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JUDGMENT SHEET

P E S H A W A R H I G H C O U R T P E S H A W A R

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

W.P. No.2471/2015

J U D G M E N T

Date of hearing: 03.02.2016 Announced on 16.02.2016

Appellant: (Zahid Arif) by Mr.Amir Javed, Advocate.

Respondent: (Chairman NAB & others) by Mr.Mohammad Jamil

Khan DPG and Mr. Umar Farooq Adam, AAG.

MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL, CJ.- The

question of law raised in the following three writ

petitions is one and the same, so we propose to dispose

of the same through this single judgment in W.P.

No.2471-P/2015:-

1) W.P. No.2471-P/2015 (Zahid Arif vs. Chairman

NAB etc);

2) W.P. No.2472-P/2015 (Sohail Bin Qayum vs.

NAB etc); and

3) W.P.No.2325-P/2015 (Sahibzada Riaz Noor vs.

Chairman NAB etc.

2. The petitioner Zahid Arif was arrested by the

NAB authorities on 13.07.2000 on the allegations of

accumulating assets disproportionate to his known

sources of income. The proceedings against him ended

when the petitioner entered into plea bargain with the

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NAB authorities under Section 25 of the National

Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (hereinafter called

“NAB Ordinance”). The Provincial Government, while

proceeding against the petitioner on departmental side,

dismissed the petitioner from service under Section 3

of the Removal from Service (Special Powers)

Ordinance, 2000 (hereinafter called “RSO 2000”) vide

order dated 29.06.2001. The petitioner challenged his

dismissal from service before the Provincial Service

Tribunal, where his appeal was accepted vide

judgment dated 17.12.2008 and he was re-instated in

service subject to a proper departmental inquiry under

Section 5 of the RSO 2000, if so desired. The opinion

of the law officers of the Government was sought on

the judgment of the Service Tribunal but they advised

the Government not to challenge the said judgment

before the Honourable apex Court.

3. Accordingly, the judgment of the Service

Tribunal was implemented. The petitioner/accused was

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re-instated in service and the Secretary of the

concerned Department nominated Sohail Bin Qayum

(petitioner in W.P. No.2472-P/2015), as an inquiry

officer, to conduct a formal inquiry against the

accused/petitioner under the RSO 2000. On conclusion

of inquiry, the petitioner/inquiry officer exonerated the

petitioner/accused from the charges and submitted his

recommendations to the Secretary concerned. The said

recommendation alongwith summaries of the

Secretaries of the Works and Services as well as

Establishment Departments were forwarded to the

competent authority i.e. Chief Secretary, who at that

time was Sahibzada Riaz Noor ( Petitioner in W.P. No.

3825-P/2015), who approved the

recommendation/summaries and the re-instatement of

accused/petitioner, already made in compliance with

the judgment of the Service Tribunal, was left intact

vide Notification dated 02.04.2009.

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4. It was after about more than 03 years in the

case of petitioners Zahid Arif and Sohail Bin Qayum

as well as after about more than 04 years in the case of

petitioner Sahibzada Riaz Noor, when the NAB

authorities issued call up notices on 27.05.2013,

28.03.2013 and 17.05.2013 respectively to them to

appear before the Deputy Director, NAB for recording

their statements. So, the petitioners appeared before

the Inquiry Officer of NAB, recorded their statements

and provided the relevant information. A call up notice

was again issued against petitioner Sahibzada Riaz

Noor on 22.9.2015 and the inquiry was converted into

investigation against all the petitioners on the ground

that under Section 15 of the NAB Ordinance, the

petitioner Zahid Arif was a convicted person after

entering into plea bargain with the NAB authorities

under Section 25 of the NAB Ordinance, hence his re-

instatement into service amounted to illegal re-

instatement of a convicted person.

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5. The petitioners feeling aggrieved have filed the

instant writ petitions wherein the respondents were

directed not to take any adverse action against them till

final decision of the writ petitions.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that

the initiation of inquiry and its conversion into

investigation despite the judgment of the Service

Tribunal, all the actions/inactions of respondents are

bad in law, disclosing patent malice and malafide

against the petitioners, which are violative of the

petitioners’ rights guaranteed under Articles 2-A, 9,

12, 14 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of

Pakistan 1973 and the Principles of Natural Justice.

