WP3 Studying Political Leaders in the Financial Crisis · 2018-03-02 · Deliverable 3.3 Final...

WP3

Studying Political Leaders in the Financial Crisis

Deliverable 3.3

Final Report for WP3:

Making Meaning of the Euro-crisis

Authors: Femke van Esch, Sebastiaan Steenman, Rik Joosen, Lieke Brand, Jeroen Snellens

Delivery date: 28 February 2018

(original delivery date 4 October 2017)

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 649484

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Contents

Contents..................................................................................................................................................2

Introduction............................................................................................................................................3

IdeasandDiscourses...............................................................................................................................4

CongruenceandLegitimacy....................................................................................................................5

Methods..................................................................................................................................................7

MeasuringLeaders’Ideas,PublicDiscoursesandCitizens’Preferences............................................7

MeasuringLegitimacy.........................................................................................................................8

EstablishingCongruence.....................................................................................................................8

Results...................................................................................................................................................11

Pan-EuropeanMeaningMaking........................................................................................................12

Thenatureofthecrisis.................................................................................................................12

Thecausesofthecrisis.................................................................................................................18

Thesolutionstothecrisis.............................................................................................................20

Leadership,CongruenceandLegitimacy..............................................................................................11

Issue-Saliency....................................................................................................................................23

RepresentativeofWhom?............................................................................................................26

DoesCongruenceleadtolegitimacy?...............................................................................................39

Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................46

References............................................................................................................................................51

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IntroductionTranscrisisaimstodevelopasolidunderstandingoftheroleofleadersinmanagingtransboundary

crisesandtherequirementsforensuringaneffectiveandlegitimatecrisisresponse.Oneoftheseven

crisis-managementtasksthatleadersneedtoperformismeaning-making.Meaning-makingrefersto

thenecessitytoformulateakeymessagethatoffersanexplanationofthethreat,actionableadvice,

andasensethatleadersareincontrolofthesituation(Boin,Cadar&Donnelley,2016).Adequate

meaningmakingiskeytodealingwithacrisisinaneffectiveandlegitimatefashion.Thisisespecially

importantduringtransboundarycrisesascultural,national,legalboundariesmakesharedmeaning

makingmoredifficultandlessroutine.

Theaimofmeaning-makingistwofold:first,toensurethatleaders‘getafirmgrasponwhat

isgoingon’,secondforleaderstodevelopaclearideaof‘whatmighthappennext’(Boinetal,2005:

140).Sensemakingisacrucialtaskinanycrisissituationbecauseithelpscentraldecision-makers

clarifytheirunderlyingassumptionsonhowtheworldworks,andcontemplatethevalueofdifferent

solutionsbeforedecisionsareactuallymade.Incaseoftransnationalcrises,meaningmakingshould

inpartalsooccuracrossboundariessoamutualunderstandingofthesituationamongstdifferent

stakeholdersmaydevelop,ordifferencesinviewarerevealed.Althoughmeaningmakingisoften

portrayedasoneoftheearlierphasesincrisismanagement,inreiterateddecision-makinggames

associatedwithprolongedcrisissituations,itshouldbeacontinuousprocess.

Meaningmakingisadifficulttaskandevenmorecomplexincaseofhighlycomplex,

transboundarycrisesliketheEurocrisis.Thethreat,complexityandcallsforurgentanddecisive

actionthataccompanysuchcrisesmaytemptleaderstoskipcrucialpartsofthemeaningmaking

effortandquicklyjumptodiscussingpossiblesolutions(VanEschandSwinkels,2016).Addingto

thesedifficultiesisthefactthatleadersshouldmarrytheavailableexpertise,publicdiscourseand

thepreferencesofthepeopleinordertodesigneffectiveandefficientsolutionsandmaintain

democraticlegitimacy.Thisreportexploresthischallengeandstudiesthemeaningmakingeffortsof

EuropeanpoliticalleadersduringtheEurocrisis.Itwillprovideempiricallygroundedinsightsinthe

interactionbetweenleaders’policyideas,publicdiscoursesandcitizens’perceptionsoftheEuro

crisis.

Toassessleaders’meaningmakingeffortsanditseffectsontheirlegitimacy,andfollowingthe

Codebook(Boin,Cadar&Donnelley,2016),thisreportwillanswerthefollowingquestions:

• Doleaders,themediaandcitizensformulateaclearinterpretationofthecrisis(intermsof

thenatureoftheEurocrisis,itsperceivedconsequencesandcauses)?

• Doleadersexplainhowtheyplantoleadtheircommunitiesoutofcrisis(involvingsolutions

andproposedinstruments)?

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• Howandtowhatextentdidleaders’meaningmakingreflectideasfromthepublicdiscourses

abouttheEurocrisis?

• Howandtowhatextentdidleaders’ideasreflectviewsoftheirnationalconstituents?

• Isthereevidencethatthegeneralmessageleadersattempttoconveyisbroadlyaccepted,or

aretheredifferentschoolsofthoughtorparadigmsvyingforattentionanddominance?

• Istherearelationshipbetweencongruencebetweenleaders’ideas,thepublicdiscourseand

citizens’beliefsandlegitimacyoftheleaderintheeyesoftheirconstituents?

IdeasandDiscoursesIntheliterature,ideasaredefinedasactors'subjectivethoughtsonhowtheworldworks(Levy,

1994).Theseideasarenotnecessarilyaccurateorrationalinthesenseofbeingobtainedthrougha

thoroughcost-benefitsanalysisorprocessoftrialanderror.Rather,peoples’beliefsystemsemerge

andgainstrengththroughoutlifeandareinformedbytheirexperience,educationandroles.

However,whiletheyarenotrational,ideasorbeliefsystemsareassumedtoshowsomeconsistency

throughtime.Despitetheirdifferentdisciplinaryrootsandterminology,moststudiesassumebelief

systemsorworldviewstoconsistofconvictionsontwoorthreelevelsofabstraction(cf.Goldstein&

Keohane,1993;Hall,1993;Jervis,2006;Levy,1994;Sabatier&Jenkins-Smith,1993;VanEsch,2007):

1)diagnosticbeliefsthatinvolvethoughtsonthestateoftheworldandnatureofthecircumstances

athand;2)instrumentalbeliefsconcerningthemeansorpoliciesthatmayprovidetheintermediary

connectiontofurthertheactors’endsandgoals;and3)principledbeliefsthatdenotethevaluesor

endscentraltotheactors’worldviews.Thesedifferentbeliefsareconnectedthroughcausaland

normativerelationstoformabeliefsystemorworldview.Manyscholarsassumebeliefsystemstobe

structuredhierarchicallyinthesensethatsomebeliefsaredeemedtobemorefundamentaltoAN

actor'sworldviewthanother,moresecondary,beliefs.Whilescholarsdifferinwhatkindofbeliefs

theydeemdominant,theconceptionofbeliefhierarchyistheoreticallyimportantbecausecommon

agreementexiststhatchangeinmorefundamentalbeliefsishardandrare,andifanybeliefchange

occurs‘itisusuallyconfinedtothesecondaryaspectsofbeliefsystems’(Sabatier&Jenkins-Smith,

1993).

Whenspeakingaboutthepublicdebate,theliteraturerarelyusestheconceptofideasbut

ratherspeaksaboutdiscourses.Discoursesaresystemsofthoughtcomposedofideas,attitudes,

coursesofactions,beliefsandpracticesthatconstructthesubjectsandtheworldsofwhichthey

speak(Foucault,1972).Whileideasareinessenceindividualcognitions,forthisprojectdiscourses

aredefinedasthewayideasandparadigmsarebeingshapedandexpressedandarethereforesocial

entities.Publicdiscoursesarecomposedofseveralframesthatfocuson,andhighlightaselectionof

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reality.Entmann(1993)distinguishesfourfunctionsofsuchdiscursiveframesthattieinseamlessly

withthedefinitionofmeaningmaking:Thefirstfunctionistodefinewhattheproblemis.Aproblem

definitionautomaticallybestowscertainattributesonasituationlikewhoistoblameforasituation

andwhoisthevictim.Thesecondandrelatedfunctionofaframeistoidentifythecausesofthe

problem.Thethirdfunctionistopassjudgmentonasituation,itscausesandeffectsandtheactors

involved.Thelastfunctionofaframeistosuggestremediesfortheproblem.Thesefourfunctionsof

discursiveframestieinwellwiththedifferentformsofideasdescribedaboveandwillbeusedto

analysethemeaningmakingoftheEurocrisisbyleadersandcitizensandinthepublicdebate

(throughmedia).

CongruenceandLegitimacyInadditiontoprovidinginsightinleaders’

andcitizens’ideasandpublicdiscourses

ontheEurocrisis,thisreportwillexplore

thecongruencebetweenthem.Three

formsofideationalcongruencemaybe

distinguished.Thefirstformofcongruence

isissuesaliency,whichisconcernedwith

whethersimilarissuesareidentifiedas

mostimportantandpressing(Lindeboom,

2012;Hobolt&Klemmensen,2005).The

secondtypeofcongruenceisideological

distance(Golder&Stramsky,2010;VanEsch,2014).Thethirdtypeofcongruenceisnarrative

congruence.Thisisthemostintricatemeasurethatrevealstheextenttowhichthesamearguments

areusedbyleadersandcitizensinpublicdiscourses(VanEsch,JoosenandVanZuydam,2016).The

threeformsofcongruencebuildononeanotherandareprogressiveintermsoftheintensityof

convergenceordivergenceinsensemakingtheyentail(seefigure1).However,congruenceisnotthe

samethingaslegitimacy.

Thisstudy’sperspectiveonlegitimateleadershipstartsfromarelationalanddemocratic

perspective.Thismeansthatitpresupposesthattheauthoritytoleadisultimatelybestowedon

leadersbytheirfollowers.Inotherwords,whetherleadershipisseenaslegitimateisultimately

dependentontheperceptionofthepeople.Althoughahighlevelofcongruencebetweenthepolicy

preferencesofleaders,citizensandpublicdiscoursesisoftenassumedtoguaranteepoliticalleaders’

legitimacyintheeyesofthepeople,recentdevelopmentsintheEUaswellasafirsttentativestudy

NarraiveCongruence

IdeologicalDistance

IssueSaliency

Figure 1: Hierarchy of congruence

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intothisquestionraisesdoubtsabouttheempiricalvalidityofthisassumption(VanEsch,2017;cf

VanEsch,JoosenandVanZuydam,2016).Toestablishtherelationshipbetweenthemeaningmaking

dynamicsandtheperceptionofleaders’legitimacy,asurveywasheldtouncoverhowlegitimate

differentleadersareintheeyesoftheEuropeanpeople.Inadditiontoincludingseveralquestionson

peoples’trustin,andperceptionsandvaluationofleaders,thesurveyaimstouncovertherational

underlyingtheirjudgement.

Todothis,thisstudyreliedonthemodeloflegitimateleadershipdevelopedbyVanEsch

(2017).BasedontheliteratureontheEU’slegitimacydeficitandleadershipstudies,thismodel

distinguishesfourvectorsoflegitimateleadership:technocratic,electoral,ideologicalandsocial

identification(seefigure2).Thetechnocraticvectorreliesonaleader’sexpertiseandcompetence

andtheassociatedpromisetodelivermoreeffectiveorefficientresults(LordandMagnette:185).

Thesecondvectoroflegitimacyrestsuponthedemocraticpracticeofelections.Politicians

arebestowedaleadershippositionbyfollowersonthegroundthattheywilldeliverpoliciesand

outcomesthatreflectvoters’preferences.Moreover,thistypeoflegitimacyhasastrongprocess-

elementinthatindemocraticcountriescitizensgenerallyacceptdecisionstheydonotagreewithas

legitimatebecausetheprocessleadingtothedecisionwasdemocratic.Thethirdvectorrestsupon

theideologicalconnectionbetweenleadersandfollowersforleadershiptobeseenaslegitimate.

Ideologyhasgreatmobilizingpowerandreliesonthemutualidentificationwithcertainvalues,a

commoncauseorutopia(Bennisteretal2015;Burns1978).Ideologydefineswhatvalues(libertyor

equality)arepivotalandwhattheymean.Anideologicalleaderattractsfollowersbymobilizingstory

ofidealsandaspirationsandthemanagementofmeaningandstirsuppowerfulpassions.

Expertise/Skill Effectiveness, efficiency

Election Voters preference

Ideology Values, utopia

Soc Identification Acknowledgment, belonging

Figure 2: Four Vectors of Legitimate Leadership

Basis of Relat ion Output

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Thefinalvectoroflegitimationisrootedinsocialidentificationandproposesleadershipmay

belegitimisedbyamutualbelongingofleaderandfollowertoaparticularsocialgroup(Haslametal

2011).Themoreleadersareseentobe‘oneofus’,areableto‘craftasenseofus’,andmake‘us’

matter(inotherwordsthemoretheyareseenasprototypicalofthefollowers’in-group),themore

theirleadershipisperceivedaslegitimate(Haslametal2011:xxii).Rooteddeepinpeoples’

psychology,Haslametalshowthatsocialidentificationforgesstronganddurablebondsandgreat

transformationalleadersusethismechanismtomobilisegreatloyaltyintheirfollowers(Haslametal

2011:47).Finally,inadditiontothesefourdimensions,thisstudywillalsoincludetwotraditional

aspectsofcredibleleadership:trustworthinessandcaring(VanEsch,JoosenandVanZuydam,2016).

Methods

Measuring Leaders’ Ideas, Public Discourses and Citizens’ Preferences

Toanswerthecentralquestionsofthisreport,meaningmakingconcerningtheEurocrisiswas

studiedinnineEUmemberstates:Denmark,France,Germany,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,the

Netherlands,SpainandtheUnitedKingdom.Atotalof167speechesof30differentpoliticaland

financialleadersand172op-edsin30newspaperswerehand-codedandanalysed.Thisdatacovers

theEurocrisisfromlate2009until2015,duringthistimeseveralimportanteventshappenedthat

mayhavecausedashiftinmeaningmaking.Inordertodeterminetheevolutioninandconsistencyin

leaders’crisismeaningmaking,thecrisiswasdividedintothreeperiods:Thefirstperiodruns

betweenthemomenttheGreekgovernmentannouncedtheextentoftheirdeficit(05-11-09andthe

firstbail-outdecisions(02-05-10);thesecondperiodbetween2May2010andMarioDraghi’s

‘whateverittakes’-speech(26-07-12);andthefinalperiodfrom26July2012andtheelectionofthe

SyrizagovernmentinJanuaryof2015.Asameamountofdatafortheleadersandmediawas

collectedforeachoftheseperiods.Inaddition,alarge-scalesurveywasheldquestioning4573

respondentsfromthesameninememberstatesontheirviewsoftheEurocrisis(aswellasthe

legitimacyoftheirleaders).1Practicalconsiderationspreventedusfromquestioningthecitizens

morethanonce.Thedescriptiveanalysesregardingthemeaningmakingbytheleaders,themedia

andthecitizenseachthatwerereportedearlier(Deliverables3.2a,bandccf.VanEschetal,2017a;

Steenmanetal,2017;VanEschetal2017b)formpartofthebasisofthecomparativeanalysis

includedinthisreport.

1Foranexplanationofthemethodsusedinthisstudyaswellasthejustificationofmethodologicalchoices,seeVanEschetal,2016).

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Measuring Legitimacy

Asindicatedabove,thisstudyusedtheopinionsofcitizensasthegroundstodeterminewhether

leadershipoftheEurocrisiswasperceivedaslegitimate.Weusedaweb-surveytoquestion

Europeancitizensabouttheirperceptionofasetofspecificleaders(theircurrentnationalHeadof

stateorgovernment,aswellasthoseofthemajormemberstates(Germany,France)andECB

PresidentMarioDraghi).Foreachoftheseleaderswedeterminedwhethercitizensknewtheleader.

Whenrespondentswereabletocorrectlyidentifyaleaderonthebasisofthetitleandaphoto,they

werepresentedwiththequestionofhowtheyfeltaboutthem(usingemoticonsdisplayingarange

ofemotions).Subsequently,theywereaskedarangeofquestionsconcerningthelegitimacyofthe

leaderintheireyesreflectingthetheoreticalmodeloutlinedabove.Inotherwords,weaskedcitizens

toanswerquestionsregardingthecompetenceandtrustworthinessoftheleader,towhatextent

theyfelttheleaderwascaring,heldasimilarideologicalpositionasthem,towhatextentthey

identifiedwiththemandfinallytowhatextentthefactthattheyweredemocraticallychosen(ornot)

wasabasisforlegitimateleadership.Morespecifically,respondentswerepresentedwithtwo

statementsforeachofthesedimensionsandwereaskedtoindicatetheiragreementonafivepoint

Likertscale.Thestatementswithregardtocompetence,trustworthiness,caringandidentification

weredrawnfromvalidatedmeasuresdevelopedinpreviousresearch(ref),theotherswerenewly

developed.Analysisshowedthateachofthescalesmeasuressufficientlyreliable(Cronbachalpha

measuresrangedbetween0,81and0,94).

