WWI 1st Aero Squadron Report

8/7/2019 WWI 1st Aero Squadron Report

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PUMITIVE EXPEDITION.

h b i j o r General John J. ,$el;shing,Commanding the Exoedltion.

OoPonia Dublan, aexico,October 10, 1916. -. . _

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Major General John J. $ers3hg,COmnanding,of h e

PUHITIVEEXFEDITIOH,

Color&aOctober Dublap, Mexico,10, 1916.


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PROPERTY OF U.S. ARMY -l-KiWQJART%S PUEITIVE X?EDIT10N, .S.ARMIn the Field, exico, ctober , 1916.

From: The Commanding eneral. To: The Couxranding eneral, outhern epartment,

Fort Sam Houston, exas. Subject: Report of operations f Punitive xpedition o June 30, 1916.

OFWNIZATIONMD O&ZERtlTIOEB.1. This expedition as organized nd its operations onducted nder instructionscontained n the following elegrams nd letters:

1st. I'FortSamHouston, Texas, March 11, 1916. GeneralPershing, FOX% Bliss, exas. Secretary f War has designated ou to command xpeditioninto Mexico to capture illa and his bandits. There will be twocolumns, ne to enter from Columbus nd one from Hachita, ia Culber-sonIs. Rachita olumn ill consist f Seventh avalry, enth Cavalry(less wo troops) nd one battery orse artillery. Columbus olumnwill consist f Thirteenth avelry (less ne troop) regiment fcavalry rom the east, one battery f horse artillery, ne company fengineers nd First Aero Squadron ith eight eroplenes.Reinforcedbrigade f Sixth nfantry, ixteenth nfantry, irst Battalion ourthField rtillery nd auxiliary roops ill follow olumbus olumn. Twocompanies f engineers ill be ordered o Fort Bliss awaiting urtherorders. Necessary ignel corps will be ordered rom here. Willfurnish ou War Department nstructions ater. Have you any recom-mendations o make? HXONE. BUEDY."

2nd.. "March 1, 1916. From: Department djutant. To: Brigadier eneral ohn J. Pershing, .S.A~rnly, Fort Bliss, exas.Subject: ignal orps detachmentsand radio equipment.

1. In connection ith the contemplated ovements f troops he following ignal orps etachments, tc., ave been directed o re-


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port to you.Signal corps wagon ra dio set a t Douglas, Arizona , complete withits signal detachm ent will be sent by ra il to Columbu s, New Mexico,and th e operator in char ge directed to report to you by wire for in-structions.The opera tor in charge of signal corps radio pack set at Culber-sons Ran ch, New Mexico, ha s been order ed to r eport to you by wire forinstructions.The operator in cha rge of signal corps wagon ra dio set at Las Ciengas,New Mexico, ha s been ordered to report to you by wire for instr uctions.The opera tor in cha rge of signel corps radio pack set at Hacbita,New Mexico, ha s been ordered to r eport to you by wire for instr uctions.Two signal corps ra dio pack sets, complete with paok animals andsignal corps det achment s, now at Mission, Tems, ha ve been directedsen t by ra il to Colum bus , New Mexico, th e senior noncommissioned officerin cha rge having been ordered to report to you by wire upon ar rivel forinstructions.The signal corps r adio t ra ctor set will be sent t o Columbus , NewMexico, with orders to report to you for instr uctions. It is inten dedto insta ll th is set at Colum bus for th e pur pose of ma inta ining COuEUni-cation with wagon sets sent with the two columns.2. In conn ection with this movemen t you ar e aut horized to use t he re-ma ining portion of Bield Compa ny I, Signal Corps, to such extent as ma ybe necessary. This coupa ny has two reser ve pack sets on ha nd, but itis un derst ood no pack equipment . These sets could be ta ken as reser vesets in case of acciden t to th ose before men tioned. Field Compa ny Ican also probably pr ovide at least four wire sections, should you deemit advisable to ha ve sam e accompa ny th e colum ns.By comm an d of Major General Funston:OUR BUXDY,Colonel, Adjutant General.

Srd. %arch 11, 1916.From: Department Adjuta nt.To: Brigadier General J ohn J. Pershing,Fort Bliss, Texas.Subject: Dxpeditiona ry Force.1. Inclosed is a copy of War Depart ment inst ru ctions to th eseheadqu ar ters in regar d to th e expeditionar y force which you ar e desig-nated to coxzand. Instr uctions in cipher have been sent you this daywhich ar e inten ded for your genera l inform at ion and &dance,2. As cora na nder of th e expeditionar y force, th e Depart ment Com-ma nder leaves you free to ma ke such assignmen ts of th e troops un der

your conrma nd s you thin k best in order to accomplish th e pur pose in,hand. The instru ctions that have been given you and tha t ar e beinggiven tr oops which will be p&ced u nd er your in media te cozma nd ar e for


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the purpose of organizing th e expedition. If you wish sny cha nges in these instru ctions telegraph these Headquar ters at once, but from the time th e tr oops report to you th ey will be subject to your orders. 3. Fu ll r eports should be mad e to th ese Head quar ters of all eventsof importance. By comn ar d of Major Gen eral Fu nst on:OUR BUXDYColonel, Adjut&t Generalll(1 inclosure) 4th.

(Enclosur e) liWash ington, D.C., Mar ch 10, 1916. Co r ma n d i n g General, Southern Department, Bort Sam Houst on, Texas. Num ber eight eighty thr ee.You will prompt ly organ ize an adequa te militar y force of tr ocpsunder the commandof Brigadier Genera l Pers hing a nd will direct himto proceed promptly across th e border in pur suit of the Mexican bandwhich at ta cked th e town of Columbu s and th e tr oops tn ere on the morn-ing of the 9th instant. These tr oops will be withdr awn to Americenter ritory as soon as the de facto governm ent in Mexico is able to re-lieve th em of th is work period. In an y event th e work of th ese tr oopswill be regar ded as finished as soon as Villa band or bands are knownto be broken up period In carr ying out these instr uctions you ar eaut horized to employ what ever guides and interpreters necessary andYOU are given gener al au th ority to employ such transportation includeing motor tr an sportat ion, with necessary civilia personn el as ma y berequired. m * * * +You ar e instr ucted to mak e all possible use of aeroplanes at San Antoniofor observation. Telegraph for wha tever reinforcement s or meter id youneed. Notify th is office as to force selected an d expedite m ovement .McCain. 11

5th. Washington, D. C.Karch 11, 1916.ConunandingGenerd ,Southern Department,Fort Sam Houston, TeEs.Num ber eight ninety seven.

Replying your nu muer 992 th e Secretw of Nar appr oves your gen-eral plan except tha t it m st not be based upon the assumption of anyra ilroad in Mexico being opened an d guar ded by U.S. tr oops periodYour plan mst assu me th at tr oops will be supplied direct from borderto wh&tever extent necessary an d th at th e use of ra ilroad is cont in-gent up on its being k ept open by th e de facto governr ren t and perm is-


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sion of tha t governm ent for us to use it period Secrecy an d prorqtmovement essential period Pirst Cavslry and Elevent h Ca valry willbe order ed to report to you as soon as you indicate where you wantthem period Keep Departm ent fully and frequent ly advised using WarDepar tm eht code period Code all messa ges to your subordina tes re-lat ing to proposed expedition.MCCAI7,

Supplementary to these instructions, a confidentia l telegra m, datedMar ch 16th, conveyed orders in dicat ing th e at tit ude to be observed t owar dtr oops of th e de facto governm ent , an d th e cour se to be followed in theevent of a mena ci~ att itude or actual att ack on the part of the forcesof th e Elsxican govern men t.Mobilization of !Croops.

2. The tr oops designat ed by th e Depar tm ent Cower to compr ise th eexpedition were th e ?th, lOth, 11th an d 13th Regiment s of Cavalr y, 6th an d16th Regiment s of Infan tr y, Bat ter ies B an d C, 6th Bield Art illery, 1stBatt alion 4th Field Artillery, Compan ies E and H, 2nd Batt alion of Engineers,Ambulan ce Compa ny Nu mber 7, P ield Hospital Num ber 7, Signal Corps det ach-ment s, 1st Aero Squadr on am i Wagon Compa nies, N um ber 1 an d 2. Theirorganizat ion, together with prelimin ar y inst ru ctions as to condu ct Of ourtr oops in Mexico, ar e shown in th e following: order :

Rl&DL$lARlXRSUNITIVEEZPEDITIOP , U.S.ARNY,Columbu s, N.K., Ma rch 14, 1916.General Orders ,)No. 1. )

I. 1. The forces of th is comm an d ar e organ ized int o a provisiona ldivision to be called %3nit ive Expedition, U.S.kmy.t2. The following st aff is an noun ced:

Chief of Staff; Lt.Col. DeR. 0. Ca bell. 10th Cav.Asst. to Chief of Sta ff: Capt ain Wilson B. Bur tt . 20th Inf.Adjutant: Major J ohn L. Hin es, Adjt. Gen. Dept.Int elligence Officerr Major J am es A. Ryan, 13th Cavalr yInspector: Cal. Lucien G. Berr y, 4th F.A.Judge Advocate: Capt. Allen S. Greer, 16th Infantr y.Quart erma ster: Major J ohn F. Madden. Qr. Mr. Corps.Surgeon: Major J ere B. Clayton, Medical Corps.Engineer Officer: Major Lytle Brown, Oorps of Pngrs.Signal Officer: Capt . Ha nson B. Black, Sig. Corps.Commanderof the Base: Major William R, Sample, 20th Inf.Aides: 1st Lieut. J am es L. Collins, 11th Cav.2nd Lieut. Mart in C. Shallenberger, 16th

3. The Pr ovisional Division will consis t of -


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(a) First Pr ovisiona l Cavalry Brigade, Colonel J amesLockett , Commanding.~Troops-11th Cavalry 13th CavalryBat tery C, 6th Pield Art illery (atta ched)(b) Second Cava lry Briga de, Colonel George A. Dodd, Corr ma nd ing

- Tr oops-7t h Cavalry 10th CavalryBat tery B, 6th Field Art illery (atta ched).(c) First Pr ovisional Infan tr y Brigade, Colonel J ohn H.Beacom, Commanding.-Troops-6t h Infantr y 16th InfvltryCos. E and H 2nd Batt alion of En gineers (atta ched)(d) Ambula nce Compan y No. 7. Field Hospit al, No. 7.(e) Signal Corps Detachmen ts, First Aero Squa dron.Detachmen t Signal Corps.(f) V&on Compa nies, Num ber 1 an d 2.4. Lieut . Colonel Eu clid B. Fr ick, Medical Corps, will rep ortto t he Comm an ding Officer (Major Samp le) as sur geon in cha rge MedicalBase Group.

