WWII Guerrilla Warfare History

8/9/2019 WWII Guerrilla Warfare History

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THA:'lSLATOH'S NOTE

In J u l y,1941,

the undec la redwar

between Chinaand

Japanw i l l e n t e r i t s f i f t h yea r. One of the most s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e sof t ~ e s t rugGle has been the o rg a n i z a t i o n of the Chinese peoplefo r unl imi ted g u e r r i l l a lNarfare. The development o f t h i s warf a re has fol lowed the p a t t e r n l a i d out by Mao Tzu Tung and h i sc o l l a b o r a t o r s in the pa.mphlet Guerr i l la . ' , .arfare t w h i ~ l, ' JaSpubl i shed in 1937 and has been widely d i s r i b u t e d in FreeChina a t t en cen t s a copy.

'ao Tzu Tung, a memLer'of the Chinese Communist p a r t yane:. former p o l i t i c a l comrnissar of the Four th Red Army, t s nonovice in the a r t o f war. Actua l b a t t l e exper ience wi th bo threGular and g u e r r i l l a t roops has q u a l i f i e d him as an exper t .This I b e l i e v e the b iograph ica l ske t ch e x t r a c t e d from EdgarSnow's :'1ed S t a r Over China w i l l i n d i c a t e .

~ e i n f luence of the anc ien t ~ i l i t r y ph i lo sophor Sun Tzuon I'Eao' s n i l i t a r y thouSht w i l l be appa ren t .to those who haveread The Sook o f , :ar. Sun Tzu wrote t h a t speed , s u r p r i s e andd ~ c e p t i o n were the prLnary e s s e n t i a l s of the a t t a c k and h i ssucc inc t advice lfSheng Tung, Chi Hsi ( D i s t r a c t i o n in the T:l;ast3 t r i k e in the ~ e s t i s no l e s s va l id today than i t was when he\frote i t twenty fou r hundred years ago. The t a c t i c s of SunTzu a r e in l a rge messure the t a c t i c s of China ' s g u e r r i l l a s t o -oay.

: 10.0 says t h a t u n l b l i t ed g u e r r i l l a warfare wi th vas t t imeand space f a c t o r s e s t a b l i s h e s a new s i l i t a r y process . Thisseems a t r u e s ta tement as t he re a re no o t h e r h i s t o r i c a l examplesof guer r i l l a . h o s t i l i t i e s as t ho rough ly organized from the m i l i -t a r y, p o l i t i c a l , and economic p o i n t o f view as those in Cllna.','e in the Harine Corps have as y e t encounte red noth ing butr e l a t i v e l y pr imi t ive and s t r i c t l y l i ; i l i ted g u e r r i l l a war. Thus

lrhat : Tao has wri t t e n o f t h i s new type of g u e r r i l l a war :may beof i n t e r e s t to us .

I have t r i e d to p r e s e n t the a u t h o r s ideas a c c u r a t e l y,but as the Chinese language i s not a p c r t i c u l a r l y s u i t a b l e~ e d i Q f o r the expres s ion o f t e c h n i c a l thought the t r a n s l a t i o nof some of the modern idioms not ye t to be found in a v a i l a b l ed i c t i o n a r i e s i s p r o b a l l y a rguab le . I can not vouch f o r theaccuracy of the r e t r a n s l a t e d quo ta t ions . I have t aken thel i b e r t y to d e l e t e f rol l the t r a n s l a t i o n m a t t e r which wa.s pure lyr e p e t i t i o u s .


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CHAyrLfl Ofm

In a war o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a r a c t e r g u e r r i l l a ope ra t ions . area necessa ry p a r t . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so in a \/8.1 vra:;ed fo r tlleemanc ipa t ion o f a people ~ h o i nhab i t a v a s t n a t i o n . China i ssuch a n a t i o n , a n a t i o n whose t echniques a re undeveloped and whosecommunications a re poo r. She f i nds h e r s e l f conf ron ted wi th astronG and v i c t o r i o u s Japanese imper ia l i sm c Under these circUJ.ll-s tances t he development o:f t ; le type of g u e r r i l l a warfare cha ract e r i z e d by the. q u a l i t y of nass i s bo th neces sa ry and natura . l .This warfare must be developed to a de6ree unprecedented and i tmust coord ina t e wit:1. the ope ra t ions of our r e g u l a r arr,1ies. I f wef a i l to do t h i s vve w i l l f i n d i t d i ff j . cu l t to defea t the enerlY.

These g u e r r i l l a ope ra t ions must not be cons idered as an independant form of war fa re . They a re but one s t ep in t ae t o t a lwar; one aspec t o the r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e . They are the ine v i t a b l e r e s u l t o f the c l a s h between oppressor and oppressed whenthe l a t t e r r each the l i m i t s o f t ~ e i r endurance. In our caset he se h o s t i l i t i e s began a t a tirtle w ~ l e n the people were unable toendure any nore f r o n t le Japanese i l : l p e r i a l i s t s . LenIn s a i d : ApeopleTs i n s u r r e c t i o n and a peop le ' s r e v o l u t i o n are no t onlynatuY'al but inevitable, ,11 (People and ~ : e v o l u t i o nVe cOl1siderg u e r r i l l a operat:: 'ons as bu t one aspec t o f our t o t a l or l a S S vrarbecause t hey, l k i n ~ the q u a l i t y o f independence, are o f themse lves incapable o f p rov id ing a s o l u t i o n to the s t r u g g l e .

G u e r r i l l a warfare has q u a l i t i e s and o b j e c t i v e s p e c u l i a r toi t s e l f . . I t i s a 1rTeapOn t:.lat a n a t i o n j n f e r i o r in ariilS and m i l it a r y equipment may employ age.inst a nore pOYTerful aGSressol'nat ion. . V:hen the invader p i e r c e s deep i n to the h e a r t of theweaker count ry and occupies I ter t e r r i t o r y in a c rue l and oppress ive manner t he re i s no doubt t h a t cond i t i ons o f t e r r a i n , c l i m a t e ,and s o c i e t y i n gene ra l o f f e r o b s t a c l e s to h i s prog re s s and may beused to advantaGe by those who oppose him., In ( ; u e r r i l l a warfarewe t u r n t he se advantages to the purpose of res i s t in . : ; and d e f e a t .ing t ~ enemy.

During the pror ; ress o f : : o s t i l i t i e s G u e r r i l l a s g r a d u a l l y develope i n t o or thodox fo rces t > a t ope ra t e i n conjunc t ion wi th o the run i t s o f t :le r e g u l a r army. Thus t:le ree ;u la r ly org8.nized t roops ,t h o s e : : ; u e r r i l l a s who have a t t a i n e d t h a t s t a t u s , and t ~ l O s e whohave no t reached t h a t l e v e l o f development conbine to forD them i l i t a r y power o f a n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y war. There can be nodoubt t h a t the u l t.ir.w. t e re8' l1 t o f t h i s w i l l be v i c t o r y.

Both in i t s development and in i t s m e t ~ o d o f p ~ l i t i o n g u e r r i l l a warfare has c e r t a i n d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . V ef i r s t d i scuss t ' le r e l a t i o n s h i p o f g u e r r i l l a warfare to nat ionp . l

p o l i c y. Because ours i s t ~ l e resJ . s tance o f a s e n i - c o l o n i a l

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count ry aga ins t an imper ia l i sm our h o s t i l i t i e s Tmst have a c l e a r l ydef ined p o l i t i c a l goal and f i rmly e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i t i c a l respons ib i l i t i e s . Our b8.sic po l i cy i s t:le c roa t ion 0: a n a t i o n a l un i t edan t i - Japanese f r o n t . This po l i cy we pursue in orde r t o ~ i n ourp o l i t i c a l goal w:licD i s the complete enanc i p a t ion of the Ch5.nes e

people . There aI'e c e r t a i n fundamental ste:;.Js necessar-;l il1 ther ea l i za t j . on of t h i s p o l i c y, to w i t :

1 Arous ing and o r g ~ l l z i n g the people2 . c h i e v i n ~ i n t e r n a l u n i f i c a t i o n p o l i t i c a l l y3 . E s t a b l i s h i n g bases4. Bquipnent of forces5 . r ecove ry of n a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h6 . Des t ruc t ion of enemy's n a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h7 Regaining l o s t t e r r i t o r i e s .

There i s no reason to cons ide r f Ueri l la warfare s e p a r a t e l y fromn a t i o n a l p o l i c y. On the con t ra ry, i t must be organized an


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What is the organ iza t ion f o r g u e r r i l l a warfare? Though a l lg u e r r i l l a bands t h a t sp r ing from the masses of the people su:C ferfrom lacle o f organ iza t ion a t the t ime of t h e i r formation t hey a l lhave in common a bas ic q u a l i t y t h a t raakes organ iza t ion p o s s i b l e .

Al lg u e r r i l l a u n i t s must have p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y

l e a d e rsh ip . This i s t r u e r ega rd les s of the source or s i z e o f suchu n i t s . Such u n i t s may o r i g i n a t e l o c a l l y, in the masses o f thepeople ; they may be formed from an admixture of r e g u l a r t roopswi th groups of the peop le , o r t hey may c o n s i s t of r e g u l a r armyu n i t s i n t a c t . Nor does mere q u a n t i t y a f f e c t t h i s m a t t e r. Suchuni t s may c o n s i s t o f a squad of a few nen, a b a t t a l i o n ofsevera l hundred men, or a regiment o f s e v e r a l thousand ,len. A l lthese y.mst have l eade r s who are uny ie ld ing in t h e i r p o l i c i e s ,r e so lu t e , l o y a l , s i n c e r e , and r o b u s t . These nen must be 'welleduca ted in r e v o l u t i o n a r y t e c h n i q u e , s e l f conf iden t , able toe s t a b l i s h severe d i s c i p l i n e , and able to cope with c Q ~ t e r ~ p r o

,pae;anda. ' In s h o r t , t : iese l eade r s must be models fo r t he peop le .As the war progres ses such l eade r s w i l l gradua l ly overcome thelack o f d i s c i p l i n e , which a t f i r s t prevaj . l s ; they w i l l e s t a b l i s hd i s c i p l i n e in t h e i r f o r c e s , s t r eng then ing them and i nc reas ingthej , r cOi lbat e f f i c i e n c y. Thus even tua l v i c t o r y w i l l be a t t a i n e d .

Unorganized g u e r r i l l a warfare ~ a n no t con t r ibu te to v i c t o r yand those who a t t a c k the moverilent as a combinat ion o f ba:C1ditryand anarchism do no t unde r s t and tiJ.e na tu re o f g1.1errilla a c t i o n .They say: "This movement is a haven f o r d i sappo in ted m i l i t a r i s t s ,vagabonds and bandi ts , J en e ll T i ~ l a n hoping thus to br ing themovement in to d i s r e p u t e . We do not deny t h a t t he re a re cor rup tg u e r r i l l a s , nor t h a t t he re are people who under the guise o fg u e r r i l l a s indulge in unlav.Jful a c t i v i t i e s . Nei ther do we denyt h a t t he r.10ve- nent has a t the p r e s e n t t ime symptoms o f a l ack o forga..Ylization, symptoms which n i g h t indeed be se r ious were we tojudge g u e r r i l l a 'varfare s o l e l y by the cor rup t and t e ~ n p o r a r y phenomena we have nen t ioned . V; e should s tudy the cor rup t phen-omena and attempt" -to e r a d i c a t e them in order to encourage guel 'r i l l a warfa re , and to incr0ase f t s m i l i t a r y e f f i c i e n c y. "This i shard work, t he re i s no help fo r i t , and the problem can no t beso lved i r m l e d i a t e l y ~ The whole people must t r y to r ~ f o r m themse lves dur ing the course of the war. We must educa te t:ler,l andreform them in the l i g h t of p a s t exper ience E v i l does not e:xistin g u e r r i l l a warfare but only in t he Unorganized and u n d i s c ip l ined a c t i v i t i e s which are anarch ism." (Len in -Guer r i l l a Warfare)

What i s bas ic g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g y ? Guer r i l l a s t r a t e g y mustpr imar i ly be based on a l e r t n e s s , l l iQbili ty, ~ ~ d a t t a c k . I t mustbe ad jus ted to the enemy s i t u a t i o n ~ the t e r r a i n , t he e x i s t i n gl i n e s o f cOYJ1m1..mication, t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h , t he weather, andthe s i t u a t i o n o f the peop le .