Establishing Congruence

Inordertoanswerthecentralquestionsinthisstudy,thecongruencebetweenthemeaningmaking

byleadersandthatbythemediaandcitizensmustbeestablished.Assuch,techniqueswere

developedtomeasureeachofthethreedimensionsofcongruenceintroducedabove.Cognitive

mapscanbeanalysedinvariousways.Therelativestrengthofideasisestablishedbytheirsaliency

(S)—thefrequencywithwhichtheyarementioned.Inaddition,scholarsmaystudythe‘consequent

paths’feedingoutofaconceptintootherconceptsaswellasthevalueoftheserelations(positive,

negative,non-existent).Thesebasicmeasuresinformleaders’scoresonthethreedifferentformsof

congruence(cfVanEsch,Joosen,VanZuydam,2016).

Inthisreport,thelevelofnarrativecongruencebetweentheleaders,themediaandthe

Europeancitizensisestablishedbyqualitativelycomparingleaders’andfollowers’crisisnarrative.To

structurethisnarrativeanalysis,wefollowedthreesteps.Firstly,weestablishedhowthedifferent

(groupsof)leaders,mediaandcitizensdefinedthenatureofthecrisisbyreviewingthemostsalient

conceptsintheircrisisnarrativesaswellasthedirectconsequencesoftheEurocrisisasidentifiedin

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thenarrative.Secondly,theperceptionsofwhatcausedthecrisiswereestablishedbydetermining

theconceptsthatdirectlyfeedintotheconceptEurocrisisinthedifferentcognitivemaps.Finally,

thepotentialsolutionstotheEurocrisisasproposedbythedifferentgroupswerestudiedby

revealingtheconceptsthatfeedintotheconceptsolvingthecrisisinthedifferentcognitivemaps

andbylookingatthesaliencyofdifferenttypesofinstruments.

Inadditiontothisnarrativeanalysis,wehavedevelopedanewdistancemeasureto

systematicallycompareissuesaliencecongruence.ThisDeltameasureisbasedontherelative

salienceofconceptsinmapsandcanbeusedforbothindividualcognitivemaps,aswellasfora

groupofmaps(forexamplethemapsofallcitizenswithinacountryoragroupofleaders).Inthis

reportwewillusethismeasuretoestablishthecongruencebetweenthecrisisnarrativesof

individualleadersandthepublicdebateintheircountryaswellasthenarrativesoftheir

constituents.

Tocalculatethismeasure,wehaveselectedtheconceptsthatwerepresentedtocitizensas

thefocusofthecomparison(seeSteenmanetal,2017fortheselectionmethod).Oneofthe

concepts(Crisis-freeEurozone)wasautomaticallyaddedtoallcitizenmaps,andthereforeexcluded

fromthecalculation.Forleadersandmediamaps,thesameconceptswereusedtocalculatethe

statisticsaswerepresentedtocitizens(someofthesearecompoundedconceptswherebysimilar

conceptsthatwereusedbytheleaderswerereformulatedintooneinordertopresentcitizenswith

anunambiguoussetofconcepts).

Fortheconceptsthatwereselected,therelativesaliency(percentageofallconceptuse)was

calculated(Sr).Thesumofalltheserelativesaliencyscoresfortheseconceptswithinamapisby

definition1,whichstandardisesconceptssotheymaybeusedforcomparisonofmapsofdifferent

sizes.Whenaconceptisnotusedinamap,itsscoreiszero.Foreachpairofconcepts,thedifference

betweentheirrelativesaliencymeasures(Sr1andSr2)canbecalculated:

1) Sr1-Sr2

Thesumofthisforeachofthepairswillbydefinitionbe0,asmorerelativeuseofaconcept

inthemap1ascomparedwithmap2willnecessarilyresultinlessrelativeuseforanotherconcept.

Tonegatethis,wesquaredtheresultofthesecalculationsandusedthesquarerootofthisasthe

basisfortheDeltameasure(seeformula2).

2) (!!! − !!!)!

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Thesumofthesemeasuresgivesastandardisedmeasureforthedifferenceinconceptusebetween

twomaps.Theresultingscorescandifferbetween0and2.Where0indicatedthatallconceptshad

thesamerelativesaliency,and2indicatingthatconceptusedifferedcompletely(noneofthe

conceptsoverlapped).Tomakethismeasuremoreeasilyinterpretable,forthedeltawehave

developed,wehavedividedthisscoreby2(thenumberofmapsthatarecompared).Formula3

showsthedeltameasurethatweused(ΔS).

3) ∆!= (!!!!!!!)!!

AlthoughΔSisameasureofdifferenceinconceptuse,thatisabletoshowdifferences

betweenboththeuseandtherelativeimportanceofconcepts,itisheavilyinfluencedbyconcepts

thatarenotusedinoneofthemaps.WehavethereforeoptedalsotocalculateΔSseparatelywith

theexclusionofconceptsthatwerenotusedinoneofthetwomapsthatwerecompared.The

standardisationofthismapislessstrong,sincethemaximumscoredependsontheSrofconcepts

thatwereexcluded.WewillrefertothisastheDeltaforusedconcepts(ΔSU).

Finally,toestablishthelevelofideologicaldistance,thisreportwillstudytowhatextent

nationalleadersandtheirconstituentsadheretothesameeconomicparadigmwhentheytalkabout

theEuro-crisis.FollowingtheliteratureinthefieldofEuropeaneconomicandmonetarypolicy

making,adistinctionismadebetweentheKeynesianandtheOrdoliberalparadigm(Golder&

Stramsky,2010;VanEsch,2014;VanEsch2012,2013;Blyth2013;DullienandGuerot2012;Hall

2012;HowarthandRommerskirchen2013;SegersandVanEsch2007).Whentakenasanidealtype,

theOrdoliberalviewischaracterisedfirstandforemostbyabeliefintheprimacyofpricestability

(‘soundmoney’),whichistheguidingprinciplebywhichallotherpolicy-measuresareassessed.

Crucially,intheeyesoftheOrdoliberals,thereisnotrade-offbetweenpricestabilityontheone

hand,andemploymentandeconomicgrowthontheother.Toensurepricestability,European

economicandmonetaryintegrationmustmeettworequirements.First,ithastoensurethat

memberstatesadoptstringentbudgetaryandfiscalpoliciesanddenouncemonetaryfinancing.

Second,OrdoliberalsstresstheneedforCBindependence,asonlyaCentralBankthatis

constitutionally,politicallyandfinanciallyautonomouswillguaranteesoundandcrediblemonetary

policy-makingbasedonexpertanalysisoftheeconomicfundamentals,ratherthanonpoliticalor

electoralconsiderations.Finally,Ordoliberalscombinetheseeconomicideaswithardentsupportfor

theprimacyofeconomicoverpoliticalorgeo-politicalconsiderations.

IntheKeynesianperspective,pricestabilityisnotregardedasthemostsalienteconomicgoal

norispricestabilityperceivedtobetheultimategoalofeconomicpolicy.Second,intheireyes,a

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trade-offdoesexistbetweeneconomicgrowthandemploymentontheonehand,andpricestability

ontheother.Inaddition,economicstimulation—achievedforinstancethroughgovernment

spending—asopposedtostringentbudgetarypolicyispromotedtofostereconomicgrowthand

employment.Theseeconomicbenefitsareseentooutweighpossibleeffectsonbudgetarydiscipline

andpricestability.IntermsofthemandateoftheECB,Keynesiansmaythusadvocateextendingits

centraltaskstoincludeothergoalsthanthemereguardingofpricestability.Sincewithinthe

institutionalconfigurationofEMU,goalssuchasfiscalandfinancialstabilityareassignedtopolitical

actors,KeynesiansgenerallyshowlessdevotiontoECBindependencethanOrdoliberals(VanEsch

2012;DullienandGuerot2012).

ToestablishtheextenttowhichleadersandtheirconstituentsadheretoKeynesianor

Ordoliberalthought,cognitivemapsweregeneratedforeachleaderforeachoftheperiodsofthe

Eurocrisisthattheywereinfunction.Forthecitizens,acollectivemapforallcitizenspercountry

wasderivedbycombiningthemapsofalloftherespondentsofthatcountry.Allstandardised

conceptsthatwereusedinanymapwereclassifiedasKeynesian,Ordoliberalorneutral.Onthebasis

oftherelationofaconceptwithalloftheconceptsinacertainmapandthesign(positive,negative,

non-existent)thevalue(positive,negative,ambiguous)ofeachconceptwithinamapwas

determined.Subsequentlytheaggregated‘saliency’perparadigmwascalculatedforeachmap.

WhenaKeynesian(budgetarydeficit)conceptwasdeemednegative,itssaliencyscorewasaddedto

thatoftheOrdoliberalparadigmandviceversa.Thesaliencyofambiguousornon-valuedconcepts

wasdisregardedinthecalculations.Bycomparingthescoresoftheleaderswiththoseoftheir

electorates,theideologicaldistancebetweenthemwasestablished.Asthisanalysistakesinto

accountnotonlytheconceptsusedinthemapsbutalsohowtheyareinterconnectedinthemindsof

theleadersandtherespondents,thisconstitutesamoreintricatebutmorelabourintensivemeasure

ofcongruencethanSteenman’sDelta.

Results: Leadership, Congruence and Legitimacy

ThissectionstartswithageneraloverviewoftheoverlapinmeaningmakingbytheEU’snational

leaders,thecombinednationalpublicdiscourseandperceptionsoftheEuropeancitizens.2This

overviewfocusesonmeaningmakingbythesegroupsregardingthenatureofthecrisis,thecauses

andsolutionsofthecrisis.Thefocussubsequentlyshiftstotheleveloftheindividualleaders.Atthis

level,thecongruenceintermsofissue-saliencybetweenleaders,thepublicdiscourseandthe

citizenswasestablishedandthelinkbetweencongruenceandlegitimacyisexplored.

2Thecomparisonbetweenleaders’ideasandthepublicdiscourseexcludesHungaryasinsufficientmediasourcescouldbeobtained.ThedataforGermany includesonlytwonewspapers, theSuddeutscheZeitungandtheFrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung,forthesamereasons.

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Narrative Congruence: Pan-European Meaning Making

The nature of the crisis

Asimplereviewofthemostsalientconceptsinthecognitivemapsoftheleadersrevealsthatoverall

theleadersoftheninememberstatesunderstudydefinetheEuro-crisisasageneralcrisisthat

involvesmemberstates’publicfinancesbutthattheyalsoassociatedwitheconomicgrowth,

(un)employmentandcompetitiveness.Thisalignstoacertainextentwiththepublicdebateinwhich

themostsalientconceptsarefiscalsupportpackage,fiscaldiscipline,economicgrowth,solvingthe

crisisandthesurvivalofEMU(table1).However,aspeoplehaveatendencytorefertoimportant

ideasusingmanydifferentconceptsthatdifferonlyindetailwhilereferringtolessimportantissues

byusingcontainerconcepts,thisdirectcomparisonofconceptsmaydistortreality.3Therefore,the

overlapin‘compoundedconcepts’–groupsofconceptsreferringtoessentiallythesameissue–was

alsoestablished.ThisanalysisrevealsthatthepoliticalandeconomicleadersdefinetheEurocrisis

predominantlyasasovereigndebtcrisisandonlyinsecondinstanceasabroadereconomiccrisis

(table2).Thisalignsverywellwiththeanalysisofthepublicdebateinwhichthecrisisisalso

portrayedpredominantlyasacrisisofpublicfinances.Themaindifferenceisthatwhilethepolitical

andeconomicleadersassociatethecrisiswithstructuralreformsandthemeasurestakenbytheECB,

inthepublicdebatethefiscalsupportmeasuresareamoresalienttopicofdiscussion.

Thecomparisonbetweentheleaders’collectivemeaningmakingandtheperceptionsofthe

Europeancitizensismoredifficult,asinoursurveytherespondentsofeachcountrywereprovided

withtheconceptsusedmostbytheirnationalleadersandthereforethesetofconceptsforthe

respondentsfromdifferentcountriesdiffered.Whenwenonethelessgroupthemapsofallcitizens

togetherandcomparetheircrisisnarrativestothemostsalientconceptsandmostsalient

compoundedconceptoftheleaders,itappearsthatthecollectivecrisisnarrativeoftheleadersdiffer

onimportantaspectsfromthatoftheircitizens,especiallywhenthecompoundedconceptsareused

asameasure.Firstly,citizensaremuchmoreconcernedwithemploymentandeconomicgrowth

thantheirleaders.Inaddition,table2revealsthattheysawtheEurocrisislessasacrisisof

governmentfinancesthantheirleaders.Ontheotherhand,theydoassociatethecrisiswithfiscal

supportmorethantheirpoliticalleadersaswellaswiththerolethefinancialcrisisof2008.Overall,it

isclearthatintheeyesoftheleadersaswellasinthepublicdebate,theEurocrisiswasportrayedas

acrisisofgovernmentfinancesandeconomicgrowth,whilethecitizensassociatedthecrisisfirstand

foremostwithemploymentandgrowth,andwithgovernmentfinancessecond.

3ThismaybeaninstanceofwhathasbecomeknownastheInuit-many-words-for-snowphenomenon,wherebyveryfrequentandnaturaloccurringevents(inourcasedeterioratedpublicfinances)aredescribedbymanydifferentwordsthatcontainnuanceddifferences.Theoccurrenceofmanydifferentwordsmaythussignalthatthephenomenonisactuallyverysalientinthemindofthespeaker.Incidentally,theattributionthattheInuithavemanydifferentwordsishighlycontested.

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HSGandCentralBankers

Sr Op-Eds Sr Citizens Sr

Benefitofall 8,57 Benefitofall 10,19 Euro-crisis/solvingthecrisis 17,16

Eurocrisis 7,24 Euro-crisis 6,33 Employment 4,45

Economicgrowth 6,10 Fiscalsupportpackage 5,57 Economicgrowth 3,93

BenefitoftheMS 4,08 Fiscaldiscipline 3,97 Soundgovernmentfinances 3,12

Benefitofourstate 3,99 Economicgrowth 3,93 Europeancooperation 2,90Structuralreforms 3,78 Solvingthecrisis 3,87 Financialcrisis(2008) 2,33Solvingthecrisis 3,40 SurvivalofEMU 3,41 Fiscalsupportpackage 2,32Soundpublicfinances 3,38 BenefitoftheMS 2,95 Bail-outofbanks 2,11Employment 3,03 Benefitofourstate 2,82 StabilityofEurozone 1,96Competitiveness 2,88 Markettrust 2,59 BenefitoftheMS 1,89Table1:Mostsalientconceptsinthemeaningmakingbyleaders,mediaandcitizens(lightblue:overlapleaders&media/citizens;darkblue:overlapwithleaders)

HSGandCentralBankers

Sr Op-Eds Sr Citizens Sr

Soundgovernmentfinances

15,10 Soundgovernmentfinances

13,21 Crisis-freeEurozone 17,16

Crisis-freeEurozone 10,64 Benefitforeveryone 12,06 Employment 4,45Structuralreforms 10,21 Fiscalsupport 11,27 Economicgrowth 3,93Benefitforeveryone 9,35 Crisis-freeEurozone 10,19 Soundgovernment

finances3,12

ECBmeasures 7,09 Structuralreforms 7,83 Europeancooperation 2,90Economicgrowth 6,94 ECBmeasures 6,10 Financialcrisis(2008) 2,33E(M)Ureforms 5,55 SuccessfulEMU 4,33 Fiscalsupportpackage 2,32StrongerEUfiscalregulation 4,59

HavingtheEuro4,33 Bail-outofbanks4 2,11

Economicdevelopment 4,46 Economicgrowth 4,13 StabilityofEurozone 1,96Financialmarketmeasures 4,36

Financialmarketmeasures 3,93 BenefitoftheMS 1,89

Table2:Mostsalientcompoundedconceptsinthemeaningmakingbyleaders,mediaandcitizens(lightblue:overlapleaders&media/citizens;darkblue:overlapwithleaders)

ThisstudycoverstheEurocrisisfromlate2009until2015,duringthistimeseveralimportantevents

happenedthatmayhavecausedashiftinmeaningmaking.Inordertodeterminetheevolutionin

andconsistencyinleaders’crisismeaningmaking,thecrisiswasdividedintothreeperiods:Thefirst

4Thebail-outofbanksispartofthecompoundedconceptfinancialmarketmeasuresusedintheanalysisoftheleadersandmedia.

14

periodrunsbetweenthemomenttheGreekgovernmentannouncedtheextentoftheirdeficit(05-

11-09andthefirstbail-outdecisions(02-05-10);thesecondperiodbetween2May2010andMario

Draghi’s‘whateverittakes’-speech(26-07-12);andthefinalperiodfrom26July2012andthe

electionoftheSyrizagovernmentinJanuaryof2015.Tables3and4showthetenmostsalient

compoundedconceptsinthemeaningmakingoftheleadersandthemediaineachofthesethree

periods.

