason remains Angell’s emphasis on economic factors and the interdependence stressed by globalisation theorists. The reason why this did not have the outcome hoped for by Angell is not because he was being hopelessly naïve but because in the world before 1945 great powers viewed their economic situation through the prism of a world characterised by competing global empires. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor it did so after more than a decade of severe economic difficulties, when it had also been denied access to some of the natural resources –notably oil- in its own region, partly by American power and when the European imperial powers were trying to organise their empires into preferential trading systems, which would establish barriers to Japanese trade. After 1945 Japan was able to achieve everything it sought in the 1930s through entirely peaceful means. Between 1949-1979 China fought the

US and its allies, India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam first over Korea and later over border issues. Economic factors were never a significant motivation but, even if they had been, China too was able to attain infinitely superior economic gains through trade and –more significantly if we are concerned with ways in which the total Western enterprise may finally be reaching the end of its five centuries of dominance- through ‘state capitalism.

The Rise of China

Some key facts:

China’s long, continuous history of 4000 years (or more). After long period of divisions and war (the ‘Warring States’ period, 475-221 BCE) the country was unified under the Qin (Ch’in) dynasty in 221 BC and the basic system developed over the next few hundred years –Confucian ideas, mandarinate, Emperor holding the ‘mandate of heaven’, the ‘tribute system’ persisted until the early 20th Century.

Although more than 90% of the Chinese population are of the same ethnic group (Han), and share the same written language, they speak several different dialects, although the government has been trying to make Mandarin Chinese the common one. Also this has not prevented frequent internal conflict between different clans. It is also important to note that the ethnic minorities still make up around 100 million people and in some cases they represent different religions and cultures –Buddhism in Tibet, Islam in the important northwestern region, Xinjiang. Xinjiang is strategically important because it borders Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan and Russia and has substantial oil and gas reserves. It was also the area where China’s first nuclear tests took place.

Ideas and ideologies have always been important in Chinese history, whether Confucianism, the form of Christianity adopted by the Taipings, who engaged in a major revolt against imperial rule in 1850-1864, or Marxism-Leninism. The emperor’s ‘mandate of heaven’ was thought to rest in part upon the degree to which he ruled in accordance with Confucian principles and Mao’s claim to power was always in part based upon his claim to have a more profound understanding of how Marxist-Leninist principles should be applied in the Chinese context. Some would see the Chinese Communist Party as performing a similar role to the mandarin class in imperial China.

Western ideas about individualism have never been accepted by the governing authorities in China. Both Confucianism and Maoism emphasize the individual’s social responsibilities rather than his/her private rights. The Chinese word for ‘democracy’ is closer in meaning to ‘government over the people’ than ‘government by the people’. Similarly, when China began a period of legal reform, partly in response to its need to engage in ever closer economic relations with the West, it tended to talk in terms of ‘rule by law’, rather than ‘rule of law’. This has been an increasing source of tension as China has grown economically and, in consequence, through globalisation and its manifestations such as the internet, its citizens have been exposed to different, Western ideas.

China’s geography has been an important factor in its history. Surrounded, for the most part, by deserts, mountains, jungles and seas, China was mostly able to maintain its culture and develop free from external interference. This also helped the Chinese to develop a view of China as a superior civilization, which was probably true for a long period –the centre of the world (the Chinese word for China, Zhongguo, literally means ‘middle country’). Crucially, China had no concept of equal relations among sovereign states. Until the 19th Century, China has only been conquered twice, by the Mongols, who also conquered large parts of India, eastern Europe and the Middle East, and by the Manchus (from what is now the northeastern province of China, Manchuria. However, in both of those cases, the conquering forces adopted Chinese ideas and established their own dynasties, which attempted to rule, to a significant degree, in accordance with Chinese traditions.

Lieberthal argues that fundamental elements in the essential character and approach of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and especially the approach of Mao, derived from the revolutionary period; in particular, the Long March and the Yan’an period, when the Party established a base there. The ‘mass line’ was one subsequent approach that developed in Yan’an. Lieberthal emphasizes seven aspects of post 1949 China that developed then:

(1) Mao was thought to have the superior strategic vision –his stature was unchallengeable(2) The CCP tried several approaches during this period to deal with disagreement, including

informal discussion but also Stalinist witch hunts, false accusations, torture and executions

(3) Party membership was mostly peasant –not well educated and with a distrust of intellectuals

(4) The Party and army (People’s Liberation Army: PLA) were closely intertwined. The PLA was seen as a political resource, especially by Mao

(5) CCP approaches to governance included mass mobilization, ‘struggle’, encouragement of spontaneity, and hostility to bureaucracy

(6) Belief that willpower could overcome obstacles and that inspired insight and genius was better than carefully thought out expert advice.

