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Confidential. © 2017 IHS MarkitTM. All Rights Reserved.Confidential. © 2017 IHS MarkitTM. All Rights Reserved.

Worlds in Flux:

Energy and GeopoliticsCarlos Pascual, Senior Vice President

Global Energy & International Affairs

IHS Markit

October 2017

Confidential. © 2017 IHS MarkitTM. All Rights Reserved.

Resources, Technology, Policy and Geopolitics will reshape

national and commercial realities: How will you invest?

2

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

History Rivalry Vertigo Autonomy

© 2017 IHS Markit

Do

llars

per

barr

el (2

016 U

S$)

Average annual crude oil prices (real), 1990–2040

Source: IHS MarkitNote: Dated Brent.


Introduction: What we will cover

3

Competition to Supply Oil

What barrels will break through?

U.S.: New Risk Factor in Global Politics

Russia, Middle East, Iran, China, North Korea

Paris Agreement

Global unity but unresolved global challenges

Electric Vehicles and Peak Demand

Peak Demand is in sight, but oil is not dead

Sheiks, Shale and Wall Street

Unconventional producers, Wall Street and short cycle barrels are upending oil markets

and challenging OPEC supply management


The Structural Transformation of

Oil Markets and its Cyclical

Political and Economic

Consequences

4


Shale oil has made the US more energy secure – but US

and global oil markets remain deeply intertwined

5

60%

US Liquids Supply (mmbpd)

Source: EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2016,


US Shale Adds a Faster Gear to the Capex-to-Supply

Conveyor Belt

6

Short-Cycle (6-12 mo)

Medium-Cycle (1-3 yrs)

Long-Cycle (3-5 yrs)

• US Tight Oil

• Global Crude Inventories

• Spare Production Capacity

• High-Potential Gulf Projects (Iraq/Iran/Saudi)

• Sustainable Return of Political Barrels (Libya/Nigeria)

• EOR, Tie-backs, Brownfield Expansions

• Greenfield Conventional Onshore

• Oil Sands

• Offshore Development (esp. Deepwater)

Shale

Onshore

Subsea tie-back

Shallow water

platform

FPSO, Semisub

etc deepwater

0 2 4 6

Illustrative capital flexibility and

Note: Bubble size represents unsanctioned volumes through 2023

Source: IHS Markit © 2017 IHS Markit

Sanction to first production (years)

Cap

ital fl

ex

ibil

ity

Short-cycle and

medium-cycle supply

potential drives long

cycle decisions

Sanction decisions

impacted by front

end of price curve

6


Annual wedges of growth and contraction are really a

geopolitical drama

7

2,10

2,58

3,41

2,45

1,72

3,073,47

-1,05

-1,52-1,84

-2,54-2,27

-1,93

-2,67-3,00

-2,00

-1,00

0,00

1,00

2,00

3,00

4,00

Wedge Base decline

Base decline & wedge production in US Onshore

Notes: Due to methodological differences, base decline shown here is understated and must be adjusted to fit with actual growth.


MM

b/d

2018 B

ase a

nd

Wed

ge b

oth

exceed

2015 r

eco

rd


8

2018: dramatic reactive growth depends on capex and price scenarios

Wall Street takes center stage: antagonist or protagonist?

-33%

8%

31%

-72%

-20%

10%

-106%

-44%

-8%

-120%

-100%

-80%

-60%

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

$40 $45 $50 $55 $60 $65 $70

Es

t. C

ap

ex

/ P

os

t-in

t. C

as

h F

low

S

urp

lus

(D

efi

cit

)

WTI Price

Low Case - $50 Bn Base Case - $71 Bn High Case - $90 Bn

US production cases: Price-funding combinations in 2018

© 2017 IHS MarkitSource: IHS Markit

8.000

8.500

9.000

9.500

10.000

10.500

11.000

Low Case - $50 Bn Base Case $71 Bn High Case - $90 Bn

Production growth path under three sensitivity cases (entry-to-exit

2018)