Thesetablesshowsthatleaderswerereasonablyconsistentinwhichissuestheymarkedas

mostimportantintheircrisisnarrativethroughoutthecrisis.Regardlessofwhathappenedduring

thecrisis,theissueofsoundgovernmentfinancesremainstheirmainconcern,followedcloselyby

structuralreformsandeconomicgrowth.However,therearealsoimportantdifferencesreflectiveof

theeventsthattookplace.Inthefirstperiod,thefinancialcrisisisstillattheforefrontofleaders’

mindsasistheinstrumentofeconomicstimulation.Inperiodtwo,thecollectivefocusshiftstowards

measureslikestrongerEUfiscalregulationaswellasfiscalsupport,theECBcrisisinterventionsand

theneedforreforms.Inperiodthree,thefocusontheECBcrisisinterventionsandtheneedfor

reformsbecomesstrongerandthereisarenewedconcernforthestateofthefinancialmarkets.The

conceptssoundgovernmentfinancesandstructuralreforms,however,remainthemostsalient.

Period1 S Period2 S Period3 SSoundgovernmentfinances

136 Soundgovernmentfinances

498 Soundgovernmentfinances

277

Structuralreforms 95 Crisis-freeEurozone 345 Structuralreforms 263Benefitforeveryone 70 Benefitforeveryone 316 Crisis-freeEurozone 241Crisis-freeEurozone 56 Structuralreforms 258 ECBmeasures 199Economicstimulation 54 Economicgrowth 230 Benefitforeveryone 178Economicdevelopment 48 ECBmeasures 204 E(M)Ureforms 161Economicgrowth 44 StrongerEUfiscal

regulation182 Economicgrowth 145

Financialcrisis[2008-] 37 Fiscalsupport 179 Financialmarketmeasures

125

Financialmarketmeasures

37 E(M)Ureforms 159 BenefitoftheMS 107

HavingtheEuro 35 Economicdevelopment 128 Benefitofourstate 94Table3:Top10mostSalientcompoundedconceptsovertimeforleaders.S:Saliency.Darkblueconceptsappearinall3periods,lightblueconceptsin2periods.

15

Table4:Tenmostsalientcompoundedconceptsperperiodinthepublicdebate.S:Saliency.Darkblueconceptsappearinall3periods,lightblueconceptsin2periods.

Table4showsthatalsointermsofthepublicdebate,theconsistencyovertimeintermsof

mostsalientconceptsisconsiderable.Likeinthecaseoftheleaders,theconceptsoundgovernment

financesisthemostsalientcompoundedconceptinallperiods,followedcloselybystructural

reforms.However,incontrasttotheleaders,thefiscalsupportmeasuresarealsoconsistently

amongthemostsalientconceptsinthepublicdebate.However,likewiththeleadersthereare

tellingdifferencesinthepublicdebateontheEurocrisisovertime.Moreover,thesechangesdonot

correspondwiththechangesvisibleinthemeaningmakingbytheleaders:Inthefirstperiod,for

instance,opinionleadersassociatedthecrisisexplicitlywiththeGreekfiscalproblemsandin

contrasttotheleaderstherewasalsomuchdiscussionaboutmemberspotentiallyleavingtheEuro.

Inthesecondperiod,thepublicdebatestartstorealignitselfwiththemeaningmakingbythe

leadersdiscussingthestateoftheEMUandneedforreforms.Inperiodthree,thisre-alignment

continuesasfiscalsupportbecomeslightlylessimportantinthepublicdebateandthecrisis

interventionsbytheECBbecomemoreimportant.Likeinthecasewiththeleaders,concernforthe

stateofEMUremainsbuttheissueofaGrexitdisappearsandtheconcepteconomicgrowth-which

wasimportantinthecrisisnarrativeoftheleaders’entersthetop-10ofmostsalientcompounded

conceptsinthepublicdebateontheEurocrisis.Overall,thereseemstobeaconvergencein

meaningmakingovertime,atleastwheretheleadersandpublicdebateisconcerned.

Again,comparisonoftheleadersandcitizensmeaningmakingismoredifficultforthe

citizens.Because,whilethemeaningmakingbytheleadersandmediahasbeenstudiedthroughout

thecrisis,practicalconstraintsprohibitedusfromsurveyingcitizens’crisisleadershipthroughoutthe

Period1 S Period2 S Period3 SSoundgovernmentfinances 129 Soundgovernmentfinances 150 Benefitforeveryone 141Fiscalsupport 126 Benefitforeveryone 142 Crisis-freeEurozone 132Benefitforeveryone 85 Fiscalsupport 131 Soundgovernment

finances124

Structuralreforms 85 Crisis-freeEurozone 126 ECBmeasures 107HavingtheEuro 70 Structuralreforms 87 Fiscalsupport 87Crisis-freeEurozone 53 Financialmarketmeasures 74 Economicgrowth 70Greekfiscalcrisis 46 SuccessfulEMU 65 Structuralreforms 67ECBmeasures 43 Keepallmemberstatesin

theeurozone55 Economic

development48

Economicdevelopment 29 E(M)Ureforms 49 E(M)Ureforms 46Keepallmemberstatesintheeurozone

28 Benefitofourstate 43 SuccessfulEMU 40

16

crisis.Asaresult,theywereaskedonlyoncetoconveytheirideasabouttheeurocrisis.Asthis

surveywasheldinMarchandAprilof2017,longafterthelastperiodofthecrisisincludedinthis

study,themostlogicalcomparisonwouldbebetweenthecrisisnarrativeofthecitizensandthe

meaningmakingoftheleadersinthelastperiodofthecrisis.Apartfromthetime-factor,period

threewasalsothemosttranquilinourstudy,reflectingthesituationofspring2017best.

Table5:Mostsalientcompoundedconceptsinthemeaningmakingbyleaders,mediainperiod3andthecitizens(lightblue:overlapleaders&media/citizens;darkblue:overlapwithleaders)

Thistime-specificcomparisonindeedrevealsmoreoverlapthanthecomparisonbetweenleaders’

mostsalientconceptsoverall(seetable1)andthoseofthecitizens.Thedifference,however,is

minorasonlytheconceptbenefitofthememberstatesisaddedtothelistofoverlap(table5).Itis

clear,thatintermsofissuesaliency,thecollectivecrisisnarrativeofthenationalleadersisonlytoa

limitedextentrepresentativeoftheviewsofthepeople,andmoreoverlapexistsbetweenleaders

ideasandthepublicdebate.

Adifferentwayofestablishinghowthecrisisisdefinedinthedifferentcrisisnarrativesisbylooking

atitsperceivedconsequences.Todothis,weexploredtheconceptsleadersidentifiedmostoftenas

adirectconsequenceofthe(concept)Eurocrisisandinwhatwaythecrisiswasseentoimpacton

5Thebail-outofbanksispartofthecompoundedconceptfinancialmarketmeasuresusedintheanalysisoftheleadersandmedia.

LeadersP3 Sr Op-EdsP3 S CitizensEarly2017 SSoundgovernmentfinances

277 Benefitforeveryone 141 Crisis-freeEurozone 7479

Structuralreforms 263 Crisis-freeEurozone 132 Employment 1941Crisis-freeEurozone 241 Soundgovernment

finances124 Economicgrowth 1712

ECBmeasures 199 ECBmeasures 107 Soundgovernmentfinances

1358

Benefitforeveryone 178 Fiscalsupport 87 Europeancooperation 1263E(M)Ureforms 161 Economicgrowth 70 Financialcrisis(2008) 1014Economicgrowth 145 Structuralreforms 67 Fiscalsupport 1009Financialmarketmeasures

125 Economicdevelopment 48 Bail-outofbanks5 921

BenefitoftheMS 107 E(M)Ureforms 46 StabilityofEurozone 855Benefitofourstate 94 SuccessfulEMU 40 BenefitoftheMS 825

17

thesefactors(positively,negatively,non-existent)andcomparedthiswiththemainconsequences

identifiedinthepublicdiscourseandbytheEuropeanpeople.6

Leaders PublicDiscourse Citizens

ConsequenceSignoflink

ConsequenceSignoflink

ConsequenceSignoflink7

Economicgrowth 15- Benefitofall 4- Employment 89-Benefitofall 3- Politicalinstability 4+ Economicgrowth 83-Employment 7- Publicsupport 3- Europeancooperation 53-

BenefitoftheMS 5- Benefitofthepeople 3- Soundpublicfinances 47-

Benefitofourstate 3- Solvingthecrisis X StabilityofEurozone 60-Strengthofoureconomy 4-/1+ SurvivalofEMU 1- Benefitforourstate 68-Soundpublicfinances 2-/1+ BenefitoftheMS 1- BenefitoftheMS 66-Economicdepression 8+/1- Benefitofourstate 1- Benefitofall 43-

Economicrecovery 5- Fiscalsupportpackage 2#1+ Bail-outofbanks 13+

Pricestability 3+ Economicdepression 4+ StabilityoftheEuro 35-

Competitiveness 2- calmfinancialmarkets 3- Financialcrisis(2008) 34+

Solvingthecrisis 1- Markettrust 2- Economicrecovery 39-SuccessfulEuropeanUnion 1- EMUsplit-off 1-/1+ Competitiveness 22-Economicdevelopment 4- Costs X Economicstrong

Europe 44-Financialstability 2- Employment 3- Fiscalsupport 7+

Fiscalconsolidation 2-/2+ Benefitofdebt-states 3- TheEuro 1+

SuccessfulEMU 1- Shiftingburdentotaxpayer 3+ SuccessfulEuropean

Union 40-

Benefitofthepeople 2- Structuralreforms 1+ TrustintheEuropeanUnion 18-

StabilityofEurozone 2- Welfare 2- Economicdevelopment 33-

Table6:MostsalientconsequencesoftheEurocrisisidentifiedbythedifferentcrisisnarratives(+:positive;-:negative;#:non-existent;x:onlyindirectlinks;lightblue:overlapleaders&media/citizens;darkblue:overlapwithleaders).

6Duetothedifferentaveragesizesofthemapsaswellasdifferentnumberofmapsavailablefortheleaders,mediaandcitizens,weuseddifferentcut-offpoints for the inclusionof theconsequences: respectivelyaminimumof5,3mapsforleadersandmedia.7Formethodologicalreasons,thepositiveconcept‘crisis-freeEurozone’wasusedasthecoreconceptthecitizens’couldusetodrawtheirmaps,whereastheleadersspokeaboutthenegativeconceptEurocrisis.Alsosomeconceptswerewordeddifferentlyforcitizensthanforleaderstomakethemcomprehensible.Tomaketheinformationinthistabledirectlycomparable,wereversedthesignsofthelinksforthecitizensandusedtheoriginalconceptsoftheleaders.

18

ThedirectconsequencesthattheEurocrisishasaccordingtotheleadersincludefirstandforemost

itsnegativeimpactoneconomicgrowthandthegeneralbenefitofeveryone.Inaddition,

unemployment,deterioratingpublicfinancesaswellasadecreaseincompetitivenessareamongst

themainnegativeconsequencesofthecrisisinthemeaningmakingoftheleaders(table6).The

overlapbetweenthisaspectofleaders’meaningmakingandthedirectconsequencesidentifiedin

thepublicdebateisonlylimited.Whilethemediasharetheleaders’concernfortheeffectsofthe

crisisforeveryone,thenegativeeffectofthecrisisonpoliticalstabilityandthepublicopinionisalso

attheforefrontofthedebate.Theseareissuesnotidentifiedasverysalientbytheleaders.Noris

theissueoftheeffectofthecrisisforthewellbeingoftheEuropeanpeopleinspecificorthesurvival

oftheEMU.Overall,theoverlapbetweenthetopmostsalientconsequencesofEurocrisisinthe

crisisnarrativeoftheleadersandthemediaisonly7outof19.Theoverlapbetweenthe

consequencesidentifiedbytheleadersandthecitizensismuchmoreconsiderable:11outofthe19

mostsalientconsequencesoverlap.Moreover,thecitizenssharetheleaders’mainconcernsforthe

effectsoftheEurocrisisonemployment,economicgrowth,thepublicfinancesandcompetitiveness.

DifferencesareonlypresentinlesssalientconsequencesandrevealthatcitizensfeeltheEurocrisis

leadstothebail-outofbanksandacerbatesthefinancialcrisis,whilejeopardisingthestabilityofthe

Euro.Overall,however,aconsiderablecongruenceexistsbetweentheleaders’perceptionofthe

consequencesoftheEurocrisisandthatoftheirconstituents,muchmoresoasbetweenthatof

leadersandthepublicdebate.Thisisincontrasttotheearlierfindingthatoverall,thewaynational

leaderstalkaboutthecrisisandseeasthemostsalientissues,isonlytoalimitedextent

representativeoftheviewsofthepeople,andmorerepresentativeofthepublicdebate.

The causes of the crisis

Inadditiontothenatureandconsequencesofthecrisis,itisimportanttoknowwhattheEuropean

leadersseeasthecausesoftheEurocrisis.For,thenatureofthesecauseswillnotonlyinfluence

whetherandtowhatextentblame-gameswillensueduringthemanagementofthecrisis,whowill

getblamed,butitmayalsodeterminewhatsolutionswillbeproposedandimplemented.Atthe

sametime,theresearchindicatesthatleadersdonotalwaysengageinathoroughdiscussionofthe

causesofthecrisisbeforecomingtoaconclusionastohowtosolveit(VanEschandSwinkels,2016).

Whenlookingatthecausesofthecrisisasidentifiedbythepoliticalandfinancialleadersand

bythepublicopinionmakers,wecandistinguishbetweendirectandindirectcausesoftheEuro

crisis.Forthehighpoliticalandfinancialleaders,theindirectcausesofthecrisisanditspotential

19

solutiondifferoverthetime.8Theonlyconceptfeaturedinallthreeperiodsasageneralcauseisthe

financialcrisisof2007-8.Inthefirstperiod,themaincausesidentifiedwereunsoundpublicfinances

andthefinancialmarkets,asisthecaseforthesecondperiod.Inthethirdperiod,theleaders

identifiedabroaderrangeofcauses,includingthosehavingapotentialamelioratingeffectonthe

Eurozone’spredicament,likestructuralreformsandtheactionsoftheECB.Withregardstothe

publicdebate,suchlongitudinalanalysisofindirectcausesdidnotproducemeaningfulresults.

However,overallthepublicdiscoursefocussedmoreonconceptsliketheneedforpolitical

commitmentandmutualEuropeanactiontosolvethecrisis,aswellas‘Grexit’,theausterity

programmesforproblemstatesandtheactionsbytheECB.Finally,inthepublicdebatethesingle

currencyseemstohavebeenregardedasageneralcauseofEurope’spredicament.

Amoredirectmeasureofthecausesidentifiedinthedifferentcrisisnarrativesisachieved

whenweonlylookatthoseconceptsthatareactuallyconnectedtotheEurocrisisinthecognitive

mapsrepresentingthecrisisnarratives(seetable7).Outofthe25causalconceptsintheleaders’

collectivemeaningmakingthatwerecausallylinkedtotheconceptEurocrisisinmorethanfive

maps,sevenwereseenashavingcontributedtotheoutbreakofthecrisis:thefinancialcrisis,the

bankingcrisis,fiscalexpansionarypolicy,macro-economicimbalances,excessivedebt,theGreek

financialcrisisandthesovereign-banknexus.Thisconfirmsthefindingsfromtheanalysisofindirect

causesthatacombinationofproblemsinthebankingworldandpublicfinancesand–toalesser

extent–structuralmacro-economicimbalancesareseenbytheEuropeanleadersasthemaincauses

ofthecrisis.Thisdiagnosisalmostmirrorthatputforwardinthepublicdebate.Infact,fourofthe

causesidentifiedinthepublicdebateoverlapwiththoseidentifiedbytheleaders:excessivedebt,

theGreekfiscalcrisis,thebankingcrisisandthe2008financialcrisis.Moreover,withexceptionofthe

conceptmacro-economicimbalances,theremainingconcepts(governmentexpenditure,fiscal

disciplineandexcessivedeficits)seemmerevariationsofconceptslikefiscalexpansionarypolicyand

excessivedebtthatwereidentifiedbytheleaders.Clearly,intheeyesoftheleadersandpublic

opinionmakerstheEurocrisiswascausedbyacombinationofbadbanksandunsoundpublic

financesinparticularinGreece.Withinthepublicdebate,however,thereareclearlyalsodissenting

voiceswithregardtotheeffectoffiscalpolicyontheEurocrisis:Whenallviewsaretalliedup,the

conceptfiscaldisciplineisidentifiedasacauseratherthanasolutiontothecrisis.Themaincauses

oftheEurocrisisasidentifiedbytheEuropeancitizensdifferquiteabitfromthoseoftheleaders:

Whereasbothfeelthemaincausesofthecrisisliewiththefailing,andinthecaseofthecitizenswith

thebail-out,ofthebanksaswellaswiththefinancialcrisis,theirdiagnosisdiffersonotheraspects.

TheEuropeanpeople,forinstance,identifybureaucracy,theMSnationalpoliciesingeneralaswell

8ThesewereestablishedusingtheGOWmeasureasdescribedinReportD3.2aandc(VanEschetal2017aandb).

20

asshiftingtheburdensoftoday’spoliciestofuturegenerationsasimportantcausesofthecrisis.

Theydoagree,however,thattoomuchgovernmentspendingcontributedtotheoutbreakofthe

crisis.However,theyfurtherfeelthathightaxesandmarketspeculationweretoblame,issuesthat

werenotidentifiedbytheirleaders.Overall,theoverlapinthecitizensandleaderscrisisnarrative

withregardtothecausesofthecrisispertainstoonlythreeoutofthe7maincausesthattheleaders

identified(table7)andtherebymuchmorelimitedthanthatoftheleadersandthepublicdebate.


