Writ Petition--Young v. Schmidt

8/14/2019 Writ Petition--Young v. Schmidt

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No.IN THE SUPREME COURT

0 F THE TATE OF CALIFORNIACHARLES YOUNG, an individual

Petitioner

GREGORY SCHMIDT, in his capacity as Secretary of the CaliforniaState Senate; and E. DOTSON WILSON, in his capacity as ChiefClerk of the California State Assembly,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF, INCLUDINGWRIT OF MANDATE; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS ANDAUTHORITIES

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLPWILLIAM A. NORRIS (SBN 25989)REX S. HEINKE (SBN 66163)L. RACHEL HEL Y AR (SBN 193080)

ORL Y DEGANI (SBN 177741)CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD (SBN 250729)JULIAN W. PARK (SBN 263501)2029 CENTURY PARK EAST, SUITE 2400Los ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067-3012TELEPHONE: 310-229- 1000FACSIMILE: 310-229- 1001

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERCHARLES YOUNG


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CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PARTIES(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.208)

Petitioner knows of no entity or person that must be listed undersubsections (1) or (2) of Rule 8.208. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.208(d)(3).


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pa2;e

PRELIMINARY AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .......................THE PARTIES...... ....................FACTS.. ........ .................CLAIMS ASSERTED """"""""""""""""""""""""""".............................RELIEF SOUGHT .........................................................................................VERIFICATION............................................................................................MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES INSUPPORT OF PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEFINCLUDING WRIT OF MANDATE ...........................................................INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................

The Supermajority Requirements Of Article IVSection 12( d), And Article XIII A , Section 3 , AreUnconstitutional Revisions to the State Constitution. ...........

Majority Rule Is Foundational To The StructureAnd Power Of The Legislative Branch Of OurGovernment. ...............................................................The Governor s Veto Authority Is AFoundational Executive Power And AnEssential Part of The System of Checks AndBalances Established By The StateConstitution.................................................................Article IV, Section 12(d), And Article XIII ASection 3 , Fundamentally Alter CaliforniaBasic Governmental Structure By EliminatingThe Legislature s Foundational Power OfMajority Rule And The Executive


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Foundational Veto Authority In The CriticalAreas Of Taxation and Budget-Making. ................... .18II. Raven Is Substantively Indistinguishable From ThisCase: Both Involve Provisions That AbridgeConstitutionally- Vested Powers Of A Branch Of StateGovernment And, Therefore, Are Revisions Of, NotAmendments To, The Constitution........................................III. Although It Deals With Article XIII A And Restriction

Of Taxing Authority, Amador Is Not RelevantPrecedent In This Case. ....................................................... ..CONCLUSION ............................................................................................CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...........................................................


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Pa2;eCASESAmador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. Bd. Of Equalization

(1978) 22 Cal.3d 208 ....................................................................... passimBrosnahan v. Brown

(1982) 32 Cal.3d 236................................................................................Calfarm Ins. Coo v. Deukmejian(1989) 48 Cal.3d 805 ..............................................................................Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. California(2001) 25 Cal.4th 287 ............................................................................. 17Clinton v. City of New York

(1998) 524 U.S. 417.......................................................................... 16 , 17County of Sonoma v. Commission on State Mandates(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1264...................................................................County of Sonoma v. Superior Court(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 322................................................................... 10Delaney v. Lowery

(1944) 25 Cal.2d 561. ............................................................................. 20Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Com.

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 707 ............................................................................... 25Green Vo Obledo(1981) 29 Cal.3d 126 ................................................................................ 2Harbor v. Deukmejian

(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078 ............................................................................Hustedt v. Workers Compo Appeals Bd.

(1981) 30 Cal.3d 329........................................................................ 17INS v. Chadha

(1983) 462 U. S. 919......................................................................... passim

111


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Kasler v. Lockyer(2000) 23 Cal.4th 472............................................................................. 17Legislature v.

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 492...................................................................... passimMarbury v. Madison(1803) 1 Cranch 137 .............................................................................. 12McFadden v. Jordan

(1948) 32 Cal.2d 330.............................................................................. 21Mistretta v. United States

(1989) 488 U.S. 361.......................................................................... 17Nogues v. Douglass(1857) 7 Cal. 65 ......................................................................................Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America

(1983) 463 U. S. 1216.............................................................................. 16Raven Vo Deukmejian

(1990) 52 Cal.3d 336....................................................................... passimStrauss v. Horton(2009) 46 Cal.4th 364..................................................................... passimUnited States v. Ballin

(1892) 144 U.S. 1....................................................................................Watchtower Bible Tract So co v. County of Los Angeles

(1947) 30 Cal.2d 426.............................................................................. 20White v. Davis(2003) 30 Cal.4th 528.............................................................................Wood v. Riley(1923) 192 Cal. 293 ................................................................................ 17STATUTES

Cal. Civ. Code ~ 12.....................................................................................Cal. Code Civ. Proc. ~ 15............................................................................ 13

~ 1085...................................................................... 1 , 2


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OTHER AUTHORITIESS. Const. , art. I , ~ 3..................................................................................

~ 5.. ............ ..................................... ................... ............. 13~ 7............... ................ ............... ....... ................. ............. 13

art. II, ~ 2................................................................................. 13art. V........................................................................................ 13

Cal. Const. , art. IV , ~ 10.............................................................................~ 12( d) . .... passim

art. VI , ~ 10...................................................................... passimart. XIII A , ~ I......................................................................... 26

~ 3.................................................................. passimCal. Const. of 1849 , art. IV , ~ 17................................................................Constitution, Jefferson s Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives(1797), H.R. Doc. No. 107-284 (2003).......................................................Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) ............................................................ IIFederalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) ........................................ II , 12, 18Federalist No. 30 (Alexander Hamilton) .................................................... 19Federalist No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton) ....................................................Federalist No. 58 (James Madison) ................................................ 11 , 18, 19

Mason s Manual of Legislative Procedure (2000 ed. ).......................... 12 , 18Voter Pamp. , Proposed Stats. and Amends. to Cal. Const. witharguments to voters , Primary Elec. (June 6 , 1978) ...............................