(7) Soviet experience was less appropriate to a peasant economy like China and Soviet advice had often been wrong –sometimes disastrously so.

After a relatively successful first five years, key underlying tensions were coming to the surface. Lieberthal suggests that four such tensions were fundamental to understanding the subsequent 20 years of turmoil: (1) the role of Mao. He was not only no good at bureaucratic administration and routine work, he was ideologically and personally opposed to it; (2) the social and political results of following the Soviet approach were a top down command economy, a huge bureaucracy, inequalities and, overall, a situation where the countryside served the cities; (3) Soviet economic aid had provided much of the capital for China’s industrial development but this had

mostly taken the form of low interest loans. By 1956 Chinese loan repayments were greater than new aid income, which required a rethinking of how ongoing economic development could produce more capital; (4) growing resentment and distrust between the peasants and Party cadres, on the one hand, and the intelligentsia –or ‘experts’- on the other

The fundamental underlying tension was between Mao’s approach to building a socialist society and the requirements of sustainable modernization for stability, predictability and the need to build up a technocratic elite. Mao’s approach emphasized building courage and character through constant struggle, preventing a new bureaucratic class from emerging, mobilizing the masses and a kind of ‘permanent revolution’ to ensure that each generation experienced the kind of revolutionary inspiration that had been key to Mao’s personal development. This, in Mao’s view, was also necessary as a counter to the possibility of China reverting back to Confucian views stressing harmony and everyone knowing his/her place.

January 1976 death of Zhou Enlai. September 1976 death of Mao. After a brief period of power struggles Deng Xiaoping effectively took over the leadership and ushered in a second revolution but with ideas that were the direct opposite of Mao’s and with much less violence (hundreds rather than millions killed). Key themes of the Deng revolution were:

An emphasis on educational qualifications as a means to success rather than class background or radical opinions

More open debate about policies A market economy Foreign Direct Investment as part of a policy of ‘opening up’ China A growing middle class An electronic revolution Greater inequality and corruption

China’s Economic Model: the End of the West?

State Capitalism is a term that has been used in many different contexts since the nineteenth century. Here it refers to one way of depicting the current politico-economic situation in China, where an increasingly capitalist/free enterprise economy coexists with an authoritarian state controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. In an interview on CNN in 2008, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao said: "The complete formulation of our economic policy is to give full play to the basic role of market forces in allocating resources under the macroeconomic guidance and regulation of the government. We have one important piece of experience of the past thirty years, that is to ensure that both the visible hand and invisible hand are given full play in regulating the market forces." According to The Economist, state-backed companies account for 80% of the value of China’s stockmarket. The journal adds “With the West in a funk and emerging markets flourishing, the Chinese no longer see state-directed firms as a way-station on the road to liberal capitalism; rather they see it as a sustainable model. They think they have redesigned capitalism to make it work better and a growing

number of emerging world economies agree with them....[they argue] it can provide stability as well as growth”

Sovereign Wealth Funds are reserves held for investment overseas by countries with substantial surpluses in their balance of trade. The most notable sovereign wealth funds have been those held by oil rich Arab states, such as Kuwait but in the last few years China has built up funds of more than $1000 billion for investment overseas. Given that China is a major power and that it is not an open society, the possibility that it might use its sovereign wealth funds for larger strategic or political purposes has caused increasing concern in some of the main targets for investment from such funds, notably the US and the EU. For example, in 2010 a company owned in part by the Chinese government bought a 5.1% stake in the only American-owned provider of enriched uranium for use in civilian nuclear reactors. Sovereign wealth funds can also be used to purchase companies that then provide expertise for Chinese companies –for example when China’s company, Geely International, took over the Swedish car firm, Volvo, for $1.8 billion.

Political aspects of inequality and poverty. Until it embarked on its experiment in state capitalism, China had one of the most equal distributions of wealth in the world. Now it has one of the most unequal distributions of wealth in Asia and the number of Chinese people living in extreme poverty (less than $1 a day) has grown to somewhere between 100 million – 200 million. Wealth is also unevenly distributed between different parts of China. There have already been some signs of serious political unrest because of this. A related phenomenon has been the emergence of a large middle class of more than 200 million of managerial, administrative, professional and technocratic individuals. Additional problems arise from the (often corrupt) involvement of local and national government officials and also the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in various economic activities. There has been much debate in recent years about the internal political aspects of all these developments. There is, for example, a classical argument that a growing middle class increases pressure for democratic reform but many argue that there is no evidence for this in China and, indeed, the opposite may be happening as the new emerging elite seeks to protect its favoured position by resisting democratic reforms that might give a voice to poorer sections of society. The People’s Bank of China estimates that between the mid-1990s and 2008 some 16,000-18,000 officials and executives at state-owned companies stole a total of $123 billion.

