WSARA 2009: Joint Strike Fighter Root Cause Analysis · WSARA 2009: Joint Strike Fighter Root Cause...

I N S T I T U T E F O R D E F E N S E A N A L Y S E S

IDA Paper P-4612Log: H 10-000647

June 2010

WSARA 2009: Joint Strike FighterRoot Cause Analysis

Scot A. ArnoldJi S. Byun

Harley A. CloudAlexander O. Gallo Matthew W. GonwaBruce R. HarmonPrashant R. PatelColin D. Sullivan

John R. Hiller, Project LeaderPatricia F. Bronson, Task Leader

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About This PublicationThis work was conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)under contract DASW01-04-C-0003,Task AY-7-3223, “WSARA 2009: Root Cause Analysis of Programs in Nunn-McCurdy Breach,” for the Director, Program Assessment and Root Cause Analyses (D, PARCA), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics). The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as representing the official position of either the Department of Defense or the sponsoring organization.

AcknowledgmentsStanley A. Horowitz, Christopher A. Martin, and James L. Wilson of IDA were the technical reviewers.

Copyright Notice© 2010, 2011 Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 • (703) 845-2000.

This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuantto the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (NOV 95).

The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation that operates three federally funded research and development centers to provide objective analyses of national security issues, particularly those requiring scientific and technical expertise, and conduct related research on other national challenges.

I N S T I T U T E F O R D E F E N S E A N A L Y S E S

IDA Paper P-4612

WSARA 2009: Joint Strike FighterRoot Cause Analysis

Scot A. ArnoldJi S. Byun

Harley A. CloudAlexander O. Gallo Matthew W. GonwaBruce R. HarmonPrashant R. PatelColin D. Sullivan

John R. Hiller, Project LeaderPatricia F. Bronson, Task Leader

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... S-1

I. Background ....................................................................................................................1

A. Program Description ................................................................................................1

B. Technical Description of the System .......................................................................1

C. Time Line of Major Events ......................................................................................2

II. Nunn-McCurdy Breach ..................................................................................................4

A. Computation of the Breach ......................................................................................4

1. Program Acquisition Unit Cost Breach .............................................................4

2. Average Procurement Unit Cost Breach ............................................................5

III. Major Cost Variances Reported in the SARs ................................................................6

IV. Proximate Root Cause Analysis of Cost Growth .........................................................10

A. Ground Rules, Data, and Assumptions ..................................................................10

B. Major Causes of the Cost Growth ..........................................................................11

1. Errors in the Milestone B Estimate ..................................................................11

2. Redesign ...........................................................................................................12

3. Change in Buy Profiles ....................................................................................13

V. Comments on Root Cause ............................................................................................14

VI. Summary of Findings ...................................................................................................17

Appendix A: Acquisition Terms of Reference ............................................................... A-1

Appendix B: Modeling Cost Impact of Schedule and Procurement Rate Changes .........B-1

Documents and Sources ...................................................................................................C-1

Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. D-1

FIGURES

1. N-M PAUC Growth by SAR Year ............................................................................. 8

2. JSF PAUC Growth by SAR Cost Variance Report .................................................... 9

3. PAUC Growth by SAR Funding Category Corrected for Quantity Effects ............. 10

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TABLES

1. JSF Cost Positions (BY 2002 $M) .............................................................................. 4

2. Calculation of Documented Nunn-McCurdy PAUC Breach (BY 2002 $M) ............. 5

3. Calculation of Documented JSF Nunn-McCurdy APUC Breach (BY 2002 $M) ...... 6

4. Gross JSF PAUC Growth Accounted for by Analyses ............................................. 11

5. JSF Assessments and Comments Categorized by Root Cause ................................. 16

S-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) was tasked by The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) Director, Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA) to identify and quantify the issues that led to the current Nunn-McCurdy breach of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. IDA’s study of the JSF program found three major issues that contributed to the 2010 Nunn-McCurdy breach. The major quantifiable reasons for the breach are:

• Errors in the Milestone B estimate resulted in a 23 percent increase in the program average unit cost (PAUC). This category includes programmatic, technical, and basic cost estimating assumptions that later proved to be false. Three major estimating issues that IDA identified and quantified are: − Incorrect contractor fully burdened labor rates were used − The airframe unit weight estimate was too low − The contractor/subcontractor fee arrangement was not modeled correctly for the

production estimate • The redesign effort increased the PAUC by 26 percent. The redesign effort led to

significant changes in the aircraft that impacted production, assembly, and design of the vehicle. The four significant issues related to the redesign effort are: − Change in materials manufacturing efficiency − Changes in non-recurring tooling and equipment − Design changes negated affordability and production efficiency plans − Additional design effort during System Design and Development (SDD)

• Changes in the buy profile led to a 5 percent increase in the PAUC. Over the course of the program the quantities have been reduced, the ramp rate to full production has been altered, and the combined Air Force, Navy, and Marine peak production rate has been reduced. The individual changes that IDA quantified are: − Change in the ramp rate to peak production − Combined impact of lower procurement rate and reduced Navy quantities

Errors in the Milestone B estimate are a root cause of the Nunn-McCurdy breach while the redesign effort and changes in the buy profile are only proximate causes of the breach. These three factors do not account for the entire 57 percent PAUC increase but they do account for a majority of the growth.

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Numerous other contributing factors have been suggested, specifically: • Lack of adequate systems engineering by the contractor early in the process • Failure of the concept demonstration programs to provide design and technical maturity • Lack of management discipline and the complexity of a global supplier program • Slowness by the program in responding to the weight growth • The difficulty in integrating designs for three aircraft • Decreased part commonality between the three F-35 variants • Lack of clear incentives by the program office through the award fee process • Lack of affordability emphasis by the program office • Adherence to aggressive schedules to meet Service needs

Some of these issues might be underlying causes of the cost growth. In the time available, however, we were not able to link any of them quantitatively to the redesign effort or changes in the JSF buy profile.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The mission of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is to develop the next generation strike aircraft in order to replace Air Force, Navy, and Marine assets. The program encompasses three variants: Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL), Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL), and Carrier Variant (CV). The CTOL is designed to replace the F-16 and A-10 for the Air Force. The STOVL is designed for the Marine Corp and will replace the AV-8B and the F/A-18A/C/Ds. Finally, the CV is designed to complement the F/A-18E/F and to replace existing Navy F/A-18A/C/Ds. In addition to the three variants, the program also funds two interchangeable engines, the F135 by Pratt and Whitney (PW) and the F136 by General Electric (GE). The JSF program also incorporates international participation through agreements with the United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, Italy, and others.

The program was established as a model of acquisition reform and incorporated Cost and Operational Performance Trades (COPT). Additionally, the JSF program incorporated a technical maturation phase prior to development that required the two competing contractors, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, to build a concept demonstration aircraft in order to prove the feasibility of several technical and performance challenges. At the end of the concept demonstration phase, Lockheed Martin was selected as the prime contractor for the JSF System Design and Development (SDD) contract.

The JSF program is expected to span over 40 years with a peak production rate of more than 200 aircraft per year. The current estimated Tri-Service procurement purchase is 2443 aircraft. International partner nations are expected to acquire an additional 783 aircraft. Foreign military sales (FMS) are also anticipated.

B. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM

JSF is a family of fifth generation strike aircraft. It incorporates several new technologies and capabilities that have either not been fielded or fielded in limited quantities. For example, the F-35 is a very low observable (VLO) aircraft that is intended to be more easily maintained and exportable. Previous VLO aircraft such as the F-22, F-117, and B-2 have not been exported. Also, the F-35 will be equipped with a novel vehicle diagnostic data management system, called

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the autonomic logistics system, which allows the ground segment to continuously monitor the vehicle health.

The JSF family is built around common interchangeable engines and mission systems. Unlike the F-18 and F-22 the JSF will have a single engine. The new engines for the F-35 will provide significantly more thrust than the F-16 engine. The STOVL shaft driven lift fan (SDLF) concept also represents a significant departure from previously fielded STOVL aircraft (AV-8B) that have used directional nozzles to provide lift. The mission systems for JSF are expected to incorporate 2–3 times more code than the F-22 and allow the pilot to access a wide range of information through the Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS), Multi-Function Display System (MFDS), and the built in Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS).

C. TIME LINE OF MAJOR EVENTS

The JSF concept grew out of the 1993 Secretary of Defense Bottom Up Review. The Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) Program Office, established in 1994 and changed to Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in 1995, carried out a series of studies investigating the feasibility of developing a common aircraft to support Tri-Service requirements. The studies pointed to developing three variants of the aircraft with high commonality. In 1995 the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) extending their participation into JSF. In 1996, the Milestone I Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) was signed and Concept Demonstration contracts were awarded to Lockheed Martin and Boeing to compete for the System Design and Development (SDD) contract. International participation increased in 1997 as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Canada joined the JSF program. Contractor flight demonstrations were carried out in 2000.

The Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) was held in October 2001. The materials prepared for that DAB revealed cost estimates by the JSF Joint Program Office (JPO) and the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG).1 In 2001 there was less than 5 percent difference between the CAIG and JPO estimates and the decision was made to fund the program to the JPO estimate.2

1 Due to the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) the CAIG has been replaced by the

Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE).

(The JPO and CAIG estimates and the discussion that follows use BY2002$). The SDD contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin and Pratt and Whitney in October 2001 for the development of the F-35 aircraft and the F135 engine respectively. GE was also funded to continue work on its F136 engine.

2 October 26, 2001 ADM. Subject: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum.

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In 2002 the Navy reduced its total projected buy from 1089 to 680 aircraft, which was a 14 percent3

In the 2003 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) a “critical” PAUC and a “significant” Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) Nunn-McCurdy (N-M) breach on the current baseline were reported (see

cut in the program’s total quantity. In the 2002–2004 timeframe the estimated weight of the design aircraft posed a threat to the Key Performance Parameters (KPP). This resulted in the formation of two weight reduction teams, the Blue Ribbon Attack Team (BRAT) and the STOVL Weight Attack Team (SWAT) in an attempt to control the design aircraft weight. The BRAT was initiated first and identified several weight reduction initiatives. Subsequently, the projected weight saving from the BRAT effort proved to be optimistic and SWAT was formed to identify additional design changes that could control the weight of the aircraft. The SWAT effort resulted in significant modifications to the design, fabrication, and assembly of the airframe. Specifically, the wing, bulkheads, and center fuselage were all redesigned, which moderated the weight growth. The redesign of these areas not only impacted the manufacturing of parts but also significantly altered the production and integration plans, which impacted the aircraft commonality.