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PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF, INCLUDINGWRIT OF MANDATE

PRELIMINARY AND JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTBy this original verified Petition for Extraordinary ReliefPetitioner Charles Young (Petitioner) seeks a writ of mandate orother appropriate relief pursuant to California Constitution article

, section 10, and California Code of Civil Procedure section1085 , enjoining Secretary of the California State Senate GregorySchmidt and Chief Clerk of the California State Assembly E.Dotson Wilson (collectively, Respondents) from enforcing thatpart of the 1933 amendment to the California Constitutionrequiring a two-thirds vote of the Legislature to approve the Statebudget - codified as article IV, section 12(d), of the Constitution- and that part of the 1978 amendment to the CaliforniaConstitution requiring a two-thirds vote of the Legislature toincrease taxes - codified as article XIII A, section 3 , of theConstitution.This Petition is brought on the ground that article IV, section12(d), and article XIII A , section 3 , are unconstitutional becausethey were passed as amendments to the Constitution, but are infact revisions that "make a far reaching change in thefundamental governmental structure or the foundational power ofits branches as set forth in the Constitution. (Strauss v. Horton(2009) 46 Cal.4th 364 , 444; see also id. at pp. 427, 430-445452.Petitioner respectfully invokes the original jurisdiction of thisCourt pursuant to California Constitution article VI , section 10;


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California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1085; and Rule 8.490of the California Rules of Court. Petitioner invokes thatjurisdiction because the issues presented here are '" of greatpublic importance and should be resolved promptly. ",(Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492 500 , quoting Raven v.Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336 , 340 (exercising originaljurisdiction over whether an amendment to the Constitution wasin fact, an unconstitutional revision); see also Brosnahan v.Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236 241 (same).)This Petition presents no questions of fact for the Court toresolve to issue the relief sought.

THE PARTIES

Petitioner Charles Young is a citizen, taxpayer, and voter of theState of California, interested in seeing that the Californiagovernment carries out its public duty consistent withConstitutional mandates. (Green v Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126144- 145 (" (W)here the question is one of public right and theobject of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a publicduty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or specialinterest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as acitizen in having the laws executed and the duty in questionenforced"), internal quotation and citation omitted.Respondent Gregory Schmidt ("Schmidt") is the Secretary of theCalifornia State Senate. Schmidt is sued in his official capacity.It is Schmidt's legal duty, among other things , to certify that abill has been duly passed by the California Senate, to engross andenroll bills that have been duly passed by the California Senate


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and to present bills that have been passed by the CaliforniaSenate and California Assembly in identical form to theGovernor for the Governor s approval or veto.Respondent E. Dotson Wilson ("Wilson ) is the Chief Clerk ofthe California State Assembly. Wilson is sued in his officialcapacity. It is Wilson s legal duty, among other things , to certifythat a bill has been duly passed by the California Assembly, toengross and enroll bills that have been duly passed by theCalifornia Assembly, and to present bills that have been passedby the California Senate and California Assembly in identicalform to the Governor for the Governor s approval or veto.

FACTSFrom 1849 to 1933 , the California Constitution treatedappropriations like any other piece of legislation. All legislationhad to be enacted by a simple majority of both Houses of theLegislature, including the State budget or tax increases.In 1933 , the Legislature placed Proposition 1 on the ballot as aproposed constitutional amendment. The amendment required atwo-thirds vote by both Houses of the Legislature to approve aState budget that grew by more than 5 percent, exclusive of

10.

school appropriations. This two-thirds rule is currently article, section 12(d), of the California Constitution.

In 1978 , Proposition 13 was placed on the ballot by an initiativepetition as another proposed amendment to the Constitution.

1 Proposition 16, which passed as a further constitutional amendment in1962 , removed the 5 percent limitation of article IV, section 12(d), butotherwise did not alter the two-thirds requirement for approving theState budget.


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11.

Proposition 13 required, inter alia, a two-thirds majority of bothHouses of the Legislature to raise taxes. This two-thirds rule iscurrently article XIII A, section 3 , of the California Constitution.

CLAIMS ASSERTEDArticle IV, section 12(d), and article XIII A, section 3 , constituterevisions of, rather than amendments to , the CaliforniaConstitution because they "involver) a change in the basic planof California government, i.e. , a change in its fundamentalstructure or the foundational powers of its branches. (Strausssupra 46 Cal.4th at pp. 438 , 441 , quoting , supra 54 Cal.3d atpp. 508- 509; see also Strauss, supra 46 Cal.4th at pp. 427 , 430-445 , 452. Specifically, these supermajority provisions deprivethe Legislature of its foundational constitutional power to adopt abudget and increase taxes by a simple majority of each Housesubject only to the Governor s exercise of his/her veto power.They also erode the Governor s foundational constitutionalpower to either approve or veto bills containing budget and taxincrease measures. In -effect, these provisions vest in a minorityof either House the power to defeat budget and tax bills dulyapproved by a majority of both Houses and minimize theGovernor s role in the process by largely undercutting his/herpower to veto or not veto such bills, thus changing the basicbalance of power structure of California government set forth in

12.the California Constitution.Because article IV, section 12(d), and article XIII A, section 3were passed as amendments to the California Constitution butare, in fact, revisions , they are unconstitutional. (See Raven


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13.

14.

Cal.3d at pp. 349-355 (striking down revision of Constitutionimproperly enacted as amendment).Petitioner, a citizen, taxpayer, and voter of California, as well asthe Legislature, the Governor, and others , will suffer irreparableinjury and damage unless this Court intervenes and directsRespondents to desist from enforcing article IV, section 12(d),and article XIII A , section 3 , and to desist from directing othersto enforce these supermajority rules.Petitioner believes that there is no requirement in thiscircumstance to plead demand and refusal. Without prejudice tothat position, Petitioner alleges that any demand to Respondentsto act or refrain from taking action as described in Paragraph I inthe Relief Sought below would have been futile if made, and thatonly a court order will cause Respondents to refrain from takingthose actions.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Petitioner requests the following relief:That this Court immediately issue a writ of mandate or otherappropriate relief directing Respondents:a. To desist from any act enforcing article IV, section 12(d),

and article XIII A, section 3 , or directing any other personor entity to enforce or give effect to these provisions;Or in the alternative, to show cause before this Court at aspecified time and place why Respondents have not doneso;

That this Court issue an order that article IV , section 12(d), andarticle XIII A, section 3 , are null and void in their entirety


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because they are revisions of the Constitution that were placed onthe ballot and passed as amendments;That, upon Respondents ' return to the alternative writ , a hearingbe held before this Court at the earliest practicable time so thatthe issues involved in this Petition may be adjudicated promptly,pursuant to an expedited briefing and hearing schedule;That Petitioners be awarded their attorneys ' fees and costs ofsuit; andF or such other and further relief as is just and equitable.