Ethical aspects of state capitalism. China’s continuing rapid economic growth and its huge balance of payments surplus and ever-expanding sovereign wealth funds have given rise to a range of complex ethical issues both in China and abroad. For example, such progress as has occurred towards reducing carbon emissions in the USA and Europe has been possible in part because of their ability to import cheaply numerous industrial goods manufactured in China. That has, in effect, simply transferred the carbon emissions to China. Secondly, major companies in the West are increasingly constrained by public opinion there in their economic dealings with countries regarded as committing major human rights abuses or which are engaged on policies strongly disapproved by Western governments (such as Iran and North Korea). China has no such constraints and has hugely increased its economic involvement with Zimbabwe, for example. In 2009 one Chinese company reached a $7 billion mining contract with Guinea just two weeks after 157 pro-democracy demonstrators there were shot

down by police. Thirdly, while foreign companies operating inside Western countries have full access to courts of law in disputes with Western governments, this is much less the case of foreign companies operating in China. For example, when Google decided in 2010 to confront China over cyber attacks against the email accounts of Chinese human rights activists by redirecting Chinese users to a Hong Kong site, it was eventually forced to compromise with China in order to have its license renewed in July. Also in 2010, Rupert Murdoch announced that he was pulling out of his stake in three Chinese TV companies after 20 years of constant difficulties with Chinese authorities. He had, in 1993, argued that capitalism was a major force working against authoritarianism: “Advances in the technology of telecommunications have proved an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere. Fax machines enable dissidents to bypass state-controlled print media. Direct-dial telephony makes it difficult for a state to control interpersonal voice communications. And satellite broadcasting makes it possible for information-hungry residents of many closed societies to bypass state-controlled television channels”. Comments on his decision to pull out have argued that he has been proved wrong in this respect.

China and the Financial crisis. Chinese leaders, after an initial panic, saw the crisis as an opportunity. Chinese businessmen have increased their purchases of Western businesses and its bankers have underpinned American, European and other economies with purchases of bonds etc. China now has more than $2 trillion in foreign reserves. Problems include the fact that major economic decisions in China (eg raising interest rates) have repercussions around the world. Americans argue that the Chinese currency is undervalued and should be allowed to float to reach its true market rate. The Chinese response is to accuse the Americans of printing money to fuel inflation and enable them to reduce the money value of their debt to China.

The Energy question. China’s consumption of oil has increased ten times since 1980. By 2030 it will consume a fifth of all energy in the world. It is already the biggest consumer of iron, copper and aluminium. China uses huge amounts of oil –adding to pollution, although it is also developing the world’s largest renewable energy industry.

Political issues in China today: ethnic and religious violence

China’s minorities make up around 10% of the total population –an increase from the 6% figure in 1949. There are 55 such groups, 18 with populations of more than a million. 2 groups most important in terms of political issues–the Uighurs (Uygurs) of Xinjiang province (8 million+) and the Tibetans (5 million+)

Dreyer’s chapter on Ethnic minorities identifies five basic reasons why the government has spent considerable time, energy and resources on the minorities:

Strategic. Most minorities live on China’s borders –some live on both sides of the border, such as Kazakhs (1 million+ in Xinjiang), Miao (9 million+ in southern China, same ethnic group in Thailand, Burma, Vietnam and Laos). Breakaway movements? Expansionism by bordering states?

Most minority areas are much less populated than the Han Chinese areas: 60% of China’s land area. So –attractive to Chinese immigrants but that inevitably causes problems with the indigenous population.

Rich natural resources and agricultural potential Propaganda factor –need to show contented minority population to underpin picture

of happy China, moving towards socialism or, in later years, state capitalism. Tourism –scenery, costumes etc

Other issues:

Pluralism/multiculturalism versus integration/assimilation Possible resentment by majority population over perceived privileges for minorities

(eg. permitted to have more children) and official toleration of cultural differences (eg. polygamy/polyandry)

Conflict between developing socialism and traditional practices (especially during Great Leap and Cultural Revolution upheavals when various practices, clothing, festival days etc were declared ‘decadent’, bourgeois’ etc. During the Cultural Revolution some ethnic leaders in Mongolia and elsewhere were accused of ‘national splittism’.

The Great Leap was a major cause of revolts in Tibet and Xinjiang that led to many refugees escaping to India and the Soviet Union –actively opposed to China and living in two countries with whom China was encountering increasing problems, leading to war (1962 with India, 1969 with Soviet Union).