II. 1. The followiq telegram s from Depart ment Hea dquar ters ar equoted for th e inform at ion of all concerned a nd com$ian ce th erewithis enjoined: Mar ch 14, 1916.The Department Cornnan der directs that you inform all subordinatesin your comm an d th at th ey will report prompt ly by wire to proper au tnor-ities who will report to th ese headqu ar ters , th e nam es of all officersan d enlisted men accompanying your corcna nd v


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be trea ted with every considera tion. They will not in e.ny case bemolested in the peaceful condu ct of th eir a ffsirs, an d th eir propertyrights will be scrupulously respected.

By corm ~&nd of Brigadier Generel Persh ing:DeR. C. C&bell,Lieutenen t Colonel, 10th Cavalry,Chief of Staff.

Crossing the Border.3. Under orders from Department Headquar ters the comma nd was toent er Mexico in two colum ns. The west colu~m , to cons ist of th e 7th

end 10th Regimen ts of Cavelry an d ora btitter y of 6th Field Artillery,W&S to h2ve its base at Ha chita an d mo ve by way of Culbersons Ranch.yihen orders for th e organization of the expedition were issued on March11th the troops to constitute the Hachita column were stationed asshown below:7th Cava lry: --Troops A 2nd B at Alam o Hu eco, New Mexico; Troop C atCulber sonls Ran ch, New Mexico; Troops D, II, I and L at Lcaing~s Ranch, NewMexico; Hea dqu crter s Troops (Prov.), Mechine Gun Plat oon end Troops E, F, G,and K at Douglas, Arizona ; and Troop M at Hu dspeth ls Ranch, Arizona .

10th Cavelry:-- En tire regiment (less Troops L an d M) at Douglas,Arizona, ha ving left Fort Hua chuca, Arizona, on ma rch 9th. rLrr iving a tDouglas on March 11th.

Batt ery B, 6th Field Artillery, at Dou&as, Arizona .These tr oops were directed to proceed overland without delay to Culber-

sons Ranch, New Mexico, where they ha d all ar rived the niGht of March14th, except wagon trcnsport at ion which cam e in early on the morninr l; ofthe 15th.4. The eas t colum n, consist ing of all oth er tr oops of th e expedition,

was to use Colum bus, New Mexico, as its base an d move directly south fronthere. The sta tions of th ese tr oops &, th at tise were as follows:

13th Czvalry (less one tr oop at Port Riley) Columbu s, Ne w Mexico an dvicinity.The 6th end 16th Regimen ts of Infantr y at El Pa so, Texzs, fron which

point they r eached Columbu s by ra il on th e night of March 13th .end th e morn-ing of tne 14th .Batt ery C, 6th Field Artillery, Nogales, Arizom, ar rived at Colunbu s

by ra il on March 14th.Troops of th e staff depar tm ents were scatter ed all along th e border

and arrived on various dates.


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5. Under th e proposed plan the two column s were to un ite at t~sencion.and ther eafter ta ke such cour se as circumst an ces might dicta te. Informa-tion reached Columbus before our depar tur e tha t Villals band ha d passedCasas Gra ndes, xxmving sout h. Fr om Villas movements it was appa rent th atfor the two column s t o un ite at Asencion would cau se delay, and also tha tthe use of Rachita as a base for the western column was inexl>edient. Itwas ther efore decided tha t th e Ha chita column was to push thr ough fromCulbersonls Ranch by the most direct route to Casas Gran des which shouldfor the time being become the advan ced base.

On the night of the 13th it was learned tha t t he comma nding officer ofthe small detachment of de facto troops, stationed at Palomas for the pur-post of guarding the gate at the line, six miles south of Columbus, hadreceived order s to oppose th e ent ry of American tr oops int o Mexico. Everyargu ment was used to convince him tha t opposition would be futile, an d hewas advised tha t an un dersta nding on th e subject had been reached betweenth e two governmen ts. But he mainta ined tha t h is orders made it imperat iveth at he oppose us by force., As an arm ed clash at the very start was un-deshra ble, Depart ment Head quar ters was notified of the situa tion, and wasadvised th at the column would cross the line at noon on the fifteent h.Notificat ion was also sent to the officer at Pdlomas th at %ie would enterMexico at the appointed time wheth er he should offer opposition or not. Thecomma nd entered as planned and found tha t the de facto detachment had leftPalomas that morning.

6. Telegrap hic order s wer e sent Colonel Dodd at Culber sons Ran ch tohold his comm an d in read iness to sta rt upon my ar rival early th at evening,but owing to an au tomobile accident my ar rival was delayed u ntil near ly 12oclock P.M.) SO that the colwnn did not star t until about midnight. FromCulbersonls Ron&, th e wagon tra nsporta tion perta ining to th e tr oops of th iscolumn lias ordered overland to Columbus, pack tra ins being th e only tra ns-portat ion ta ken across the line from Culbersons.

This com~.nd bivouacked early on the morning of the 16th at GeronimoRock, ma rching again at noon an d ha ltix for th e night at Ojita s, a distznceof fifty- miles from Culbersonls Rn~lch. The column start ed early on the17th tovzrd Casa s Gfaildes, orrivig in c2q one h&f rcile nort h of ColoilioDub1r .n on th e Ccs;s Grbn des r iver ct 7:30 P .!.Eerlg Pursuit .

7, Upon c_rr ivA of th e CulbP rson force -t Dublan , it wa s rep ortedby na tives thzt Villa an d his ban d Bere somewh ere in th e vicinity of S:-,.n1Iigule de Rebicore gat her in; su:.,:J ies, recup era tiq th eir stock 2nd seizingnew mount s from th e people in tha t vicinity. It v[as at once determ ined tosend south th ree separa te cavalry column s with instru ctions to cooperatewith each other to th e fullest extent. It was believed possible, by movingthese deta chment s, in general, par allel to each other, th at Villa wouldbe prevented from moving toward Sonora on th e west, or toward th e ra ilroadon the east , with the additional chance of cutting his tr ail or gettingah ead of him before he could move south of the ra ilroad into the mountains


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back of Guer rer o, to which section it was believed he would probably go.8. One of the thr ee deta chment s, consisting of the 7th Cavalry, 29

officers an d 647 enlisted men un der Colonel J am es B. Erwin, 7th Cavalry,left 6olonia Bublan on the night of Mar ch 17th ~18th witn order s to proceedwitnout delay by way of Galeana to the sout hwest of El Valle, then ce toascend the easter n slope of the Sierra Make Oriental mount ains by tra ilto toe easter n eQe of the San Miguel plat eau in the hope of strikingVillas ban d if th ere, or as he moved eastwa rd with his spoils,The second detachm ent consisting of the second squa dron of :he 10thCava lry, 14 officers an i 258 enlist ed men , un der Colonel K. C. Brown, wasdirected to proceed by ra il and detra in at Rucio and from ther e movedirect to San Miguel.The th ird column consisting of the first squadr on of th e 10th Cavalry,

8 .officers an d 204 enlist ed men , un der comm an d of Major IL YI. Eva ns, wasalso ordered to proceed by ra il to Las Varas, near Pa dera, cover th eterr itory to the south of Babicora plateau , prevent Villa from movingsouthwest, and to cooperate with th e other two column s as far as pra cticable.

9. Tne reason for sending th e two 10th cavalry deta chment s by ra ilwas tha t th is r egiment had already traveled from Fort HUELC~NC~o ColoniaBublan , a dista nce of 252 miles since Mar ch lOth , an aver ee of over 30mi les a day, and the animals had be,- to show the effect s of the s t r a in .Moreover, it wa s thought th at they could ther eby gain time on Villasswiftly moving colum n. Upon my telegra.:phic request to th e general ma n-ager of the El Pa so Southwester n Railroad, a tra in was promptly sent fromJ au res for th e use of th is r egiment. Upon ar rival of th e tra in at ColoniaBublan on th e morning of &rch 19th, th e car s were found in very bad condi-tion. The box cars ha d to be vent ilated by cutt ing holes in the sides,an d man y repa irs had to be rpa de on all cars, causing considerable delayin departure. Man y difficulties as to fuel, wat er an d un willingnes s onth e par t of ra ilroad employees were encoun tered during the ra il journ ey soth at Colonel Browns squa dron did not ar rive at Rucio un til 8 otclock onth e morning of the 20th. He promptly detra ined and proceeded to S,anKiguel over a rocky mount ain tr ail, ar rivin; tker e on th e morning of the2ls.t to find th at Villa ha d not been within several miles of th e place.Fr om th is point Colonel Browns colum n moved on th e 23rd to El Toro wher ehe received informa tion tha t Villa ha d recently fought Colonel knotscomma nd of Carra noistas near Santa Clara Ranch.Major Pvansl column continued by ra il to Musica where he concluded todetra in end ma rch overland to Las Varas, arr iving ther e on March 22nd. Arailroad wreck at the lrwitchba ck over Cumbr e Tunn el, in which two carswere overtu rned an d eleven men injured, considerably delayed Major Evan scolumn.

10. In the mea nt ime Colonel George A, Dodd was directed to join th e7th Cavalry deta chment and t&e charge of the operations of both regiment swith an especial injunction to esta blish comm onicat ion with the other twocolum ns an d endea vor to secure all possible coopera tion am ong our forces.


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On Ur ch 22nd Colonel Dodd got in touch with Colonel Sala s, coizand ing defacto tr oops near El Vslle, who confirmed th e report that the la t ter hadencount ered a detachm ent of Villistas on th e 19th insta nt and had beendriven back through Cruces t o El Valle. Colonel Dalass CormxXi was f0m-dto be in a demoralized condition, and had ta ken u p a defensive positionjust south of El Valle, expecting furth er at ta ck from the Villistas.

