Worldly Ethics by Ella Myers

Worldly Ethics

Ella myErs

democratic politics and care for the world

W orldly Eth i cs–—–

Democratic Politics and

Care for the World

E l l a MyE r s

DukeuniversityPress

DurhamanDLonDon 2013

©2013DukeUniversityPress

Allrightsreserved

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C o n t e n t s

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aCknowLeDgments ix

introDuCtionTracingtheEthicalTurn 1

ChaPteroneCraftingaDemocraticSubject?

TheFoucauldianEthicsofSelf-Care 21

ChaPtertwoLevinasianEthics,Charity,andDemocracy 53

ChaPterthreeTheDemocraticEthicsofCareforWorldlyThings 85

ChaPterFourPartisanshipfortheWorld:TendingtotheWorld

asHomeandIn-Between 111

ePiLogueSelf/Other/World:ForgingConnectionsand

FosteringDemocraticCare 139

notes 153

BiBLiograPhy 195

inDex 207

aC k n o w L e D g m e n t s

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Thoughwritingcanoftenfeellikeasolitarypursuit,IamquiteawarethatIdidnotcreatethisbookonmyown.Iamdeeplygratefulfortheinstitutionalsupport,intellectualstimulation,andplainoldencouragementIhavereceivedalongtheway. I most likely would never have found my way to politi-cal theory or discovered its many pleasures and challengeswereitnotforthetremendousgoodfortuneofcrossingpathswithPeterEubenandWendyBrownearlyinmyundergradu-atestudiesattheUniversityofCalifornia,SantaCruz.IcanstillrecalltheexcitementIfelteverytimeIattendedEuben’slegendary,manic“PoliticalFreedom”classandtheinquisitive-ness and ambition that Brown’s demanding seminars awak-enedinme.Iamgratefultobothofthemforshowingmewhatengagedscholarshipandteachinglooklikeandforencourag-ingmetoseegraduateschoolandanacademiccareerasrealpossibilitiesinmylife. IbeganthisprojectatNorthwesternUniversity,asamem-berofalivelyandgrowingpoliticaltheorycommunitythere.Linda Zerilli was an invaluable interlocutor and critic, tire-lesslyreadinganddiscussingmanydraftsofthisprojectinitsearly stages. Her rigorous intellectual engagement with myideas was invigorating, flattering, and exhausting. My worktodayisbetterforit.BonnieHonigalsoprovidedsharpcom-mentaryandexpertguidance.Heroriginal,incisivereadingsoftextsandeventsalwayspushmetoconsiderthingsanew.IamespeciallyappreciativeofBonnie’songoinginterestinmyworkandherwillingnesstoofferpracticaladviceinadditiontosharpconceptualinsights. IamluckytobeafacultymemberofthePoliticalScience

Acknowledgments—x

DepartmentandGenderStudiesprogramattheUniversityofUtah,whereIamsurroundedbytalentedandinterestingcolleaguesandstudents.IamespeciallyindebtedtoMarkButton,whoreadthecompletemanuscriptandofferedcharacteristicallyprobingandcarefulcomments.Iamgrate-fulforourmanyconversationsoverthepastseveralyearsandforthere-assuringwordshehasofferedatcrucialmoments.SteveJohnston,amorerecentarrivaltoourdepartment,hasbroughtgreatenergywithhim,andIlookforwardtoourexchangesinthefuture.Manyothercolleaguesfromacrosscampushavealsobecomegoodfriends.MattBasso,BethClement,BenCohen,KellieCusten,GretchenDietrich,NadjaDurbach,EdmundFong,LelaGraybill,MontyParet,RichardPreiss,PaisleyRekdal,AngelaSmith,KathrynStockton,andJessicaStraleyhaveallhelpedmakeSaltLakefeellikehome,providingnotonlyintellectualcompanionshipbutwarm meals, laughter, and commiseration. Finally, my students havehelpedme thinkdifferentlyandbetterabout thequestionspursued inthisbook,andtheyhavereliablykeptmeonmytoes. Manyotherpeoplehaveplayedanimportantroleinhelpingthisbookseethelightofday.InadditiontothoseI’vealreadymentioned,IwanttoacknowledgePaulApostolidis,CrinaArcher,JasonFrank,MichaelHan-chard,andPatchenMarkell—allofwhomhavereadandcommentedonpartsoftheprojectatvariouspoints,posingtoughquestionsandofferingfruitfulsuggestions.Thanksalsototwoanonymousreaderswhoprovidedastute,provocative,andveryhelpfulcommentsonthemanuscript.MyworkhasbeenshapedinwaysbigandsmallbydiscussionsovertheyearswithCristina Beltrán, MichaeleFerguson, Kristy King, JillLocke, LidaMaxwell,SaraMonoson,JeanneMorefield,ChrisSkeaff,MattVoorhees,andLenaZuckerwise.DemetraKasimisdeservesspecialmentionforthemanyhoursshehasspentdiscussingthisprojectandforprovidinggoodcheerwhenmostneeded. Earlierversionsofsomeofthisbook’sargumentswerepresentedattheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociationmeetingsin2007and2009andattheWesternPoliticalScienceAssociationmeetingsin2009and2011.Partofchapter1waspublishedas“ResistingFoucauldianEthics:AssociativePoliticsandtheLimitsoftheCareoftheSelf”inContemporary Political Theory7,no.2(2008),andIamgratefulforpermissiontousethisma-terialhere.IamthankfulforcriticalfinancialsupportIreceivedfromtheUniversityofUtah.Asemester’sleaveallowedmetocompletethefirstfulldraftofthemanuscript,andaFacultyFellowAwardfromtheUniversity

Acknowledgments—xi

ResearchCommitteeatpreciselytherightmomentallowedmetoreviseandpolishthefinalversion.ThanksalsotoDukeUniversityPress,espe-ciallytomyeditor,CourtneyBerger,whohasbeensupportive,responsive,andwise. AsIhaveworkedonthisprojectIhavebeensustainedbyextraordi-naryfriendswhoseintelligence,humor,andcarehaveseenmethrough.IespeciallythankPaulAdelstein,TonyBianchi,MikeBosia,PhilDrachtandHeatherHuffman-Dracht,JasonGiven,RoshenHendrickson,Mar-tine Hyland, Demetra Kasimis, Nick Markos, Jon McCoy, Paul North,ChristinePirrone,LauraScott,MikeandHeatherSimons,DavidSinger,FrieseUndine,LizaWeil,andEvaYusa.Thanksalsotomysister,BrookeMyers-Awalt,forlistening,understanding,andbeinghilarious.Iwanttothankmyparents,RobynWagnerandTomMyers,fortheirloveandsup-portandforfosteringinmeasenseofcuriosity,aloveofbooks,andadesiretokeeplearning.AndtoSolomon,whoarrivedasthisprojectwascomingtocompletion:mygratitudeforyoursmile,yoursweetcuriosity,andallthesurprisestocome. Finally,IowethemosttoMarkSchwarz.Idedicatethisbooktohimin appreciation of the wit, patience, and warmth he brings to our lifetogether.Hehasalwaysbelievedunwaveringlyinthisprojectand,evenmoreimportant,inme,withorwithoutabook.Hisdistinctivevoiceandvisionmaketheworldmoreintriguingandmyplaceinitmoresure.

i n t r o D u C t i o n

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trac i ng th E Eth i cal tu rn

The category of ethics is ascendant in recent democraticthought—thatmuchisclear.Evenabriefreviewofcontem-porarypoliticaltheoryrevealsadevelopmentnotableenoughtohavegarneredaname:the“turntoethics.”1Thisphrase,thoughhelpful,isalsomisleadingsinceitsuggestsaunifiedphenomenon,animplicationbeliedbythemultiple,compet-ingunderstandingsofethicsandethosthatshapethecurrentconversation.Theprevalenceofanethicalvocabularyisun-deniable,butthissignalslessthepursuitofacommonpurposethanastruggleoversignification. Still, one feature of contemporary democratic theory’smultivalentobsessionwithethicsisstriking.Againandagain,acrossworktakinginspirationfromhighlydisparatesources,ethicsemergesasan indispensabletreatment foracrippleddemocraticpolitics.2That is,despitedivergentconceptions,ethicsiscastasaresponseto(sometimesill-specified)prob-lemsplaguingdemocracytoday.Ethicsisfiguredrepeatedlyasananimatingsupplementtopolitics,supplyingdemocracywithsomethingitcannotgiveitselfbuturgentlyrequires.In-deed,perhapstheonlybeliefunitingthediverseworkidenti-fiedwiththeturntoethicsistheconvictionthatethicscon-stitutesthatmissingsomethingthatcanhelpcurewhatailsdemocraticlife.Thisconvictionincreasinglycirculatesinnon-