Dated: July 9 2009 AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER &FELD LLPWilliam A. NorrisRex S. HeinkeL. Rachel HelyarOrly DeganiChristopher BlanchardJulian W. Park

By ?fY.A.~ O. J?~William A. NorrisATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERCHARLES YOUNG


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VERIFICATION

, William A. Norris , declare:I am counsel for the Petitioner in the above-entitled action. I have

read the foregoing Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Including Writ ofMandate, and know its contents. The matters stated in this Petition are trueof my own personal knowledge, except where such matters are stated oninformation or belief, and as to those matters , I believe them to be true.verify this Petition in place of Petitioner because Petitioner is currentlyabsent from Los Angeles County, where my office is located.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true andcorrect under the laws of the State of California, and that this verificationwas executed in Los Angeles on July 9 2009.?r~QI/7~

William A. Norris


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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORTOF PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF, INCLUDINGWRIT OF MANDATE

INTRODUCTIONMirroring the United States Constitution, the California Constitution

vests the State s sovereign power to govern in three branches: thelegislative power in the State Legislature, the executive power in theGovernor, and the judicial power in the State courts. The CaliforniaConstitution also distinguishes between a revision and an amendment of itsprovisions, setting forth different procedures for accomplishing each.Several times, this Court has decided whether a particular measure passedas an amendment to the Constitution is , in fact, an unconstitutional revision.This Petition presents the same question.

Recently, in Strauss v. Horton (2009) 46 Cal.4th 364, this Courtcarefully reviewed the revision/amendment dichotomy and all the Court'prior decisions analyzing the distinction between these two methods ofaltering the California Constitution. (Id. at pp. 412-440.) After analyzingthe prior cases , the Court explained that a change to the Constitution is arevision, not merely an amendment, if it amounts to "' a change in the basicplan of the California government '" that is

a change in (the)fundamental (governmental) structure or the foundational powers of itsbranches.

(Id. at p. 438 , quoting Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492508-509 , emphasis omitted; see also Strauss, supra 46 Cal.4th at pp. 427430-445 452.

Article IV, section 12(d) and article XIII A , section 3 , of theCalifornia Constitution require two-thirds of each House of the Legislature- a supermajority, as opposed to the usual simple majority - to pass everyState budget or tax increase. They were expressly adopted as amendmentsto the Constitution, not as revisions. Therefore, the question here is


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whether the supermajority requirements of these provisions constitute "'change in (the) fundamental (governmental) structure or the foundationalpowers of its branches. (Strauss, supra 46 Cal.4th at p. 438 , quotingLegislature v. Eu, supra 54 Cal.3d at pp. 508- 509, emphasis omitted.They do. As such, they are unconstitutional revisions.

Article IV, section 12(d) and article XIII A , section 3 , alter thefundamental structure and the foundational power of both the legislativeand executive branches of California s government. As to the legislativebranch, they transfer the power of the majority of the Legislature to aminority of one-third plus one of either House, giving such a minority theability to block any budget and any tax increase bill despite the fact that thebill has the support of a majority of both Houses. As to the executivebranch, these supermajority provisions render the Governor s veto powervirtually meaningless when it comes to bills to adopt budgets or increasetaxes. With these provisions in place, a minority of either House of theLegislature can block any such bill that has been approved by a majority,but not a supermajority, of both Houses from ever reaching the Governordesk unless the bill has received the required two-thirds vote of bothHouses , which, of course, is the number of votes necessary to override aveto. Thus , the supermajority provisions substantially diminish the powerof the executive branch to participate in the decision-making processconcerning the State budget and tax increases.

It is difficult to imagine more fundamental changes to thefoundational power and structure of the legislative and executive branches.The supermajority requirements of article IV, section 12(d) and article XIII, section 3 , obliterate constitutionally-vested powers of coordinatebranches of government and, thus , shift the balance of power between thosebranches, altering the Constitution s carefully-conceived system of checksand balances. Indeed, these provisions are not meaningfully different, and


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are at least as "devastating" to the preexisting governmental scheme , as thepurported amendment which this Court determined was a revision to theConstitution in Raven, supra 52 Cal.3d at p. 352. That purportedamendment required California courts to defer to the United StatesSupreme Court' s interpretations of the federal Constitution in construingcertain rights of criminal defendants set forth in the California Constitution.(Id. at pp. 342-346, 350.) Just as the purported amendment in Ravenaltered the fundamental structure of government by "vest(ing) a criticalportion of state judicial power" in the federal courts (ido at p. 355), article

, section 12(d) and article XIII A, section 3 , alter the fundamentalstructure of government by vesting a critical portion of the State legislativepower in a minority of either House of the Legislature, and by eroding theexecutive s veto power over budget and tax increase legislation. As sucharticle IV, section 12(d), and article XIII A , section 3 , are unconstitutionalrevisions masquerading as amendments.

THE SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE IVSECTION 12(d), AND ARTICLE XIII A, SECTION 3 , AREUNCONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONS TO THE STATECONSTITUTION.Majority Rule Is Foundational To The Structure AndPower Of The Legislative Branch Of Our Government.Majority rule is foundational to the structure and power of the

legislative branch under both the federal and California Constitutions.The Constitution s prescription" for legislation in both documents ispassage by a majority of both Houses. (INS v. Chadha (1983) 462 U.919 958; see also County of Sonoma v. Superior Court (2009) 173

Cal.App.4th 322 , 348.Majority rule is such a fundamental principle of our republican form

of democracy that its roots are in the Federalist Papers and other


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foundational documents. (See, e. , The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison)If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the

republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister viewsby regular vote ); The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Thefundamental maxim of republican government. .. requires that the sense ofthe majority should prevail"); Constitution, Jefferson s Manual and Rulesof the House of Representatives (1797), H.R. Doc. No. 107-284 (2003) at p.266 ("the voice of the majority decides, for the lex majoris partis is the lawof all councils, elections , &c. , where not otherwise expressly provided.see also United States v. Ballin (1892) 144 U. S. 1 6 ("The general rule ofall parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of amajority of the quorum is the act of the body. This has been the rule for alltime , except so far as in a given case the terms of the organic act underwhich the body is assembled have prescribed specific limitations.