11. AS it was tinought tha t Villa was still at Namiquipa, COlOnelDodds column cont inued south, crossing th e Sant a Maria river on MLarch23rd about six miles north of Cruces, to a point about fifteen miles north -east of Nam iquipa where he bivouacked for th e night. Later news appar entlyconfirmed th e report th at Villa had recently fought a detachm ent of Car-ra ncistas near Nam iquipa, but th e inform at ion as to th e direction Yillnhad ta ken was indefinite and confusing.Report s to Colonel Dodd on th e 24th indicat ed th at Villa h;ld passedthr ough or near Oso Canyon and had gone south or southwest . In the hopeof cuttin g in &head of him Dodd tiierefore moved westwar d to Sant a Ana,arr iving early on the morning of th e 26th. It would be noted t ha t th ecount ry was extremely dry, and tn at it was next t o impossible to followa tr ail of any kind.

12. Uoon inform at ion received at headqua rt ers by telegraph from ColonelBrown, th at Vilias forces were somewhere between Nam iquipa and Sant a

5C1ara, Major Evans wa s directed by mire to move to San J ose de Babicoraand comm unicate with Colonel Brown. On the 24th at Na miquipa, ColonelBrown had a consult at ion with Colonel Cano and was advised tha t Villalsband was either at Oso Cmyon or near Santa Clara. Upon this report Col-onel Brown telegraphed headqu art ers th at he would at ta ck Villa next day.He nmr ched th rough Nam iquipa to Oso Canyon rema ining th e night of th e 25th.Colonel Cana ls comm and of two hun dred men campin=, near by. Cano was tocoopera te by dending out scout ing par ties to locate the enemy, whileColonel Brown was to r emain at Oso Canyon and plan to move against Villaby night. Meanwhile Kajar E vanls column was joined at El Tore on th e 24th.Colonel Brown, with both column s, rema ined at El OSO on th e 26th and, uponlearning th at Colonel Cano had not sent out scout ing par ties as agreed,left the 27th for Peloncillos. Being advised t hat Villa was at Sant aCata lina, he sur rounded th e ran ch at daylight on th e 28th but found nothing.Here he hear d th at Villa in person had passed to Quema da th ree days before.Fr om here Ma jor Evans.1 column went to Tapeties and on th e 23th at El&bio, Colonel Brown moved to @emada where he rema ined durin g th e 29th.

Colonel Dodds column left Sant a Ana on the 27th an d camped east ofPr ovidencia, hoping to obtain n ews of Villas wher eabout s. But ColonelDodd remar ks in his report tha t he had about concluded tha t all infom-tion Up to t hat tim e regarding Villas movements after the Nam iquipa fightwas fzhlse, an d cites a belated messa ge from Colonel Brown, dat ed Namiquipath e 25th sta ting Wllals whereabouts unkn own, but it is thought possiblyhe has gone through th e mount ains toward Bachineva.

13. Tra cing Villas movemen ts from Mar ch 19tn, th e dat e of his fightwith th e Carr ancista force at Nemiquipo, it is now known th at he left th ereon March 20th campiW at El Rose-l, or Lujans Well, th at night; tha t on the2lst he ma rched to La Cart hucera, twelve miles southea st of Lujant s \ Tell;


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th2.t iie was at L@emade on the 23rd; tha t he reached Rubio on the 23d, leav-ing on the night of the 25th a nd reacing San Diego de1 Konte on the morningof tne 26th . Fr om tliere he followed a tr ail leading south west to AguaCaliente, then ce changed direction to the westward arr iving the night ofthe 26th at San Ysidro near Guerr ero, where he successfully fought withthe Carran cistas on the 27th.

Attitu cie of th e Peoule.14. The movemen ts of our column s ar e given above in deta il to showth at th e inform at ion upon which th ey were acting was very conflicting. Ithad now become evident tha t t he de facto troops intended to prevent thekjiericclns from overt ak ing Villa if possible. At th e sta rt th e reporttha t Villa was at San Miguel was un founded. Pr actically every Mexicanso far encount ered ha d quest ioned our right to be in Mexico, an d claimedther e was no aut hority for our presence.A proclamat ion had been issued by General Obregon and published insevera l towns, copies of which our column s carr ied an d displayed asevidence of an agreement between th e two government s. This proclamat ionshould have settled the mooted question in so far as the lo&t inhabita ntswere concerned, but it did not change th eir views nor their intent ions,although it probably d id prevent active hostilities at the sta rt. Theproclmtion was as follows:

The Governor of the State, in a telegram dat ed the 15th inst.,advised th is Municipal Pr esidency, of which I em in char ge, of th efollowing, which I copy he rewit h:Wuniciazl President , Casas Gran des. In a telegram dat ed the13th inst aG, Gener al Alvaro Obregon, SecretTr y of Mar an d Na vy,says tne followi~: Our government h aving enter ed into an agreementvrith tha t of tne United Sta tes of the North, providing teat the troopsof either government may cross the border, in pur suit of bandits whoar e comm ittin g depr edat ions along our frontier, I advise you of sam ein order tha t you may in turn advise all comma nders a long the borderin order tha t they may mak e judicious use of these powers, teking carein each case to act in accord with the military au thorities of theAmerican m in order thr:t the pureu it of these b::ndits may give thebest resu lts. Affectionat ely. Klich I t&e pleasu re in co.mru nicatin gto you, advising you tes t th e difficult y ha s now been sett led. Affec-tionately. The Actin ; Pr ovisionol Governor. Colone l Igna cio C.Ruriquezz.sThis is a tru e copy ta ken from the origina l.Constitu tion and Reforma,

Casas Gran des, Lrch 20, 1916The Acting Municipal President ,P. G. Galindo,(RuNICIPkL S&XL) (Rulrio)

15. Colonel Dodd, in his re port on Mar ch 28th sta tes: But inform +tion having reached me too late, combined with misrepresent ations, nu llifiedwhat was done toward carrying out th e plan. Colonel Brown learn ed while


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at Oso Canyon t hat Cano had not kept his word, and had made no att empt toascerta in the wherea bouts of Villa. Colonel Brown in his r eport says:Have just ha d a conference with Cano who could not produce th e man whosaw Villas tr ail. I fear he simply lied to me. No appa rent effortwas ma de by any of the various Carr an cista comm an ders to keep in touchwith Villa, nor was th ere any active pu rsu it of Villas ra pidly fleeingcommand. Many desert ers from Villa were retu rnin g to th eir homes whomu st have brought back inform at ion, a& it is idle to presume th at thedirection Villa had ta ken, or his actua l location were un known to the defacto commanders.Convincing evidence of opposition was shown in th e tissu e of false-hoods t old our officers. As the Mexican villages along the San ta Mariariver are known as th e Queblos de 10s Indiosl an d th e inha bitan ts ar egenerally Villista sympat hizers, an d as it was from th ese towns th at Villaha d recruited mu ch of the force he led t o Columbu s, it vias probablynatu ral tha t they should mislead us. Nam iquipa was th e home of Cervant es,Villas chief lieuten an t, who planned and carr ied out the att ack onColumbus. So there was among the people a resentment toward us tha twas clear ly shown in th e brasen ly false news they disseminat ed. Pr ac-tically all inform ation from na tive sources was either entirely mislead-ing, or if base d on fact, locat ed Villas ban d at places severa l dayslater than the actual date. The people in gener al were but followingVillas well-known meth ods in using his me-arm to assist him to escape.Sever&l Mexicans ha ve fra &ly said th at they would consider it a na tionaldisgrace if th e American s should ca_otu re Villa. Nor was th is att itudeconfined ent irely to th e na tive Mexican s. Most foreigner s, includingAmericansthat thequently no

with interestsex-edition vr

assistanceouldcame

in Mexico, hoped we wouldbe withdra wn if we should

from that source.not

su csucceed,

ceed, andbelieving

conse-

OTHSR PURSUINGCOLUMNS.16. In the mean time other pur suing detachments were organized to beheld in read iness to move in any direction tha t circumsta nces might dicta te.The first of th ese deta chment s was th e 2d Squadr on an d tr oop L of th e 13th

Cavalry, un der Major Elmer Lindsley, 13th Cavelry, consist ing of 11 officersand 275 men. This column was directed to occupy Chu ichu pa. It leftColonia Dublan on &rch 20th , ma rchin g ma inly by night , by way of ColoniaPecheco, an d reached Chuichupa Mar ch 22d. The pur pose of th is movewas to ,U:ri the tr ails leading westwar d in the event Villa should evadeth e column s pursu ing him an d str ike in th at direction. As Villa cont inuedto flee south, Major Lindsleyl s deta chment was moved to Babicora plainto cover th e terr itory vacated by the 10th Cavalry. Leaving Chu ichu paon th e 24th of Ea rth by way of Uusica, he ar rived at San Miguel de Babicoraon the 27th an d contin ued on to San J ose de Babicora on March 30th.Another detachment under Major Tompkins, 13th Cava lry, cons isting ofTroops K, M an d InWhim Gun Pls.toon, lath Cavalry, with Tr oops I a& I[ ofth e 10th Cavalry, 11 officers an d 160 enlisted men, left Colonia Dublan onMarch 21st with instr uctions to follow up th e San ta Maria river and be on*hand should his services be needed later in th e pur suit of any portion ofVillaIs force, In accordance ther ev~ith Major Tompkins went to Mamiquipa


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where he pas in camp on K!rch 29th. A provisional squadron was organized from the 11th Cavalry, composed of men selected from all troops of the regiment, and placed under command of Kajar Robert L. Howze, 11th Cavalry. This corsznd, consisting of 10 officers and 255 enlisted men, left Colonia Dublan on rarch 24th and pro- ceded south along the line of communications to Xamiquipa, where it was

in cernp arch 29th. Another provisional squadron, from the 11th Cavalry, consisti= of picked men from each troop with two machine gon detac'hments, aking a total of 10 officers and 292 men, was placed under Lieutenant Colonel H.T. Allen, 11th Cavalry.

Stations and troous on Line of Comnninications, tlarch 9th.