The learned counsel in support of their arguments

placed reliance on the judgments of Siraj Din and 3

others vs. Sardar Khan and 2 others (1993 SCMR

745), Arif Ghafoor vs. Managing Director, H.M.C.,

Texila and others (PLD 2002 Supreme Court 13),

Government of Pakistan through Secretary M/o

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Finance and others vs. Asif Ali and others (2006

SCMR 1005), Ghulam Sarwar Zardari vs. Piyar Ali

alis Piyaro and another (2010 SCMR 624), Dr.

Javaid Shahbaz Rab vs. The State through

Chairman National Accountability Bureau,

Islamabad (2011 P Cr.L.J 376), Mansoor Ahmed

Qureshi vs. The State (PLD 2005 Karachi 443),

Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited

through Chairman and 3 others vs. Messrs

Muhammad Saeed Wazir, for General-Manager,

(T&R)PTCL and another (2005 SCMR 1225) and

Badshah Gul Wazir vs. Government of Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others

(2015 SCMR 43).

7. As against that, the learned DPG submitted

that a person entering into plea bargain would be

deemed to be a convicted person, therefore, he cannot

be re-instated into service because of the said stigma,

so the re-instatement of accused/petitioner is an act in

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violation of the provisions of Section 15 of the NAB

Ordinance read with Sections 3A and 5 of the RSO,

2000. The learned DPG also questioned the

maintainability of the writ petitions because the case

against the petitioners is at the investigation stage and

this Court while exercising its power under Article-199

of the Constitution cannot interfere or hamper with the

case of an accused at investigation stage. The learned

DPG also placed reliance on the judgment of this

Court, titled, Syed Abid Hussain Shah and 9 others

vs. Chief Secretary N.-W.F.P., Peshawar and 7

others (2013 P.Cr.L.J 974).

8. We have heard arguments of the learned

counsel for the parties and have also perused record of

the case.

9. There is no cavil to the well settled proposition

that the High Court in exercise of its powers under

Article-199 of the Constitution though can quash an

F.I.R but normally would not quash the investigation

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of the case at its preliminary stage. However, the facts

and circumstances of the instant case are different from

the cases investigated under the Criminal Procedure

Code against an accused person. The procedure under

the NAB Ordinance is that first an inquiry is

conducted, which is then converted into investigation

and thereafter a Reference is filed against the accused

before the Accountability Court. The arrest of an

accused person under the Criminal Procedure Code

can be made after lodging of an FIR but the NAB

authorities even during the course of investigation can

arrest a person. There is also no denial to the fact that

under Section 25 (b) of the NAB Ordinance, an

accused who is released on the ground of plea bargain

would be deemed to be a convicted person.

10. The case of present petitioners is debatable

keeping in view the original Sections of the NAB

Ordinance, the RSO 2000 and its subsequent

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amendments. The old section 15 of the NAB

Ordinance was to the following effect:-

“Where an accused person is convicted for

the offence of corruption or corrupt practices

as specified in the Schedule to this Ordinance,

he shall stand disqualified for 21 years for

seeking, or from being elected chosen

appointed or nominated as a member or

representative of any public office, or any

statutory or local authority of the Government

of Pakistan.

Provided that any accused person who

has availed the benefit of section 25 of this

Ordinance shall also be deemed to have been

convicted for an offence under this

Ordinance, and shall stand disqualified for 21

years as above.” (underlined by us).

The first amendment was brought in Section 15 of the

NAB Ordinance through Ordinance No. IV of 2000

dated 30.02.2000, where under after the word

“elections” the words “or to hold public office” were

added. This Section was again amended through

Ordinance No.XXXV of 2001 dated 10.08.2001

whereunder the following amendment was made:-

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15. Disqualification to contest elections or to

hold public office:

(a) Where an accused person is convicted of

an offence under section 9 of this Ordinance,

he shall forthwith cease to hold public office, if

any, held by him and further he shall stand

disqualified for a period of ten years, to be

reckoned from the date he is released after

serving the sentence, for seeking or from being

elected, chosen, appointed or nominated as a

member or representative of any public body

or any statutory or local authority or in service

of Pakistan or of any Province:

Provided that any accused person who has

availed the benefit of sub-section (b) of section

25 shall also be deemed to have been

convicted for an offence under this Ordinance,

and shall forthwith cease to hold public office,

if any, held by him and further he shall stand

disqualified for a period of ten years, to be

reckoned from the date he has discharged his

liabilities relating to the matter or transaction

in issue, for seeking or from being elected,

chosen, appointed or nominated as a member

or representative of any public body or any

statutory or local authority or in service of

Pakistan or of any Province.”