CausesSignoflink

CausesSignoflink

Causes9Signoflink

Financialcrisis(2008-) 8+ Excessivedebt 4+/1# Bail-outofbanks 77+/71-

Bankingcrisis 8+ Governmentexpenditure 1+/1# Financialcrisis(2008) 85+/29-

Fiscalexpansionarypolicy

5+/2- Greekfiscalcrisis 3+/1#Bureaucracy 45+/16-

Macroeconomicimbalances 5+ Bankingcrisis 5+ Ournationalpolicies 31+/22-

Excessivedebt 3+ Financialcrisis(2008-) 3+Futuregenerationspayingthepriceforpoliciesoftoday

23+14-

Greekfiscalcrisis 7+ Counterproductiveeconomicmeasures 3+ Government

expenditure 18+/15-Sovereign-banknexus 6+ Fiscaldiscipline 2+/1#/1- Ourstatebailingout

Eurozonestates 19+/11- Excessivedeficits 4+ Hightaxes 20+/6- Marketspeculation 19+/7-Table7:MostsalientcausesoftheEurocrisisidentifiedbythedifferentcrisisnarratives(+:positive;-:negative;#:non-existent;x:onlyindirectlinks;lightblue:overlapleaders&media/citizens;darkblue:overlapwithleaders).

The solutions to the crisis

Exploringtheperceivedcausesofthecrisisalreadyprovidesuswithanideaofwhatleaderspropose

shouldhappentosolvethecrisis.However,asitisnotnecessarilythecasethatleadersare

consistentintheirmeaningmakingregardingthecausesandsolutionstoacrisis(VanEschand

Swinkels,2016),exploringtheconceptsthatdirectlyfeedintotheconceptsolvingthecrisisinthe

differentcognitivemaps,mayprovideamoreadequatemeasure(seetable8).Intheeyesofthe

leaders,themostimportantwaytosolvetheEurocrisisistoengageisstructuralreforms.This

9Theconceptslistedhere,arethosethatfeednegativelyintotheconceptCrisis-freeEurozoneinthemapsofthecitizens.

21

proposedsolutioniscloselyfollowedbyfiscalconsolidationandanincreaseincompetitivenessand

economicgrowth.Againthemeaningmakingbytheleadersreflectsthepublicdebateregardingthe

mostdesirablesolutionstothecrisisreasonablywell:Fiveoftheninesolutionstothecrisisidentified

asmostsalientinthepublicdebatearealsoincludedintheleaders’listof11mostsalientsolutions:

Economicgrowth,fiscaldiscipline,fiscalsupportpackages,fiscalconsolidationandstructural

reforms.However,somenotabledifferencesdoexist.Firstly,publicopinionmakersacrosstheEU

placemorevalueoneconomicgrowthandfiscalsupportasthebestsolutiontothecrisisandalso

identifytheECBassetpurchasesasanimportantmeasurewhereastheleadersdonot.Moreover,

competitivenessandtheneedforsolidarityandmakingamutualEuropeanefforttosolvethecrisis

areabsentfromthelistofmostsalientsolutionsidentifiedinthepublicdiscourse.Finally,thereis

muchdiscussionaboutthepreciseeffectofcertainmeasuresinthemedia.Mostnotably,thereis

discordaboutwhetherstructuralreformswillactuallyhelptosolveorworsenthecrisis,andsome

alsodenythatfiscaldisciplinemayprovideasolutiontothecrisis.


SolutionsSignoflink

SolutionsSignoflink

Solutions10Signoflink

Structuralreforms 8+ Economicgrowth 3+/1# Soundgovernment

finances11 184+/37-

Fiscalconsolidation 3+ Fiscalsupportpackage 3+/2# European

cooperation12 163+/30-GovernmentandECBcrisismeasures 2+/2# Eurocrisis X Employment 137+/50-Fiscaldiscipline 2+/1# Fiscaldiscipline 3+/4# Economicgrowth 132+/37-

Competitiveness 7+ ECBassetpurchases 3+/1# CompliancewithSGP

norms 107+/26-

Economicgrowth 6+ Fiscalconsolidation 3+/1# Fiscalsupport

package 63+/49-MutualEuropeaneffort 3+ EUleadership X StabilityofEurozone 79+/20-

Solidarity 4+ Structuralreforms 1+/1# Economicrecovery 70+/24-

Stronginstitutionalframework 2+ TheEuro 58+/35-Fiscalsupportpackage 3+/1# SuccessfulEMU 69+/13-CompliancewithSGPnorms 1+/1# Competitiveness 49+/28-Table8:MostsalientsolutionstotheEurocrisisidentifiedbythedifferentcrisisnarratives(+:positive;-:negative;#:non-existent;x:onlyindirectlinks;lightblue:overlapleaders&media/citizens;darkblue:overlapwithleaders).

10Theconceptslistedhere,arethosethatfeedpositivelyintotheconceptCrisis-freeEurozoneinthemapsofthecitizens.11Theconceptsfiscaldisciplineandfiscalconsolidationweremergedwiththeconceptsoundpublicfinancesforthecitizens’maps.12TheconceptsEuropeancooperationandmutualEuropeaneffortweremergedforthecitizens’maps.

22

Withregardtothesolutionstothecrisis,theideasoftheleaderstieinevenmoreclosely

withthoseassertedbytheEuropeancitizens.Liketheirleaders,citizensstresstheneedforsound

governmentalfinances,Europeancooperationandeconomicgrowth.Moreover,theyalsofeel

compliancewiththeSGP,fiscalsupportandanincreaseincompetitivenesscouldhelpEuropeexit

thecrisis.Inadditiontothesolutionstheysharewiththeirleaders,however,theyalsostressthe

needforincreasingemployment-ratesandseemtohavemorefaithintheEuroandEMUthantheir

leaders,indicatingthatastableEurozone,theEuroandasuccessfulEMUwouldhelpsolvethecrisis.

Overall,thecongruencebetweenleaders’andcitizens’narrativesonthesolutionsofthecrisisis6

outof11concepts.

Uptothispoint,theanalysisofthesolutionstotheEurocrisisisbasedonthesaliencyand

distributionofindividualconceptsovermaps.However,clearcategoriesofinstrumentsmaybe

distinguishedbygroupingsimilarconceptstogether(VanEschetal,2017a).Comparingtheleaders’

discussionoftheinstrumentswiththoseofthemediaandcitizens,afewmarkeddifferencesand

similaritiesstandout.First,inthecrisisnarrativeoftheleaders,structuralreformsarethemost

discussedinstrument,followedbytheECBmeasuresandinstitutionalEUorEMUreforms.Wherethe

leadersidentifiedthefinancialcrisisandsoundpublicfinancesasthemaincausesofthecrisis,

tacklingtheseproblemsarerespectivelyonlynumber5and4onthelistofmostsalientsolutions.In

themedia’snarrativeoftheEuro-crisis,fiscalsupportwasidentifiedasthemostdiscussed

instrumentinsolvingthecrisis.FollowedbystructuralreformsandECBmeasures.Strangelyenough,

strongerEUfiscalregulationisratherlowonthelist,althoughproblemswithpublicfinanceswere

seenasthemaincauseofthecrisis.Similarlyremarkableisthateconomicstimulationwasnot

identifiedasthego-tomeasuretosolvethiscrisisinthepublicdebate.Inthecrisisnarrativeofthe

citizens,reformsofEMUandtheEUarethenumberoneinstrumentseentosolvethecrisis,followed

closelybyfinancialmarketmeasures(no.5ontheleaders’list)andthego-tomeasureoftheleaders,

structuralreformsandfiscalsupport.ThegreatestdiscrepancyexistinthevalueoftheECBmeasures

thatdoesnotplayasignificantroleinthepeople’smeaningmakingofthecrisis,butwasidentified

bytheleadersasthesecondmostimportantinstrumenttotacklethecrisis.Lookingatthedistance

oftherankingsofthedifferentinstrumentsinthecrisisnarrativeoftheleaders,themediaandthe

citizens,againaslightlygreaterdiscrepancyexistsbetweenthemeaningmakingbyleadersand

citizensthanthatofthemedia(sumofdistancescores:14versus12).

23

Leaders PublicDiscourse CitizensInstruments Rank Rank Distance Rank Distance

ECBMeasures 2 3 1 7 5Economicstimulation 7 7 0 6 1E(M)Ureforms 3 5 2 1 2Financialmarketmeasures 5 4 1 2 3Fiscalsupport 6 1 5 4 2StrongerEUfiscalregulation 4 6 2 5 1Structuralreforms 1 2 1 3 0Table9:PreferredinstrumentstotackletheEurocrisisidentifiedbythedifferentcrisisnarratives(darkblueisadistanceoflowerthan3withtheleaders’narrative).

Issue-Saliency

Intermsofissuesaliency,thecomparisonofthecrisisnarrativeespousedbythenationalleaders,

thepublicdiscourseandtheircitizens,revealssomeinterestingpatterns.13Firstly,thereare

considerabledifferencesintheextenttowhichnationalpoliticalleadersactuallyrepresentthepublic

discourseandtheircitizens’beliefsintheirmeaningmaking.Withregardtothecitizens,theleast

representativeleaderistheDutchformerPrimeMinister(PM),JanPeterBalkenendewithΔS=0,671.

Thisscoreismorethantwostandarddeviationsaboveaverage.TheDutchPMiscloselyfollowedby

GordonBrownandBrianCowenwhosescoresofrespectively0,618and0,543aremorethanone

standarddeviationaboveaverage.Incontrast,themostrepresentativeleaderintermsofhis

meaningmakingoftheEurocrisisistheHungarianPMViktorOrban.WithΔS=0,297,hisscoreismore

thanonestandarddeviationbelowaverage.

Whenthedeltascoresforusedconceptsareassessed-meaningthatonlytheconceptsthat

bothleadersandcitizensusedaretakenintoconsideration-theimagechanges.Usingthismeasure,

thecrisisnarrativeoftheIrishPMBrianCowenisnowleastrepresentativeofhisconstituents

thinkingabouttheEurocrisiswithascoreof0,521,twostandarddeviationsaboveaverage.Viktor

Orban’snarrativeisagainthemostrepresentativewithΔS=0,297,closelyfollowedbytheformer

ItalianPMMatteoRenziwithascoreof0,258.Bothscoresaremorethanonestandarddeviation

belowtheaverage.

13TheΔSUscoresforthecitizenscannotbecompareddirectlytothoseofthemedia,sincethemethodthroughwhichthecognitivemapswerederiveddifferforthetwogroups.

24

Leader ΔSCitizens ΔSUCitizens CitizenRank

ΔSMedia

ΔSUMedia

MediaRank

TotalRank

Merkel 0,348 0,339 3 0,297- 0,224- 2 1

Rasmussen 0,485 0,405 13 0,332 0,289 4 6

Thorning-Schmidt 0,431 0,413 11 0,502 0,403 11 13Rajoy 0,420 0,391 8 0,388 0,330 7 7

Zapatero 0,345 0,311 2 0,447 0,370 9 4Hollande 0,472 0,390 12 0,358 0,239- 3 3

Sarkozy 0,432 0,406 10 0,352 0,297 5 5Orban 0,297- 0,297- 1 x x x x

Cowen 0,543+ 0,521++ 16 0,279- 0,226- 1 9Kenny 0,414 0,404 9 0,381 0,345 8 8

Monti 0,406 0,392 7 0,429 0,429 10 10Renzi 0,433 0,258- 4 0,495 0,495+ 13 12

Balkenende 0,671++ 0,354 15 0,811++ 0,532+ 15 15Rutte 0,365 0,331 5 0,408 0,299 6 2

Brown 0,618+ 0,316 14 0,637+ 0,363 14 14Cameron 0,359 0,359 6 0,528 0,433 12 11

Mean 0,440 0,368 0,42914 0,351 SD 0,100 0,061 0,1251 0,087 Table10:RepresentativenessofLeaders’MeaningMakingontheEurocrisis(-:mean-1SD,+:mean+1SD,++:mean+2SD)

WhenbothΔSandΔSUaretakenintoaccountandtheleadersarerankedinordertoteaseout

themeaningofthefindings,someadditionalpatternsbecomevisible.Firstly,bothleadersthatonly

servedduringthefirststageofthecrisis,BalkenendeandBrown,haverelativelyunrepresentative

scoreswhileRenziwhoonlyservedduringthelastperiodofthecrisishasarelativelyhigh

representativescore.AsthecitizenswereaskedtorelaytheirvisionoftheEurocrisisinearly2017,

theseoutcomesarelikelytobeinpartamethodologicalartefact.Atthesametime,timingdoesnot

explaineverything:TheFrenchPresidentFrancoisHollande,whoalsoonlyservedinthelastperiod

wedistinguishinourstudy,hasarelativelylowscore.Secondly,takingallscoresintoaccount,the

HungarianPMOrbanemergesastheleaderwhosemeaningmakingoftheEurocrisisrepresentshis

constituents’perspectivemostclosely.HeiscloselyfollowedbytheformerSpanishPMZapateroand

theonlypoliticalleaderthatsurvivedtheentirecrisisinoffice,theGermanChancellorMerkel.

Numbers4and5onthelistofleadersadvocatingthemostrepresentativecrisisnarrativeareRenzi

andtheDutchPMRutte.

14Thecalculationofthemeanandstandarddeviationofthemediadeltasincludethecomparisonscoresforthesaliencyofthecitizensofeachcountry.Thecorrecteddeltas for Irishand Italiancitizenswere relativelyhigh (mean+1SD),meaningthat thereare largedifferencesbetweentheextent towhichthe Irishand Italianmedia findan issue importantandtheextenttowhichtheIrishandItaliancitizensdo.

25

Whencomparingleaders’meaningmakingwiththepublicdiscourse–asvoicedinop-edsin

fourofeachcountries’majornewspaperswithvariousideologicalleanings–againtheleast

representativeleaderintermsofDeltavaluesisJanPeterBalkenendewithaveryhighscoreof

0,811,morethantwostandarddeviationsaboveaverage.HeiscloselyfollowedbyGordonBrown,

who,withascoreof0,637,ismorethanonestandarddeviationabovetheaverage.Incontrastthe

scoresofAngelaMerkel(0,297)andoddlyenough,BrianCowen(0,279)–whowastheleast

representativeleaderintermsofcitizens-areveryrepresentativewithaDeltaofmorethanone

standarddeviationbelowaverage.Whenlookingatthecorrectedscores,theleastrepresentative

leaderisagainJanPeterBalkenende,followedbyMatteoRenzi,bothwithscoresmorethanone

standarddeviationabovetheaverage(0,532and0,495).Incontrast,thecrisisnarrativeofMerkel,

HollandeandCowenreflectthepublicdiscourseintheircountriesrelativelywellwithrespective

scoresof0,224,0,239and0,226.

Overall,withanaverageΔSandΔSUof0,440and0,368onaspectrumof0to1andsome

scoreswellbelowtheseaverages,thecrisisnarrativesofthenationalleadersshowconsiderable

overlapwiththatoftheirpeople.However,thelevelofcongruencediffersquiteabitbetween

leaders,withOrban,Merkel,RenziandRuttecomingoutasmostrepresentativeandCowen,

Balkenende,Brown,RasmussenandHollandeastheleastrepresentative.TakingboththeΔSandΔSU

scorestogether,intoaccount

Thecongruencebetweenleaders’narrativesandthenationalpublicdebate,withanaverage

ΔSandΔSUof0,429and0,351,isslightlyhigher.However,thevariationincongruencescoresforthe

publicdebateishigherandaverydifferentpictureemergesfromthatoftheoverlapbetween

leadersandcitizens.For,takingbothmeasuretogether,themostrepresentativeofthepublic

debate,istheIrishleaderCowenandthirdandfourthonthelistareHollandeandRasmussen:all

threeofwhichwereamongsttheleaderswhosenarrativewasleastrepresentativeofthatoftheir

citizens.However,incontrastAngelaMerkel’smeaningmakingcomesoutasveryrepresentativeof

bothhercitizensandtheGermanpublicdebate.Finally,theleadersleastrepresentativeofthepublic

debateareBalkenendeandBrown,whoalsoscoredbadlyintermsoftheirconstituents,theyare

followedbyThorning-Schmidt,RenziandCameron.Allinall,thedifferencesinscoresbetweenthe

congruencebetweenleadersandcitizensandleadersandthepublicdebatemaywarrantthe

conclusionthatinsomecountriesthenarrativevoicedinthemediaclearlydoesnotreflectthe

concernsofthepeople.However,theonlyleaderthatsuccessfullysurvivedtheEurocrisis(and

beyond),AngelaMerkel,alsonavigatesthisdividemostsuccessfullyandcomesoutasthemost

representativeingeneral.

26

Representative of Whom?

Withregardtothecitizens,however,onemayaskthequestionofwhosebeliefsontheEurocrisis

areactuallyrepresentedbestbytheleaders’meaningmaking.Inordertofindout,wedividedeach

setofnationalrespondentsindifferentcategoriesonthebasisofadditionalquestionsposedtothem

inthesurvey:Thequestionthataskedrespondentshowtheleadermadethemfeelandthequestion

whatpartytheywouldvoteforifelectionswereheldthatday.