17. Without going into details of the movements of the various detachments of th e conwad th at ha & been steadily advancing southwsxd it will be sufficient to show the organizations and their approxinmte stations about that date as follows:

!ComzndingORGAl~Iz&TIONS Officer 1 Location . RemarksDivision Headquarters 'Dublan ,General ershing at Nemiouioa. Hdqrs. 1st Prov. Cav. Brigade Col. Lockett (Dublan I Detachments: b /

1st sq., 13th Cavalry Maj. Linds1eyiSa.n ose de i Babicora*i2 Tps. 13th Cavalry !Maj.Tompkins Namiquipa 1st Prov. Sq.,llth Cav. j&&i. Howze \Namiqoipa !?Hdqrs. 2d Prov. Cav. Brigade ibolonel Dodd /Guerrero* ;Detachments: I7th Cavalry jColone1 ErwinjGuerrero* (Troop A, 7th Cavalry .Capt. Nissen iPortrilio Pass*Troop D, 7th Cavalry jCapt. Boice !Santa h*2nd Sq. 10th Cavelry /Colonel Brown,Quemad.as1st sq. 10th Cavalry iMajor Evans :Rubio*2 Troops, 10th Cav. Maj.Tompkins Namiquipa

Hdqrs. 28 Prov. Inf.Erigade i Col. Beacon 'Dublan Detachments: Co. C, 16th Inf., with Wagon Cos.Eos. 1 & 2 ; Capt. Ball Enroute hrblan Co. M, 16th Inf. : Capt. Creary >Corralitas Det. Cos. 16th Inf. :Maj. b!oore Colonia Juarez* Co. B, 16th Inf. [Caot. Smith ~BOCO Grande

_ 3d Bn., 16th Inf. j Capt.Shaffer El Valle i Less 2 coniganie,*Not on line of Communi ations.


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-13-Stations of Troops - Continued.

Organizations Co. D. and one-half M.G; Co. 6th Inf. 1 Co. and one half M.G. Co., 6th Inf. 2 Cos. 6th Infantry

Co. 0, Engineers Co. H, Engineers Co. E, Engineers Pack Trzin 1st En., 4th F.A. 1st Bn., 4th F.A.

Ambulance Company No. 7. Field Hospital, No. 7 signal corps: Hq. 1st Aero Sqdn. Det. 1st Aero Sqdn. Hq. Signal Det. Wagon wireless sets Uagon Co. No. 3. Pack Train, No. 10 Pack Trains,;Tos. and 7 Pack Train, No. 11 Bq. 1st and 3rd Sqdns. 5th Cavalry Hq. and 5 Cos. 24th Inf. 3 Cos. 24th Inf. 1st Bn., 20th Inf. 2nd Sqdn. 5th Cav. * Not in line of commonicati

Commanding Officer

Capt. Johnson Lieut. Monroe Capt. Roach Lieut. Fox Capt. Garvis Capt. Grant

Capt. Merrill Capt. Jones Major Clayton Capt. Black Capt. Foulois Capt Black

Capt. Bryson

Col. Wilder Col. Penrose Capt. Gilmore h&j. Sample @j. Fleming llS.

Location

Galeana Cruces Chocolate Pass Boco Grande Naimquipa Asencion San Fose de Babicora* Dublarl DublEn Ihlblan Dublall El ValleAll stationsDublan andNmiquipaDublan Dublan Namiquipa @emada* Gibson's Ranch rxlblan nd war stations Columbus Columbus Columbus

Remarks

With Major Lindsley

I-I-r

Ij-

I

I I,jI

Guerrero Fi.sE:ht. 18. Upon arrival at Bachineva on the 28th. Colonel Dodd received informa-

tion which-appeared to be trustworthy that Vilia had been there two or three days before and had taken supplies and anirrals nd impressed several men into his service. It was said also that he had made an inflamatory speech telling the people that the Americans were coming, and urging all


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Mexicans to join his forces. Dodd also hear d there tha t Villa ha d beenseverely wound ed in a fight with Car rencistss at Guerr ero on th e 27th, andwas tnen at Guerrero witA 500 or 600 men. He very prompt ly decided toact, an& sta rt ed toward Guerr ero tha t afternoon, continu ing by a nightma rch toward Guer rero with a view to reaching Villa~s camp at daylight,Unfortu na tely his na tive guide led him by a very circuitous route, doublingthe actua l distence an d ma king a ma rch of fifty five m iles necessary. WhenDodds colum n ar rived nea r Guer rer o t:le guide would not or could not yiveany informxtion as to road s or tr cils, so th at it Was eight OClOCkefi.r;itein the morning before the at ta ck gas besun.

19. Guer rer o is located in th e lovcer plain of tie Gucrr ero Valley a nd,on accoun t of hi,h blufls, is not visible fro;i, th e e?.st un til OiiC 'IS dircct-ly over it. The blur Ls a re t lur u:) s, in 1mn y places ir.yassa bie, :L. r.re cutbj- iir:;.ess:51e ~r ;~,;:os r4n .i.n; ~211 ij:


17/112

who carry off th eir dead. Undoubtedly a much larger num ber tha n thiswas killed.3. Pie captu red Villas two ma chine pas, a nu mber of horses, saddlesand arms.4. Our casua lties were four enlisted men woun ded, none of th me seriously. 5. The at tack was a surpr ise but owing to misrepresenta tion of guide failed to be th e tota l success 1 an ticipated. Ha d 1 ha d a good guide th e ent ire outfit would ha ve been %oxeds. The at ta ck r esult ed in the breaki= up and scat terin g of Villas tr oops,t he grea te r portion of th em being dr iven in a ten mile running fight into the mounta ins northeast of the railroad where after brisk skirmishing th ey separ at ed int o sma ll bands, an d our horses were too weak to follow them farther . These par ties will probably rea ssemble somewhere in th e vicinity of S. A&L, an d I ha ve notified th e Comma ndingOfficer at WJQUIPA to be on the lookout. 6. A lar ge nu mber of Car ra ncista prisoners, who were kept for execut ion it is un derst ood, were liberat ed or ma de th eir escape. 7. In order to rea ch th is point th e cort i;i&ndmarched 17 hours

out of 24 coverir& 55 miles ar d th en kept ~1) th e fi;;ht for five ho_J rs.* * * c * * 9. Elijio Hernr;ndez, who comm an ded th e Villa tr ool)s, 2nd who \ IUS one of Villas most tr us ted officers . was killed in th e fight toda y. 10. I am sendirg this by messenger, but as I am promised tha t thetelegraph line p7ill be in opera tion tomorrow, shall wire it also. * * * Y * *

12. With Villa probably perm an ent ly disabled, Lopez seriouslywounded and Hern andez dead and the blow administered this morning,th e Villista par ty would seem to be pret ty well disintegra ted.* * * * * *16. Deta iled report will be furnish ed lat er.Geo. A, Dodd,

Colonel, Cavalry.lExtr act from Colonel Dodds detailed report .

II * * * when it became evident tha t tne bandits had be-come alar med an d par ties were leaving town on both sides, ma king itevident tha t atta ck nest be inaugura ted at long ran ge, and at once,if at all, fire with llrachine guns was opened at NBD1 riflesnd withat I rEI t . At this time the progress made by the 2d squadron and itspos%$ion was not all satisfactory. Short ly after firing comm encedon th e east side Winens squa dron rea ched a rr oyo KFIL,E Troop underCapt ain S. F. Dallam , 7t h Cavalry, being adva nced t o ar royo lIGI1, wher eexcellent work was done, in th e killi= of Genera l Her na ndez, th e com-ma nding officer, captu ring two ma chine =gunsand oth er arm s, and secur-ing some Carr anza prisoners, wh o were being held by th e bandit s. Dobandits escaped throwh the ar royo after Dallam had att ained thisposition, while th ose who ha d alrea dy passed y;ere pressed an d drivenwestward. The balance of the squadron ar riving at arr oyo Wr encoun-ter ed a lar ge body of Villista s moving in an orderly ma nn er, not firin g


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-16-

an d carr yi% th e Mexican flag, on accoun t of which fire of our tr oops was withh eld un der conditions most favorable to us, a nd as ha d been plann ed would ha ve been an nihilation to th is portion of th e Villistss. This is a ma tt er of deep regret, as not firing an d carrying th e na tional flag of Kexico was simply a ru se to escape pu nishm ent; a ru se resorted to by th e escaping bondits on th e east side while leaving town; but in th is case fire was increased instea d of being withheld, with sat isfactory resu lts. As a nu mber of th e ban dits were seen to excape at the north end of tonn and then strike eastward, Lieut. Cal. Selah R. H. Tompk ins, ha vis but one tr oop C, dismoun ted at I?, was sentnortn an d east to inter cept th e excapix par ty. He was immediatelyrein forced by Major A. L. Dele, 7th Cava lry, with I, K an d L Troops,and later as th e Villista s were moving towards t he hills nea r Calera, BTroops un der Capta in Vi. B. Cowin, an d th e &dxLne Gun Troop under 1stLieut. A. C. Mimberly. were sent AS still fur ther reinforcement s, arunn ing fight resulted and kept unt il the Villistas entered the mountains,which were very rough, broke int o sma ll deta chment s and scatter ed,exhau stion of horses an d conditions prevented furth er pur suit,

22 . The following order em bodying a telegrnn from th e Secretar y ofliar WAS published to tfle comm an d:HWX#JARTZPS i_TJ NITIVRXXPDDITION, U.S.ARlE,

In th e Field, Mexico, April 4, 1916.Genera l Orders, )

No. 17. )1. Tne followins telegr sln from th e iiar Depa rt men t is pu blished forth e inforsmt ioil of th e COnifilld: Fort Sa m Houst on, Tex:s,

%31-16.GenerEJ Porshinz,

Columous , N e\ r Kexi co. Uum ber eighty four period Followin< just r eceived from\ :Lshi&on quote Secret ory of ;!ar desir es you to co.nvey toGenera l Pcrshinz, Colonel Dodd, and comma nd, his hearty COT.&men da tion of e@oit men tioned in your eleven se ven six.Scott, Chief of Sta ff, Un quote. By direction of th e Depa rt -ment Commander.

BUI WY. 12. All officers an d enlisted men 3 th e comm an d ar e cautioned against

A feeling of over confidence AS to th e final resu lt to be achieved bythis expedition. The Comm an ding Genera l a ppreciates most highly th e workalrea dy perform ed by this conm end an d considers it exceptional in ma nyrespects to an ything hith erto recorded in th e enna ls of th e arm y. Allmem bers of the comm an d are urged to put forth nenewed energy both a sindividua ls an d as Organ izations in th e endeavor to aCcOmplbSh successfullyth e mission entr ust ed to th e ewdition by our people.