Introduction—2

academiccirclesaswell—ethosfiguresprominentlyinmainstreamdiag-nosesoftheillsafflictingliberaldemocracies.3 This book provides a sympathetic critique of the quest for a demo-cratic ethos, cautioning against the directions this search often takes,while seeking to forgeadifferentpath. Iaffirmthesignificanceof thedemocratic ethos question, yet I argue that prominent efforts to spec-ifyanethicssuitedtodemocracyare, in theend,notespeciallydemo-cratic.Formulationsofethics inspiredby theworkofMichelFoucaultandEmmanuelLevinas,Ishow,areinclinedtoundermine,ratherthanenhance,citizens’democraticactivity.Thesetherapeuticandcharitablemodesofethics,whichcenteroncarefortheselfandcarefortheOther,respectively,maybeadmirableintheirownright,but,despiteclaimstothecontrary,theyareill-equippedtonourishassociativedemocraticpoli-tics.ThedyadicrelationsthatarelabeledethicalinbothofthesecasesnarrowattentiontothefiguresofselfandOtherandobscuretheworldlycontextsthataretheactualsitesandobjectsofdemocraticaction. Ielaborateanddefendhereanalternativeethos,onewhichfocusesnotonanindividual’spracticeofcarefortheselforcarefortheOther,butoncontentiousandcollaborativecarefortheworld,anideaIdevelopwithandagainstHannahArendt’spolitical theory.Theworldlyethicsadvo-catedhererests,first,onanaccountofdemocraticrelationsthathigh-lightsthesenseinwhichcitizens’jointactionconcernssomethingintheworld,asimultaneouslycommonandcontestedobjectthatisthefocusofmutualattention,advocacy,anddebate.Aviabledemocraticethicshon-orsthisdynamic,recognizingthatdemocraticrelationsareneversimplyintersubjectivebutinvolverelationsbetweenmultipleactorsandspecificfeaturesoftheworldtheystruggletoshape.Aworld-centereddemocraticethosaimstoinciteandsustaincollectivecareforconditions,carethatisexpressedinassociativeeffortstoaffectparticular“worldlythings.”More-over,thisethosistiedtoanexplicitlynormativeconceptionofworldasbothasharedhumanhomeandmediatingpoliticalspace.Thuscarefortheworld,whichliesattheheartofdemocraticethos,isexpressednotonlybyassociativeactionthattendstoconditionsbutalsobyactionthatpursuesparticularsubstantiveends. Wemustfirstask,however,whatgivesrisetotheturntoethicsinre-centdemocraticthought?If,asIargue,thismoveoftenfalters,itisnone-thelesspromptedbygenuineconcernsofthepresent.Twobroadcondi-tionsareespeciallysignificant,inmyview,providingthecontextinwhich

Tracing the Ethical Turn—3

thequestionofdemocraticethoshasbeenposed:widespreadcitizendis-engagementwithintheU.S.polityandtheso-calledfactofpluralism.Thefirst,well-documentedsituationischaracterizedbyAmericans’lowlevelsofparticipation across multiple sites and forms of citizen activity.Thegrowingdisaffectionofmanyandtheseemingwithdrawaloflargeseg-mentsof thepopulation frompublic life throwintoquestionthebasicpremiseofself-government.Italsocreatesavacuumthattendstobefilledbythemostextremeanddogmaticvoices,whichthreatentomonopolizeoratleastgreatlydistortpublicdiscourse.Inlightofthesecircumstances,theconceptofdemocraticethosemergesasawayofthinkingaboutwhatcaninspireormotivateordinarycitizens’participationindemocraticpoli-tics.Effortstodefineanethicsfordemocracyareusuallyconcernedwithelaboratingsensibilitiesororientationsthat,iffostered,mightdrawmorepeopleintodemocraticactivity.Thechallengeis,furthermore,todeveloporientations that canencourage impassioned participation in thediffi-cult,frustratinglaborofdemocraticpoliticswhileavoidingthevitriolanddemonizationthatcharacterizesomuchpoliticaldebatetoday. Thebeliefthatethicsofonekindoranothercaninspireandnourishdemocraticpoliticsreliesuponanimplicitunderstandingofpoliticsasir-reducibletotheformalfeaturesofgovernment—aregime’sinstitutions,laws,andprocedures. Indeed, the inquiry intoethosasksone to thinkaboutthespiritofdemocracy, that is, theconstellationofdispositions,habitsoffeeling,andqualitiesofcharacterthatservetoanimateandsus-tainpracticesofself-government.Ifthisspiritisinsomesenseweakenedorevenmissingtoday,howmightitbecultivated?4Whataffectsorsensi-bilitiesdoesitcallfor?Andcansuchqualitiesbefosteredamongavariedcitizenryinwaysthatrespectdiversityandliberty?Thesearchforethicsisatleastpartlyaresponsetoanominallydemocraticordercharacterizedbyonlyminimaldemocraticactivity. ThesecondimportantcontextforunderstandingtheproliferationofethicstalkiswhatMaxWeberreferredtoatthebeginningofthetwen-tiethcenturyasour“inescapablecondition,”orwhattodayoftengoesbythename“thefactofpluralism.”Growingrecognitionofthecompetingandirreconcilablegoods,faiths,andwaysoflifethatcharacterizehumanexistencehasthrownintoquestiontheideaofasinglemoralitythatwouldgroundpoliticallife.Inlightofthisdevelopment,thetopicofethicshasassumednewimportance. Ifpoliticscanno longerbe imaginedas theinstantiationofauniversalGoodinaworldmarkedbymultiple,incom-

Introduction—4

patiblecomprehensiveviews,theideasofethicsandethosseemtoopenupwaysofthinkingaboutthenormativedimensionsofpoliticsinnon-absolutistways.Theforayintoethicssignalsanattempttowrestlewithquestionsofvalue,character,andcommitmentinapluralistage. Butiftheinquiryintoethicsispartlyinresponsetothefactofplural-ism,nowwidelyacceptedasthestartingpointforpoliticaltheorizing,thisinvestigationshouldbedistinguishedfromtheinfluentialworkofJürgenHabermasandJohnRawlsandtheirintellectualheirs,whichalsopresentspluralismasthestartingpoint.AlthoughbothHabermasandRawlstreattheexistenceofmultiple,irreconcilablecomprehensivedoctrinesorcon-ceptionsof thegood lifeasagiven,eachrespondstothiscondition inwaysthattheturntoethicschallenges. Ontheonehand,Habermasacknowledgesthatnosingleanswertothequestionofthegoodlifeispossible;answerstothatquestionarerootedinparticulartraditionsandculturesthatdivergeandconflictwithoutthepromiseofreconciliation.Yethealsoclaimsthatamoralpointofviewcanbeattained through fidelity to a specialprocedure of justification.Thismoralpointofviewisrationalanduniversal,irreducibletoconcreteformsofSittlichkeit,orethicallife.5Habermasacknowledgesamultiplicityofethicalvaluesandcorrespondingwaysoflifeasthelotofmodernity,yetthisethicalpluralityisqualifiedandlimitedbyaproceduralistmoralitythatretainsforliberal-democraticpoliticsaformofuniversalnormativity.Rawls,ontheotherhand,famouslyendeavorsinhislaterworktoprovideapolitical,ratherthanmoral,justificationforhisconceptionofjustice,onewhichremainsneutralbetweencompetingmoraloutlooks.ThefactofpluralismitselfleadsRawlstoalterhistheoryofjusticeinsuchawaythatitsjustificationisheldtobeindependentofanycomprehensivemoralideal.Justiceasfairnessdoesnotaspiretouniversalitybutisinstead,ac-cordingtoRawls,self-consciouslyrootedinaparticularhistoricalcon-text,thatofmodernconstitutionaldemocracy.ButwhileRawlsseekstoavoidthemoraluniversalismthatHabermasretains,hisnonmetaphysi-calaccountofjusticeincludesadefenseof“publicreason”thatstrictlylimitstheexpressionofpluralisminpoliticallife.AlthoughthenuancesofRawlsianpublicreasoncontinuetobeheavilydebated,itsfunctionisclear:itspecifiesthekindofreasongivingandargumentationthatRawlsholdsshouldandshouldnotcharacterizepublicdebateinadiverse,lib-eralsociety.6Underconditionsofpluralism,Rawlswrites,“therearemanynonpublicreasonsbutonlyonepublicreason.”7


Theturntoethicsinpostfoundationaldemocratictheorytakesplural-ismasapointofdeparture,then,butitsorientationtowardthisfactisdistinctivefrombothHabermasianandRawlsianapproachesintwopri-maryways.8First,whenethicsofonekindoranother isofferedupasnourishmentfordemocraticlife,thegestureusuallydisavowsmorecon-ventional formsofmorality.WorkthatdrawsonFoucaultandLevinas,forexample,presentsethicsasanexplicitchallengetomorality,howeverformalorprocedural.Indeed,ethicsinthisveinissometimescalledpost-moralinrecognitionofitsdeparturefromfamiliarmoraltraditionsthatarethoughttodenyordoviolencetothepluralityofvalues,goods,andfaiths.Speakingveryschematically,ethicsisunderstoodtobemorepar-ticularandaffectivethanuniversal,reason-governedmodelsofmorality.Whileconventionalmoralitiestendtoaspiretothestatusoflaw,ethicsprivilegesthecultivationofdispositionsoverrule-following,suggestingawayofbeingintheworldthatcannotbeformulatedincodified,univer-salterms.9Second,thepursuitofpost-moralethicsisusuallyunderstoodasanefforttoexpand,ratherthancontain,theexpressionofpluralisminpubliclife.ForthinkerslikeWilliamConnolly,JudithButler,andSimonCritchley,forexample,whodrawonFoucauldianandLevinasianethicsinsupportofradicalizeddemocracy(andwhoseworkIaddressinthefol-lowingchapters),thetaskisnotprimarilyunderstoodtobeoneoflimit-ingthepresenceofpluralisminpoliticaldebateanddecisionmaking.10Instead,theaimistoconceptualizeanddevelopthequalitiesofcharac-terandhabitsoffeelingthatmightenablelivelyandrespectfulexchangeacrossdeepdifference,fosteringevenfurtherpluralizationofcollectivelife.Whatvirtues,theyask,mightguideandanimatecitizenactioninaliberal-democraticpolitymarkedbycompetingandirreconcilablecom-prehensiveviews,whicharenotandcannotbeleftatthedoor?11 Ifthesearchforademocraticethosismotivatedlargelybythesedis-tinctiveproblemsofthepresent,wecanseethatitalsorevivessomeveryold concerns within political theory. Although the history of politicalthoughtdoesnotofferanysimpleconsensusonthematter,itrevealsapersistentpreoccupationwiththequestionofhowethicsmightbecon-nectedtopolitics,apreoccupationthatspanstimeandcompetingintel-lectualtraditions.Severalimportantstrandsofthatlineage,includingan-cient,civicrepublican,andliberal,constitutethebackdropagainstwhichthelatestinquiryintoethosistakingplace. Mostnotably, therecent reappearanceof the termethos inpolitical