Actual policies towards minorities fluctuated in line with changing balance of power within the elite.

The move towards market capitalism and increased growth brought new problems –several ethnic regions were left behind and exploited, including through having their land expropriated. Even when the centre tried to appease the ethnic areas by giving them tax advantages, this helped to produce a flood of Han immigrants into Tibet and elsewhere. These immigrants often received higher wages than the Tibetans (which was partly seen as a necessary inducement by the authorities but inevitably viewed as treating the indigenous population as second class citizens as well as designed to reduce the locals to a minority.

The global rise of Islamist fundamentalism also affected China’s Muslim areas, especially Xinjiang

Tibet, especially, became a focal point for Western human rights activists, partly because of growing western interest in Buddhism and Tibetan history (sometimes seen from an overly romantic perspective). The Dalai Lama received the Nobel Prize in 1989. Similarly, Xinjiang became a focal point for concern by Muslim activists and some Muslim governments. In 1989 the Communist headquarters in the Xinjiang capital, Urumqi, were attacked after the publication in China of a book critical of Islam.

After the Tianamen Square incident, the government took an increasingly repressive attitude towards minority discontent, with many arrests. A 1997 criminal law, while making publications insulting or discriminating against minorities punishable by three years jail, also had a clause imposing up to ten years jail sentences on persons who “take advantage of national or religious problems to instigate the splitting of the state

or undermine the unity of the state”. In the same year, the government arrested Muslim students in Xinjiang campaigning for limitations on the sale of alcohol. Up to 300 were killed in a later demonstration.

After September 11, 2001 repression against Uighur Muslims increased. Beijing claimed there were more than a thousand Taliban-trained Uighurs, promoting fundamentalism and engaging in terrorism. Actual number probably much less.

Early policies of protecting minority languages were given much less emphasis from the late 1990s, with much more pressure to learn Chinese. There was also a hardening of the official line against religion.

Minority resistance was also increasing, including assassinations, terrorist bombings and violence against Han residents.

The Dalai Lama has consistently called for more autonomy, rather than full independence for Tibet but China has fiercely opposed his arguments. He fled Tibet for India, following an unsuccessful uprising against Chinese rule in 1959. Demonstrations against Chinese policy there took place in several countries during China’s 2008 hosting of the Olympic Games.

Violence broke out in Xinjiang in 2009, with some Han Chinese killed by Uighurs and hundreds of Uighurs killed in the subsequent repression. Xinjiang’s Han population has increased from around 5% in 1949 to nearly 50% today. The population increase has cause some economic problems, such as water shortages. Han immigrants tend to be richer and have been given preference in local civil service positions: the Chinese hiring them say this is because educational and literacy levels are much lower amongst the Uighurs.

How might the modernisation process affect the governance of China?

(Some points below are drawn from article by Li Hongtu, others from articles and books by Elizabeth Economy, Susan Shirk, David Saich and Kenneth Lieberthal)

1975 concept of modernisation used in government report. Chinese called on torealise “Four Modernizations”, in the fields of industry, agriculture, national defence, science and technology.

Two previous models since 1949: the Soviet model characterised by the creation of a centrally planned economy, by a strategy of high-speed industrialisation with priority given to heavy industry, and by a series of radical social reforms, political and literary purges.“Learn from the Soviet Union”, “the USSR today is China’stomorrow” were the slogans of the day. The market economy was seen as part of capitalism and private property abolished.

Mao’s revolutionary road to socialist modernization: People’s Communes, backyard steel furnaces, Great Leap Forward, attacks on intellectuals, later the Cultural Revolution

1976-1997. Deng Xiaoping period: called for the “Liberation of the Mind” from old dogmas and a mistaken understanding of socialism, including the belief that a centrally-planned economy was identical with socialism, that a market economy was by nature capitalistic, that nationalised and collective enterprises are naturally superior to private ownership, that class struggle becomes more acute as society advances.

December 1978, the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Congress of the CCP held. Policies of reform, opening-up, economic development and modernization put forward; market economy established, state-owned enterprises coexist with other forms of ownership, namely collective, private, and mixed; science and education emphasized

Issues

The struggle between Ti and Yong or “Chinese learning as essence, Western learning as utility”. Ti refers to the underlying system of a country, for example, the

political system and economic system, etc. Yong means way or method, or useful material, for example advanced technology, useful knowledge, etc. During the 19th century, this slogan was used to argue that that China’s imperial system should be the foundation, while the Western system should remain a mere utility. China was to achieve modernization, but without altering the dynastic system, and only through learning from the West’s advanced technology, useful knowledge, etc. China’s defeat by Japan in 1894 led to much soul-searching about the relation between Ti and Yong. Some intellectuals argued that the imperial system was responsible for the defeat. Some called for “Total Westernisation”: summarised as “Democracy” and “Science”.