Withregardtothequestionastohowtheleadermadethemfeel,weaskedrespondentsto

clickoneofasetofemoticonsdisplayingaspectrumofemotions.Wesubsequentlyclassifiedthe

respondentsthatansweredthequestionwithan‘OK’,‘Happy’or‘Love’-emojias‘happywiththe

leader’.Therespondentsthatrespondedbyclickingthe‘Angry’,‘Scared’or‘Sad’-emojiwere

categorisedas‘unhappywiththeleader’.Ouranalysisrevealsthatthereareindeeddifferences

betweenhowwellthecrisisnarrativesofleadersoverlapwiththecitizensthatarehappywiththem

andthosethatareunhappywiththem.However,inseveralcasesthesedifferencesaresmallerand

evencontrarytowhatonemayexpect.

Withregardtothecitizensthatwerehappywiththeirnationalleaders,themostremarkable

findingconcernstheformer(andcurrent)DanishPMLarsLøkkeRasmussenwhosecrisisnarrative

differssignificantlyfromthatofthepeoplethatarehappywithhim.HisΔSof0,536ismorethanone

standarddeviationabovetheaverage.However,interestinglytheoverlapofhismeaningmakingof

theEurocrisiswiththatofcitizensthatarenothappywithhimisalsoverylimitedwithascoreof

0,481whichismorethanastandarddeviationabovetheaverage.Incontrastandinlinewiththe

expectation,thecrisisnarrativeofViktorOrban(0,295)andAngelaMerkel(0,325)(bothmorethan

oneSDbelowaverage)overlaptoasignificantextentwiththatofthecitizensthatfeelhappyabout

theirleadership.Moreover,Orban’smeaningmakingalsodoesnotdivergemuchfromthe

Hungariansthatareunhappywithhim.Actually,hisscoreforthisgroupisonlyslightlyhigherat

0,301,whichstillismorethanonestandarddeviationbelowaverage.Inlinewithwhatmaybe

expected,though,theoverlapbetweenthecrisisnarrativeofHollandeandthoseFrenchcitizensthat

feelunhappywithisquiteconsiderable(0,489).

WhenΔSUisused,Rasmussen’snarrativestillshowlittleoverlapwiththatofthecitizensthat

are(nonetheless)happywithhim(0,451),whiletheformerIrishleaderEndaKenny’snarrativealso

conformstotheexpectationbyshowinglittlecorrespondencewiththatofthepeoplethatare

unhappywithhim(0,441).ThescoresofViktorOrban(0,295/0,301)andespeciallyMateoRenzi

(0,272/0,269)arepeculiarinthesensethattheirnarrativesarequiterepresentativeofboththe

citizensthatarehappyandunhappywiththem(seetablex).

27

Leader ΔSHappycitizens

ΔSUHappycitizens

HappyRank

ΔSUnhappy

ΔSUUnhappy

UnhappyRank

Dif.ΔSHappy/Unhappy

Dif.ΔSUHappy/Unhappy

Merkel 0,325- 0,315 2 0,384 0,374 1 -0,059- -0,059-Rasmussen 0,536+ 0,451+ 9 0,481+ 0,399 9 0,055+ 0,052Rajoy 0,386 0,366 5 0,432 0,399 4 -0,046 -0,033Hollande 0,441 0,346 8 0,489 0,412 2 -0,047 -0,066-Orban 0,295- 0,295- 1 0,301- 0,301- 6 -0,005 -0,005Kenny 0,398 0,382 7 0,450 0,441+ 3 -0,052 -0,058Renzi 0,457 0,272- 4 0,438 0,269- 7 0,018 0,003Rutte 0,397 0,356 6 0,349 0,315 8 0,048+ 0,041+Cameron 0,354 0,354 3 0,376 0,376 5 -0,022 -0,022Mean 0,399 0,349 0,411 0,365 -0,012 -0,016

SD 0,073 0,052 0,063 0,057 0,044 0,043Table11:RepresentativenessofLeaders’MeaningMakingofCitizensthatareHappyandUnhappywiththem(-:mean-1SD,+:mean+1SD,++:mean+2SD,scoresinblueconformwithexpectations)

Thelasttwocolumnsoftablexshowthedifferencesbetweenthescoresofthecomparison

withthehappycitizensandwiththeunhappycitizens.Intuitively,thesescoresshouldbenegativeas

thenarrativeofleadersshouldhavesmallerdifferenceswiththenarrativeofcitizensthatarehappy

withthemcomparedtothenarrativeofcitizensthatareunhappywiththem.Thisisthecaseforsix

leaders;AngelaMerkel,MarianoRajoy,FrançoisHollande,ViktorOrban,EndaKennyandDavid

Cameron.Ofthesecomparisons,thescoresofMerkelandHollandeareespeciallyremarkable,

becausethescoresdiffermorethanonestandarddeviationbelowtheaverage,indicatinga

considerabledifference.Forthreeleaders,thedifferenceislowerforthecitizensthatareunhappy

withthemthanforthecitizensthatarehappywiththem:LarsLøkkeRasmussen,MatteoRenziand

MarkRutte.ForRasmussenandRutte,theirscoresaremorethanonestandarddeviationabovethe

average.Thisshowsthatbeinghappywithyourleaderdoesnotalwaysresultfromsharingthesame

view,orviceversaandthatotherfactorsmaybeatplay.Also,itappearscitizensmaystronglyagree

withtheirleaders,butstillbeunhappywiththem.

Asimilaranalysiswasdoneseparatingrespondentswhoindicatedthattheywouldvotefortheparty

oftheleaderinquestion,andthosewhowouldvoteforadifferentpartyornotvoteatall.

28

Leader ΔSVoters

ΔSUVoters

RankVoters

ΔSNon-voters

ΔSUNon-voters

RankNon-voters

Diff.ΔS

Diff.ΔSU

Merkel 0,354- 0,344 2 0,355 0,345 5 -0,001 -0,001Rasmussen 0,550 0,456+ 13 0,484 0,403 13 0,067 0,052+Thorning-Schmidt

0,411 0,399 8 0,438 0,417 11 -0,027 -0,018

Rajoy 0,394 0,369 6 0,436 0,404 9 -0,042 -0,036-Zapatero 0,378 0,346 4 0,338- 0,305- 2 0,040 0,041Hollande 0,445 0,364 7 0,480 0,397 12 -0,035 -0,034-Sarkozy 0,433 0,398 9 0,437 0,412 10 -0,004 -0,014Orban 0,313- 0,313 1 0,307- 0,307- 1 0,006 0,006Cowen 0,576 0,565++ 16 0,537 0,512++ 16 0,039 0,053+Kenny 0,461 0,449 12 0,408 0,398 8 0,053 0,051+Monti 0,674+ 0,383 14 0,406 0,393 7 0,268++ -0,010Renzi 0,451 0,269- 3 0,434 0,261- 4 0,016 0,007Balkenende 0,693+ 0,373 15 0,671++ 0,353 15 0,022 0,021Rutte 0,441 0,400 10 0,358 0,322 3 0,083 0,078+Brown 0,600+ 0,300- 11 0,628 0,327 14 -0,029 -0,027-Cameron 0,367 0,367 5 0,369 0,369 6 -0,002 -0,002Mean 0,471 0,381 0,443 0,370 0,028 0,011SD 0,114 0,069 0,100 0,060 0,074 0,035Table12:RepresentativenessofLeaders’MeaningMakingofCitizensthatareHappyandUnhappywiththem(-:mean-1SD,+:mean+1SD,++:mean+2SD,scoresinblueconformwithexpectations).

Thegreatestgapbetweentheircrisisnarrativeandthatofthesupportersoftheirpartyisfoundfor

JanPeterBalkenende,GordonBrownandMarioMontiwitharespectivescoreof0,693,0,600and

0,674,allofwhicharemorethanastandarddeviationaboveaverage.VictorOrban(0,313)and

AngelaMerkel(0,354)emergeasmostrepresentativeofthebeliefsoftheirfollowersintheir

meaningmakingwithscoresmorethanastandarddeviationbelowaverageintermsofDeltaS.

ApplyingtheΔSUmeasureresultsindrasticdifferentoutcomes.15Thesmallestcongruenceoccurs

betweenBrianCowenandhisfollowers(0,565,morethantwoSDaboveaverage),followedbyLars

LøkkeRasmussen(0,456,oneSDaboveaverage).ThecrisisnarrativeofMatteoRenzi(0,269)and

GordonBrown(0,300)aremostrepresentativeofthatoftheirvoterswithscoresmorethanone

standarddeviationbelowaverage.

Fortherespondentsthatindicatedtheywouldvoteforapartyotherthanthatoftheleader

ornotvoteatall,JanPeterBalkenende(0,671)againcameoutastheleastrepresentativeleader.

TheΔSUscoresshowaslightlydifferentpattern.BrianCowentakestheplaceofJanPeterBalkenende

ofleastrepresentativeleaderwithascoreof0,512,morethantwostandarddeviationsabove

15Thisdifferencemaybearesultofthelimitedsizeofthegroupsthatindicatedtovoteforthepartyoftheleader.Thisresultsinsmallmapsandinwhichmanyoftheconceptsusedbytheleaderarenotincluded.

29

average.Moreremarkably,however,isthatseveralleaders’crisisnarrativesactuallyshowa

considerableoverlapwiththatofthepeoplethatwouldnotvoteforthem.ViktorOrbanandJosé

LuisRodriquezZapatero,forinstancevoiceverysimilaropinionsasthepeoplethatwouldnotvote

forthemwithscoresofrespectively0,307and0,338,morethanonestandarddeviationbelow

average.UsingtheDeltaSUsedmeasure,doesnotchangethispicture(scores0,305;0,307),itonly

addsMatteoRenziwithascoreof0,261,asoneoftheleadersthatvoicetheopinionsofpeoplethat

donotpoliticallysupportthemverywell.

Comparingthecongruencescoresbetweentheleaderandtheirvotersandthosebetween

leadersandthepeoplethatwouldnotvoteforthemrevealthatOrban,ZapateroandRenziarenot

theonlyleadersthatshowapeculiarpattern.Likeinthecasewithhappyandunhappyvoters,one

wouldexpecttheoverlapbetweenthestoriesofleadersandtheirvoterstobegreaterthanthatwith

peoplethatwouldnotvoteforthem,andassuchtheresultofdetractingthesoreofthelatterfrom

thefirst(seetablex)tobenegative.Thisisindeedthecaseforsevenleaders:Merkel,Thorning-

Schmidt,Rajoy,Hollande,Sarkozy,BrownandCameronandpartlyforMonti.However,thecrisis

narrativeofeightleadersisclosertothepeoplethatwouldnotvoteforthem:Rasmussen,Luis

Zapatero,Orban,Cowen,Kenny,Renzo,BalkenendeandRutte.Thisissurprising,asitmeansthat

partyaffiliationmaynotbeanimportantpredictorforsubstantiveagreementbetweenleaderand

citizen(orviceversa).

Ideological Distance

Inadditiontocalculatingthecongruencebetweennationalleadersandtheircitizenswasestablished

bycalculatingtowhatextenttheirmapscontainreferencetotheKeynesianandOrdoliberal

paradigms.Theoverviewoftheideologicaldistancebetweenthenationalleadersandtheircitizens

asreportedbelowrevealssomeinterestingpatternsbothincomparisontoeachotherandtothe

resultsoftheanalysisintermsofissuesaliency.

ThefirstcomparisonisthatbetweenthecognitivemapsoftheDanishprimeministers

RasmussenandThorning-Schmidttotheirconstituents.Asshowninfigure3,16theideasofboth

DanishleadersaremoreKeynesianthanOrdoliberalthroughoutthecrisis.Rasmussenscoresare

mostKeynesian,especiallyinperiod1.Duringthattimehisideasaremorethanonestandard

deviationaboveaveragewhenwetakethefactorbetweenKeynesianandOrdo-liberalideasasa

measure.RasmussenalsotalksalotmoreabouttheeconomicdimensionofthecrisisthanThorning-

Schmidt,especiallyinperiod2.Thorning-Schmidt’sattentionforthisdimensionslipsawayduringthe

16 The scores for the level of Keynesian ideas is made artificially negative for the benefit of visual representation. This does not have a substantive meaning.

30

lastperiodofthecrisisstudiedinthisreport.Liketheirleaders,thecollectivecognitivemapofthe

DanishcitizensismoreKeynesianthanOrdoliberalinnature,howevertheirviewsarelessKeynesian

thanthoseoftheirPrimeMinisters.

Figure3:IdeologicaldistancebetweentheDanishleadersandtheirconstituents.

TurningtoFrance,aremarkablepatternofchangeappears.PresidentSarkozystartoutasa

stronglyKeynesianleaderwhenthecrisisstarts,however,hewitnessesacompleteU-turninhis

convictionsduringperiod2(seefigure4).Infact,hedevelopsintoastrongOrdoliberal(seeVanEsch,

2014).However,atthesametimethathemakesthisU-turn,hisattentionfortheeconomic

dimensionsoftheEurocrisisdeclines.WiththeelectionofHollande,FranceregainsaPresidentwith

solidKeynesianviewsofthecrisis.Infact,likeSarkozyinperiod1,Hollande’sideasaremore

Keynesianthanthatofhiselectorate.Theviewsdisplayedinthecollectivecognitivemapofthe

FrenchcitizensarehoweverstillsolidlyKeynesianatthetimethesurveytookplace(spring2017).

-30.00 -20.00 -10.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00

Rasmussenp1

Rasmussenp2

Thorning-Schmidtp2

Thorning-Schmidtp3

Danishciizens

Rasmussenp1 Rasmussenp2 Thorning-Schmidtp2

Thorning-Schmidtp3 Danishciizens

Keynesian -24.24 -24.69 -14.36 -11.59 -15.05

Ordoliberal 9.09 13.58 9.39 6.29 13.12

31

Figure4:IdeologicaldistancebetweentheFrenchleadersandtheirconstituents

Figure5:IdeologicaldistancebetweentheGermanleaderandherconstituents

Germanyisaspecialcaseinthisstudy,asitsChancellorMerkelistheonlyleaderthatisin

officeatthestartoftheEuro-crisisandmanagestostayinofficeuntilthisday.Fromfigure5,itis

evidentthatoneofthemainchangessheexperiences,isthatherattentionfortheeconomic

dimensionofthecrisisdecreasessignificantly.Throughoutthecrisis,Merkelisandremaina

convincedOrdoliberal,however,interestinglyshebecomelessextremeinherviewovertime(see

alsotable13).Itmayseemcurioustoseetheleaderofthemostpowerfulmemberstate

-30.00 -20.00 -10.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00

Sarkozyp1

Sarkozyp2

Hollandep3

Frenchciizens

Sarkozyp1 Sarkozyp2 Hollandep3 FrenchciizensKeynesian -26.76 -7.92 -20.26 -17.26

Ordoliberal 7.04 12.92 8.62 14.07

-30.00 -20.00 -10.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00

Merkelp1

Merkelp2

Merkelp3

Germanciizens

Merkelp1 Merkelp2 Merkelp3 GermanciizensKeynesian -5.26 -5.68 -3.23 -5.60

Ordoliberal 21.05 16.19 8.87 9.78

32

compromiseintothedirectionoftheviewsofherjuniorpartnersintheEUovertime.However,our

studyalsoshowsthat–althoughtheGermancitizensaresolidlyOrdoliberalintheirthinking–they

aremuchmoremoderateintheirviewsthantheirChancellorstartsoutwith.Merkel’schangeof

viewsmaythushavebeenanadaptationtotheviewsoftheGermanpeopleratherthantoherEU

partners.

Figure6:IdeologicaldistancebetweentheHungarianleaderandhisconstituents

TheHungarianPrimeMinisterOrbanscoresquiteconsistentlyOrdoliberalthroughoutthe

crisis,moreover,hisscoresarequiteextremeandcomingclosetothoseofMerkel.However,he

doestalklessabouttheecodimensionoftheeurocrisis.Whileatthelevelofconcepts,Orbanhasa

verygoodfitwithhiscitizens(seeabove),whenhisentiremapsisanalysedholisticallyandthe

ideologicaldistancebetweenhisviewsandthoseoftheHungariancitizensintermofparadigmare

compared,asignificantdifferencebetweenOrbanandtheHungarianpeopleemerges.For,asfigure

6shows,incontrasttotheirPM,theHungarianpeoplearedecidedlyKeynesianintheirviews.This

outcomeillustratestheimportanceoftakingintoaccounttherelationsandnormativeevaluations

embeddedinleaders’andcitizens’statementsandthemeritofaCManalysisoveraword-based

analysis.Furtheranalysisisnecessary,butthisstarkdifferenceinideologicaldistanceanddifference

inissuesaliency,mayalsoofferanexplanationforthepoorexplanatoryvalueofOrban'stheDelta

scoresforhislegitimacyintheeyesoftheHungarianpeople.Furtherresearchshouldindicate

whetherthescoresattheparadigmaticlevelwouldbebettersuitedtoexplainleaders'legitimacyin

theeyesoftheircitizens.

