World Development Report 1984

PUB-5003Recovery or Relapse in the World Economy?Population Change and DevelopmentPopulation Data SupplementWorld Development Indicators

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WorldDevelopment

Report1984

Published for The World BankOxford University Press

Oxford University Press

NEW YORK OXFORD LONDON GLASGOW

TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON HONG KONG

TOKYO KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE JAKARTA

DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI

NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM CAPE TOWN

" 1984 ky the Interniationial Bank

for Reconstruictioni and DevelopmientilThe World Bank

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1. Underdeveloped areas-Periodicals. 2. Economiic development

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HC59.7.W659 330.9'172'4 78-67086

Foreword

This Report is the seventh in this annual series that governments and their peoples have a wideassessing development issues. This year the focus range of views on this subject.is on population change and its links with develop- Even with success in efforts to slow populationment. Population growth does not provide the growth, future population growth will still bedrama of financial crisis or political upheaval, but heavily concentrated in what are now the pooreras this Report shows, its significance for shaping areas of the globe. Thus the average level ofthe world of our children and grandchildren is at human welfare will depend largely on the degreeleast as great. What governments and their peo- of economic and social transformation in thoseples do today to influence our demographic future areas. The poverty of those areas cannot be blamedwill set the terms for development strategy well on rapid population growth alone; the causes ofinto the next century. Failure to act now to slow poverty go well beyond population change. Norgrowth is likely to mean a lower quality of life for will reducing population growth alone ensure theirmillions of people. In the poorest countries of the economic transformation. But this Report showsworld, and among the poorest groups within that slowing the pace of population growth cancountries, poverty contributes to high mortality make a difference-and that the ingredients forand even higher fertility. It thereby creates a doing so are also those that will increase economicvicious circle: the slow pace at which development growth.reaches the poor contributes to rapid population The analysis of the population situation followsgrowth, making the elimination of poverty increas- our annual review of global economic develop-ingly difficult. Slowing population growth is a dif- ments, which as in previous years occupies theficult challenge to humanity-but a challenge that first part of the World Development Report. It mightmust and can be successfully addressed. be argued that the general public remains insuffi-

On the one hand, the situation is grave: this ciently aware of the growing links among nationsReport concludes that in some countries develop- over the past few decades, and of the extent todayment may not be possible at all unless slower pop- of international economic interdependence. In anulation growth can be achieved soon, before increasingly interdependent world, low growth,higher real incomes would bring fertility down fiscal and labor market problems, and resultingspontaneously. On the other hand, there is reason inflation in industrial countries have taken a heavyfor hope: the experience of the past decade shows toll in developing countries. Exports have suf-that education, health, and other development fered, fear of protectionism has increased, andmeasures that raise parents' hopes for their chil- high real interest rates have made debt servicing adren, along with widespread access to family plan- costly burden. If the industrial countries fail toning services, create a powerful combination in regain the growth rates they managed in the 1950sreducing fertility. and 1960s, many countries in the developing

The discussion of population places special world will have great difficulty making progress inemphasis on the role of public policy in an area the years ahead. Indeed, the prospects for much ofwhere fundamental human values are at stake. sub-Saharan Africa will be particularly grave.Population is a subject that touches issues central But it is also apparent that even in a harsh inter-to the human condition, including personal free- national climate, the developing nations can takedom and the very definition of economic and social actions to improve their own economic perfor-progress. This Report tries to do it full justice, in a mance. Developing countries share the problemssensitive and thought-provoking way, recognizing of the developed, from fiscal deficits to distorted

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labor markets. And they have a vested interest in As its predecessors, this year's World Develop-reducing their own trade protectionism and adopt- ment Report is a study by the staff of The Worlding outward-oriented policies. Bank, and the judgments in it do not necessarily

Although recovery, at least in the industrial reflect the view of our Board of Directors or thenations, is now on a firmer footing, the outlook for governments they represent.the years ahead is full of uncertainties. The outlookwould brighten considerably if every nation tooksteps to improve its own domestic economic per-formance. But development assistance is also criti-cal, in reviving the global economy and in address-ing many of the fundamental development issuesof our era, including population. Especially for thepoorest countries, a substantial increase in conces- A. W. Clausensional flows of funds is needed to secure develop- Presidentment momentum. And although the direct costs of The World Bankprograms to reduce population growth are notlarge, a greater commitment by the internationalcommunity is sorely needed to assist developingcountries in the great challenge of slowing popula-tion growth. May 25, 1984

This Report was prepared by a team led by Nancy Birdsall and comprising Martha Ainsworth,Rodolfo Bulatao, Dennis Mahar, William McGreevey, Nicholas Prescott, and Gurushri Swamy, andassisted by Jill Armstrong. Deepak Lal and Martin Wolf contributed to Part I. The Economic Analysisand Projections Department, under the direction of Jean Baneth, prepared the statistical materials onwhich Part I is based, as well as supplied data for the whole Report. Peter Miovic coordinated thework of the Economic Analysis and Projections Department on Part I. Ramesh Chander supervisedthe preparation of the World Development Indicators, assisted by David Cieslikowski. Staff of thePopulation, Health, and Nutrition Department provided extensive help on Part II. The authors wouldlike to thank these and the many other contributors and reviewers. Thanks also go to the productionstaff-Christine Houle, Pensri Kimpitak, Jeanne Rosen, and Gerald Martin Quinn (who also designedthe cover)-and especially to the support staff headed by Rhoda Blade-Charest and including Ban-jonglak Duangrat, Jaunianne Fawkes, and Carlina Jones. The work was carried out under the generaldirection of Anne 0. Krueger and Costas Michalopoulos, with Rupert Pennant-Rea as principaleditor.

iv

Contents

Definitions and data notes ix

Glossary xDemographic terms xAcronyms and initials xi

1 Introduction 1

The economic outlook 1Population and demographic change 2

Part I Recovery or Relapse in the World Economy?2 Recession in retrospect 11

Industrial countries in the past two decades 12Developing countries after 1973 23

3 Prospects for sustained growth 34

A ten-year perspective 34The Low case and developing countries 35The High case and developing countries 37Policy requirements of the High case 39Capital flows and debt 42Poverty and low-income countries 47International action 48The links with population 50

Part II Population Change and Development4 Demographic change and public policy 51

The setting for high fertility 51The need for public policy 54Lessons from history 56Current demographic change in developing countries 63Demographic prospects and goals 73

5 The consequences of rapid population growth 79Differences among countries 81Macroeconomic effects of rapid population growth 81Constraints on agricultural production 90Population and the environment 94Urban population growth and internal migration 96Population growth and the international economy 100Conclusions 105

6 Slowing population growth 106

Socioeconomic factors and fertility 108Marriage, breastfeeding, and contraception 212Incentives and disincentives 121

7 Family planning as a service 127The use of contraception 128Supplying family planning services 136Financing family planning 148Obstacles to program expansion 152

v

8 The policy agenda 155

Population policy 155Policy priorities in developing regions 161Donor assistance policies 178

9 Ten years of experience 182Economic adjustment 182Population change: success and new challenge 183

Population data supplement 186

Bibliographical note 202

World Development Indicators 207

Text tables2.1 Population, GDP, and GDP per capita in 1980, and growth rates, 1960-83 112.2 Rates of growth in the real product wage and in labor productivity for the manufacturing

sector and the aggregate economy, by country, 1962-78 162.3 Total public expenditure of industrial countries as share of GDP, 1961-81 172.4 Real rates of return on corporate capital, by country, 1962-76 172.5 Percentage of industrial countries' imports covered by nontariff barriers 182.6 Net savings and savings by sector in industrial countries, 1964-81 222.7 Change in export prices and in terms of trade, 1965-83 242.8 Consumption, savings, and investment indicators for developing countries, 1970-81 242.9 Exports from developing countries, 1965-83 282.10 Current account balance and its financing, 1970-83 302.11 Debt indicators for developing countries, 1970-83 31

3.1 Average performance of industrial and developing economies, 1960-95 353.2 Growth of GDP per capita, 1960-95 363.3 Change in trade in developing countries, 1965-95 363.4 Current account balance and its financing in developing countries, 1983 and 1995 383.5 Growth of GDP in developing countries, Low scenario and variants, 1985-95 413.6 Growth of trade in developing countries, Low scenario and variants, 1985-95 42

4.1 Percentage decline in crude birth rates and in total fertility rates, selected countries, 1965-82 654.2 Comparison of age structures in developed and developing countries, 1980 674.3 Rural and urban population growth, 1950-2000 674.4 Permanent emigration as a percentage of increase in populations of emigrants' countries 694.5 Projections of population size in selected countries, 2000 and 2050 774.6 Population size and density in Bangladesh under two fertility assumptions, 1982-2050 78

5.1 Growth of population, GNP, and GNP per capita, 1955-80 825.2 Malawi: projected primary-school costs under alternative fertility and enrollment assumptions,

1980-2015 855.3 Potential savings in primary-school costs under rapid fertility decline, selected countries,

2000 and 2015 865.4 Gross domestic investment per potential new worker, selected countries, 1980 875.5 Kenya: projections of employment by sector, under two scenarios, 1976-2050 895.6 Growth rates of food output by region, 1960-80 905.7 Cereal yields and fertilizer use, selected countries, 1969-81 945.8 Export structure and human capital 103

6.1 Total fertility rates and reduction from total potential fecundity due to different determinantsof fertility, selected countries and years 114

7.1 Percentage of currently married women aged 15 to 49 using contraception, by regionand for selected countries 127

7.2 Percentage of married women aged 15 to 49 practicing efficient contraception among thosewho want no more children 134

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7.3 Discontinuation of contraception, recent surveys 1367.4 Public expenditure on population programs, selected countries, 1980 1497.5 Source of contraception among currently married women aged 15 to 44 and their husbands 1517.6 Fertility targets and estimates of population program expenditures, 1980 and 2000 1538.1 Population policy indicators for selected countries with populations of 15 million or more 1568.2 Development indicators: Africa compared with all developing countries 162

Population data supplement tables1. Population projections 1922. Population composition 1943. Contraceptive use and unmet need 1964. Factors influencing fertility 1975. Status of women 1986. Family planning policy 200

Text figures1.1 Past and projected world population, A.D. 1-2150 31.2 Indicators of standard of living, selected countries and years 51.3 Developing countries' share of population and production, 1800-1980 6

2.1 Growth rates of GDP for developing and industrial countries, 1961-83 122.2 Growth, inflation, and unemployment in seven major industrial countries, 1966-83 12

4.1 Fertility and mortality transition in developed and developing countries, 1860-1982 594.2 Birth and death rates and rates of natural increase by region, 1950, 1965, and 1980 644.3 Urban agglomerations with more than 10 million inhabitants: 1950, 1975, and 2000 684.4 Fertility in relation to income in developing countries, 1972 and 1982 704.5 Life expectancy in relation to income in developing countries, 1972 and 1982 704.6 Actual and projected life expectancy at birth of the world's ten largest countries, 1950-2100 754.7 Actual and projected total fertility rates of the world's ten largest countries, 1950-2100 754.8 Population growth of developing countries under alternative paths of future fertility

and mortality 754.9 Brazil's age pyramid, 2020 78

5.1 Index of school-age and working-age populations, selected countries, 1950-2000 845.2 When will the number of agricultural workers start to decline? 885.3 Foodgrains and population in India, 1950-83 93

6.1 How government decisions influence family decisions 1066.2 Relation between fertility and income per person 1096.3 Total fertility rate by education group in selected countries 1106.4 Average timing of reproductive events in selected types of societies 1136.5 Accounting for fertility decline, selected countries and years 1156.6 Fertility decline within female education groups in selected countries 120

7.1 Trends in contraceptive prevalence in 1970-83, selected countries 1307.2 Contraceptive use and unmet need for contraception, selected countries, 1977-81 1318.1 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa,

1972 and 1982 2628.2 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in the Middle East

and North Africa, 1972 and 1982 1688.3 Gross enrollment ratios by sex: selected countries in the Middle East and North Africa,

1960 and 1980 1698.4 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in Latin America

and the Caribbean, 1972 and 1982 1718.5 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in South Asia, 1972 and 1982 1738.6 Contraceptive use by method: Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, 1975-83 1748.7 Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in East Asia, 1972 and 1982 1778.8 External assistance for population programs in developing countries 179

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Boxes1.1 The arithmetic of population growth: compounding and momentum 4

2.1 Administered protection and the open international trading system 192.2 Comparisons between the 1930s and the 1980s 202.3 Adjustment to external shocks, 1974-81 252.4 The oil syndrome: deficits in oil-exporting countries 272.5 Paths to crisis and adjustment among Latin American debtors 29

3.1 Costs of protection in textiles and clothing 403.2 Trade as an engine of growth 433.3 Delinking from the world economy? 443.4 Exchange rates and price adjustments: lessons from the experience of developing countries 453.5 IDA 49

4.1 The isolation paradox 554.2 The Malthusian case: changes in labor supply, wages, and population growth

in preindustrial England 574.3 The European fertility transition 624.4 Alternative measures of fertility and mortality 664.5 Is the rise in life expectancy slowing too soon? 724.6 Three views of population change 76

5.1 Consequences of population growth: conflicting views 805.2 Prospects for poverty and population growth, 1980-2000 835.3 Food supplies for a growing world population 915.4 Reclaiming the Himalayan watersheds 955.5 Indonesia's transmigration program 995.6 The brain drain and taxation 1025.7 Coping with rapid fertility decline: supporting the elderly in China 104

6.1 Landholding and fertility 1096.2 Women's use of and control over their time ill6.3 Measuring the value of children 1226.4 A deferred incentive scheme in Bangladesh 126

7.1 Family planning for health 1287.2 Birth planning technology 1327.3 Measuring unmet need for family planning 1327.4 Management information systems for improved service delivery 1387.5 Family planning fieldworkers 1417.6 The impact of service quality: Matlab Thana, Bangladesh 1447.7 Military versus social expenditure 150

8.1 Pronatalist policies 1578.2 China's census: counting a billion people 1588.3 Demographic policy objectives 1598.4 Africa: how much land, how many people? 1648.5 Infertility: a challenge to programs in sub-Saharan Africa 1668.6 Teenage pregnancy 1678.7 Changing policies and attitudes toward family planning in Brazil 1728.8 Family planning and women's credit cooperatives in Bangladesh 1758.9 China's one-child family policy 178

MapsDistribution of product among selected countries, 1982 14Contraceptive prevalence 189Births and total fertility 190

viii

Definitions and data notes

The principal country groups used in this Report * Sub-Saharan Africa comprises all thirty-nineare defined as follows: developing African countries south of the Sahara,

* Developing countries are divided into: low- excluding South Africa, as given in Accelerated De-income economies, with 1982 gross national product velopment in Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank, 1981.(GNP) per person of less than $410; and middle- * Middle East and North Africa includes Afghani-income economies, with 1982 GNP per person of stan, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,$410 or more. Middle-income countries are also Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudidivided into oil exporters and oil importers, identified Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen Arabbelow. Republic, Yemen (PDR), and the United Arab

* Middle-income oil exporters comprise Algeria, Emirates.Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, * East Asia comprises all low- and middle-Gabon, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, income countries of East and Southeast Asia andMalaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Syria, Trinidad the Pacific, east of, and including, Burma, China,and Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela. and Mongolia.

* Middle-income oil importers comprise all other * South Asia includes Bangladesh, Bhutan,middle-income developing countries not classified India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.as oil exporters. A subset, major exporters of manu- 0 Latin America and Caribbean comprises allfactures, comprises Argentina, Brazil, Greece, American and Caribbean countries south of theHong Kong, Israel, Republic of Korea, Philippines, United States.Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and Billion is 1,000 million.Yugoslavia. Tons are metric tons (t), equal to 1,000 kilograms

* High-income oil exporters (not included in de- (kg) or 2,204.6 pounds.veloping countries) comprise Bahrain, Brunei Grow7th rates are in real terms unless otherwiseDarussalam, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi stated.Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Dollars are US dollars unless otherwise specified.