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In g u e r r i l l a warfare s e l e c t the t a c t i c of seeming to come fromthe e a s t and a t t ack ing from the west ; avoid the s o l i d a t t a c k thehollowl a t t a ck ; withdraw; d e l i v e r a l i g h t n i n g blow, seek a l i g h t n -ing dec i s ion . Wllen g u e r r i l l a s engage a s t ronger enemy they wi thdraw when he advances; haras s him when h e s t o p s ; s t r i k e him whenhe i s weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In g u e r r i l l a s t r a t e g ythe enemy's r e a r f l anks , and o t h e r vu lne rab le spots a re his v i t a lp o i n t s , and t he re he must be harassed , a t t acked , d i spe r sed , exhaus ted and a n n i h i l a t e d . Only in t h i s way eRn e u e r r i l l a s ca r ryout t h e i r mission of independent g u e r r i l l a ac t ion and coordina t ionwi th the e f f o r t o f the r egu la r armies . But, in s p i t e of the mostcomplete prepara t ion , the re can be no vic to ry i f nlistakes are madein the matter of conraand. G u e r r i l l a warfare based on the p r i n ci p l e s we have mentioned and ca r r i ed on over a vas t extent o f t e r -r i t o r y in which comrm.mications a re inconvenient w i l l contr : tbutet remendously towards u l t ima te de fea t of PIe Japanese and consequentemancipation of t he Chinese people .

A c a r e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n Dust be made between two t ~ r p e s ofg u e r r i l l a warfare . The f a c t t h a t r evo lu t ionary g u e r r i l l a warf a re i s based on the masses o f the people does not in i t s e l fmean t h a t the organ iza t ion o f g u e r r i l l a wii t s i s impossible ina VI. ar of counter r evo lu t ionary charac te r. As e::ar.lples of theformer t ~ e we ~ a y c i t e Red g u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s durin:; theRussian r evo lu t ion ; those of t : le Reds in C:lina; of the Abyssin ians aga ins t the I t a l i a n s f o r the p a s t t lu 'ee year s ; those o f

the l a s t seven years in I1anchuria" and the vas t a n t i Japaneseg u e r r i l l a VIal t h a t i s c a r r i e d on in China toda:r. Al l theses t rugg les have been ca r r i ed on in tlill" i n t e r e s t s of the wholepeople or the g rea t e r pa r t o f them; a l l had a broad bas i s In then a t i o n a l man power, and a l l have been in accord y{ith the lawsof h i s t o r i c a l development. They have e x i s t e d and w i l l cont inueto e x i s t f l o u r i s h and develop as long as they are not con t ra ryto n a t i o n a l p o l l e y. The l a t t e r type of g u e r r i l l a warfalled i r e c t l y con t rad ic t s the law of h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p ~ e n tOf t h i stype we Ylay c i t e the examples furn ished by the VIhite Russiang u e r r i l l a un i t s organized by Denilcin and Kolchak; those organized

by the Japanese ; those organized by the I t a l i a n s in Abyss in ia ;those suppor ted by the puppet govel"lllrlents in Hanchuria andMongolia; and those t h a t w i l l be organized here by Chineset r a i t o r s . Al l Sllcn have oppressed the masses, and have beencont rary to t 16 t r u e i n t e r e s t s of the people . r:2hey must bef i r ~ n l y opposed. They a re easy to des t roy because they lack abroad fotLYldation in the people . I f we f a i l . to d i f f e r e n t i a t ebetween the two types o f g u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s T:lentioned i t i sl i k e l y t h a t we VTill e x a ~ e r a t e t h e i r effec t .when appl ies by aninvader. Vfe might a r r i v e a t the c O ~ i c l u s i o n t h a t lithe invadercan organize g u e r r i l l a un i t s from a1:1on8 the people . Such aconclus ion might wel l d i ~ i n i s h our confidence in g u e r r i l l a warf a r e . As far as t h i s mat te r i s concerned we have but to re':'member the h i s t o r i c a l experience of r evo lu t ionary s t r ugg l e s .

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F u r t h e r, we must d i s t i n g u i s h genera l r evo lu t iona ry wars fromthose of a pure ly 1 class t t ype . In the former case the wholepeople of a nat ion without r ega rd to c lass or p a r t y c a r r y o ~ ag u e r r i l l a s t rugg le which i s an i n s t r u n e n t of tho n a t i o n a l p o l i c y.

I t s bas i s i s t ~ e r e f o r e mUQh broader than i s the bas i s of as t rugg le of c lass type . Of a genera l g u e r r i l l a war i t has beens a i d : "When a na t ion i s invaded t ~ e people become sympE\.theticto one another and a l l a id in orgi l l l iz ing g u e r r i l l a u n i t s . Inc i v i l war, no I:1atter to what ex ten t g u e r r i l l a s are developed theydo not produce the same r e s u l t s as when they are formod to r e s i s tan invas ion by foreigners .1 (Civi l War in L u s s l a ) . T h ~ one s t rongf ea tu re o f guer I ' i l l a warfare in a c i v i l s t rugg le i s i t s qua l i t y ofi n t e rna l p u r i t y. One c lass l!lay be e a s i l y un i t ed and peI'haps f i g h twith gI 'eat e f f e c t r whereas in a n , t i o n a l r evo lu t iona ry war guerr i l l a u n i t s are faced wi th the proble}:,l of i n t e rna l un i f i c a t i o n o f

d i f f e r en t c lass grouI)s. This n e c e s s i t a t e s the use of propaganda.Both types of g u e r r i l l a war are however s i m i l a r i.n tha.t t hey bo them.,.Dloy the s arae r1il i a r ~ T methods.

Nat ional g u e r r i l l a warfare , thouGh h i s t o r i c a l l y of the samecons i s t ency has ehployed vary ing implements as t l n e s , peoples andcondi t ions d i f f e r . 'rhe guej. r i l l a 6 s ~ e c t s of t:l.e Opium \ [ar, thoseo f the fi2;ht ing in f'Ianchuj. ifl s ince the Hukden inc i den t , and thos eemployed in China today are a l l s l i g h t l y diffe:.. :,mt. The g ~ e r r i l lwarfare conduc t ed by the I1orroccans s.c;e.ins t the r ' rench and theSpanish was not exac t ly s i m i l a r to t ha t -wh ich \ Ie conduct today in

China., These d:i.l 'ferences express t:18 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o fd ~ _ f f e r e

peoples in d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s . Although t ~ l r i s a genera l s i m i l a r -i t y in the qua l i t y of a l l these s t rugg les the re are d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s in fo:,:,m. This f a c t vIe Y:lust r ecogn ize . Clausew:i.t 4 in "OnVTar t wrote: Wars in every per iod have independent forms and independent cond i t ions and t he re fo re every per iod must have i t s independent theory of war." Lenin in "On G u e r r i l l a 'v','arfare t s a i d :"As regards the form of f i g h t i n g i t i s uncond i t iona l ly r e q u i s i t et h a t h i s t o r y be i n v e s t i g a t e d in order to discover the cond i t ionsof environment , the s t a t e o f economic progress and the p o l i t i c a lideas t h a t ob ta ined , t he n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , customs anddegree of c i v i l i z a t i o n . Again: I t i s necessary to be conple te lyunsympathet ic to abs t r ac t formulae and r u l e s and to study wi thsympathy t he cond i t ions o f t he a c t u a l f i g h t i n g fOl' these w i l lchange in accordance with t : le p o l i t i c a l and economic s i t u a t i o n sand the r e a l i z a t i o n of t ~ e peoplefs a s p i r a t i o n s . These p r o c r e s .s ive c ~ l a n g e s i11 cond i t ions c r e a t e new methods."

If , in todayfs s t r u g g l e , we f a i l to apply the h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h sof r evo lu t ionary G u e r r i l l a VIaI we w i l l f a l l i n to the e r r o r o f bel i e v i n g with T f OU Hs i h e n ~ t h a t under the impact of Japan 's mechanized army " t h e g u e r r i l l a u n i t has l o s t i t s h i s t o r i G a l funct ion ."Jen C h ' i Shan w r i t e s : " I n olden days g u e r r i l l a warfare was p a r t o fregu la r s t r a t egy but t he re i s almost no chance t h a t i t can beappl ied today." These opin ions are harmful . I f we do not make

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an e s t i n a t e o f t ~ l G c h a r a c t 8 r ~ ~ 8 t : cs p e c u l i a r t o o u r c m t i - J a p a n e s eg u e r r i l l a 'war b u t i n s i s t on a ~ p l y i l 1 C ; t o i t r.18Clw..nical fo rmulaed e r i v e d frolil Po.st ~ l i s t o r : T we a r e 'Jlakinc; t h e m i s t a k e o f ~ l a c i n g our h o s t i l i t i e s i n t h e Sa le c a t e g o r y as a l l o t h e r n a t i o n a l g u e r -r i l l a s t r u s ~ s l e sI f we h o l d t i s view we w i l l s ~ _ L l p l y be b e a t i n go u r heads aga:I.nst a s t o n e \ i J8 11 2.nd v e w ~ _ l l be l l i ' lable t o p r o f i tfro: ' l s u . e r r i l l a hos t i . l i t i e s .

To sunmar5.ze: 'iIhD.t i s t1w g u e r r i l l a l Ia r o f r e s i s t m l C e 2.c;ainstJapan? t i s one a s p e c t o f t h e e n t i r e w a r, w ~ i c h a l t ~ o u G h a l o n ei n c a p a b l e o f p r o d u c i n g t h e d e c i s i o n , a t t a c k s t h e el'.emy i n e v e r yq u a r t e r , d i m i n i s h e s t h e e x t e n t o f a:c'ea 'Lmder hj.s c o n t r o l in c r ' 3ases o n r n a t i o n a l s t renc; t_ l and a s s i s t s o u r r e g u l a r e _ r ~ ] i e s ti s O l ~ e o f t h e s t r a t e g i c i n s t r u m e n t s L ~ s e d t o i n i l i c t d e f e a t on o u renelj1Y. t i s t h e one pUi'e e :cpress ion o f e . n t i - J a p i m e s e : ' )01ic:r:t h a t i s t o s a y, i t i s m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h o r g a n i z e d b y t h e a c t i v ep e o p l e and i n s e p a r a b l e fro:.l t hem. t i s a porrerf1.:1 s p e c i a l1jiea:JOn J:: ttl. v lich ,,-;e r e s j.s t t ~ l e J a ) a n c s e n:nd w: .thout w h i c h wecan n o t d e f e a t t hem.