By comm an d of Brigadier Genera l Fersh ing:De R. C. da bell,Lieut. COl., 10th Cavalry,

Chief of Staff.


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Pursuit Continued.23. After th e fight at Guerr ero th e deta chment s of Villas comu an d

scatter ed to t:he four winds, some being reported as retu rning nortii to th emount ains of Bachineva, others to Pr ovidencia, while others were hu rryingsouth. Rum Ors, reported and even positive asser tions by na tives would havein&icat ed Villas depar tu re in almost any direction an d his presence inseveral places at once. On March 29tln Colonel Brown was at Quenlada , KajOrZvans at Tepehuen es, Major Hosvze at Damiquipa , &jor Lindsley appr oachingSan J ose de Ea bicora, Major Tompkins at Nam iquipa, an d Colonel Allen atColonia Dublan. lI.d ,Ha ving ar rived at San Geronino Ran ch, Colonel Dodds re_port of th eGuerr ero fight reached ms th ere on th e 3Oth.c Directions were at once senthim to scout th e coun try thoroughly and ma de every effort to locate Villaor an y of his followers left in th at section. These instr uctions reachedlim at i?rovi&encia, where he lti retu rn ed in th e belief th at m_tch of Villasforce, if not Villa himself, had moved toward the mount ains in th at vicinity.

&ajor Hoszels column , which ha d been gradu ally moving south, ar rivedat San Geronimo on the 30th. Upon informa tion th at Villa was then hidingto tile west of Bachine va, Howze was sent to scout the mountains from thewest, retjurn ing to Bachineva from th e sout h, an d Tom,:kins moved by a nightma rch to San ta Ana , to cover th e western slope, both column s un iting on th e1st at Bachineva.Uoon receiving in person at Bachineva, reports from th ese officersth at no tra ce of any ban dits ha d been discovered, it seemed probable th atVills ha d gone into t oe mount ainous coun try southea st of Guerr ero or pas-sibly moved south . Howze was th erefore ordered to Guerr ero, from whichplace, in lieu of fur ther instr uctions, he should govern himself accordingto inform at ion he might obtain, an d Tompkins was directed to follow theVillista s tha t were reported to have been at Bacnineva on th e 30th un &erBeltren.

24, In case it should be ascerta ined th at Villa was moviw generallysouth, th e plan was again to use ~ra llel column s converging near the Dura ngoline, in an effort to overta ke or get ah ead of Villas forces before th eycould get th at for south , Colonel Brown was to t&e the road farth esteast , with Toqkins, in general, in th e centre, Howze farth er to th e westwhile Dodd Mas to guar d tire tra ils leading into the mountains to the west.Colonel Broom ha d left Quema da on th e 3 0 t h for San Diego de1 Monte, vlherehe was joined by Kajar Evan s, rema ini% th ere c,uring the Slst, sendingan officer to th e ra ilroe& in a futile effort to rea ch Colonel Dodd ormyself by telegraph. Leavix Evan s to ,w%rd the pass, Colonel Brown, th efollo~.ix day, directed his course thro@ tne .mount zins by way of ~$u_aC-lient e v:her e he un ex;>ectedi; encount ered a ban d of Villista s. His rep ortof the aff2A.r is a s follows:lA.fte r xe i& xone over tile iiviCe :& \ :ere out 012. tl:e rxin r:il;e

ct I:15 .>.k., cai.E - o &-as Czlient es xiitlout lxvin: int ima tion ironour Luide of th e existen ce of th is u2,rr io. - * * * ** * Our dvcnce Au.5riL cnG t:le enem y disc3vereir e;:c:l oth er eir&!.t~.n-eousiy ciid CO?LL~~CC~. Tiriilg, 1 >e;>"_t >;? :.-iti: i;C:,_O7_y_rtC;s c~,G IrOO:js 2 & ?


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to the town which the enemy soon abandoned, retreating over a woodedhill and across our left front. Major Young took Troops G end H andstruck them more or less in flank, following them some six or sevenmiles to the east through the main timbered range to El Mestemo,g i v i n g up the chase only at dark x x x killing two."

After spending the night at Nemipavechic, the second of April was occupied in searching the vicinity for the trail of the Villistas. Leaving Nemipavechic on the 3rd, the column went to San Antonio and, upon receiving a message on the morning of the 4th from General Cavazos that our sseistance in catching Villa was not desired, he stopped at San Antonio until the 5th. 25. To go back to the other columns, Major Tompkins followed a Vil-lista trail to Santa Maria on the 2d, thence through Agua Caliente to Nami-pavechic on the 3d. Having received reports at San Antonio on the 4th thatVilla was moving in the direction of San Borja, Tompkins continued to Cusifor the night, and on towerds San Borja the following day. Upon approachingthat village he was handed a note from General Cavacos as follows:

"On the 3d of April I telegraphed you that I thought it prudent to suspend the advance of your troops until we both received orders on this subject from the Citizen Military Commander of the State. As I have just received knowledge that your forces are advancing in accordance with the itinerary which I have prepared for the troops under my ovn commend, I would esteem it very much if you would suspend your advance until you receive the order to which I refer, by which means there can be avoided a conflict which may occur by reason of your advance. x x x Your attentive and true servant, General Jose Cavatos.' Upon meeting General Cavazos permission to continue south was re- fused, Cavazos saying that Villa was dead and buried. As a clash seemed

imminent, Tompkins retired four miles to Cieneguitas, where he campad for the night. At this place he heard that Villa had passed through Sant Maria de Cuevas the day before. He marched to Santa Rosilia on the 6th, remaining there on the 7th to shoe horses end rest his command. 26. Major Howze having proceeded by vay of San Geronimo for sup-plies, camped six miles north of Guerrero on April 4th, Casi on the 6th,and Cieniguita on the 7th. At San Borja, it WMS confidentially re-ported to him that Villa was nnly slightly wounded; that Pablo Lopez,

wounded, had been carried in a vehicle with the Vi l l i s t a c o l u mn ; thathe had just died, which suggested to Villa to mnounce his own death;and that Villa with an escort of fifty men was following down the SierraParas mountains to Durango. Howze sayst "I struck southward with theutmost vigor possible and near Casa Colorado struck Villa's trail sixdays old. We followed it through the mountain fastness, over the nearlyimpossible Gabilena trail end in three days gained nearly three on Villa.At a place called Aguaje he went into the Sierra Puras mountains devoidof food, tiithoutplains or cultivation, over a trail nearly if not quite


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impassable for American animals. x x x x x I skirted the mountain wall as far as San Jose de1 Sitio.

en route to Los E&ados on the 8th, the column met Colonel Cavazoswith 200 men about noon, with whom a clash was narrowly averted, as shownby Major Howze's report:

"At about lo:30 a.m., April 8th, at a point about ten miles south of San Borja, my command was charged by the mounted forces of General Cavazos, his platoon in advance was reinforced by 50 or 60 men, and all took up the gallop, yelled and drew their rifles as they approached us. In the meantime our men were promptly being placed in an erroyo which afforded a splendid field of fire and excellent cover. I personally moved between the two lines waving my hat and calling in Spanish that we were Americans. About 100 of Cavacos' men reached a point within 50 yards of me before they stopped. If one shot had been fired, I feel convinced that we would have destroyed half of Cavacos' 300 men. The control which our officers exercised over their men and the display of splbndid judgment by officers and noncommissioned officers in a delicate situation, saved what came near being a serious complication. Our officers were left gener- -ally tith the convictions that General Cavazoa was seeking conflict. His manner and tone were quite offensive." Camping at San Jose de1 Sitio on April 9th, the natives were found to be generally unfriendly and, as expected, Major Howze's camp was fired into during the night. On April lOth, the march was continued south to

Santa Crur de Herrera, with the intention as Colonel Howze says, "of in- tercepting Villa should he debouch from the impassable mountain8 in his effort to get to Durango for the purpose of getting food." Colonel Howze was fired on several times en route that day and was viciously attacked at 5130 o'clock in the afternoon near La Joya de Herrera, the band being completely dispersed, losing their commander, Captain Silva. On April llth, Santa Cruz de Herrera was surrounded in an effort to capture another party of Villistas reported as occupying the town, with the result that Lieutenant Beltran [son of General Beltran) and one soldier were killed and a few arms captured. Camp was made that night a short distance up the Belleza river, and the following night at Heojolilan.

27. Major Evans had remained at San Diego de1 Monte guarding passesas directed, and, upon receiving information that a band of Villistas waspassing northward, moved to Quemada on the 2d, thence to Tepehuanes throughSanta Catalina to San Geronimo on the 5th, where he was given verbal ordersto continue to Namiquipa and cover the Santa Clara-Oeo country, which dutywas performed by his various detachments until the reorganization of com-msnds on May 9th.Colonel Brown started from San Antonio on April 5th, camping nearCusi, leaving early next morning for Cieneguita. En route he was over-taken, by an aeroplane which delivered my instructions to move his columneastward and follow the Santevo-Tres Hermenas-Valle de Zaragose road toParral, generally covering the eastern border of the territory throughwhich our troops were searching bandits. Having passed Major Tompkinsat Santa Rosalia, he entered La Joya on the 7th, where he learned that

. Cienega had been recently attacked by General Garza's command of de


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facto troops and that ten bandits had been killed. Brown marched to Satevo on the 8th, reaching Tres Hermonae ten miles southeast the following day where he met General Garza, with whom he became on friendly terms. Leaving on the tenth, Brown passed through Sauz and Vslle de Zaragoaa and arrived at Media Ranch the 12th. From Santa Rosalia, Major Tompkins continued his march to Fresnites on the 8th. When a short distance from Freanitea, the following day, his column was fired into by a detachment of eight men of General Garza's commend, and at San Juan at noon that day he met the force under General Garza moving to San Jose de1 Sitio. As Major Howze, who wan to the west, would probably cover San Jose de1 Sitio, and knowing that Colonel Brown was coming from Satevo to Parral, Tompkins decided to direct his course at once toward Parral, where he intended to r-e-supply nd be prepared to work north, if so ordered. Acting upon this decision, he marched to Conches on the lath, where he arrived in time to drive off twenty-five Villistns who were looting a factory. He was advised here that Fernandez with one hundred Villistas had lately gone to Valle de Zaragoaa, from which he concluded that the general Villistas movement had Durango as ita objective. From Concho~ on the 11th he went to Santa Cruz de Villegas. These three col- u.mns vere ow probably south of any considerable force of the Villistas, although it is possible that one or two small detachments h-d passed into Durango.