Appendix A). Subsequently, in March 2004, a new Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) was approved. Subsequently, the 2005 SAR reported “significant” N-M breaches in the PAUC and APUC on the original baseline. Following the N-M breaches a new APB was established in March 2007.

After the 2007 APB, several review teams were formed to assess the JSF program. Initially, the Joint Estimating Team (JET), led by Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) CAIG, was formed to quantify the resources required in the FY 2010–2015 budget to adequately fund JSF. The JET reported its results in 2008. Subsequently, a JET 2 study was initiated to update the 2008 JET results for the FY 2011–2016 budget. During the same period the Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) also reviewed the JSF manufacturing and ramp up plan. Additionally, the F135 Joint Assessment Team (JAT) reviewed the F135 engine and found that additional investments would be required. As a result of these reviews an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) was signed by Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) that ordered a DOD-wide review of the JSF program and established the JET 2 estimate as the cost estimate for the JSF program, resulting in a “critical” PAUC and APUC N-M breach against the original baseline.4

3 Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR): 2001 and 2002 SAR. The quantity cut

resulted in a reduction in aircraft from 2886 to 2457.

4 Feb 24, 2010, Subject: F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Restructure Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).

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II. NUNN-MCCURDY BREACH

A. COMPUTATION OF THE BREACH

1. Program Acquisition Unit Cost Breach

The Nunn-McCurdy PAUC breach is based on two factors, the Original APB and the subsequent growth in the unit cost. At the time of the 2001 APB estimate, the JPO and CAIG estimate differed by less than 5 percent and the decision was made to fund the program to the JPO estimate.5,6

Following are the key features of the breach:

As of the 2009 SAR the JSF PAUC estimate has grown 57 percent from its initial October 2001 ABP value of $61.8 million to its current value of $97.1 million, resulting in a “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach.

• Of the 57 percentage point growth in the PAUC estimate, 11 percentage points are associated with RDT&E and the remaining 46 percentage points are associated with Procurement (Recurring Flyaway, Non-Recurring Flyaway, Other support and Initial Spares).

• The single largest area of growth in the PAUC estimate is the Unit Recurring Flyaway (URF) estimate, growing from $40.5 million to $60.4 million and accounting for 32 points of the 57 percent PAUC growth.

Table 1 depicts the PAUC growth as it relates to the officially documented cost positions. As previously noted, the 2001 Original APB is very close to the initial JPO and CAIG estimates; therefore, a “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach occurred relative to all three cost positions.

Table 1. JSF Cost Positions (BY 2002 $M)7

Documented Estimate

RDT&E ($M)

Procurement ($M) Total ($M)

Total Units

PAUC ($M/Unit)

Growth in PAUC (%)

2001 Original APB $32,300 $143,300 $177,100 2866 $61.793 0% 2004 Change 1 APB $42,100 $149,500 $193,100 2457 $78.592 27% 2007 Change 2 APB $42,100 $168,981 $212,581 2458 $86.485 40% 2009 SAR $45,136 $193,005 $238,599 2457 $97.110 57%

5 The initial aircraft quantities were 2866, which included 14 RDT&E aircraft.

6 October 26, 2001, Subject: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum.

7 The Total line includes $1,500 M in Milcon.

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Table 2 summarizes the calculation of the PAUC breach. As seen in the table, the growth in Unit Recurring Flyaway cost ($19.9 million) accounts for more than half of the $35.3 million growth in PAUC and, without at least a $15.4 million increase in the URF, there would have been no Nunn-McCurdy breach. Furthermore, neither a single, nor any pair, of cost categories in and of themselves breach the N-M “critical” threshold.

Table 2. Calculation of Documented Nunn-McCurdy PAUC Breach (BY 2002 $M)8,9

APB 2001

SAR 2009

PAUC

Total $/Unit

Total $/Unit

Delta $/Unit

% Change to Total

APB MILCON $1,500 $0.523

$457 $0.186

$(0.337) -1%

RDT&E $32,300 $11.270

$45,136 $18.370

$7.100 11% PROCUREMENT

Recurring Flyaway $116,094 $40.507

$148,353 $60.380

$19.873 32%

Non-Recurring Flyaway $5,122 $1.787

$15,815 $6.437

$4.650 8%

Support

Other Support $15,404 $5.375

$15,542 $6.326

$0.951 2%

Initial Spares $6,681 $2.331

$13,295 $5.411

$3.080 5%

Total $177,100 $61.79

$238,599 $97.110

$35.317 57%

In summary, the 57 percent growth in JSF PAUC from the 2001 ABP to the 2009 SAR exceeded the 50 percent growth level required to trigger a “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach. The growth was primarily in procurement, which in turn was driven by growth in the URF cost. No breach would have occurred without significant growth in URF cost. In addition to the growth in cost, the program also experienced a 14 percent reduction in quantities. While the growth in some subaccounts was relatively large (e.g., Initial Spares more than doubled), their contribution to the overall breach was relatively small.

2. Average Procurement Unit Cost Breach

The APUC estimate also experienced a “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach, mirroring the PAUC. Although there are no additional insights into the cause of the breach beyond those discussed for the PAUC, the following data are presented for completeness. The basis of the Nunn-McCurdy APUC breach may be summarized as follows, where all cost estimates are

8 The original estimate included 2866 aircraft and the current estimate is for 2457.

9 The numbers of the table track to pages 16, 17, and 38 of the 2009 SAR.

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reported in BY 2002$: the JSF APUC estimate has grown 57 percent from its ABP October 2001 value of $50.2 million to its current, December 2009 SAR value of $79.0 million, resulting in a “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach.10 Table 3 summarizes the calculation of the APUC breach. As seen in the table, the growth in URF cost ($20.0 million) accounts for nearly 70 percent of the $28.8 million growth in APUC.

Table 3. Calculation of Documented JSF Nunn-McCurdy APUC Breach (BY 2002 $M)11,12,13,14

APB 2001

SAR 2009

APUC

Total $/Unit

Total $/Unit

Delta $/Unit

% Change to Total

APB PROCUREMENT

Recurring Flyaway $116,094 $40.706

$148,353 $60.726

$20.020 40%

Non-Recurring Flyaway $5,122 $1.796

$15,815 $6.474

$4.678 9%

Support

Other Support $15,404 $5.401

$15,542 $6.362

$0.961 2%

Initial Spares $6,681 $2.343

$13,295 $5.442

$3.100 6%

Total $177,100 $50.245

$238,599 $79.003

$28.758 57%

In a similar vein to the PAUC calculation neither a single, nor any pair, of cost categories in and of themselves breach the N-M “critical” threshold for APUC, and the URF also represents the single largest contributor to the N-M breach.

III. MAJOR COST VARIANCES REPORTED IN THE SARS

The SAR is an official report to Congress of a program’s yearly performance and current status. The SAR provides data on the program’s expected funding profile by account (RDT&E, Procurement, and Milcon), cost variances by explanation category (Economic, Quantity, Schedule, Engineering, Estimating, Other, and Support), as well as a change explanation for each

10 The initial aircraft quantity of 2852 was reduced to the current quantity of 2443.

11 Original Estimate is October 2001 Acquisition Program Baseline.

12 Current Estimate is the 2009 SAR.

13 Number of A/C = 2852 (Original Estimate) and 2443 (Current Estimate) and exclude the 14 RDT&E A/C.

14 Numbers track to pages 16, 17, and 38 of 2009 SAR.

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variance (e.g., Adjustment for current and prior escalation). The SAR data provides an initial starting point for understanding how the program has changed since the original APB and where the of cost growth is reported. Unfortunately, the SAR does not contain enough data at a sufficiently detailed level to serve as the only basis for conducting a root cause analysis. For example, the SAR does not track assumptions made in the Milestone B cost estimate and it entangles numerous effects into a single cost change explanation (e.g., Increases in Propulsion estimate due to raw material prices, hardware/configuration changes, exchange rate updates, and higher than expected lift system hardware costs).15

A plot of PAUC growth by SAR year is shown in

SAR data, however, were used to identify the significant areas of cost growth, calibrate IDA models, and compute the N-M breach by account.

Figure 1. About 39 percent PAUC growth is reported in two SAR years: 2003 and 2009.16 Using the SAR Change Explanations and Cost Variance Reports, we computed that the Navy quantity reduction of 409 aircraft resulted in 4 or 6 percent17

15 2009 SAR.

PAUC growth, thus confirming that it is not the significant driver of the N-M breach.

16 The following are examples of SAR Explanations of PAUC Growth. In 2003, labor and OH rate increases; one year production delay; configuration update; MYP delayed. In 2005, configuration update; increased airframe materials cost; change in subcontractor manufacturing plan for wing; change in prime/subcontractor work share resulting in increased labor rates. In 2009, labor and OH rate increases; revision in air vehicle and propulsion estimate based on actual SDD and early LRIP costs; planned MYP delayed; production sustainment cost increases (based on changes in equipment costs); added risk funding due to JET assessment; change in production quantity and profile.

17 The 4 or 6 percent value varies depending on if the SAR Change Explanation or Cost Variance report, respectively, is used. The difference is due to an accounting issue based on how costs associated with quantity reductions are accounted for between the Quantity and Support category in the explanation categories.

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Figure 1. N-M PAUC Growth by SAR Year

The PAUC growth by SAR cost variance category, Figure 2, indicates that a significant majority of the cost growth is attributable to Estimating issues. The Estimating category covers cost model refinements or cost estimating assumptions not covered in any other categories. The Economic, Quantity, and Schedule variances are calculated automatically. Engineering is used to cover cost changes associated with a physical or functional change in the fully configured end item. Finally, Support covers cost changes not associated with flyaway costs. Based on these definitions the SAR indicates that very little of the cost growth is associated with changes in the aircraft or the associated change in quantity.

30%

20%

7%

0% 0%6%

20%

1%

6%

5%1%

19%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Total PAUC Growth

APB 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009

Significant N-M Breach Level

Critical N-M Breach Level

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Figure 2. JSF PAUC Growth by SAR Cost Variance Report

Combining the PAUC cost breach calculation (Table 2) and the SAR cost variance explanations we can correct for the change in quantity to identify which accounts still exhibit “significant” PAUC growth. Figure 3 shows that taking into account the 14 percent reduction in units does not significantly change the results of the breach calculation. The URF cost remains the single largest contributor to the N-M breach. Without accounting for quantity changes, RDT&E is responsible for an 11 percent increase in the PAUC; however, when quantity changes are included in the calculation, RDT&E only accounts for an 8 percent increase in the PAUC.