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CHA?TER TWO

THE RELATION OF GUERRILLA O S T L T P ~ S rrO REGULAR OPERATIONS

The genera l f e a t u r e s of orthodox h o s t i l i t i e s t h a t i s thewar of p o ~ t i on and the vrar o f movement, c . i f f e r fundamental lyfrom g u e r r i l l a war fa re . There are o the r r e a d i l y apparent d i f f e r ences such as those i n organ iza t ion , armament, equipment , supply,t ac t i c s , l ommand; in the concept ion of the terms I fron t II andlI r e a r l l in the m a t t e r of m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .

v ~ h n cons idered from the numer ica l po in t of view g u e r r i l l aun i t s are many; as i nd iv idua l combat un i t s t hey may vary in s i zefrom the smal l e s t o f seve ra l score or severa l hundred men tothe b a t t a l i o n or the regiment of seve ra l thousand. This i s notthe case in r e g u l a r l y organized u n i t s . A primary f e a t u r e ofg u e r r i l l a opera t ions i s t h e i r dependence upon ~ h e people themse lves to organize b a t t a l i o n s and o the r u n i t s ~ As a r e s u l t o fthis} organ iza t ion depends l a rg e l y upon l o c a l c i rcumstances . Inthe case of g u e r r i l l a groups the s tandard o f equipment i s o f alow order, and they must p r i m a r i l y depend f o r t h e i r sustenance

upon what the l o c a l i t y a f f o r d s .

The s t r a t e g y o f g u e r r i l l a varfare i s m a n i f e s t l y l l i ~ l i k t h a temployed in orthodox opera t ions , as the bas ic t a c t i c of the formeri s cons tant a c t i vi ty and movement, r Vhere i s in g u e r r i l l a warfareno such t h ing as a dec i s ive b a t t l e ; t ha re i s noth ing comparableto the f ixed , pass ive defense t h a t f e a t u r e s orthodox war. Inguer r i l l a warfare t he trf)nsforma t i o n of a moving s j tua t i on in toa p o s i t i o n a l defens ive s i t u a t i o n never a r i s e s . The genera lf ea tu res o f reconnaissance , p a r t i a l deployment , genera l d e p l o y ~ ment, and development o f the a t t a c k t h a t are usua l i n mobilewarfare ' a re not common to g u e r r i l l a war.

There are d i f f e r e n c e s a l so in the mat te r o f l eade r sh ip Rndcommand In g u e r r i l l a warfare smal l u n i t s a c t i n g independent lyplay the p r i n c i p a l ro le and there must be no excess ive i n t e r -fe rence ~ i t h t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . In orthodox warfare , p a r t i c ~ l a r l y in B. moving s i tua t ion ' , a c e r t a i n d.egree of i n i t i a t i ve i s accordedsUbordina tes , bu t in p r i n c i p l e cor.wand i s c e n t r a l i z e d . ~ h i s i sdone because a l l u n i t s and a l l suppor t ing arms in a l l d i s t r i c t snlust coord ina te to the h ighes t degree . In the case of g U e r r i l l awarfare t h i s i s n o t only undes i r ab le bu t imposs ib le . Only adj acen t g u e r r i l l a u n i t s can coordina te t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s to anydegree. S t r a t e g i c a l l y t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s can be roughly c o r r e l a t e dwi th those of the r egu la r fo rces , and t a c t i c a l l y the y must coopera te wi th ad jacen t u n i t s of t he r e g u l a r army. But t he re areno s t ~ i c t u r e s on the ex ten t of g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y nor i s t pr imari l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the q u a l i t y of coopera t ion of many uni t s

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When we d i scuss t he terms f ron t and r ea r t must beremembered, t h a t while g u e r r i l l a s do have bases , t h e i r primaryf i e l d of a c t i v i t y i s in the enemy's r e a r a r e a s . They themselveshave no r e a r. Because an orthodox army has r e a r i n s t a l l a t i o n s(except i n some spec ia l cases as dur ing the 10,000 mile march o fthe Red Army or as in the case o f c e r t a i n u n i t s opera t ing in

Shansi province)t

can not opera te as g u e r r i l l a s can.As to the mat te r of m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s : those o f the

g u e r r i l l a s are to exterminate smal l fo rces of the enemy: to haras s~ d weaken l a rge fo rces ; to a t t a c k enemy l i n e s of c o ~ ~ u n i c t i o n

to e s t a b l i s h bases capable o f suppor t ing independent opera t ionsin the enemy's r e a r ; to fo rce the enemy to d i spe r se h i s s t r eng th ,and to coord ina te a l l these a c t i v i t i e s with those o f the r e g u l a rarmies on d i s t a n t b a t t l e f r o n t s .

From the foregoing summary of d i ffe rences t h a t e x i s t betweeng u e r r i l l a warfare and orthodox warfa re t can be seen t h a t t i simproper to compare the two. Fur the r d i s t i n c t i o n must be made i norde r to c l a r i f y t h i s mat te r. While the 8 t h ~ o u t e Army i s ar egu la r Army i t s North China campa.ign i s e s s e n t i a l l y g u e r r i l l ain nature fo r t o p e ~ t e s i n the enemy's r e a r . n occas ion , how-eve r, 8 th Route Army commanders have concen t r a t ed powerful f o r e ~ to s t r i k e an enemy i n motion and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of or thodoxmobile warfare were ev iden t i n the b a t t l e a t PI ing Rsing Kuanand i n o t h e r engagements.

n the otM,r hand, a f t e r t h ~ f a l l of Feng Ling Tu, the oper-a t ions o f Cent ra l Shansi , and Suiyan t roops were more g u e r r i l l athan or thodox i n na tu re . In t h i s connect ion the prec i se cha ra9 te rof Genera l i ssimo Chiang ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s to tre e ffec t t h a t i nde -pendent br igades would c a r r y out g u e r r i l l a opera t ions should ber e c a l l e d . In s p i t e of such temporary a c t i v i t i e s these orthodoxu n i t s r e t a i n e d t h e i r i d e n t i t y and a f t e r the f a l l of Feng Lingthey were not only ab le to f i g h t along or thodox l i n e s bu t o f t enfound t necessa ry to do so. This i s an example of the f a c t t h a tor thodox armies may due to changes i n the s i t u a t i o n t emporar i lyfunc t ion a s g u e r r i l l a s . Likewise g u e r r i l l a u n i t s t h a t are formedfrom the people may gradua l ly develop i n t o r e g u l a r u n i t s and whenopera t ing as such, employ the t a c t i c s o f orthodox mobile war.vfuile these u n i t s func t ion as g u e r r i l l a s they may be compared toinnumerable gnats wlich , by b i t i n g a g i a n t both i n f r o n t and i nr e a r, u l t i m a t e l y exhaus t him. They make themselves as unendurableas a group of c r u e l and h a t e f u l d e v i l s and as they grow and a t t a i ng igan t i c p ropor t ions they w i l l f ind t h a t t h e i r v ic t im i s no t onlyexhausted bu t i s p r a c t i c a l l y penish ing . I t i s fo r t h i s very reasont h a t our g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s are a source of cons tan t mental worryto Imper ia l Japan .

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While i t i s improper to confuse orthodox with g u e r r i l l aopera t ions i t i s equa l ly improper to cons ider t h a t there i s achasm between the two. Vfuile d i f f e r e n c e s do eXis t , s i m i l a r i t i e sappear under c e r t a i n condi t ions and t h i s f a c t must ')e appre

c ia ted i f we wish to e s t a b l i s h c l e a r l y the r e l a t i onsh ip betweenthe two. I f we cons ide r both types of warfare as a s ingle subj e c t or i f we confuse g u e r r i l l a warfare wi th t he mobile opera t ions of orthodox war we f a l l i n t o t h i s e r r o r : we exaggera tethe funct ion of g u e r r i l l a s and minimize t h a t of the regu la rarmies . I f we agree with Chang Tso Eua who says l lGUerr i l lawarfare i s the primary war s t r a t e g y of a people ' seeking toemancipate i t s e l f o r with Chao Klang who bel- ieves t h a tl lGuerr i l la s t r a t e g y i s the only s t r a t e g y poss ib le f o r an oppressed people we a re exaggera t ing the importance o f g U e r r i l l ah o s t i l i t i e s What these zea lous f r i e n d s I have j u s t quoted dono t r e a l i ze i s t h i s : That i f vlTe do no t f i t g u e r r i l l a opera t ionsi n t o t h e i r proper n iche we can n o t promote them r e l i s t i c ~ l l yThen, no t only would those INho oppose us t ake advantage of ourvarying opin ions to t u rn them to t h e i r own uses to undermine us ,bu t g u e r r i l l a s would be led tn assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s theycould not succe s s f u l l y discharge and which should proper ly be .c a r r i e d out by orthodox force s . In the meanti.me the impor tan tg u e r r i l l a func t ion of coord ina t ing a c t i v i t i e s with the regu la rforces would be neg lec ted . Furthermore, i the t heo ry t h a t g u e r r i l l a warfare i3 our on ly s t r a t egy were c ~ u l l y app l i ed ,the r e g u l a r fo rces would be vveakened, we would be div ided i n

fturpose, and g u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s would dec l ine . I f we say:'Let us t ransform the r egu la r fo rces i n t o g u e r r i l l a s and do n o tplace our f i r s t r e l i a n c e on a v i c t o r y to be ga:i.ned by the r e g u l a rarmies over the enemy we may c e r t a i n l y expec t to see as a r e s u l tthe f a i l u r e o f the ant i -Japanese war o f r e s i s t a n c e . The conceptt h a t g u e r r i l l a warfare i s an end in i t s e l f and t h a t g u e r r i l l aac t i vi t i e s can be d i vorced from tho se of the r egu l a r foroe s i si n o r r t ~ I f we assume t h a t g u e r r i l l a warfare does no t progressfrom beginning to end beyond i t s e lementary forms we have f a i l e dto recognize the f a c t t h a t g u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s can, unders p e c i f i c cond i t ions , develop and assume orthodox c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

n opinion t h a t admits the ex i s t ence of g u e r r i l l a war but i s o l a t e si t i s one t h a t does no t proper ly e s t ima te the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ofsuch war.

e

Equal ly as dangerous i s the concept which condemns g u e r r i l l awar on the ground t h a t war has no o the r aspec t s than the pure lyorthodox. This opin ion i s of ten expressed by those who have seenthe cor rup t pbenomena of some g u r r i l l ~ l regimes, observed t h e i rlack of d i s c i p l i n e and have seen them used as a screen behindwhich c e r t a i n persons have indulged in b r i b e r y and o t h e r cor rup tp rac t i c e s . These people w i l l no t admit the fundamental n e c e s s i t y

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fo r ~ e r r i i lbands which spr ing from the armed people_ Theysay Only the regu la r forces are capable o f conduct ing g u ~ r r i l lopera t ions . This theory i s a mistaken one and would lead tothe ab o l i t i on o f the p e o p l e ' s g u e r r i l l a war.