* Industrial market economies are the members ofthe Organisation of Economic Co-operation and All tables and figures are based on World BankDevelopment (OECD, identified in the glossary) data unless otherwise specified.apart from Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, which Data from secondary sources are not alwaysare included among the middle-income develop- available through 1983. The numbers in this Worlding economies. This group is commonly referred to Development Report shown for historical data mayin the text as industrial economies or industrial differ from those shown in previous Reportscountries. because of continuous updating as better data

* East European nonnmarket economies include the become available, and because of recompilation offollowing countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslo- certain data for Part I for a ninety-country sample.vakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, The recompilation was necessary to permit greaterPoland, Romania, and USSR. This group is some- flexibility in regrouping countries for the purposetimes referred to as nonmarket economies. of making projections.

Growth rates for spans of years in tables coverThe World Development Indicators uses the the period from the beginning of the base year to

same groups but includes only countries of 1 mil- the end of the last year given.lion or more.

In Part II of this Report, regional groupings ofcountries are defined as follows:

ix

Glossary

Demographic terms information about, and services for, use of contra-ception.

Fecundity. The physiological capacity of a woman,Amenorrhea. Absence or suppression of menstrua- man, or couple to produce a live birth.tion. Fertility. The reproductive performance, measuredChild death rate. The number of deaths of children by number of births, of an individual, a couple, aaged one to four in a given year per 1,000 children group, or a population.in this age group. Infant mortality rate. The number of deaths ofCohort. A group of people sharing a common tem- infants under one year old in a given year per 1,000poral demographic experience who are observed live births in that year.through time. For example, the birth cohort of Life expectancy at birth. The average number of1900 would be the people born in that year. There years a newborn would live if current age-specificare also marriage cohorts, school class cohorts, mortality were maintained. Life expectancy at laterand so on. ages is the average number of years a personCompleted fertility rate. The number of children born already at a given later age will live. Life expect-alive per woman in a cohort of women by the end ancy at age five and above can exceed life expect-of their childbearing years. ancy at birth substantially if the infant mortalityContraception. The conscious effort of couples to rate is high.avoid conception through rhythm, withdrawal, Married women of reproductive age. Women who areabstinence, male or female sterilization, or use of currently married, or in a stable sexual union, gen-contraceptives: intrauterine device (IUD), oral con- erally between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine.traceptives, injectable contraceptives, condom, Some analysts count only women between thespermicides, and diaphragm. ages of fifteen and forty-four.Contraceptive prevalance rate. The percentage of mar- Maternal mortality rate. The number of deaths ofried women of reproductive age who are using (or women due to complications of pregnancy andwhose husbands are using) any form of contracep- childbirth per 100,000 live births in a given year.tion. Mortality. Deaths as a component of populationCrude birth rate. The number of births per 1,000 change.population in a given year. Net reproduction rate. The average number ofCrude death rate. The number of deaths per 1,000 daughters that would be born to a woman (orpopulation in a given year. group of women) if during her lifetime she were toDependency ratio. The ratio of the economically conform to the age-specific fertility and mortalitydependent part of the population to the productive rates of a given year. This rate takes into accountpart; arbitrarily defined as the ratio of the young that some women will die before completing their(those under fifteen years of age) plus the elderly childbearing years. A net reproduction rate of 1.00(those sixty-five years and over) to the population means that each generation of mothers is havingin the "working ages" (those fifteen to sixty-four exactly enough daughters to replace itself in theyears of age). population.Family planning. Conscious effort of couples to reg- Parity. The number of children previously bornulate the number and timing of births. alive to a woman.Family planning programs. Programs that provide Popuilation growth rate. The rate at which a popula-

x

tion is increasing (or decreasing) in a given year tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,due to natural increase and net migration, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-expressed as a percentage of the base population. lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-Population momentum. The tendency for population land, United Kingdom, United States, and Com-growth to continue beyond the time that replace- mission of the European Communities.ment-level fertility has been achieved because of EC The European Communities comprisethe large and increasing size of cohorts of child- Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic ofbearing age and younger, resulting from higher Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,fertility and/or falling mortality in preceding years. Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

Postpartum. Refers to the time immediately after FAO Food and Agriculture Organization.childbirth. GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.

Rate of natural increase. The rate at which a popula- IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction andtion is increasing (or decreasing) in a given year Development.due to a surplus (or deficit) of births over deaths. IDA International Development Association.The rate of natural increase equals the crude birthrate minus the crude death rate per 100 people. It IMF International Monetarynd.also equals the population growth rate minus emi- IPPF International Planned Parenthood Federa-gration. ton.Replacement-level fertility. The level of fertility at NGO Nongovernmental organization.which a cohort of women on the average is having ODA Official Development Assistance.only enough daughters to "replace" itself in the OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-opera-population. By definition, replacement level is tion and Development members are Australia,equal to a net reproduction rate (see above defini- Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,tion) of 1.00. Replacement-level fertility can also be France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ice-expressed in terms of the total fertility rate. In the land, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Nether-United States today a total fertility rate of 2.12 is lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,considered to be replacement level; it is higher Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,than 2 because of mortality and because of a sex and United States.ratio greater than 1 at birth. The higher mortality OPEC The Organization of Petroleum Exportingis, the higher is replacement-level fertility. Countries comprises Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon,Total fertility rate. The average number of children Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq,that would be born alive to a woman (or group of Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,women) during her lifetime if during her child- United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.bearing years she were to bear children at each age UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Tradein accord with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. and Development.

Urbanization. Growth in the proportion of the pop- UNDP United Nations Development Pro-ulation living in urban areas. gramme.

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific,

Acronyms and initials and Cultural Organization.UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population

CPS Contraceptive Prevalence Survey. Assistance.DAC The Development Assistance Committee of WFS World Fertility Survey.the OECD (see below) comprises Australia, Aus- WHO World Health Organization.

xi

I I

1 Introduction

The past few years have produced so much turbu- mature into sustained and rapid growth of thelence in the world economy that governments and kind the world enjoyed for twenty-five years afterbusinesses have naturally been preoccupied with World War II.the short term. Now that recession is giving way to That much is clear from a review of the past,recovery, they can start to take a longer view. For which is the subject of Chapter 2. It concludes thatdeveloping countries in particular, the shift is wel- the 1980-83 recession was not an isolated event-come: development is quintessentially long term, caused, for example, by the second oil price rise ofyielding its best results when policies and pro- 1979-80. Its roots went back farther, to the rigidi-grams can be designed and sustained for years at a ties that were steadily being built into economiestime. from the mid-1960s onward. The rising trends in

Long-term needs and sustained effort are under- unemployment and inflation were the manifesta-lying themes in this year's World Development tion of increasingly inflexible arrangements for set-Report. As with most of its predecessors, it is ting wages and prices and for managing publicdivided into two parts. The first looks at economic finances.performance, past and prospective. The second The chapter emphasizes that policy failings havepart is this year devoted to population-the causes characterized both the industrial and the develop-and consequences of rapid population growth, its ing countries. Because of the industrial countries'link to development, and why it has slowed down predominance in the world economy, the conse-in some developing countries. The two parts mir- quences of their economic failure have weighedror each other: economic policy and performance heavily on the developing countries. In particular,in the next decade will matter for population the much publicized debt difficulties of the pastgrowth in the developing countries for several two years came to a head because of the unusualdecades beyond; population policy and change in combination in 1980-83 of recession and high realthe rest of this century will set the terms for the interest rates in the industrial countries. Industrialwhole of development strategy in the next. In both countries provide a market for about 65 percent ofcases, policy changes will not yield immediate ben- the developing world's exports. Their buoyancy-efits-all the more reason for starting to act imme- or lack of it-and the amount of trade protectiondiately. Delay will reduce the room for maneuver they choose to employ have a critical influence onthat policymakers will have in years to come. the foreign exchange earnings of developing coun-

tries. These earnings in turn will largely determine

The economic outlook whether the "debt crisis" gradually subsides, orseriously retards the growth prospects of develop-

The recession of 1980-83 was the longest in fifty ing countries for many years to come.years. It increased unemployment, reduced invest- That is one of several contrasting alternativesment, and undermined social programs in almost highlighted by the scenarios presented in Chapterevery country in the world. It put great strain on 3. These scenarios look ahead as far as 1995, butthe international trade and financial systems and they are not intended as forecasts of what will hap-caused friction between governments everywhere. pen. They merely illustrate what might happen,But it provided many valuable lessons for eco- depending on the policies pursued by govern-nomic policy because it highlighted longstanding ments and the effectiveness of governments inweaknesses in every economy and in international tackling economic problems. They show, for exam-arrangements. Unless policymakers learn from its ple, that GDP in the developing world could growlessons, the recovery now under way will not at 5.5 percent a year in 1985-95 if the industrial

1

countries regain their momentum of the 1960s, but until well into the twentieth century, the world'sat only 4.7 percent a year in that period if the population grew at the then unprecedented rate ofindustrial countries do no better than in the past about 0.5 percent a year, faster in today's devel-ten years. That would make the difference oped countries, slower elsewhere. World popula-between almost every country in the world raising tion size doubled again, this time in about 150per capita incomes and people in many of the years; it had reached about 1.7 billion by 1900. Inworld's poorest countries growing steadily poorer. the twentieth century, growth continued to accel-

Chapter 3 also explores the gains that develop- erate, from 0.5 to 1 percent until about 1950 anding countries could make by improving their own then to a remarkable 2 percent. In just over thirtyeconomic policies, irrespective of what happens in years, between 1950 and today, world populationthe industrial countries. It concludes that, if they nearly doubled again-growing from 2.5 billion tomake such improvements, some countries might almost 4.8 billion (see Figure 1.1).be able to add close to an extra percentage point to Since 1950 population growth has been concen-their economic growth rates. None of these trated largely in the developing countries. Thoughimprovements can be regarded as unachievable, a postwar baby boom combined with falling mor-since they have already been achieved by some tality in the industrial countries, the populationdeveloping countries. The chapter stresses the growth rate never exceeded 1 percent in Europevaluable contribution that appropriate pricing poli- and seldom exceeded 1.5 percent in North Amer-cies can make to faster economic growth. In partic- ica. At its peak, fertility in the United States meantular, it contrasts the record of countries that have that families had on average little more than threeadopted outward-looking trade policies with those children; in Europe and Japan postwar familiesthat have concentrated on import substitution. were even smaller. By the 1970s, in most devel-

The predicament of sub-Saharan Africa is a oped countries fertility had fallen to a level near orrecurring theme throughout this Report. Though even below "replacement"-about two childrenits total GDP growth was not much slower than in per couple being the level which, over the longother regions in the 1970s, Africa's population run, holds population constant (demographicgrew faster; for the region as a whole, GDP per terms are defined in the glossary).capita fell during the 1970s. It could well do so The postwar experience of developing countriesagain in the years up to 1995. Of the policy failings was not only different but historically unprece-that contributed to slow growth in other develop- dented. Driven by falling mortality and continueding countries, all can be found in more or less high fertility, their population growth rate rosechronic form in many African countries. The scope above 2 percent a year. It peaked at 2.4 percent infor raising growth rates by improving policies is the 1960s. It is now around 2.0 percent a year,therefore greatest in Africa. In addition, however, because of a slightly greater decline in birth ratesmany of Africa's weaknesses require extra conces- than in death rates (see Figure 1.1). Further declinesional aid if they are to be tackled effectively. in population growth will not come automatically.

Much of the slowdown so far can be attributed to

Population and demographic change China, where fertility is already low, close to anaverage of two children per family. Most families

While the causes of poor economic performance in other developing countries now have at leastcan be traced back twenty years, the links between four children, in rural areas five and more. In a fewdemography and development can be understood countries in which fertility fell in the 1970s, there isonly by going back even farther into the past. In evidence that it has leveled off recently. For partsthe long run of history, the second half of the of South Asia and the Middle East, forecasts of atwentieth century stands out for its remarkable lower rate of population growth are based more onpopulation growth. Consider that in the year 1 the hope than on present trends. For much of Africaworld had about 300 million people. Its population and Central America, population growth rates arethen took more than 1,500 years to double. rising and could rise still further. In Africa couplesThough the general trend was rising, population say they want more children than in fact they aregrowth was not steady; the balance of births over having, while mortality-though high-can bedeaths was tenuous, and crises such as war or expected to decline.plague periodically reduced populations in parts of Furthermore, population "momentum" meansthe world. Only in the eighteenth century did the that growth rates in developing countries willnumber of people start to rise steadily. From 1750 remain high for several decades even if couples

2

Fast and projected world population,

A.D. 1-2150 Population(blins)

12

BCrth and death rates, 195 0-8O

Crude rate

Crude

(pera th1977 )

U 1(Per

thousand)

8

.~

.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

3

DeeOped

A.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~countries'Population

Stu,yces5 Durand, 1977; UN, 1966.

20

Box 1.1 The arithmetic of population growth: compounding and momentum

Ra,tc, oi porpulatiorn grrr.'th among .:oirn- tirtrilir, bL-ri,- Ern1. and eight birth- ard -i.rid iT aK c,luritr-,p.:i:'-. t. -r

trie- lend to tall ink-ic. m%--rain g,ro,up- pci "om an,ut ha- rh, mocrrnentUrn- 'nga niwn~!3 i,r,-r- p. r.arrd i n*i Ir-

rapid gr-rnlIh *,_uur-nriu oI Airwa A;ia c:reated h. the-. hig;h tErTlit1 3nd tailing nut-, n: jI. n'r.rane**-Li- tal' 0 r-p I ,-:Mcr.r

and Latin Anmerica -'ith annual ..ro.' ih irralifir c-i rh, pa;r thrr; dt-Cadm% F-i>' I, . -I Ib ri arri p ra niid I Th'

rat,e; icr rnu-,t beiveen 2 i -and 4 Ti per- high lttrilit. and t.ithng crili. -a I r --a-, r p-. rr3iid t. .r h.' -.

crfni and glr.. ginth corionirif~ prirnar- .i.-mErti unlcring:ilh:.ri agc nf.-. i-un.-.f. i.ul ri 1I triI,II -

IIa th.: tndu;trializr-d nation; -. it h rr;iiit ac r-.ri-n *lr. rh.:.l d-,is.rln I- -1-a.p-l I1I,- ih.. luc,iiip r

groa-. h rate; bcob.. 1 percent In I !i. - r-p.rulaii.nl in ni-r e pi .cun- bu.l I1 Jl., rs. t ir~.r lb.: nar-

tile, lhe nt.i 1cn.rrjii,-n it ~, ,ri-- . Ill r. .. ir p-,ram-.i r.-r 22 , -1 --.; rh,

.-.utrunabCr in. F-rE . -c,u; -ne Th-. *) en. cir. o. fhal :e 2n.rat..d hi n.. -i-- rtul,

Age structure Ls Senegal. IOSO, and 2112i'I it i hc numbt-r N, hirilic pr i. ooir.i aicr.- It h-. ITi, Ihh, ir a;.Ifinc,- rapidi-. lhw birth rat.. can y'a-, I F.' , rc- .naId Ic .ha r . . -r pa r-,d .LI

hgl- :nid rbc vilnunrb-.cr * i,rth;; C,r. t,i - r im, - i,rc..r

Lv F- b-c~~~~~~~~~~~~~. 4rrsjc in th,n it f. ar I 'i- l.. n,..l,-r p'. r n)o thr >2.1

in -.i~ni; i.Unirli~ *i \;-ia -,rid [innr nTt. -i i i. ih,: titrtti il-nir.-

AcrI r ,a *-- h r..ni t:rrli- ir ' i- iI Il-- t ILi.1

d.Jn.:, Cl-a pr-r 4L, brthV rat;. rm3in L-u~ 5.9)' 3 1 hb nifi nt~, ai -

.Er, in I..-: irj-zi trilt r3i.t

itll .tl I I- r- rc,rr.. ---Jild I-,- 2 2

nA ~ n I-".n;I-3 t .4b. wat 4 I.,n im I ar.-: r. ar-a thin ,f. I rhinil h 1r liNi

jA .-. ld,Iinc -d alna-.! 1,pn n ii th,.tnt ri h 1r.nth rhIn . .thr-r -- hd t.-.,..- ~~~~~~~~rat.: ha' I all; n ba -.nla I', F.-- 'cent .1d the

-~~~ t~~.:ial numb; r --i birth; h i- mi. r i-cd ir,.n:

.. ,..ut3 rr..li..n.a.-:inn'li-:l..i 1 4-.).a. Di,irilrution art :countrie4 troth i-42

i-'ut i inr i,- tart-, 1-.&i .I populairons exceeding I million b%aaerage Pi,&f-65groadh rate

- -It. Intr iiPrcl .-. tail tr- I L.. : .-. l.-.iam, it.it- rul ,-.

n-un .rc k-lit. ~ that lear rlic i--tal numb,: .-: hrib-

,r.ai.:It i:..~i-.--- hi,%e ini rcr,- J turthcr r- - n,-arl.- -

I inm r V.~~~im -.plar

-mall dmEr,.n:,_m in 3rinu l gt-irioci ..-r np. pihii.f in II ntI t .r-

iii,r,o - 3, r,4, it 1, ,.t n.. ., r 1. t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ii

ri.untri ht Inpcludng ajivti r n-a- Ib T.:-,. I-. - 1ula.,- I...r) n .