In summary, the SAR data indicate the following: • Reductions in quantity are not a significant driver of the N-M breach • The increase in the Procurement URF cost is the single largest contributor to the N-M

breach • The 2003 and 2009 SARs had the two largest changes in PAUC (20 percent and 19

percent, respectively)

30%

20%

7%

0%4%

6%

6%

6%

35%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Total PAUC Growth

Other Support Schedule Quantity Engineering Estimating



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Figure 3. PAUC Growth by SAR Funding Category Corrected for Quantity Effects

IV. PROXIMATE ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS OF COST GROWTH

A. GROUND RULES, DATA, AND ASSUMPTIONS

A multifaceted approach was used to understand the cost growth observed between the Milestone B and 2009 SAR estimate. In conducting the analysis, we used SAR data, JPO Milestone B documentation, historical IDA data, and contractor-provided information.

A top-down approach using the SAR data was employed to understand and quantify the cost growth associated with the major funding categories (e.g., RDT&E, Milcon, and Procurement) and the schedule and production profiles. This approach led us to initially focus on the single largest contributor to the N-M breach, the URF.

30%

20%

7%

-1%

8%

1%5%

7%

32%

4%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

PAUC Other Support Iniital Spares Non Recurring Recurring

Support Flyaway

Total Growth MILCON RDT&E Procurement: 45% points of N-M Breach Quantity



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In conjunction with the SAR data, a bottom-up approach was employed that scaled up the Milestone B estimate to account for programmatic and technical changes that have occurred post Milestone B. This required increasing the various Milestone B URF subcategories (e.g., manufacturing, QA, tooling, materials) in order to compute the first order cost impact on the PAUC. IDA estimated the change in the PAUC by modifying key technical parameters and assumptions to match the current state of the program. Using a top-down and bottom-up approach allowed IDA to evaluate the accuracy of the Milestone B assumptions in the light of subsequent events. This approach yields a direct link between specific estimating assumptions and the growth over the Milestone B estimate.

B. MAJOR CAUSES OF THE COST GROWTH

IDA concluded that JSF PAUC growth can be grouped into three broad categories: errors in the Milestone B estimate, the redesign effort, and changes in the buy profile. The PAUC growth associated with each of these categories is depicted in Table 4.

Table 4. Gross JSF PAUC Growth Accounted for by Analyses

Errors in the Milestone B Estimate

Aircraft Weight Growth 6%

Escalation Rates 14%

Fee-on-Fee 3%

23%

Redesign

Change in Materials Manufacturing Efficiency 6%

Changes in Non-recurring Tooling and Equipment 7%

Design Changes Negated Affordability and Production Efficiency Plans 6%

Additional Design Effort during System Design and Development 7%

26%

Change in Buy Profiles

Ramp Delay to Peak Production 2%

Lower Procurement Rate and Reduced Quantity 3%

5%

1. Errors in the Milestone B Estimate

• Aircraft Weight Growth (6 percent): The Milestone B estimate used an estimate of the Airframe Unit Weight (AUW) for each variant, which included a 6 percent margin for

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growth, to compute the URF costs. The actual AUW turned out to be 10 to 21 percent18

•

higher than the Milestone B estimated AUW. The direct effect of the growth was to increase procurement costs for manufacturing and engineering labor, materials, quality assurance (QA), and tooling. Escalation Rates (14 percent): DOD cost estimators are required to use escalation rates provided by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) in making cost estimates used for budgeting of major systems. The Milestone B JPO estimate followed these rules. However, at the time of Milestone B, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Lockheed Martin had already agreed to a Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) that increased rates more than the OUSD(C) escalation indices. We found that Lockheed Martin’s actual rates closely matched the rates forecasted in their FPRA; therefore, the fully burdened labor rates turned out to be significantly higher than those used in the JPO Milestone B. In addition, changes in prime/subcontractor workshare added to cost growth. IDA did not perform an independent estimate of the impact19

•

but did verify the error through the JPO milestone B documentation and the 2001 FPRA. Fee-on-Fee (3 percent)

2. Redesign

: The Milestone B estimate was predicated on the application of a single fee to the sum of all costs, prime and subcontractor. This assumption remained valid through SDD. However, beginning with Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 1, the contractor teaming arrangement changed such that each contractor applied a fee to its own costs, while the prime contractor also applied a fee to the subcontractor costs and subcontractor fees. This led to cost growth since additional loading was not anticipated in the Milestone B estimate. We used LRIP 1 contractor cost data reports (CCDR) and the JPO Milestone B documentation to estimate this cost growth.

• Changes in Materials Manufacturing Efficiency (6 percent): IDA used the Milestone B materials weight statement and the 2008 commonality database to identify changes in the material, price, estimated increases in the buy-to-fly20

•

ratio, and additional labor in manufacturing the material relative to the Milestone B estimate. These changes led to growth relative to the original Milestone B estimate. Changes in Non-Recurring Tooling and Equipment (7 percent)

18 The actual AUW growth was beyond the 6 percent weight margin in the Milestone B estimate. The AUW

estimate used in IDA’s analysis was from the 2008 commonality database provided by Lockheed Martin. The Milestone B AUW estimate was from the JPO Milestone B briefing. The contractor AUW estimate at Milestone B was below the Government estimate.

: The increases in non-recurring tooling and equipment results directly from the redesign effort. IDA did not break down the details of the increase but used the SAR estimate.

19 Cost impact taken from 2001–2009 SARs.

20 Buy-to-fly refers to ratio of weight of the material in the finished part vs. the amount of material purchased to manufacture the part. It is used as a measure of manufacturing efficiency.

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• Design Changes Negated Affordability and Production Efficiency Plans (6 percent)

•

: The Milestone B estimate included several affordability factors associated with increased productivity. For example, a manufacturing cost reduction factor of 20 percent was used to account for this additional productivity. Other factors were also applied to tooling and quality assurance. However, that plan was based upon the initial airframe design. The redesign effort negated the implementation of these affordability initiatives, resulting in cost growth. The removal of the affordability factors returned the JSF labor productivity estimate to that of the F-22 (as of the JSF Milestone B). Additional Design Effort during System Design and Development (7 percent): The RDT&E cost increased from the Milestone B estimate. IDA did not break down the details of the RDT&E increase, but took the SAR estimate minus the estimated fixed costs due to the delay in the start of production. The largest increase in RDT&E occurred in the Dec 2003 SAR, which indicated that the cost increase was due to “SDD schedule extension for additional design maturation and known and unknown risks.”21

3. Change in Buy Profiles

The SDD schedule change between the 2002 and 2003 SAR was only one year, indicating that this was primarily a design issue.

• Ramp Delay to Peak Production (2 percent)

Appendix B

: IDA estimates a ramp delay to peak production of three years. However, it is difficult to measure the delay precisely and one could reasonably estimate from two to four years for the delay (see ).

• Lower Procurement Rate and Reduced Quantities (3 percent

Appendix B

): This estimate reflects a six-year procurement delay and the reduction in procurement units. In addition, the reduction in procurement units also changed the variant mix. Since the new variant mix was weighted more towards less expensive planes, this offsets part of the cost growth associated with lower production rates and reduced quantity (see ). The SAR reports that quantity reductions account for 4 or 6 percentage points of the N-M breach.

In terms of caveats and limitations to the study, two issues potentially qualify IDA’s findings. First, IDA’s estimate of the 54 percent PAUC growth represents the sum of the above factors, each of which (except for quantity reductions) individually resulted in positive cost growth. In contrast, the 57 percent cost growth indicated in the 2009 SAR is the net result of all factors, including not only those resulting in positive cost growth but also those resulting in negative cost growth. Therefore, the 54 percent IDA estimate and the 57 percent SAR estimate are not precisely reconcilable without detailed analysis of every individual cost that changed during the period of interest. However, the 54 percent and the 57 percent are entirely comparable in terms of baseline, major factors considered, and characterization and understanding of the Nunn-McCurdy breach. 21 2003 SAR.

14

Second, the factors IDA assessed were assessed on an individual basis and not in the context of a fully encompassing and integrated cost model. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that there are correlations among the factors which, if not accounted for, would cause the 54 percent to be biased. However, IDA found no indication or evidence of factor correlation or bias, certainly not on the scale that would alter the conclusions.

Therefore, neither issue presents a significant qualification to IDA’s findings. Although IDA’s assessment does not account for the entire growth in PAUC, it does capture the great majority of that growth. It identifies nearly all of the major individual factors, quantifies their impact in a highly transparent way using official Government and contractor data, and links those impacts to root causes. The second order effects relating to potential correlations between factors were not apparent in the data and analysis, and impose no qualifications on the results. Neither omitted factors nor second order effects can significantly alter or qualify the main conclusions of the study.

V. COMMENTS ON ROOT CAUSE

If one steps back from both the specific root causes defined in WSARA and the detailed, individual factors identified in IDA’s assessment, it is possible to obtain a broader and more fundamental view of the nature of the JSF Nunn-McCurdy breach. At the most basic level, the question is whether the cost growth resulted primarily from the actions of the Government or from the actions of the contractor. Was it poor cost estimation and poor Government management or was it poor execution by the contractor team that led to the cost growth? Although IDA did not address the issue specifically in that way, IDA’s results provide insight into the issue and quantitatively bound and constrain the discussion. Approximately 40 percent of the growth (i.e., 23 of the 57 percentage points of growth) is traceable to an unrealistically low cost estimate at Milestone B. An additional 9 percent (i.e., 5 of the 57 percentage points) of the growth is traceable to changes in quantity and schedule. Thus, about half the growth can be linked directly to Government actions. Further, if the redesign effort can be linked to the poor initial weight estimates by the Government and the contractor, then part of that cost impact also is traceable to Government actions. It is clear that, at the most fundamental level, Government actions were significantly more important in driving the cost growth than contractor execution problems.