As the authors of the Federalist Papers recognized in defending theconcept of majority rule in the federal Constitution, supermajority insteadof simple majority requirements "reverse()" the " fundamental principle offree government" by transferring power to a minority. (The Federalist No.58 (James Madison).) Responding to the argument that something morethan a majority should be required for a legislature to exercise its powerJ ames Madison wrote that:

In all cases where justice or the general good might require new lawsto be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamentalprinciple of free government would be reversed. It would be nolonger the majority that would rule: the power would be transferredto the minority. Were the defensive privilege limited to particularcases , an interested minority might take advantage of it to screenthemselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, inparticular emergencies , to extort unreasonable indulgences.


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(Ibid. emphasis added.In a similar vein, Alexander Hamilton warned that supermajority

requirements paralyze the government' s ability to legislate effectively:To give a minority a negative upon the majority, which is always thecase where more than a majority is requisite to the decision, is ... tosubject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser. ... Itsreal operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy theenergy of the government , and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, orartifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto , to the regulardeliberations and decisions of a respectable majority.

(The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).The admonitions of Madison and Hamilton are echoed in Mason

Manual of Legislative Procedure, which has been adopted by the CaliforniaLegislature as the definitive authority on legislative procedure. (Office ofthe Chief Clerk, California State Assembly, Legislative Procedure 4 (200 I),available athttp://www.assembly.ca.gov/ clerkiBILLSLEGISLA TURE/LegProcedPartlpdf (last visited June 23 2009).) That treatise recognizes that even theLegislature has no power to impose a supermajority requirement to passlegislation, because "(t)o require a two-thirds vote... to take any actionwould be to give to any number more than one-third of the members thepower to defeat the action and amount to a delegation of the powers of thebody to a minority." (Mason s Manual of Legislative Procedure (2000 ed.

353.Although not explicitly set forth in the Constitution, the power tolegislate by a simple majority is as embedded in the power vested in the

legislative branch of government as the power to interpret the Constitutionis embedded in the power vested in the judicial branch. As far back asMarbury v. Madison (1803) I Cranch 137 , the United States Supreme


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Court held that, based on precedent and history, interpreting and applyingthe Constitution is "the very essence of judicial power " even though thatpower is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. (Id. at p. 176; see alsoCiv. Code, ~ 12 ("Words giving a joint authority to three or more publicofficers or other persons are construed as giving such authority to amajority of them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving theauthority); Code Civ. Proc. , ~ 15 (same).) Likewise , in Raven this Courtheld that the judicial power to interpret the State Constitution, is sofundamental to the role of the judiciary that it can be altered only byrevision, and not by mere amendment. (Raven, supra 52 Cal.3d at p. 355;see also Nogues v. Douglass (1857) 7 Cal. 65 , 70 ("The judiciary, from thevery nature of its powers and the means given it by the Constitution, mustpossess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort. . . .

Whenever the Framers of the United States Constitution wanted, incarefully-considered, limited circumstances , to require a supermajority votefor particular legislative actions , they did so explicitly, as an exception tothe general rule of majority rule. Thus, a two-thirds vote of both Houses ofCongress is necessary to propose a constitutional amendment and then athree- fourths vote of the state legislatures is required for its final adoption(art. V); a two-thirds vote of Congress is necessary to override apresidential veto (art. I , ~ 7 , cl. 2); a two-thirds vote of the Senate isnecessary to approve a treaty (art. II , ~ 2 , cl. 2); a two-thirds vote of theSenate is required to convict after impeachment (art. I , ~ 3 , cl. 6); and atwo-thirds vote by the House is required to expel a member (art. I , ~ 5 , cl.2). Likewise, supermajority requirements were a narrow exception tomajority rule in the original California Constitution. Indeed, it allowed foronly one instance when a supermajority vote was required: to override theGovernor s veto of a bill passed by a majority of both Houses. (Cal. Const.of 1849, art. IV, ~ 17.


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In sum, the legislative power to legislate by majority vote , like thejudicial power to interpret the Constitution, has deep roots in precedent andhistory. The record is clear: the Framers of both the federal and CaliforniaConstitutions so clearly understood that the Legislature would act bymajority rule that they saw no need to make this explicit in the Constitutionwhile any supermajority requirement was an exception that had to be madeexplicitly, as was done in article IV, section 17 of the CaliforniaConstitution , requiring a two-thirds majority to overcome a gubernatorialveto. Thus , just as the judicial power to interpret and apply the StateConstitution can be changed only by Constitutional revision, and not byamendment, alteration of the legislative power to pass laws by majorityvote requires revision of the Constitution, and cannot be accomplished bymere amendment.

The Governor s Veto Authority Is A FoundationalExecutive Power And An Essential Part of The System ofChecks And Balances Established By The StateConstitution.Similar to the judicial power to interpret and apply the Constitution

and the legislative power to pass laws by majority rule, the Governor s vetoauthority is a foundational executive power and a critical component of thesystem of checks and balances established by the California Constitution.

Like the federal Constitution, the California Constitution includes aPresentment Clause that "prescribe(s) and definers) the respective functionsof the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process. (Chadhasupra 462 U.S. at pp. 945-946 (setting forth the federal ConstitutionBicameral and Presentment Clauses , art. I , ~ 7 , cls. 2-3). CaliforniaPresentment Clause provides that:

Each bill passed by the Legislature shall be presented to theGovernor. It becomes a statute ifit is signed by the Governor. TheGovernor may veto it by returning it with any objections to the


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house of origin, which shall enter the objections in the journal andproceed to reconsider it. If each house then passes the bill by rollcallvote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring,it becomes a statute.