28. Immediately after the Guerraro fight, the provisional squadron un-der Colonel Allen :vas urried south. Leaving Dublan on March 30, and following the line of communications, it arrived at Naniquipa on April 2d. From there 100 men of the column scouted in a southeasterly direction through Los Tanquea and Canynn de1 Oso on April 3d, reaching San Geronimo

on the Sth, where it Lyas oined by the remainder of the detachment. The colu:~~~as sent to Lake Itascate, thence to Dolores on the following day, reaching San Antonio on the 8th. Upon information that Pablo Lopez was at Bustilloo Ranch, personal instructions were given to Colonal Allen to proceed in pursuit. La Cienega and Bustillos ranches were both thoroughly searched itithout esult, so the cournand roceeded to Carretas, where it struck what was thought to be Pablo Lopez's trail, but lost it a few hours later. under his orders, Colonel Allen continued south by way of San Ber- nardino and San Lorenzo, camping on the 11th a few miles south of La Joya, reporting at Satevo on the 12th, Deere I had arrived the previous day at the advance camp of the aeroplane squadron.

29. At the beginning of April, Colonel Dodd, with the 7th Cavalry under Colonel Erwin, was occupying a line through Providencia and Minaca watching the passes leading west, while Lieutenant Colonel S.R.H. Tompkins with two troops was at Bachineva. These reconnoitering parties thoroughly scouted the country to the west and had frequent s:lall kirmishes. A detachment under Captain Kendrick, consisting of Troops K and M, reconnoiter-ing in the direction of Temosachic dn April 7th, was fired into near Zarca Ranch by thirty Villistaa, five of whom were killed with no loss to the detachment.

Colonel Dodd moved to Minaca on April 8th, -with command of 15 officers


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-ix-and 175 men, to cover the field west of Howze, or pursue certain bands reported in the mountains behind Guerrero, according to circumstances. His movement brought forth objections on the part of General Luis Herrsra, then commander of that district, on the ground that it ;vould nterfere with the Carrancista plans, but after receiving my message, conveyed to him by Major Ryan, General Herrera xithdrew his opposition. For the time baing, Dodd remained near Minaca, and the other detachments of his comaand continued on their duties az indicated above.

Parral. 30. The unprovoked and outrageous attack at Parral, April l%th, onMajor Tompkins' command by the civil population aided by the Carrancistaforces under their own field officers, was the culmination of a long seriesof petty acts of hostility which grew in number and viciouzness as our col-

urns moved south. The visit of an officer from the Parr&l garrison toiuIajorompkins' camp two nights before the attack, was evidently for thepurpose of ascertaining toe size of his force and of misleading him intobelieving that the people of Parral were friendly. His command was per-mitted to enter the town unmolested and its presence met with nothing morethan a mild protest until it started to leaveA camp site had been selected just outside the town to which he wasshown by General Lozano, the commander of the Carranza forces in that dis-trict. This camp site was a veritable trap, surrounded by hills on allsides, and a command once caught there would have been at the mercy of theattackers, but Major Tompkins wisely avoided it. As to General Lozano'spart in thiz treachery it is probable that he .aad he members of his staffwere kept in ignorance of the intentions of either the civilian element orthe members of hia own garrison, and he was thus in a position later todisavow the act.

General Luis Herrera, whose home is in Parral, upon leaving Chihuahuain March :vith small command of Carrrancistas, s reported to have threat-ened that he would attack the first troops he met. Early in April hevisited my camp at San Geronimo and was not at all cordial. As alreadystated, he had opposed Colonel Dodd's movement on April 8th, claiming thatour going south would not accord with his plans for the capture of Villa,It was current gossip among the Mexicans in territory south of the railroadthrough which our troops travelled, that Luis Herrera had announced that theAmericans would be stopped at Parral. There is no doubt that he and hiefollowers had determined to oppose us by force, either at that point orelsewhere in that vicinity. Luis Herrera and his father, the Presidents of Parral,are very influential in that section and the people do not hesi- tate to do their bidding.

Major Tompkins fired only after he was attacked and did evarything possible to avoid a fight. After he was persistently pursued several miles he very properly deployed a troop at a time and inflicted zevere damtige pon his pursuers, killing 42 according to authentic reports of the fight received through native sources.

In his report of this affair Major Tompkins says: "On reaching Conch08 (Valle de Zaragos) I camped, about 11.00

p.m. A Carranza captain who had come from Parral came into camp and


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gave me information of Carranza and Villista troops. In additionhe stated that he would send word to General Loxano, Carranga's Com-mander at Parr-al, f our advance to the south, so that the Carran-cista commander would have men meet us, assign a camp and arrange forprovisions. Upon reaching Parral no one met us. I took the ad-vance guard and vrent o the General's quarters to interview him. Hetold us some information and said he would take us to a camp. Hethen mounted up, and, with several of his officers, led my column tothe camp outside of town. As the pack train was leaving the edgeof the town the rear guard was fired into, and a few moments laterCarranza soldiers armed appeared on a hill to the south. I notifiedthe General that we had been fired into and he exclaimed (profanity)and started back to town on the run. Men in the rear guard who sawhim, report that he drew his saber and beat the crowd back, also thatone of the Carrancista officers drew his pistol and shot down fourmembers of the oro>sd n an attenyt to disperse it. The firing com-tinued and I put my rear guard in position to cover the retreat of themain body. At this moment a representative from General Lozano'scommand reached us and requested that I continue my retreat immediate-lY* I answered that I would retreat out of his district as soon asthe grain and forage which I had arranged for !tith r. Scott ofParral had reached camp and the horses fed. The representative re-tired with this message and I remained to await the answer. At thismomant some of the Carranza soldiers on the hill to the south movedon my left flank to occupy a hill which commanded the position of themain body. I yelled at them to go back; they paid no attention. Ithen sent a squad to drive them back. As soon RS this squad moved outthe soldiers on the hill to the south opened fire on me and I answered.A few minutes later Sergeant Ridgley on my left was killed; the fir-ing in my front became heavier; I could see that the soldiers and thetown were both against me, so I decided to retire. I retreated andfound that two men had been wounded when the command was formed. Iretreated 16 milas, followed all the way by about 300 Carrancista sol-diers. I covered my retreat by halting, dismounting and deployingmy rear guard and the two tro0:ps in succession. During this retreatPrivate Ledford, K Troop, was vrounded second time and died in thesaddle. I killed or wounded 12 of the enemy. (So reported by theCarrancistas). Upon reaching this place I decided to remain in po-sition. I erected barricades, loopholed the walls and constructeda strong defensive position. The Cerranzatroops scattered to the hilla to the south and southwest and continued the fire. The firing ceased at 6:50. Couriers who had gone back to the north for supports arrived here at 7:lO with Colonel Brown and Major Young's squadron of the 10th Cavalry." Comprehensive telegraphic reports were forwarded to Department Head-quarters as soon as possible giving the important details of the Parral af-fair. My own views in the preuisea aa to the course to be pursued by theforces of the expedition were also given by telegraph as requested. Thetelegraphic correspondence is of record and need not be reiterated in this

report.


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-23-After Parral.

31. At first it was thought best to retsin the troops in the vicinityof Parral, but the strained relations between the two governments that re-sulted from this fight brought the whole matter into the sphere of diplomacyand it was soon deemed advisable to withdraw for the time being. Fortunate-ly the dispositions made of the various columns, and the orders under whichthey were operating naturally brought them to the vicinity of Parral aboutthe same time. The four columns in that section were united soon afterthe fight under command of Colonel Brown, making a force sufficiently strongto have given a good account of itself under any circumstances likely toarise immediately. But to have retained troops there would have required anextension of the line of communications 180 miles from San Antonio, end theroad was difficult. To supply such a force with the transportation thenavailable would not have been an easy task. These rapidly moving columnshad out run the means of supply, end ss there was neither food nor forageobtainable in that district, withdrawal was the best solution of the problem.There were no serviceable aeroplanes left by which to communicate with Cola-nel Brown, and as he had evidently taken the view that he should not withdraw,it became necessary to send Colonel Cabell, the Chief of Staff, there to in-vestigate the situation axri, f advisable, to direct the retirement of theforces. Upon his arrival the above conditions as to supply were found toexist, and as Colonel Brown had made every effort to obtain nseded suppliesand had been unsuccessful, the command was ordered to return to San Antonio.

Tomochic. 32. On April llth, a rumor reached Colonel Dodd at Ninaca that a force

of Villistas was at Yoquivo, where it had looted the town and captured aFrenchman and an American who were held as prisoners. Leaving Ninaca onthe lath, the command reached the vicinity of Yoquivo on the 20th, hoping tosurprise the bandits the following morning, only to find that they had gone.At Yoquivo it was learned that Cervantes was in command, with Baca, Aios andDominques as subordinates; that the force consisted of about 150 menf andthat the two prisoners had been liberated. As Tomcchic seemed to be theirdestination, Colonel Dodd promptly followed, arriving at five o'clock in theafternoon. Tomochic is a small town located on tha Tomochic River, sur-rounded by rugged mountains, with elevations approximating 9,000 feet. Thecommand approached the town by a well concealed trail from the southwestand, upon reaching the outskirts, it entered at the gallop and took POSS-ession. The enemy having occupied the hills on the north and south sidesopened fire upon the column. Of this engagement, Colonel Dodd says:

"Those scattered on the hills north and south were dislodged .,or killed, while others withdrew to the mountains east. From thefirst point of observation "Au, a large herd of horses and also whatappeared to be a column of troops were noticed in the distance at "G".The indication being that the main body might be in that directiontwotroops (H, Wells and I, Gillem), accompanied by Captain Leary and allunder charge of MEijor ade, were sent rapidly in that direction, with


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and have been broken into smaller bands and scattered to different sec-tions of the State of Chihuahua and elsewhere. The situation haschanged to the extent that our troops no longer pursue a cohesive forceof considerable size, but by surprise with small, swiftly moving detach-ments, they must hunt down isolated bands, now under subordinate leadersand operating over widely separated portiona of the country. For thispurpose the territory to be covered for the present ia accordinglydivided into districts and apportioned to organizations available forsuch duty.