ItiO chnrti r.eate --t c Irip.ndin-c -rh.:.a-i.ft-i..o - a-i uu-n =-- -- t

i--er rrn.d pcru.d-ae bi dittcrcn..t .n.or, r. rn I. .r.i ir,.i,l-r1r-- .w i.~

ind p4.pla-i...n ti.r.a.- n.a.rg .- E--.-h, iri.~ ri-idi i.t ., n r-,,n -..w L iii-r

po.1r-a- th I- pr-ii.ct - r mir , r ii-i 1crrl rr-- Ti. -p - F.puii- -r...l -r< s ~ -

p-ri rr..rrri I.u; a i p ru i. r. i.r Il-C, Il rh T T--t-i- Lch irt ~ i, -- rmh . Ii .:nut j 141 IL - *--:-Iit-- .

tiptla zr.~ - in--- rare r : F n.r ,t-n in F,, -l I- rcii n- ii "ii. F - i-pi V-. I r , ar r I.rr rp ,IIh

sa,int pcr .id 'i.ui b-r,nti. n nr.a- r-i … 4-i,r1:I.. ii r- r-h' Uan.-A hi L. 1 i,& .

Tad -da .r ccri atr .-.rr--r it. ! I rd, .:-. p -ar- i.i r r.1 3 t nipt.-,.r ir I- rr ifh - i i,.-r. -4 ii ri Adlfl M1. . .ri I t n 1 tl

ni, tIa; 12. .. nl..r in- Jr D , :it a -Dir-n. F- - ra thi i1,. ~i: d rii .It -II ..- l.,r I .:r. rr -- i r , -

4

have fewer children (see Box 1.1); absolute annual FIGURE 1.2

increases will be close to or more than 80 million Indicators of standard of living, selected countries

people a year in developing countries well into the and yearsnext century. The baby "bulge" that resulted from Primary school enrollment rate

the trends of high fertility and falling mortality that (percent)Singapore

started twenty years ago is now entering child- l00 Chile

bearing age. In China, for example, the number of Brazia

women aged twenty to thirty-four almost doubled United States Korea

between 1950 and 1980; throughout the 1980s, as E and Wales B anIadesh

the children born in the 1960s enter their twenties, 50 Sudanthe number of women marrying and bearing chil- Japan $ Ethiopia

dren will continue to increase. To reduce popula-tion growth to 1 percent a year by the early 1990s,couples in China would need to have fewer than 0

two children on average. 1900 1960 1980

These considerations should not obscure the Literacy ratecentral fact that the world's population growth (percent)

rate is falling. The latter part of the twentieth cen- United States

tury has been a demographic watershed, the high England and Chile

point of several centuries of accelerating growth Wales Korea

and the beginning of what demographers project Brazil

to be a continuous decline, until world population 50 Malaysia

stabilizes sometime in the twenty-second century. India

Though absolute numbers will continue to 25 SudanBangladesh

increase for several decades, the issue now is how Pakistan

quickly the rate of increase can be slowed down- Ethiopia

and how individual countries (and the interna-tional community) are to cope with continued 1900 1960 1980

growth in the meantime. Life expectancy at birth(years)

The rise in living standards 60 iCrhie

KoreaUntil the seventeenth or eighteenth century, life Sweden Malaysia India

expectancy had probably changed little, and few United States Pakistan

people were literate. Since 1850, however, while 40 England and Vales . Sudan

world population size has more than tripled, Japan Ethiopia

income per person has increased perhaps six timesin real terms, life expectancy has risen dramati-cally, and education has become widespread. Pro- 20

gress in education and life expectancy in develop- 1900 1960 1980

ing countries has been especially notable since GNP per capita1950. Even in today's poorer developing countries, (constant 1980-82 dollars)

primary school enrollment rates and life expec- M United States

tancy are above the levels achieved by richer coun- 3,000

tries eighty years ago, though income per personand adult literacy are not (see Figure 1.2). 2,000

But these averages can be misleading. Though England and Chile

most people are better off today, for many the s ,Sinp aoreSweden Brazilgains have been small. Since 1950 it has been the 1,000 ; i Sudan

with lower levels of income per person Malaysia Pakistancountries wltn lower levels or mcome per person .. Korea India

that have had much faster population growth. In Japan E thiopa

those countries absolute increases in income havebeen much smaller than in the countries which

Sources: Tan and Haines, 1984; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960; Keyfitzbegan the period already richer. Consider a simple and Fleiger, 1968; Mosk, 1983; Johansson, 1977; Zimmerman, 1965.

5

example. Between 1955 and 1980 income per per- Such comparisons raise several statistical diffi-son in the United States grew at an average 2.0 culties. They exaggerate differences between poorpercent a year. In 1980 dollars, average income and rich countries because not only incomes butincreased from $7,030 to $11,560. Meanwhile, in also prices, especially for services, are lower inIndia, income per person grew at about 1.7 percent poor countries, and this is not reflected in officiala year-but only from $170 to $260 (in 1980 dol- exchange rates. But even with appropriate adjust-lars). What had been a $6,860 income gap between ments (based on the UN International ComparisonAmericans and Indians in 1955 had almost dou- Project), the income gap between India and thebled to $11,300 in 1980; America's average income, United States is still estimated to have increasedsome forty-one times India's in 1955, had become from almost $5,000 to almost $8,000 between 1955forty-four times larger by 1980. Large absolute dif- and 1980. The general conclusion is inescapable:ferences in average income between developed much of the world's output is produced and con-and developing countries have persisted and have sumed by relatively few of its people.even increased since 1950 (see Figure 1.3). Amongand within developing countries, differences in The demograplicfiituireeducation and life expectancy also persist.

By 1980, 79 percent of the world's total output World Bank population projections are shown inwas produced in the developed countries, where Table 19 of the World Development Indicators atabout 25 percent of the world's people live. The the back of this Report. These, and alternative pro-remaining 21 percent was shared by the other 75 jections prepared for this Report and shown in thepercent of people. Only 5 percent was shared Population Data Supplement, are explained inamong the 47 percent living in low-income coun- Chapter 4. The projections should not be treated astries such as Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan, predictions, but as illustrations of what can hap-and most countries of tropical Africa. pen given reasonable assumptions. If the assump-

FIGURE 1.3

Developing countries' share of population and production, 1800-1980

Total world $11,720 billionproduction

$970 billion $2,630 billion$230 billion

Developing countries' 19share-44 percent percent

share

2,417 million

Total world 1,673 millionpopulation

944 millon

I,

1800 1900 1930 1980

Source: McGreevey, 1984.

tions underlying the "standard" projections in some countries it is not already too late-whetherTable 19 are correct, world population would stabi- rising unemployment and increasing landlessnesslize around the year 2150, having risen from will overwhelm social and political institutions;almost 4.8 billion to more than 11 billion (see Fig- whether fragile administrative systems will beure 1.1). It would reach 9.8 billion by the year 2050. unable to maintain health programs; whether, inThe population of today's developed countries countries that are already crowded and still heavilywould grow from about 1.2 billion today to 1.4 reliant on agriculture, mortality will rise to checkbillion in 2050, while that of those countries now further population growth.classified as developing would grow from over 3.6 Such speculative pessimism needs to be setbillion to 8.4 billion. By the time world population against the concrete reasons for optimism. Thestabilized, the population of India would be 1.7 experience of the past two decades shows that eco-billion, making it the most populous nation on nomic growth and social development are possi-earth. Bangladesh, a country about the size of the ble, even starting at low initial income levels, andstate of Wisconsin in the United States, would that developing countries can take conscious stepshave a population of 450 million. Nigeria, Ethio- to influence their demographic futures. Both mor-pia, Zaire, and Kenya, among the most populous tality and fertility-the latter matters much morecountries in Africa, would have populations of 620 for population growth-can be brought downmillion, 230 million, 170 million, and 150 million, more quickly than projected. Declines need notrespectively. As a group, sub-Saharan Africa and rely, solely or even primarily, on per capita incomeSouth Asia-today's poorest countries, with the growth. Educational change can occur rapidly;fastest population growth-would account for 50 policy effort can make a difference. Moreover, thepercent of the world's people, compared with 30 actions that would speed the demographic transi-percent today. tion are also those which would increase economic

Even allowing for some error in such projec- growth.tions, it is clear that future population increaseswill be concentrated in what are now the poorer Causes, consequences, and curesareas of the globe; the average level of human wel-fare will depend largely on the degree to which Part II of this Report discusses three themes.economic and social transformation occurs in these * Rapid population grozoth is a developmenit prob-areas. lein. Although population growth does not provide

Are the assumptions that produce these projec- the drama of financial crisis or political upheaval,tions realistic, and what do they imply for future its significance for shaping the world is at least ashuman welfare? The critical assumptions are that great. In the past three decades many developingthe decline in mortality will continue until life countries managed to raise average income even asexpectancy of about eighty years is reached, and their populations grew rapidly. In that strict sense,that fertility will decline to replacement level-in rapid population growth has been accommodated.developing countries between the years 2005 and But the goal of development extends beyond2045, depending on recent mortality levels, fertility accommodation of more people; it is to improvetrends, and family planning efforts; and in most people's lives. The cost of rapid populationdeveloped countries in the year 2010. (In the sev- growth, at least for the world as a whole, may noteral developed countries in which fertility is now be a catastrophe-with luck sudden famine, war,below replacement level, it is assumed to rise and political or environmental collapse can be avoided.then stabilize at replacement.) But continuing rapid growth on an ever larger base

In some respects these assumptions are optimis- is likely to mean a lower quality of life for millionstic. Consider the poorer countries of Africa and of people. The main cost of such growth, borneSouth Asia. Even with rapid income growth and principally by the poor in developing countries,advances in literacy in the next two decades, they has been and will be faltering progress againstare not likely to reach the income and literacy lev- what is still high mortality, and lost opportunitiesels that triggered fertility declines in such countries for improving people's lives.as Brazil, Korea, and Malaysia in the 1960s (see Why does rapid population growth slow devel-Figure 1.2). Yet their fertility is projected to decline opment? First, it exacerbates the awkward choicesignificantly-and even with those declines their between higher consumption now and the invest-populations will more than double in the next fifty ment needed to bring higher consumption in theyears. A pessimist might wonder whether for future. Economic growth depends on invest-

7

ment-all the more so if human skills are scarce slowing population growth later more difficult, asand technology limited. But if consumption is low today's children become tomorrow's new parents.already, the resources available for investment are Population policy has a long lead time; otherlimited; faster population growth makes invest- development policies must adapt in the meantime.ment in "population quality" more difficult. Sec- Inaction today forecloses options tomorrow, inond, in many countries increases in population overall development strategy and in future popu-threaten what is already a precarious balance lation policy. Worst of all, inaction today couldbetween natural resources and people. Where mean that more drastic steps, less compatible withpopulations are still highly dependent on agricul- individual choice and freedom, will seem neces-ture and the potential for increasing production sary tomorrow to slow population growth.through extending cultivation is limited, continu- 0 There are appropriate public policies to reduce fer-ing large increases in population condemn many tility. Proposals for reducing population growthhouseholds to continuing poverty. Such increases raise difficult questions about the proper domaincan contribute to overuse of limited natural of public policy. Family and fertility are areas of liferesources, mortgaging the welfare of future gener- in which the most fundamental human values areations. Third, rapid increases in population make at stake. This Report considers two reasons forit hard to manage the adjustments that accompany public policy to reduce fertility. First, in the transi-and promote economic and social change. The tion from a traditional to a modern economy, thegrowth of cities in developing countries, largely private gain from having many children maydue to high rates of natural increase, poses serious exceed the social gain. This gap occurs for severalmanagement problems; so too does continued reasons. For any family there are obvious rewardsrapid growth that in some rural areas threatens from many children. But poor parents especiallypermanent environmental damage. have other reasons for high fertility. They rightly

These costs of rapid population growth differ fear the risks of infant mortality because, in theamong countries. Where education levels are absence of pensions or public support, they look toalready high, investment in transport and commu- their children to support them in old age. Fornications is in place, and political and economic women who are poor and for whom other oppor-systems are stable, countries are in a better posi- tunities may be limited, security and status aretion to cope with the strains of rapid growth- linked to childbearing. Yet these private rewardswhether their natural resources are limited or they are achieved at great social cost because part of theare already "crowded." But countries in that cate- responsibilities for educating and employing chil-gory-Colombia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, dren falls on society at large. Second, during aSingapore, and Thailand-also tend to be those in country's transition to a modern economy, somewhich population growth is already declining. In couples have more children than they want. Thiscountries where the population is still largely gap also occurs for several reasons. Informationdependent on agriculture, and the amount of new about family planning may be scarce or the costs ofland or other resources is limited-including contraception high. Couples may not realize thatBangladesh, Burundi, the Arab Republic of Egypt, mortality rates are falling, so that fewer births areIndia, Kenya, and Nepal-progress in the face of needed to ensure that the number of children theycontinuing rapid population growth will be want will survive to become adults. Couples mayextraordinarily difficult. Agricultural moderniza- not be fully aware of the health risks of large fami-tion and diversification into manufacturing will lies. Where young women marry early, couples dorequire large new investments in both human and not discuss sexual matters, and parents pressurephysical capital, and considerable administrative new couples to have children, there may be socialand political skill to ensure efficient allocation of as well as financial costs in controlling fertility.scarce investment resources. Even in countries Thus tradition can combine with lack of infor-with untapped natural resources-Brazil and Ivory mation about birth control to contribute to highCoast, for instance-rapid population growth fertility.makes it harder to effect the investments in com- Where there is a gap between private and socialplementary inputs (roads, public services, drain- gains, a main reason for it is poverty. Povertyage, and other agricultural infrastructure) and in means not only low income but also lack of eco-the human skills needed to tap such resources. nomic and social opportunities, an insecure future,

The costs of rapid population growth, moreover, and limited access to services such as education,are cumulative. More births now make the task of health, and family planning. The gap requires

8

public policy to provide alternative ways of secur- ity must not mean a willingness to achieve it at anying the benefits that many children provide for cost. In fact, the successful experience of manytheir parents. Measures to improve income oppor- countries already indicates it need not.tunities, broaden social insurance and pension * Experience shows that policy makes a difference.schemes, and extend services all provide new sig- The experience of the past two decades of popula-nals to households, encouraging individuals to tion policy is encouraging. Many countries havewant smaller families. Social efforts to expand edu- shown that effective measures can be taken to slowcation and employment opportunities for women population growth. Such measures are affordable:do the same. In short, there is a particular strategy family planning programs, for example, have beenof development in which the signals transmitted to successful in reducing fertility at very low cost.parents encourage them to have fewer children in Such measures also respect human rights, andtheir own private interests. they complement other development efforts in