A proper cor-ception o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t e x i s t s betweeng u e r r i l l a e f f o r t and t h a t of the r egu la r to rces i s essent j .a l . Viebel ieve t can be s t a t e d t h i s way: Gue:.:rilla opera t ions dur ingthe ant i -Japanese war may fo r a c e r t a i n t ime and t empora r i lybecome i t s paramount f e a t u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n so f a r as the enemy'sr e a r i s c oncerne.d. However, l f we view the war' as a whole therecan be no doubt t h a t our r egu la l fo rces are o f primary importancebecause t i s they who are alone capable o f producing the dec i s ion .G u e r r i l l a warfare a s s i s t s t':lem i n pl 'oducing t h i s favorable d ~ -c i s i on . Orthodox fo rces may under c e r t a i n cond i t ions opera te asg u e r r i l l a s and the l a t t e r may, under c e r t a i n cond i t lons , developto the s t a t u s of the formero However, bo th g u e r r i l l a fo rces andr egu la r fo rces have t h e i r own r e spec t ive development and t h e i rproper combinat ions.

o c l a r i f y the r e l a t i onsh ip between the mobile aspec t o forthodox war and g u e r r i l l a war, we may say t ~ t genera l agreemente x i s t s t h a t t he p r i n c i p a l element of our s t r a t egy must be mobi l i ty.With the war o f movement we m ~ a t t imes combine the w ~ of p o s it ion . Both o f thase a r s a s s i s t ed by genera l g u e r r i l l a h o ~ t i l i t i e sI t i s t rue t h a t on the b a t t l e f i e l d mobile war o f t e n become spos i t i ona l ; i t i s t rue t h a t t h i s s i tua t10n may be r eve r sed ; t i sequa l ly t rue t h a t each form may combine with the o t h e r. Thep o s s i b i l i t y o f such combinat ion w i l l become more ev iden t a f t e r thep r e v a i l i n g s t anda rds of equipment have been r a i s e d . For exmaple,in a genera l s t r a t e g i c a l coun te r a t t a c k to r ecap tu re key c i t i e sand l i n e s o f communication i t would be normal to use b J t h mobileand p os i t i ona l methods. Eowever, the p o i n t must again be madet h a t our f u n d m e n ~ l s t r a t e g i c a l form must be t he war of movement.I f we deny t h i s ~ l e can no t a r r i v e a t the vic toI ' ious s o l u t i o n ofthe war. ' In sum, while we must promote g u e r r i l l a warfare as anecessa ry s t r a t e g i c a l aux i l i a ry to orthodox opera t ions we mustne i t he r ass ign t the primary p o s i t i o n in our war s t r a t e g y, normay we subst:i . tute t f o r mobile and p o s i t i o n a l warfare as conductedby orthodox fo rces .

1.0


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CBA PTEJ TEHEE

G ~ RR I LLAdA l;FA R 2: IN ]: IS 1'0 HY

G u e r r i l l a war fa r e i s n e i t h e r a p r o d u c t o f China n o r i s i tp e c u l i a r to the p r e s e n t d ~ y From the e a r l i e s t h i s t o r i c a l daysi t has been a f e a t u r e o f wars fought by e v e r y c l a s s o f mena g a i n s t i n v a d e r s and o p p r e s s o r s . Under s u i t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s i thas CI 'ea t p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The 111


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s i t i o n s 2nd i n t e r v e n t i o n o f f o r e i --,n im.perialisll1S and t hei n t e r n a l d i s t u r b a n c e s o f ~ J h i t e R u s s i a ~ l groups were f o r c e d

to o r g a n i z e t hemse lves i no c c u ~ i e d

t e r r i t o r i e s~ n d

f i g h t ar e a l war. I n S i b e I ' i a a:1d AlasI.t':::':l, i n tile: I ' ea r o f tb.e J r ~ , r y o f t i le t r a i t o r De, l i ldn and i n t::le r e a r of t he Po les t h e r e weremany Red Russ:i.an G n c r r : i l l a s . These n o t G ~ l l y d i s r u p t e d anddest:c 'oyed t:::le com 1Uriic8t ions i n t he ene:,l? ' s r e a r bu t 8 l s o f r e -q ~ ~ n t l y preve:1 ted h i s a d v 8 ~ c e . On one o c c a s i o n t ~ c g u e r r i l l a sc 'Onp le t e ly d e s t r o y e d 8 : r e t r3a t in :_ , t : l i tc &.r:::,;y t i18t :'lUc1 pI '8Viousl y b e e n del:'e.Jted by r e : ' u18r Red f o r c e s . E o l c h a k , D e n i l d n , t h eJa lxmese , a n d c : l e P o l e s , owin . ; to t::.le n e c e s s i t ~o f s t av i .nc o f ft he a t t a cks 01' 2:uerl'ill13.s were Corc :;d to wi tild:r'8.VJ re:3ulc;rt r o o p s frOl1J. t i le f r o n t . lIThu.s n o t o n l y W 8 S the e118dly's ',lanpower iml)Over

i s h e db u t ;18 fo und l l i u se I f U:: 18 'o le t o c')pe . I i t h

. t i le e v e r 'ilOvin:', ".' .HJrr'il18.!l ('1:118 "JatuI 'e o f Guerri l l,e l 1 ~ r r l o l l : l . . . . . t : > ~ l e ~ -':r1 D u s C ! l o a\ .1. k ...


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casj_ons when a war o f . love::ent was cO ; ibined ,-Jitb. lar-ses c a l e ~ u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s to s t r i k e the I t a l i a n s heavyblows. LIoreover, s e v e r a l c i ti.c: S , l e r e re - t c ,ken ::md c a s u a l i -t i e s to ta l l i l1 . . : lLl0,OOO were i n f l i c t e d . Hud tl::,-is p o l i c ~ beens t e a d f a s t l y c o n t i n u e d i t w8uld have been d i f f i c u l t to havenB.;led the u l ti(tkl t e winner. kc t i le p re s e n t t i ~ : t e uer r i l lD .a c t i v i t i e s c o n t i n u e i n A b y s s i ~ i b 0nd i f the i n t e r n a l p O l i t i c a lques t i ons can be s o l v e d an e x t e ~ s i o n o f such ~ c t i v i t i e s i sp r o b a b l e .

In 1,341. a;1.d 1842 when brL. ve peop le f rom Sen Yuan L if o u ~ h t che E n z l i s h ; a s s i n from 1850 to 1864 dur ing the T ' s ipr inG war, und f o r a t n i r d t ime i n 1899 i n the Boxer u pr i s i n g g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s were employed to a r a ~ 8 r k a b l e d eg r e e . P a r t i c u l a r l y wes t h i s so d u r i n ; the f l a i P ' i n g W8rwhen g u e r r i l l a o p e r 8 t i o n s PIers n o s t ex te l1s ive and the Gl1.' l n gt r o o p s were o f t e n CO:11pletely e x ~ : . a u s t e d [ll1.d . forced to f l e e f o rt h e i r l i v e s .

In t l i e se wars L l e r c ViTerc no :c.UJ_a:"-l1::; p r i n c i p l e s o r g u e r r i l l aa C ~ l o n Perhaps t he se ~ u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s v e r e n o t c a r r i e do u t n c o n j u n c t i o n ' ide; l reS;J.l::.r o p 8 r a t i o n s , o r perhaps t h e r ewas a l a c k o f c o o r d i n a t i o n . But the f n c t t h a t v i c t o r y wasnot ca ined was no t Lecause o f any l ~ c k i n g u c r r i l l c a c t i v i t ybut r a t L e r because o f the i n t e r f e r e n c e l r p o l i t i c s i n , ; l i l i t a r ya f f a i r s ' . Exper ience s-;,ows t:l o::t i p r e c e d e n c e i s n o t : ; i v e n tothe q u e s t i o n o f c o n q u e r i n ~ the eneny Q , ) t : l i n p o l i t i c o l Gnd; n i l i t s r y a f f D i r s , f.:r'.d i f r e :u l2 . r ~ i o s t i l i t i : ; ; s ore rlOt conduc tedwi th t e n a c i t y , 3 u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s 3 o ~ e con no t ~ r o d u c e f:LrlB 1 v i c t o r y.

-Prom 1927 to 1 ~ ) 3 3 the Chinese ~ e d nrq ~ o u g : n t ; cLnDst

con t inu811y Bnd e ~ p l o y o d ~ u 8 r r i l l a t a c t i c s c o n s t u n t l y. , Att ~ e v e r y b e ~ ~ I ~ l i r l G a p o s i t i v e p o l i c ~was adop t e d . Dany b a s e sw e r e e s t a b l i s h e d and f rom g u e r r i II;:. bunds t l ~ e : leds Vlere ab l eto cevel 'op i n t o r 2 , ~ u l a r a r e n e s . As t h e s e 8r.Ees fou.::;ht, newt u e r r i l l a r e ~ i ~ e s were deve loped o v e r c ~ i d e &rea. T ~ e s e r e -eLle s coa rd ina t ed ti:; e i r e f f o r t s \ Ji t h t l lO S:;3 o f t h e r e g u l a rf o r c e s . IJrlis p o l i c y accoun ted f o r ti-:.e i1c.:my v i c t o r i e s 2 ~ : : i n e d by g u e r r i l l a tr 'oo[ls r e l c J t i v e l y few i n nu;nber \, Vr.a ,vere E,r.,;ed~ i t h weapons i n f e r i o r t o t hose o f t h e i r o p p o n e n t s . The l e n d e r so f t ~ d ~ p e r i o d p r o p e r l y combined 3 u e r r i l l a a p e r a t l o n s w i t h awar o f .novc:uent bo t h s t r a t e ~ : i ca 11y G;ld i:;s c t i c a l l y . Th9:/ d elEuded p r i m t , r i l y Up021. a l e r t l e s s . T lley s t r e s s e d t ~ l e ( :o r rec t

b a s i s f o r b o t h p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s and ro i l i t c i ry o p e r a t i o n s .They deve loped t h e i r : u e r r i l 1 a bands i n t o t r a i n e d u n i t s . Theyt h en d e t e r J i n e d upon ~ t e n yea r p e r i o d o f r e s i s t a n c e whichth(te t h e y overcame in:1Ul:lerable d i f f i c u l t i 3 s Emd ~ 1 ~ 1 v e on ly l a t e -l y reached t h e i r g o a l o f di :cec t pc- ; r t i c ipa t ion L ~ t l ~ 8 un-i.;iJ&pcmese W D r. T ~ l e r e i s no dou.bt t h a t the i n t e r n a l u ~ l i f i c E , t i o n

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2703-900820/Dec/SOjb

o f China 18 nov a per:l1a,1ent Gnd d e f i n i t e f a c t [Hld t h 2 t thee x p e r i e n c e s ga ined d u r i l 1 2 ~ o u r i n t e r n a l struggle;:} have provedto be bo t h neces sa ry end advan ta5eous to us i n t he s t r u g c l e

go in s t Jepane se i npe r i aL i s m. There a re 'l18ny VD l u a b l e l e S sonsvve can l e a r n frail;' (;:le eXl Jerience o f t h o s e y e a r s . PYinc:J.pal8,,10n;; the::l i s the f a c t thQ t g u e r r i l l a success l a r g e l y dependsupon p o w e r f u l p o l i t i c 8 1 l e a d e r s who work u n c e a s i n g l y to b r i n gabou t i n t e r n a l u n i f i c a t i o n . Such l e a d e r s ~ u s t work w i t h thepeop l e ; t h e y must have a c o r r e c t c o n c e p t i o n o f the pol;Lcy tobe adop ted bo th a s r e g a r d s the peop le and the ~ n e m y

A f t e r September 1 8 t b , 1931 s t r o n 3 a n t i - J a p a n e s e 3 u e r r i l l a .cc.Llpb i ).18 were opened i n ea ch o f the t h r e e n o r t h Gas t ) r o v i n c e s ,G7 u e r r l 11 C 8 c t l V l

t J p e r s l s ~ s G.Llere U l Spl'Ge , O.[- ; len t crueJ.lt..:Les 0 L and d e c e i t s p r a c t i c e d by the Japanesa a t the expense o f thepeop l e , end i n Slj i te o f t h e fElCt t ~ 1 . a t h e r GY':,lies l18ve occup iedt ~ 8 l a n d Dnd op p r e s s e d the peop le f o r the l a s t seven y e a r s ,Tll.e s t ruSGle can '..,e c1ivlJed i n t o t,'",) p e r i o d s , Durin::; thef i r s t , which ex tended fro., l Sep-ce;,:..ber 18t l l , 1931, to January1 9 3 3 , a n t i - J 8 ) s n e s e : u e r r 111 a a c t i v i t y 8 x p l o d e d c o n s t a n t l y i na l l t h r e e prov ince s . 1 1a Chan Shan , .nd Ssn Pin::; Vie i e s t a b l i s hed an ant i -cTapanese X e ~ i , le i n l Iei L u n : : ~ C;:lial1':;. In Chi Linthe ITa t i o n a 1 Sa 1 va t ionl Ar:,1Y: n d i ~ l e Se Ie De;' ense Army werel ed by Nang Te Lin and L i Tu r e s p e c t i v e l y . In Fang T ' i e n , 'Chu Lu and o t h e r s , COl:L;lEmc1ed g u e r r I l l a uni t s . The i .nf luenceo f t he se f o r c e s was r e a t . Thev h a r a s s e d the Janane8e u nc e a s i n c l y bu t b e c a u s ~ t he r e wasvan i n d e f i n i t e p o l i t i c a l g o a l ;i :nproper l e a d e r s h i p ; f a i l u r e to coo rd ina t e m i l i t a r y c o m m ~ m d and o p e r a t i o n s and to work w i t h t h e p e o p l e , and f i n a l l yf a i l u r e to d e l e g a t e p r o p e r p o l i t i c u l f u n c t i o n s to the a r ~ yt ~ l e whole o r g a n i z a t i o n 'Nas f e e b l e , end i t s s t r e n g t h was n o tu n i f i e d . As a d i r e c t r e s u l t o f t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s the campaignsf a i l e d and the t r o o p s were f i n a l l y de fea t ed by our enemy.