Introduction—6

theorypointstoitsoriginalancientGreekcontext,inwhichethos,“thecharacteristicspirit,prevalenttoneofsentiment,ofapeopleoracommu-nity,”wasunderstoodtobeacrucialcomplementtonomos.12Together,theywerethoughttoconstitutea“universalizingpair”inwhichtheprin-ciples of order, written and unwritten, were joined with a particular,sharedsensibility.13TheGreeks’definingbeliefinamutuallyinfluentialrelationship between city and soul, elegantly captured in Plato’s refer-encesto“thepoliteiaofthesoul,”wasinformedbytheconvictionthatthesoul,thoughbelongingtoanindividual,wasshapedanddirectedbythesurroundingpoliticalorder,consistingofbothofficialinstitutionsandacommunalspiritorcharacter,nomosandethos,whichtogetherservedasasourceofmoraleducationforitsmembers.“Soulcraft”wascloselybound up with the organization of collective life, in both its legal andextralegaldimensions.Ethos in thiscontext referredneither toacodeofrulesnortoanattributeoftheindividual,buttoadistinctive,sharedwayofbeingthatcomplementedbutwasirreducibletothegovernment’sformalstructure.IntheworkofPlato,Aristotle,andotherthinkersoftheperiod,ethosconnotesdisposition,character,andbearing,understoodincollectiveratherthanstrictlypersonaltermsandheldtobesusceptibletopurposefulshapingandcultivation.14Theethosofacityorconstitutionwasits“moralambience,”coloringawholewayoflifeandexertinganim-portantinfluenceonthechildrenrearedthere.15 The belief that political life is inevitably inhabited by an ethos alsocharacterizesthecivicrepublicantradition,whichapproachesthetopiclargely through the conceptual vocabulary of civic virtue. Republicanthinkersregardsuchvirtueasfundamentaltosoundcitizenship,insist-ingthatahealthyrepublicdependsnotonlyonwell-designedinstitutionscapableofupholdingtheruleoflaw,butalsooncitizens’qualitiesofchar-acter,whichorientthemtowardpursuitofthepublicgood.Whilethetra-ditionrangingfromCicerotoMachiavellitoTocquevilleisfarfromuni-fied,theattentiondevotedtothequestionofcitizens’“habitsoftheheart”isoneofitsdefiningfeatures.16Inspiredbyclassicalthoughtandpractice,republicansunderstandtheformationofsubjectstobeacentralproblemforpolitics.AccordingtoTocqueville,forexample,Americaninstitutionsofself-governmentbothcultivatedandrequiredcitizenswhosharedcer-taindispositionsandorientations,suchasafeltsenseofcollectiverespon-sibilityandaspiritofcontinualimprovement.Fromthecivicrepublicanvantagepointpoliticsandethicsaredistinguishable,withpoliticsrefer-


ring toacommunity’s institutionalarrangementsandethics to itsciti-zens’characterandsensibilities,buttheyarenecessarilyboundupwithoneanotherinarelationofreciprocalinfluenceandtogetherconstituteasociety’spoliticalculture. Finally, although not always as readily recognized, liberal thoughtthroughtheageshasfocusedattentiononthosequalitiesofcharacterorethicalpreconditionsthoughttomakeasuccessfulliberalorderpossibleandinvestigatedhowthesemightbeencouraged.Ananemicaccountofliberalism,accordingtowhichliberalsareentirelyunconcernedwiththegoodlifeandseekonlyanimpartialumpireingovernment,stillcircu-lates,despitethedifficultyoffindinganyliberalthinker,pastorpresent,whoactuallyarticulatessuchaposition.Yetmanycontemporaryliberalsaffirmthesignificanceofcitizenvirtuetopresent-dayliberalordersandhavebroughttolighttheextenttowhichcanonicalliberalpoliticaltheoryhasbeenconcernedwithitsownversionofcivicvirtuefromthestart.17PeterBerkowitz,forexample,hasshownthattheachievementofalib-eralwayoflifeforHobbes,Locke,Kant,andMill,amongothers,dependsuponcertainvirtueswhicharenotautomaticallygeneratedbyliberalism’scentralinstitutionsandwhicharesometimesevendiscouragedbythem.18Similarly,MarkButtonhasconvincinglyarguedthatthesocialcontract,socentraltoliberalthoughtfromitsinceptiontotoday,ismorethanade-viceforconceptualizinglegitimacy(asisusuallyassumed).Italsoservestotheorizea“transformativeethos”thatcanfosterincitizensthe“civiccharacter”and“ethicalsensibility”thataliberalorderrequires.19WhatBerkowitz,Button,andothershelpidentifyis lessaunifiedaccountofliberalvirtuesacrossthinkersthanasharedconvictionthattherearesuchvirtues,quitevariouslydefined,andthattheircultivationisadifficultbutpressingquestionforliberals.Theabidinginterestinanethicsthatani-matesliberalpoliticsiscomplicated,however,byliberalism’scorecom-mitmenttoindividuallibertyandskepticismtowardgovernmentintru-sion.Liberalthoughtischaracterizedbysimultaneousenthusiasmforandaversiontovirtue.20Withoutdiscountingthisambivalence,itisimportanttoacknowledgethatenthusiasmforvirtue,sometimesoverlooked, isaprominentfeatureofliberalpoliticaltheory.Theinquiryintoethosanditsroleinpoliticallifeisintegral,then,notonlytoclassicalandcivicre-publicanthoughtbutalsotoliberalphilosophy. Whenthinkerstodayturntoethicsorethos(usuallyusedinterchange-ably)toaddresscontemporarydemocracy,theytapintothesetraditions.

Introduction—8

TheydrawonancientGreekinsights,forexample,evenastheyputthemintheserviceofvisionsofpoliticallifethatbearlittleresemblancetotheclassicalpolis.Mostsignificant,theytaketheirbearingsfromtheancientconvictionthatcharacteranddispositionmatterpolitically,thatis,bythebeliefthatapolityisirreducibletoitsformalfeatures.Fromthisperspec-tive,everypoliticalcommunityisshaped,forgoodorill,byitscollectivespiritnolessthanbyitslaws.Manycontemporarydemocratictheorists,explicitlyornot,arereturningtoanancientconcernandaffirmingtheGreeknotionthat“justastheetheandthenomoiofacityarecloselycon-nected,sotoothestudyof‘ethics’isitselfapartof‘politics.’”21 Likewise,thequestforademocraticethosrevivesacentralfeatureofrepublicanthoughtbyaskingafterthehabitsoftheheartthatcoulden-ablemorerobust,respectfulformsofparticipationbyabroaderrangeofcitizensinadiversifyingAmericanpolity.Contemporarythinkersseek-inganethicsfordemocracyarereimaginingcivicvirtueforthepresent,exploringwhichsensibilitiesandorientationscanpreparecitizensforco-actionwithoneanotherandhowthesevirtues,whichseemtobeinrathershortsupply,mightbepromotedundercurrentconditions.Atthesametime,proponentsoftheturntoethics,thoughfocusedonthequestionofcultivation,evincesomeofliberalism’sambivalence,remainingalerttothedangerofpaternalismthatattendsanyefforttoshapecitizens’charac-ter.Theoristsofdemocraticethosstrivetoconceptualizeakindofmoraleducation that avoids normalization and, further, actually aids plurali-zation. Giventheextenttowhichcontemporarydemocratictheorybuildsonthesepriorstrandsofpolitical thought, it is temptingto label theturntoethicsareturntoethics.Yetwhileancientandmoderninfluencesareundeniable,recentinquiriesintoethicsarenotsimplycontinuouswithearliermodesofthought.Mostimportant,ancientandcivicrepublicansourcesconnectedethosandcivicvirtue,respectively,tofairlyhomoge-neousandself-containedpoliticalcommunities,characterizedlargelybyface-to-facerelationswithinrelativelysmallterritories.22Thequestionofethostodaytakesitsbearingsfromaverydifferentsetofconditions,asthepreviousdiscussionofpluralismnoted,andaskswhethertheideaofcitizenvirtuecanbeadaptedandreimaginedforadiverse,mobile,andexpansivesociety.Aretherecertainhabitsoftheheartuniquelysuitedtothepracticeofdemocraticpoliticsamongavast,heterogeneous,increas-


inglyglobalizedcitizenry?23Andcandesirabledispositionsbenurturedinwaysthatprotectandextendpluralityratherthanseekmonisticunity? Whileproponentsoftheethicalturnanswerthesequestionsaffirma-tively, today’ssearchforademocraticethos isnotwithout itscritics. Iwanttoclarifythenatureoftheseobjectionsandexplainwhymyprojectcriticallyparticipatesin,ratherthanrejectsoutright,theethicalturn. Amajorchargeleveledbyskepticsatthoseseekinganethicsfordemoc-racyisthatsucheffortsarepoorlydisguisedexercisesinmoralabsolut-ism.Thatis,whileethicsisusuallypresentedasalessrigidalternativetoconventionalformsofmorality,somecriticsoftheethicalturnallegethattheattempttolocateanethicsfordemocracyexpressesthedesiretogrounddemocracyinanextrapoliticalfoundation.24Forexample,ErnestoLaclauarguesthat“ethicization”revertstoadiscourseof“firstphiloso-phy.”Toseekanethicsfordemocracyistoseekanultimateauthoritybe-yondpoliticalpractice;itisanattempttoevadepolitics’“radicalcontin-gency.”25ChantalMouffevoicesasimilarconcernwhensheclaimsthatthetendencyamongcontemporarydemocratictheoriststoadoptanethi-calvocabularyisdrivenbythefantasyofa“finalguarantee”thatautho-rizespoliticalarrangements.Thehuntforethics,sheavers,isthehuntfora“moreprofoundormoresolid”groundthan“thepractices,thelanguagegamesthatareconstitutiveof[a]particularformoflife.”26 Theworryisnotjustthatproponentsoftheethicalturnpositagroundwhere there is none, but that the preoccupation with the category ofethics,howeversoothing,signalsaveryreal“contractionofpoliticalam-bitions.”27WendyBrown,forexample,warnsagainstthetemptationtoembraceamoralizingimperativethatsubstitutesforengagementinthemessy,frustratingworkofstrugglingforpower,withandagainstothers,inthefieldofpolitics.28LikeMouffe,wholabelstheturntoethics“are-treatfromthepolitical,”GeorgeShulmanarguesthatpartoftheallureofethicsisitsapparentpromiseofatruththatprecedesorisexternaltopoliticalcontestation—atruththatwouldseemtorelievecitizensofthedifficultworkoforganizingtogethertomakepublicdemandsandmobi-lizingothersonbehalfofthedemandstheyadvocate.29Henotesfurtherthattheobsessionwithethicsisasymptomofdespairovertheprospectsforsuchcollectiveactiontoday.Perhapsthereiscomfortinthethoughtthatone’staskconsistsinaffirmingtherightethicaloutlook,fromwhichdesirablepoliticalconsequenceswillhopefully follow.When“action in