But experience shows that all this takes time to enhancing welfare.have an effect. Population growth can be slowed Fertility has fallen most dramatically in China,more directly, and in ways that also benefit the where a public policy to slow population growthpoor. Governments can do more to encourage includes public education, social pressure, andbreastfeeding and later age of marriage, which economic measures other governments might bereduce population growth by lengthening the reluctant to consider. But large declines have alsoaverage interval between generations. Through occurred in other low-income areas: Sri Lanka andsupport for family planning programs, govern- several states of India (Kerala, Karnataka, andments can spread information about the advan- Tamil Nadu), where education is widespread; andtages of planning family size-making it as easy as Java in Indonesia, where there is an active familypossible for individuals to choose the number and planning program.timing of their children and helping to close the Within regions, countries differ. Fertility hasgap between the number of children parents have fallen faster and to lower levels in Colombia,and the number they want. Finally, governments where family planning programs received govern-can use incentives and disincentives to signal their ment support starting in the late 1960s, than inpolicy on family size. Through incentives, society Brazil, a richer country where central governmentas a whole compensates those couples willing to involvement is minimal. It has fallen more inforgo the private benefits of an additional child, Egypt and Tunisia, countries with demographichelping to close the gap between private and social objectives, than in their richer neighbor, Algeria. Itgains to high fertility. has fallen more in India than in Pakistan; per cap-

The size of the two gaps, and hence the policy ita income is low in both, but in Pakistan popula-actions needed, vary among countries and among tion policy has received less sustained supportdifferent groups within each country. When cou- over the past two decades. The pattern of declineples have two or even three children, it is much shows that differences in income, religion, and cul-less likely that the social costs of each child exceed ture do not tell the whole story. Education, accessthe private costs parents are willing to bear. But to family planning services, the status of women,if each couple has four or even six children, in a and economic and social policies that bring oppor-society with only limited ability to finance the tunities to the majority of people all make a differ-education of a growing population, then it is more ence.likely that the social optimum is being exceeded The specific policy agenda for each countryand that both social and private interests would be depends on its political culture, on the nature ofbetter served by smaller families. While there are the problem it faces, and on what it has alreadydistinctions between different types of policies to accomplished. But to illustrate what is possible,reduce fertility, in virtually every country there is this Report provides examples of the implicationssome appropriate combination of development for population growth of "rapid" mortality andpolicies geared to the poor, family planning, and fertility declines. These declines are for most coun-incentives. tries more rapid than those shown in the standard

The ultimate goal of public policy is to improve World Bank projections, but comparable to what aliving standards, to increase individual choice, and few countries have already achieved. For mostto create conditions that enable people to realize countries these declines would mean fertility ratestheir potential. Lower fertility is only an intermedi- of between two and three children per couple inate objective; a commitment to achieve lower fertil- the year 2000 and population growth rates of

9

between 1 and 2 percent-moderate compared tality and fertility give only a rough guide to whatwith rates today. For some countries, the declines is possible. For some countries, they may be tooimply eventual large differences in population size ambitious; others have already set even morecompared with the standard projection-for ambitious fertility targets. In the longer run, someKenya, about 70 million rather than 120 million in countries may wish to move to even lower or zero2050 (compared with a population of 18 million rates of population growth. But the alternativetoday) and for Bangladesh, 230 million rather than paths illustrate an important point: the course ofalmost 360 million (compared with 93 million future population growth and its effects on socialtoday). and economic progress are well within the realm of

These alternative paths of rapid declines in mor- conscious human choice.

Part I Recovery or Relapse in the World Economy?

2 Recession in retrospect

The world has now had two major recessions in also more severely affected. Their GDP grew bythe past ten years. The recession of 1974-75 was only 2.5 percent in 1980, 2.4 percent in 1981, 1.9sharp but short in industrial countries, where GDP percent in 1982, and an estimated 1 percent in 1983rose by 6.1 percent in 1973, then by only 0.8 per- (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). They had fared bet-cent in 1974, before falling by 0.4 percent in 1975. ter in the first recession not only because it wasIn 1976, however, GDP growth in industrial coun- shorter but also because, for a time, their heavytries was back up to 4.7 percent. Developing coun- borrowing allowed them to grow. In the secondtries were less badly affected. Their GDP growth recession, however, the availability of foreign capi-was 7.4 percent in 1973 and 5.9 percent in 1974; it tal declined abruptly after 1981. This changefell only modestly to 4 percent in 1975 before rising imposed substantial pressure on those countriesto 6.3 percent in 1976. which had come to rely on foreign loans as a prin-

The recent recession of 1980-83 was not so sharp cipal way of escaping recession.but it lasted longer. In the industrial countries GDP The recent recession had two proximate causes:grew by 3.3 percent in 1979, then 1.3 percent in the rise in oil prices in 1979, stemming from supply1980, and 1.3 percent in 1981. It fell by 0.5 percent disruptions in Iran, and the disinflationary policiesin 1982 and is estimated to have risen to only about of governments in most major industrial countries2.3 percent in 1983. The developing countries were after 1980. Both the need to reduce inflation and

TABLE 2.1

Population, GDP, and GDP per capita in 1980, and growth rates, 1960-83

9D 1980 GD8p GDP growth rates(billions population per capita (average annual percentage change)

Countrygroup of dollars) (millions) (dollars) 1960-73 1973-79 1980 1981 1982 1983

Developing countriesb 2,118 3,280 650 6.3 5.2 2.5 2.4 1.9 1.0Low-income 549 2,175 250 5.6 4.8 5.9 4.8 5.2 4.7

Asia 497 1,971 250 5.9 5.2 6.3 5.2 5.6 5.1China 284 980 290 8.5 5.7 6.1 4.8 7.3 5.1India 162 675 240 3.6 4.3 6.9 5.7 2.9 5.4

Africa 52 204 250 3.5 2.1 1.3 1.2 0.5 -0.1Middle-income oil importers 915 611 1,500 6.3 5.6 4.3 0.9 0.7 0.3

East Asia and Pacific 204 183 1,110 8.2 8.6 3.6 6.7 4.2 6.4Mliddle East and North

Africa 28 35 800 5.2 3.0 4.2 -2.4 5.5 2.0Sub-Saharan Africac 37 60 610 5.6 3.7 5.5 3.9 1.1 0.3Southern Europe 201 91 2,210 6.7 5.0 1.5 2.3 0.7 -0.9Latin America and Caribbean 445 241 1,840 5.6 5.0 5.8 -2.3 -0.4 -2.2

Middle-income oil exporters5 654 494 1,320 6.9 4.9 -2.4 2.4 0.9 - 1.7High-income oil exporters 228 16 14,250 10.7 7.7 7.4 0.0 ..

Industrial market economies 7,463 715 10,440 4.9 2.8 1.3 1.3 -0.5 2.3

. . Not available.a. Estimated.b. Data for 1982 and 1983 are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.c. Does not include South Africa.d. The estimated 1983 data exclude Angola, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Iraq.

FIGURE 2.1 directions-with a lag in each case of about a year.Growth rates of GDP for developing and industrial The present marked downturn in the rate of infla-countries, 1961-83 tion is the third since 1970. The rate of unemploy-

Percent ment has not shown any significant downturns8 but has had three marked upturns since 1969.

veloping countries The progressive deterioration from cycle to cycle/ \ ADeveloping countries is also evident. GDP growth in the industrial coun-

6 tries has not matched its rate of 1973 in any subse-quent year. The cyclical peaks and troughs in

- AIJr 3,, yZ 5 \ I unemployment have risen from 2.9 and 2.7 per-4 r F ' v S \1 li \ cent in the first of the cycles shown in Figure 2.2 to

8 and 5 percent in the most recent. In the case ofinflation, the peaks and troughs have risen from5.7 and 2.7 percent in the first cycle shown in Fig-

2 ' 2' ' \li ure 2.2 to 12.2 and 7.1 percent in the most recent.

Inflation has, however, fallen below its previouscyclical trough. This might be taken as a break in

Industrial countries,.°____________________________________________ _ ',the tendency toward progressive deterioration,V but the conclusion is not warranted. In order to

lower inflation to a level still well above the aver--2 age for the 1960s, unemployment rates have risen

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983' to three times the level of the 1960s.

a. Estimated.

Sourcres: For developed countries, OECD, 1983; for developing countries, Policy-induced problemsWorld Bank data.

One explanation of why stop-go cycles havethe severity of the resulting recession can be tended to be sharper in recent periods is that asunderstood only as a manifestation of a long-termdeterioration in the economic performance of FIGURE 2.2

industrial countries. This deterioration may be Growth, inflation, and unemployment in seven majorexplained in part by past policy choices as well as industrial countries, 1966-83

by underlying economic and social conditions. In Percent

an interdependent world economy, growth in 14

developing countries is significantly affected by Consumer prices

what happens in industrial countries (see map). To 12 Nassess the prospects of developing countries, it is /therefore important to consider the extent to which 10 |poor policies in the industrial world were to blamefor their difficulties. To the extent that they were, 8 \

improved policies in industrial countries could /contribute to faster future growth in developing 6 Unemployment ,

countries. r---4

Industrial countries in the past two decades 2--

Figure 2,2 illustrates the experience of seven majorindustrial countries since the mid-1960s. It shows 0 GDP growth rate

that they have had marked cycles in GDP growth,unemployment, and inflation and-more seri-ously-adverse underlying trends. Since 1968 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983'

GDP growth has experienced three downturns, Countries include Canada, France, Germany, italy, Japan, United

and the present recovery appears to be the third Kingdom, and United States.

strong upswing. Inflation and unemployment a. Estimated.

have tended to follow GDP growth-in opposite Source OECD, 1983.

12

soon as it is widely believed that governments are slow growth. The oil price rises of 1973-74 andembarked on an inflationary course, nominal 1979-80 aggravated these difficulties and requiredwages rise and bond prices and exchange rates fall. adjustments which the industrial economies foundThe result, especially under floating exchange difficult to make efficiently.rates, is that inflation rises more quickly than antic- LABOR MARKET RIGIDITIES. In the late 1960s realipated and, in turn, the authorities are forced to wages in manufacturing in many industrial coun-choke off the expansion with monetary restraint tries were rising at a rate faster than warranted bysooner than would have been necessary with less underlying productivity growth. By the early 1970ssensitive markets. the trend was marked, except in Canada (see Table

The tendency toward slower growth can be 2.2). Although there are forms of labor-using tech-explained in part by changes in underlying condi- nical progress that could justify such a develop-tions. By the late 1960s the opportunities for catch- ment, the tendency toward rising unemploymenting up with the technology of the United States (especially in manufacturing) suggests that that ishad been largely exploited by both Japan and west- not what was happening.ern Europe, so one source of exceptional growth If real wages are above the level at which alldeclined in significance. Another source-the shift those who seek work can find it, there are threeof workers from low-productivity agriculture to solutions: to let unemployment rise; to let inflationhigh-productivity manufacturing-had also largely rise if wages are not indexed to prices, either for-been exhausted. A third source-trade liberaliza- mally or informally; or to try to control wagestion and reintegration of the industrial economies through incomes policy. Governments attemptedafter World War Il-though it had boosted growth a combination of all three. The early 1970s, in par-for at least two decades, was no longer providing ticular, witnessed efforts by several governmentsthe stimulus it did earlier. Finally, the increasing to achieve the required stability in the labor marketshare of service industries in GDP may have through some form of incomes policy, combinedslowed the growth of GDP since the growth of with fiscal and monetary expansion. In some coun-productivity has traditionally been lower in serv- tries, such as Austria, Japan, and the Federalices than in manufacturing. Republic of Germany, formal or (more usually)

Although such fundamental factors played a informal policies based on voluntary self-disciplinepart in slowing down GDP growth, they cannot among workers have had some success. In otherentirely explain the deterioration in economic per- countries, such as the United Kingdom and theformance. To begin with, some forces were work- United States, formal incomes policies achieveding in favor of faster growth-rapid innovations in only temporary success. In general, real wagekey industries such as electronics, for example. inflexibility in the industrial countries contributedCountries might also have exploited the potential to "stagflation"-continuing inflation at relativelyfor shifting labor out of unemployment and declin- high unemployment.ing "smokestack" industries to new areas, and the PUBLIC SPENDING AND DEFICITS. For the industrialopportunity to expand trade with developing countries as a whole, public spending rose fromcountries, especially by importing more labor- 29.3 percent of GDP in 1961 to 40.9 percent in 1981intensive goods in return for exports of machinery (see Table 2.3). Its structure also changed signifi-and other sophisticated products and services. cantly. Among the seven major industrial coun-Furthermore, although underlying changes in eco- tries the share of government expenditure onnomic opportunities may explain a tendency defense, general administration, and economictoward lower growth, they have little to do with services fell from 16.4 to 10.9 percent of GNPthe stop-go pattern of cyclical disturbances com- between 1954 and 1980. Meanwhile, the share ofbined with rising unemployment and inflation. spending on education, health care, income main-That pattern can be explained only by the eco- tenance, and old-age security rose from 10.5 tonomic policies followed in industrial countries. 23.4 percent of GNP. Most of the increase was con-

Two policy-induced developments deserve par- centrated on health care (where prices were risingticular attention: first, the increasing rigidity of the rapidly) and old-age security.labor market and the resulting strong upward The rising share of spending on health care andpressure on real wages; and second, the growth old-age security partly reflects increases in the pro-and pattern of public spending, taxation, and fiscal portion of old people, but increases in coveragedeficits. The links between these are at the root of and benefits were more important. Between 1960the problems of inflation, unemployment, and and 1975 demographic change contributed about

13

Distribution of product among selected countries, 1982

: 4 ~ l l ' 1 lJunea Kin.gdo".

Uiter,de Stales

58 t ; ElrKndand Jaj = *- Gunes i ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~TuisiA rageria a'

Guat~'~ , i: V E 0 LrDvaESa.Y I:Trinidad and Jaac - 0 Mali l1.El a~~~~~~. ,~To a,. Ma.rit

= e Gn Up Brazil ol ° CNiger ChGiaade Senega Nigerica

Venezuela E iW 0.5 CA.R. ugandal

Cam-1gni Kenya

Middle-income~~~~~~~~~~eron Icnme

_ lndustrial market economies~~~~~~~~Rari

E onzanarZam1E bia

Lesotho, Zimbat

South AfricaArgenina

Groups of economies

F]Low-income economiesE Middle-income economies

High-income oil exporters

Industrial market economies

East European nonmarketeconomies

Gross domestic product

- 1 percent

- 0.05 percent

14

l l l ' < ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Jpi.ari ,,

Nelhenanas Fe.J p. Gekn.iej -

Belg.eM

Swniernana Auzf [ _.

L v t ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~India[;

A ram 7I l,:, a

Papua New Guinea

E

Countries are drawn in proportion totheir share of total GNP. Those forwhich data on GNP are not available, as New Zealand

well as those with fewer than 1 millioninhabitants, are excluded.

15

TABLE 2.2

Rates of growth in the real product wage and in labor productivity for themanufacturing sector and the aggregate economy, by country, 1962-78(average aninual percentage c/lange)

Sector, mcasure, Germnany. United Uinitedand period Canada France Fed. Rep. Italy Japan Kingdoin States

ManufacturingReal product wage

1962-69 5.0 4.8 5.6 7.4 10.8 4.6 3.41969-73 3.6 7.0 7.5 9.7 12.6 5.6 3.61973-75 0.1 6.2 6.8 4.4 0.6 4.6 0.11975-78 . 4.8 5.4 2.0 8.9 -1.4 3.0

Labor productivity1962-69 4.5 6.3 5.9 6.8 11.2 4.5 3.11969-73 4.4 5.4 4.8 6.9 8.7 4.1 3.21973-75 -0.4 2.8 5.2 0.4 -1.8 -1.3 -0.31975-78 4.5 6.1 5.0 4.1 7.3 1.2 3.0

Aggregate economyReal product wage

1962-69 3.6 5.1 5.0 7.8 8.5 3.2 3.11969-73 2.0 5.5 6.3 7.9 12.2 3.7 2.61973-75 1.5 5.1 4.8 6.0 8.6 4.9 0.21975-78 1.8 5.2 2.7 1.2 2.7 1.5 2.3

Labor productivity1962-69 3.3 5.2 5.3 7.4 9.9 3.1 2.71969-73 3.2 5.7 5.2 6.6 9.1 3.9 2.61973-75 0.7 2.6 4.0 3.0 3.9 0.7 0.31975-78 2.0 5.0 4.5 1.3 4.1 2.0 2.1

Note: Real product wage is defined as the ratio of the nominal wage to the price of commodities produced.. . Not available.Source: Sachs, 1979.