After 1975 China faced the same challenge of choosing the best way to modernise and learn from the West. The debate between Ti and Yong came up again: some intellectuals called for total westernisation, some spoke against it, arguing that experience had shown that “total westernisation” was impossible for China. Deng Xiaoping argued that the market economy was not to be divided into two parts –capitalism or socialism, and that China shouldn’t get tangled up in debates about the nature of a market economy but just get on with constructing one –now in existence as the “socialist market economy”.

Another issue concerns whether China should opt for revolution or reform in culture and politics. Some argue that China’s ancient culture should be gradually abandoned and China should introduce more and more Western ideas. The argument here was that unless traditional thinking was changed, modernization would slow down and even go into reverse. Others emphasized the need for reform of China’s political system.

China’s military modernisation could have consequences for its relations with other countries that would directly or indirectly affect its governance. Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, stated in June 2010 that “I

have moved from being curious to being genuinely concerned” about China’s military programmes.

China has had to introduce increasing numbers of rules relating to corporate governance that might impact over time on state governance –the need for shareholders to have transparency and full disclosure from company managers, shareholders’ rights to challenge board decisions, their right to information and various rights for aggrieved shareholders to pursue their grievances through legal means (for example, reforms to the Company Act in 2005) –although local courts are inefficient and can be reluctant to take up corporate governance issues

The encouragement of education and the development of an intellectual class, while intended mainly to produce technical and scientific experts, has also had the effect of producing an intellectual elite interested in political reform. While frequently repressed and imprisoned, this group has maintained an important presence in the ongoing discourse about China’s future. A new problem has been increasing numbers of unemployed college graduates. One Ministry of Education estimate in 2005 was that 25% of the 3.38 million graduates in that year would be unable to secure work.

As China becomes a world economic and, potentially, military and political power, it will be increasingly concerned to project an image of a modern society: this might well require much more political reform. Much recent debate in China has focused on this.

Because of inadequacies in the capacity of China’s legal system to offer redress for the many people with major grievances in China, there have been many demonstrations of workers and peasants protesting about a range of issues: embezzlement of pension funds by corrupt officials, seizure of land and other issues.

The gap between rich and poor has widened to a point where the richest 10% have 45% of the country’s wealth, the poorest 10% have only 1.4%. Another issue is the ‘demographic timebomb’: in 2030 the number of people over 65 will more than double to 350 million; in 2065 54% of the population will be over 60 and only 22% working unless the government permits larger families or immigration.

In an address last year to the US Council on Foreign Relations, Elizabeth Economy argues that there has been increasing official recognition of the need for political reform. In October 2010 the Party issued a communiqué stating , "Great impetus will be given to economic restructuring while vigorous yet steady efforts should be made to promote political restructuring." A series of People’s Daily editorials published in October articulated the central party leadership’s interest in a reasonably constrained version of political reform. The editorials argued that in the process of political

restructuring, it is "imperative to adhere to party leadership, to the socialist system and to socialism with Chinese characteristics," and that the aim of political reform is to "enhance the vitality of the Party and the country and to mobilize people’s enthusiasm."

Beijing has launched several notable initiatives to develop a system of official accountability and promote greater transparency within the existing political system. These include anti-corruption campaigns; regulations to promote public access to information in areas such as the environment and to govern "the convening of party congresses, selection for and retirement from official posts, and fixed-term limits" and experiments in budgetary reform. Beijing has also permitted a few non-Communist Party members to hold key positions within the government, such as Wan Gang, the Minister of Science and Technology, and Chen Zhu, the Minister of Health.

With social unrest on the rise, the Party is also searching for ways to be more responsive to the interests of the Chinese people, without transforming the system entirely. One effort is an online bulletin board, "Direct Line to Zhongnanhai," where the Chinese people can leave messages for the top leaders. Both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have participated in active web-based dialogues with the Chinese people. Local officials may appear on radio shows and some delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and District Congresses have also established times to meet with their constituents to listen to their concerns. There has been discussion within the NPC, however, that such meetings are problematic because officials may develop their own individual constituencies and popular followings.

Elizabeth Economy also argues that some of China's recent reform initiatives, such as the drive to develop a "harmonious society", derive from an element of the political spectrum that is concerned overwhelmingly with social justice. Some intellectuals, as well as former military officials, workers, and farmers have raised serious concerns about the downside of thirty years of unfettered economic growth. Crony capitalism, the failure to ensure an adequate social welfare net, and growing environmental challenges are all seen as failures of the current Chinese political economy. Sometimes grouped as "the New Left", these scholars are suspicious of further market reforms and want a stronger state-hand in the market to ensure social justice.