15

WSARA22

• Unrealistic performance expectations

requires a root cause analysis with respect to a major defense acquisition program including an assessment of the underlying cause or causes of shortcomings in cost, schedule, or performance of the program, including the role, if any, of the following seven classifications:

• Unrealistic baseline estimates for cost and schedule • Immature technologies or excessive manufacturing or integration risk • Unanticipated design, engineering, manufacturing, or technology integration issues

arising during program performance • Changes in procurement quantities • Inadequate program funding or funding instability • Poor performance by government or contractor personnel for program management

IDA identified and quantified the major reasons underlying the cost growth in the JSF program; however, IDA did not map the root causes IDA identified to WSARA root causes. In addition to quantifying the causes of PAUC growth, IDA also reviewed documentation of a number of recent studies. The most significant documentation includes the following reports:

A. SARs for 1997 through 2009 B. F-35 Joint Estimate Team I (JET I), September 9, 2008 C. F-35 Joint Estimate Team II (JET II), October 2009 D. F-35 IMRT Report, October, 20 2009 E. Naval Air Systems Command Risk Assessment, May 5, 2010

Table 5 categorizes a number of comments excerpted from the above documents to a root cause.

22 Public Law 111-23.

16

Table 5. JSF Assessments and Comments Categorized by Root Cause

Comment Source Unrealistic performance expectations Lack of strong Systems Engineering rigor and overall discipline E Multi-block software development plan leading to lab gridlock E Unrealistic baseline estimates for cost or schedule Engineering staffing ramp down too optimistic B, C Software/ Mission systems schedule too optimistic B, C SDD aircraft manufacturing span times too short B, C Flight test schedule too optimistic B, C Rates – Estimates of labor and OH rates A, C Immature technologies or excessive manufacturing or integration risk Analogy method for airframe design weights was inadequate A Unanticipated design, engineering, manufacturing, or technology integration issues arising during program performance Weight of the initial SDD airframe designs A Loss of commonality impacting material costs A Initial CV keel design inadequate for carrier launches Material changes and costs A Changes in manufacturing plan for wings A Increased manufacturing span times/shortage of parts D Propulsion (added thrust changes and materials) A Changes in procurement quantities Equipping all Navy aircraft with Electro Optical Tracking System A Reduction of 409 Navy aircraft A International aircraft additions A Inadequate program funding or funding instability Funding process within DOD does not support a complex large scale international

partner, global supplier program D

Poor performance by Government or contractor personnel responsible for program management Government unable to independently assess technical maturity E Lack of consistent DCMA engagement across the contractor’s sites D Non-Compliant Earned Value Management E Disciplined Technical Review Processes not evident E LM must assume a more aggressive leadership role D Planned capability not aligned to an executable schedule D, E Inability to plan and execute against a plan D, E Mission systems integration and software development not under control E Realistic program baseline not in place E Risk reduction management process and funding not credible A, D, E Integrated cost and affordability improvement program not being execute D Parts shortage and production line workarounds D

17

VI. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The IDA analysis concludes that errors in the Milestone B estimate accounted for about 23 percent PAUC growth. These errors were associated with the underestimation of airframe unit weight, the use of faulty labor rates, as well as the move to a contract structure based on a prime and sub relationship instead of a teaming arrangement with a shared fee pool. The root cause of these factors is an unrealistic Milestone B cost estimate.

IDA concludes that the redesign effort led to 26 percent growth over the Milestone B estimate, based on reductions in materials manufacturing efficiency, increase in non-recurring tooling and equipment, negation of affordability plans, and the increase in RDT&E effort. We do not have a clear hypothesis to offer as to the root cause of these factors, although the initial error in estimating aircraft weight clearly is implicated.

IDA concludes that the delay in ramp up to peak production, the lowered procurement rate, the overall reduced quantity accounted for 5 percent growth relative to the Milestone B estimate. Some would include these sources of PAUC increase with the consequences of the redesign. Others would argue that they reflect a lack of realism in the ramp rates assumed in the Milestone B estimate, inadequate attention to affordability at Milestone B, or the result of DOD budget policies. We have no persuasive hard evidence to offer on this disagreement.

A-1

APPENDIX A: ACQUISITION TERMS OF REFERENCE

Average Procurement Unit Cost = Procurement Costs / Procurement Quantities

Program Average Unit Cost = Total Program Costs / (Procurement + RDT&E Quantities)

There are eight possible Nunn-McCurdy breaches, four for the APUC and four for the PAUC. The breach calculation is performed by measuring the percentage growth in the APUC or PAUC. A “significant” N-M breach occurs if the average unit costs have increased by >15 percent of the Current APB or >30 percent of the Original APB. A “critical” breach occurs when the average unit costs have increase by at least 25 percent against the Current APB or 50 percent against the Original APB. The Original APB is the APB that is established during the Milestone B decision (formerly Milestone II).

The Nunn McCurdy breach is reported in the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). The SAR maintains an official record of the projected costs for a program by funding categories (e.g., RDT&E, Procurement, and Milcon). In addition to tracking total program costs, the SAR tracks the year-to-year change in costs and provides an explanation for the changes. Furthermore, each cost variance reported in the SAR is then attributed to one of six categories: Other, Support, Schedule, Quantity, Engineering, or Estimating. While providing insight, the SAR categories and program offices’ explanation of cost growth are not necessarily root causes as defined by IDA, PARCA, or WSARA.

B-1

APPENDIX B: MODELING COST IMPACT OF SCHEDULE AND PROCUREMENT

RATE CHANGES

A. BACKGROUND

IDA developed an analytic tool to estimate the JSF procurement costs; assuming a lot fixed cost, a unit cost curve that is driven by learning, and the theoretical first unit cost T1 for each variant. The purpose is to capture how changes in the buy profile, schedule, and quantities affect the average unit cost. The total estimated impact of these changes is a 5 percent increase in the PAUC. The calculations were calibrated to the 2001 SAR,1

B. BUY PROFILE CHANGES

which provided the earliest official record of the BY 2002 $ costs aligned with the JSF production profile.

The current plan for F-35 procurement extends procurement for nine years beyond the date reported in the 2001 SAR (see Figure B-1); the last procurement funding year slipped from FY 2026 to FY 2035.

1 The 2001 SAR procurement costs are slightly larger than the 2001 APB, due to changes in labor and overhead

indices issues. In order to account for the difference between 2001 APB and the 2001 SAR the final results were scaled down by the ratio of the 2001 APB to the 2001 SAR.

B-2

Figure B-1. Comparison of MS-B and SAR 2009 Procurement Plan

We estimated the cost impact of the change in the procurement profile using Equation 1.

𝑈𝐶𝑖 �𝑞𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝐴𝐹 , 𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝑁 , 𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐶 ,𝑄𝑖�

= 𝑭1𝑞𝑖

+. 95𝑀𝑌𝑃𝑖 �𝑻𝟏𝑼𝑺𝑨𝑭𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝐴𝐹

𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝐺+ 𝑻𝟏𝑼𝑺𝑵

𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝑁

𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝐺+ 𝑻𝟏𝑼𝑺𝑴𝑪

𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐶

𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝐺�𝑄𝑖

𝜷

Equation B-1. IDA model used estimate schedule, quantity, and production rate impacts

𝑈𝐶𝑖: unit cost in BY02 dollars for lot i as reported in the 2001 SAR.

𝑞𝑖: total lot quantity for all aircraft including international customers,

𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝐺: lot quantity bought by the the US government, where 𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝐺 = 𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝐴𝐹 + 𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝑁 + 𝑞𝑖𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐶 ,

𝑄𝑖: cumulative quantity for all aircraft (with SDD and international units) at the midpoint of lot i.

MYPi has the value of 1 for lots with multi-year procurement savings and 0 otherwise

Parameters estimated:

F, the fixed cost associated with each lot;

𝑻𝟏𝑼𝑺𝑨𝑭,𝑻𝟏𝑼𝑺𝑵and 𝑻𝟏𝑼𝑺𝑴𝑪 are first unit costs of the variants for each military service

β is the learning parameter

-

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026202720282029203020312032203320342035

USG

Fis

cal Y

ear B

uy Q

uant

iy

MS-B Plan

SAR 2009 Plan

+9 Years: 2026 to 2035

B-3

The MYP basis value (.95, a 5 percent savings) is per JPO assumptions

We decomposed the nine year delay into the portion associated with the delay in the production ramp-up and the portion driven by the decrease in the peak production rate.

1. Procurement Delay Due to Slowed Procurement Ramp-Up

To calculate the ramp delay we created a hypothetical production profile where all of the characteristics of the plan reported in the 2001 SAR were preserved except for the ramp-up to full rate production (see Figure B-2 below). While the current plan takes four years longer to reach full rate production, the calculated total procurement period delay is only three years. Our assumption for the hypothetical plan was that the peak production rate would be sustained for eight years, as is the plan reported in the 2009 SAR.

Figure B-2. Production Ramp Impact on Production Delay

2. Procurement Delay Due to Reduced Production Rate

The current 2009 SAR plan shows a peak annual procurement rate of 130 for U.S. government buys, down from 194 in the 2001 SAR. The reduction in rate accounts for the remaining six year production delay and the decrease in total procured quantity. Note that in all cases the USAF buy is the “critical” path in the completion of the procurement schedule. Thus the primary driver of the procurement stretch is the decrease in the USAF rate from 110 to 80 aircraft per year. The decrease in USMC and USN production rates was accompanied by

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100

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200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026202720282029203020312032203320342035

USG

Fis

cal Y

ear B

uy Q

uant

iy

SAR 2009 ramp with MS-B peak rate and quantity

MS-B Plan

+3 Years: 2026 to 2029

B-4

decreases in the USMC and USN total procured quantity. Figure B-3 compares the 2001 SAR plan with the hypothetical plan.

Figure B-3. Production Ramp and Peak Rate Impact on Production Delay

Note that the decomposition of the nine year delay into ramp-up and production rate effects does not change the resulting cost estimate, only its allocation between the two categories.

3. Cost Model Specification and Estimation

Equation B-1 was fit to the 2001 SAR procurement data using nonlinear least square with multiplicative errors. The unit costs are associated with the U.S. government buy; however, the model captures the learning and fixed costs associated with international purchases. We assumed

the fixed portion of total lot costs would never be less than 8 percent and that 𝑇1𝑈𝑆𝑁

𝑇1𝑈𝑆𝐴𝐹 = 1.29 and

𝑇1𝑈𝑆𝑀𝐶

𝑇1𝑈𝑆𝐴𝐹 = 1.24, based on information provided by the JPO.2

The fit resulted in an annual fixed cost of $914 million, the USAF T1 of $202 million, the USMC T1 of $250 million, and the U.S. Navy T1 of $261 million, and a learning slope of 86 percent (β= 0.23). All costs reported are in BY2002$.