20 percent of the growth of spending on social to high interest rates, they drive up the cost ofservices and income maintenance, while changes borrowing, not only within the country, butin eligibility and improvements in benefits contrib- worldwide.uted 80 percent. Between 1975 and 1981 changes ineligibility had ceased to be significant. Demo- E, on the industrial countriesgraphic change then contributed 17 percent of thegrowth, and improved benefits 78 percent. Pressures in the labor market and on public finance

To pay for the growth of spending, taxes rose in industrial countries have contributed to fourfrom 28.7 percent of GDP in 1961 to 37.5 percent in major problems since the late 1960s: inflation,1981. That increase did not cover all the rise in unemployment, declining profitability, and aspending, however; public sector deficits also broadly defined protectionism.increased as a proportion of GDP. The significance * Inflation may be seen as the result of accom-of the general rise in public sector deficits is contro- modation to labor market pressures and the resultversial, in part because of the difficulty of separat- of deficit financing. One main effect of inflation ising the effects of business cycles and inflation from that it heightens uncertainty about the future-evi-those of structural trends in these deficits. It can be denced, for example, by the high inflation premi-argued that the deficits may sometimes have acted ums demanded in long-term interest rates. Thisas a valuable support for demand during a period has significant implications for developing coun-of recession. It is undeniable, however, that, tries, which have an interest in securing medium-depending on the method of financing, deficits and long-term loans to match the long gestationhave caused difficulty in some countries at particu- period of some of their development projects. Per-lar times. Where large countries such as the United haps the most important aspect of uncertainty,States are concerned, deficits can have important however, is created by the inflationary cycle itself.global consequences. Insofar as they contribute Experience that expansion breeds inflation

16

TABLE 2.3

Total public expenditure of industrial countries as share of GDP, 1961-81(percent)

Countnj 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981

Canada 30.0 30.1 36.6 39.6 41.4France 35.7 38.5 38.3 44.0 48.9Germany, Fed. Rep. 33.8 36.9 40.2 48.1 49.3Italy 29.4 34.3 36.6 42.2 50.8Japan 17.4 20.3 20.9 27.8 34.0United Kingdom 33.4 35.6 38.4 46.2 47.3United States 29.0 29.2 32.3 34.5 35.4Average for all

industrial countries 29.3 30.6 33.3 37.9 40.9

Source: OECD, 1983.

and then policy-induced contraction is itself an a natural reaction, but one that contributed toimportant constraint on long-term investment sharply rising unemployment. Among the coun-and growth in both developed and developing tries where profit rates fell were Germany, Japan,countries. the United Kingdom, and the United States.

* The rise in unemployment has been related to * With real-wage rigidities, declining profitabil-real-wage pressures, exacerbated by the productiv- ity in the corporate sector, and rising unemploy-ity slowdown of the 1970s. The effect of the pro- ment, governments were under great pressure toductivity slowdown was to lower the rate of protect specific industries. Often protection isincrease of the real wage that was compatible with viewed in terms of trade measures alone-tariffsfull employment. In the United States real wages and quotas-and its costs are seen in terms of whatappear to have adjusted rapidly to the new trend- it does to prevent other countries' exports. Butthey rose little after 1973 and adjusted quickly to protection can take many forms, including subsi-the 1973-75 recession (see Table 2.2). In western dies, and can be viewed more broadly as theEurope, however, the same was not true until the attempt to prevent or slow change by preservinglate 1970s. In the 1970s employment grew by about outmoded industries and firms.20 million in the United States; with a similar size Because it has taken covert and obscure forms,labor force, countries in the European Community the evidence on the growth of protection is poor.expanded employment by only 2 million. Probably the most important protectionist policy in

* The effects of real-wage pressures on employ- practice has been open-ended subsidies for specificment have been exacerbated by the emergence in a firms in, for example, steel, chemicals, motor vehi-number of industrial countries of both rising capi- cles, and shipbuilding. In western Europe thetal-output ratios and falling rates of profit, at least share of public spending on subsidies was risingin the corporate sector (see Table 2.4). Faced with by the late 1960s and grew larger in the late 1970sthe higher costs of employing labor, firms shifted and early 1980s. Also important have been quanti-to more capital-intensive methods of production- tative restrictions in the form of "voluntary"

TABLE 2.4

Real rates of return on corporate capital, by country, 1962-76(pcarcen t)

Geranwi!l Uniited United

Period Caniada Frantce Fed. Rep. Italy lapa d d States

Average1962-64 7.9 9.7 19.3 10.4 28.2 11.9 12.01965-69 9.6 10.0 19.5 11.4 27.9 10.6 12.21970-73 9.0 11.6 15.0 10.3 21.9 8.3 8.61974-76 9.2 8.0 11.4 .. 13.5 3.7 7.1

Not available.Souirce: Sachs, 1979.

17

export restraints and orderly marketing agree- earlier rise had amounted to an annual transfer ofments, which violate the principles and rules of about 2 percent of GDP from the industrial coun-GATT. Estimates of the percentage of imports tries, or roughly half a year's growth. But much ofaffected by nontariff barriers are shown for this could, at least initially, be borrowed back (andselected industrial countries in Table 2.5. The more as the surplus available for borrowing fell betweeneffective the nontariff barrier the less the actual 1975 and 1979 so did the real price of oil). Althoughvalue of imports that enter a country. Thus esti- the oil price increase was damaging to industrialmates are only illustrative of the relative degree of countries, it alone does not explain subsequentprotection. There has also been a growing use of problems of slow growth, unemployment, and"less than fair value" provisions of trade law as a inflation except in the context of already existingform of harassment (see Box 2.1). economic rigidities.

Quite apart from the threat to developing coun- Consider the labor market. The rise in the pricetries, protection damages the industrial countries of energy lowered the real wage that was com-themselves. First, efficiency is reduced by actions patible with full employment. It also led to anthat cut the link between domestic and interna- incentive to shift away from energy- and capital-tional prices. Second, there is an important added intensive forms of production toward more labor-source of uncertainty with potentially serious intensive methods. This substitution explains aeffects for long-term, trade-oriented investment part of the observed slowdown in labor productiv-and thus for returns on investment. ity growth. Where the required reductions in real

wages and real wage growth did not occur-as in

Impact of rising oil prices some countries in western Europe-the productiv-ity slowdown was small, but the oil price rise gave

To understand the impact of the 1979-80 rise in oil a permanent upward boost to unemployment.prices, it is necessary first to consider the policy In industry some capital stock had becomereactions to the jump in prices in 1973-74. That redundant as expectations for higher growth were

punctured. The changing price of energy alsoaccelerated the obsolescence of significant parts of

TABLE 2.5 the capital stock, especially in such industries asPercentage of industrial countries' imports steel, shipbuilding, chemicals (including petro-covered by nontariff barriers chemicals), and motor vehicles. Governments

Imports fromi then responded with increased attempts to propDeveloped Developing up such industries with protection and subsidies.

Inporter countries countries Despite the failure of real wages to adjust andthe declining rates of return on corporate capital,

United States 13.0 5.5. Japan 19.2 5.4 investment demand and then economic activitySwitzerland 22.6 48.8 were partially sustained for nearly a decade by lowSweden 1.0 7.0 and sometimes negative real rates of interest. TheNorwav 8.2 10.9 economic conditions of the late 1970s and theAustria 15.0 8.1 "debt crisis" which subsequently emerged in the

Denmark 194 19.2 1980s can be understood only in terms of the pecu-Ireland 15.0 9.5 liar relationship through much of the 1970sFrance 20.1 7.1 between real wages, which tended to rise fasterUnited Kingdom 14.9 14.3 than productivity, and real rates of interest, whichItaly 12.5 7.0 stayed low.Germany, Fed. Rep. 12.6 8.5Netherlands 16.1 19.8 Negative real rates of iterest spurred a rapidBelgium and Luxembourg 19.2 29.7 growth of borrowing, especially by the non-oil

Note: This table is based on detailed information on nontariff developing countries. Although in the 1950s andbarriers available in UNCTAD. The figures measure the value of 1960s the shares of different groups of countries inimports affected by nontariff measures in relation to total international lending changed only gradually, inimports. Import figures are from 1980, whereas the information the 1970s the non-oil developing countries' shareon nontariff barriers applies to 1983. If a country's importrestrictions are rigorous, it imports little and few of its imports rose sharply. The great increase in lending wasare affected by restrictions. Thus these figures provide little largely the result of the oil producers' surplus. Thebasis for comparison among countries in the total amount of industrial countries were not large net borrowersrestrictions.inutilcutiswrnolagnebroesa. Weighted average; excludes Greece. themselves; investment growth was sluggish in

18

*Box 2.1 Administered protection and the open internationaltrading system

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industrial countries after 1973, despite the need for bility, and slow growth. There is considerable dis-expanded investment to adjust to changes in the agreement about the degree of disinflation neededworld economy. Increased investment would have to reduce inflationary pressures at any point inimplied more rapid structural transformation, time. But the effects of the disinflation actuallywhich the advanced industrial economies found undertaken were not surprising. It is difficult tohard to undertake. Indeed, uncertainty about reduce inflation of the magnitude experienced inthe future course of inflation discouraged long- the 1970s without experiencing some loss of out-term investment in favor of projects having shorter put and employment.pay-back periods. The latter offered greater liquid- The extent of the losses, however, depends onity but were less effective for restructuring the several factors. One is the economny's flexibility ineconomy. the face of reduced demand. To the extent that

labor contracts take time to renegotiate and wages

Consequences of disinflation do not adjust quickly, reduced demand tends toproduce unemployment. There is evidence that

The disinflation of the early 1980s has its roots in over time the rate of rise of nominal prices, espe-the events and policies of the previous decade. It cially of labor but also of some goods, has come tomay be seen not only as a stage in the inflationary respond more slowly to recessions. This is not acycle but also as a determined attempt by some recent phenomenon. It has merely become worsecountries to break out of the vicious spiral of labor and more general over time, requiring greatermarket rigidities, inflation, macroeconomic insta- losses of output and employment for each percent-

19

Box 2.2 Comparisons between the 1930s and the 1980s

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age point reduction in the rate of inflation. This not anticipated, the result was the worst recessionproblem is then superimposed on the real-price since the 1930s (see Box 2.2).rigidities, which have generated longstanding ten- Although disinflation was a major reason for thedencies toward underemployment of resources. rise in real interest rates-especially short-term

A second factor is the degree to which the gov- rates-it was probably not the only one. Withernment's commitment to reduce inflation is credi- growing budget deficits in the United States and inble. If people do not believe that the authorities several European countries, and with the declinewill do what they say, they can be convinced only in the surplus of oil-exporting countries after 1980,by experience. The more deeply rooted is their dis- the supply of real savings also declined. This itselfbelief, the more protracted and painful their expe- would be expected to lead to a rise in real interestrience may need to be. Thus, if the extent and rates, other things being equal.persistence of the monetary tightening had been Savings rates in the industrial countries peakedfully anticipated, nominal interest rates would in 1973 when net savings rates were 14.1 percent ofhave declined as inflation declined. Since it was GDP. Since then net savings rates have hovered in

20

ii.: tie ccli- 'armarkur:-i li- l.cr ;.rc,cln *i- -l LI". r r r rI he cuntTacling .p,raI ot*rign r,i, Jtlt Tll.. wjtt,r China - :rr- %%orlid t3de, 1a2t)p

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the range of 9 to 10 percent (see Table 2.6). House- Disinflation was successful in its immediatehold savings rates held up well in the 1970s, while objective (see Figure 2.2). Among major industrialcorporate and government savings rates were countries, the reduction in consumer price infla-strongly pro-cyclical. In recessions profit shares tion was particularly sharp in the United Kingdomfall and governments run larger deficits. Thus a (from 18 percent in 1980 to 5.4 percent in 1983), theprincipal reason for the decline in gross and net United States (from 13.5 percent in 1980 to 4.2 per-savings rates was simply slow and unstable cent in 1983), and Japan (from 8 percent in 1980 togrowth. It is as yet unclear whether there has also 0.7 percent in 1983). With few exceptions, how-been a fundamental underlying trend toward ever, even in the trough of the cycle, rates of infla-lower rates of gross savings. But the high real rates tion remained above the average for the 1960s. Atof interest in the early 1980s do suggest that the the same time, there were serious adverse effectscredit market has become very tight and, in the for world trade and the world trading system andevent of increased demand for private investment, equally-if not still more-serious effects for theis likely to get still tighter. international financial system.

21

TABLE 2.6 indebtedness is denominated in dollars, the appre-Net savings and savings by sector in industrial ciation of the dollar greatly increased debt servic-

(cerentage of GDP) ing costs for all, including the developingcountries.

Net In the ten years preceding 1979, in the context ofYear savings Corporate Government Household general world inflation, the US dollar depreciated

1964 10.8 3.4 2.0 5.4 about 50 percent against the German mark and1971 12.0 2.6 1.9 7.6 about 60 percent against the Japanese yen. This1973 14.1 2.7 2.8 8.7 tended to raise the rate of increase of dollar-1974 11.9 0.7 2.1 9.2 denominated prices, and thus doubly helped1975 9.0 0.8 -1.3 9.6 debtors with dollar-denominated debts. The1976 9.6 1.4 -0.3 8.51977 10.4 1.9 0.4 8.2 switch to global disinflation in the 1980s was1978 11.4 2.4 0.4 8.6 accompanied by a strengthening of the dollar;1979 10.9 2.1 0.9 8.0 between 1979 and 1982 it appreciated by 33 percent1980 9.5 1.2 0.3 8.1 against the German mark and 14 percent against1981 8.8 0.6 -0.2 8.2 the Japanese yen. While national prices continued

Note: Based on seven major OECD countries, including to rise (albeit more slowly), the average of interna-Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom,and the United States. Numbers mav not add to totals because tional prices, converted into dollars, was actuallyof rounding. falling. This greatly increased the burden carriedSouirce: Hakim and Wallich, 1984. by debtors with dollar-denominated debts;

because of the tightness of international creditmarkets, they faced interest rates well into double

World trade grew by just 1.5 percent in 1980, figures as well as principal repayments whose realstagnated in 1981, and then fell by 3.6 percent in purchasing power was actually rising.1982. The main reason was the sharp fall in the The second reason for difficulty was more deep-volume of trade in fuels. World exports of manu- seated. During 1960-73 the real interest rate in thefactures did better in terms of growth but still Eurocurrency markets (three-month dollar rateworse in relation to previous performance. They deflated by the US GDP deflator) averaged 2.5 per-rose by 5.0 percent in 1980 and 3.5 percent in 1981 cent; during 1973-79 it averaged only 0.7 percentbefore falling by 2.3 percent in 1982. While the and at various times was negative. In such an envi-decline in the growth of world trade was largely ronment, provided it lasts, it is almost impossiblethe result of the recession itself, protection proba- to owe too much. The tendency toward increasedbly had some effect as well. New protectionist indebtedness was a general feature of economicactions and agreements after 1980 largely con- life, and in no way unique to developing countries.cerned trade among industrial countries, espe- Corporations and some governments in industrialcially imports into Europe and North America countries tended to go increasingly into debt, asfrom Japan. There were, however, several devel- did the governments of a number of developingopments that harmed developing countries, countries. When real interest rates jumped toincluding a somewhat more restrictive renegotia- almost 7 percent in 1981 and 1982, serious diffi-tion of the Multifibre Arrangement in 1981, subse- culty was bound to follow.quent restrictions on textiles and clothing, and The difficulties were most conspicuous in thefurther development toward comprehensive case of developing countries, particularly thoserestrictions on imports of steel into the United which had borrowed heavily from commercialStates and the European Community. banks in the previous ten years. Although official

There are two reasons the disinflation of the transfers and direct foreign investment had beenearly 1980s created such severe problems for the major form of capital flows to developing coun-the international financial system. The first was the tries in the 1950s and 1960s, they were overtakenmix of fiscal and monetary policies pursued by the by commercial bank lending in the 1970s. At theUnited States. Because of a growing budget deficit time, this seemed a benign vehicle for recycling thefinanced by borrowing in a country with a rela- large surpluses of oil-exporting countries, and antively low savings rate, interest rates rose. They effective way of obtaining higher investment inattracted a substantial capital inflow and helped developing countries than could be financedproduce a large real appreciation in the dollar's through their domestic savings alone. But it alsoexchange rate. Since the bulk of international resulted in a huge buildup of commercial debt in

22

several countries. The rise in nominal and real achieved between 1960 and 1973. India also main-interest rates in the past few years and the slow- tained its growth. Other regions did less well,down--even halting-of new lending have made it especially sub-Saharan Africa. (The low growth ofdifficult for some countries to service their com- oil exporters shown in Table 2.1 is somewhat mis-mercial debt and raise the threat of a global finan- leading since there were large increases in incomecial crisis. because of improvements in the terms of trade.)