11. Similarly, Section 3-A in the RSO 2000 was

inserted by KPK Act No.XII of 2003 dated 20.10.2003

as under:-

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“3A. Procedure in case of conviction by a court

of law.—(1) Where a person in Government service

or in corporation service on conviction by a court

of law is sentenced to imprisonment or fine; the

competent authority shall examine the facts and the

grounds on which the order convicting such person

was passed by a court of law.

(2) Where on examination the competent

authority finds that order of imprisonment or fine is

based on—

(a) established charges of corruption or moral

turpitude, it shall pass order of dismissal from

service of the delinquent person in Government

service or in corporation service which shall be

effective from the date of his conviction by a court

of law; or

(b) charges other than corruption or moral

turpitude it may, in the light of the facts and

circumstances of the case, decide as to whether it is

a fit case for taking departmental action under this

Ordinance, and if it so decides it may, subject to the

provisions of sub-section (2) of section 3, impose

any penalty provided by this Ordinance as it may

deem fit.".

Under the N.W.F.P. ORDINANCE NO. V OF 2001,

Section 5 of the RSO 2000 was amended as under:-

"5. Power to appoint an Inquiry Officer or

Inquiry Committee.—

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(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the

competent authority shall, before passing an order

under section 3, appoint an Inquiry Officer or

Inquiry Committee to scrutinize the conduct of a

person in Government service or a person in

corporation service who is alleged to have

committed any of the acts or omissions specified in

section 3. The Inquiry Officer or, as the case may

be, the Inquiry Committee, shall—

(a)communicate to the accused the charges and

statement of allegations specified in the order of inquiry

passed by the competent authority;

(b)require the accused within seven days from the day

the charge is communicated to him to put in a written

defence;

(c)enquire into the charge and may examine such oral

or documentary evidence in support of the charge or in

defence of the accused as may be considered necessary

and the accused shall be entitled to cross-examine the

witnesses against him; and

(d) hear the case from day to day and no adjournment

shall be given except for special reasons to be recorded

in writing and intimated to the competent authority.

(2) Where the Inquiry Officer or, as the case may be,

the Inquiry Committee, is satisfied that the accused

is hampering, or attempting to hamper, the progress

of the Inquiry, he or it shall record a finding to that

effect and proceed to complete the inquiry in such

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manner as he or it deems proper in the interest of

justice.

(3) The Inquiry Officer or, as the case may be, the

inquiry Committee, shall submit his or its findings

and recommendations to the competent authority

within twenty-five days of the initiation of inquiry.

(4) The competent authority may dispense with the

inquiry under sub-section (1) if it is in possession of

sufficient documentary evidence against the

accused, or for reasons to be recorded in writing; it

is satisfied that there is no need of holding an

inquiry.

(5) Where a person who has entered into plea

bargaining under any law for the time being in

force, and has returned the assets or gains acquired

through corruption or corrupt practices voluntarily,

the inquiry shall not be ordered:

Provided that show cause notice shall be issued on the

basis of such plea bargaining to such person informing of

the action proposed to be taken against him and the

grounds of such action requiring him to submit reply

within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. On receipt of

the reply, the competent authority may pass such orders as

it may deem fit.".

This amendment was given retrospective effect from

the 15th day of August, 2000.

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12. In view of the above relevant provisions of

law, the admitted position in this case would be that

accused/petitioner was arrested by NAB on 13.07.2000

and released by the Court on 17.10.2000 after plea

bargain with the NAB authorities and at that time both

the amendments in Section 15 of the NAB Ordinance

were not yet introduced and the only disqualification

for an accused was that of 21 years to be elected,

chosen, appointed or nominated as a member or

representative of any public office, or any statutory or

local authority of the Government of Pakistan. The

petitioner being a Government servant was not coming

in that category. The NAB authorities communicated

the above plea bargain to the Head of the Department

of the petitioner, who dismissed the petitioner under

Section 3 of the RSO 2000 from service on 29.06.2001

without any inquiry. The august Supreme Court of

Pakistan in the case of Pakistan Telecommunication

Company Limited through Chairman and 3 others vs.