Introduction—10

concert”appearstoberareorunlikely,30wemaybeattractedtothenotionthatdemocracycanberescuedbysomethingotherthanitself,namely,thediscoveryoftheproperethics.31 Althoughtheseclaimsarecompelling, it isamistake todismiss theturntoethicsasadeadend.Ratherthaneschewthecategoryofethicsinthenameoftheautonomyofthepoliticalorinsistupontheprimacyofpolitics,thisprojectinterrogates,butalsocontributesto,democratictheory’sinvestigationofethos.Thecriticscitedearlierarepartlycorrect:theturntoethicscanassumeabsolutistformsandattimesdoessignalanattempttoevadetherealitiesofdemocraticstruggle,pointsIhaveinsisteduponelsewhere.32Butthisisnotnecessarilyso;ethicsisnotamonolith.Therearemanycompetingconceptionsofethics,justasthereareofpoli-tics.Someversionsofethicsarelikelytodiscourageratherthaninspirecollectiveactionbydemocraticcitizens.Twoofmychapters,infact,focusontheproblemsposedbyethicalmodelsthatcenterondyadicrelationsofcare—aseriouslimitationlargelyoverlooked,evenbythosewhoareotherwiseskepticaloftheethicalturnindemocraticthought.Yetitisalsopossibletoconceptualizeanddefendanethosthatisuniquelysuitedtothechallengesofassociativedemocracy,asthisbook’saccountofworldlyethicswillshow. Ethics, I believe, remains a valuable idiom for thinking and talkingaboutthenormativeandaffectiveorientationsandsensibilitiesthatareinevitablypartofpoliticallife.Itisnotamatterofwhetherwewanttobringethicsintopolitics;thephenomenathattendtotravelunderthesenamesarealreadycombined,forbetterorworse.Indeed,thelanguageofethicsandpoliticsrendersasseparatedimensionsofculturalexistencethatareactuallyquitedifficulttopullapart.Nonetheless,ethicscontinuestoprovideauseful,albeitimperfect,conceptualvocabularyforinvesti-gatingthoseelementsofdemocraticlifethatareleftoutofstrictlyinsti-tutionalandrationalistaccounts.Morespecifically,mybookdeploysanethicalvocabularyinordertoconsiderthespiritthatalreadyinhabitsas-sociativedemocraticaction—whichInamecarefortheworld—andtoar-gueforitsimportanceandpurposefulcultivation.Indoingso,Iresistthetendencytocastethicsperseasunworldlyinoppositiontotheworldlycharacterofpolitics.BonnieHonig,forexample,rightlyinsists,followingArendt,thatpoliticsisbothinandabouttheworldandthattheromancewithethicsmayserveasanescapefromthe“exposure”worldlyengage-mententails.33But ifpolitics isnotconfinedto formalproceduresand


institutions,whatdispositionsandsensibilitiesareatworkwhencitizensundertakethedemanding,uncertain,butalsooftenpleasurableworkofworld-centereddemocraticaction?Certainly,asIwillshow,someformsofethics—whichIconceptualizeastherapeuticandcharitableincharac-ter—canaptlybecharacterizedasunworldlyandthereforeasgenerallyunsupportiveofdemocratic activity.But it is amistake todeclare thatethicsassuchisalwaysandonlyalienatedfromtheworld,understoodasthemessy,power-laden,variedspaceofdemocraticassociation.Thisbookargues,onthecontrary,foradistinctivelyworldlyethics,notonlyasapos-sibilitybutasareality,onethatisalreadyexpressedandenactedtodaybyadmirableformsofjointaction. Thisisacriticalandconstructiveproject.Theargumentofferedhereaimstorevealunacknowledgedcostsoftheturntoethics.IdemonstratethatFoucauldianandLevinasianapproaches,eachfocusedonadifferentdyadicrelationofcare,areinclinedtoenervateratherthanenrichasso-ciativeactionbydemocraticcitizens.Mycritiquedoesnotconcludewithacall toabandonthequestforademocraticethos,however.Instead,Iconceptualizeanddefendanalternativeethicalorientation,onefocusedonincitingcitizens’collectivecareforworldlythings.AndIarguethatworldlyethics,implicitincertaincollectivecitizenefforts,isapromisingresourcefordemocraticactiontoday. Thebook’scaseforworldlyethicscentersonanassociativeconcep-tionofdemocraticpoliticsthatemphasizesjointactionbycitizensaimedatshapingsharedconditions.34Thisviewofdemocracygrantsprimacytopublicpracticesinwhichdifferentiatedcollectivitiesstruggle,bothwithandagainstoneanother,toaffectfeaturesoftheworldinwhichtheylive.Thetermassociativereferstothreeinterlockingfeaturesofsuchapolitics:(1)itinvolvescollaborativeandcontentiousaction,bornoutofassocia-tionamongmultiplecitizens;(2)suchactionisnotconfinedtotheoffi-cialchannelsofgovernmentbutfrequentlyappearsatthelevelofcivilsociety,withinso-calledsecondaryassociations;andfinally,mostsignifi-cant:(3)democraticactorsarebothbroughttogetherandseparatedfromoneanotherbycommonobjects. Inotherwords, theyalwaysassociatearoundsomething. First,associativesignalsanonholisticunderstandingofdemocraticcol-lectivity.Relationsofassociationareonesinwhichdistinct individualscoordinatetheiractionswithothersinordertopursuegoalsnotachiev-ablebyasingleactor.35Democraticpoliticsthusunderstooddoesnotde-

Introduction—12

pendontheexistenceofaunifieddemosorasinglepeople.Rather,asso-ciativedemocraticpoliticsinvolvescollectivitiesthatareconstitutedbymultiple“co-actors.”36Inaddition,theserelationsofsolidaristicassocia-tionaresituatedwithinbroader,morecontentiousformsofassociationinwhichcompetingcollectivesviepubliclywithoneanotheroverspecificpractices,laws,policies,andnorms. Second,althoughcertainpoliticalinstitutionsandspacesserveasen-abling conditions for the enactment of associative democratic politics,this politics is not confined to the official channels of government. AsmanyofthemostpowerfulexamplesofassociativedemocraticpoliticsinrecentAmericanhistoryindicate,theseprojectsfrequentlyinvolvecre-ativeformsofadvocacythattakeplaceonthemarginsoforinoppositiontothestateapparatus.WhetherinpursuitofAfricanAmericancivilrights,environmentalprotections,ahumaneaiDspolicy,oreconomicpoliciesthatbenefittheso-called99percent,directcollectiveactionhastypicallyinvolvedthecreationofnewinstitutionsandthereconfigurationofpub-licspace,notsimplytheoccupationofpreexistingpoliticalvenues.Wecannotfullyanticipatewhereorhowassociativedemocraticpoliticswillappear.37 Finally,associative indicatesthatdemocraticrelationsarenotsimplyintersubjective, ifby that wemean they involve two ormore subjects.Rather, democratic politics involves relations among plural individualswhich are mediated by shared, yet also disputed, objects of attention.These third terms around which democratic actors associate serve assitesofmutualenergyandadvocacy.Citizensaresimultaneouslybroughttogetherandseparatedfromoneanotherbyspecific,worldlymattersofconcern,which“interest”or liebetweenthem.38Relationsofbothco-operationandantagonismamongdemocratic constituencies aremedi-atedbysomethingintheworldthatisthefocalpointoftheiractivity. Thisportraitdoesnotclaimtodepictdemocracyassuch;certainfea-tures of democratic politics are emphasized at the expense of others.Nonetheless,itisimportanttorecognizethatassociativeactivitybyordi-nary citizens is central to almost every conception of democratic poli-tics, includingphilosophicalformulationsandpracticalunderstandingsalike.Citizenassociationiscertainlynotalways interpretedinthewaysketchedabove—indeed,asIwillshow,thecentralroleplayedbyme-diatingworldlythingsisespeciallyneglected—yetthereisapervasive,sharedunderstandingthatthe“artofassociation”isabsolutelycentralto


anysatisfactoryaccountofdemocraticpolitics.39DavidHeld’sinfluentialModels of Democracy,forexample,revealstheextenttowhichassociativeactivitybycitizensisregardedasadistinctive,indispensablecharacteris-ticofdemocracy,evenaccordingtocompetingphilosophieswhichother-wisedivergeconsiderably.40Itisnotonlydirectdemocrats,butalsoDah-lianpluralistdemocratsandmoreconventionalliberaldemocrats,amongothers,whoassignanimportantroletocitizenassociationwhendefiningdemocracy.41 Moreover,everyday languagesuggests thatpeopleregularly identifyassociationalpracticesbywhichpluralcitizensaimtoaffecttheirenvi-ronmentasspecificallydemocratic,eveninthecontextofregimesthatwouldnot themselves be socategorized. Forexample, mediacoverageintheUnitedStatesinearly2011oftendescribedthecollectiveprotestsinEgyptleadinguptotherevolutionaspartofa“democraticuprising”orastheexpressionof“democraticfreedom.”42Thesecharacterizations,alsoprevalentininformalconversationsamongnonexperts,indicatethatpeopletendtounderstandpublicactioninconcertpreciselyasanenact-mentofdemocracy,whereveritoccurs.TheidentificationoftheprotestsinTahrirSquareinthespringof2011asdemocratichadlesstodowiththe fact that someparticipantswerecalling fordemocratizing reformsthanwiththesharedinsightthattheprotesterswerealreadypracticingdemocracybyjoiningtogethertogeneratepowerandproduceeffectscol-lectivelythattheycouldnotalone. Ifassociativeactionisintegraltonearlyeveryphilosophicalandprac-ticaldefinitionofdemocracy, then thisbook’s investigationofethos isperhapsofsomegeneralinterest.Thebook’scentralquestions—Doesthepracticeofassociativedemocracyhaveanethos?Howshoulditbecharac-terized?Canitbepurposelyfostered?How?—will,Ihope,resonatewithdemocratsofvaryingstripeswhosharetheconvictionthatordinaryciti-zens’jointaction,andnotmerelyindividuals’righttovote,isessentialtodemocraticlife. Thebook’sinitial,ground-clearingprojectcentersonworkthattakesinspirationfromFoucaultandLevinas.Theoristswhoturntothesethink-ersinordertodevelopanaccountofdemocraticethosaretypicallyinter-estedinnourishingactivistformsofdemocracythatinvolvesignificantassociationalactivityamongcitizens.Yet,asIshow,theethicalorienta-tionstheyconceptualizeareill-suitedtoenrichingtheassociativedynam-icsoutlinedabove,inwhichcollaborativeandcontentiousformsofaction