Population growth rates in developing countries

Developing countries after 1973 during the 1970s continued to be high and in someregions (notably sub-Saharan Africa) increased. In

Thus the international environment had become per capita terms, growth in many countries wasless favorable to developing countries in the period therefore even less impressive; in sub-Saharanafter 1973 and became even less favorable after Africa, per capita incomes actually fell during1979-80. The slowdown in industrial-country 1973-83 (see Chapter 5).growth hurt all developing countries, although the For the purpose of assessing economic welfare,effect was not the same for all. Those which were the growth of gross domestic income (GDY) isexporters neither of oil nor of manufactures suf- more relevant than the growth in GDP. By allow-fered most. The effect on oil exporters was at first ing for changes in the terms of trade, GDY takesmore than offset by the rise in petroleum prices. account of changes in the rate at which nationalInflation in the 1970s helped to some extent all output can be converted into national consump-debtors. The sharp rise of real interest rates after tion. All oil-importing countries experienced some1979 hurt most large middle-income borrowers, worsening in the terms of trade in the 1970s.most of them in Latin America. Most important, Recent improvements have not restored the termsthe rise in instability in the 1970s-of prices, of of trade to their levels of the 1960s (see Table 2.7).exchange rates, and of interest rates-complicated The effects of the terms of trade for oil-importingthe tasks of decisionmakers (both public and pri- countries should not be exaggerated, however. Forvate) everywhere. example, between 1973 and 1979 the rate of GDP

However, interest rates and capital flows are growth of middle-income oil importers of 5.6 per-only one determinant of growth in the developing cent a year was only a little above the GDY growthcountries. A second is their own policies; last rate of 5.3 percent. Only for oil exporters haveyear's World Development Report focused on their changes in the terms of trade been important; theirmanagement of economic policies and institutions. rate of GDY growth was 9.0 percent a year com-A third influence is that of foreign trade. The main- pared with 4.9 percent GDP growth.tenance of high growth and near full employment Where oil-importing countries performed well,in industrial countries provides a boost to world they did so for two basic reasons. First, they main-trade. It also reduces the political pressures in tained or increased savings and investment ratesindustrial countries for tariffs, quotas, and other (see Table 2.8); second, they maintained orforms of protection for declining industries. More increased the growth of export volumes, especiallytrade and less protection in turn enable developing manufactured exports (see Box 2.3). These perfor-countries to develop efficiently in line with their mances in turn were made possible by the kind ofown comparative advantage. domestic and trade policies that permitted an effec-

The changing balance between these three fac- tive adjustment to external conditions. Middle-tors explains the performance of developing coun- income developing countries were not uniformlytries, first in coping with the 1974-75 recession, successful in these areas; some may have relied toothen in achieving a sustained expansion until 1979, much on borrowing without adjustment. In gen-and most recently in struggling through the 1980- eral, though, the 1970s was a successful decade for82 recession from which they have yet to recover. It them.also explains why some countries have done better That was not true of low-income countries inthan others. Africa. Production was held back by adverse exter-

nal conditions in combination with a series of

Differences among developing countries domestic policies: poor incentives to farmers,costly and inefficient agricultural marketing sys-

The middle-income countries of East Asia and the tems for both inputs and outputs, and the mainte-Pacific achieved GDP growth rates of 8.6 percent a nance of overvalued exchange rates. Between 1973year between 1973 and 1979, comparable to that and 1982, countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Tan-

23

TABLE 2.7

Change in export prices and in terms of trade, 1965-83(average annual percentage change)

Country group 1965-73 1973-80 1981 1982 1983

C!a t ;.,--p. -t pricesDeveloping countries

Food 6.6 7.8 -16.1 -14.1 5.2Nonfood 3.7 10.1 -14.6 -9.4 10.3Metalsandminerals 1.6 5.6 -12.0 -8.0 -2.2Fuels 6.7 24.7 10.5 -2.6 -14.5

Industrial countriesManufactures 4.7 10.9 -4.2 -1.8 -3.2

Cihange in tenns of trade

Low-income Asia -0.5 -1.4 -0.1 -1.6 -0.6Low-income Africa -0.1 -1.5 -9.9 -0.9 4.6Middle-income oil importers -0.6 -2.2 -5.5 -1.9 3.0Middle-income oil exporters 1.1 8.1 9.0 -0.4 -7.0Developing countries 0.4 1.6 -0.5 -1.2 -0.6

Note: Calculations are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.a. Estimated.

zania, Uganda, and Zaire experienced an apprecia- ducer prices have been increased in many cases, intion of their real exchange rates, because relatively real terms they were lower in 1982 than in 1980 inhigh rates of domestic inflation were not fully off- Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Togo. In someset by falls in their nominal exchange rates. Even other countries-Burundi, Ivory Coast, Liberia,countries such as Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Upper Volta-and Somalia, which did depreciate their nominal although the prices of a few agricultural commodi-exchange rates, ended up with a higher real effec- ties have been raised, those for many others havetive rate or only a small devaluation. fallen in real terms.

The same phenomenon affected pricing policies, Governments in sub-Saharan Africa also let theirparticularly in agriculture. Although nominal pro- public finances deteriorate. In countries such as

TABLE 2.8Consumption, savings, and investment indicators for developing countries, 1970-81(percentage of GDP)

Country group 1970 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981

All developing countriesConsumption 78.9 76.5 76.7 75.3 74.4 76.8Investment 22.7 23.8 26.3 26.1 26.9 27.0Savings 21.1 23.5 23.3 24.7 25.6 23.2

Low-income AsiaConsumption 77.1 75.0 75.7 75.5 74.2 76.2Investment 23.7 25.6 25.7 25.1 27.7 25.8Savings 22.9 25.0 24.3 24.5 25.8 23.8

Low-income AfricaConsumption 86.6 88.6 92.5 91.0 91.5 94.1Investment 15.5 15.1 16.4 17.9 16.9 16.6Savings 13.4 11.4 7.5 9.0 8.5 5.9

Middle-income oil importersConsumption 79.5 77.5 79.1 77.1 77.9 79.2Investment 23.6 24.4 26.7 25.4 25.7 25.3Savings 20.5 22.5 20.9 22.9 22.1 20.8

Middle-income oil exportersConsumption 79.1 74.6 72.6 70.8 67.5 72.1Investment 20.5 21.7 27.0 28.9 29.2 31.4Savings 20.9 25.4 27.4 29.2 32.5 27.9

24

Box 2.3 Adjustment to external shocks, 1974-81

E, trri -hI-cl-s rli ILnrr u tn.i* I it- nirlinltl c .. r Et vi E in 'r..in- -o.unirl Th.rd a It counir'e- ir ei enlpl|

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t-,Ni' tht -it 1 t-i , -1;il hi: -.n i-,. pnri e- '-*- iptilrtanI mIn ltinit i-t FI-i \iiil- ..t . -n bn theor1 -1 e\peeri'n-t F--r thi;

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25

Burundi, Guinea, Mali, Malawi, and Sierra Leone, countries did not worsen in the 1970s (see Tablepublic expenditure has increased despite budget- 2.8). In some countries-India being a prominentary constraints. In many countries domestic sav- example-they even improved. Nonetheless, dis-ings collapsed in the 1970s. In Ethiopia the savings tortions in the domestic financial system made therate declined from about 12 percent to 3 percent problems of domestic adjustment to external pres-(1973-82); Tanzania from 16 percent (1967) to 9 per- sures more difficult. Thus Turkey in 1977-79 main-cent (1981); Sudan from 10 percent (1970) to about tained fixed nominal deposit rates in the face of3 percent (1978); Ghana from about 15 percent accelerating inflation. Brazil reduced monetary(1970) to 3 percent (1981); Kenya from about 15 correction on financial assets in 1980.percent (early 1970s) to 9 percent (1981); and Zim-babwe from about 20 percent in the early 1970s to Effects of the recent recessionabout 10 percent in 1981. Despite foreign capitalinflows, the rate of capital accumulation also fell In 1974-75 many developing countries were able toconsiderably in sub-Saharan Africa. compensate for the deterioration of trading oppor-

For oil exporters, the rise in oil prices consider- tunities by exploiting the better opportunities forably increased their incomes. But the volume of the migration of labor and for importing capital.their exports grew very slowly and the booming Between 1979 and 1983, by contrast, most develop-energy sector had a depressing effect on other ing countries initially-and virtually all ulti-parts of the economy. After 1982, when it became mately-found their external circumstances deteri-clear that the predictions of their oil revenues had orating in all significant respects.been too optimistic, their relatively slow GDP Weak demand in the industrial countries duringgrowth of the 1970s was compounded by general 1980-82 was the main cause of falling export pricesdeflation in an attempt to reduce imports (see for developing countries (see Table 2.7). Prices forBox 2.4). industrial raw materials fell for the additional rea-

As with the industrial countries, harsher exter- son that high interest rates discouraged storage,nal conditions in the 1970s exacerbated the conse- while food prices dropped because of bumperquences of various policy-induced distortions in world harvests. Overall, the prices of primarymany developing countries. A common response products in relation to those of manufacturesin many middle-income countries (Brazil, Korea, reached a post-1945 low in 1982. In 1983, as eco-Philippines, Turkey, and Yugoslavia) to the 1973- nomic recovery began in industrial countries, and74 rise in oil prices was to stimulate demand as some supplies were limited by unfavorablethrough expansionary monetary and fiscal policies weather, raw material prices started to rise again.and then to finance the resulting current account Nevertheless, they remained lower than in 1979,deficits through commercial borrowing. While and almost all developing countries faced worsemuch of this borrowing went to finance invest- terms of trade by 1983 than they had in 1980.ment, the rates of return to both public and private In volume terms, the developing countries'investment were declining. Among the major bor- exports of raw materials and fuels fell absolutelyrowers, incremental capital-output ratios-the during the recession. Exports of food, always rela-amount of extra investment needed to produce an tively insensitive to income, continued to growextra unit of output-rose, for example, from less (see Table 2.9). Exports of manufactures, havingthan 3 in Brazil in 1970-75 to nearly 4 in 1975-80, grown at 10.6 percent a year between 1973 andand from 3.6 to 4.5 in the Philippines. Inefficiency 1980, rose at only 6.9 percent a year between 1980increased for a variety of reasons: shifts toward and 1983. Given the sluggish GDP growth incapital-intensive industry, low capacity utilization industrial countries, however, developing coun-in various sectors, and inefficient use of resources tries did manage to increase their share of worldin expanding the public sector. markets for manufactures.

Countries which saw an improvement in their Among developing countries, one of the differ-terms of trade in the early 1970s also expanded ences that weighed even more heavily in thetheir public spending. But since the improvement recent recession than in the two preceding decadeswas transitory, the extra public expenditure was between inward- and outward-looking tradeincreased public sector deficits and exacerbated policies. Previous World Development Reports havebalance of payments and debt servicing problems. suggested that outward-looking policies-those in

Apart from low-income Africa, the trends in sav- which there is rough equality between the incen-ings and investment rates in most developing tives for exporting and import-competing activi-

26

- - 3 nr-j -- - 3 --- ---

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-c T-'� 2

2,"-. 21 to

2 � 2

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a - - -

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02;

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a

00

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c 2 2 '2

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'C 2

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'7 , C. C.. _a- a, � '2; 2 2

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2 2 - - r

C')�-'1 __ ___ ___ ___ ______ ____

TABLE 2.9

Exports from developing countries, 1965-83

Commodity and Change in export volumes Value of exportsdeveloping-country (average annual percentage change) ( billions of current dollars)group 1965-73 1973-80 1981 1982 1983 1965 1981

CommodityManufactures 14.9 10.6 16.3 -1.6 6.0 7.1 134.6Food 1.3 6.0 19.7 5.0 0.9 13.3 74.8Nonfood 3.7 1.5 2.5 -6.1 1.7 5.4 24.5Metals and minerals 6.3 5.9 2.6 -2.1 -1.9 4.5 26.9Fuels 6.4 -1.3 -21.9 5.1 6.1 7.3 165.1

Developing-country groupLow-income Asia 2.9 7.6 17.2 -3.8 4.6 5.2 36.0Low-income Africa 4.0 -1.3 -2.6 10.6 0.2 1.9 6.6Middle-income oil importers 8.1 7.6 12.5 -0.5 3.2 18.5 219.0Middle-income oil exporters 5.7 -0.8 -17.0 5.2 5.7 12.0 150.5All developing countries 6.3 3.1 0.4 1.1 4.1 37.5 412.1

Note: Data for 1982 and 1983 are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.a. Estimated.

ties-are preferable to inward-looking policies that debt to GDP and almost uniformly lower ratios ofemphasize import substitution. To the extent pos- debt service to exports.sible, this equality needs to be achieved through For low-income developing countries, the deteri-the maintenance of appropriate exchange rates. oration in their terms of trade was perhaps moreWhere some protection is imposed, export and serious than the effects of the debt problem itself.other subsidies can offset the resultant disincentive However, low-income countries in Asia (and espe-to export producers. But export subsidies can be cially China and India) embarked in the 1970s oncostly to the budget. Moreover, they introduce reforms that introduced greater flexibility in theirother potential distortions and may lead to coun- economic structure through greater integrationtervailing action by industrial countries. into the world economy, and helped raise their

The benefits of outward-looking policies are felt domestic savings rates. China has been success-in terms of higher growth rates in the long run and fully promoting its manufactured exports, whilein a greater ability to adjust to external shocks. India has significantly increased its commercialThis is confirmed by a study of twenty-two oil- borrowing since 1980-81. These policy reforms,importing developing countries between 1979 and combined with an improved institutional infra-1982. It found that countries with strong export structure, allowed them to maintain their eco-growth had GDP growth of 3.8 percent a year, nomic growth. Sub-Saharan Africa was much lesscompared with 2.8 percent a year where export successful in adjusting, because of a legacy of poorgrowth was average and 1.3 percent a year where performance and policies. In per capita terms,it was weak. In the same sample, those countries income is estimated to have fallen every yearpursuing active trade policies (including elements since 1980 in low-income African countries (seeof both export promotion and efficient import sub- Table 2.1).stitution) grew faster, at 3.2 percent a year; than Contrary to expectations, the recession in thethose which relied mainly on import restrictions. industrial economies did not bring down interest