2 The values to calculate the ratios were taken from “JSF Cost Brief to IDA”, Mike Clark, Joint Strike Fighter

Program Office, June 23, 2006.

-

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026202720282029203020312032203320342035

USG

Fis

cal Y

ear B

uy Q

uant

iy

MS-B Plan

SAR 2009 ramp and peak rateand MS-B quantity

+6 Years: 2029 to 2035

Driven byUSAF

110 to 80 rate

B-5

Figure B-4 shows the fit of the model to the 2001 SAR data.

Figure B-4. Model Fit to 2001 Data

The resulting estimated parameters fit the data very well. The first two lots and the last lot were not used to estimate the parameters because they had low procurement rates. Fixed costs are allocated to all aircraft purchases (U.S. and international). Fixed costs associated with the procurement delays were allocated to the U.S. aircraft because there were no international purchases in those years.

4. Calculation of PAUC Growth Due To Ramp, Rate, and Quantity Changes

The results of the PAUC calculations are presented in two steps shown in Table B-1: first, the changes from the ramp delay to peak productions, and second, lower procurement rate and reduced quantities. The net result is a 5 percent increase in PAUC with 2 percentage points of the PAUC growth associated with the 3-year Ramp Rate change and the remainder (3 percentage points) increase associated with the program stretch and peak production rate reduction and associated total quantity cut.

-

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

11,000

2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026

Annu

al U

S G

over

nmen

t Pro

cure

men

t Cos

t M

illio

ns o

f BY0

2 D

olla

rs

Allocation of fixed cost to USG procurement

After 2022 all fixed costsare paid by USG

B-6

Table B-1. Calculation of Final PAUC Adjustments

Milestone B

3-year Ramp Rate Delay

Peak Production Delay and Quantity Cut

US Govt Quantity 2866 2866 2457 RDT&E, BY02$ B $32,300 $32,300 $32,300 Procurement, BY02$ B $143,300 $146,007 $126,279 Milcon, BY02$ B $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 PAUC, BY02$ M $61.793 $62.738 $65.152 % Increase in PAUC 0 2% 5%

C-1

DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES

Document By/From Date

2009 SAR Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) F-35 As of December 31, 2009

December 31, 2009

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Reports and Testimonies

CBO Testimony Statement of Christopher Jehn, Assistant Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office on Modernizing Tactical Aircraft before the Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate

Congressional Budget Office

March 10, 1999

CBO Testimony Statement of Cindy Williams, Assistant Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office on Modernizing Tactical Aircraft before the Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate

Congressional Budget Office

April 16, 1997

DAES Charts DAES Charts October 2006–

March 2010 DAES Current Status Report Current Status Report (DAES & Web Services) F-35 As of March 24, 2010

March 24, 2010

Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Joint Strike Fighter - Lightning II Monthly Assessment Report (Prepared for the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office)

DCMA Lockheed Martin Fort Worth

May 20, 2008

Joint Strike Fighter - Lightning II Monthly Assessment Report (Prepared for the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office)


October 14, 2008



April 1, 2009



October 1, 2009



November 1, 2009

Joint Strike Fighter - Lightning II Monthly Assessment Report DCMA Lockheed Martin Fort Worth

December 1, 2009


January 1, 2010


February 1, 2010


March 1, 2010

Joint Strike Fighter - Lightning II Charts April 1, 2010 F-35 Lightning II Program - Executive Summary Paul M. McQuain,

Deputy Commander, DCMA Lockheed

April 14, 2010

C-2

Document By/From Date Martin, Ft Worth

DCAM LMAC EVMS Audit Email Peter Murphy, D CAPT, OSD ATL

November 30, 2007



May 1, 2009

Post Acceptance Review for Cause - Compliance Report for the Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company Fort Worth Texas (Report Number CTR-2007-002) (Prepared for Office of the Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics)

DCMA Earned Value Management (EVM) Center

November 19, 2007

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Reports Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate - Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management : Joint Strike Fighter Significant Challenges Remain as DOD Restructures Program (GAO-10-520T)

GAO March 11, 2010

Joint Strike Fighter Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting Warfighter Requirements on Time(GAO-10-382)

Congressional Committees

March 1, 2010

GAO Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and Managing Program Costs

Karen Richey May 1, 2008

Joint Strike Fighter Cooperative Program Needs Greater Oversight to Ensure Goals Are Met (GAO-03-775)

Report to Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

July 1, 2003

Joint Strike Fighter Recent Decision by DOD Add to Program Risks (GAO-08-388)

Report to Congressional Committees

March 1, 2008

Testimony before the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives - Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management: Joint Strike Fighter Recent Decision by DOD Add to Program Risks (GAO-08-569T)

GAO March 11, 2008

Joint Strike Fighter Accelerating Procurement before Completing Development Increases the Government's Financial Risk (GAO-09-303)


March 1, 2009

Tactical Aircraft Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter Program with Different Acquisition Strategy (GAO-05-271)


March 1, 2005

Joint Strike Fighter DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing Demonstrates Acceptable Performance (GAO-06-356)


March 1, 2006

Joint Strike Fighter Progress Made and Challenges Remain (GAO-07-360)


March 1, 2007

Testimony before the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives - Statement of Michael

GAO March 22, 2007

C-3

Document By/From Date Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management: Defense Acquisitions Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter Engine Program (GAO-07-656T) Testimony before the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives - Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management: Joint Strike Fighter Significant Challenges and Decisions Ahead (GAO-10-478T)

GAO March 24, 2010

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives - Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management: Joint Strike Fighter Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters Most Challenging Phase (GAO-09-711T)

GAO May 20, 2009

Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition Mature Critical Technologies Needed to Reduce Risks (GAO-02-39)

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

October 1, 2001

Defense Acquisitions Assessments of Selected Major Weapons Programs (GAO-06-391)


March 1, 2006

Joint Strike Fighter DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing Demonstrates Acceptable Performance (GAO-06-356)


March 1, 2006

Defense Acquisitions Assessments of Selected Major Weapons Programs (GAO-09-326SP)


March 1, 2009

Defense Acquisitions Assessments of Selected Major Weapons Programs (GAO-08-467SP)


March 1, 2008

Defense Acquisitions Assessments of Selected Major Weapons Programs (GAO-05-301)


March 1, 2005

Tactical Aircraft Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter Program with Different Acquisition Strategy (GAO-05-271)


March 1, 2005

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate - Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management Issues: Tactical Aircraft F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization (GAO-05-519T)

GAO April 6, 2005

Historical SARs Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) F-35 As of December 31, 1997

Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) F-35 As of December 31, 1998

C-4










IPT F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II IPT #5 Kick-off Meeting, 24 March 2010

March 24, 2010

N-M Cost Team Review IPT #3 Picture of F-35 AF-01 N-M Cost Team Review IPT #3\Presentation Slides F-35 Lightning II - Nunn-McCurdy IPT #3, Introductions and Agenda

Art Sheridan, Director, F-35 Affordability

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Overview and Status Eric Branyan, VP F-35 Deputy Program Manager

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II SDD Engineering Development Jay Swartz, Director, F-35 Development Deputy

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Systems Hardware & Development Status/Software

Eric George, Director, F-35 Mission Systems and Software

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Prognostics and Health Management Hal Morrison, F-35 Health Management Systems

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Change Integration Allen Vyce, Director, F-35 Change Integration

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II SDD Production Bobby Williams, Vice President F-35 Global Production

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Test & Verification Doug Pearson, VP F-35 Test & Verification

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Program Staffing Summary David Demoret, Director, F-35 Finance

April 5, 2010

C-5


F-35 Lightning II LRIP Program Overview Matt Maxwell, Dir F-35 LRIP Program Manager

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Production Schedule Factory Transition Bobby Williams, Vice President F-35 Global Production

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Sourcing & International Participation Jim Shidler, International Participation

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Production Non-Recurring Richard Mange, PhD, Senior Manager F-35 PNR

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II LRIP 1-3 Completion Status and Contract Performance

Jim Glaub, Dir F-35 LRIP Business Management

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Manufacturing Labour Hour Analysis Brent Johnstone, F-35 Estimating

April 6, 2010

F-35 Lightning II LM General Material Actuals Analysis Augie Goerner, Senior Manager, F-35 Estimating

April 6, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Subcontractor Production Costs Dennis Pieczonka, Supply Chain Management

April 5, 2010

F-35 Lightning II MCRR Followup Connie Derrick April 6, 2010 F-35 Lightning II Data Followup Connie Derrick April 6, 2010 F-35 Lightning II Integrated Training Systems Don Searles April 7, 2010 F-35 Lightning II Affordable LO Don Searles April 7, 2010 F-35 Lightning II Supply Chain Management Don Searles April 7, 2010 F-35 Lightning II Support Equipment Don Searles April 7, 2010 F-35 Lightning II Global Sustainment Kimberly Gavaletz, VP

JSF Global Sustainment

April 7, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Sustainment Business Operations Don Searles April 7, 2010 F-35 Lightning II Sustainment Cost Estimate Overview Tim Echard, F-35

Sustainment Business Strategy

April 7, 2010

F-35 Lightning II Follow-On Development James Dorrell, Director - F-35 Improvements & Derivatives

April 5, 2010

N-M Cost Team Review IPT #3\Questions Cross Reference Joint Strike Fighter Cost Integrated Product Team (LM Aero Questions Only) Consolidated Questions

CAPE April–May 2010

N-M Cost Team Review IPT #3\Videos Engineering Display STOVL Flight Memos

C-6


Memorandum for George Schneiter - Joint Strike Fighte OIPT Report

J.S. Gansler June 13, 2000

Memorandum for AF/A8P, SAF/AQP and SAF/FMBI - 30 Day F-35 Cost Assessment

Richard K. Hartley, SES, DAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Cost and Economics)

May 21, 2008

Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition - F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) Lightning II Acquisition Program Baseline Development Estimate Change 2

Kenneth J. Kreig, USD (AT&L)

March 30, 2007

To Dan Crowley, Executive Vice President & General Manager, Lockheed Martin Corporation - Billing Error under Contract N00019-02-C-3002

Delores M. Etter, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition)

August 10, 2007

Memorandum for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Via Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Deviation Report

Charles R. Davis, Brig. Gen, ASAF, Program Executive Office, Joint Strike Fighter Program, Delores M. Etter, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition)

November 21, 2006

Memorandum for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Via Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Deviation Report Dated 21 Nov 2006 Addendum