© 2017 IHS Markit

Th

ou

sn

ad

b/d

Source: IHS Markit

Base: +0.4

MMb/d

Low: -0.7

MMb/d

High: +1.1

MMb/d

Production as entry

(MMb/d)Production at exit (MMb/d) Entry-to-exit change (MMb/d) New Wells Rigs

Capex in

$ Bn

Low Case 2018 - $50 Bn 9.7 9.0 -0.7 14,292 562 $50

Base Case 2018 - $71 Bn 9.7 10.0 0.4 18,110 901 $71

High Case 2018 - $90 Bn 9.7 10.7 1.1 20,487 1,099 $90

Source: IHS Markit


OPEC, Russia: bet on supply management to cure

accumulated ills

9

(1.800)

(1.300)

(800)

(300)

200

700

Jan-17 Feb-17 Mar-17 Apr-17 May-17 Jun-17 Jul-17

Gulf-5 Russia

Other non-OPEC participants Other OPEC participants

Libya and Nigeria Net production cut

Change in crude supply from October 2016 levels

© 2016 IHS

Th

ou

san

d b

/d

Notes: Angola is taken as change from September 2016 levels as agreed at the OPEC meeting

on November 30

Source: IHS

Agreed "cuts"

0,03

0,06

0,03

-0,14

-0,01

0,00

0,08

-0,02

0,01

0,01

-0,02

0,03

-0,20 -0,15 -0,10 -0,05 0,00 0,05 0,10

Total

Venezuela

UAE

Saudi Arabia

Qatar

Kuwait

Iraq

Iran

Gabon

Ecuador

Angola

Algeria

OPEC January-June 2017 average crude production minus

agreed target level

Notes: Libya and Nigeria are not included in this figure because they are

exempted from OPEC production targets. Equatorial Guinea, which joined OPEC

in May 2017, is also not included in this figure as its output target has not been

explicitly stated by OPEC..

Source: IHS Markit© 2017 IHS

Markit

Million barrels per day


Short-cycle price dynamic: hard work to stay in place

$0

$20

$40

$60

$80

$100

$120

1Q

13

2Q

13

3Q

13

4Q

13

1Q

14

2Q

14

3Q

14

4Q

14

1Q

15

2Q

15

3Q

15

4Q

15

1Q

16

2Q

16

3Q

16

4Q

16

1Q

17

2Q

17

3Q

17

4Q

17

1Q

18

2Q

18

3Q

18

4Q

18

Dated Brent LLS WTI

Qu

art

erl

y a

vera

ge p

rice p

er

barr

el

Outlook

Dated Brent and other benchmark crude price outlook to 2018

Notes: LLS = Louisiana Light Sweet. WTI = West Texas Intermediate.

Source: IHS Markit, Argus Media Limited (historical) © 2017 IHS Markit

Assumptions

OPEC and Russia maintain some

degree of production restraint through

2018, as producers are cautious

about the price repercussions of

raising output too quickly.

US and Canadian annual crude

production rises a combined 0.8

MMb/d in 2017 and 1.1 MMb/d in

2018. US production posts such

growth despite WTI prices in the mid-

to-high $40s, owing to ample capital,

hedging, and attractive well

economics.

World liquids demand remains robust,

posting annual average growth of 1.7

MMb/d in 2017-18, fueled by gains in

China, India, and other emerging

market economies in Asia.

10

Benchmark crude price outlook (dollars per barrel)

3Q 2015 4Q 2015 1Q 2016 2Q 2016 3Q 2016 4Q 2016 1Q 2017 2Q 2017 3Q 2017 4Q 2017 1Q 2018 2Q 2018 3Q 2018 4Q 2018

Dated Brent $50.44 $43.71 $33.95 $45.51 $45.80 $49.35 $53.66 $49.58 $50.56 $50.26 $49.50 $48.75 $48.00 $47.26

LLS $50.32 $43.56 $35.12 $47.33 $46.53 $50.42 $53.43 $50.12 $50.10 $49.50 $48.53 $47.69 $47.07 $46.46

WTI $46.47 $42.03 $33.41 $45.50 $44.88 $49.23 $51.68 $48.11 $48.49 $47.94 $47.00 $46.17 $45.39 $44.74

Source: IHS Markit, Argus Media Limited (historical)


KuwaitQatar

UAE

Algeria

Iraq

Saudi Arabia

Nigeria

Angola

Ecuador

Venezuela

Iran

Libya

Russia

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

2017 OPEC Thresholds: Brent at $51/bbl

Source: IHS © 2017 IHS

Fis

ca

l B

rea

k-e

ve

n, U

SD

/ B

bl

Current Account Break-even, USD / Bbl

Today’s geopolitical drama: prices profoundly shape

economic and political choices of producer economies

11

Insufficient revenue from oil

to balance current account

or budget


to balance budget

Sufficient revenue from oil to

balance current account and

budget


to balance current account


Who will in the competition to

supply the market?