The benefits of outward-looking policies may be rates substantially. Because two-thirds of develop-gleaned from the different rates of recovery from ing-country debt was denominated in dollars andthe recession. The middle-income developing much of it at variable interest, the rise in real ratescountries of Asia had a much stronger recovery meant a fundamental change in their finances. Itduring 1983 than those of Latin America, and have greatly increased the costs of borrowing and ofhad a generally superior performance since 1980. postponing domestic adjustment. Thus the impactThey did not use borrowing to postpone adjust- of the recession on developing countries came inment to the same extent, partly because the costs two distinct phases. The first-when adjustmentof adjustment in their dynamic economies were was postponed by many developing countries-lower. They had generally lower ratios of public ended in the middle of 1982; the second-a period

28

Box 2.5 Paths to crisis and adjustment among Latin American debtors

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of rapid and painful adjustment for some-has account deficit. Nevertheless, in 1982 oil-importingcontinued since then (see Box 2.5). developing countries did manage to borrow more

than they were paying their creditors in capital and

The pressures of international debt interest, notwithstanding the capital flight occur-ring in some of them. In 1983, however, the flow

From the beginning of the 1980-83 recession, oil- was reversed, at least with respect to commercialimporting developing countries as a group were finance.forced to start curbing the volume of their imports. For oil exporters the experience in the early partNevertheless, their combined current account defi- of the recession was markedly different from thatcits did grow-from $29 billion in 1978 to $70 bil- of oil-importing developing countries, althoughlion in 1980 and $82 billion at their peak in 1981 the denouement turned out to be similar. In 1980(see Table 2.10). One reason for these increases oil exporters ran current account surpluses andwas the rapid rise in interest payments. In 1982, increased the volume of their imports. The higherfor example, interest due from all developing oil prices were not sustained, however, and thecountries, including that on short-term debt, was volume of their oil exports fell. In 1981 they, too,$66 billion-more than half of their total current slipped into deficit-of $26 billion followed by $32

TABLE 2.10

Current account balance and its financing, 1970-83(billionis of current dollars)

Countrygroupanditem 1970 1980 1981 1982 1983'

Developing cou ntriesNet exports of goods and nonfactor services -9.8 -55.2 -80.5 -57.1 -10.9Net factor income -3.6 -16.4 - 30.0 -43.2 -48.3

Interest payments on medium- andlong-term loans -2.7 -32.7 -41.2 -48.4 -49.0

Current account (excludes official transfers)' -12.7 -69.6 -107.8 -97.6 -56.2Financing

Official transfers 2.4 11.6 11.7 10.8 11.1Medium- and long-term loans

Official 3.7 21.5 21.2 21.4 17.6

Private 4.6 35.7 49.6 33.5 39.9

Oii importers

Net exports of goods and nonfactor services -8.9 -69.3 -70.5 -46.9 -26.0

Net factor income -1.5 -4.3 -14.4 -21.8 -23.0

Interest payments on medium- and

long-term loans -2.0 -21.3 -26.7 -31.7 -32.3

Current account (excludes official transfers) -9.8 -70.3 -81.8 -65.6 -46.1

FinancingOfficial transfers 1.8 9.6 9.4 9.0 8.9

Medium- and long-term loans

Official 2.9 16.9 16.5 15.9 13.9

Private 3.7 24.6 30.8 22.0 11.1

0i2 exporters

Net exports of goods and nonfactor services -0.9 14.2 -10.0 -10.1 15.1

Net factor income -2.1 -12.1 -15.6 -21.4 -25.3

Interest payments on medium- and

long-term loans -0.7 -11.5 - 14.5 - 16.7 - 16.7

Current account (excludes official transfers) -2.9 1.7 -26.1 -32.1 -10.0

FinancingOfficial transfers 0.6 2.2 2.3 1.8 2.2

Medium- and long-term loansOfficial 0.8 4.6 4.7 5.5 3.6

Private 0.9 11.1 18.8 11.6 28.9

Notc: Calculations are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.a. Estimated.b. Current account does not equal net exports plus net factor income due to omission of private transfers. Financing does not equalcurrent account because of omission of direct foreign investment, other capital, and changes in reserves.

30

TABLE 2.11

Debt indicators for developing countries, 1970-83(percent)

Indicators 1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983'

Ratio of debt to GNP 13.3 14.0 15.4 16.6 18.1 19.3 19.5 19.2 21.9 24.9 26.7Ratio of debt to exports 99.4 63.7 76.4 79.6 84.7 92.9 83.7 76.1 90.8 108.7 121.4Debt service ratiob 13.5 9.5 11.1 10.9 12.1 15.4 15.0 13.6 16.6 19.9 20.7Ratio of interest service to GNP 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.2Total debt outstanding and

disbursed (billions of dollars) 68.4 141.0 168.6 203.8 249.8 311.7 368.8 424.8 482.6 538.0 595.8Official 33.5 61.2 71.6 83.5 99.8 120.1 136.0 157.5 172.3 190.9 208.5Private 34.9 79.8 96.9 120.3 150.0 191.6 232.8 267.3 310.3 347.1 387.3

Note: Calculations are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.a. Estimated.b. Ratio of interest payments plus amortization to exports.

billion in 1982 (see Table 2.10). In both years the to some extent caused by imprudent decisions byoil-exporting countries drew down reserves, as did both borrowers and lenders. In some cases, thisthe oil importers. Their creditworthiness, too, was was no doubt true. But the scale of the overallbeing questioned. strains of indebtedness was the result of an unex-

Concern about creditworthiness is related both pected mixture of circumstances-prolonged reces-to the likelihood that debtors, if necessary, will be sion in industrial countries, the strong dollar, andwilling to service their debt out of income (rather high rates of interest. This unexpected mixturethan extra borrowing) and to the economic cost of made debt servicing more difficult, even for coun-debt service. That cost depends on several factors: tries such as Korea and Indonesia, although theythe ratio of debt to wealth (in the case of a country, were able to avoid rescheduling.the present value of future national income); the For African countries, the "debt crisis" had areal rate of interest; the ease with which the neces- different meaning. Though the overall indebted-sary adjustments to spending in relation to output ness of low-income Africa is relatively low ($22.6can be made; and the cost of making transfers in billion of outstanding medium- and long-term debtforeign exchange. In almost all these respects, in 1983), the fall in net disbursements of externalcreditors saw that the position of developing coun- finance from a peak of $3.9 billion in 1980 to $1.7tries as a group was deteriorating. Between 1979 billion in 1982 has posed problems. The ability ofand 1982 ratios of debt to GNP had risen from 19.3 many countries to service their debt is weak, andto 24.9 percent, of debt to exports from 84 to 109 this is reflected in the large number of debt re-percent, and of debt service to exports from 15 to schedulings in low-income Africa. Nearly half of20 percent (see Table 2.11). In effect, debt accumu- all reschedulings between 1975 and 1983 were bylation was on an explosive path. African countries, with Zaire alone accounting for

If any single event can be isolated as the turning six, Togo for five, and Liberia for four. Most seriouspoint in the attitude of the lenders, it probably of all is the decline in official lending from $2.6occurred in August 1982 when Mexico got into dif- billion in 1980 to $1.7 billion in 1982, which will beficulties over its debt service obligations. In the exacerbated by the reduction in the size of the sev-context of a debt structure with short maturities enth replenishment of the International Develop-and high nominal interest rates, the reduced will- ment Association (IDA).ingness to refinance meant that these difficultiesquickly spread to other borrowers. Because of the Adjustment in developing countriesnumber of lenders involved, the immediate resolu-tion of the problem also involved support by the To restore their balance of payments, developingcentral banks of the industrial countries and a countries need to make some external adjustmentsdegree of involuntary lending. Subsequently, a to raise exports in relation to imports. This has itsnumber of countries faced debt servicing difficul- direct counterpart in an internal adjustment thatties. In 1983 there were thirty-six reschedulings reduces real spending in relation to real output. Ainvolving $67 billion of debt. key question facing developing countries is the

It is possible to argue that the "debt crisis" was pace of the adjustment they need to make.

31

In many countries internal adjustments had to bound to improve. However, experience showsstart with the public sector. Borrowing abroad had that there are more and less efficient ways ofhelped finance internal public deficits. Even when achieving this result. Adjustment involves a reduc-the public sector was not the only borrower, it tion of spending in relation to output. But reduc-often guaranteed foreign loans contracted by pri- tions in output itself provide no contribution tovate borrowers. In a number of countries, public adjustment and represent pure waste. Countriessector deficits had reached 10 percent of GNP by therefore need to switch output into exports and1982; in certain cases, they were as large as 15 per- efficient import substitution. If they fail to makecent of GNP. Given the undeveloped state of that switch, deep cuts in spending are bound todomestic capital markets, such deficits could be reduce output. As a result, the attempt to reducefinanced (even in the short term) only by inflation spending in relation to output also creates aor by borrowing abroad. recession.

The extent of those liabilities can be gauged from Since 1982 developing countries have substan-a few figures. In 1982 the developing countries as a tially improved their trade balances. For oil-group had $715 billion of foreign debt. More than importing developing countries the currentthree-quarters was medium- and long-term. Some account deficit (excluding official transfers) fell60 percent of the total was owed to commercial from $82 billion in 1981 to $66 billion in 1982 and anbanks; another 30 percent was due to official credi- estimated $46 billion in 1983 (see Table 2.10). Fortors, nearly half of which was concessional aid. oil-exporting developing countries the deficit fellMore than half of total outstanding debt had been from $32 billion in 1982 to an estimated $10 billionincurred by only ten countries. Their need to in 1983. Indeed, the combined deficit in 1983 wasadjust was the most urgent of all developing coun- only a little larger than the interest due in that year.tries, but others were to varying degrees facing In many countries these declines have resultedbalance of payments difficulties. largely from cutting imports in relation to output

The strains increased enormously in 1982. Net and from recession-induced reductions in demanddisbursements of medium- and long-term private for imports. Between 1980 and 1982 the volume ofloans to developing countries fell from $50 billion imports fell by about 50 percent in Argentina andin 1981 to $34 billion in 1982, with most of the drop 20 percent in Brazil; it fell by 35 percent in Mexicooccurring in the second half of the year. In the first in 1982. In Brazil imports as a proportion of GDPquarter of 1983 net private lending was only $2.6 fell from about 10 to 6 percent between 1980 andbillion; most of this consisted of involuntary lend- 1983 and in Chile from 30.4 to 21.3 percent. Ining under the auspices of IMF rescheduling agree- many cases imports have been cut to the point ofments. Thus the increase in medium- and long- consisting only of industrial raw materials andterm private lending shown in Table 2.10 is almost essential foodstuffs with little even for investment.entirely due to the rescheduling of existing short- Furthermore, the import restrictions employed interm debt. many indebted countries to curb imports threaten

Internally, the required adjustments to this sharp a long-term deterioration in the efficiency of tradedecline in lending have taken two forms: an overt regimes and a reduction in future growth.attempt to reduce the size of the public sector defi- Only a few countries have managed to expandcit and a de facto increase in taxation through a rise exports enough to avoid serious domestic reces-in the inflation tax. Indeed, the acceleration in sion. Korea and Turkey, for example, had sizableinflation that has occurred in a number of the prin- foreign debts; but by following effective adjust-cipal debtor countries is not an accident. It is one ment policies, they succeeded in expanding bothway for existing public sector deficits to be their real imports and exports during the 1980s. Byfinanced in the context of the decline in foreign contrast, the real value of exports declined inlending. Closing the deficits by increased taxation Argentina and Venezuela between 1981 and 1983,(whether overt or covert) has often led to a was stagnant in Brazil, and rose by about 20 per-squeeze on the private sector with potentially cent in Mexico.adverse consequences for long-term investment Adjustment has meant a sharp decline in perand growth. The same adverse effects on long- capita consumption. During 1980-83 it fell by 2 toterm growth will occur when it is public sector 10 percent a year in countries as diverse as Argen-investment that is cut. tina, Brazil, Chile, Ivory Coast, and Yugoslavia. In

Given a large enough cut in real spending, the all these countries, per capita consumption hadcurrent account of the balance of payments is grown between 1970 and 1981.

32

In many countries private investment suffered indeed outlast the resolution of the current debtfrom weak domestic demand and high interest problems. There is evidence that governmentrates. In Brazil capacity utilization has fallen by spending on social programs has fallen by lessabout 13 percent since 1980. In the Ivory Coast than spending on production and infrastructure.industrial value added fell by 3 percent in 1980 and But much of social spending undoubtedly goes to1981, and investment (excluding petroleum) by 20 maintain staff salaries, so the materials and sup-percent. As for employment, the number of manu- plies necessary for maintaining health and educa-facturing jobs in greater Sao Paulo fell by 13 per- tional standards may be falling much more.cent between mid-1980 and 1982; in the Ivory The consequences of austerity are dramatic forCoast industrial employment has fallen by 10 per- the country concerned. But they go further thancent since 1980. Distress borrowing by private that because cuts in imports affect the entire worldfirms, bankruptcies, and government takeovers economy. As a group, developing countries arehave become common. In Argentina bankruptcies larger markets for the European Community, theand judicial interventions increased from 52 in United States, and Japan individually than any1977 to nearly 300 in 1981. In Chile several hun- one of the three is for the other two. Developingdred bankruptcies were reported in 1982. countries are also of great importance to one

Cuts in public spending have often been another. This is a particularly serious problem inachieved by reducing or eliminating subsidies- Latin America where a long history of import sub-not only for parastatals but also for food, educa- stitution and schemes for regional trade integra-tion, and health. The short- and long-term conse- tion have led to significant intraregional trade,quences can be far-reaching. At one level, a especially in manufactures. In the case of Brazil,reduction in food subsidies, along with devalua- the reductions in imports by the rest of Latintion, reduces real incomes. At another, a decline in America (as well as by other developing countries)spending on education and health detracts from has seriously harmed its exports. Consequently,building human capital, while less spending on the required external adjustments are more diffi-infrastructure may damage a country's growth cult and the corresponding internal adjustmentspotential in the medium term. These effects may more painful.