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Messrs Muhammad Saeed Wazir, former General-

Manager, (T&R) PTCL and another (2005 SCMR

1225) has laid down that”-

“Contention of the petitioner was that civil servant

having entered into a plea bargain with National

Accountability Bureau, could be dismissed under

S.3(1)(c)(iv) of the Removal from Service (Special

Powers) Ordinance, 2000- Validity – Issuance of

show-cause notice and holding of inquiry, in the

given circumstances, was necessary under S.3,

Removal from Service (Special Powers)

Ordinance, 2000- When neither any show-cause

notice was issued nor any inquiry was held,

Service Tribunal had rightly set aside the

impugned order of dismissal – Regardless of

whether the proceedings were taken under

Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline)

Rules, 1973 or under Removal from Service

(Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, a dismissal

without notice and without inquiry could not be

orders in circumstances of the present case –

Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.”

The petitioner filed service appeal before the Services

Tribunal on 01.12.2001 which was decided on

17.12.2008 whereby the dismissal order was set aside

and accused/petitioner was re-instated into service.

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The concluding Para of the judgment of the Service

Tribunal runs as under:-

“23. We, therefore, accept the present appeals, set

aside the impugned orders dated 20.08.2001 and

29.6.2001 of dismissal of the appellants from

service, and we direct the official respondents to

reinstate the appellants into their service

immediately w.e.f. the dates of their dismissal from

service. The respondents may initiate and conduct

disciplinary proceedings against the appellants,

urgently, if they may so like, in accordance with the

law prevailing and in force on the dates of plea

bargaining of the appellants, in the light of the

judgments of the August Supreme Court of Pakistan

and the High Courts. For the purposes of the

inquiry, the appellants shall be deemed to be at the

stage of service before 23.5.2001. The issues of

payment of salary etc. of the appellants for the

period from the dates of dismissal till the dates of

their re-instatement as a consequence of this

judgment, and of their back benefits, shall follow

the result of the disciplinary proceedings.”

With regard to the effect of amended Sections 3 and

5 of the RSO 2000, it was observed by the Service

Tribunal that:-

“The facts of the cases have clarified that

proceedings against both the appellants were

initiated on, or before, 13.4.2001. Neither Section 3

nor Section 5 of the N.W.F.P. Removal from Service

(Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 (the N.W.F.P.

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Ordinance No.V of 2000) was substituted till

23.5.2001. The order of dismissal of Sher Adam

Khan appellant was issued on 20.8.2001, while the

order of dismissal of Zahid Arif appellant was

issued on 29.6.2001. Section 3 of the N.W.F.P.

Ordinance No.V of 2000 contained the provision

regarding inquiry by the Committee constituted

under Section 5 on 13.4.2001. That provision was

deleted later-on, but was re-inserted vide the

N.W.P.P Ordinance No.VIII of 2002. The

appellants were entitled to the facility available in

section 3 of the NWFP Ordinance No.V of 2000

which was not withdrawn till 23.5.20041.”

The above judgment of the Service Tribunal was not

challenged before the apex Court and got finality. A

proper inquiry was thus conducted against the

petitioner by Suhail Bin Qayyum, petitioner, who was

appointed by the Secretary of the Department as

Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer in his inquiry

report exonerated the petitioner on the ground that he

had shown all his assets in his annual declaration of

assets proforma available in the department and no one

objected to it. These assets were also shown in the

Wealth Tax statement and there was no other evidence

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to show that these assets were accumulated illegally.

The objection of the learned DPG that no record was

requisitioned from the NAB authorities during the

course of inquiry loses its weight, when the NAB itself

had informed the Department about the plea bargain

made by the accused/petitioner and was then also in

the knowledge of the judgment of the Service Tribunal

for re-inquiry. If they were in possession of some

material evidence against the petitioner, they could

have made it part of the record of inquiry.