2. The commander of each separate district will organize his Ownagents, and establish ae far as possible his own service of information*Every assistance will be given from these headquarters in providingguides and interpreters and in furnishing information. It is also dir-ected that this office and adjacent commanders be furnished with allinformation o f importance that comea to the knowledge of district com-mandera, especially such as would influence the operations of troops inadjacent districts. Each district commander will act on his ovn initia-tive on any information that seems likely to lead to the capture of anyof the participants n the Columbus raid, and will keep the CommandingGeneral and, as far aa practicable, the Brigade Commander, advised ofall movementa in hia district.

3. 811 officers are reminded that this expedition is operating within the limits of a friendly nation whose peaceful inhabitants should be treated with every consideration. It is also desirable to maintain the most cordial relations, and cooperate aa far as feasible, with the forces of the de facto government. Experience so far has taught, however, that our troops are always in more or lees danger of being attacked, not only by hostile followers of Villa, but even by others who profess friendship, and precaution mu& be taken aocordingly. In case of an unprovoked attack, the officer in command will without hesi- tation, take the most vigorous measure6 at his disposal to administer eevere punishment on the offenders, bearing in mind that any other courpse is likely to be construed as a confession of weakneae.

4. The following districts to be covered are embraced within thelimits prescribed. The boundary lines are to be understood aa indicat-irg in general the territory over which district commanders are for thepresent to operate, but will not limit their efforts to secure informa-tion, often otherwise unobtainable, nor confine their activities whenin actual pursuit of Villista bands. In locating their headquarters,district commanders, under direction of their Brigade commandera, willgive due consideration to the question of supply.Namiquipa District:

Commencing at a point north of Alamo on the thirteenth parallel, thence east to the Uexican Central Railroad inclusive, south to Sauz,


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generallywest through Tepehuanes San Miguel, adera to Tio Chico,north to the thirteenth arallel, hence ast to Alamo. Bustillos istrict.

Commencingat San Miguel, hence long southern oundary f Namiquipa istrict o Saut, south to near Salas, eget o San Andres, and San Antonio, nd excluding oth towns, hence southwest o Ma1 Paso, thence orthward o Bachineva nd San Miguel, ncluding oth towna. Satevo istrict.

Commencingat San Antonio, hence ast, hrough nd including an Audres o Mapula, thence long the Mexican entral ailroad o Jime-nez, Parral o Santa Barbara. hence orthwesterly o San Lorenzo nd to SanAntonio.San Bor.ia istrict.

Commencingat San Antonio, outh&& to San Lorenao nd Santa Barbara,west to Guachochic, orth to Carichic, orthwest o Rancho de Santiago, orthwestto San Antonio. Guerrero istrict.

Commencingat San Miguel, hence south through achineva o Mal Paso, southwest o Ranch0 e Santiago, outheast o Carichio, outh to Cuachochic,west to the third meridian est of Chihuahua, orth to a point west of Madera, hence ast to E&era, thence outheast o San Miguel. By command f Brigadier eneral ershing:

DeR. C. Cabell, Lieutenant olonel, 0th Cavalry. OFFICIALI J. L. HIRES, Major, Adjutant eneral, Adjutant.

34. Pursuant o the plan laid down in the foregoing rder, avalry regimentswere assigned o those istricts here they had had the most service nd with which the personnel as moat familiars DISTRICT; TROOPS: DISTRICT OMMANDERI Namiquipa. 10th Cavalry Major llvood . Evans. Guerrere ..... '7th avalry .....ColonelGeorge . Dodd. Buatillos..... 3th Cavalry ..... olonel erbert . Slocum. Satevo ........ 5th Cavalry .....ColonelWilbur . Wilder. San Borja ..... 11th Cavalry ..... olonel ames Lock&t.


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Ojos Azulea.35. On the evening of May 4th it was reported that Julie hcosta andCrux Dominques, two Villista leadere, were in the vicinity of Cuei, withone hundred and twenty men threatening that town and the small Carrencistaforce in the vicinity. The people of Cusi sent two representatives to

San Antonio requesting protection for their town. A6 these bandit leadershad previously given it out that they had a thousand men and that theyintended to attack the American camp at San Antonio, and had also frighten-ed the inhabitants in that district by their attitude, the time w&s oppor-tune to teach them a lesson. Accordingly, Major Howze with six troop6and the Machine Gun Platoon of the 11th Cavalry, number6 14 officers and319 enlisted men, were dispatched to Cusi with instructions to move againstthio band as circumstance6 might indiate. Howxe reached Cusi about mid-night, May 4th, and learned that the hostile barrd a8 then in camp at UjosBzules. After procuring guides, he started in that direction, arrivingat Ojos Axules at daylight. Hi6 arrival and the attack that followedwere a complete surprise, resulting in the total rout of the band, whoselosses were 61 men killed, a6 ascertained later, and a large number wounded,,without the loss of a single American. Major HOVte'6 report of the fightis as follows:

"General Pershing: We made an all night march to Ojos Azules, distance thirty six miles. Reached here at 5r45 a.m., unfortunately one-half hour after daylight. We surprised Julio Acosta, Crux Dominques and Antonio Angel{ jumped them. Had a running fight for two hours; drove their bend6 into the hills between here and Carichic. Killed 42 verified by officers, captured several and some 50 or '75 orses and mules. It is believed we killed Angel, although identification not complete. We rescued a Carrancista lieutenant and four soldiers just before they were to be shot. We followed the enemy COn6iSting of about 140 until our hOr6e6 were wholly exhausted, but the chase did not stop until the enemy left unhit had been broken up entirely. In fact, those who escaped us did so a6 individuals. Uur approach wa6 discovered by the Villistas' herd guard which fired at our Indians, and also alarmed the sleeping enemy which ran pell-mell, half-dressed, firing at us in their flight. The remarkable pert is, although theclothing of several of our men was hit, not a single man wa6 wounded,thanks to the utter surprise and confusion of the enemy. We lost threeor four horsee. I had to wait two hOUr6 at Cusihuiriachic for guidea,hency my inability to get here earlier than 5145 a.m., to do which we had to ride a6 hard as our horse6 could stand. It is needless to say that the officer6 and men behaved as would be expected. I intend to rest here.

HOWZE, Major, 11th Cavalry. ojos fL6UlO6, Mexico.

May 5, 1916."


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Major Howze's action showed enterprise and good judgment and resultedin the destruction and disintegration of Acosta's band. Since that timeAcosta has never been able to assemble more than 20 men, and he has kepthis band ard himself hidden in the mountains back of Guerrero where he isreported at the present time.

Withdrawal to Nami~uipa, 36. The regiments concerned in the order organizing districts had

reached their designated localities and the work of scouring the countryand pursuing individual bands had been begun. Meanwhile the relationsbetween the two governments became very tense and various de facto offi-cials began to circulate rumors of war end to announce that the Americanswere to be driven out. On May 9th, instructions were received from theDepartment Commander directing the withdrawal of the command to DublaneAlthough no information through local eourceB had reached me indicatingany hostile movement at that time toward our line, the instructions e-ceived stated that the necessity for concentration was considered im-perative. Having arrived at Lake Itascato, the Department Commanderwes advised that the eituation did not seem to demand immediate vith-drawal to Dublan, whereupon orders were received directing me to hold thetroops where they were and make such tactical dispositions in the vicin-ity of Namiquipa aa might seem advisable.

Restricted Activities - Cervantes' Death. 37. The abandonment of our advance stations left the command OCCU-pying the original line of communications with Namiquipa aa the southernCamp. Our cavalry troops covered the front with supports at San Geronimo

end Providencia. As our troops vacated territory, the de facto troopsbecame more aggressive, patrols from both sides frequently meeting, andonly by the exercise of great discretion and forebearance on the pmrt ofour officers were clashes avoided. Troops along the line were occupiedin the pursuit of small bands of Yillistaa, and in running down reportsof de facb troop movements.

The activities of Colonel Cardenas, an important member ofVilla's staff, had stirred up Rubio and vicinity and our troops had madeseveral unsuccessful attempts to capture him. On May l&h, LieutenantG-S. Patton, 8th Cavalry, of my staff, with a small detachment was sentto that section in automobiles to purchase corn, Upon reaching San MiguelRanch near Rubio, several Villistae ran out, firing upon the detachment asthey went. Lieutenant Patton and one of our men opened fire in return,killing three of the Villistas, one of whom proved to be Colonel Cardenas.

About this time, Candelario Cervantes with 25 Yillistas boldlyreturned to the vicinity of Namiquipa and began to prey upon the peacefulinhabitants. Detachments were kept constantly in the field in his pursuit,following up all reports that appeared credible. On May 25th, a detach-ment under Lance Corporal Davis mksbury, consisting of 8 men of theMachine Gun Platoon, 17th Infantry, 2 men of the Corps of Engineers,


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and one man of the Quartermaster Corps from Cruces, happenad to be aboutsix miles south of there, sketching roads and hunting cattle, when theywere attacked by a party of nine Villistas, and Corporal Marksbury waskilled and three men wounded. The Villistas lost two killed who, uponproper identification, turned out to be *Colonel" Candelario Cervantes andJose Bencome. &special credit is due Private George D. Hulett, 1'7th nfantryfor success in this small skirmish, who killed both these bandits as theyrode by firing at him. The killing o f Candelario Cervantes was particularlyfortunate as, next to Villa himself, he w6.s he most able and the most dee-pcrate of Villa's band.Un May 31at, accompanied by the Chief of Staff 6nd one side, I left Namiquipa for a conference at Dublsn with General Gabriel Gavire, commanding de facto troops et Juarez. A meeting was held on June lst, during which the discussion covered proposed cooper&ion between the forces of the two governments. An agreement was finally reached which limited the number of de facto troops to be stationed along the lines of railroad, and speci- fied that no de facto troops should occupy towns along our line of communications. The agreement was tentative and was, of course, subject to the ap- proval of higher authority in our respective goaernments. It is presumed that the Mexican government did not approve of the agreement, as nothing further has been said of it.