Charles R. Davis, Brig. Gen, ASAF, Program Executive Office, Joint Strike Fighter Program, Delores M. Etter, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition)

February 2, 2007

Memorandum for the Record - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement (APBA)

William Balderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Air Programs)

February 26, 2007

Program Budget Decision No. 161 Aircraft December 9, 2001 Assessing the Final Assembly and Checkout Alternatives for the Joint Strike Fighter Program (Project No. 1088) (AT&L 01-404)

RAND - Cynthia Cook, Principal Investigator

Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force - Revision to F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Restructure Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) of February 24, 2010

Ashton B. Carter March 3, 2010

Memos\ADM Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Navy - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum

E. C. Aldridge, Jr October 26, 2001

Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force - F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) Low-Rate Initial Production (Lot 1) and CTOL and Short Take-Off and Landing (STOVL) Lot 2 Long

Kenneth J. Krieg, USD (AT&L)

April 19, 2007

C-7

Document By/From Date Lead Items Decision Review Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force - F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) Program Review Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)

Kenneth J. Krieg, USD (AT&L)

June 7, 2007

Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Navy - F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) Program Review Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)

Michael W. Wynne May 31, 2005

Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, Director, Program, Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E) - F-35 Lightning II Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) - Joint Estimate Team (JET) Program Funding (U)

John J. Young, Jr., USD (AT&L)

October 14, 2008

Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force - F-35 Lightning II Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)


August 5, 2008

Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Navy - F-35 Lightning II Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 2 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)


April 8, 2008

Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force - F-35 Lightning II Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 3 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)


December 3, 2008

Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Navy - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Milestone I Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)

Paul G. Kaminski November 15, 1996

Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)

E. C. Aldridge, Jr July 26, 2002

Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force - F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Restructure Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)

Ashton B. Carter February 24, 2010

Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force - F-35 Lightning II Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 4 Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)


Info Memo for Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)


January 16, 2009

OIPTs\2000\25 May 00 OIPT Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - Joint Strike Fighter OIPT Report

George R. Schneiter, Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems

June 12, 2000

Executive Summary - Memorandum for Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report

Deputy Directy, Acquisition Management (Prepared by Wendell L. Irby (ARA,AM)

March 21, 2000

Memorandum for George Schneiter - Joint Strike Fighter OIPT Report

J.S. Gansler June 13, 2000

OIPTs\2000\Environmental Issues OIPT Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Principal Deputy Under Secretary of

Georget R. Schneiter, Director, Strategic and

June 1, 2000

C-8

Document By/From Date Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - Joint Strike Fighter OIPT Report

Tactical Systems

Executive Summary - Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) through Director, Defense Research and Engineering - JSF Environmental Issues - Status

From Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems (Prepared by Michael Novak, OUSD (AT&L), S&TS-AW

December 13, 2000

Executive Summary - Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) through Director, Defense Research and Engineering - JSF Environmental Issues - Status

From Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems (Prepared by Michael Novak, OUSD (AT&L), S&TS-AW

December 21, 2000

OIPTs\2005\2005 OIPT Review November 17, 2005 F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) Program Review OIPT Read Ahead

Andrew F. Pozda November 12, 2005

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Correspondence Cover Sheet

Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report

Glenn F. Lamartin, Director, Defense Systems

April 29, 2005

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Input for the November 16th OIPT Read-ahead for F-35 JSF OIPT Brief Rear Admiral Steven

Enewold, USN, Program Executive Officer, Joint Strike Fighter Program

November 17, 2005

Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Navy - F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) Program Review Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)

Michael W. Wynne May 31, 2005

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Investment Program Funding & Quantities

Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2006 (Report 109-141) (109th Congress, 1st Session - Senate)

Mr. Stevens, from the Committee of Appropriations

September 29, 2005

Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2006, Report of the Committee on Appropriations (Report 109-119) (109th Congress, 1st Session -House of Representatives)

June 10, 2005

Department of Defense Appeal, FY 2006 Defense Appropriation Bill

Joint Strike fighter (JSF)

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Report 109-69) (109th Congress, 1st Session - Senate)

Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

May 17, 2005

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 1815 (Report 109-89) (109th Congress, 1st Session - House of Representatives)

May 20, 2005

Department of Defense Appeal, FY 2006 Defense Appropriation Bill

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

September 27, 2005

Defense Acquisitions Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs (GAO-05-301)


March 1, 2005

Tactical Aircraft Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Report to March 1, 2005

C-9

Document By/From Date Fighter Program with Different Acquisition Strategy (GAO-05-271) Congressional

Committees Tactical Aircraft F/a-22 and JSF Acquisition Plans and implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization (GAO-05-519T)

Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

April 6, 2005

Inspector General, Department of Defense - Memorandum for Program Manager, Joint Strike Fighter

Report on Controls Over the Export of Joint Strike Fighter Technology (Project No. D2004-D000LG-0155.000)

October 18, 2005

OIPTs\2005\2005 OIPT Review November 17, 2005\OIPT Report


Diane M. Wright, Deputy Director, Air Warfare

November 30, 2005



November 1, 2005

Memorandum for Director, Defense Systems - F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report Coordination Comments from AR&A

Nancy L. Spruill, Director, AR&A

November 28, 2005

Coordination Sheet F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) OIPT Report OIPTs\2006 Info Memo for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report

David G. Ahern, Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition

December 5, 2006

F-35 JSF OIPT Brief Rear Admiral Steven Enewold, Program Executive Officer, Joint Strike Fighter Program

March 14, 2006

OIPTs\2007\2007 OIPT Program Review 3-21-2007 Documentation Status DM#116713 LRIP 2 Long Lead Funds Requested (LM/NGC/BAE/PW) DM#116713 ECS Input for Joint Strike Fighter for 16 November 2006 OIPT F-35 Joint Strike Fighter LRIP Decision Program Support Review Jim Thompson, Office

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Systems and Software Engineering

March 21, 2007

Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report


April 10, 2007

Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Diane M. Wright, April 3, 2007

C-10

Document By/From Date Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report (with IC Comments)

Deputy Director, Air Warfare



March 1, 2007

F-35 JSF OIPT March 21, 2007 Read Ahead for F-35 JSF OIPT (Draft) March 21, 2007 Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2007, and for Other Purposes Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5631 (Report 109-676) (109th Congress, 2d Session - House of Representatives)

September 25, 2006



March 1, 2007

John Warner, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 5122 (Report 109-702) (109th Congress, 2d Session 0 House of Representatives)

September 29, 2006

Coordination Sheet F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) OIPT Report Defense Acquisitions Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs (GAO-06-391)


March 1, 2006

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing Demonstrates Acceptable Performance (GAO-06-356)


March 1, 2006

Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engineer Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis (GAO-06-717R)

To John Warner, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, and Curt Weldon, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

May 22, 2006

OIPTs\2007\2007 OIPT Program Review 8-29-2007 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2008, Report of the Committee on Appropriations to Accompany H.R. 3222 (Report 110-279) (110th Congress, 1st Session - House of Representatives)

July 30, 2007

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Report of Committee on Armed Services to Accompany S. 1547 (Report 110-77) (110th Congress, 1st Session - Senate)

F-35 Mid-Course Risk Reduction (MCRR) OIPT Coordination matrix

ECS Input for Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) for 29 August 2007 OIPT F-35 Mid-Course Risk Reduction (MCRR) OIPT Coordination matrix (w SSE)

F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) OIPT Read Ahead Prepared by Andrew F. Pozda

August 28, 2007

C-11


Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report on the Mid Course Risk Review (MCRR)


September 1, 2007

Action Memo for Acting Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), DUSD (A&T) - F-35 Mid-Course Risk Reduction (MCRR) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report


September 20, 2007

F-35 OIPT Principals F-35 Mid-Course Risk Reduction (MCRR) OIPT Coordination matrix (w ARA/AM)

Information Memo for Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition, Deputy Director, Air Warfare - F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) Program Summary (Support of August 30 visit)

Colonel Jim Baker, Deputy, Tactical Aircraft

August 28, 2007

MCRR Progress to Plan F-35 Mid Course Risk Reduction (MCRR) OIPT Dave Ahern, Director,

Portfolio Systems Acquisition, PSA/AW

August 29, 2007

DUSD (A&T) Read-Ahead Colonel Jim Baker, Richard "Buckeye" Parker

OIPTs\2008\OIPT Meeting 1-28-2008 DPR '08 Criteria LRIP 2 Full Funding and LRIP 3 Long-Lead Funding

ECS Input for Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) for 28 Jan 2008 OIPT F-35 SECNAV Brief Maj Gen Charles

Davis, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program

February 8, 2008

F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) OIPT Read Ahead Andrew F. Pozda January 25, 2008 Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Overarching Product Team (OIPT) Report


March 21, 2008

F-35 JSF OIPT January 28, 2008 F-35 OIPT Jan 28, 2008 Seating Chart Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Investment Program Funding & Quantities

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1585 (Report 110-477) (110th Congress, 1st Session - House of Representatives)

December 6, 2007

Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2008, and for Other Purposes, Conference Report to H.R. 3222 (Report 110-434) (110th Congress, 1st Session - House of Representatives)

November 6, 2007

OIPTs\2008\OIPT Meeting 10-23-2008 Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report


October 24, 2008

C-12


ECS Input for Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) for October 23, 2008 OIPT

Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report


October 24, 2008

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Chart F-35 Lightning II OIPT Read Ahead Andrew F. Pozda October 22, 2008 F-35 JSF OIPT Draft October 23, 2008 F-35 OIPT Email Nancy Spruill Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report


March 21, 2008



November 7, 2008


Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Navy - F-35 Lightning II Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 2 Acquisition Decision Memorandum

April 8, 2008

Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, Director, Program, Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E) - F-35 Lightning II Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) - Joint Estimate Team (JET) Program Funding (U)

John J Young October 14, 2008

Authorization (Title I - Procurement, Title II - RDT&E) Appropriation Congressional Record - House (H9555) September 24,

2008 Defense Acquisitions Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs (GAO-08-467SP)


March 1, 2008

OIPTs\2009\OIPT Meeting 8-12-8009 Coordination Sheet F-35 OIPT Report ECS Input for Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) for August 11, 2009 OIPT



August 28, 2009

F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) OIPT Read Ahead Andrew F. Pozda August 11, 2009 F-35 JSF OIPT Brief Read Ahead Maj Gen (Sel) D.R.