13. The call up notices was duly responded by

the petitioners by recording their statements and

providing necessary information to the NAB

authorities, whereafter they kept mum over the matter

for a long period of more than 3/4 years. It appears

from the record that on 24th August, 2015, the NAB

authorities wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary, KPK,

Peshawar about the illegal re-instatement of

accused/petitioner and requested him to look into the

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matter and take necessary steps to safeguard the

public/government interest. Reply to the letter in

question was given by the Secretary Establishment,

Government of KPK wherein it was stated that the

Provincial Government is of the view that prima facie

there was no malafide action on part of Sahibzada Riaz

Noor, Ex-Chief Secretary in this case. A call up notice

was issued to the Secretary Establishment to appear

before the Additional Director, NAB on 14.12.2015

and it was because of this action of the NAB that the

Secretary Establishment through a written letter dated

31.12.2015 requested to consider his letter as

withdrawn so that the law may take its due course. The

conduct of the NAB is apparent from its letter dated

24.8.2015 written to the Chief Secretary KPK whereby

he was informed that the NAB has authorized

investigation against Sahizada Riaz Noor, Ex-Chief

Secretary KPK and others regarding illegal re-

instatement of accused Zahid Arif, Ex-Assistant

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Engineer C&W Department. It was further intimated

that the accused entered into Plea Bargain with NAB,

which is to be deemed conviction under the provisions

of NAO 1999 against whom an inquiry was ordered by

the Service Tribunal but the Inquiry Officer exonerated

him of the charges and the Ex-Chief Secretary, being

the competent authority, agreed with the

recommendation of the Inquiry Officer. The Chief

Secretary was requested to look into the matter and

take necessary steps to safeguard the public /

government interest. This letter was replied by the

Secretary Establishment Department, KPK on behalf

of the Chief Secretary wherein it was stated that the

accused officer was dismissed from service on

29.06.2001 while the amendment in Sub Section (a) of

Section 15 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

was made on 10.08.2001, therefore, after conducting

formal inquiry the competent authority (the then Chief

Secretary) on the recommendation of the inquiry

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officer exonerated and reinstated the accused into

service. So, there was no malafide action on part of

Sahibzada Riaz Noor, Ex-Chief Secretary in this case.

When this letter was received by the NAB authorities,

they issued a Call up Notice under Section 19 of the

NAB Ordinance against the Secretary Establishment,

KPK to appear before the Additional Director, NAB

on 14.12.2015 for recording his statement and

providing information/evidence whatsoever, which

relate to the commission of said offence. Just within 15

days of appearing the Secretary Establishment before

the NAB authorities, he withdrew his letter dated

02.12.2015 vide his letter dated 31.12.2015. The above

action of NAB thus clearly depicts their conduct

against the petitioners and misuse of their powers

against the high-ranking officers of the Government,

who had nothing to do with the matter but they were

compelled to retreat from their stance that the Ex-Chief

Secretary had approved the summary in good faith.

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14. So for as the safeguarding of the

public/government interest is concerned, the same had

already been safeguarded through recovery of a huge

amount from the accused/petitioner. The criminal and

departmental proceedings are quite distinct from each

others. If an accused is acquitted by the Court of law,

punitive action can be taken against him on

departmental side and vice versa. Once the

accused/petitioner made plea bargain, he was no more

required by the NAB and the formal inquiry against

him was under the judgment of the Service Tribunal,

which was not challenged by the Government or the

NAB authorities before the apex Court. The august

Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Arif

Ghafoor vs. Manager Director, H.M.C., Taxila and

others (PLD 2002 SC 13) has held that:-

“Disciplinary proceedings’ and criminal

proceedings’ as used in service matter)-

Distinguished – Both the proceedings cannot be

termed as synonymous and interchangeable –

‘Disciplinary proceedings’ and ‘criminal

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proceedings’ are quite distinct from each other

having altogether different characteristics and

there is nothing common between the

adjudicative forums by whom separate

prescribed procedure and mechanism is followed

for adjudication and both the forums have their

own domain of jurisdiction – Decision of one

forum would have no bearing on the decision of

other forum in any manner whatsoever and it

would be a misconceived notion to consider the

acquittal in criminal trial as an embargo against

disciplinary proceedings.”