(Cal. Const. , art. IV , ~ 10.As the United States Supreme Court explained in Chadha the

Framers were acutely conscious" that the Presentment Clause, along withthe bicameral requirement

would serve essential constitutional functions(462 U.S. at p. 951) by allowing the passage oflegislation only after it hasproceeded through "a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process (id.at p. 959) that was " finely wrought and exhaustively considered" (ido at p.951). That process includes "passage by a majority of both Houses andpresentment to the (executive)," who may approve the bill , or veto andreturn it with his objections, thereby requiring a two-thirds majority of bothHouses to overcome the veto. (Id. at p. 958 , footnote omitted.

The Presentment Clauses of both the federal and CaliforniaConstitutions thus establish a system of checks and balances whereby theLegislature and the Executive deliberate with each other and moderate eachother s powers. "The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, thePresident' s veto and Congress ' power to override a veto were intended toerect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people from theimprovident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps.(Chadha, supra 492 U.S. at p. 957.

To preserve those checks , andmaintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the powerof each Branch must not be eroded. (Id. at p. 958.) Indeed, therequirements of presentment and the executive veto were considered "imperative" that the "draftsmen took special pains to assure that theserequirements could not be circumvented. (Id. at p. 947.


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The executive veto is a critical and essential part of the carefulsystem of checks and balances established by the federal and CaliforniaConstitutions. (Harbor vo Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078 , 1085- 1086

In the United States , the veto has evolved as an integral part of the systemof checks and balances. Woodrow Wilson viewed the power as the mostformidable prerogative of the presidency. One historian has commentedthat, while the strength of Congress consists of its authority to enactlegislation, the President's strength consists of his right to veto it"footnote and citations omitted.) By granting the Executive a veto powerthe Framers ensured that the Executive would play an indispensable role inthe process of making laws , serving as a check on and balance to thelegislative power to pass laws by majority vote. (Chadha, supra 462 U.at p. 947 ("It is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared byboth Houses and the President " whose role assures that a "' national'perspective is grafted on the legislative process.

Given the integral role of the executive veto in this system of checksand balances , the Chadha court held that a provision whereby one House ofCongress could override an executive order was unconstitutional because itdeprived the executive branch of its full and proper authority under thePresentment Clause. (Chadha, supra 462 U. S. at pp. 951-959l Morerecently, in Clinton v. City of New York (1998) 524 U.S. 417 , the UnitedStates Supreme Court ruled that the congressional delegation of a line- itemveto power to the President was unconstitutional because it altered thefundamental framework of the Presentment Clause, which authorizes thePresident to object to whole bills , not parts of bills. (Id. at pp. 439-440

2 After Chadha the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a D.Circuit decision striking down a two House legislative override ofexecutive action. (Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer EnergyCouncil of America (1983) 463 U. S. 1216.


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445-446; see id. at pp. 447-448 (declining to pass on the wisdom of thepolicy behind the line item veto; the only issue was whether the law was inaccord with the "' finely wrought' procedure commanded by theConstitution ), quoting Chadha, supra 462 U. S. at p. 951.) 3

Similarly, this Court has held that the Legislature may not makeappropriations "in such way as to circumvent the veto power of theGovernor. (Wood v. Riley (1923) 192 Cal. 293 , 306; see also MistrettaUnited States (1989) 488 U.S. 361 , 383 (provision oflaw that "prevents theExecutive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assignedfunctions" is an unconstitutional subversion of the separation of powers),citation and quotations omitted; Hustedt v. Workers Compo Appeals Bd.(1981) 30 Cal.3d 329 338 (Legislature violates separation of powersdoctrine when it "defeat( s) or materially impair( s) the exercise of (anotherbranch' s) functions

Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. V. California(2001) 25 Cal.4th 287 297 (California courts ""' have not hesitated to strikedown provisions of law that either accrete to a single Branch powers moreappropriately diffused among separate Branches or that undermine theauthority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch.quoting Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472 493.

3 Unlike the President under the federal Constitution, the Governorof California has authority under the State Constitution to exercise a line-item veto power over appropriations. The Governor was given thisauthority through a change to the Constitution in 1879. Conferring line-item veto authority on the Governor did not merely amend the Constitutionit was a revision that restructured the balance of power between thelegislative and executive branches. This change to the State Constitutionwas accomplished properly, however. It was added through a constitutionalconvention. (Cal. Const. of 1879 , art. IV, ~ 16.) By contrast, the UnitedStates Congress sought to give the President line-item veto authoritythrough simple legislation, a procedure that was held unconstitutional inClinton V. New York.


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Thus , both the United States Supreme Court and this Court haverecognized that the Executive s power to veto or not veto legislation is afoundational power critical to the basic structure of our government and tothe system of checks and balances on which that government is based.

Article IV, Section 12(d), And Article XIII A, Section 3Fundamentally Alter California s Basic GovernmentalStructure By Eliminating The Legislature s FoundationalPower Of Majority Rule and Eroding The ExecutiveFoundational Veto Authority In The Critical Areas OfTaxation and Budget-Making.

As discussed above, our lawmaking process rests on a fundamentalprinciple of majority rule and a careful balancing of power between theLegislature and the Executive. The supermajority provisions of article IVsection 12(d), and article XIII A , section 3 , turn that "finely wrought"system (Chadha, supra 462 U.S. at p. 951) on its head by stripping thesimple majority of the power to pass critical budgetary and tax legislationand by diluting the Governor s veto authority over such legislation.

The supermaj ority provisions of article IV, section 12( d), and articleXIII A, section 3 , alter the basic framework of California government bytaking legislative power from the simple majority of the Legislature andtransferring it to a minority of anyone-third plus one member of either theCalifornia Assembly or California Senate. (The Federalist No. 58 (JamesMadison) (With a supermajority requirement the fundamental principle offree government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority thatwould rule: the power would be transferred to the minority ), emphasisadded; The Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) ("To give a minority anegative upon the majority, which is always the case where more than amajority is requisite to the decision , is ... to subject the sense of the greaternumber to that of the lesser ); Mason s Manual of Legislative Proceduresupra at p. 353 ("To require a two-thirds vote... to take any action would


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be to give to any number more than one-third of the members the power todefeat the action and amount to a delegation of the powers of the body to aminority. ) Because under article IV, section 12(d), and article XIII Asection 3 , a two-thirds majority is required to pass any budget or taxincrease, minority factions that can cling to just over 33% of the votes ineither House are empowered to block such essential legislation, thusparalyzing the legislative process , or to extort "indulgences" in exchangefor votes. (The Federalist Noo 58 (James Madison).