Introduction—14

takeplaceinpluralsitesandaremediatedbydisputedcommonobjects.Inparticular,carefortheselfandcarefortheOtherdescribeethicalorien-tationsthatcelebratedyadicrelationsinwhichtheprimaryactor,asingleself,tendstoherselfortoanother.Thesemodelsofcarecannotsimplybeextendedtoassociativedemocraticpolitics.Neithertheface-to-faceim-mediacyoftheLevinasianencounternorthereflexiveintimacyofFou-cauldianartsoftheselfleavesroomforthecrucialthirdterm,acommonanddisputedobject,thatinspiresdemocraticprojectsanddrawscitizensintorelationsofsupportandcontestationwithoneanother.Inresponsetothisneglect,thebookelaboratesanalternativeethics,alsocenteredonpracticesofcare.Yetthecarethatiscentraltoassociativedemocracy,Ishow,isenactedbymanypersons,notone.Andtherecipientofthatcareisneitheraselfnorevenselvesbutaparticularfeatureofsharedcondi-tions—aworldlything—thatisbothacommonandcontentiousobjectofconcern. Onefinalnote,beforeofferingamapofthebook’scontents:thethreecentral thinkers in this project, Foucault, Levinas, and Arendt, whoseworkanditsappropriationbyothersIexamineinrelationtothequestionofdemocraticethics,areheirstoaspecific,sharedintellectualheritage.43Thislineage,existentialphenomenologyingeneralandMartinHeideg-ger’sthoughtinparticular,isnotthefocusofmyinquiry,yetthefactthatallthreetheorists’writingsareshapedbyandresponsivetothissingulartheoreticaltraditionisimportant.44Mostnotably,itmayhelptoexplainwhytheirworkisespeciallyfertilegroundfortoday’sinvestigationsintoethos,investigationswhich,asdiscussedearlier,areundertakenfromanonessentialist,postmoralvantagepoint.45Despitethedistinctivenessoftheirrespectiveapproachesandtheuniquerelationsofcareeachcon-ceptualizes, Foucault, Levinas, and Arendt can be regarded as partici-pants inacommontheoreticalendeavor,onewhich ismarked,firstofall,bya“criticalorientationtorationalism,abstractsystem-building,andotherobjectifying modesof thought suchaspositivism.”46 Inaddition,thefocusofexistentialphenomenologyon“worldlyrelations”and“con-cretelivedexperience”ratherthanon“mentalcontents”isevidentinallthree thinkers’workandconnectswith theirreaders’ interest inethosasanembodied,enactedwayofbeing.47Finally,becausetheexistential-phenomenological perspective is especially alert to “non-rational di-mensionsofhumanexistence:habits,non-consciouspractices,moods,andpassions,”itisunsurprisingthatwritingsemergingfromthistradi-


tionhavecaptivatedcontemporaryaudiencesinterestedinethics,whereethics isunderstoodasdispositionalandaffective,an importantextra-rationalaspectofpoliticallife.48Thefollowinganalysisfocusesprimarilyonexploringthedifferencesbetweentherapeutic,charitable,andworldlyethics,whichtaketheirbearingsfromFoucault,Levinas,andArendt,re-spectively.Thesecompetingapproachestoethicsarenotsimplyoronlyatoddswithoneanother,however;asharedexistential-phenomenologicalorientationinformstheworkofallthreeandseemstoresonatewiththoseseekingademocraticethostoday.

Thebook’sargumentproceedsasfollows.Chapter1focusesonhowFou-cault’slateworkhasbeentakenupbytheoristsseekingacontemporarydemocraticethos.Foucault’sinterestinancientaesthetic/asceticmodesofself-elaboration,whichhedescribesasanethicsof“careoftheself,”hasintriguedthoseinterestedincultivatingnewformsofdemocraticsub-jectivitythatmightspurdeeper,morerespectfulformsofcitizenengage-ment.BuildingonFoucault’srecommendationthattheethicsofself-caremightbereinventedforthepresentandhelptofosterselveswho“playgamesofpowerwithaslittledominationaspossible,”WilliamConnolly,forexample,hasadvocatedethicaltacticsperformedbytheselfonherselfasindispensableforcontemporarypluralistdemocracy.49 InthischapterIexaminebothFoucault’sandConnolly’swork,focus-ingonConnolly’scontentionthatartsoftheself,or“micropolitics,”haveavitalroletoplayininspiringandshapingcollectivedemocraticaction,that is, “macropolitics.” Iarguethatalthoughthis idea isappealing,anethicscapableofanimatingassociativedemocraticactivitycannottaketheself’srelationshiptoitselfasastartingpoint.EventhoughFoucaultandConnollyconceptualizeaselfthatiscontinuallyrecraftedratherthandiscoveredinitsultimatetruth,theirworknonethelessadvancesathera-peuticethics,whichtreats theself’s relationshipwith itselfasprimaryandenvisionsdemocraticactivityasaconsequenceorextensionofthatreflexiverelation.Thechapterilluminatesthistherapeuticethicalorien-tationandtriestodispelthebeliefthatitisbycaringforoneselfthatonecomestocarefortheworld.Iarguethatunlesstheself’srelationshiptoitselfisdrivenfromthestartbysharedconcernforaworldlyproblem,thereisnoreasontobelievethatitwillleadinanactivist,democraticdi-rection.Indeed,focusedcarefortheselftooreadilysubstitutesfortend-ingtotheworldthatissharedwithdiverseothers.

Introduction—16

InlightofthecriticalperspectivecastonFoucauldianethics,Iturninchapter2toLevinas’sethicaltheory,whichcondemnsegoisminthenameoftheself’sinfiniteresponsibilitytotheOther.Thisunderstandingofethics,centeringontheOtheranditssummonstotheself,privilegesanintersubjectiveratherthananintrasubjectiverelation. FortheoristssuchasSimonCritchleyandJudithButler,thisfocusontheself’sobligationtotendtoaneedyOtherappearsespeciallyusefultoademocraticethosbecauseitconfrontsself-interest,callingonustocon-cernourselveswiththefatesofothers.MyreadingsofLevinas,Critchley,andButler,however,showthatitisamistaketoassumethatacharitableethics,centeredontheself’sprovisionofaidtoasingular,sufferingother,cansupportcollectivedemocraticendeavors.ThetendencytopresentaLevinasian-inspiredethicaltruthasthekeytopoliticaltransformationisfalselyreassuring;itevadesthedifficultiesofdemocraticmobilizationbyimplyingthatassociativeactionsimplyawaitsacceptanceofanindisput-ableethicalreality:theself’stotalobligationtotheOther.Yetanethicsfocusedontheself’scarefortheOther,evenifunderstoodinlessfounda-tionaltermsthanthis,isunabletonourishassociativedemocraticaction.Levinasian ethics may be compelling, but it revolves around a dyadic,hierarchicalrelationthatisfocusedonaddressingimmediateneeds.Suchcharitablerelationshavevalue,but,asIshow,theyaredistinctfrom,evenat odds with, democratic ones, which involve collaboration among co-actorswhostruggletotendnottoasingularOther,buttotheworldlycon-ditionsunderwhichselvesandotherslive. IarguethatthetherapeuticandcharitablemodelsofethicspromotedbyFoucault,Levinas,andkey interpreters suchasConnolly,Critchley,andButlerareunlikelytoinspireandsustaincollectivedemocraticac-tivity,inwhichparticipantscooperateandcontendwithoneanotherinanefforttoaffectworldlyconditions.CareforoneselforcarefortheOther,though perhaps valuable, does little to encourage associative relationsamongcitizens.Moreover,itisamistaketoassumethatformsofdemo-craticengagementsomehowfollowfrompropercarefortheselforforanOther.Indeed,Ishowthatthetherapeuticandcharitableorientationsothershaveadvocatedinthenameofademocraticethosneedtobere-sistedifweseektofosteractivistformsofdemocraticcitizenship. Chapters3and4arededicatedtotheorizingaworld-centeredethos.50Iarguethatthespiritofcarefortheworld,whichalreadyanimatessomeassociativedemocraticprojects,deservestobeexplicitlythematizedand