While a significant segment of China’s political elite works to "modernize" the political system, others seek to revolutionize it. Political activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo represents the boldest of those who call for such revolutionary reform with his online human rights manifesto, Charter 08, and his calls for universal values, direct elections, constitutional democracy, separation of powers, and protection of private property, among other elements of institutional reform.

Many Chinese intellectuals and media elite support such views. After Liu’s award, a group of 100 journalists, scholars, writers, and ordinary citizens signed a public letter calling on the Communist Party to realize the goals of democracy and constitutional government espoused by Liu. Just prior to Liu’s award, a group of retired Party elders submitted a letter to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress

calling for freedom of speech and press, and the abolition of censorship. This group included many former senior media officials, such as the former director of People’s Daily, editor-in-chief of China Daily, deputy director of Xinhua News Agency, and even the former head of the News Office of the Central Propaganda Department.

Such reformers clearly viewed Premier Wen Jiabao as their patron within the Chinese leadership. Premier Wen, in a set of speeches, as well as a much heralded interview with CNN, has argued that freedom of speech is "indispensable for any country," and that "continuous progress and the people’s wishes for and needs for democracy and freedom are inevitable." He further has noted that the Party has to evolve—one that served as a revolutionary Party should not look the same as a governing party. Wen’s concluding remarks in the CNN interview further suggest that he was pushing for change outside generally-accepted party principles: "I will not fall in spite of a strong wind and harsh rain, and I will not yield till the last day of my life." More recently Wen’s image of moderate reformer was damaged by a New York Times report saying that he had effectively amassed around $2 billion.

There is also a lively discourse in China's print and online media that supports reform. Journalists, scholars and web activists all maintain a constant stream of advocacy for more fundamental political reform. They lodge their calls for such reform as essential to the achievement of key Communist Party priorities.

One popular argument, for example, is that revolutionary political reform is necessary for continued economic growth. An editorial, "The Only Answer is Political Reform," published by the board of the Economic Observer in late October 2010 argues: "Without reforming the political system, we cannot guarantee the benefits that economic reform brings, nor will we be able to continue to push ahead with reforms to the economic system and social reform will also fail…In fact, whether it’s breaking the deadlock on economic reform or making a breakthrough on social reform, both rely on pushing ahead with political reform."

Political reform advocates also often suggest that social stability—one of the Party’s top priorities—can only be ensured by more fundamental reform. Hu Shuli, the outspoken editor of Caixin and Century Weekly, for example, argues that political reform has stagnated because of "fears that a misstep would lead to social unrest." She goes on to note, however, that, "Overblown worries that delay what’s needed only exacerbate the very tensions threatening to destabilize society." Similarly, Liang Wendao, a host on Phoenix Satellite TV, wrote an editorial detailing a number of social challenges, such as "carcinogenic tea oil being sold in supermarkets, rumors of deadly tick bites and the resistance to forced demolitions," and argued that all of these are counterproductive to the official goal of "maintaining stability."

Political reform as an integral step to improving China’s foreign policy and image is also becoming a widely supported theme. Wang Jisi, the head of Peking University’s School of International Studies, for example, has stated that the only way to overcome the unfortunate oscillation within Chinese political thinking and commentary—between claiming superiority and inferiority or victimization—is by more exposure to the outside world, better education within China, and improving "our own society and rule of law." An editorial in Century Weekly, entitled "At Last, A Magic Moment for Political Reform," echoes this theme, noting that social problems, such as forced

evictions, have strained relations between the government and people, causing people to lose faith in their country and damaging China’s image abroad.

The growing role of the Internet in Chinese political life poses a significant challenge to the Party’s efforts to constrain political reform. While the Internet is a valuable tool for the Party, both in learning what the Chinese people are thinking and in promoting transparency within the political system, it raises serious concerns as well. Central Party School official Gao Xinmin raised several issues in an off-the-record speech that was later made public on the web: "Against a backdrop of a diversity of social values, new media have already become collection and distribution centers for thought, culture and information, and tools for the amplification of public opinion in society. They are a direct challenge to the Party’s thought leadership and to traditional methods of channeling public opinion. Traditional thought and education originates at the upper levels, with the representatives of organizations, but in the Internet age, anyone can voice their views and influence others. Many factual instances of mass incidents are pushed by waves of public opinion online, and in many cases careless remarks from leaders precipitate a backlash of public opinion."