This transfer of power from the majority to the minoritysubstantially alters the fundamental power of the Legislature with respect totwo of the most critical functions of any legislative body - budget and.taxation. It has long been recognized that the power to tax and to allocatemonies is at the heart of a legislature s constitutional authority. (See , e.The Federalist No. 30 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Money is, with propriety,considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustainsits life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions.complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of itas far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as anindispensable ingredient in every constitution. ); The Federalist No. 33(Alexander Hamilton) ("the power to make laws to collect revenues is alegislative power ) In defending the Congress ' power to raise taxes underthe proposed United States Constitution, Alexander Hamilton sagelypredicted that in times of crisis substantial restrictions on a legislature

4 Ironically, though the supermajority provisions of article IVsection 12(d), and article XIII A, section 3 , were clearly intended to limittaxes , they may serve as a disincentive to tax reduction. Knowing that atwo-thirds vote will be required to increase taxes in the future, legislatorsmay be hesitant to lower taxes for fear they may be unable to raise neededrevenue at a later date.


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ability to raise revenues would eventually doom the government to failure.(The Federalist No. 30 (Alexander Hamilton).

The importance of the Legislature s budget and taxation powers arelikewise recognized under California law, and, for that reason, have longbeen carefully guarded by this Court. More than half-a-century ago, thisCourt observed: "(T)he power of taxation for revenue purposes is probablythe most vital and essential attribute of the government. Without suchpower it cannot function. " (Watchtower Bible Tract Soc. v. County ofLos Angeles (1947) 30 Cal.2d 426 429, emphasis added.

Generally theLegislature is supreme in the field of taxation, and the provisions ontaxation in the state Constitution are a limitation on the power of theLegislature rather than a grant to it." (Delaney v. Lowery (1944) 25 Ca1.2d561 , 568.) Reinforcing this theme, this Court has described theLegislature s power to enact a budget as " fundamental." (White Vo Davis(2003) 30 Cal.4th 528 , 558; see also County of Sonoma v. Commission onState Mandates (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1280- 1281 (describing thepower of the Legislature as "supreme" in tax matters and describing theLegislature s powers regarding the budget as "considerable

The minority empowerment of the supermajority provisions ofarticle IV, section 12(d), and article XIII A , section 3 , also comes at theexpense of the Governor, whose role in the lawmaking process in the keyareas of taxation and budget-making is substantially diminished. Beforethe two-thirds requirements for passing a budget or raising taxes wereadopted , the Governor could either approve such bills that had been passedby majority of the Legislature or veto them and require a two-thirds vote ofthe Legislature to override the veto. Thus , the Governor had significantpower over such bills. Now that the two-thirds requirements have beenpassed, the Governor no longer has the option to either approve or veto anybudget or tax increase bill that has the support of a majority, but not a


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supermajority, of the Legislature. Those bills never even reach theGovernor s desk, because a minority one-third plus one of either the Senateor Assembly can block them from ever getting through the Legislature.The only budget and tax-increase bills that now reach the Governor arethose that have received a two-thirds vote of both Houses. But that , ofcourse, is the number of votes necessary to override any gubernatorial veto.Thus , while the Governor retains a technical veto power over budget andtax-increase bills passed by two-thirds of the Legislature , that power isvirtually meaningless. By crippling the executive veto power, thesupermajority provisions of article IV, section 12(d), and article XIII Asection 3 , considerably weaken the power of the executive brancl). toparticipate in the decision-making process concerning the State budget andtax increases.

The supermajority provisions thus ineluctably alter the carefulsystem of separation of powers and checks and balances mandated by theConstitution. These provisions shift control over whether budgetary andtax increase measures will pass to the hands of a minority that is "beyondthe system of checks and balances which heretofore has characterized ourgovernmental plan. (McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Cal.2d 330 348.They prevent the executive and legislative branches "from accomplishing(their) constitutionally assigned functions" and so are an unconstitutionalsubversion of the separation of powers principle. (Mistretta, supra 488

S. at p. 383 (executive branch), citation and quotations omitted; seeHustedt, supra 30 Cal.3d at p. 338 (Legislature violates separation ofpowers doctrine when it "defeat ( s) or materially impair( s) the exercise of(another branch' s) functions

In short, when it comes to the critical areas of budget and taxationarticle IV, section 12(d), and article XIII A , section 3 , have eviscerated theCalifornia Constitution and the vital powers it provides to the legislative


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majority and the Governor. As this Court held in Raven such afundamental change can be accomplished only through constitutionalrevision, not amendment. (Raven, supra 52 Cal.3d at pp. 352-355(initiative that robbed the judicial branch of power granted by theCalifornia Constitution effected a revision, not an amendment, to theConstitution).) The two-thirds provisions are invalid revisions that shouldbe stricken from the Constitution.II. RA VENIS SUBSTANTIVELY INDISTINGUISHABLE FROMTHIS CASE: BOTH INVOLVE PROVISIONS THATABRIDGE CONSTITUTIONALLY-VESTED POWERS OF ABRANCH OF STATE GOVERNMENT AND , THEREFOREARE REVISIONS OF, NOT AMENDMENTS TO, THE

CONSTITUTION.This Court' s decision in Raven is indistinguishable in any

meaningful way from this case. In Raven this Court held that a proposedamendment to the Constitution, Proposition 115 , was an unconstitutionalrevision due to the measure s "far reaching changes in the nature of ourbasic governmental plan. (Raven, supra 52 Cal.3d at pp. 354-355.) Thesupermajority provisions of article IV, section 12(d), and article XIII Asection 3 , are no less far reaching than Proposition 115 in their effect on the

5 The federal practice of filibustering lends no support to the two-thirds requirements of article IV, section 12(d), and article XIII A, section3. There are fundamental differences between the cloture rule , whichrequires a three-fifths vote of the United States Senate to override afilibuster, and the supermajority provisions at issue here. First , the cloturerule is a self-imposed, procedural provision allowed under the federalConstitution (U.S. Const. , art. I , ~ 5 , cl. 2 ("Each House may determine theRules of its Proceedings )), with incidental substantive effects, while thesupermajority provisions are revisions of the California Constitutionimposed by the electorate on the government. Further, the Senate s cloturerule does not require a supermajority vote to pass a bill, only to end Senatedebate. Finally, the rule does not apply in the House of Representatives. Inshort, historical acceptance of the Senate s cloture rule does not providesupport for the two-thirds rules in question here.