purposefullycultivated.Thefirststeptowardelaboratingthisethicalori-entation,whichIargueisespecially importanttodemocratic life, istoarticulatethecentralconceptofworld.Chapter3developsthisnotion,first,bydefiningworldasthearrayofmaterialandimmaterialconditionsunderwhichhumanbeingslive—bothwithoneanotherandwitharichvarietyofnonhumans,organicandtechnological.ThisportraitdrawsonArendt’sunderstandingofworldasan“in-between,”thatis,boththesiteandobjectofpolitics,yet,astheabovestatementindicates,Ichallengeherrestrictionofworldtowhat isman-made.Inaddition,Iclaimthatcoactionamongcitizensisbestunderstoodnotasbeingdirectedattheworldperse,asArendtwouldhaveit,butatparticularworldlythings,whicharemoreplural,dynamic,anddisputedthanhertheoryrecognizes.Inreferencetothing’soriginalmeaning,worldlything,acentralconceptinthisbook,indicatesnotagenericobjectbuta“matteroffact”thathasbeenreconstitutedasapublic“matterofconcern.”51Thisthing,Ishow,is crucial to every democratic undertaking; it is the contentious thirdtermaroundwhichpeoplegather,bothinsolidarityanddivision.Aviabledemocraticethoshonorsthisdynamic,seekingtoinspiremutualcareforworldlyconditions. Chapter3engageswiththeworkofArendt,JohnDewey,BrunoLatour,andothersinordertorevealthestructureofcitizenassociationinwhichworldlythingsbothconnectanddivideconstituencies,astructurethatiseclipsedbydyadicmodelsofethics.Chapter4buildsonthisaccountofthecrucialroleplayedbyworldlythingsindemocraticpoliticsinordertospecifythenormativeendsthatcarefortheworldpursues.Thischapterclarifiesthatnotallformsofcollectiveorganizinginrelationtoaworldlythingormatterofconcerncountasinstancesofcarefortheworld.ThedemocraticethosIdefendisrefinedtomeancarefortheworldasworld.HereIadvanceanexplicitlynormativeconceptionofworld—asbothasharedhumanhomeandmediatingpoliticalspace—thatallowsforcriti-caldistinctionstobemadebetweencompetingprojectsundertakenbydemocraticactors.Thechapterelaboratestheseconceptsbyexaminingcontemporaryorganizationsandmovements,includingNoMoreDeaths/NoMásMuertes,theBeaconsprogramsinNewYorkCityPublicSchools,andtheRighttotheCityMovement,whichembodythedemocraticethosIadvance. Abriefepiloguerevisitsthedistinctionsbetweencarefortheself,carefor theOther,andcare for theworld that informthebook’sargument

Introduction—18

insupportofanethosthatcananddoesanimateassociativedemocraticpolitics.HereIconsiderwhetherandhowthedyadic,intimatemodalitiesofcareemphasizedbyFoucauldianandLevinasianethicscanbetrans-formedintocollaborativepracticesofcarefocusedonshapingcollectiveconditions. What strategies of politicization, for example, can activatefeelingsofcareandconcernanddirect themtowardworldly things? Iconsiderthetechniquesthatcanhelpfostercarefortheworldevenundercircumstancesseeminglyinhospitabletoit. Oneimageinparticular,fromthemarginsofArendt’swork,canhelpilluminatethedistinctiveorientationthatdefinesworldlyethics.Inthesummerof1963,GershomScholem,therenownedJewishscholar,wrotea lettertoArendtconcerningherrecentlypublishedbookEichmann in Jerusalem,whichreportedonthetrialoftheformerssofficerAdolfEich-mann.52AtthetimeofitsappearanceEichmann in Jerusalemwasthesub-jectofintensedispute,debatesthatcontinuetoshapeitsreceptiontoday.OneofthemostcontroversialpointsinthebookwasArendt’schargethattheJudenräte,orlocalJewishgoverningstructures,had,intheirmainte-nanceofJewishpublicorderintheghettoes,enabledtheNazistoslaugh-tergreaternumbersofJewswithgreaterefficiencythantheymightother-wisehavedone.Manypeople,Jewsandnon-Jews,wereshockedbythisseeminglyharshandunempathicclaim.Scholem’s letter toArendtac-cusesherofadoptinga“heartless”toneinherdiscussionsof“Jewsandtheirbearinginthedaysofcatastrophe.”Bywayofelaboration,ScholemexplainstoArendt,“IntheJewishtradition,thereisaconcept,hardtodefineandyetconcreteenough,whichweknowasAhabath Israel:‘LoveoftheJewishpeople.’”Andhedeclaresthathefinds“littletraceofthis”inherbook.53 InherresponsetoScholem,Arendtdirectlyaddressesthischarge.Shewritesofthe“loveoftheJewishpeople,”“Youarequiteright—Iamnotmovedbyanyloveofthissort.”Shestates,“This‘loveoftheJews’wouldappeartome,sinceIammyselfJewish,assomethingrathersuspect.IcannotlovemyselforanythingwhichIknowispartandparcelofmyownperson.”Andshewrites,asapointofcontrast,that“thegreatnessofthispeoplewasoncethatitbelievedinGod,andbelievedinHiminsuchawaythatitstrustandlovetowardshimwasgreaterthanitsfear.Andnowthispeoplebelievesonlyinitself?Whatgoodcancomeofthat?—Well,inthissenseIdonot‘love’theJews,nordoI‘believe’inthem.”54Arendt’sre-sponsetoScholemcallsintoquestiontheself-orientednatureofAhabath


Israel,theloveoftheJewishpeoplebytheJewishpeople.Sheremindshimofthereal“greatness”oftheJews,whichconcernedtheirtrustinandloveforanentityoutsidethemselvesinrelationtowhichtheycametobe:God,whoactedasacommonobjectofdevotionandthusconstitutedasharedworldforthem,anin-between.ItisnottheJews’loveforthem-selvesorevenforoneanotherthatArendtwantstorecallandhonor,buttheirregardforathirdterm,theirGod,aroundwhichtheyconstitutedacommunity. ThisbookinvitesreaderstoseeinArendt’sexchangewithScholemanascentdemocraticanalogy.Scholem’sinvocationofaself-orientedre-lationof loveand faith(of Jews to themselves)evokesadyadicethicalrelationofthesortIcallintoquestion.Arendt’sradicalshiftinperspec-tive,whichbringsintoviewarelationinvolvingmultipleindividualsandasharedobjectofloveandfaith,offersareligiousanalogtothedemo-craticrelationswithwhichthisbookisconcerned.Thethirdterm,God,isakintothosesecular,worldlyobjectsthat,asIargue,inspirethelaborsofdemocraticactorsandmediaterelationsamongthem.Thebooktrackshowthesedemocraticmodesofrelation—inwhichindividualsarecon-nected to and separated from one another bya common object whichtheyattempttoaffect—areoccludedbypopularethicalapproaches.Anditurgesustoseethatasensibilityfocusedoncollectiveandcontentiouscareforworldlythingsisanethosuniquelyfitfordemocracy.

n o t e s

–—–

i ntroduction

1.SeeThe Turn to Ethics,ed.Garber,Hanssen,andWalkowitz.LeadingexamplesofthisdevelopmentincludeAnderson,The Way We Argue Now;Bennett,The En-chantment of Modern LifeandVibrant Matter;Butler,Giving an Account of OneselfandPrecarious Life;Coles,Rethinking Generosity;Connolly,Why I Am Not a Secular-ist,Pluralism,andA World of Becoming;Critchley,The Ethics of DeconstructionandInfinitely Demanding;Orlie,Living Ethically, Acting Politically;White,The Ethos of a Late Modern Citizen;andZiarek,An Ethics of Dissensus.

2.WilliamConnollyfrequentlyreferstoethicsasbeingindispensabletodemocracy.See,forexample,Why I Am Not a Secularist,13,170,187.

3.Forexample,manymediarepresentationsoftheOccupyWallStreet(ows)move-mentinlate2011emphasizeditsenactmentofanethos,alternatelyidentifiedasnonviolent(nPr),leaderless(HuffingtonPost),do-it-yourself(JewishWeek),andno-demands(Salon.com)incharacter.SupportersoftendepictedthisethosasavaluableresourceforreinvigoratingAmericandemocracy.Formoretheoreticalreflectionsonows’sethos,seeWendyBrownonits“populistethos”in“OccupyWallStreet:ReturnofaRepressedRes- Publica”andRichardGrusinonthemove-ment’s fostering of a “revolutionary counter-mood” in “Premediation and theVirtualOccupationofWallStreet.”ButseealsoGeorgeShulman,“InterpretingOccupy,”whicharguesthatacademicshavemostlyinterpretedowsinwaysthatvalidate“ourownpreferredframeworksofanalysis.”Shulman’squestion,“Mustanyefforttounderstandowsmakeitevidencetoconfirmwhatwealready(wantto)believe?”couldeasilyberaisedinrelationtotheethosmanyhaveattributedtothemovement.

4.OnemightobjectthatwhatislackingintheU.S.polityisnottherequisitespiritbuttheinstitutionalarrangementsthatensuretheexerciseofgenuinelydemo-craticpower.TheinfluenceofcorporationsonU.S.elections,expandedbyCitizens United v. Federal Election Committee(2010),might,forexample,supporttheclaimthatcitizensactrationallywhentheydeclinetoparticipateindemocraticpoli-tics.Lackingeffectivesitesofdemocraticdecisionmaking,citizensmaysimplyoptout.Yetitisinsufficienttoinsistthatstructuralreform,ratherthanethos,istherealissue.ThisissonotonlybecauseoftheoldbutaptRousseauvianinsightregardingthecircularrelationshipbetweenasociety’sspiritanditsinstitutions.Morepointedly still, the institutionalproblems thatmightexplaincitizendis-

Notes to Introduction—154

engagement—growingcorporatepower,anexpandedexecutivebranch,anen-trenchedtwo-partysystem,andsoon—donotputtorestthequestionofethos.Indeed,theymayraiseitanew:mighttheabsenceofeffectivecollectiveactioninresponsetotheseconditionsleadonebacktotheproblemofaspiritthatismissingbutthatcouldhelpmobilizecitizens,renderingthesemerefactssitesofdemocraticcontestationandresistance?

5.AsNikolasKompridissays,Habermasemploys“averysharpform/contentdis-tinctiontodistinguishauniversalisticconceptofjusticefromparticularconcep-tionsofthegoodlife”(“FromReasontoSelf-Realisation?,”333).Themoralpointofview,accordingtoHabermas,properlyguidesquestionsaboutwhatisright,whilequestionsaboutwhatisgoodcanbeansweredonlywithinthecontextofaspecificformoflife.