12


Reactivity of American unconventionals defines the pace for

future FID and who supplies future barrels

13

(1.575)

(3.939)

(6.389)

(9.525)

(12.244)

-20.000

-15.000

-10.000

-5.000

0

5.000

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Cumulative growth in supply from sanctionedprojects

Source: IHS Markit

Th

ou

sa

nd

b/d

Global crude and condensate 2016 base production

outlook 2019-2023

© 2017 IHS MarkitSource: IHS Markit

Global crude and condensate call on new supply

2019-2023

© 2017 IHS Markit

0

5.000

10.000

15.000

20.000

25.000

30.000

35.000

Market call on newcrude supply

Unconstrainedsupply upside

Global market call on new supply vs. potential

growth (2019-2023)

© 2017 IHS Markit

Th

ou

sa

nd

b/d

Source: IHS Markit

Unsanctioned

project pipeline

peak capacity (~

20-25 MMb/d)

Gulf-6 (3-5 MMb/d)

US LTO (4-6 MMb/d)


Countries entering global hydrocarbons markets need fiscal

terms and resource quality to compete: 2017 bid rounds

Number of opportunities indicate a number of licensing rounds (specific licensing rounds/auctions can be held for different areas

(onshore/offshore, brown-fields vs green-fields, type of resource (conventional vs unconventional)*Already closed, pending awards

** Commencing shortly

Canada (1

Opportunity)

United States (2

Opportunities)Mexico (5

Opportunities)

Peru (1

Opportunity)**

Suriname (1

Opportunity)

Uruguay (2

Opportunities)

UK (1

Opportunity)** Russia (1

Opportunity)

Iran (2

Opportunities)

Iraq (1

Opportunity)

Equatorial Guinea (1

Opportunity)*

Lebanon (1

Opportunity)

Israel (1st offshore

round)

Australia (3

Opportunities)

Sri Lanka (1

Opportunity)

Thailand (1

Opportunity)

Malaysia (1

Opportunity)*

Indonesia (1

Opportunity)

Argentina (1st

offshore round)

Brazil (4

Opportunities)

Madagascar (1

Opportunity)

New Zealand (1

Opportunity)

Norway (2

Opportunities)Greenland (5

Opportunities)

Bid rounds in 2017

14


0

5.000

10.000

15.000

20.000

25.000

30.000

Conventional onshore Conventional shallow

Deepwater Oil Sands

Orinoco extra-heavy oil Unconventional

2017 estimated total production by asset type for 21 largest IOCs

Th

ou

sa

nd

bo

e/d

30%

34%

18%

15%

3%

0

3.000

6.000

9.000

12.000

15.000

18.000

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026Conventional onshore Conventional shallow

Deepwater Oil sands

Orinoco extra-heavy oil Unconventional

2017-2026 forecast new source incremental growth by asset type

Th

ou

sa

nd

bo

e/d Unconventional 44%

Conventional Ons 9%

Deepwater 23%

Conventional Shallow 21%

The deepwater is still important

15


16

Reductions in project cost continue to make global Deepwater competitive

in lower oil price environment

Libra breakevens improve with proposed Local Content waivers & further cost reduction


Paris Accord: Will it reshape global

energy markets and geopolitics?

17


18

PARIS AGREEMENT: Revolutionized climate negotiations.