Their lordships of the August Supreme Court of

Pakistan in the case of Government of Pakistan

through Secretary M/o Finance and others vs. Asif

Ali and others (2006 SCMR 1005) have also held

that:-

“Criminal Courts in the light of strict observance

of law of evidence, have to judge admissibility of

evidence to hold a person guilty of criminal

charge but in case of charge of misconduct,

departmental authorities are not required to

follow technicalities of law. Unless essential

elements of components of a criminal offence are

proved through evidence, direct or circumstantial,

the conviction is not possible, whereas in case of

misconduct, departmental authorities may not

follow complicated procedure of criminal Court

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and rule of appraisal of evidence, rather such

authorities in the light of general principle of law

may determine question of guilt or innocence of a

person by giving him a fair and adequate

opportunity of hearing in accordance with law.”

In the case of Mansoor Ahmed Qureshi vs. The

State (PLD 2005 Karachi 433) it has been observed

that:-

“Sub-section (a) and Proviso to S.15 of National

Accountability Ordinance, 1999 was amended on

10.8.2001 by Amending Ordinance to include

punishment of a convicted accused to hold public

office and to be disqualified for a period of ten

years etc. – When reference was filed on 14.7.2001

said punishment was not available – Amended

Ordinance promulgated on 10.8.2011, was to have

effect from the date of its promulgation and could

not be given retrospective effect and accused could

only be deemed to be convicted under un amended

proviso to S.15(2) of National Accountability

Ordinance, 1999.”

It is well settled proposition of law that the question of

interference with vested rights is a matter separate

from the issue of retrospective operation. Only that

law can be given retrospective effect which brings

some change in its procedure but no retrospective

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effect can be given to a substantive law, under which

certain rights accrues to a person. The august Supreme

Court of Pakistan in the case of Badshah Gul Wazir

vs. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

(2015 SCMR 43) has held as under:-

Amendment/substitution of an enactment---

Curtailing substantive right/accrued right---

Retroactive/retrospective operation--- Scope---

Substituted section, particularly one curtailing

substantive rights, did not have "retroactive

operation" unless the legislature elected to give

it retrospective effect ---Substituted section could

not obliterate accrued rights.

It may also be mentioned here that no retrospective

effect has been given while promulgating Ordinance

No.XXXV of 2001 and Ordinance No.CXXXIII of

2002. Thus, at the time of making plea bargain by the

accused/petitioner, the amended law requiring the

cessation of office by petitioner was not in the field.

15. This is a case of the nature where an accused

already released by the competent Court of law is

again being compelled to go through the rigorous

proceedings of the NAB authorities including their

arrest before filing of a Reference in a matter which

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was within the powers of the Inquiry and Competent

Authority under the RSO 2000 to which an indemnity

under Section 14A of RSO 2000 has also been given

against any prosecution or other legal proceedings. The

August Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of

Ghulam Sarwar Zardari vs. Piyar Ali alias Piyaro

and another (2010 SCMR 624) has laid down as

under:-

“Art.199-Constitutional jurisdiction of High

Court – Scope- Mala fide investigation – High

Court has jurisdiction under Art.199 of the

Constitution and is competent to correct such

proceedings and pass necessary orders to ensure

justice and fair play. Investigating authorities do

not have entire and total authority of running

investigation to their whim – If investigation is

launched mala fide or beyond jurisdiction of

investigating agency, then the same can be

corrected and appropriate orders can be passed.”

16. We thus find that the alleged amendments in the

National Accountability Ordinance are not applicable

to the case of the petitioner nor the NAB authorities

can be given a free hand to initiate proceedings in a

case at such a belated stage at their own whims

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specially when it has attained finality at a proper

forum. Under the Plea Bargain, petitioner was released

before any trial, therefore, the accused/petitioner can

not be vexed twice by the NAB authorities as to why

he was re-instated in service when at the time of

release of the petitioner, no such provision of cessation

of public office was in the field under the NAO

Ordinance and the relevant amendments in the Laws

were made thereafter, as discussed above.

17. So, in this view of the matter, all the three writ

petitions are accepted and the action initiated by the

respondents is declared as null and void and the

inquiry / investigation / proceedings against the

petitioners are hereby quashed. The parties are left to

bear their own costs.

Announced.

CHIEF JUSTICE

J U D G E

A.Mateen