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fundamental structure of California government and the foundationalpowers of its legislative and executive branches. Just like Proposition 115they abridge constitutionally-vested powers of coordinate branches of stategovernment. Thus , under Raven these supermajority provisions areimpermissible revisions of the Constitution.

Proposition 115 required California courts to defer to the UnitedStates Supreme Court' s interpretations of the federal Constitution inconstruing certain aspects of the California Constitution - includingcriminal defendants ' rights to due process , equal protection, assistance ofcounsel, and avoidance of cruel and unusual punishment - notwithstandingthe provision of the California Constitution stating that "' (r)ightsguaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed bythe United States Constitution. (Raven, supra 52 Ca1.3d at pp. 342-346350 , quoting Cal. Const. , art. I , ~ 24.) Far from merely amending theCalifornia Constitution, this Court held, Proposition 115 structurallytransformed it: the measure "vest( ed) a critical portion of state judicialpower" in the federal courts and "substantially alter ( ed) the substance andintegrity of the state Constitution as a document of independent force andeffect." (Id. at pp. 352 355.) Noting that in an earlier case Amador ValleyJoint Union High Sch. Dist. Vo Bdo Of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208the Court had observed that a hypothetical "' enactment which purported tovest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to a revision '" ofthe Constitution, the Raven Court reasoned that "Proposition 115contemplates a similar qualitative change" because " (i)n essence and effect(it) would vest all judicial interpretive power as to fundamental criminaldefense rights, in the United States Supreme Court. (Raven, supraCal.3d at p. 352 , quoting Amador, supra 22 Cal.3d at p. 223 , internalquotation omitted. ) The Raven Court concluded that " (fJrom a qualitative


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standpoint, the effect of Proposition 115 is devastating" to our preexistinggovernmental plan. (Raven, supra 52 Cal.3d at p. 352.

As discussed above, the two-thirds requirements of article IVsection 12(d), and article XIII A , section 3 , vest a critical portion of boththe State legislative power and the State executive power in a minority ofeither the State Senate or the State Assembly, with respect to the vital areasof budgeting and taxation. From a qualitative standpoint, thesesupermajority provisions "closely resemble() Amador hypotheticalprovision vesting all judicial power in the Legislature, a provision (thisCourt) deemed would achieve a constitutional revision. (Raven, supraCa1.3d at p. 355.) Like Proposition 115 , they have a far-reaching impact onthe "basic governmental plan or framework embodied in the preexistingprovisions of the California Constitution " and thus effect change beyondthe scope of a constitutional amendment. (Strauss, supra 46 Ca1.4th at p.441 , emphasis omitted.) And like Proposition 115 , article IV, section12(d), and article XIII A, section 3 , effect a change so profound anddevastating" to the structure of our government and the foundational

powers of two of its branches that they constitute revisions of theConstitution, not mere amendments. (Raven, supra 52 Cal.3d at p. 352.III. ALTHOUGH IT DEALS WITH ARTICLE XIII A ANDRESTRICTION OF TAXING AUTHORITY AMADORNOT RELEVANT PRECEDENT IN THIS CASE.

In Amador this Court addressed another direct challenge to ArticleXIII A , determined that article XIII A is not like the hypotheticalenactment vesting all judicial power in the Legislature, and held thatarticle XIII A fairly may be deemed a constitutional amendment, not a

revision. (Amador, supra 22 Cal.3d at p. 228.In Amador however, the petitioners did not challenge and this Court

did not address section 3 of article XIII A , which requires two-thirds of the


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State Legislature to pass any tax increase, and is the only portion of ArticleIII A at issue here. (Amador, supra 22 Cal.3d at p. 220 (advising that theCourt' s opinion is limited to the specific constitutional issues resolved; "oursummary description and interpretation of the article and of theimplementing legislation and regulations do not preclude subsequentchallenges to the specific meaning or validity of those enactments.

Rather, the petitioners in Amador challenged sections I and 2 ofarticle XIII A, which grant power to the Legislature to allocate revenues

6 Section 3 may be stricken as an unconstitutional revision withoutaffecting the remaining provisions of article XIII A, which this Courtdetermined are constitutional amendments in Amador because section 3 isseverable from those other provisions. (See Raven, supra 52 Cal.3d at pp.355-356 (severing invalid revision of Constitution from valid portions ofinitiative measure properly passed as constitutional amendment);Legislature v. Eu, supra 54 Cal.3d at pp. 534- 535 (same); Calfarm Ins. Co.vo Deukmejian (1989) 48 Ca1.3d 805 821 (same).) As a preliminary matterarticle XIII A includes a severability clause (section 6), which, while notconclusive

normally calls for sustaining the valid part of the enactment."(Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 707 , 716quoting Calfarm, supra 48 Ca1.3d at p. 821; see Raven, supra 52 Ca1.3d atpp. 355-356 (giving effect to severance clause).) Moreover, section 3easily meets the three criteria for severability prescribed by case law. (SeeGerken, supra 6 Cal.4th at p. 716.) First, the provision is mechanicallyand grammatically severable: It constitutes a distinct and separate provisionof article XIII A

which can be removed without affecting the wording ofany other provision. (Raven, supra 52 Cal.3d at p. 356.) Second, theprovision is functionally severable: The remaining provisions , which dealwith property taxes and the taxation power of local governments

canoperate entirely independently of the invalid restriction. (Legislature, supra 54 Cal.3d at p. 535.) Third, the remainder of the initiative wouldlikely have been adopted by the electorate had they foreseen the invalidityof the challenged portion of section 3. (Raven, supra 52 Cal.3d at p. 356.The voters who enacted Proposition 13 would "presumably prefer" theproperty tax relief accorded under the balance of the initiative "to thesystem that existed before the initiative was enacted. (Calfarm , supraCal.3d at p. 821.) There is no reason to believe that the legislativesupermajority provision "was so critical to the enactment of Proposition(13) that the measure would not have been enacted in its absence. (Ibid.