-30.00 -20.00 -10.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00

Orbanp2

Orbanp3

Hungarianciizens

Orbanp2 Orbanp3 HungarianciizensKeynesian -4.08 -5.24 -12.64

Ordoliberal 12.76 14.52 7.44

33

Figure7:IdeologicaldistancebetweentheHungarianleaderandhisconstituents.

TheviewsoftheIrishPMKennyarequiteOrdoliberalduringbothperiod1and2ofthecrisis.

Hissuccessor,KennystartsoutasslightlyOrdoliberalinperiod2butthedifferenceinscorebetween

hisKeynesianandOrdoliberalideasisverysmall.So,althoughduringperiod3,KennymakesaU-turn

inthathisviewsofthecrisisbecomemoreKeynesianthanOrdoliberal,thechangeisrelativelysmall

intermsofthescores.LikeMerkel,however,hischangeinviewsmaybeinstigatedbyawishto

representtheviewsoftheIrishcitizensbetter.Fortheircollectivecognitivemap(sourcedafter

period3)showaverymildKeynesiandominanceinideasontheEuro-crisis.Again,thedifference

withthescoreoftheOrdoliberalideasis,however,verysmall.Moreover,thecitizensseemless

focussedontheeconomicdimensionoftheEuro-crisis.AllinallitisclearthattheideasofKenny

correspondmoretothoseoftheIrishcitizensthatthoseofCowen.However,duetothetimingof

thesurvey,thismaypartlybeatime-effect.

WithregardtotheItalianleadersandcitizens,alackofsourceshaspreventedusfrom

studyingthebeliefsofBerlusconiwhowasinofficeatthestartoftheEuro-crisis.HissuccessorMario

Montiappearstobeveryoccupiedwiththeeconomicdimensionofthecrisisduringperiod2andhis

viewsasrepresentedinhiscognitivemapareslightlymoreKeynesianthanOrdoliberal.Inperiod3,

Montidevotesonlyhalfofthewordsonthetopicthanhedidinperiod2andatthesametimehis

viewsbecomeslightlymoreOrdoliberalthanKeynesian.Whilethisthusconstitutesaparadigmatic

U-turn,thedifferencebetweenthesaliencyofhisKeynesianandOrdoliberalideasremainsvery

small.RatherthaninterpretinghisviewsaspredominantlyOrdoliberal,realisticallyhisviewsare

-30.00 -20.00 -10.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00

Cowenp1

Cowenp2

Kennyp2

Kennyp3

Irishciizens

Cowenp1 Cowenp2 Kennyp2 Kennyp3 IrishciizensKeynesian -8.87 -10.00 -10.57 -16.35 -8.62

Ordoliberal 20.97 23.91 12.60 9.62 7.81

34

moreaccuratelyinterpretedascombiningideasfrombothparadigms.HissuccessorRenzitalks

slightlylessabouttheeconomicdimensionofthecrisisand-likeMontiinperiod2-scoresonly

slightlymoreKeynesianinhisideas.ThisincontrasttotheviewsoftheItaliancitizenswhoaremore

outspokenKeynesianintheirideas.Allinall,neitherMontinorRenziseemstoadequatelyrepresent

theparadigmaticideasoftheirelectorate.

Figure8:IdeologicaldistancebetweentheItalianleadersandtheirconstituents.

Figure9:IdeologicaldistancebetweentheSpanishleadersandtheirconstituents.

-30.00 -20.00 -10.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00

Monip2

Monip3

Renzip3

Italianciizens

Monip2 Monip3 Renzip3 ItalianciizensKeynesian -24.77 -9.89 -9.56 -17.35

Ordoliberal 21.62 12.64 8.82 12.08

-30.00 -20.00 -10.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00

Zapaterop1

Zapaterop2

Rajoyp2

Rajoyp3

Spanishciizens

Zapaterop1 Zapaterop2 Rajoyp2 Rajoyp3 SpanishciizensKeynesian -19.32 -13.71 -24.43 -10.34 -13.46

Ordoliberal 14.20 19.76 9.54 12.93 7.15

35

TheSpanishPrimeMinister,Zapatero,startsoutasquiteKeynesianthinkerwhentheEuro-

crisisstarts,however,afterMay2010,hisviewschangeandhisOrdoliberalviewsbecomedominant.

AsimilarbutmoreextremeU-turnisexperiencedbyhissuccessor,Rajoy,whostartshisreignduring

thesecondperiodasdecidedlyKeynesianbutafterthesummerof2012,seeshisviewsbecoming

slightlymoreOrdoliberalthanKeynesian.Atthesametimethisshifttakesplace,healsobecomes

lessfocussedontheeconomicdimensionoftheEuro-crisis.Incontrast,theSpanishcitizens,whose

viewsweresourcedduringthespringof2017,holdclearKeynesianideasregardingtheEuro-crisis.

Assuch,theirideasthusdiffersignificantlyfromthoseoftheirleadersandovertimethereisa

patternofdivergencebetweentheSpanishpeopleandtheirprimeministers.

Figure10:IdeologicaldistancebetweentheDutchleadersandtheirconstituents.

ReviewingtheDutchsituationrevealsthatPrimeMinisterBalkenende,whowasinofficeat

theverystartoftheEuro-crisis,speaksverylittleabouttheEuro-crisis.Moreover,whenhedoes,he

speaksonlyscarcelyabouttheeconomicdimensionofthecrisis.Thefewviewsheputsforwardare

completelybalancedintermsoftheKeynesianandOrdoliberalparadigm.Thisdiffersfromthe

OrdoliberalviewsprofessedtobytheDutchcitizensattheveryendofthecrisis.Ruttestartsoutas

veryOrdoliberalintermsofeconomicparadigmduringthesecondstageofthecrisis.However,oddly

enough,afterthesummerof2012,hisviewschangeandbecomedecidedlyKeynesian.Thisisan

unexpectedresultastheDutchelitearegenerallyknownfortheirstrongOrdoliberalviews.

Moreover,Rutte'sU-turnisverypronounced,moresothanU-turnexperiencebyotherleadersin

ourstudy.Lookingmorecloselyathiscognitivemaps,theU-turnseemstobecausedbythestrong

-30.00 -20.00 -10.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00

Balkenendep1

Ruwep2

Ruwep3

Dutchciizens

Balkenendep1 Ruwep2 Ruwep3 DutchciizensKeynesian -6.00 -5.56 -14.09 -7.02

Ordoliberal 6.00 15.28 5.91 11.47

36

focusRuttehasduringperiod3oneconomicgrowthandemployment(whicharequalifiedasmore

Keynesianideas).ThereisnosignofhimsupportingtypicalKeynesianpolicieslikeallowingformore

flexibilityinthebudgetarydomainorengagingineconomicstimulation.Unlikewasthecasewith

Merkel,theU-turnRutteexperiencesdoesnotseemtobeinformedbyadesiretovoicethewillof

theDutchpeople,astheirscoreisquiteconvincinglyOrdoliberal.

Finally,theideologicaldistancebetweentheBritishPMsBrownandCameronandtheir

citizensisreviewed.GordonBrownstartsoutwithaveryextremeKeynesianscore,themost

extremeinthisstudy.However,ashismapisextremelysmallandthescoresaremeasuredin

percentageofthetotalcognitivemap,hisscoremaybeanartefactofthemethodusedtocalculate

theideologicaldistanceinthisstudy.However,histendencytowardsKeynesianismdoesreflectthat

oftheBritishpeople,butisfarmoreextreme.HissuccessorCameronstartsoutasslightlymore

OrdoliberalthanKeynesian,butheexperiencesaU-turninperiod3whenhisKeynesianideas

becomedominant.ThisshifthasmainlytodowithadropinthesaliencyofhisOrdoliberalviews.

Moreover,Cameron'sU-turnislesspronouncedthanthoseofSarkozyandRutte,butitdoesbring

hisviewsmoreinlinewiththoseoftheBritishcitizens,whosescoreisconvincinglyOrdoliberal.In

fact,intermsoffactorthedifferenceintheextentofwhichtheideasofCameroninperiod3andhis

peopleareOrdoliberalisnearlyequal.

Figure11:IdeologicaldistancebetweentheBritishleadersandtheirconstituents.

Table13sumsupalloftheIdeologicaldistancescores.Itprovidesthefactorbywhichthe

dominantparadigmovershadowsthelesssalientparadigmaswellasthemedianoftheOrdoliberal

-45.00 -35.00 -25.00 -15.00 -5.00 5.00 15.00 25.00 35.00 45.00

Brownp1

Cameronp2

Cameronp3

Briishciizens

Brownp1 Cameronp2 Cameronp3 BriishciizensKeynesian -41.18 -11.50 -13.11 -15.57

Ordoliberal 8.82 13.00 8.74 10.24

37

andKeynesianscoreperactors.Thethirdcolumnliststhesubstantivedifferencebetweenthe

leaders’paradigmaticideasandthefourthcolumnliststhedifferencebetweenthemedianscoresof

theleaderandhiselectorate,therebyindicatingtheactualdistancebetweentheirscores.

Reviewingthesescoresrelativetheeachotherandtheaveragescoresandstandard

deviation,itisclearthattheideasof21actors(leadersorcitizens)comeoutaspredominantly

Keynesianagainst17Ordoliberal.Overall,theaveragemedianis-0.75indicatingthatinsumthe

viewsoftheseactorsaremoreKeynesianthanOrdoliberal.So,whilemostscholarsagreethat

OrdoliberalismwasthedominantparadigmguidingthecrisismanagementeffortsduringtheEuro-

crisisintheEuropeanUnion,wemustconcludethatdominanceisnotthesameasdispersion.While

Ordoliberalideasmayhavebeendominant,Keynesianideaswereslightlymoredispersedand

frequentlyheld.Withinthisgroupofleadersandcitizens,fiveleaderscanbeidentifiedasextremein

theirideas(scoringmorethan1SDoveraverage):TheFrenchPresidentSarkozyinperiodone,the

GermanChancellorMerkelinallofthethreeperiodsofthecrisis,theHungarianPMOrbaninperiods

twoandthree,theDutchPrimeMinisterRutteinperiodtwoandtheUKleaderBrowninthefirst

stageoftheEuro-crisis.OnlySarkozyandBrowndivergeinthedirectionofextremeKeynesianism,

theotherleadersscoreindicateadominanceoftheOrdoliberalparadigm.Incontrast,theDanish,

FrenchandIrishpeople,aswellastheIrishPMKennyinperiodtwo,theItalianPMsMontiandRenzi

theSpanishleaderRajoyinperiodthree,theDutchPMBalkenendeandtheUKPMCameronin

periodtwoheldideasthatarerelativelymoderate(morethan1SDbelowaverage).Ofthisgroup

onlyKenny,MontiinperiodthreeandCameronadvocatedOrdoliberalideas.

Thesecomparisonstotheaveragedonotnecessarilysaysomethingabouttheideological

distancebetweentheleadersandtheircitizens.Table13showsthatthereare13leadersthatin

differentperiodsofthecrisisdisplayarelativelylargeideologicaldistancewiththeircitizens:The

DanishPMRasmusseninperiodsoneandtwo,theFrenchPresidentsSarkozyinperiodone,Hollande

inperiodthree,theSpanishleaderRajoyinperiodtwo,theDutchPMRutteinperiodthreeandthe

BritishPMBrowninperiodonealldivergestronglyfromtheparadigmaticideasoftheircitizensin

thesensethattheirscoresaremoreKeynesian.TheGermanChancellorMerkelinperiodone,the

HungarianPMOrbaninperiodtwoandthree,theIrishleaderCoweninperiodsoneandtwoandthe

SpanishPrimeMinisterZapateroinperiodtwoalsodivergestronglyfromtheircitizensintermsof

theirparadigmaticideas.However,theirbiasistowardsamoreOrdoliberalscore.Allinall,in11of

the29cases,leaders’beliefsweredominatedbyadifferentparadigmthanthatoftheirconstituents.

Theextentofthedivergence–intermsofdifferenceinmean-differedfrom7,24to1,43.

38

Actor/period Median(M) Factor Leader<>electorate MLead-Cit

Rasmussenp1 -7,58 2,67 MoreKeynesian -6,61Rasmussenp2 -5,56 1,82 MoreKeynesian -4,59Thorning-Schmidtp2 -2,49 1,53 MoreKeynesian -1,52Thorning-Schmidtp3 -2,65 1,84 MoreKeynesian -1,68Danishcitizens -0,97 1,15 (Keynesian) Sarkozyp1 -9,86 3,80 MoreKeynesian -8,27Sarkozyp2 2,50 1,63 Ordoliberal<>Keynesian 4,09Hollandep3 -5,82 2,35 MoreKeynesian -4,23Frenchcitizens -1,59 1,23 (Keynesian) Merkelp1 7,89 4,00 MoreOrdoliberal 5,80Merkelp2 5,26 2,85 MoreOrdoliberal 3,16Merkelp3 2,82 2,75 MoreOrdoliberal 0,73Germancitizens 2,09 1,75 (Ordoliberal) Orbanp2 4,34 3,13 Ordoliberal<>Keynesian 6,94Orbanp3 4,64 2,77 Ordoliberal<>Keynesian 7,24Hungariancitizens -2,60 1,70 (Keynesian) Cowenp1 6,05 2,36 Ordoliberal<>Keynesian 6,46Cowenp2 6,96 2,39 Ordoliberal<>Keynesian 7,37Kennyp2 1,02 1,19 Ordoliberal<>Keynesian 1,43Kennyp3 -3,37 1,70 MoreKeynesian -2,96Irishcitizens -0,41 1,10 (Keynesian) Montip2 -1,58 1,15 LessKeynesian 1,06Montip3 1,37 1,28 Ordoliberal<>Keynesian 4,01Renzip3 -0,37 1,08 LessKeynesian 2,27Italiancitizens -2,63 1,44 (Keynesian) Zapaterop1 -2,56 1,36 LessKeynesian 0,60Zapaterop2 3,02 1,44 Ordoliberal<>Keynesian 6,18Rajoyp2 -7,44 2,56 MoreKeynesian -4,29Rajoyp3 1,29 1,25 Ordoliberal<>Keynesian 4,45Spanishcitizens -3,16 1,88 (Keynesian) Balkenendep1 0,00 1,00 Ambiguous<>Ordoliberal -2,22Ruttep2 4,86 2,75 MoreOrdoliberal 2,64Ruttep3 -4,09 2,38 Keynesian<>Ordoliberal -6,31Dutchcitizens 2,22 1,63 (Ordoliberal) Brownp1 -16,18 4,67 MoreKeynesian -13,51Cameronp2 0,75 1,13 Ordoliberal<>Keynesian 3,41Cameronp3 -2,18 1,50 LessKeynesian 0,48Britishcitizens -2,66 1,52 (Keynesian) Average(AV) -0,75 1,99 0,42

StandardDeviation(SD) 3,72 0,71 4,19

AV-SD -4,47 1,28 -3,77

AV+SD 2,96 2,70 4,61Table13:LevelofIdeologicaldifferencebetweenleadersandcitizenspercountry(darkblue:DominantlyKeynesian;lightblue:DominantlyOrdoliberal;green:below1SDunderAV;redabove1SDoverAV).

39

Legitimacy

Inothertoanswerthequestionastowhatextentarepresentativecrisisnarrativealsoleadscitizens

toperceivetheirpoliticalleaderasmorelegitimate,wealsoaskedcitizenstoansweranumberof

surveyquestionsabouttheircurrentheadofstateorgovernmentpertainingtothedifferentaspects

oflegitimateleadership.Moreinparticular,weaskedthemtoratetheiragreementwiththe

followingstatementsrelatedtooneofthedimensionsoflegitimateleadershipona5-pointLikert

scale:

1. [Theleader]iscompetent(competence);

2. [Theleader]hastherequiredknowledge(competence);

3. [Theleader]istrustworthy(trustworthy);

4. [Theleader]ishonest(trustworthy);

5. [Theleader]takescareofme(caring);

6. [Theleader]standsupforme(caring);

7. [Theleader]issomeonelikemeorpeopleclosetome(identification);

8. Irecognizemyselfin[theleader](identification);

9. Iagreewiththevisionthat[theleader]hasfor[mycountry](ideology);

10. Iagreewiththeway[theleader]handledtheEurocrisis(ideology);

11. [Theleader]waselecteddemocraticallyandcanthereforemakedecisionsfor[my

country](democracy);

12. EventhoughIdonotalwaysagreewith[theleader],Iaccepthis/herdecisionsbecause

s/hewaselecteddemocratically(democracy).

Thetablebelowshowstheresultsofthesemeasuresforeachoftheleaders,forthecitizensoftheir

owncountry.