From seeking the “ideal” to what countries can do.Entry into force: 4 November 2016

• As the world commits to a low carbon

transition, the conversation in oil has

shifted from “Peak Supply” to “Peak

Demand”

• Base case scenarios see total oil

demand continuing to rise through

2040, even in lower carbon pathways

> IHS Rivalry: 113mm bpd

> IEA New Policies:108mm bpd

• To achieve a 2°C target, Peak

Demand would need to occur by

2021

> IHS Autonomy: 99mm bpd

> IEA 450PPM:94 mm bpd

Countries that joined the Paris Climate Agreement

Note: Denmark’s agreement excludes Greenland. Map is updated as May 31, 2017.

Source: UNFCCC and Business Insider.

Ratified

(160)

Signatories

(195)

Not Signed / Withdrawing

(3)


Eventually the world will have to reconcile NDC pledges with a 2DS target. Will

this open new geopolitical battles?

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2030 China United States EuropeanUnion

India* Russia Indonesia Brazil* Japan Canada Mexico* Rest of world 2030

Global GHG emissions and max NDC savings in 2030, BAU versus NDC and 2 Degree emissions levels

Notes: BAU includes LULUCF emissions and is a combination of IHS and country-provided projections; the top 10 emitters shown above are projected to represent up to 80% of reductions pledged by all NDCs.

Source: IHS Markit© 2017 IHS Markit

Gig

ato

ns o

f C

O2e

-23.7

-3.6

-3.0-3.2

-1.1 -1.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.4-0.8

-9.4

Top 10 2D gap

2D

19


Defining Challenges: 100% energy access, growing

population, sustainability – what are the solutions?

1.06 billionpeople live without electricity

Africa55%

Asia38%

Others, 6%

Power sector’s

coal

consumptionis expected to

rise by over

40% during 2015-25

Coal demand in sub-Saharan

Africa

increases by

around 50% in 2040

20


Success in achieving a 2DS world requires translating

technological change into investment

Evolution of the power generation mix in the 450 Scenario

Source: IEA

21


New Policies Primary Energy Demand and Related CO2 Emissions

Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013

To accommodate Non-OECD growth, all countries must

change they way they produce and consume energy

22


Mobility: vehicle electrification,

peak oil demand, and the

geopolitical implications

23


By 2040 Electric Vehicles could represent 30% (Rivalry) to 60%

(Autonomy) of LDV sales in US, Europe, India, China (70% of world sales)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

LDV sales by powertrain: Rivalry


Mil

lio

ns

pe

r ye

ar

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

LDV sales by powertrain: Autonomy


Mil

lio

ns

pe

r ye

ar

Diesel HEV

BEV

FCE

Other

BEV = battery electric vehicle. PHEV = plug-in hybrid electric vehicle.

HEV = hybrid electric vehicle with gasoline ICE. FCEV = fuel cell electric hybrid.

Gasoline

PHEV

Gasoline

DieselHEV

PHEV

BEV

OtherEVs = BEVs + PHEVs

24


Declining battery cost is a key assumption in scenario

outlooks for EV sales. Automotive battery pack costs have

declined 53% since 2013.

$0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

2013 2016 2019 2022 2025 2028 2031 2034 2037 2040

Automotive battery pack cost outlook

Note: Cost represents an industry average, nominal prices


$/k

Wh

Autonomy

Rivalry

25


Driverless technology lowers the cost of mobility and is

among the most disruptive forces in LDV demand

26

© 2017 IHS Markit: 1694430

$0,58

$0,57

$0,42

$0,32

$0,53

$0,36

$0,31

$0,00

$0,10

$0,20

$0,30

$0,40

$0,50

$0,60

$0,70

Personal ownedcar (ICE)

Human driverpersonal car

(ICE)

Hybrid(driverless)

BEV (driverless) Human driverpersonal car

(ICE)

Hybrid(driverless)

BEV (driverless)

Cost of mobility per mile traveled by car in the USA

Notes: BEV = battery electric vehicle. Hybrid = gasoline/electric with internal combusion engine. ICE = internal combusion engine.