Dur ins the second p e r i o d , which has ex tended f rom J a n u a r y1933 to t h e p r e s e n t t L l e , the s i t u a t i o n has ,z:reat ly improved .This 118S come abou t because g r e a t nLvlbers o f p e o p l e who havebeen oppressed by t : le enemy l18,Ve dec ided to r e s i s t h im; b ecause o f the p c l r t i c i p 8 t i o n o f tlOte C: linese cO.n'O lUnist i n t h ~ o n t i - J a p a n e s e war, Dnd because o f t h e f i n e work o f the vo lunt e e r un1 t s . T h e : i u e r r i l l a s lave f i n a l . l y educa t ed the p e o p l eto the m e ~ n i n ~ o f 3 u e r r i l l w a r f a r e and i n t h e n o r t h e a s t thas a c a i n becone an i 0 p o r t a n t bnd p o w e r f u l i n f l u e n c e . A l ~ r e a d y seven o r eJ


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2708-90082 0 / D e c / 5 0 j b

are s t i l l some weak p o i n t s . For i n s t ~ n c e n a t i o n a l defensepo l i ce ha s noc been s u f f i . c i e n t l y dave l o ~ e c 1 ; p a r t i c i p a t i o n o fthe people i s not : e n e r a l ; i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l o rg a n i z a t i o n i ss t i l l in i t s priTiary ste_Jes, cJnd t ~ l e fo rce used to a t tac :" theJapanese 2nd the puppet g o v e r ~ u e n t s i s not ye t s u f f i c i e n t .But i f p r e s e n t po l i cy i s cO!ltinued t e n a c i o u s l y 211 these weakn8 S Be s v, i i l l be overCO,IS. Ex:per'iei:1ce proves t::18 t sue r r i l l a , 'war w i l l deve lop to even grou te r propor t ions and t h a t , ins p i t e of the c r u e l t y of the Japanese and t h e l o n y methodst ~ e y have devised to chea t tne people they can not ext inGuishguerr ' i l lEl ac t i v i t i e s i n the t h r ee nor thea s t e r n pI'ovi.nc3 s .

Tile g u e r r i l l a expe r i ences o f China and o f o t h e r c o u n t r i e swhich have been ou t l ined prove t h a t in a war o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y

na tu re such h o s t i l i t i e s are p o s s i b l e , Dbturul ~ d necessa ry.They prove t h a t i f t h e p r e s e n t a n t i - J a p a n e s e war fo r thee;ilc::llCipo.tion o f t:1e ; ~ C s e s o f t ~ l e Chinese people i s to ga inul tL 'nate v i c t o r y suc:::. h o s t i l i t i e s ;LUst e:cp.nd t r e : l n d o u s l ~ lH i s t o r i c a l 3xper ience i s w r i t t e n in i r o n and blood . 4e mustpo in t out tila t t ~ V c;uerr'Lll8. C ; ' i lpa i::';l12, be n ~ 1:0 _oed in C:.lill8.today are a pa ...:e in tl lat ~ ~ i s to ry -Chat l l . JS no preceden t . Thei rinf lu .ence w i l l be conf ined not s(;181y to CllinD in her p r e s e n tan t i - J apanose war but ~ i l l be world wide.

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2708-9 00819/Dec 50 b

CHAPTER FOUR

CAN VICTORY BE AT'l'AI1"J.;;D BY GUERRILLA, OP::':RATIONS?

G u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s are but one phase of the war of r e -s i s t ance a g a i n s t Japan and the answer to the ques t ion of whetheDor no t they can produce u l t ima te v i c t o r y can be given on ly a f t e ri n v e s t i g a t i o n and comparison o f a l l e lements o f our own s t r e n g t hwith those o f the enemy. The par. t i cu la r s o f such a comparisonare s e v e r a l . F i r s t , the s t rong Japanese b a n d i t na t ion i s anabsolu te monarchy. During the course of her i nvas ion of Chinashe had made comparat ive progres s in the techniques of i n d u s t r i a lproduct ion and i n the development o f exce l l ence and s k i l l in herarmy, n a V J ~ and a i r force e But in sp i t e of t h i s i n d u s t r i a lprogres s she remains an absolu te monarchy of i n f e r i o r phya ica l

endoMnents. Her man. power, her raw m a t e r i a l s and her f i n a n c i a lr e sources are a l l inadequate and ins1 . l ff ic ien t to main ta in h e rin p r o t r a c t e d warfare or to meet the s i t u a t i o n presen ted by awar prosecu ted over a vas t a rea . Added to t h i s i s the an t i -warfee l i n g nOVi manife s t ed y the J pane se pe ople , a fee l i n g which i sshared y the j u n i o r o f f i c e r s and more ex tens ive ly, y the s o ld i e r s o f the invading army. B ~ l r t h e r m o r eChina i s no t Japan ' son ly enemy. Japan i s unable to employ h e r e n t i r e s t r e n g t h i n thea t t a c k on China; she can n o t , a t most , spare more than 1,OJO,.000men for t h i s purpose as she must hold any in excess o f t h a t number f o r use a g a i n s t o t h e r poss ib le opponents . Because of these

impor tan t pr imary cons ide ra t ions the invading Japanese b a n d i t scan hope n e i t h e r to be victor i .ous i n a p r o t r a c t e d s t rugg le norto conquer a v a s t a r e a . Thei r s t r a t e g y must be one o f l i g h t n i n gwar a.nd speedy d e c i s i o n . I f we can ho ld out fo r t h ree o r moreyears i t w i l l be most d i f f i c u l t f o r Japan to bea r up under thes t r a i n .

In the war the Japanese br igands must depend upon l i n e s o fcommunication l i n k i n g the p r i n c i p a l c i t i e s as rou tes f o r thet r a n s p o r t o f war m a t e r i a l s . The most impor tant cons ide ra t ionsf o r h e r are t h a t her r e a r be s t ab le and peace fu l and t h a t h e r

l i n e s o f communication be i n t a c t . I t i s no t t o h e r advantage towage war over a v a s t a rea with d i s r u p t e d l i n e s o f communication She can not d i s p e r s e her s t r e n g t h and f i g h t in a number of p lacesand h e r g rea t e s t f e a r s are thus e rup t ions in her r e a r and d i s -rup t ion o f h e r l i n e s o f communication. I f she can main ta incommunications she w i l l be able a t w i l l to speed i ly concent ra tepowerful f o r c e s a t s t r a t e g i c p o i n t s to engage our organized u n i t sin dec i s ive b a t t l e . Another impor tan t Japanese o b j e c t i v e i s top r o f i t from the i n d u s t r i e s , f inances , and man power in capturedareas and wi th them to augmen t h e r own i n s , u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h .Cer ta in ly t i s no t to her advantage to forego t hese b e n e f i t s , nor

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to be forced to d i s s ipa t e her ene rg ies i n a type o f warfare inwhich the gains 1;vill n o t compensate f o r the l o s se s . I t i s f o rthese reasons t h a t g u e r r i l l a warfare conducted in each b i t ofconquered t e r r i t o r y over a wide a rea w i l l be a heavy blow s t rucka t the Japanese b a n d i t s . Experience in the f i v e nor the rn prov inces as wel l as i n Kiangsu, Che Kiang and An Hui has a b s o l u t e l ye s t a b l i s h e d the t r u t h o f t h i s as se r t i on .

2China i s a count ry h a l f co lon i a l and h a l f f euda l ; t i s a

count ry which i s p o l i t i c a l l y m i l i t a r i l y and economical ly backward. This i s an inescapable conclus ion . I t i s a v a s t count rywi th g r e a t r e sources and tremendous popu la t ion ; a country inwhich the t e r r a i n i s complicated and the f a c i l i t i e s fo r communi,:c a t i o n are poor. Al l these f a c to r s f avor a p r o t r a c t e d war; they

a l l favor the a p p l i c a t i o n of mobile warfare and g u e r r i l l a operat i o ns . The es tabl i shment of innumerable an t i - Japanese bases be'hind the enemy's l i n e s w i l l force him to f i g h t unceas ingly inmany p laces a t once bo th to h i s f r o n t and h i s r e a r . -He thuse n d l e s s l y expends h i s r e sources .

We must u n i t e the s t r eng th o f the army with t h a t of t hepeople ; we must s t r i k e the weak SpotB in the enemy's f l a n k s ; i nh i s f r on t ; i n h i s r e a r . We must make war everywhere and thUS,cause d i spe r s a l o f h i s fo rces end d i s s i p a t i o n of h i s s t r e n g t h .Thus the time w i l l come when a gradua l change w i l l become ev iden t

in the r e l a t i v e pos i t i on of ourse lves and our enemy and when t h a tday comes t w i l l be the beginning of our u l t i m a t e v ic to ry v ~ the Japanese .

3

Although China ' s popu la t ion i s g r e a t t i s unorganized . Thisi s a weakness which must be taken i n t o account .

The Japanese b a n d i t s have invaded our country no t merely toconquer t e r r i t o r y but to c a r r y out the v io l en t , rapac ious and

murderous p o l i c y of t h e i r government which i s the ex t i nc t i on ofthe Chinese r a c e . For t h i s compell ing reason we must un i t e then a t i o n wi thou t regard to p a r t i e s or c l a s se s fild fo l low our p o l i c yof r e s i s t an c e to the end. China today i s no t the China of old .I t i s no t l i k e Abyss in ia . China today i s a t the p o i n t of h e r .g r e a t e s t h i s t o r i c a l progress . The s tandards of l i t e r a c y ~ othe masses have been r a i s ed ; the rapprochement o f comrl1unistsand n a t i o n a l i s t s has l a i d the foundat ion fo r an an t i - Japanese warf r on t t h a t i s c o n s t a n t l y bel.ng s t rengthened and expanded; government, army and people a re a l l working wi th g r e a t energy; the rawm a t e r i a l r e sources and t he economic s t r e n g t h of the n a t i o n arewai t ing to be used; the unorganized people i s becoming an organized

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2708-900819 Dec 50b

na t ion . These energ ies must be d i r e c t e d toward the goal of prot r a c t e d war so t h a t should the Japanese occupy much of our .territor"'lT o r even most o f i t , 1 S we who w i l l gain f i n a l victory. Not only must those behind our l i n e s organize for r s i s ~ -ance but a lso those who l ive in Japanese occupied teIlritor;,T in"every pa r t of the count ry must do the same. The t r a i to r s . whoaccept the Japanese as f a the r s are few in number and t h o s ~ whohave taken oath t h a t t hey would pre fe r daa th to a b j e c t l ~ v e r y are many. I f we r s i ~ t with t h i s s p i r i t what enemy ean,we-riotconquer and who ~ ~ say tha t u l t ima te v i c t o r y wi l l no t be ours , .