"Duncan" Heinz, USMC, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program

F-35 JSF OIPT Brief Maj Gen (Sel) D.R. "Duncan" Heinz, USMC, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program

August 12, 2009

Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, David G. Ahern, September 15,

C-13

Document By/From Date Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report

Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition

2009



November 7, 2008

Duncan Hunter, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Committee Print of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany S. 2001, (HASC No. 10) (110th Congress, 2d Session - House of Representatives)

September 1, 2008

Congressional Record - House (H9434, H9555) September 24, 2008

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Mr. Skelton, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the following Report to accompany H.R. 2647 (Report 111-) (111th Congress, 1st Session - House of Representatives)

June 17, 2009

S. 1390 To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2010 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military, construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes (Report No. 111-35) (111th Congress, 1st Session - Senate)

Mr. Levin from Committee on Armed Services reported

June 25, 2009

Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, Report of the Committee of Appropriations to Accompany H.R. 3326 (Report 111-230) (111th Congress, 1st Session - House of Representatives)

July 24, 2009

Defense Acquisitions Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs (GAO-09-326SP)


March 1, 2009


OIPTs\2009\OIPT Meeting 10-29-2009 ECS Input for Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) for August 11, 2009 OIPT

F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) OIPT Read Ahead Andrew F. Pozda October 23, 2009 F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) OIPT Read Ahead Andrew F. Pozda August 11, 2009 F-35 JSF OIPT Brief Read Ahead Maj Gen (Sel) D.R.

"Duncan" Heinz, USMC, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program

F-35 JSF OIPT Brief Maj Gen (Sel) D.R. "Duncan" Heinz, USMC, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program

August 12, 2009



September 15, 2009

Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter

David G. Ahern, Director, Portfolio

November 7, 2008

C-14

Document By/From Date (JSF) Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report Systems Acquisition

Duncan Hunter, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Committee Print of the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany S. 3001 (HASC No. 10) (110th Congress, 2d Session - House of Representatives)

September 1, 2008


Committee on Armed Services Conference Report- Procurement, RDT&E

Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, Report of the Committee on Appropriations to Accompany H.R. 3326 (Report 111-230) (111th Congress, 1st Session - House of Representatives)

July 24, 2009

Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, Mr. Inouye, from the Committee on Appropriations submitted the following report to accompany H.R. 3326 (Report 111-74) (111th Congress, 1st Session - Senate)

September 10, 2009



March 1, 2009


OIPTs\2010\OIPT Meeting 2-7-2010 (SDD Restructure) ECS Input for Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) for August 11, 2009 OIPT

F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) OIPT Read Ahead Andrew F. Pozda February 17, 2010 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II SDD OIPT/Nunn-McCurdy Discussion Draft

SDD Program Restructure OIPT Read Ahead Maj Gen CD Moore, USAF, Acting Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program

February 17, 2010



September 16, 2009

Duncan Hunter, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Committee Print of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany S. 3001 (HASC No. 10) (110th Congress, 2d Session - House of Representatives)

September 1, 2008


Committee on Armed Services Conference Report - Procurement, RDT&E

Appropriations Committee - Aircraft Procurement, Navy for Fiscal Year 2010


March 1, 2009


C-15


OIPTs\2010\OIPT Meeting 3-10-2010 (LRIP Lot 4) Coordination Sheet F-35 OIPT Report March 10, 2010 F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) OIPT Read Ahead Andrew F. Pozda March 8, 2010 Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) - F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 4 Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) Report


March 19, 2010

F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)) OIPT Read Ahead Andrew F. Pozda Read Ahead for F-35 OIPT Brief LRIP 4 Production Decision Maj Gen C.D. Moore,

USAF, Acting Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program

March 10, 2010



September 16, 2009

Duncan Hunter, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Committee Print of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany S. 3001 (HASC No. 10) (110th Congress, 2d Session - House of Representatives)

September 1, 2008


Committee on Armed Services Conference Report - Procurement, RDT&E

Appropriations Committee - Aircraft Procurement, Navy for Fiscal Year 2010



March 1, 2009


May 14, 2010


Ashton Carter February 24, 2010

Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force - F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program Restructure Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) of February 24, 2010


Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force - F-35 Lightning II Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 4 Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)


Memorandum for Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force - F-35 Lightning II Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 5 Advance Procurement (AP) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM)


Other Documents Proposed DAES Topic - EV Central Repository (CR) Email Deborah Tomsic,

OSD-ATL October 19, 2007

C-16


Test Program Options Fred Janicki, OSD Costs Assessment

November 1, 2009

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) Report

October 20, 2009

F135 Engine Joint Assessment Team (JAT) Final Report November 20, 2009 JSF - 2007 Recap - 2008 Challenges Email Andrew Pozda, OSD-

ATL January 23, 2008

Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter: Opportunities and Options

RAND - John Birkler, John C. Graser, Mark V. Arena, Cynthia R. Cook, Gordon Lee, Mark Lorell, Giles Smith, Fred Timson, Obaid Younossi

February 1, 2001

JSF and PBD 161 Email Philip Rodger, OSD-ATL

December 14, 2001

Joint Strike Fighter Program Update Brigadier General John L. Hudson, USAF, Director, Joint Strike Fighter Program

November 1, 2001

JSF SDD Contract and Management Reserve (Slides) IDA MCRR Charts Deputy's Advisory Working Group Brief Brigadier General

C.R. Davis, USAF, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Lightning II Program

August 31, 2006

F-35 Lightning II Development Roadmap (CEO Grief 22 May 2008), Flight Test Extension (JESB Brief 22 Apr 2008), DT/OT Schedule Extension (DAB Brief 20 Mar 2008), IOT&E (OIPT Brief 28 Jan 2008)

January–May 2008

Focus Group on F-35 Mid Course Risk Reduction (MCRR) Colonel Jim Baker, Deputy, Tactical Aircraft, PSA/AW

August 14, 2007


Ashton B. Carter February 24, 2010

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Independent Manufacturing Review Team (IMRT) Report

October 20, 2009

Sakai Developers' Meeting Antranig Basman, CARET, University of Cambridge

September 27, 2005

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Distributed Product Description (DPD)

James W. Hollenbach, Simulation Strategies, Inc., Lt Col Robert J. Hartnett, Jr., USAF, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

The Affordable Solution - JSF Brigadier General Leslie Kenne, USAF, Director, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

Technology Solution for the Next Generation of Affordable Strike Frederic C. Schwartz,

C-17

Document By/From Date Fighters Technical Director,

Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

Joint Strike Fighter, Cost Modeling in the JSF Obaid Younossi, Advanced Cost Estimating IPT

Affordability and the New Air Combat Capability (Defender) Peter Goon Winter 2005 Is the Joint Strike Fighter Right for Australia? Part 2 - JSF V Risk Factors (Australian Aviation)

Carlo Kopp, PEng May 1, 2004

Is the Joint Strike Fighter Right for Australia? Part 1 - F-35 V F/A-22 (Australian Aviation)

Carlo Kopp, PEng April 1, 2004

America's Self-Destroying Airpower - Becoming Your Own Peer Threat

Center for Strategic & International Studies - Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Hans Ulrich Kaeser

December 16, 2008

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Charts JSF Cost Brief to IDA Mike Clark June 23, 2006 Cost Estimating Techniques for Tactical Aircraft Manufacturing Labor (IDA Paper P-4490)

IDA - James P. Woolsey, Project Leader, Bruce Harmon

Other Documents\JET F-35 Joint Estimate Team Estimate of FY10-15 Resource Requirements

F-35 Joint Estimate Team

September 9, 2008

F-35 Joint Estimate Team II Estimate of FY10-15 Resource Requirements

F-35 Joint Estimate Team II, Fred Janicki, OSD Cost Assessment

October 1, 2009

Programs Global Insight's Pricing and Purchasing Service F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress (7-5700) (RL30563)

Jeremiah Gertler, Specialist in Military Aviation

December 22, 2009

Programs\AT&L Documents 20 Apr Memorandum for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Via Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition - JSF Program Deviation Report

C.D. Moore, Maj Gen, USAF, Acting Program Executive Officer, Joint Strike fighter Program, David M. Van Buren, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ)

February 1, 2010


December 31, 2009

Memorandum for Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Navy, USD(C), AS(A), DUSD(L&MR),

Ashton B. Carter April 12, 2010

C-18

Document By/From Date SAF/AQ, ASN/RDA, N88, AF/A8, USMC DCA, ASD(LA), ASD(PA), D,CAPE, D,ARA, D,PSA, D,DP&AP, D,DCMA, D,DR&E, D,PARCA, DGC(A&L), D,J8, D,OT&E, D,SE, DUSD(IP), JSF PEO - Nunn-McCurdy Review for the F-35 Joint Strike Program Memorandum F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II IPT #5 Meeting #2, 8 April 2010

April 8, 2010

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II Principals Meeting #2, 15 April 2010

April 15, 2010

Programs\NAVAIR Joint Programs TOC Affordability NAVAIR April 1, 2010 F-35 SDD CPI based EAC Estimate At Complete based on Cost Performance Index Trend Analysis

JPO EVM Team September 6, 2006

Cost and Schedule Performance NAVAIR JSF Risk Assessment V18e NAVAIR December 1, 2009 JSF F-35 SDD Management Reserve NAVAIR June 2008–

October 2009 Joint Strike Fighter Risk Assessment RDML Don "BD"

Gaddis, Assistant Commander for Research and Engineering, Naval Air Systems Command

April 5, 2010

TOC Display - JSF (F-35) TOC Over Time Chart Programs\JPO Briefs Lockheed Martin Weight Breakdown F-35 SDD CPI based EAC Estimate at Complete based on Cost Performance Index Trend Analysis

JPO EVM Team September 6, 2006

LM Aero F-35 SDD Monthly EVM Assessment Joint Strike Fighter Program Office (JPO)

December 1, 2009

LM Aero F-35 SDD Monthly EVM Assessment Joint Strike Fighter Program Office (JPO)

January 1, 2010

Cost & Schedule Performance Chart JSF Cost Brief to IDA Mike Clark June 23, 2006 LM Aero F-35 SDD Monthly EVM Assessment Joint Strike Fighter

Program Office (JPO) September 1, 2009

2009 SAR Cost Estimate Mike Clark, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

March 24, 2010

2009 Cost Update Affordability Team, Joint Strike fighter Program office

March 4, 2010

SAR07 Cost Update Mike Clark, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

July 9, 2009

Programs\TEMP_ORD_ASR Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,

J. Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational

December 11, 2009

C-19

Document By/From Date Development and Acquisition), Joint Strike Fighter Program Executive Officer - Approval of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II Test and Evaluation Master Plan, Revision 3