Source: IHS Markit. © 2017 IHS Markit

Co

st

per

mil

e t

rave

lle

d in

co

nsta

nt

20

16 U

S$ 2017 Autonomy 2040Rivalry 2040


Remember the existing vehicle fleet: fuel economy standards

– not EV penetration – have the biggest impact on oil demand

-

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

Global LDV gasoline and diesel demand: Rivalry

Notes: This is an illustrative example of how much gasoline EVs displace vs improving fuel economy

“Rivalry without EVs” is calculated by assuming all global electric miles are instead driven by gasoline HEVs

“Rivalry without EVs and constant fuel economy assumes” that all global LDV miles are travelled by vehicles with a constant 25 mpg fuel economy from 2020

out 2040

Source: IHS Markit © 2017 IHS

Millio

n b

/d

10%

decrease

because

of EVs

70%

decrease

because of

higher fuel

economy

Oil demand assuming constant fuel

economy and no EVs

Rivalry demand

with no EVs

Rivalry

27


Gasoline and diesel demand will decline, but existing fleets will

still make them the principal fuel sources through 2040

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

20

00

20

04

20

08

20

12

20

16

20

20

20

24

20

28

20

32

20

36

20

40

Rivalry LDV energy demand in RTW markets

Notes: Ethanol is included in gasoline. CNG = compressed natural

gas. LPG = liquified petroleum gas

Source: IHS Markit. Electricity is consumed by LDVs, not demand © 2017 IHS Markit

Mill

ion tons o

f oil

equiv

ale

nt

Gasoline

Diesel

ElectricityCNG, LPG, Hydrogen

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

20

00

20

04

20

08

20

12

20

16

20

20

20

24

20

28

20

32

20

36

20

40

Autonomy LDV energy demand in RTW markets

Notes: Ethanol is included in gasoline. CNG = compressed natural gas. LPG

= liquified petroleum gas © 2017 IHS Markit

Mill

ion tons o

f oil

equiv

ale

nt

Gasoline

Diesel

ElectricityCNG, LPG, Hydrogen

28


Higher demand and field declines will still require the world

to find 43 MMb/d by 2040

82

34

Sanctioned, 2

Unsanctioned, 24

91

Unconventional, 4

YTF, 13

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Crude oil andcondensate

production in 2016

Field declines to 2040 New capacityadditions to 2040

Crude oil andcondensate production

in 2040

Global crude oil and condensate outlook balance in 2040

MM

b/d

Global crude oil and condensate production outlook in 2040

© 2017 IHS Markit

MM

b/d

Source: IHS Markit

29


Peak Demand: do science fiction and constructive realism

meet? Oil countries and companies weigh economic futures

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

Historical Growth 2020 Peak 2030 Peak

Scenario Forecasts for Oil Demand (mmbpd)

30


Diversification the new strategy: Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030

• The Saudi economy is expected to expand 1.3 percent in 2018,

down from a 2.3 percent projection in January, according to

the IMF.

> Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s plan to

overhaul the economy and reduce its reliance on crude are

weighing on growth.

• Successful USD 17.5-billion debut sovereign issue and

expectations of additional packages during 2017 expected to

unlock public-private partnerships and generate greater

investment

• The Saudi Aramco IPO marks a historic shift for the Saudi

economy and the global oil market writ large.

• Vision 2030 intends to diversify the Saudi economy beyond

the oil sector while addressing budget deficits that have

plagued the government since 2014.

> Aramco is working to diversify its portfolio, signing roughly $50

billion in deals with U.S. companies.

– Some of these deals did not directly involve oil, such as one

for a new shipbuilding complex in Saudi Arabia.

31

Targets 2016 2030

Non-Oil Government Rev. $163 B $1 T

Non-Oil Exports 16.0% 50.0%Women in Workforce 22.0% 30.0%

Unemployment 11.6% 7.0%

Life Expectancy 74 80


US Politics and Global

Uncertainties: Russia, the Middle

East, Iran, China, North Korea

32


33


US-Russia: domestic crisis and breach of trust complicates

tragedy in the Middle East

34

The Senate

Elections

Michael Flynn

Jeff Sessions

• Fired by President Trump

• Clinton’s E-mails

• Flynn – Russia investigation

• “Leaked” classified information to the media

• Recuses himself from Russia inquiry

during Senate testimony

•Denies knowledge of

Trump’s Campaign

involvement with the Russians

Rod RosensteinJames Comey

Robert Mueller

•Appointed to investigate links between the Russian Gvt. and Trump’s Campaign

•Memo on Comey amidst Russia investigation raises doubt over his objectivity

•Resigns after not being able to disclose content of his talks with

Russia

•Promise of “dirt” on Clinton

Donald Trump Jr.