6.SomeofthemostpowerfulobjectionstobothHabermas’sandRawls’saccountsofpublicreasoncontendthattheirapproachestodemocraticdeliberationunwit-tinglyreinforceexistingpowerrelationsandspecificallydisadvantagemarginal-izedgroups,whoseformsofexpressionmaynotconformtothenormativemodelsofcommunicationtheyadvance.SeeYoung,“CommunicationandtheOther,”andDeveaux,Cultural Pluralism and the Dilemmas of Justice.

7.Rawls,Political Liberalism,220. 8.Anderson’sThe Way We Argue Nowisanexception.Shestatesthatethoshasbe-

comea“valorized term” incontemporarypolitical theorybutsays ithasbeenwronglyjuxtaposedwithreasonandalignedwithaffect(11–12).Andersonchal-lengesthisframing(andFoucauldianethicsinparticular,whichshecastsasin-coherent)insupportofHabermasiandiscourseethics,whichsheclaimsunitesethicsandrationality.

9.ThecontrastbetweenmoralityandethicscorrespondsroughlytotheHegeliandistinctionbetweenformal,universalMoralitätandthemoreparticular,custom-arySittlichkeit.

10.Thisisnottosaythatthoseinvolvedintheturntoethicsadvocateananythinggoesapproachtopolitical life.Connolly, forexample,questionstheexclusionsgeneratedbyRawlsianpublicreason,whichrestrict“newdrivesofpluralization”(Connolly,Ethos of Pluralization,xiv).Yethealsonotesthat“exclusions,restric-tions, and boundaries” are necessary, particularly to restrain fundamentalism.Similarly,ChantalMouffearguesthat“totalpluralism”isnotpossibleordesirableandthat“somelimitsneedtobeputtothekindofconfrontationthatisgoingtobeseenaslegitimateinthepublicsphere.Butthepoliticalnatureoftheselimitsshouldbeacknowledgedinsteadofbeingpresentedasrequirementsofmoralityorrationality,”astheyareforHabermasandRawls(Mouffe,The Democratic Para-dox,93).

11.Connolly maintains that secularist positions that eschew comprehensive con-ceptionsinpoliticsmakeitdifficultforpartisanstoengageinissuesofthedaybecausemostparticipantsactuallydodrawontheirmetaphysicalandreligiousperspectives.Thusthedesiretoridpoliticallifeofsuchperspectivesmaybestra-tegicallyineffective.SeeConnolly,Why I Am Not a Secularist,chapter1.Inthisre-gard,thediscovery—anapparentsurprisetomanyDemocrats—thatamajority


ofcitizenswhovotedforGeorgeW.Bushin2004citedmoralvaluesasthesinglemost important issue of the election, is instructive. See Katharine Q. Seelye,“MoralValuesCitedasaDefiningIssueoftheElection,”New York Times,Novem-ber4,2004.SeveralyearslaterBarackObama’softenmoving,morallyinfusedrhetoricleadinguptotheelectionof2008seemedtoexpresshiscriticismofthetendencytocedevaluestalktotheright:“Inreactiontoreligiousoverreach,weequatetolerancewithsecularism,andforfeitthemorallanguagethatwouldhelpinfuseourpolicieswithalargermeaning”(Obama,The Audacity of Hope,48).

12.Oxford English Dictionary(2ded.,1989).Chamberlain,“From‘Haunts’to‘Charac-ter,’”102.BoththeoedandChamberlainidentifyAristotle’sRhetoricasaprimarytext inestablishing thismeaningofethos.Chamberlain explains that “inmostwritersofthefifthcenturyBCandlater,ethoscanusuallybeunderstoodandtrans-latedas‘character,’”withthecaveatthatsuchcharacterisunderstoodincollectiveandnotstrictlyindividualistterms(101–2).

13.Chamberlain,“From‘Haunts’to‘Character,’”102. 14.ThomasCortsnotesthattherehasbeen“confusionoftwoGreekterms”which

aresimilarinEnglish:ἔθος,meaningsimply“custom”or“habit,”andἦθος,mean-ing“custom,disposition,character.”ThelattertermistheoneusedbyAristotle,anditispresentedasacomplementtonomosintheancientGreektradition.Thelatterterm,Cortsnotes,alsocarriesapositiveconnotation, indicatinga“gooddisposition,”whiletheformeris“morallyneutralandreferstobehavioraltraits.”Cortsrecommendsthatscholarstransliterateἔθοςasethosandἦθοςasēthos inordertoreflectthisdistinction.Inaddition,“Theymightalsoemphasizetheposi-tivemoralqualityofἦθος,ratherthanthebehavioralneutralityofitssisterterm”(“TheDerivationofEthos,”201–2).Thisbook,however,followsthecontemporaryconventionamongdemocratictheorists(andtheoed)ofusingethostoreferto“thecharacteristicspirit,prevalenttoneofsentiment,ofapeopleoracommu-nity.”SeealsoChamberlain,“From‘Haunts’to‘Character,’”wherehenotesthattheNicomachean Ethics“explainstheconnectionbetweenethosandēthos”insofarashumanvirtueis“habituable,”thatis,susceptibletotrainingandhabit(102–3).

15.Chamberlain, “From ‘Haunts’ to ‘Character,’” 102. He notes that “orators canspeaktotheiraudienceof ‘your’or ‘our’ēthē,”indicatingasharedmoralsensi-bility.

16.Tocqueville,Democracy in America,volume1,part2,chapter9. 17.Work that highlights the significance of virtue in contemporary liberalism in-

cludesMacedo,Liberal Virtues,andGalston,Liberal Purposes. 18.Berkowitz,Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism. 19.Button,Contract, Culture, and Citizenship. 20.Berkowitz,Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism,x–xii.Buttondescribesthis

as“theparadoxofcivicvirtueforliberalism”:“Liberalsocietiespresupposeandrelyonarangeofimportantmoralqualitiesandvirtuesfortheirveryidentityandstability,”yetitishardforliberalstoconceive“howthosequalitiescouldlegiti-matelybetheobjectsofcultivation,”giventheircommitmenttoindividualfree-domandan“overridingconcerntolimitcoercivegovernment”(Contract, Culture, and Citizenship,16).


21.Chamberlain,“From‘Haunts’to‘Character,’”103.Oratleasttheyare“closelycon-nected”whenasocietyisstable.BothPlatoandAristotlearealerttothedifficul-tiesthatarisewhenetheandnomoiarenolongermutuallyreinforcing.

22.Apartialexceptiontothischaracterization isMachiavelli’sportraitofrepubli-canism, which, as MaurizioViroli argues, follows prior republican thought byemphasizingtheruleoflaw,theprincipleofcivicequality,andtheimportanceofcivicvirtuebutpartscompanywiththehumanistandCiceroniantraditionsbychallengingthevalueofconcord.Viroli,“MachiavelliandtheRepublicanIdeaofPolitics.”

23.ThisquestionsuggestsaprojectdifferentfromRobertBellah’swell-knownco-authored book,whichborrowsTocqueville’s phrase in supportof a communi-tarian,arguablynostalgicvisionofAmericanlife.Bellahetal.,The Habits of the Heart.

24.RaymondGeusshasarguedstronglyagainst“ethics-first”formsofpoliticaltheory.ButhecharacterizesethicsquitenarrowlyasaformofKantianmoralabsolutismthatregardspoliticsasderivativeofanideal(aviewheidentifieswithRawls’swork).Geuss’scriticismsareworthconsideration,buthedefinesethicsinaverylimitedandsometimesevencaricaturedwaythatdoesnotbegintocapturethedi-verseconceptualizationsofthetermbypoliticaltheorists,manyofwhomcannotreasonablybechargedwiththesimple-mindedidealismGeussportraysinordertodramatizethemeritsofhisownrealism.SeeGeuss,Philosophy and Real Politics.

25.Laclau,“Deconstruction,Pragmatism,Hegemony,”58,60,54. 26.Mouffe,“WhichEthicsforDemocracy?,”91.Elsewhere,however,Mouffeisfar

from dismissive of ethics: “To secure allegiance and adhesion to [democratic]principleswhatisneededisthecreationofademocraticethos...themobiliza-tionofpassionsandsentiments,themultiplicationofpractices,institutionsandlanguagegamesthatprovideconditionsofpossibilityfordemocraticsubjectsanddemocraticformsofwilling”(“Deconstruction,Pragmatism,andthePoliticsofDemocracy,”6).

27.Apostolidis,“PoliticsandConnolly’sEthics.”Althoughhismainargumenthereisthatthe“complementaritiesofethicalandpoliticalaction”arerevealedwhenConnolly’sethicalworkisreadinconnectionwiththeexperiencesandnarrativesofimmigrantworkers,thearticlenonethelessendsonacautionarynote,warningthattheoristsshouldrenewtheir“enthusiasmforinterrogatingthestructuraldy-namicsofpowerthathelpordertheterrainwhereethicalpracticesaredeployed.”

28.Brown,“MoralismasAnti-Politics.”SeealsoDean,“ThePoliticsofAvoidance,”whichdepictstheturntoethicsasaformofnaïveidealismthatdetractsattentionfromthecriticalandoppositionalpoliticsinwhichdemocraticcitizensoughttobeengaged.Inarelatedmove,JacquesRancière’s“TheEthicalTurnofAesthet-icsandPolitics”caststheethicalturnasanevasionofjudgmentanddistinctionmaking,thoughthisclaimissuggestedmorethanfullyargued.

29.Shulman,“AcknowledgmentandDisavowalasanIdiomforTheorizingPolitics.” 30.“Actioninconcert”isArendt’sphrase,whichappearsthroughoutherwritingsand

isespeciallyprominentinThe Human Condition. 31.Ibid.Honig,“ThePoliticsofEthos,”alsoadvancesthishypothesis.Inamorehis-


toricalreadingoftheturntoethicsintheFrenchcontext,JulianBourg’sFrom Revolution to EthicsdocumentsaparadigmshiftfollowingMay1968,inwhichanewemphasisonethics(onewhichpersiststothisday)appearedinresponsetotheapparentimpossibilityofpoliticalrevolution.Althoughhedoesnotlabelthisdevelopmentasignalofdespair,hedoespresenttheshifttotheethicalregisterasaconsequenceofthefailureofinstitutionaloverthrowin1968.