Cameron

Holland

e

Kenn

y

Merkel

Orban

Rajoy

Rasmussen

Ren

zi

Rutte

Average

Ran

k

Competency 2,67 2,23 2,83 3,46 2,67 2,27 2,88 2,54 3,60 2,79 2Trustworthy 2,42 2,58 2,65 3,04 2,06 2,11 2,42 2,40 2,85 2,50 3Caring 2,11 1,94 2,19 2,52 2,03 1,80 2,11 2,07 2,36 2,12 5Identification 1,86 1,81 1,91 2,52 1,64 1,64 1,74 1,88 2,25 1,91 6Ideology 2,14 2,10 2,48 2,70 2,37 2,00 2,29 2,27 2,70 2,34 4Democracy 2,90 3,00 3,01 3,34 2,62 2,84 3,27 2,10 3,39 2,94 1Average 2,35 2,28 2,51 2,93 2,23 2,11 2,45 2,21 2,86 2,43

Rank 5 6 3 1 7 9 4 8 2Table14:Citizens’perceptionoftheirnationalleaders’leveloflegitimacy(blue:above2,5)

40

Theresultsofthesurveyshowthatoverall,theGermanchancellorAngelaMerkelisperceivedasthe

mostlegitimateleaderbytheGermanpeople,followedcloselybytheDutchPMMarkRutteandIrish

TaoiseachEndaKenny.TheSpanishPMMarianoRajoy,theformerItalianPMMatteoRenziandthe

HungarianPMOrbanaretheleastlegitimateintheeyesoftheirconstituents.Withregardtothe

differentdimensionsoflegitimacy,overalltheleadersscorebestonthedimensionthathasnothing

todowithhowtheyperformorconductthemselves-thedemocracydimension–withanaverage

scoreof2,94.Apparently,theelectoraldimensionisstillthestrongestgroundfordemocracyinthese

states,andfewleadersactuallyscorehigherononeoftheotherdimensionsthantheydoonthe

democracydimension.Thesecondhighestscoringdimensionintermsofaverageiscompetency,

followedcloselybytrustworthiness,whilethepeopleawardtheirleaderswiththelowestscore(on

average)forhowcaringtheyareandtheextenttowhichtheyidentifywiththeirleaders.Finally,in

thecontextofthisstudyoncongruenceofideas,theleaders’scoresontheextenttowhichtheir

constituentsfeeltheysharetheirideologicalviewsisrelativelylow.

The gender-dimension of legitimate leadership

Theliteratureshowsthatthereareimportantgenderaspectstopoliticalleadership(Skard2016;

Sykes2014):Mostofthesestudiesfocusonthegenderoftheleaderandtheeffectsonhowfemale

leadersareperceivedbythewiderpublicorthebarriersforwomentoattainandmaintaina

leadershipposition.Asoursetofleadersonlycontainstwofemaleleaders,itisdifficulttocontribute

inanymeaningfulwaytothisbranchoftheliterature.However,anequallyinterestingissueis

whetherdifferencesinperceptionofthelegitimacyofleadershiparerelatedtothegenderofthe

public.Asoursurveyincludedarepresentativesampleofcitizens,approximatelyhalfofthe

respondentspercountryarewomen,makingstatisticalanalysispossible.

Inordertodeterminewhethergendermattersinthisregard,wehavecomparedthe

legitimacyscoresforthepoliticalleadersanddeterminedwhetherthesescoresshowedany

correlationtothegenderoftherespondents.Wehaveconductedthisanalysisfortherespondents

ofeachofthecountriesinoursample,bothforthenationalpoliticalleaderofthatcountrythatwas

atthehelmattheendoftheEurocrisis,aswellasforfourforeign/Europeanleaders:theGerman

ChancellorMerkel,theFrenchPresidentHollande,theBritishPrimeMinisterCameron(inthecaseof

theGermanandFrenchrespondents)andECBPresidentDraghi.Inaddition,wehavealsocompared

theemotionsexperiencedbytherespondentswhenseeingaphotooftheseleaders(thatthey

41

reportedbyclickinganemoticon).Tocomparefemaleandmalerespondents,wehaveusedt-test

(twotailed)forthelegitimacyscores,andChisquareanalysesfortheemotions.17

Theresultsofthisanalysisareatthesametimeremarkableandcurious.Firstly,ofthenine

nationalleaders,onlyinthecaseoftheFrenchPresidentFrancoisHollande,theHungarianPrime

MinisterVictorOrbanandtheDutchPrimeMinisterRutte,somesignificantdifferencesinperceived

legitimacyoccursbetweenthemaleandfemalerespondents(seeTables14,15and16).Inthecase

ofPresidentHollande,thefemalerespondentsweremorelikelytoansweraffirmativelytothe

questions‘[theleader]waselecteddemocraticallyandcanthereforemakedecisionsfor[my

country]’and‘EventhoughIdonotalwaysagreewith[theleader],Iaccepthis/herdecisionsbecause

s/hewaselecteddemocratically’(seetable14).ThesamegoesfortheHungarianleaderVictor

Orban.Moreover,inhiscasethefindingsalsoshowthatfemalerespondentsdeemhimsignificantly

morecompetentthanmalerespondentsdo(seetable15).Finally,table16shows,thatfemale

respondentsaremorelikelytoperceivetheDutchprimeministerMarkRutteascaringthanthe

Dutchmalerespondents.

Thesefourdifferencesare,however,theexceptiontotherule.Nosignificantdifferences

werefoundonanyoftheotherlegitimacydimensionsorforanyoftheothernationalleaders.So,

outofthe54dimensions(sixforeachofthenineleaders),onlyinthesefourcasessignificantgender-

relateddifferenceswerefound.Interestingly,inallfourcasesthescoresawardedtotheleadersby

womenarehigherthanthoseawardedbymen.

Mformalerespondents(SD) Mforfemalerespondent(SD) t-valueCompetent 2,19(1,13) 2,27(1,09) 0,68Trustworthy 2,50(1,21) 2,67(1,22) 1,61Caring 1,86(1,01) 2,02(1,03) 1,65Identity 1,77(0,97) 1,86(1,05) 1,00Ideology 2,06(1,11) 2,15(1,13) 0,95Democratic 2,85(1,28) 3,17(1,32) 2,71**Table15:GenderandperceptionoflegitimacyofPresidentHollande.*significantatp<,05;**significantatp<,01;***significantatp<,001

Mformalerespondents(SD) Mforfemalerespondent(SD) t-valueCompetent 2,51(1,39) 2,82(1,38) 2,42*Trustworthy 2,00(1,23) 2,13(1,34) 1,16Caring 1,93(1,27) 2,13(1,28) 1,76Identity 1,60(1,00) 1,69(1,01) 1,06Ideology 2,25(1,34) 2,48(1,40) 1,80Democratic 2,49(1,40) 2,75(1,43) 2,04*Table16:GenderandperceptionoflegitimacyofPrimeMinsterOrban.*significantatp<,05;**significantatp<,01;***significantatp<,001

17 Due to the low number of respondents selecting ‘love’ for the emotion-questions, there are usually two cells with an expected frequency below 5, which makes Chi square the most appropriate measure.

42

Mformalerespondents(SD) Mforfemalerespondent(SD) t-valueCompetent 3,62(1,10) 3,57(1,00) 0,43Trustworthy 2,79(1,18) 2,92(1,08) 1,29Caring 2,28(1,05) 2,47(1,02) 2,00*Identity 2,21(1,07) 2,31(0,99) 1,02Ideology 2,70(1,18) 2,69(1,05) 0,06Democratic 3,41(1,19) 3,35(1,11) 0,33Table17:GenderandperceptionoflegitimacyofPrimeMinsterRutte.*significantatp<,05;**significantatp<,01;***significantatp<,001

Evenmoreremarkablethanthisstrikinglackofdifferenceintheperceivedlegitimacy

betweenthedifferentgenders,isthefactthattheanalysisshowedthattherearenosignificant

differencesbetweenmaleandfemalerespondentsinanyofthesevenemoticonstherespondents

couldtick.Allinall,ourstudythusleadstotheconclusionthatoverallthegenderofthepublicdoes

notplayaimportantroleintheirperceptionofthelegitimacyoftheirownnationalleader,orthe

emotionstheystirinthem.

Turningtorespondents’perceptionandemotionsregardingthefourforeign/European

leaders-Merkel,Hollande,Cameron18andDraghi–acompletelydifferentpatternemerges.As

shownintable17,18,19and20,severalsignificantdifferencesinperceptionwerefoundbetween

themaleversusthefemalerespondents.Themostremarkablefindingisthattheleastdivisive

leadersalonggenderlinesistheonlyfemaleleaderinthisset:TheGermanchancellorAngela

Merkel,whoisseendifferentlypredominantlybyIrishmaleandfemalerespondentsandwithregard

totheideologicaldimension(seetable17).Thissupportsthegeneralfindingingenderstudiesthat

womenarenotnecessarilymorepositivetowardsfemaleleadersthanmen.

Nationality Legitimacydimension

Scoremalerespondents

Scorefemalerespondents

t-value p-value

Danish Trustworthy 3,74 3,50 2,12 0,034Hungarian Ideology 2,80 2,51 2,14 0,033Irish Trustworthy 3,46 3,07 3,01 0,003Irish Ideology 3,47 3,08 2,79 0,005Irish Democratic 3,43 3,01 3,17 0,002Italian Ideology 2,96 2,45 3,92 <0.001Spanish Ideology 2,94 2,62 2,71 0,007Table18:SignificantdifferencesintheperceptionofthelegitimacyofMerkel’sleadershipbyforeignnationals.

18 The questions about Cameron were only posed to French and German respondents. Moreover, the dimension ‘caring’ was not covered in the questions regarding these ‘foreign’ leaders. For Draghi the question was posed: ‘[the leader] was not elected democratically and can therefore not make decisions for Europe’.

43




t-value p-value

Hungarian Competent 3,65 3,25 2,31 0,022Hungarian Trustworthy 3,62 3,09 3,00 0,003Hungarian Ideology 3,69 2,98 3,78 <0,001Hungarian Democratic 3,92 3,36 3,06 0,002Irish Competent 3,55 3,19 2,30 0,022Irish Trustworthy 3,48 3,08 2,49 0,013Irish Ideology 3,69 3,24 2,55 0,011Irish Democratic 3,50 2,99 3,23 0,001Italian Ideology 3,20 2,83 2,59 0,010Spanish Competent 3,06 2,75 2,62 0,009Spanish Trustworthy 2,98 2,64 2,66 0,008Spanish Ideology 3,18 2,83 2,72 0,007Dutch Identity 2,72 3,13 2,35 0,019Dutch Ideology 3,37 3,92 3,24 0,001Dutch Democratic 3,35 3,85 3,54 <0,001British Competent 3,17 2,80 1,97 0,050British Ideology 3,17 2,60 2,86 0,005British Democratic 3,22 2,74 2,67 0,008Table19:SignificantdifferencesintheperceptionofthelegitimacyofHollande’sleadershipbyforeignnationals.Bold:Femalescores>malescores

TheFrenchPresidentHollandeandespeciallyECBPresidentDraghiareperceiveddifferentlybymale

andfemalerespondentstoafargreaterextent.InthecaseofHollande,thegenderdifferencesare

alsomostpronouncedwithregardtotheideologicaldimensionoflegitimacyandamongIrishaswell

asHungariancitizens(table18).Incontrast,themaleandfemaleperceptionsofDraghidiverge

stronglyonseveraldimensionsincludingtrustworthiness,competence,ideologyandidentity.With

regardtothedemocraticdimensionoflegitimacy,thequestionwasaskedwhetherrespondents

agreedthatDraghi,whoisnotelectedcouldnottakedecisionsforEuropeonthatbasis.Alsowith

regardtothisquestionsignificantdifferencesbetweenmenandwomenwerefoundinfourcountries

(seetable20).AgainthedifferencesweremostpronouncedforIrelandandinDraghi’scase,inThe

Netherlands.




t-value p-value

French Competent 3,61 3,30 2,36 0,019French Trustworthy 3,57 3,19 2,82 0,005French Ideology 3,37 3,03 2,14 0,033German Competent 3,46 3,15 2,05 0,041German Ideology 3,32 2,89 2,57 0,011Table20:SignificantdifferencesintheperceptionofthelegitimacyofCameron’sleadershipbyforeignnationals.

44




t-value p-value

Danish Identity 1,90 2,58 2,52 0,014French Trustworthy 3,51 2,93 2,06 0,041French Ideology 3,63 2,99 2,21 0,029German Competent 3,45 2,95 2,67 0,008German Trustworthy 3,13 2,66 2,27 0,025German Identity 3,22 2,42 3,46 0,001German Democratic(neg) 3,62 3,09 2,54 0,012Hungary Competent 4,18 3,39 3,22 0,002Hungary Trustworthy 4,09 3,15 3,81 <0,001Hungary Ideology 4,00 3,18 3,06 0,003Irish Competent 3,77 3,11 3,32 0,001Irish Trustworthy 3,52 2,76 3,61 0,001Irish Identity 2,93 2,38 2,39 0,018Irish Ideology 3,48 2,85 2,90 0,004Irish Democratic(neg) 3,83 3,32 2,37 0,019Italian Competent 3,88 4,13 2,15 0,030Spanish Democratic(neg) 3,24 2,88 2,25 0,025Dutch Competent 3,54 3,99 2,30 0,022Dutch Trustworthy 3,23 3,82 2,64 0,009Dutch Identity 2,75 3,48 2,74 0,007Dutch Ideology 3,00 3,75 3,01 0,003Dutch Democratic(neg) 3,50 4,18 3,40 0,001Table21:SignificantdifferencesintheperceptionofthelegitimacyofDraghi’sleadership.Bold:Femalescores>male

scores

Interestinglyandincontrasttothepatternfoundfortherespondentnationalleaders,inthecaseof

theforeign/Europeanleadersthescoresawardedbythefemalerespondentsofallnationalitiesare

almostunequivocallylowerthanthoseofthemen.OnlythescoresassignedbytheDutchwomenare

almostallhigherthanthoseoftheirfellowcountrymen.Whythegenderpatternfornationaland

foreignleadersisreversedorwhytheDutchpatternisdifferent,wecanonlyguess.

Finally,incontrasttothenationalleaders,somedifferenceswerefoundintheemotionsthat

theforeignleadersstirinthefemaleandmalerespondentsinsixoftheninecountries.ForHollande

significantdifferenceswerefoundamongsttheDanish,GermanandBritishrespondentswherebythe

DanishandGermanmenindicatedtobemoreindifferentthanthewomentowardstheFrench

President.TheBritishfemalerespondents,however,feltmorenegativeemotionstowardsHollande

thantheirfellowcountrymen.Cameronstirredsignificantlydifferentemotionsamongstmenand

womeninFranceandGermany(theonlycountriesthequestionwasasked).Inbothcountries,the

womenfeltmorenegativeemotionswhereasinGermanythemenwerealsomoreindifferent

towardsCameronthanthewomen.Finally,theGermanChancellorMerkelstirredupdifferent

emotionsamongstwomenandmeninIrelandandItaly.Inbothcountries,themaindifferenceliesin

45

thefactthatthemenweremoreindifferentandwomenmorenegativeaboutMerkel.Thisagain

underscoresthegeneralfindingingenderstudiesthatwomenarenotnecessarilymorepositive

towardsfemaleleadersthanmen.Overall,theanalysisshowsthat–withtheexceptionforECB

PresidentDraghi–genderisnotasignificantdeterminantofpeople’sperceptionofthelegitimacyof

theirleader,especiallynotwithregardtheirnationalpoliticalleader.

Does Congruence lead to legitimacy?

Inordertoseewhetheranyofthesedimensionsoflegitimacyhasanylinkwiththecongruence

betweentheleaders’meaningmakingandthatoftheirconstituentorthepublicdebate,we

correlatedtheselegitimacyscoreswithleadersΔSvaluesfortheircitizensandforthenationalmedia.

Thenegativevaluesintablexindicatethatindeedevidenceofacorrelationexists,althoughdueto

thelownumberofcases(9forthecorrelationswithΔSforcitizens,and8formedia),noneofthese

individualcorrelationsaresignificant.Assuch,aSpearmanrankcorrelationratherthanaPearson

correlationwasusedtobetterdealwiththelownumberofvalues.

Althoughfurtherresearchisneededtoconfirmthatthereisindeedasignificantcorrelation

betweencongruenceandlegitimacy,theindividualcorrelationscombineddoprovideevidencefor

thefactthatlowerΔSscoresgotogetherwithhigherlegitimacyscores.Thefactthatallcorrelations,

butthreeforthecitizens’ΔSUandthreedimensionsoflegitimacyarenegativeissignificantly

differentfromwhatcouldreasonablybeexpectedtohappenbychance(p<0,001for21outof24

negativecorrelation,ifnocongruencebetweenlegitimacyandΔSwouldexist).Assuch,wefeelthere

issomegroundfortakingourfindingsasaseriousfirstindicationofabroaderpattern.

rswithΔS

citizensrswithΔSU

citizensRank rswithΔS

mediarswithΔSU

mediaRank

Competency -0,33 0,02 4 -0,21 -0,26 4Trustworthy -0,02 0,18 5 -0,52 -0,62 2Caring -0,40 -0,08 3 -0,19 -0,24 5Identity -0,27 -0,27 2 -0,07 -0,12 6Ideology -0,50 -0,23 1 -0,36 -0,31 3Democratic -0,02 0,35 6 -0,52 -0,67 1Table22:Correlationbetweencongruenceandthedimensionsoflegitimacy(blue:correlation).