•Meeting with Kremlin-connected Russian lawyer

•E-mail disclosure

House of

Representatives

•Sen. Richard Burr, a North Carolina Republican and Sen. Mark Warner, a Virginia Democrat.

•Rep. Mike Conaway, Texas Republican, and Rep. Adam Schiff, California Democrat.


U.S.-Russia Tensions Block Cooperation to Stabilize the

Levant, while Russia’s leverage with OPEC increases

35

ISIS

Governance

after the battle

SyriaTransitioning

Assad

IranRoute to

Hezbollah

Russia


Iran: Trump decertification triggers uncertainty that can

threaten the nuclear agreement

RussiaEuropean

Union

Iran France

Great Britain

China

GermanyUnitedStates

What decertification means:

• U.S. decides the suspension of

sanctions was not “appropriate and

proportionate” to the steps that Iran has

taken to end its illicit nuclear activities.

• Waivers to continue agreement remain

through June

• Administration opens 60-day door to

Congress to impose sanctions

• U.S. military against decertification

• Congress may be split

• Impact on oil markets may change over

time

Other Parties to the

agreement:

• Respect IAEA certification

Core Elements From 20,000 to 5,000 centrifuges

at Natanz

Uranium stockpiles reduced by

98% to 300kg for 15 years• Uranium stockpiles capped

at an enrichment level of

3.67%

• R&D limited to the Natanz

facility for 8 years

• Fordo facility ceases

enrichment for 15 years

Arak facility redesigned into a

research and production facility

for medical isotopes

IAEA access within 24 days for

15 years

36


China: once excluded from TPP, now writing Asia’s rules of

commerce and security

37

One Belt, One Road (OBOR)

> Silk Road Economic Belt &

Maritime Silk Road

– “This project of the century.”- Xi Jinping

– More than 60 countries, with a combined GDP of

$21 trillion.

– China has spent $50 billion on the initiative

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

> $100 billion in Initial Capital

– Non-regional members: 25 billion

– Regional members: 75 billion

• China: 29.8 billion

South China Sea

> Each year, $5.3 trillion of trade passes

through the South China Sea

– U.S. trade accounts for $1.2 trillion.

> 7 billion barrels of proven oil reserves

> An estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of

natural gas

Regional Security

> North Korea:

– Clash of Chinese

identitites –

•dominance v interventionaverse

After TPP

> “Losing the United States from the TPP is a big loss,

there is no question about that, but we are not about

to walk away [...] certainly there is potential for

China to join the TPP.” Malcolm Turnbull,

Australian Prime Minister

> Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership


Stakes Critical Tools

• Regional: South Korea, North Korea, Japan

• Global:China, U.S., Russia, Europe

• At risk: Global Non-Proliferation regime

• Mechanism to engage key parties

• Generate options for solutions & consequences

North Korea: Neither key parties nor critical tolos engaged to generate

solutions

38

314 KM

“I will surely and

definitely tame the

mentally deranged U.S.

dotard with fire.”

“I told Rex Tillerson, our

wonderful Secretary of State,

that he is wasting his time

trying to negotiate with Little

Rocket Man"


Conclusions: Drivers of Power, Wealth and Sustainability

39

Lower for longer is today’s energy drama

• Unconventional oil abetted by capital flows create short-term reactivity that rapidly modulates supply and price.

Only cheapest barrels will compete with Gulf and US Shale to entermarket

• FID delays coudl risk future supply shortalls – but when?

Diversification starts now

• Hedging risk takes time:

• IPOs, Sovereign Wealth management, gas transition, energy v oil company.

• EVs will reshape, not end, oil demand

Politics of Confrontation has added U.S. to drivers of global risk

• Russia: Stalemate in relations until U.S. file settled

• Middle East: U.S. alone lacks tolos for stability

• Iran: Decertification triggers uncertainty that could reopen nuclear account

• China: U.S.ceases to write rules of the game

• Korea: Ingredients for solution missing

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