Events Prior to Carrizal. 38. The relations between the United States and Mexico had become verytense and the Mexican people were much aroused in the belief that war wasinavitabl6. De facto troops were being assembled at pointa on the railroadsinthe east ani west, threatening our line of communications. The command-ing general of the de facto troops in he district of Alamada had issuedinstructions for his forcea to hold themselves in readiness to operate

against the Americans. A force of 10,000 men was reported in the vicinityof Ahumade, and a large number of troops had moved from the south of thecity of Chuhuahua. It was understood among the Mexican people that thesetroops, instead of being sent to pursue bandits, were actually for the pur-pose of driving the Americans out of Mexico. The commanding officer atAhumadawas in constant telegraphic communication with the local commanderet Cesas Grandes, and the letter was advised that the troops at Ahumadawere preparing to attack the American lines and directing his cooperation.The Mexican population held themselves entirely aloof from us, and peoplewho had hesn friendly became decidedly unfriendly. It was impossible toobtain the assistance of men who had hitherto been in our service es secretagents. !Che white population were alarmed and afraid to venture beyondour protection. Our small fleet of air-ships had been wrecked in the earlydays of the cempaign and not one was available at this critical period.It therefore became necessary to rely upon the reeources within the commandto obtain information of the de facto troops. Frequent reconnaissances inall directions became imperative, in order to keep informed of any hostilemovements of de facto bodies and be prepared to concentrate at any threatenedpoint.

39. General Trevino, in commend at Chihuahua, sent me a telegram to


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-3o-the effect that if the American troops were moved south, east or west, they wuld be attacked, further showing the intense feeling existing at that tinm among all classes. The following are copies of his telegram and my reply: Chihuahua Headquarters, June lb, 1916.

General Pershing, Casas Grndea. I have orders from my government to prevent, by the use of arms,new invasion3 of my country by American forces and also to prevent theAmerican force3 that are in this state from moving to the south, east or

west of the places they now occupy. I communicate this to you for yourknowledge for the reason thnt your force3 will be attacked by the Mexicanforces if these indications are not heeded.Courteously, J. B. TREVINO, The General in Chief. My reply va3 a3 followat

Field Headquarter3 American Expedition, Casas Grendee, Mexico, June lb, 1916. General J. B. Trevino, Chihuahua, Mexico.

I am in receipt of your telegrem advising me that your govarn-ment ha3 directed you to prevent any movement to the east, south or west ofthe Bmerican forces now in Mexico period And that should such movement takeplace the American forcea will be attacked by Mexican forces period Inreply you are informed that my goverrumnt has placed no such restriction3upon the movements of American forces period I shall therefore use my ownjudgment as to when and in what direction I shall move my forces in pursuitof bandits or in seeking information regarding bandits period If underthese circumstances he Mexican forces attack any of my columns the reapon-sibility for the consequences will lie with the Mexican government.

Respectfully yours, John J. Pershing, General, Cormnanding merican Forces. The local counnanding fficer of de facto troops delivered me E verbal message on the same date to the effect that "General Carranza had ordered that the American troops should not move in any direction except north." In reply I asked him to telegraph Bi.3 uperiors that I declined to respect such instructions, saying: "1 do not take orders except from my own government.

Carrixal' ight. 40. Among other reconnoitering detachments, Captain Boyd with Troop G, 10th Cavalry, was sent eastward in the direction of Bhumada to thoroughly scout the country and obtain information regardin the troops and their move-ments. He was told that he could probably learn the facts at Santa Domingo or in that vicinity, end was cautioned not to bring on a fight. Captain Morey

with Troop M, 10th Cavalry, ~89 sent from Ojo Federico upon the same mission and with practically the Same caution.Captain Boyd and Captain Morey met at Santo Domingo Ranch, about60 miles east of Dublan, on the evening of June 20th. They obtained from theAmerican foreman in charge, who had recently visited Ahumada, much reliable


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inform at ion concerning th eir mission without zoing to point s garr isoned byde facto tr oops. Capta in Boyd, however, decided to enter Carr izal and con-tinue from there to Ahuma da with Capta in Morey under his comma nd.Arriving in th e vicinity of Carr izal on th e morning of th e 21st,he was met by th e comman ding general and other officers at the out skirt s ofthe town, a nd told tha t their orders would not permit him to go furt.her toth e east . Superior nu mbers of ldexicsn tr oops were in bat tle form at ion, bothmount ed end dismount ed, at the edge of town, and all their preparat ions in-dicat ed th at they would carry out th eir instr uctions and oppose Capta inBoyds pr ogres s by force. After some furth er discussion, Capta in Boyd rodeup within short ran ge of th e Mexican position, dismount ed his troops prepara-tory to enter ing th e towc. At th e moment of dismountin g, he received a heavyfire from all par ts of th e Mexican lines. A reference to the accompanyingma p will shor th e various movements of Capta in Boyds force during th e fight.The deta ils have been given in special report and need not be repeat ed here.Capta in Boyds own men pushed forwar d with dash and carried the Mexicanposition, Lieutenan t Adair leading. The list of losses will be found laterin th e appendices of th is report. The mem ory of th e splendid bravery ofth ese tw o officers who lost th eir lives an d of th e men who pers onally followedthem is cherished by this entire comma nd.In closing th is br ief report of Carr izal it should be empha sizedth at th is expedition enter ed Mexico in pur suit of bandit s, thr ough the cour-tesy of the Mexican governmen t, and, th at th e de facto militar y forces, infiring on our tr oops, comm itt ed a delibera te act of war. Also in declaringthrough the military comnm nder at Chihuahua, tha t the limerican forces wereto be at ta cked under certsin conditions, the Mexican governm ent accentu at edits own responsibility in th e prem ises, In other vords, th e tiexican Govern-ment itself was entir ely responsible for th e opposition offered to Capta inBoyds progress an d, finally for th e culmin at ing act of open host ility tothe United States which start ed the fight at Carrizal.

Prepara tions after Carrizal.41. When the fight at Cerrizal was reported, orders were prepa red and

immedia te st eps were ta ken to assu me th e aggressive with all available tr oopsof th is comm and . Superior in str uctions indicat ed such action, and th e situa -tion seem ed to deman d it. Fur th er concentr at ion for prompt movement becemeimperative, if we were to be ready to meet.with out delay wha t appear ed to bea crisis. Without enterin g into the deta ils of th e plans, the tr oops southof Kl Valle were ordered north by telegraph, tr uck t ra ins were assem bled forsuch use a s might be required of th em , and the comm an d as a whole was at onceplaced and held in position for qu ick action. Telegrap hic rep orts of pr oposedplans were made at the time, and the particulars will be omitted.

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ADMINISTRATION___________-_-General Staff in the Field.

1. Th e importance and the necessity of a well organized generalstaff for any army in the field has been decidedly emphasized by the ex-periences of this Expedition. d Chief of Staff with a large pra cticalkn owledge of ha ndling tr oops, csnsiderable field service and an abun danceof comon sense is a valuable asset for a comma nding general to have.&I energetic chief of staff possessing these qualification8 is indispensableeven in a command of this size, and much more so with a larger force. As-sisted by the junior members of the general staff, the specific duties ofwhom are well prescribed in our service regulations, the chief of Staff isin a position to coordinate the work of the various departnents and torelieve this commander of many minor details of administration, thus leav-ing the commanding general free to occupy his mind with military and possiblypolitical question8 that present themselves for solution. In the prepara-tion of orders for the movements of troops, and for governing and controllingthe supply departments, and in handling many other matters, such an officeris essential to maintain all parts of an army in the field, in smooth workingorder. During this expedition the above features have been exemplified inactual accomplishment by the Chief of Staff and his assistants. There havebeen many times when it was necessary for me to be far to the front in touchwith advance column s, and durin, 7 such times the entire oontrol of the Expedi-tion has been left to the Chief of Staff, who issued the necessary ordersand followed out general lines of policy laid down for his guidance. dbrief report by the Chief of Staff will be found among the appendices tothis report.

Adjutant General's Department. 2. Fortunately, when this Expedition was ordered there was available a well organized and fully equipped office with capable personnel on duty with the 8th Brigade at El Paso and ready to take the field; consequently the duties of the office have been efficiently performed from the start and the Adjutant General has been ablo to handle most of the administra- tive details without specific instruction.

In order to meet just such an emergency as confronted this com-mand at the beginning, it is suggested that all brigades and divisions beprovided with a well instructed personnel, furnished with full field equip-ment, all under a competent adjutant general of experience. Such an organ-ization would always be available for u se in a larger comma nd or elsewhereas its serviaes might be needed.

Dasid upon actua l experience in the field, th ere might be pre-pared in the office of the Adjutan t General a memoran dum covering th e vari-ous dut ies of such an office in the field and prescribing the featu res th atthe adjuta nt should an ticipat e an d provide for. Such a memoran dum is nowbeing prepared by the ddjutant of this command. The recommendations con-tained in his report herewith are approved.

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Inspector General's Department.

3. The Inspector General's Department nas not represented with thisExpedition until recently, so that nothing pertaining to that Departmentwill be found among the Staff reports, but in order to keep constantlyinformed regarding the condition of troops, camps, transportation and thework of the staff and supply departments, a member of the command was app-ointed Inspector. These duties were performed by Colonel L.G. Berry, 4thField Artillery, from March 14th, to April 30th, 1916. Colonel Berryinspected the troops and camps along the line of couxnunication nd theBase at Columbus, correcting errors and defects on the spot and reportinghis action later together with the general results of the inspection. OnApril 3Oth, Colonel Berry was relieved and Colonel H. T. Allen, 11th Cav-alry, with Colonel B. L. Tata, 5th Cavalry, as assistant, performed thesedutias in like manner up to the 21st of June when Colonel G.O. Cress, thepresent Inspector reported for duty from Department Headqucwters.

JUDGE ADVOCATE'S DEPABTXXNT. 4. Soon after entering Mexico it beceme evident that it would beimpracticable for the Department Commander to detail general courts as

the officers and troops were constantly on the move and the probabilityof their remaining at any one place, even temporarily, could not be fore-seen. To meet this situation request was made, under the provisions of theAct of Congress approved March 2d, 1913, that authority be given the com-mander of the expedition to detail general courts, which request was ap-proved hlay th, 19

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