The Internet is, in fact, evolving into a virtual political system in China: the Chinese people inform themselves, organize, and protest online. As the blogger Qiu Xuebin writes, "When the interests of the people go unanswered long term, the people light up in fury like sparks on brushwood. The internet is an exhaust pipe, already spewing much public indignation. But if the people’s realistic means of making claims are hindered, in the end we slip out of the make-believe world that is the internet and hit the streets." In July 2010, bloggers provided firsthand accounts of a large-scale pollution disaster in Jilin Province, contradicting official reports. Thousands of people ignored government officials, angrily accusing them of a cover-up, and rushed to buy bottled water. Chinese are also "voting" online. In one instance, a journalist sought by the police on trumped-up charges of slander took his case to the Internet. Of the 33,000 people polled, 86 percent said they believed he was innocent. The Economic Observer then launched a broadside against the police, condemning their attempt to threaten a "media professional". The authorities subsequently dropped the charges against the journalist.

Activists have also used the Internet to launch successful campaigns—some involving physical protests—to prevent the construction of dams and pollution factories and to oppose the removal of Cantonese on television programs airing in Guangdong. Most striking perhaps, has been the emergence of iconic cultural figures who use the Internet for political purposes. The renowned artist Ai Weiwei, for example, has pursued justice for families whose children died in the Sichuan earthquake, even documenting his encounters with recalcitrant officials on YouTube. The racecar driver and novelist-turned-blogger, Han Han, routinely calls for greater media and cultural freedom. Since its launch in 2006, his blog has received more than 410 million hits.

The social network site Twitter, despite being blocked in China, has become a particularly politicized Internet venue. According to the popular “netizen”, Michael Anti, Twitter is the most important political organizing force in China today. He notes that more than 1.4 million yuan was raised for the beleaguered NGO Gongmeng (Open Constitution Initiative) via Twitter. And he points to the uncensored discussion held between the Dalai Lama and Chinese citizens in May 2010 as an example of the political influence that Twitter can exert. According to Anti, the people who participated stopped referring to the Dalai Lama as Dalai and now call him by the more respectful Dalai Lama. Anti reports that there are over 100,000 active Chinese Twitter users, and he anticipates that there will be 500,000 or more within the next two to three years.

Implicit, and often explicit, in the debate over the nature of China's future political reform is the role of the outside world. A recurrent theme is a willingness to learn from the West but a rejection of a Western model. Qin Xiao, the former Chairman of China Merchant Bank Group, speaks the need for such a balance: "An historic theme in modern China is the search for a unique model and way to modernize. A major part of this theme revolves around a 'dispute between the west and China and a debate of the ancient and modern.'…It misreads and misinterprets universal values and modern society. It is a kind of narrow-minded nationalism that rejects universal civilization…Adhering to universal values, while creating Chinese style approaches, is truly the objective for our time." Global Times notes, "China has to continue its political reforms in the future, including drawing beneficial experiences from Western democratic politics, however, China will never be a sub-civilization, and it will only follow its roadmap in a gradual manner."

An additional challenge for China’s government stems from its failure to develop adequate mechanisms to manage the numerous environmental and technological risks that inevitably accompany rapid development. Major incidents in recent years have included high rates of industrial accidents (especially in mining) and safety issues with some Chinese goods, including food and drugs. China has established central agencies to try to regulate such risks but some argue that more decentralised agencies are necessary to identify risks, to develop science-based health and safety standards and to ensure the accountability of companies and officials responsible for creating or not preventing hazards. The development of institutions and processes for managing such risks is sometimes referred to as the ‘sixth modernisation’

How might China’s emergence as a superpower affect international politics over the next few decades?

Statistics and Projections

China’s economic growth in 2010: 10.3%; in 2011:8.9%. But the government is concerned about the inflationary aspects of this and talks about a 7.5% rate. It also says it wants growth to be healthier (less pollution), sustainable and to bring greater improvements to people’s livelihoods.

200 million live on less than $1.25 a day. 900 million still live in the countryside China’s total GDP is now second to the US, but per capita GDP is 93rd in the world The Chinese economy represents about 8% of total world economic activity. The US

economy represents more than 25% One projection argues that the Chinese economy will have a value of $123 trillion by

2040 (3 times the output of the whole world in 2000) In 1998 China produced 830,000 graduates. In 2010 this number had grown to more

than 6 million. Graduate pay has been falling in real terms and many find themselves unemployed

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is seen as a reflection of a country’s economic power. In 1914 45% of world FDI was owned by Britain; in 1967 the US owned 50%; China today, including Hong Kong, owns 6%. In 2010 FDI into China topped $100 million; Chinese FDI was $59 billion.