The Japanese are waging a barbar i c war along u n c i v i l i ~ e d l i n e s . For t h ~ t reason Japanese of a l l c l a s s e s oppose the p o l ~ -c i e s of t h e i r government, as do vas t i n t e rna t i ona l groups" n theo t h e r hand, because China ' s cause i s r igh teous , our o u n t r ~ ~ n of.a l l c l a s s e s and p a r t i e s ar e uni ted to oppose t h e invader ; we havesympathy in many fo re ign c o u n t r i e s , i nc lud ing even Japan t s e l f .This i s perhaps the most impor tan t reason why Japan wi l l lose andChina w i l l w i n ~

The progres s of the war f o r the emancipation of the Chinesepeople w i l l be in accord with these f a c t s . The g u e r r i l l a war o fr e s i s t a n c e w i l l be in accord with these f a c t s , and tha t g u e r r i l l aopera t ions c o r r e l a t e d with those of our regu la r fo rces wi l l producev ic to ry i s the convic t ion of the many p a t r i o t s who devote t h e i ren t i r e s t r eng th to gue t ' r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s

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2708-900819!Dec!50aj

CII PTLR FIVE

ORGAliIZA'rr;r- '-:'on GUlmnILLA HOSTILITI::":;S

Four po in t s Dust be cons idered under t h i s sUbjec t . These a re :

l ~ How a re guerr:i,l;La bands formed ?2 IIow aI'e g u e r r i l l a bands o rg a n i z e d ?3 The f:1.ethods of armin.g g u e r r i l l a bands.4 0 Vfha t elements c o n s t i t u t e a g u e r r i l l a band ?

These are a l l ques t ions p e r t a i n i n g to the organ iza t ion of armedg u e r r i l l a u n i t s ; they are ques t ions which those who have had noexper ience in g u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s do not unders tand and onwhich they can a r r i v e a t :00 sound dec i s ions ; indeed , they Vlouldnot know in what Danner to beg in . F i r s t : How are g u e r r i l l au n i t s o r i g i n a l l y fornled? The u n i t may o r i g i n a t e i n anyone o f thefol lowing ways:

(a) rro:-,l the masses of t ~ i people .(b ) I ' ron r egu la r army Ull.its t empora r i ly d e t a i l e d fo r the

purpose .{c) From r egu la r army u n i t s permanent ly d e t a i l e d . (d) From the cormina t ion of a r egu la r army u n i t and a u n i t

r e c ~ u i t e d from the peop le .

(e) From the l o c a l m i l i t i a .( f ) From d e s e r t e r s frOl.l the ranks of the enemy.(g) From former band i t s and band i t groups .

In the presen t h o s t i l i t i e s no doubt a l l t hese sources w i l l beemployed.

In tIle f i r s t case above the g u e r r i l l a u n i t i s formed from thepeople . This i s the fundamental type . Upon the a r r i v a l of theenemy arny to oppress and s l augh te r the people t l l e i r leaders c a l lupon t hen to r e s i s t . They assemble the most valorous e l e n e n t s ,

arm them wi th o l d r i f l e s or b i r d guns and thus a g u e r r i l l a u n i tbegins . Orders have a l r0ady been i s sued throughout the na t ionwhich c a l l upon the people to form g u e r r i l l a u n i t s bo th fo r l o c a ldefense and fo r otl ler combat. I f the l o c a l governments approveand a i d such movements they can not f a i l to prospe r. ~ someplaces where t he l o c a l gov.eril.ment i s not deter:i1ined or where i t so ff i c e r s have a l l f l e d , the leaders among tne masses ( r e ly ing onthe sympathy o f the people and t h e i r s ince re de.sires to r e ~ i s t Japan and succor the count ry) c a l l upon the people -to l e s i ~ t ang.they respond. Thus many g u e r r i l l a u n i t s are organize4 . Incircumstances of Vl.is kind the du t i e s o f l eade r sp ip u s u a l l y f a l l

-

upon the shoulders of young s tuden t s , t eachers ,p r ~ f e s s o ~ s

o the r educa to r s , l o c a l s o l d i e r y, profess iona l men, r t i ~ n ~ and

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those without a f ixed profess ion who are w i l l i n g to e x e r t them-se lves to the l a s t drop of t h e i r blood. Recent ly i n Shans i , Hopei,Chahar, Suiyuan ,Shan tung"Chek iang , Anhui, Kiangsu, and o the rprovinces ex tens ive g u e r r l l l a h o s t i l i t i e s have broken out,. Al l ofthese are organized and l ed by p a t r i o t s . The amount of such a c t i -v i t y i s the b e s t proof of the foregoing s t a t emen t . The more suchbands there are , the b e t t e r w i l l the s i t u a t i o n be . Each d i s t r i c teach count ry, should be able to organize a grea t n umber of guerr i l IDsquads which when assembled form a g u e r r i l l a o m p n y ~ There arethose who say: " I am a farmer" or "I .am a s tuden t" ; " I can d i scussl i t e r a t u r e bu t not m i l i t a r y a r t s . This i s i n c o r r e c t . Ilhere i sno profound d i ffe rence between the farmer and the sold ien . Youmust have o u r g e ~ You s imply l eave your farms and become s o l d i e r s .That you are fa rmers i s of no d i ffe rence and i f you have educa t iont h a t i s so much the b e t t e r . When you take your arms in hand youbecome s o l d i e r s ; when you are organized you become m i l i t a r y u n i t s ,G u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s a re the u n i v e r s i t y of war and a f t e n you havefought severa l t imes v a l i a n t l y and aggress ive ly you may become al eade r o f t roops and t he re w i l l be many wel l known r egu la r so ld ie r swho wi l l n o t be your peers . Without ques t ion the foun ta in head ofg u e r r i l l a warfare i s in the masses of the people who organizeg u e r r i l l a u n i t s d i r e c t l y from themselves .

The second type of g u e r r i l l a u n i t i s t h a t which i s organizedfrom small u n i t s of . the r e g u l a r fo rces t empora r i ly detached f o rthe purpose. For example, since h o s t i l i t i e s commelced many groupshave heen t emporar i ly detached from armies , d i v i s i o n s and br igadesand ass igned g u e r r i l l a d u t i e s . A regiment of the r e g u l a r army may,i f c i rcumstances warrant , be d i spe r sed i n t o groups f o r the purposeof r r y ~ n g on g u e r r i l l a opera t ions . As an example of t h i s therei s the 8th Route Army i n North China. Excluding the per iods wheni t c a r r i e s on mobile opera t ions as an army i t i div ided i n t o i t se lements .and these c a r r y o n g u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s . This type ofg u e r r i l l a u n i t i s e s s e n t i a l fo r two reasons< F i r s t , i n mobilewarfare s i t u a t i o n s the coordina t ion of g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s withr egu la r ope ra t ions i s necessa ry. Second, u n t i l g u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i -t i e s can be developed on a grand sca le there i s no one to c a r r yout g u e r r i l l a miss ions but r e g u l a r s . H i s t o r i c a l exper iences showsus t h a t r e g u l a r army u n i t s are not able to undergo the hardshipso f g u e r r i l l a campaigning over long p e r i o d s ~ The l eader s of r e g u l a run i t s engaged i n g u e r r i l l a opera t ions must be ext remely adap tab le .They must s tudy the methods of g u e r r i l l a war. They must u.nderstandt h a t i n i t i a t i v e , d i s c i p l i n e , and the employment of stratagems area l l of the utmost importance. s the g u e r r i l l a s t a t u s of r e g u l a ru n i t s i s b u t temporary t h e i r l eader s must l end a l l poss ib le suppor tto the o rg a n i z a t i o n of g u e r r i l l a u n i t s from among the people . Theseu n i t s must be so d i s c i p l i n e d t h a t they hold t oge the r a f t e r thedepar ture o f the r e g u l a r s .

The t h i r d type of u n i t c o n s i s t s o f a detachment o f r egu la r swho are permanent ly ass igned @ l e r r i l l a u t i s ~ This type o fsmal l detachment does no t have to be prepared to r e j o i n ther egu la r f o r c e s . l t s pos t i s somewhere i n the r e a r o f the enemy

20


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and there t becomes the backbone o f g u e r r i l l a orgi l l l izat ion. Asan example of t h i s type o f organ iza t ion we may take the Wu T ' a iShan d i s t r i c t in the h e a r t of the Hopei-Chahar-Shansi area . Alongthe borders of these provinces u n i t s from the 8th Boute ~ r m y havees tab l i shed a framework f o r g u e r r i l l a opera t ions . Around thesesmal l cores many detachments heve been organized and the a rea o fg u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y g r e a t l y expanded. In aneas in which there i sa p o s s i b i l i t y of c u t t i n g the enemy's l i n e s of supply t h i s systemshould be used . Severing enemy sl:..pply rou tes d e s t r o ~ s h i s l i f el i n e and i s one f ea tu re t h a t can no t be neg lec t ed . f a t the timeof withdrawal of the r e g u l a r fo rces from a c e r t a i n a rea some u n i t sare l e f t beh ind these should conduct g u e r r f l l a opera t ions in theenemy1s r e a r ~ As an example o f t h i s we have the g u e r r i l l a bandsnow c o n t i n u i n g , t h e i r independent opera t ions in the Shanghai-Woo

u n o ~ a rea i n s p i t e of the wi thdrawal o f r egu la r force s

The f o u r t h type of organ iza t ion i s the r e s u l t of a mergerbetween smal l r e g u l a r detachments and l o c a l g u e r r i l l a u n ~ t s Ther egu la r fo rces may despatch a squad, a p la toon , or a company,which i s p laced a t the d i s p o s e l of the l o c a l g u e r r i l l a commander,I f a small group experienced in mil i tal 'y and p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s i s 'sen t t becomes the core o f the l o c a l g u e r r i l l a u n i t . Theseseve ra l methods are a l l e x c e l l e n t and i f proper ly appl ied the i n -t e n s i t y of g u e r r i l l a warfare can be extended. In the Wu T ' a i Shana rea each of these methods has been used .

The f i f t h type mentioned above i s formed from the l o c a lm i l i t i a , from po l i ce and home guards. In. ever;T North China province there a re now many of these groups and they should be formedin ever; l o c a l i t y. The government has i s sued a mandate to thee f f e c t t h a t the people are not to depar t from war a reas . Theo f f i c e r i n command of the county, the commander of the PeacePrese rva t ion Uni t , the Chief of Pol i ce are a l l r equ i re6 to obeyt h i s mandate. They can no t r e t r e a t with t h e i r fo rces bu t mustremain a t t h e i r s t a t i o n s and r e s i s t o

The s i x t h type of u n i t i s t h a t organized from t roops t h a tcome over from the enemy the Chinese t r a i t o r troopsll


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The s e v e n t h type o f g u e r r i l l a o r g a n i z a t i o n i s t h a t formedfrom bands o f b a n d i t s and b r i g a n d s . Th i s , l t h o u ~ ~ d i f f i c u l t , mustbe c a r r i e d o u t w i t h u t m o s t v i g o r l e s t the enemy use such bands toh i s own a d v a n t a g e . Many b a n d i t groups pose a s a n t i - J a p a n e s e g u e r

r i l l a s andt

i s o n l y n e c e s s a r y to c o r r e c t t h e i r p o i i t i c a l b e l i e f sto c o n v e r t them.