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from real property taxation among various local agencies. (Amador, supra22 Cal.3d at p. 220.) The petitioners argued that these provisions interferewith home rule, or the ability of local government to control and financelocal affairs without undue interference by the Legislature. (Id. at p. 224-225.) This Court rejected that argument, finding that the relevantprovisions "are no more threatening to home rule than () preexistingconstitutional limitations" on local taxing authority, and, therefore, do notdisturb our basic governmental plan. (Id. at pp. 225-227.

Thus Amador principal holding was that article XIII A' s transferto the State Legislature of the authority of local government districts toapportion revenues from taxes on real property within their jurisdictions

, its expansion of the Legislature s control of the power to distribute realproperty tax revenues at the expense of subordinate local governmentswas a permissible amendment to the Constitution, not a revision. Thatholding had nothing to do with article XIII A' s requirement in section 3that two-thirds of the State Legislature approve any kind of tax increase , orwith the effect of that supermajority requirement on the power to govern

7 Article XIII A, section I , provides that property taxes shall becollected by the counties and apportioned according to law to the districtswithin the counties." (Cat Const. , art. XIII A

emphasis added.) Atthe time this provision was enacted , there was no state law which providedfor distribution of property tax revenues. (Voter Pamp. , Proposed Stats.and Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Primary Elec. (June, 1978), analysis by Legislative Analyst.) Subsequently, the Legislaturepassed implementing legislation setting the formulae pursuant to whichcounty auditors must allocate property tax revenues to various agencieswithin their boundaries. (Amador, supra 22 Cal.3d at pp. 226-227.) TheAmador Court found that " (i)n general (these formulae) aim at allocatingthese funds on a pro rata basis without imposing any condition whateverregarding their ultimate use " and thus do not interfere with home rule. (Id.at p. 227.


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distributed by the Constitution to any of the three coordinate branches ofthe State government.

The only other holding of consequence in Amador involved section4 of article XIII A, which restricts local government authority to imposespecial taxes" by requiring that such taxes be approved by two-thirds of

the local voters. The petitioners in Amador argued that this provisionresult(s) in a change from a ' republican' form of government (i.

lawmaking by elected representatives) to a ' democratic ' governmental plan(i. , lawmaking directly by the people). (Amador, supra 22 Cal.3d at p.227.) Not surprisingly, this Court rejected that argument.

The Amador Court reasoned that the requirement that two-thirds ofthe electorate approve local special taxes "does not change our basicgovernmental plan" because in all other areas the authority of localgovernment to enact laws and regulations remained unimpaired. (Amadorsupra 22 Cal.3d at pp. 227-228.) Because the Court was dealing with localpower to levy taxes , rather than the State Legislature , and a requirementof approval by a supermajority of the local electorate, not a supermajorityof the State Legislature , the Court had no cause to consider issues such asthe effect of a two-thirds requirement on the balance of power betweencoordinate branches of government and our system of checks and balances.N or did the Court have reason to consider that the taxing authority is themost critical of the Legislature s powers. (See pp. 18- , above.) Bycontrast, even before passage of article XIII A, local governments had toreceive specific approval from the Legislature before levying new taxes.(Voter Pamp. , Proposed Stats. and Amends. to Cal. Const. with argumentsto voters , Primary Elec. (June 6, 1978), analysis by Legislative Analyst.)Article XIII A merely added an additional restriction on their alreadylimited taxing authority.


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Petitioner here challenges only that portion of article XIII A thatprovides for a two-thirds majority vote by the Legislature to approveincreases in taxation at the state level , i.e. , section 3; he does not challengethe provisions at issue in Amador which restricted local taxing authority,and unlike section 3, did not impair the State Legislature s constitutionalpower to legislate by the foundational principle of majority rule or theGovernor s constitutional veto power.

Thus Amador erects no obstacle to the relief sought by this Petition.For the reasons set forth above , the supermajority requirement of section 3unlike the other provisions of article XIII A addressed in Amador effectsan impermissible revision of the Constitution.

CONCLUSIONFor the reasons stated above, Petitioner respectfully urges this Court

to hold that Article IV , section 12(d) and Article XIII A , section 3 , areunconstitutional revisions to the California Constitution, and to grant therelief sought in this Petition.Respectfully submittedDated: July 9 2009 AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER &FELD LLPWilliam A. NorrisRex S. HeinkeL. Rachel HelyarOrly DeganiChristopher BlanchardJulian W. Park

By /V~O'h~William A. NorrisATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER


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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.204(c))

This brief consists of 8 028 words as counted by the Microsoft Wordversion 2002 word processing program used to generate the brief.Dated: July 9 , 2009 AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER &FELD LLPWilliam A. NorrisRex S. HeinkeL. Rachel Helyar

Orl y DeganiChristopher BlanchardJulian W. Park

By )1/~ o.n~William A. NorrisATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS


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PROOF OF SERVICESTATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles , State of California. I am overthe age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 2029Century Park East, Suite 2400, Los Angeles , California 90067. On July 9, 2009, Iserved the foregoing document described as: PETITION FOREXTRAORDINARY RELIEF, INCLUDING WRIT OF MANDATE;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES on the interested partiesbelow, using the following means:Gregory Schmidt, Secretary of the Senate E. Dotson Wilson, Chief ClerkCalifornia State Senate California State AssemblyState Capitol State CapitolRoom 3044 Room 3 196Sacramento , CA 94248 Sacramento, CA 95814(916) 651-4171 (916) 319-2856Diane F. Boyer-VineLegislative Counsel of California925 L Street, Suite 900Sacramento, CA 95814(916) 341-8200

~ BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY I enclosed the document in anenvelope or package provided by an overnight delivery carrier andaddressed to the respective addresses of the parties stated above. I placedthe envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office ora regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier.~ (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the Stateof California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 9 2009, at Los Angeles , California.

Rose ShushanyanIPrint Name of Person Executing Proof) (;",,"=J

Writ Petition--Young v. Schmidt

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Transcript of Writ Petition--Young v. Schmidt