By 2007 the total value of Chinese investment in Africa had reached $7.5 billion, US investment was $13 billion, the EU’s $25 billion

China has 10 million small businesses The US, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Germany account for around

50% of total Chinese trade. The current Chinese trade imbalance with the EU is $130 billion (to China’s advantage)

Trade with Latin America and Africa was $20 billion in 2000; it had grown to $140 billion by 2008

China’s population is 1.3 billion (total world population is 6.7 billion). It is projected to reach 1.45 billion by 2040. India’s population is 1.2 billion –projected to reach 1.52 billion by 2040

China is now the world’s largest consumer of energy. It is relatively rich in coal and oil but only 2% of its requirements come from nuclear power, 17% from hydroelectric power (China’s rivers make this source potentially much greater

Military spending is around 2% of GDP (some outside observers query this figure, arguing that in reality it might be twice that proportion)

China increased military spending by 12.7% in 2011, to $91.5 billion. But some of this was due to the need to increase military pay because of rising inflation

US military spending is more than $550 billion. Indian military spending is $30 billion

China is increasing its capacity to project its military power by building an aircraft carrier. It has also successfully tested stealth aircraft

China as a model

In the last five years China has sponsored around 500 ‘Confucius Institutes’ round the world to promote Chinese language and culture. It intends this number to increase to 1000 by 2020. Some see these, which normally involve collaboration between a Chinese and a foreign university, as an exercise in Chinese ‘soft power’. In Canada an intelligence report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in 2008 said "Beijing is out to win the world's hearts and minds, not just its economic markets, as a means of cementing power." Similar criticisms have appeared in India, Germany and Japan. In Israel, Tel Aviv University officials shut down a student art exhibition about the oppression of the Falun Gong movement. A Tel Aviv District Court judge said the university "violated freedom of expression and succumbed to pressure from the Chinese Embassy, which funds various activities at the university, and took down the exhibit, violating freedom of expression."This ruling was criticised by the dean of students, who "feared that the art exhibit would jeopardize Chinese support for its Confucius Institute and other educational activities on the campus."

‘Soft power’ involves ways of building up a country’s prestige and influence by non-military means. US ‘soft power’ includes FDI, music, movies, the dominance of the English language, the internet and its image as a force for liberal democratic and human rights values. China’s ‘soft power’ resources are fewer and include its ability to project itself as an alternative path to growth to the Western ‘democratic capitalism’ model and a source for economic aid that pays little attention to concerns about human rights, transparency and corruption.

China as a threat?

Taiwan remains the most likely source of conflict with China. China’s disputes over islands in the South China and East China seas are manageable if all sides can share in their economic exploitation. But Taiwan is strategically, psychologically and symbolically vital to Chinese interests.

The United States is seeking ways of reducing the size of its global military commitments, including encouraging Japan and India to build up their own military capacities

The regional ‘balance of power’ is subject to constant minor fluctuations, involving moves by the regional great powers (including Russia and the US) as well as smaller states, including Indonesia, Australia and Central Asia. This process is likely to continue rather than settling down into a fixed balance –UNLESS China (or another great power) appears aggressive.

China has consistently stressed its desire to achieve a ‘peaceful rise’. During the 2009 US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a leading Chinese foreign affairs official said: “China’s number one core interest is to maintain its fundamental system and

state security; next is state sovereignty and territorial integrity; and third is the continuing stable development of the economy and society”.

During the same meeting, an American economist argued that the US and China should work towards ‘an informal G2 that could provide effective joint leadership of the world economy’. This would supplement (not supplant) the G8 and G20.

An article in Foreign Affairs in 2009, entitled ‘The G2 Mirage’ dismissed this proposal.

New International Society –Different Models?

1. International Society today: Bull’s Anarchical Society, plus US hegemony/unipolarity plus some cosmopolitan elements –Responsibility to Protect, International Criminal Court, global civil society

2. The above, with less US preponderant power and more cosmopolitanism (might require an EU revival/advance towards federalism with further ‘normative power Europe’ elements)

3. The above with less US preponderant power and less cosmopolitanism (both have been resisted by China)

4. A global EU. Increasing economic interdependence leads to more regulation and more global institutions. (would require China to continue along a westernizing route)

5. A neomedieval order. Many actors, state, sub-state, global, regional.

6. China returns to being the Middle Kingdom –the richest and most powerful state, somewhat aloof from the rest of the world so long as its wishes and interests are observed. State capitalism supreme? More Confucian values?

7. The above but with China having taken on board most Western values, including a freer capitalist system.

8. Different regional orders, with reasonable free trade provisions between them and security, including R2P interventions devolving to the regions.