I n s p i t e o f i n e s c a p a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t y p e so f g u e r r i l l a bands t i s p o s s i b l e to u n i t e them to form a v a s t s eaof g u e r r i l l a s . The a n c i e n t s s a i d n T a i Shan i s a g r e a t mounta inbecause t does n o t s c o r n t h e m e r e s t h a n d f u l o f d i r t ; t h e r i v e r sand seas a r e deep b e c a u s e t h e y a b s o r b t h e w a t e r s o f sma l l s t r e a m s .A t t e n t i o n p a i d t o t h e e n l i s t m e n t and o r g a n i z a t i o n o f g u e r r i l l a so f e v e r y type and f rom every s o u r c e w i l l i n c r e a s e the p o t e n t i a l it i e s o f g u e r r i l l a a c t i o n i n the a n t i - J a p a n e s e w a r. T h i s i s some

t h i n g t h a t p a t r i o t s w i l l n o t n e g l e c t .

The Method o f O rg a n i z i n g G u e r r i l l a Regimes

Many o f t h o s e who d e c i d e to p a r t i c i p a t e i n g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e sdo n o t know t h e methods o f o r g a n i z a t i o n . For such p e o p l e , a s w e l la s f o r s t u d e n t s who have no knowledge o f m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s ~ m a t t e r o f o r g a n i z a t i o n i s a prob lem t h a t r e q u i r e s s o l u t i o n . Evenmaong those who h ve m i l i t a r y knowledge t h e r e a r e some who known o t h i n g o f g u e r r i l l a reg imes because t h e y are l a c k i n g i n t h a t p a rt i c u l a r t y p e o f e A p e r i e n c e . The s u b j e c t o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f

such r e g i m e s i s n o t c o n f i ned to the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c u n i t sb u t i n c l u d e s a l l g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e a r e a where t h eregime f u n c t i o n s .

As an example o f such o rg an i z . a t i on we may t a k e a g e o g r a p h i c a la r e a i n t h e e n e m y s r e a r . This a r e a may compr i se many c o u n t i e s .I t must be s u b d i v i d e d and i n d i v i d u a l companies o r b a t t a l i o n sformed t o acco rd w i th t he sl. .1.bdivisions. To t h i s mi l i t a r v a r e aa m i l i t a r y c o ~ n n d e r and p o l i t i c a l commiss ioners a r e p p o ~ n t e dUnder t he se t h e n e c e s s a r y o f f i c e r s 9 b o t h m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l ,are a p p o i n t e d . I n t h e m i l i t a r y h e a d q u a r t e r s t h e r e w i l l be the

s t a f f , t b e a i d e s , the supp ly o f f i c e r s , and t h e m e d i c a l p e r s o n n e l .These a r e c o n t r o l l e d by the c h i e f o f s t a f f who a c t s i n a c c o r d a n c ew i t h o r d e r s f rom the commander. I n t h e p o l i t i c a l h e a d q u a r t e r st h e r e are b u r e a u s o f propaganda o r g a n i z a t i o n , p e o p l e ' s mass movements and m i s c e l l a n e o u s a f f a i r s . C o n t r o l o f t h e s e i s ves t ed i nt h e p o l i t i c a l cha i rmen .

The m i l i t a r y a re a s a r e subd i vided i n to sp la l l e r d i s t r i c t s i na c c o r d a n c e w i t h l o c a l geography, t h e enemy s i t u a t i o n l o c a l l y , andt h e s t a t e ()f ~ e r i l l deve lopment . Each o f t h e s e s m a l l e r d i v is i o n s w i t h i n t h e a r e a i s a d i s t r i c t , each o f which may c o n s i s t o f

f rom two to s i x c o u n t i e s . To e a c h d i s t r i c t a m i l i t a r y commanderand s e v e r a l p o l i t i c a l commiss ioner s are a p p o i n t e d . Under t h e i rd i r e c t i o n m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l h e a d q u a r t e r s are o rg a n i z e d . Tasks

22,


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are ass igned in accordance with the nlimber of g u e r r i l l a t roopsa v a i l a b l e . While the names of the o ff i c e s in the t t d i s t r i c tcorrespond to those i n the l a rge r, "area, t the number of ' func t iona r i e s assigned in the forme'r Case should be reduced to the l e a s tpos8ib le . In o rde r to u n i f y c o n t r o l , to handle g u e r r i l l a t roopst h a t come from d i f f e r e n t ~ o u r c e s and to harmonize m i l i t ~ r y opera t ions and l o ca l p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s a committ8e of from seven tonine members should be organized in each area and d i s t r i c t . Thiscommittee, the members of which a re o e l e c t e d b y the t roops andthe l o ca l po l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s , should func t ion as a forum f o r t hediscuss ion of bo th m i l i t a r y an1 p o l i t i c a l mat te r s .

All the people in an a rea should arm themselves ~ n d be organi zed i n t o two g r o ~ p ~ ne o f t i l e s e groups i s a combat ~ o u p theo the r a s e l f defense u n i t with bu t l i m i t e d m i l i t a r y q u a l i t y.Regular combatMlt g u e r r i l l a s are organized i n to one of th ree gene r a l types of un i t e The f i r s t o f t hese i s the small uni't , . thep la toon o r company. In each county t h ree to s ix u n i t s may beo r g ~ i z e dThe second type i s the b a t t a l i o n o f from two to fourcompanies. ne such u n i t should be organized i n each county.While t he u n i t fundamental ly belongs to the county in which organi zed i t may opera t e in o the r count ies . While i n a reas o the r thani t s own t must operate in conjunct ion with l o c a l u n i t s i n orde rto take advantage of t h e i r manpower, t h e i r knowledge o f l o c a lt e r r a i n , l o c a l customs, and t h e i r in format ion of the enemy.

The t h i r d type i s the g u e r r i l l a regiment which c o n s i s t s o ffrom two to four of the above mentioned b a t t a l i o n u n i t s . I f s u f f i -c i e n t manpower i s ava i l ab le a g u e r r i l l a br igade of from two. tofou r reg iments may be formed.

Each o f the un i t s mentioned 'above has i t s own p e c u l i a r i t i e sof organ iza t ion . A squad, the smal l e s t u n i t , has a s t r e n g t h offrom n ine to e leven men inc luding the l eader and the a s s i s t a n tl eader. I t s arms may be from two to f ive western s ty le r i f l e s ,with t he r e m i n i n ~ men armed with r i f l e s of l o c a l manufacture , b i r dguns, spears o r b ig swords. Two to four such s ~ u d s form a p la toon .This too has a l eader and an a s s i s t n n t l eader, and when ac t ingindepender, t ly t i s ass igned a p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r to c a r r y o n p o l i -t i c a l propaganda work. The pla toon may have about ten r i f l e s withthe remainder of i t s weapons being b i r d guns, l ances , and b igswords. Two to four of such un i t s form a company which, ' l ike thepla toon has a leader, an a s s i s t a n t l eader, and a p o l i t i c a l ' o f f i c e r .Al l these u n i t s are under the d i r e c t supe rv i s ion of the m i l i t a r ycommanders o f the a reas in which they opera te .

The b a t t a l i o n u n i t must be more thoroughly organized andb e t t e r equipped than the smal ler ~ ~ i t s I t s d ~ s c i p l i n e and i t spersonnel should be super io r. I f a b a t t a l i o n 1 S formed ~ r o m


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company u n i t s i t should no t deprive subordina te u n i t s e n t i r e l yof t h e i r manpower and t h e i r a ~ l I f i n a small a rea the re i s apeace prese rva t ion corps , a branch o f the m i l i t i a , o r p o l i c e ,r egu la r g u e r r i l l a u n i t s should no t be d i spe r sed over i t

The g u e r r i l l a u n i t nex t in s ize to ' the b a t t a l i o n i s theregiment . This must be under more severe d i s c ip l i ne than i s theb a t t a l i o n . In an independent g u e r r i l l a regiment there may be t e nmen per squad; three squads per p la toon; th ree p la toons pe r company; th ree companies per b a t t a l i o n ; and th ree b a t t a l i o n ~ to theregiment . Two of such regiments form a br igade . Each of theseu n i t s has a commander, a vice commander and a p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r .

In North China guer. r i l l a cava l ry u n i t s should be e s t a b l i s h e d .These may be regiments o f from two to four companies, or b a t t a l i o n s .

All these u n i t s from the lowes t to the h i g h e s t are combatantg u e r r i l l a u n i t s which rece ive t h e i r supp l i e s from the Centra lgovernment. D e t a i l s of t h e i r organ iza t ion are shown in the t a b l e s .

All the people of both sexes from the ages of s ix teen tof o r t y - f i v e must be organized i n t o ant i -Japanese s e l f defense u n i t s ,the b a s i s o f which i s voluntar ; ' se rv ice . As a f i r s t s t ep theymust procure arms, then bo th m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l t r a i p ing mustbe gi ven them ' rhe i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are : l o ca l sen t ry du t i e s ,secur ing informat ion of the enemy,' a r r e s t i n g t r a i t o r s and prevent ing the d i s semina t ion o f enemy propaganda. - When the enemylaunches ,a g u e r r i l l a suppress jon dr ive these u n i t s , armed withwhat weapons t he re a r e , are assigned to e e r t a i n areas to d e c ~ i v eh inder and harass him. Thus the s e l f defense u n i t s a s s i s t t hecombatant g u e r r i l l a s . Ths T have o the r func t ions . They f u r n i s hs t r e t c h e r b e a r e r s to c a r r y the wounded, c a r r i e r s to take food tothe t roops and comfort miss ions to provide the t roops with t e aand por r idge . I f a l o c a l i t y can organize such a s e l f defense u n i tas we have descr ibed the t r a i t o r s can n o t hide nor c=an band i t s andr o b b e ~ s d i s tu rb the peace of the people . Thus the p e o p ~ e w i l lcontinue to a s s i s t the g u e r r i l l a s and supply manpower to our r egu l a r armies . The organ iza t ion o f s e l f de.fense u n i t s i s a t r a n si t i o n a l s tep in the development of u n i v e r s a l consc r ip t ion . Suchuni t s are re se rvo i r s o f manpower f o r the or thodox force s .

There have been such organ iza t ions f o r some time in Shans i ,Shensi , Honan, and Suiyuan. The youth organ iza t ions in d i f f e r e n tprovinces were formed f o r the purpose of educa t ing the young, Theyhave been of some he lp . However, they were no t vol.untary and-theconfidence of t he people was thus not -gained. These organ iza t ionswere no t widespread and t h e i r e f f e c t was ahnos t neg l i g ib l e . Thissystem was the re fo re supplanted by the new type organ iza t ions whichare organized on the p r inc ip l e s of vo lun ta ry coopera t ion


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non-separa t ion of the members from t h e i r na t ive l o c l i t i e s ~ When the members o f these organ iza t ions are in t h e i r na t ive townsthey support themselves. Only i n case of m i l i t a r y neces s i t y arethey ordered to remote p laces and when t h i s i s done the governmentmust support them o Each member o f these groups must have a weapon,

even i f the weapon i s only a k n i f e , a p i s t o l a lance or a spear. ,In a l l p laces where the enemy opera te s these s e l f defense

u n i t s should organize within themselves a small g u e r r i l l a groupof perhaps from t h ree to ten men armed wi th pis- to ls o r revo lvers .This group i s no t r equ i red to leave i t s n a t i v e l o c a l i t y.