Takingthefindingsseriously,theresultagainshowsomeinterestingpatterns.Firstly,ittheresults

showthatwithregardtothecongruencebetweenleadersandcitizens’meaningmakingthe

correlationwiththeideologicaldimensionofleadershipisthestrongest.Thisfindingunderscores

thatthenewissue-saliencymeasure,andespeciallytheΔSmeasure,trulyrevealssomethingabout

46

theoverlapinviewsbetweenleadersandcitizens.Asinterestingisthatcongruenceatthecitizens

levelhasastrongcorrelationwiththeidentificationwithaleaderandtheextenttowhichcitizens

feeltheleadercaresforthem.Thisindicatesthatagreementonsubstancehasanemotionaleffect

oncitizens,fosteringfeelingofkinshipandbelongingaswellasemotionalsecurity,orviceversa.

Finally,whereasbeingdemocraticallyelectedisanimportantdimensionoflegitimacy,wehave

foundhardlyanycorrelationbetweencongruenceofideasandthedemocraticlegitimacyofleaders

intheeyesoftheirconstituents.Theoretically,thisleadstothehypothesisthatleadersthat

representtheideasofcitizenswell,relylessonthefactthattheyaredemocraticallyelectedtobe

perceivedaslegitimate.

Inlinewithallthefindingspreviouslyreportedinthisstudy,thefindingsforthecongruence

ofleaders’crisisnarrativeswiththepublicdebatedifferconsiderablyfromthecongruencewith

citizens.Firstlyandoddlyenough,theoverallcorrelationbetweenthelegitimacyintheeyesof

citizenshasastrongercorrelationwiththecongruencebetweenleadersandthemediathanthe

congruencebetweenleadersandcitizensownideas.Thismeansthatcitizensfindtheirleadersmore

convincingwhentheyvoiceideasespousedinthemediathanwhentheyvoiceideassimilartotheir

own,aremarkablefinding.Secondly,thedimensionsoflegitimacywithwhichoverlapwiththepublic

debatehasthestrongestcorrelationalsodiffer.Inthiscase,thecorrelationisstrongestforthe

democracydimension–whichmaymakesenseifyouregardthepublicdebateastheconsensusof

allcitizens’views.Thesecondstrongestcorrelationiswiththetrustworthinessofleaders.This

indicatesthatwhenthepublicdebatemirrorstheideasoftheleader,theleadersisseenasmore

honestandtrue.Finally,thedimensionsoflegitimateleadershipthatwerelinkedmoststronglyto

thecongruencewithcitizensviews,caringandidentification,havethelowestscoreintermsof

correlationwiththepublicdebate.Asthesearealsolowerinanabsolutesense,thiswarrantsthe

hypothesisthataleaderthatvoicestheviewsespousedbythenationalmediaislessabletoenlist

feelingsofkinship,belongingandemotionalsecuritythanonethatvoicestheopinionsofthecitizens

themselves.

Allinall,thesefinalconclusionsregardingtheassociationbetweencongruenceand

legitimacyarenecessarilytentative.However,theydogiverisetointerestingnewhypothesesthat

warrantfurtherresearchonalargersetofEuropeanleaders.

Conclusion

Inthisreportthefollowingquestionshavebeenaddressed.

• Doleaders,themediaandcitizensformulateaclearinterpretationofthecrisis(intermsof

thenatureoftheEurocrisis,itsperceivedconsequencesandcauses)?

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• Doleadersexplainhowtheyplantoleadtheircommunitiesoutofcrisis(involvingsolutions

andproposedinstruments)?

• Howandtowhatextentdidleaders’meaningmakingreflectideasfromthepublicdiscourses

abouttheEurocrisis?

• Howandtowhatextentdidleaders’ideasreflectviewsoftheirnationalconstituents?

• Isthereevidencethatthegeneralmessageleadersattempttoconveyisbroadlyaccepted,or

aretheredifferentschoolsofthoughtorparadigmsvyingforattentionanddominance?

Incombinationwiththeearlierreports(VanEschetal,2017a&b;Steenmanetal,2017)theanalysis

inthisreportshowsthatleaderswerereasonablyconsistentintheirmeaningmakingofthecrisis.

Regardlessofwhathappenedduringthecrisis,theissueofsoundgovernmentfinancesremained

theirmainconcern,followedcloselybystructuralreformsandeconomicgrowth.However,thereare

alsoimportantchangesovertimethatarereflectiveoftheworldlyeventsthattookplace.Inthefirst

periodofthecrisis,thefinancialcrisiswasstillattheforefrontofleaders’mindsasistheinstrument

ofeconomicstimulation.AfterMay2010,theleadersshifttheirfocustowardstheinternalEU

problemsanddiscussmeasureslikestrongerEUfiscalregulationaswellasfiscalsupport,theECB

crisisinterventionsandtheneedforreforms.AfterDraghi’s‘Whateverittakes’-speech,talkofthe

ECBcrisisinterventionsandtheneedforreformsincreasesandthereisarenewedconcernforthe

stateofthefinancialmarkets.Theconceptssoundgovernmentfinancesandstructuralreforms,

however,remainthemostsalientduringthisperiod.

ThisdiagnosisofthenatureoftheEurocrisisalignsrelativelywellwiththefactorsleaders

identifyasthecausesoftheEuro-crisis.Thesevenmaincausesofthecrisisintheireyeswerethe

financialcrisis,thebankingcrisis,fiscalexpansionarypolicy,macro-economicimbalances,excessive

debt,theGreekfinancialcrisisandthesovereign-banknexus.Thisrevealsthatacombinationof

problemsinthebankingworldandpublicfinancesand–toalesserextent–structuralmacro-

economicimbalances,areseenbytheEuropeanleadersasthemaincausesofthecrisis.Thefit

betweentheperceivedcausesof,andsolutionstothecrisisislessperfect.Forintheeyesofthe

leaders,themostimportantwaytosolvetheEurocrisisistoengageisstructuralreformswhichdoes

nottieindirectlywiththeidentifiedcauses.Thisproposedsolutionis,however,closelyfollowedby

fiscalconsolidationandanincreaseincompetitivenessandeconomicgrowth,policiesthatmaybe

abletotacklethefiscalandeconomicimbalances.Strangelyenough,leadersdonotstressfinancial

marketmeasureswhereasthefinancialandbankingcrisiswereseenasmajorcausesoftheEuro

crisis.Thisdiscrepancybetweensomeofthecausesofandsolutionstothecrisisisconfirmedwhen

lookingattheinstrumentsleadersaimtousetosolvethecrisis.Usingthismeasurerevealsthat

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structuralreformsarethemostdiscussedinstrument,followedbytheECBmeasuresand

institutionalEUorEMUreforms.Wheretheleadersidentifiedthefinancialcrisisandsoundpublic

financesasthemaincausesofthecrisis,tacklingtheseproblemsarerespectivelyonlynumber5and

4onthelistofmostsalientsolutions.Allinall,leadersarethusrelativelyconsistentintheircrisis

meaningmaking,bothovertimeandintermsofthe(related)elementsintheirstories.Theonly

exceptiontothisconclusionistheslightdiscrepancybetweentheidentifiedcausesandsolutions.

Collectively,leaders’meaningmakingmayhavebeenconsistentbutintermsofcongruence

therewereconsiderabledifferencesinhowwellleadersvoicethepublicdiscourseandthe

perceptionsoftheircitizens.Overalltheconclusioniswarrantedthattheleaders’Eurocrisis

narrativeshowsagreatercongruencewiththepublicdebatethanwiththecrisisnarrativeofthe

Europeanpeople.Withregardtothenatureofthecrisis,forinstance,thediagnosisoftheleaders

alignedverywellwiththeanalysisofthepublicdebate:BothportrayedtheEurocrisisasfirstand

foremostacrisisofpublicfinancesandeconomicgrowthsecond.Themaindifferenceisthatwhile

thepoliticalandeconomicleadersassociatethecrisiswithstructuralreformsandthemeasures

takenbytheECB,inthepublicdebatethefiscalsupportmeasuresareamoresalienttopicof

discussion.TheEuropeancitizens,however,associatedthecrisisfirstandforemostwithemployment

andgrowth,andwithgovernmentfinancessecond.Overall,however,thereseemstobea

convergenceinmeaningmakingovertime,especiallywheretheleadersandpublicdebateis

concerned.Thetime-specificcomparisonofleaders’andcitizens’ideasregardingthecrisisrevealsan

overlapthatisonlyslightlygreaterthanthecomparisonbetweenleaders’andcitizens’mostsalient

conceptsoverall(seetable1).Itisclear,thatintermsofissuesaliency,thecollectivecrisisnarrative

ofthenationalleadersisonlytoalimitedextentrepresentativeoftheviewsofthepeople,andmore

overlapexistsbetweenleadersideasandthepublicdebate.

Withregardtothecausesofthecrisis,asimilarpatternisfound.Leaders’diagnosisalmost

mirrorthatputforwardinthepublicdebate.Infact,fourofthecausesidentifiedinthepublicdebate

overlapwiththoseidentifiedbytheleaders:excessivedebt,theGreekfiscalcrisis,thebankingcrisis

andthe2008financialcrisis.Moreover,withexceptionoftheconceptmacro-economicimbalances,

theremainingconcepts(governmentexpenditure,fiscaldisciplineandexcessivedeficits)seemmere

variationsofconceptslikefiscalexpansionarypolicyandexcessivedebtthatwereidentifiedbythe

leaders.However,withinthepublicdebatetherearemoredissentingvoices,especiallywithregard

totheeffectoffiscalpolicyontheEurocrisis.ThemaincausesoftheEurocrisisasidentifiedbythe

Europeancitizensdifferquiteabitfromthoseoftheleaders:Whereasbothfeelthemaincausesof

thecrisisliewiththefinancialandbankscrisisandunsoundgovernmentfinances,theirdiagnosis

differsonmanyotheraspectsaswellasontheorderofthecauses.TheEuropeanpeople,for

49

instance,identifybureaucracy,hightaxesandmarketfailureasimportantcausesofthecrisis.So,

althoughthecongruenceishigherforthecausesthanforthedefinitionofthenatureofthecrisis,

overall,theoverlapinthecitizensandleaderscrisisnarrativewithregardtothecausesofthecrisisis

againmuchmorelimitedthanthatoftheleadersandthepublicdebate.

Withregardtotheproposedsolutionstothecrisis,thepatternreverses.Againthemeaning

makingbytheleadersreflectsthepublicdebateregardingthemostdesirablesolutionstothecrisis

reasonablywell:Bothgroupsidentifyeconomicgrowth,fiscaldiscipline,fiscalsupportpackages,

fiscalconsolidationandstructuralreformsaspotentialwaystosolvethecrisis.However,some

notabledifferencesdoexist:PublicopinionmakersacrosstheEUplacemorevalueoneconomic

growthandfiscalsupportasthebestsolutiontothecrisisandalsoidentifytheECBassetpurchases

asanimportantmeasurewhereastheleadersdonot.Finally,thereisdiscordaboutwhether

structuralreformsandfiscaldisciplinewillactuallyhelptosolveorworsenthecrisisinthepublic

debate.Leaders’ideasregardingthesolutionstothecrisistieinmorecloselywiththoseassertedby

theEuropeancitizens.Liketheirleaders,citizensstresstheneedforsoundgovernmentalfinances,

Europeancooperationandeconomicgrowth.Moreover,theyalsofeelcompliancewiththeSGP,

fiscalsupportandanincreaseincompetitivenesscouldhelpEuropeexitthecrisis.Inadditiontothe

solutionstheysharewiththeirleaders,however,theyalsostresstheneedforincreasing

employment-ratesandseemtohavemorefaithinthewaystheEuroandEMUmayhelpsolvethe

crisis.Overall,thecongruencebetweenleaders’andcitizens’meaningmakingontheEuro-crisisis

greaterwithregardtothesolutionsthananyotheraspectofmeaningmakingHowever,lookingat

thedifferentinstrumentsidentifiedinthecrisisnarrativeoftheleaders,themediaandthecitizens,a

slightlygreaterdiscrepancyexistsbetweenthemeaningmakingbyleadersandcitizensthanthatof

themedia.Atacollective,pan-EU,levelleaders’meaningmakingisthusmorereflectiveofthepublic

debateasrepresentedinthemediathanoftheviewsoftheircitizens.

Thisconclusionisreinforcedwhenwetakethecongruenceinissuesaliencybetween

individualleadersandtheirnationalconstituentsanddebateintoaccount.Inthefinalsectionofthis

report,itwasshownthattheoverlapbetweenindividualleadersandtheircitizenswasconsiderable,

evenstrongforsomeleaders.However,overall,thefindingsconfirmedthatthecongruencebetween

leadersmeaningmakingandthepublicdebatewasevenstronger.Thisanalysisalsoshowedthat

leaders’crisisnarrativescanbeveryrepresentativeofthepublicdebateintheircountries,butatthe

sametimeshowalackofoverlapwiththeideasoftheirconstituents,andviceversa.

Finally,lookingattheideologicaldistance,itbecameclearthatasmallmajorityofactors

(leadersorcitizens)adheredtotheKeynesianratherthantheOrdoliberalparadigmandthatalsoon

averagetheviewsoftheleadersandcitizensinthisstudyweremoreKeynesianthanOrdoliberal.So,

50

whilemostscholarsagreethatOrdoliberalismwasthedominantparadigmguidingthecrisis

managementeffortsduringtheEuro-crisisintheEuropeanUnion,wemustconcludethatdominance

isapparentlynotthesameasdispersion.WhileOrdoliberalideasmayhavebeendominant,

Keynesianideaswereslightlymoredispersedandfrequentlyheld.Withinthisgroupofleadersand

citizens,fiveleaderscanbeidentifiedasextremeintheirideas:TheFrenchPresidentSarkozyin

periodone,theGermanChancellorMerkelinallofthethreeperiodsofthecrisis,theHungarianPM

Orbaninperiodstwoandthree,theDutchPrimeMinisterRutteinperiodtwoandtheUKleader

BrowninthefirststageoftheEuro-crisis.Incontrast,theDanish,FrenchandIrishpeople,aswellas

theIrishPMKennyinperiodtwo,theItalianPMsMontiandRenzitheSpanishleaderRajoyinperiod

three,theDutchPMBalkenendeandtheUKPMCameroninperiodtwoheldideasthatarerelatively

moderate.Aconsiderablenumberoftheseleadersdisplayarelativelylargeideologicaldistancewith

theircitizens.Interestinglyinlightoftheresultsonthebasisofissue-saliencyaswellastheir

legitimacyscores,theDutchPMRutte,theGermanChancellorMerkelandtheHungarianPMOrban

areamongstthoseleaders.Allinall,in11ofthe29cases,leaders’beliefsweredominatedbya

differentparadigmthanthatoftheirconstituents.Theextentofthedivergence–intermsof

differenceinmean-differedfrom7,24to1,43.

Thefinalandcentralquestiontackledinthisreportwasthequestionofwhethera

relationshipexistsbetweencongruencebetweenleaders’ideas,thepublicdiscourseandcitizens’

beliefsandlegitimacyoftheleaderintheeyesoftheirconstituents?Thefindingsinthisreportshow

thatatleastforthecasesstudiedinthisproject,thisisindeedthecase:Overall,congruencedoes

correlatewithlegitimacy.Inlinewithallthefindingspreviouslyreportedinthisstudy,however,the

findingsforthecongruenceofleaders’crisisnarrativeswiththepublicdebatedifferconsiderably

fromthecongruencewithcitizens.Firstlyandoddlyenough,theoverallcorrelationbetweenthe

legitimacyintheeyesofcitizenshasastrongercorrelationwiththecongruencebetweenleadersand

themediathanthecongruencebetweenleadersandcitizensownideas.Thismeansthatcitizensfind

theirleadersmoreconvincingwhentheyvoiceideasespousedinthemediathanwhentheyvoice

ideassimilartotheirown,aremarkablefinding.Secondly,thedimensionsoflegitimacywithwhich

congruencewiththepublicdebateandcongruencewithcitizenscorrelatesmostalsodiffers.Forthe

publicdebate,thecorrelationisstrongestforthedemocracydimensionfollowedcloselybythe

trustworthinessofleaders.Forcitizens,theresultsshowthat–asmaybeexpected-thecorrelation

withtheideologicaldimensionoflegitimateleadership–theideathatleadersareallowedtotake

collectivedecisionswhentheyvoicesimilaropinionsastherespondent-isthestrongest.Thisfinding

underscoresthatthenewissue-saliencymeasure,andespeciallytheΔSmeasure,trulyreveals

somethingabouttheoverlapinviewsbetweenleadersandcitizens.Asecondinterestingfindingis

51

thatcongruenceatthecitizens’levelhasastrongcorrelationwiththeidentificationwithaleader

andtheextenttowhichcitizensfeeltheleadercaresforthem.Thisindicatesthatagreementon

substancemayhaveanemotionaleffectoncitizens,fosteringfeelingofkinshipandbelongingaswell

asemotionalsecurity,ortheotherwayround.Finally,whereasbeingdemocraticallyelectedisan

importantdimensionoflegitimacy,wehavefoundhardlyanycorrelationbetweencongruenceof

ideasandthedemocraticlegitimacyofleadersintheeyesoftheirconstituents.Maybeleadersthat

representtheideasofcitizenswell,relylessonthefactthattheyaredemocraticallyelectedtobe

perceivedaslegitimate.

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