Test and Evaluation, Chris DiPetto, Acting Director, Developmental Test and Evaluation

F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition Strategy Version 3.2

F-35 Lightning II Program Office

September 1, 2008

Joint Strike Fighter Operational Requirements Document (ORD) March 13, 2000 F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) Third Version

F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

January 1, 2009

CAPE(CAIG) Layout Maturation Status Terry Harrell, AV

Variant Development Execution Lead

January 11, 2005

STOVL Weight Attack Team (SWAT) OSD-CAIG, Art Sheridan

January 11, 2005

Memorandum for Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and Logistics) - Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) Milestone B Independent Cost Estimate for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program

David L. McNicol, Chairman, Cost Analysis Improvement Group

October 24, 2001

CAIG Review Weight Management and Control Jay Swartz February 28, 2005 Downloads from JPO\Award Fee JPO Contractor Evaluation Discussion Tim Trayers, Director,

Business Integration April 21, 2010

PEO (JSF) Assessment of the JSF Contractors 1 May 2009– 31 October 2009

Downloads from JPO\Award Fee\Assessment Criteria by Period

AIR-2.6/Ser 02-4353 Maria Melton, JSF Air System Contracting Officer, Joint Strike Fighter Program



September 30, 2002

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 –AWARD FEE PERIOD 2 UNEARNED TARGETS AND PERIOD 3 FOCUS UPDATE

Leonardo Manning, Contracting Officer, Joint Strike Fighter Program

December 18, 2002


March 31, 2003

C-20


JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 –AWARD FEE PERIOD 4 FOCUS CRITERIA UPDATE

Randall Cohen, Contracting Office, Joint Strike Fighter

May 1, 2003

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 –AWARD FEE PERIOD 5 FOCUS CRITERIA


September 30, 2003



October 31, 2003

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 –AWARD FEE PERIOD 6 FOCUS CRITERIA

Maria Melton, Contracting Officer, Joint Strike Fighter Program

March 31, 2004



July 23, 2004

CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 –AWARD FEE PERIOD 6 FOCUS CRITERIA UPDATE


July 29, 2004

ASC Period 7 Focus Criteria JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 –AWARD FEE PERIOD 7 FOCUS CRITERIA UPDATE


March 9, 2005

ASC Period 8 Focus Criteria JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 – AWARD FEE PERIOD 7 FOCUS CRITERIA LETTER UPDATE


April 29, 2005

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 – AWARD FEE PERIOD 9 FOCUS LETTER UPDATE

Lisa Bregman, Contracting Office, Joint Strike Fighter

October 31, 2005



May 30, 2006

Assessment Roadmap JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 – AWARD FEE PERIOD 11 FOCUS LETTER


September 29, 2006

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 – AWARD FEE PERIOD 11 FOCUS LETTER UPDATE #2


November 29, 2006

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 – AWARD FEE PERIOD 12 FOCUS LETTER


March 30, 2007



April 30, 2007



September 28, 2007


Maria Melton, Director of Contacts, Joint Strike Fighter Program

October 31, 2007

Award Fee Period 14 Block/Software Development & Execution PM: Glenn Willis March 25, 2008

C-21

Document By/From Date Evaluation Area (EA) Approach



March 28, 2008



April 30, 2008

Award Fee Period 15 Block/Software Development & Execution Evaluation Area (EA) Approach

PM: Tori Shu 1 Nov 2008 through 30 Apr 2009

Pd 15 Warfighting Capability JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) AIR SYSTEM CONTRACT N00019-02-C-3002 – AWARD FEE PERIOD 16 FOCUS LETTER UPDATE

Cheryl Carpenter, Contracting Office, Joint Strike Fighter Program

March 31, 2009


Cheryl Carpenter, Contracting Office, Joint Strike Fighter Program

April 30, 2009

Downloads from JPO\Award Fee\LM Debriefs FDO Determination of Award Fee, Period 1, LM May 29, 2002 Award Fee Period 2, ASC Debrief (Tier 2 & 3) Award Fee Period 3: Tier 2 & 3 Debrief to the ASC Award Fee Period 4: Tier 2/3 Debrief to Lockheed Martin on the Air System Contract

Period 5 Award Fee - Debrief to Lockheed Martin on the JSF Air System Contract


December 2, 2004











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Downloads from JPO\Cost Estimates Commonality Chart (MS B - SAR 09) SAR 06 Cost Update Mike Clark, Director,

Affordability, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

April 3, 2007

SAR07 Cost Update Affordability Team, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

March 5, 2008

2008 Cost Update Affordability Team, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

March 2, 2009

Welcome to the JSF OSD CAIG October 11, 2001 2009 SAR Cost Estimate Mike Clark, Joint

Strike Fighter Program Office

March 24, 2010

2009 Cost Update Affordability Team, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

March 4, 2010

SAR 09 Data - Procurement and RDT&E Downloads from JPO\Cost Estimates\CARD JSF Commonality Assessment David Steffee, Naval

Air Systems Command

May 1, 1999

Joint Strike Fighter, Cost Analysis Requirements Document (CARD), TR 7101-026A/09

• Chapters 1.0-14.0 • Appendixes A-D, K-O • On-Board Software Size and Parameters of LM Aero 235 • Lockheed Martin Risk Assessment Table

MCR Federal Inc July 31, 2001

Lockheed Martin Weight Matrices Lockheed Martin Support Equipment Listing (By Variant) Lockheed Martin OFP Software 235 Government Assessed Risk Items: General Electric June 29, 2000 Government Assessed Risk Items: Lockheed Martin June 29, 2000 Appendix H Government Risk Assessment Database Government Assessed Risk Items: Pratt & Whitney (Pertaining to Lockheed Martin)

June 29, 2000

JSF Procurement, Delivery and Bed-Down Schedules (Lockheed Martin) (By Variant)

235 O&S Estimate February 1, 2001

Lockheed Martin Manpower Estimate (By Variant) 235 O&S Estimate January 1, 2001 Lockheed Martin Weapons System Details for the CTOL, STOVL, and CV Variants

Training 235 O&S Estimate January 1, 2001 Downloads from JPO\Cost Estimates\JSF Lifecycle Cost Estimate 31 Oct 2001

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Program Office Estimate, (Configuration 235), Joint Strike Fighter, Life Cycle Cost Estimate (TR-7101/056A-01)

• Preface • Chapters I-IV, V (A-E), and VI-VIII

Joint Strike Fighter, Advanced Cost Estimating Integrated Product Team, Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

October 31, 2001

Downloads from JPO\CPARs\FET SDD Contractor Performance Assessment Record (CPAR) 8/19/2005 - 8/18/2006 April 19, 2007 Contractor Performance Assessment Record (CPAR) 8/19/2006 -

10/31/2007 April 9, 2008

Contractor Performance Assessment Record (CPAR) 11/1/2007 - 10/31/2008

April 8, 2009

Downloads from JPO\CPARs\LM SDD Contractor Performance Assessment Record (CPAR) 10/26/2001 -

10/25/2002 March 17, 2003


March 22, 2004


February 23, 2005


March 20, 2006


March 8, 2007


March 31, 2008


April 9, 2009


March 10, 2009

Downloads from JPO\CPARs\P&W SDD Contractor Performance Assessment Record (CPAR) 10/26/2001 -

10/25/2002 February 27, 2003

Contractor Performance Assessment Record (CPAR) 11/01-2002 - 10/31/2003

February 23, 2004


February 9, 2005


February 23, 2005


March 20, 2006


March 8, 2007


May 5, 2008

Contractor Performance Assessment Record (CPAR) 11/01/2007 - 10-31/2008

April 9, 2009

Contractor Performance Assessment Record (CPAR) 11/01/2007 - 10- May 5, 2009

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Document By/From Date 31/2008

Downloads from JPO\Design Reviews Introduction & CDR Process Richard Woodburn,

Glenn Wheeler February 13, 2006

CDR Summary Assessment Richard Woodburn, Glenn Wheeler

February 13–17, 2006

Introduction & CDR Process AS CDR 3 Brent Thoden, Jim Ruocco

June 10, 2007

AS CDR 3 Summary Assessment Jun 18–22, 2007 Air Vehicle Overview Air System PDR John Fuller, Col.

Chuck Howe March 24–27, 2003

Downloads from JPO\LM Contracts\LRIP Contracts N00019-06-C-0291 Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of Contract Amendment/

Modification No. P00003

July 27, 2007

Award/Contract N00019-08-C-0028 Award/Contract N00019-09-C-0010 Downloads from JPO\LM Contracts\SDD Contract Joint Strike Fighter Systems Development and Demonstration Program Conformal Contract, Contract N00019-02-C-3002 through O00294

Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of Contract Amendment/ Modification No. P00138

October 26, 2001

Downloads from JPO\Program Documents F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition Strategy Version 3.2

F-35 Lightning II Program Office

September 1, 2008

Joint Strike Fighter Operational Requirements Document March 13, 2000 JSF Program Schedule (History Charts)

D-1

ABBREVIATIONS

ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum

APB Acquisition Program Baseline

APUC Average Procurement Unit Cost

AT&L Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

AUW Airframe Unit Weight

BRAT Blue Ribbon Attack Team

CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group

CAPE Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

CCDR Contractor Cost Data Report

COPT Cost and Operational Performance Trades

CTOL Conventional Take-Off and Landing

CV Carrier Variant

DAMIR Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval

DOD Department of Defense

EOTS Electro-Optical Targeting System

FMS Foreign Military Sale

FPRA Forward Price Rate Agreement

GE General Electric HMDS Helmet Mounted Display System

IDA Institute for Defense Analyses

IMRT Independent Manufacturing Review Team

JAST Joint Advance Strike Technology

JAT Joint Assessment Team

JPO Joint Program Office

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

KPP Key Performance Parameters

LRIP Low Rate Initial Production

MFDS Multi-Function Display System

D-2

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

N-M Nunn-McCurdy

OSD Office of Secretary of Defense

PARCA Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analyses

PAUC Program Average Unit Cost

PW Pratt & Whitney

QA Quality Assurance

RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

SAR Selected Acquisition Report

SDD System Design and Development

SDLF Shaft Driven Lift Fan

STOVL Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing

SWAT STOVL Weight Attack Team

URF Unit Recurring Fly away

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)

VLO Very Low Observable

WSARA Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98)

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WSARA 2009: Joint Strike Fighter Root Cause Analysis · WSARA 2009: Joint Strike Fighter Root Cause...

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