The organ iza t ions of these s e l f defense uf l i t s i s mentioned int h i s book because such u n i t s are usefu l f o r the, purposes o f i n cu lc a t i n g the people wi th m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l knowledge, keepingorder in the r e a r and rep lenis ,h ing the ranks o f the regu:l.ars.These groups should be organized no t o n l y ' i n the a c t i v e war zonesbu t in every province in China. "The people must be insp i red tocooperate vo lun ta r i lK ' We must 'no t force them fo r i f we do tw i l l be i n e f f e t ~ l ~ , This i s ext remely impor tant . The organizat i o n of a s e l f defenso army s i m i l a r to t h a t we h ~ v e mentioned i ssho lffi in 'lIable 5

In order to con t ro l an t i - Japanese m i l i t a r y organ iza t ion as awhole t i s ne.eessary to e s t ~ l i s h a system o f mi l i t a r y areas ,andd i s t r i c t s along the l i ne s we have i nd i ca t ed . The o r g n i z ~ t i o n 'of such .areas and d i s t r i c t s i s shovm in Table 6.

Equipment of G u e r r i l l a s

In regard to the problem of g u e r r i l l a equipment t must beunderstood t h a t g u e r r i l l a s are l i g h t l y armed a t t a ck groups t h a trequi re simple equipment. The s tandard of equipment i s bqsed uponthe nature of du t i e s assigned; the equipment of low c lass g u e r r i l l au n i t s i s not as good as t h a t of h igher c l a s s u n i t s . For example,those who do no t have the du t i e s o f dest . raying r a i l r oads a re no t aswel l ~ q u i p p e d as those who have tha t duty. The equipment of guerr i l l a s can no t be based on what ~ h e guer r i ' l l a s want, or even whatthey need, but must be based on what i s a v a i l a b l e fo r t h e i r use ,Equipment can not be fu rn i shed immediately but must be acq,uired 'gradual ly. These are poin t s to be kept i n mind.

The ques t ion of equipment inc ludes the co l l ec t i on , supply,d i s t r i b u t i o n and . replacement of weapons, ammunition, blanketscOl11

l11unication mate r i a l s , t r an spo r t , and f a c i l i t i e s f o r propagandawork. The supply of weapons and ammunition i s most d i f f i c u l tp a r t i c u l a r l y a t the time the u n i t i s e s t ab l i shed , b u t t h i s problemcan always be so lved even tua l ly. Guer r i l l a bands which onigina tein the people are furn ished with revo lvers , p i s t o l s b i rd guns,spea r s , b i g swords, and land mines and moptars of loca l manufacture.Other elernentary weapons are added and as many new type r i f l e s asare ava i l ab le a re d i s t r i b u t e d . Afte r a per iod o f r e s i s t ance t i sp o s s i b l e to increase ' the amount o f equipment by cap tu r ing t fromthe enemy In t h i s , respect the t r an spo r t companies are the e a s i e s t

:


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~ 8 Q 9 8 ~ ; 7 l J e c 7 b

to equip f o r in any success fu l a t t a ck we wi l l capture the enemy st r a n s p o r t . An armory shoulQ be e s t a b l i s h e d i n each g u e r r i l l ad i s t r i c t f o r the manufacture and r e p a i r of r i f l e s and f o r theproduct ion of ca r t r i dges , hand grenades and bayonets . G u e r r i l l a smust not depend too much on an armory. The enemy i s the p r inc ipa lsource of t h e i r supply. For d e s t r u c t i o n of r a i lway t rackage ,br idges , and s t a t i o n s in enemy c o n t r o l l e d t e r r i t o r y i t , is necessaryto gather t oge the r demol i t ion mate r i a l s . Troops must be t r a inedin the prepara t ion and use of demol i t ions and a demol i t ion u n i tmust be organized in each reg iment .

As f o r c lo th ing minimum requi rements , these are t h a t each mansha l l have a t l e a s t two s u i t s of summer weight uniform, orie s u i tof win te r c l o t h i n g , two ha t s , a p a i r of wrap p u t t e e s and a b l a n k e t .Each man must have a haversack o r a bag f o r food. In the nor theach man must have an o v e r c o a t ~ In acqu i r ing t h i s c l o t h i n g wecan no t depend on cap tu res made from the enemy f o r i t i s forb iddenfo r cap to r s to take c lo th ing from t h e i r p r i s o n e r s . In orde r tomainta in h igh morale in g u e r r i l l a fo rces a l l t he -c lo th ing and equipment mentioned should be fu rn i shed by the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of thegovernment s t a t ioned in each g u e r r i l l a d i s t r i c t . These men mayc o n f i s c a t e c l o t h i n g from t r a i t o r s o r ask con t r iou t ions from thoseb e s t able to a ffo rd them. In subordina te g u e r r i l l a groups uniformsare unnecessary.

Telephone and r ad io equipment i s no t n e c e ~ s a r y i n lower groupsbut a l l u n i t s from regiment up a re equipped with both o This materi a l i s b e s t ob ta ined by con t r ibu t ions from the r e g u l a r fo rces andby cap tu re from the enemy.

In the g u e r r i l l a army in genera l , and a t bases i n p a r t i c u l a rthere must be a high s tandard of medica l eqliipment, Besides thes e r v i c e s o f the doc to r s , medicines must be procured . Althoughg u e r r i l l a s can depend on t he enemy fo r some p o r t i o n o f t h e i r medic a l s u p p l i e s they must , in genera l , depend ~ p o n c o n t r i b u t i o n s . I fwesteI n medicines are not a v a i l a b l e l o c a l medicines must be madeto s u f f i c e .

The p r ~ b l e m o f t r a n s p o r t i s more v i t a l in ~ o r t h China than int h e south fo r in the south a l l t h a t i s necessa ry i s mules and hors e s . Small g u e r r i l l a u n i t s need no animals , bu t reg iments andb r i g a d e s w i l l f ind them necessa ry. Commanders and s t a f f s o f un i t sfrom companies up should be f twnished a r i d i n g animal each. Att imes two o f f i c e r s w i l l have to share a horse . Off i ce r s whosed u t i e s are of minor na tu re do no t have to be mounted.

Propaganda m a t e r i a l s are very impor tant . Every l a rge g u e r r i l l aun i t should have a p r in t i ng Press and a mimeograph s tone . They

must a l so have paper on which top r i n t

propaganda l e a f l e t s andno t i c e s . They must be suppl ied wi th chalk and l a rge brushes . Ing u e r r i l l a a reas the re should be a p r i n t i n g press or a l ead typepre S S e

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For t h e purpose o f p r i n ~ l n g t r a i n i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s t h i sm a t e r i a l i s o f t h e g r e a t e s t i n ~ o r t n c e p

In a d d i t i o n t o t h e equ ipmen t l i s t e d above i t i s n e c e s s a r y to

have f i e l d g l a s s e s compasses and m i l i t a r y maps . An a c c o m p l i s h e dg u e r r i l l a group w i l l a c q u i r e t h e s e t h i n g s .

Because o f t h e proven importctnce o f g u e r r i l l a h o s t i l i t i e s i nt he a n t i - J a p a n e s e war t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s o f the n a t i o n a l i s t govern -ment and t h e commanding o f f i c e r s o f t h e v a r i o u s war zones s h o u l ddo t h e i r b e s t t o s u p p l y t h e g u e r r i l l a s w i t h what t h e y a c t u a l l yneed and a r e u n a b l e to g e t f o r t h e m s e l v e s . However i t mus t ber e p e a t e d t h a t g u e r r i l l a equ ipmen t w i l l i n t h e main depend on t h ee f f o r t s o f t he g u e r r i l l a s t h e m s e l v e s . I f t h e y depend on h i g h e ro f f i c e r s t o o much t he p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t w i l l be to weaken t he

g u e r r i l l a s p i r i t o f r e s i s t a n c e .

Elements o f t he G u e r r i l l a Army

The t e rm l Ie lementl l a s u s e d In t h e t i t l to t h i s s e c t i o n r e f e r sto t he p e r s o n n e l , b o t h o f f i c e r s and men o f t h e g u e r r i l l a army.Since e a c h g u e r r i l l a group f i g h t s i n a p r o t r a c t e d war i t s o f f i c e r smus t be b r a v e and p o s i t i v e men whose e n t i r o l o y a l t y i s d e d i c a t e dto t he cause o f e m a n c i p a t i o n o f t he p e o p l e . An o f f i c e r ~ h o u l d have t h e f o l l o w i n g q u a : : i t ie s : g r e a t powers o f endurance so t h a ti n s p i t e o f any h a r d s h i p he s e t s an example to h i s men and i s

a model f o r them; he mus t be a b l e t o mix e a s i l y w i t h t h e people , ;h i s s p i r i t and t h a t o f t h e men mus t be one i n s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h ep o l i c y o f r e s i s t a n c e to t h e J a p a n e s e . I f he w i s h e s t o g a i n v i ct o r i e s he mus t s t u d y t a c t i c s . A g u e r r i l l a group Witll o f f i c e r so f t h i s c a l i b r e would be u n b e a t a b l e . I do n o t mean t h a t e v e r yg u e r r i l l a group can hdve , t i t s i n c e p t i o n , o f f i c e r s o f s u c hq u a l i t i e s . The o f f i c e r s must be men n a t u r a l l y endoweC w i t h goodq u a l i t i e s which i t i s p o s s i b l e to d e v e l o p d u r i n ~ t h e course o fc a m p a i g n i n g . The mos t i m p o r t a n t n a t u r a l q u a l i t y i s t h a t o f com-p l e t e l o y a l t y to t h e i d e a o f p e o p l e s e m a n c i p a t i o n . I f t h i s i sp r e s e n t , t h e o t h e ~ s w i l l d e v e l o p ; i f t ~ s n o t p r e s e n t nothin

c a n be done . When o f f i c e r sa::c e

f i r s t s e l e c t e d f rom a groupi t

i st h i s q u a l i t y t h a t s h o u l d r e c e i v e p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n . The o f f ic e r s i n a group s h o u l d be i n h a b i t a n t s o f t h e l o c a l i t y i n whicht he group i s o rg a n i z e d a s t h i s w i l l f ~ c i l i t t e r e l a t i o n s be tweent h e ~ and t h e l o c a l c i v i l i a n s . I n add i t i o n , o f f i c e r s so cho senwould be f a m i l i a r w i t h c o n d i t i o n s . I f i n any l o c a l i t y t h e r e a r en o t enough men o f S U f f i c i e n t l y h i g h q u a l i i c a t i o n s f o r o f f i c e r san e f f o r t mus t be made t o t r a i n and e d u c a t e t h e p e o p l e so t h e s eq u a l i t i e s may be deve loped and t h e p o t e n t i a l o f f i c e r m a t e r i a li n c r e a s e d . There c a n be no d i s a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n o f f i c e r s n a t i v eto one p l a c e and t h o s e f rom o t h e r l o c a l i t i e s


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2703-000819/ c/5 0b

A g u e r r i l l a group ought t o ope ra t e on the p r i n c i p l e t h a tvo lun tee r s only a re accep tab le f o r s e r v i c e . I t i s a mistake toimpress people i n t o s e r v i c e . As long a s a person i s w i l l i n g tof i g h t h i s so c i a l cond i t ion o r p o s i t i o n i s no c o n s i d e r a t i o n , butonly men w o are courageous and deterTIined can bear the hardsh ipsof g u e r r i l l a campaigning in a p r o t r a c t e d war.

A s o l d t e r w o h a b i t u a l l y breaks r e g u l a t i o n s must be dismissedfrom the army. Vagabonds and vic ious people must no t be acceptedf o r s e r v i c e . The opium h a b i t must be forb idden and a s o l d i e r w ocan n o t break h imse l f o f the h a b i t should be dismissed . Victoryin g u e r r i l l a war i s condi t ioned upon keeping the membership pureand c lean .

I t i s a f a c t t h a t dur ing t he war the enemy may take advantageof c e r t a i n people who are l ack ing

WWII Guerrilla Warfare History

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