32.On the question of absolutism, Myers, “From Pluralism to Liberalism,” dem-onstratesthattheindeterminateethicaloutlookarticulatedbyBerlin—thatofvaluepluralism—ismisinterpretedandappropriatedbycontemporary liberalswhoseektoturnitintoamoralfoundationsanctioningliberalism.Myers,“Re-sistingFoucauldianEthics,”showsthattheturntoethicsalsohasthepotentialtodistractfrommorepressingquestionsofhowtogeneratecollectivepower.SomeofFoucault’sinfluentialreadershavewronglyemphasizedhislaterworkontheethicsof“carefortheself”asastrategyforresistingdisciplinarypowerandbio-power.Thisapproach,Iargue,minimizesFoucault’sastuteanalysesofhowdisci-plineandbiopowerfunctionby“individualizing”and“massifying,”respectively,andhisrelatedbutunderappreciatedaccountofthe“counter-power”bornoutofassociativeactivitythatcanpotentiallycontendwiththeseforces.ThisneglectedbutcentralFoucauldianinsightshouldalertustothelimitsofcareoftheselfasameansofreworkingexistingpowerrelationsandredirectourattentiontoasso-ciativestrategiesinstead.

33.Honigobserves,“Still,itseemstome,althoughethosmaybeanimportantpartofpreparationandreceptivityforwould-bepoliticalactors(themselvesalreadypoliticizedasconstitutedsubjects),itisnomatchfortheworldlinessofpoliticalengagement”(“ThePoliticsofEthos,”428).Thisclaimechoesmyearlierargu-mentin“TheTurntoEthicsandItsDemocraticCosts,”whichconceptualizesthequestforethosprimarilyasanevasionof—andthreatto—democraticpolitics.

34.Thisunderstandingofpoliticsservesasacounterpointtowhathasbeentermedthe“democraticdeficit”incontemporarytheory,thatis,thetendencyinrecentpoliticalthoughttoemphasizetheliberalsideofliberaldemocracybyfocusingprimarilyonquestionsofindividualrightsandsafeguardsagainstthestateattheexpenseofpursuingquestionsthatconcernthedistributionofpoliticalpowerandtheexistenceofmeaningfulopportunities forcitizenparticipation inself-government. I borrow the term “democratic deficit” from Mouffe, Democratic Paradox(3–4),thoughitwasinwidecirculationduringthedebatesoverthede-signoftheEuropeanUnion.

35.AlexisdeTocquevillefamouslycreditsassociationalactivitywithsavingthe“in-dependentandweak”citizensofdemocracyfromhelplessness.The“artofasso-ciation” inwhich men “combine for great ends” enables individual citizens toproduceeffectstheycouldnototherwise.Tocqueville,Democracy in America,vol-ume2,part2,chapters5–7.

36.HannahArendtrefersto“co-acting”whenshestatesthatactionis“neverpossibleinisolation”(The Human Condition,189).

37.Althoughtheexistenceofcertainlegalprotectionssuchastherighttoassemblecanhelptosupporttheemergenceofcollectivemovements,examplesofassocia-


tivedemocraticpoliticsamongdissidents,asintheSolidaritymovementofthe1980sinPoland,indicatethatitwouldbeamistaketoruleouttheappearanceofassociativeactioneveninregimeswithverylimitedrightsprotections.Equallymistakenistheideathattheexistenceofconstitutionalrightstospeechandas-sembly,forexample,isproofthatAmericanpoliticalcultureishospitabletothecreationandpreservationofassociationalrelations.AsMichaelRoginhasdem-onstrated, aggressive governmental efforts throughout American history haveeffectivelysuppressedassociativeactivitiesandcollectiveformsoflifethoughttothreatenstatepower.WhatRogincallsthe“countersubversivetradition”intheUnitedStatesinvolvesthestate’svalorizationof“privatefreedom”andaroutinedenialof“publicfreedom,”or“thefreedomofcommunitymemberstospeakandacttogether”(“PoliticalRepressionintheUnitedStates,”65).

38.Arendt,The Human Condition,182. 39.“Artofassociation”isTocqueville’swell-knownphrase,whichappearsinDemoc-

racy in America,volume2,part2,chapter5. 40.Held, Models of Democracy. Of the eight variants of democracy Held analyzes,

sevengrantaprominentplacetocitizens’associativeactivity.Althoughtheinsti-tutionallocationsandmeaningsassignedtoassociationsvary,rangingfromthecitizencouncilsofclassicrepublicanismtothepressuregroupsofmidcenturypluralism,onlythemodelofdemocraticelitismgrantslittletonoimportancetoassociationalactivity.

41.Thepurposeandmeaningascribedtoassociationalactivityvaryaccordingtotheparticularframeworkwithinwhichitisinterpreted.ArchonFung’s“AssociationsandDemocracy”containsaveryusefulmappingofthedifferentargumentsad-vancedinsupportofassociationalactivity.Fungshowsthatdemocraticassocia-tioniscreditedwithmakingsixkindsofcontributions,notallofthemcompatible.(Forexample,accordingtosome,associationisanintrinsicgood,butliberalstendtoseeitasanexpressionofpersonalfreedomwhileparticipatorydemocratsre-garditasamodeofcollectiveself-determination.Stillothertheoriesseetheprac-ticeofassociationinmoreinstrumentalterms,whetherasameansofdevelopingcertainskillsandcapacitiesorasamechanismforimprovingtherepresentationofinterests.)Thisdiversityshouldnotbesurprising,giventhatthecontributionsascribedtoassociationalactivityaregeneratedbycompeting“backgroundideals,”whichFunglabelsclassicalliberalism,representativedemocracy,andparticipa-torydemocracy.

42.See,forexample,RobertF.Worth,“YemenontheBrinkofHell,”New York Times,July20,2011,andSimonSebagMontefiore,“EveryRevolutionIsRevolutionaryinItsOwnWay,”New York Times,March23,2011.

43.In “A Brief Introduction to Phenomenology and Existentialism” Wrathall andDreyfus include Arendt, Levinas, and Foucault in their short list of thinkersstronglyinfluencedbyphenomenologyandexistentialism.

44.Althoughphenomenologyandexistentialismoriginallyappearedastwodistinctstrandsoftwentieth-centuryEuropeanthought,theyhave“largelymergedintoacommoncanonofworksandwaysofdoingphilosophy”(ibid.,5).Seethissame

Notes to Chapter 1—159

text for an account of the primary features of “merged” existential phenome-nology.

45.Foucault’sandLevinas’sworksfeaturemuchmoreprominentlythanArendt’sintherecentturntoethics,perhapsbecauseArendtdoesnotembraceanexplicitlyethicalvocabulary.Sheisalsosometimesmisreadasathoroughlyamoralthinker,though,asIwillshow,thebeginningsofapowerfulethicalsensibility—carefortheworld—runthroughoutherwritings.

46.Kruks,Retrieving Experience,6. 47.ThisisWrathall’sandDreyfus’sdescriptionofHeidegger’sshiftawayfromHusserl

(“ABriefIntroductiontoPhenomenologyandExistentialism,”3). 48.Ibid.,5. 49.Foucault,“TheEthicsoftheConcernforSelfasaPracticeofFreedom,”298. 50.Myprojectexploreshowtheunderstandingofethicsmightproductivelyshiftby

adoptingwhatLindaZerillihascalleda“world-centeredframe.”Shetooidenti-fiesthisframewithArendt,thoughherinterventionfocusesontheimportanceofreconceivingfreedomasa“worldquestion”ratherthana“subjectquestion”forfeministtheoryandpolitics.SeeZerilli,Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom,intro-duction.

51.Iborrowthedistinctionbetweena“matteroffact”anda“matterofconcern”fromLatour,“FromRealpolitiktoDingpolitik,”16.

52.ScholemandArendt,“EichmanninJerusalem.” 53.Ibid.,51. 54.Ibid.,54.

1. crafting a dEMocratic subjEct?

1.Forexample,theantiwargroupCodePinkwascriticizedbysomefortheiractivi-ties,whichincludedinterruptingandhecklingduringspeechesbyofficials,in-cludingPresidentGeorgeW.Bush.EwenMacAskill,“DebateoverUSHealthcareTakesanUglyTurn,”The Guardian,August12,2009;IanUrbina,“BeyondBeltway,HealthDebateTurnsHostile,”New York Times,August7,2009.PopularattentiontoquestionsofcivilityinpoliticspeakedinJanuary2011aftertheassassinationattemptonRep.GabrielleGiffordsandthemurderofsixothersatapublicCon-gressonYourCornereventatashoppingcenterinTucson.HeleneCooperandJeffZeleny,“ObamaCallsforCivilityinNewEraofAmericanPolitics,”New York Times,January12,2011.

2.Myers, “Resisting Foucauldian Ethics.” I argue that contemporary theory thatchampionsFoucauldianself-careasaprivilegedmodeofresistanceoftenneglectsFoucault’sanalysisofdisciplinarypowerandbiopower,which,ifreadcarefully,shouldalertonetothelimitsofthecareoftheselfasastrategyforreshapingpowerrelations.

3.WilliamConnollyisthemostinfluentialproponentofthisview.SeeConnolly,The Ethos of Pluralization,Why I Am Not a Secularist,andPluralism.SeealsoDumm,Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom;Orlie,Living Ethically, Acting Politically;Simons,Foucault and the Political.

EllaMyersisAssistantProfessorofPoliticalScienceandGenderStudiesattheUniversityofUtah.

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataMyers,Ella,1976–

Worldlyethics:democraticpoliticsandcarefortheworld/EllaMyers.

p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.

isBn978-0-8223-5385-0(cloth:alk.paper)isBn978-0-8223-5399-7(pbk.:alk.paper)

1.Democracy—Moralandethicalaspects.2.Internationalrelations—Moralandethicalaspects.3.Citizenship—Moralandethicalaspects.4.Politicalparticipation—

Moralandethicalaspects.I.Title.jC423.m962013

172—dc23 2012033712

Worldly Ethics by Ella Myers

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