33

3 Prospects for sustained growth

With economic growth reviving, attention shifts to basic scenarios. Designated the Low case and Highthe prospects for sustaining the recovery. Looking case, these scenarios should not be viewed as pre-further ahead, governments are assessing the dictions; the outcomes depend on the policieschances of raising long-term growth rates above adopted in developed and developing countries.their average in the 1970s. That task, as Chapter 2 They also do not consider or allow for any exoge-made clear, depends on overcoming certain deep- nous shocks to the world economy that couldseated problems that were revealed and exacer- result from, for example, a severe disruption ofbated by two sharp rises in oil prices. The indus- energy supplies.trial countries have been slowed by the growing The Low case indicates what might happen if theinflexibility of their economies, especially in labor industrial countries were to do nothing to improvemarkets, and by the upward pressures on public their performance of the past ten years (see Tablespending and the associated tendency toward 3.1). Their GDP growth would then average 2.5higher taxation and periodic bouts of inflationary percent a year in 1985-95, nearly the same asfinancing. The results have included falling returns between 1973 and 1979. Governments of industrialon investment; a declining investable surplus; countries would find it hard to control inflation,defensive policies of protection and subsidization; and their budgetary deficits and unemploymentand, in consequence, slow growth and stubborn would remain high. Protectionist sentiment wouldinflation. Many developing countries face difficul- be strong, threatening the exports of developingties which are not dissimilar to those of the indus- countries and their ability to service their debt. Buttrial countries, especially policy-induced distor- protectionist actions would increase no more rap-tions in the economy and problems in controlling idly than in the past several years, and developingpublic spending and deficits. countries would still have the potential to increase

This chapter begins by examining some sce- penetration of markets in industrial countries.narios for growth in the years up to 1995, exploring The Low case is based on an average inflationthe policies and conditions that would bring them rate in the industrial countries of 6 percent a year,about. In particular it looks at what has to be done in dollars at unchanged exchange rates. This isto restore the growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s, close to 7 percent in current dollars because of aconsidering both the choices facing industrial presumed depreciation of the dollar after 1985 ofcountries and the benefits that developing coun- 13 percent. This inflation rate is likely to be thetries could reap, even in unfavorable world condi- average of widely divergent rates over successivetions, by changing their own policies. The chapter cycles. With real interest rates at 3.5 percentthen discusses the implications of the different sce- because of the large budget deficits, the nominalnarios for international debt, along with the interest rate would average 9.5 percent. This raterelated policy issues for both the industrial and the too would probably fluctuate considerably overdeveloping countries. Finally, it stresses the poten- time.tial for international collaboration, especially over Competition for funds from the governments oftrade liberalization and capital flows. industrial countries would keep real interest rates

up, and so would discourage lending to many

A ten-year perspective developing countries. The ratio of official develop-ment assistance to GNP in the industrial countries

To illustrate the range of possibilities for the world is presumed to remain at its historical average, soeconomy in 1985-95, this chapter describes two development assistance would grow at 2.5 percent

34

TABLE 3.1

Average performance of industrial and developing economies, 1960-95(average annual percentage change)

1985-95

High LowCountry group 1960-73 1973-79 1980-85 case case

Industrial economiesGDP growth 4.9 2.8 1.9 4.3 2.5Inflation ratea 6.1 9.9 2.3 4.3 6.8Real interest rateb,c 2.5 0.7 5.2 2.5 3.5Nominal lending ratec 5.8 8.4 11.6 6.0 9.5

Developing economiesdGDP growth 6.3 5.2 2.8 5.5 4.7

Low-incomeAsia 5.9 5.2 5.8 5.3 4.6Africa 3.5 2.1 1.7 3.2 2.8

Middle-income oil importersMajor exporters of manufactures 6.7 5.8 1.6 6.3 5.2Other 5.3 4.3 1.9 4.3 3.8

Middle-income oil exporters 6.9 4.9 2.4 5.4 4.7Export growthe 6.3 3.1 5.5 6.4 4.7

Manufacturese 14.9 10.6 8.1 9.7 7.5Primarye 5.0 0.9 4.0 3.4 2.1

Import growthe 6.4 5.9 3.2 7.2 5.1

Note: Projected growth rates are based on a sample of ninety developing countries.a. Inflation in the United States is 3.5 percent a year in the High case and 6 percent in the Low case. But for the industrial countries as awhole, it is higher in dollars because of an assumed depreciation of the dollar of 13 percent between 1985 and 1990.b. Average of three-month US dollar Eurocurrency rates for the periods 1960-73 and 1973-79, deflated by the rate of change in the USGDP deflator.c. Average annual rate.d. Does not include South Africa.e. Historical growth rates are for the periods 1965-73 and 1973-80.

a year in real terms, with bilateral aid increasing its unemployment eases, protectionist measures sub-share if present trends in the reduction of multila- side, so developing countries would find it easierteral aid, evidenced by the recent cut in the IDA to expand their exports and to ease their debt serv-replenishment (see Box 3.5 below), continue. In all icing burden. Investment confidence would rap-their forms, capital flows to developing countries idly improve, which, along with larger aid pro-would therefore grow quite slowly. grams, would lead to an expansion of the flows of

The High case, by contrast, offers industrial capital to developing countries.economies a path of sustained and steady expan-sion, with GDP growing at 4.3 percent a year in The Low case and developing countries1985-95 (see Table 3.1). Unemployment wouldthen fall steadily. Inflation would average 3.5 per- In the Low case, slow growth in the industrialcent a year, in dollars at present exchange rates countries would limit GDP growth in developing(and 4.3 percent in current dollars), varying only countries to an average of only 4.7 percent a year,modestly from year to year. Budget deficits, partic- and to only 2.7 a year in per capita terms (see Tableularly in the United States, would gradually be 3.2). This supposes that developing countries,reduced-first as a percentage of GDP, then in despite slower growth of their imports in relationabsolute terms. With deficits being brought under to GDP, escape the full effects of slow growth incontrol, the real interest rate is projected to fall to industrial countries.2.5 percent a year, giving nominal interest rates of Given considerable differences among countries,only 6 percent. the Low case means for some little or no growth.

With lower domestic interest rates and smaller Per capita income in low-income Africa wouldbudget deficits, investment would increase. As decline; among some middle-income oil importers,

35

TABLE 3.2Growth of GDP per capita, 1960-95(average annual percentage change)

1985-95

Higig Low Increased ImpnrovedCountry group 1960-73 1973-79 1980-85 case case protection policies

Alldevelopingcountries 3.7 2.0 0.7 3.5 2.7 2.3 3.1Low-income 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.4 2.7 2.4 3.0

Asia 3.4 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.0 2.6 3.3Africa 1.0 -1.0 -1.6 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3

Middle-incomeOil importers 3.8 3.3 -0.6 3.6 2.6 1.9 3.1

Majorexporters of manufactures 4.4 3.6 -0.3 4.4 3.3 2.4 3.8Other 2.6 1.7 -0.9 1.5 1.0 0.7 1.2

Oil exporters 4.3 2.3 -0.4 2.7 2.0 1.9 2.3Industrial countries 3.9 2.1 1.5 3.7 2.0 2.0 2.0

per capita income would grow at only 1 percent a cent a year over the ten years. Middle-income oilyear. China and India would grow at 4.6 percent a exporters would have a GDP growth of 4.7 percentyear, India at only 2.5 percent a year in per capita a year, 2.0 percent in per capita terms. As oil pricesterms. Countries such as Korea and other major rise, however, their GDY would grow much fasterexporters of manufactures, affected only by the because of the continued improvement in theirslower growth of their world markets, would get terms of trade.the capital they need to keep growing at 3.3 per- The trade outlook would mirror growth for thecent or more a year in per capita terms, for a total different groups of developing countries. Exportsgrowth of 5.2 percent. by all developing countries would grow at 4.7 per-

Other less creditworthy countries, such as Brazil cent a year during 1985-95 (see Table 3.3). Manu-and Mexico, would grow less, especially in the late factured exports would expand at about 7.5 per-1980s, while their adjustment continued; in the cent a year compared with 9.7 percent in the Highearly 1990s their growth would speed up. With case. The reduction in growth rates of manufac-their populations growing at 2.3 percent a year, per tured exports would be proportionately muchcapita income of middle-income oil-importing smaller than that of industrial-country growth vis-countries as a group would grow at only 2.6 per- a-vis the High case because, even with some addi-

TABLE 3.3Change in trade in developing countries, 1965-95(average annual percentage change)

Merchandise exports' Exports of manufactures

1985-95 1985-95

High Low High LowCountry group 1965-73 1973-80 1980-85 case case 1965-73 1973-80 1980-85 case case

Alldevelopingcountries 6.3 3.1 5.5 6.4 4.7 14.9 10.6 8.1 9.7 7.5Low-income 3.3 5.4 5.0 6.8 5.2 6.4 6.9 8.2 9.3 7.1

Asia 2.9 7.6 5.4 7.5 5.7 6.6 7.4 8.5 9.3 7.2Africa 4.0 -1.3 3.5 3.3 2.2 4.5 0.5 0.9 8.9 6.6

Middle-incomeOil importers 8.1 7.6 6.6 7.5 5.7 18.2 11.5 8.1 9.7 7.6

Major exportersof manufactures 10.5 9.6 7.2 8.2 6.3 18.6 12.1 8.4 9.8 7.6

Other 4.8 3.7 4.1 4.0 2.8 15.6 7.1 5.0 9.0 7.3Oil exporters 5.7 -0.8 4.1 4.1 2.4 12.7 7.9 7.4 10.5 7.7

Note: Projections are based on a sample of ninety countries.. . Not available.

36

tional protection in industrial countries, manufac- 1995. The more successful would see their devel-tured exports would still grow largely in line with opment proceed as Korea's did in the 1960s andthe supply capacity of developing countries. As in early 1970s. They would begin to rely more onthe past, exports of primary commodities, how- markets and less on government directives for theever, would grow more slowly than growth in the allocation of resources. And they would pursueindustrial economies. more outward-oriented trade policies. Others

Under the Low case, net loan disbursements would not, so there is likely to be considerable(private and official) plus official transfers to the dispersion around the average of 5.7 percentdeveloping countries would fall in real terms, from growth for the middle-income group. Oil$68 billion in 1983 to $63 billion in 1995, while importers other than the major exporters of manu-developing countries would pay $58 billion in factures would grow at only 4.3 percent a year, andinterest (see Table 3.4). oil exporters at 5.4 percent a year.

Under the High case, the poorest countries

The High case and developing countries would grow at 3.2 percent to 5.3 percent a year,with several Asian countries doing better. Low-

In the High case, the prospects for developing income African countries would still do badly;countries would greatly improve. Their GDP even in the High case, per capita income would failwould grow at about 5.5 percent a year, almost as to rise. This is in part because the market outlookfast as it averaged in the 1960s (see Table 3.1), and for these countries' commodity exports is not veryat 3.5 percent in per capita terms. They would good. The volume of such exports is projected toreceive somewhat higher real prices for a larger increase only slightly. At the same time, thesevolume of exports, and credit would be available at countries' weak financial position means signifi-lower interest rates. cant increases in commercial lending to them are

The major exporters of manufactures would do unlikely, so they must continue to rely on conces-best, with GDP growth at 6.3 percent a year, some sional assistance for the bulk of their capitalcountries could manage 8 percent or more. Such transfers.rapid growth would imply that they were moving World trade would grow at about 7 percent ainto more technology-intensive products-as is year in real terms, given global GDP growth ofalready happening in Korea with heavy engineer- about 5 percent. In a world of freer trade, tradeing, for example, and in Singapore with precision would grow faster in relation to GDP than it did inengineering. the 1960s. Exports of manufactures from develop-

Some of the middle-income countries-such as ing countries would grow at 9.7 percent a year,Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey-could exports of primary products at 3.4 percent (seealso make major structural progress in the years to Table 3.3).

Exports of primary goods Merchandise imports"

1985-95 1985-95

High Low High Low1965-73 1973-80 1980 85 case case 1965-73 1973-80 1980-85 case case Couittrygroup

5.0 0.9 4.0 3.4 2.1 6.4 5.9 3.2 7.2 5.1 All developing countries1.8 4.5 2.6 4.1 3.1 0.6 6.4 3.5 5.9 4.1 Low-income0.3 7.9 2.1 4.6 3.6 -0.6 8.7 4.1 6.4 4.6 Asia4.0 -1.4 3.8 2.8 1.9 3.5 0.1 1.1 3.6 1.6 Africa

Middle-income4.4 4.5 4.5 3.2 2.4 7.7 4.6 2.2 7.6 5.6 Oil importers

Major exporters5.2 6.0 4.8 3.8 2.9 9.7 5.3 2.8 8.4 6.3 of manufactures3.7 3.0 3.9 2.0 1.2 4.6 3.2 -0.3 3.9 1.9 Other3.6 -1.1 3.9 3.3 1.8 6.6 9.3 5.4 7.1 4.5 Oil exporters

a. Projections include exports and imports of nonfactor services.

37

TABLE 3.4

Current account balance and its financing in developing countries, 1983 and 1995(billions of constant 1980 dollars)

All developing countries Low-income Asia

High Low High Lowcase case case case

Item 1983a 1995 1995 1983' 1995 1995

Net exports of goods and nonfactor services -10.8 -69.5 -29.0 -8.9 -17.4 -14.0Interest on medium- and long-term debt -48.7 -52.1 -58.0 -1.7 -3.1 -3.1

Official -9.7 -16.0 -17.5 -0.9 -2.4 -2.4Private -39.0 -36.1 -40.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7

Current account balanceb -55.8 -109.5 -78.1 -1.3 -12.1 -9.3Net official transfers 11.0 16.6 14.3 1.7 2.4 2.1Medium- and long-term loansc 57.2 74.0 49.1 4.1 8.1 6.0

Official 17.5 35.0 26.6 3.9 7.3 5.8Private 39.7 39.0 22.6 0.2 0.8 0.2

Debt outstanding and disbursed 592.0 914.9 656.2 47.5 89.6 67.9As percentage of GNP 26.7 21.9 17.1 8.7 8.9 7.2As percentage of exports 121.4 80.3 71.3 99.5 85.0 78.7

Debt service as percentage of exports 20.5 12.7 13.7 9.9 7.0 7.1

Note: The table is based on a sample of ninety developing countries. The GDP deflator for industrial countries was used to deflate allitems. Details may not add to totals because of rounding. Net exports plus interest does not equal the current account balance due toomission of net workers' remittances, private transfers, and investment income. The current account balance not financed by officialtransfers and loans is covered by direct foreign investment, other capital (including short-term credit and errors and omissions), andchanges in reserves. Ratios are calculated using current price data.

The major exporters of manufactures, already and investment needed to service loans on com-accounting for 80 percent of the developing coun- mercial terms is particularly painful. Yet, providedtries' exports of manufactures, would see their policies are reasonable, the returns to investmentmanufactured exports grow at about 10 percent a in poor countries can be very large indeed. Con-year. Some of them-such as the Philippines and cessional assistance is needed partly to finance theThailand-could do much better than others. development of human capital and to strengthenOther middle-income oil importers would expand institutions-programs for which economictheir manufactured exports at about 9 percent a returns are high but delayed. Because the potentialyear. Meanwhile, low-income Africa would have of the low-income countries will not be realizedits manufactured exports grow at about 9 percent a until these programs are in place, the role of con-year, starting from a very low base (see Table 3.3). cessional aid in promoting development is vital.To do this, however, it would have to reduce its Moreover, because the returns to these invest-reliance on western European markets and to ments are high, aid can contribute significantly todiversify its exports, expanding into manufactured development in the low-income countries and helpproducts. to raise the global efficiency of investment.

The contrast between the Low and the High caseUnder the High case, loan disbursements plus is not merely quantitative. It amounts to a qualita-

official transfers to developing countries would tiedfrnc aswl,bauehe paetytive difference as wetl, because the apparently

rise from a peak of $83 billion in 1981 to $91 billion insurmountable obstacles of the past ten yearsin 1995 (in constant 1980 dollars-see Table 3.4), a would steadily diminish if High-case growth wererise in real terms of only 2.5 percent a year from achieved-or, under the Low case, would become1983-slower than the projected rate of growth of even more entrenched. With a continuation ofindustrial countries. eve moeetece.Wt. otnaino

slow growth, millions of people in many develop-Low-income countries would also obtain a grow- ing countries will become progressively poorer;

ing inflow of capital in the High case, largely with faster growth, almost everybody in the worldthrough the expansion of concessional loans from will enjoy some increase in real income. The prizegovernments and international institutions. With that the High case offers is considerable. The ques-low income levels, the sacrifice of consumption tion is how to win it.

38

Middle-income countries

Major exporters Other oil-importing Oil-exportingLows-income Africa of manufactures countries countries

High Low High Low High Low High Lowcase case case case case case case case

1983' 1995 1995 1983' 1995 1995 1983a 1995 1995 1983a 1995 1995

-4.3 -7.1 -5.2 -0.6 -18.8 -1.5 -12.2 -16.7 -9.9 15.0 -9.6 1.5-0.8 -1.3 -1.3 -22.2 -22.6 -25.5 -7.4 -7.3 -8.8 -16.6 -17.9 -19.3-0.4 -1.0 -1.0 -3.5 -5.1 -5.9 -2.2 -3.6 -3.9 -2.7 -3.9 -4.3-0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -18.7 -17.5 -19.6 -5.2 -3.7 -4.9 -13.9 -14.0 -15.0-4.3 -7.0 -5.8 -22.8 -40.5 -26.7 -17.5 -17.8 -14.3 -10.0 -32.1 -21.9

1.8 2.8 2.4 3.1 5.0 4.3 2.3 3.2 2.9 2.2 3.1 2.71.4 3.4 2.7 11.8 27.7 17.1 7.5 12.5 9.5 32.3 22.3 13.81.6 3.2 2.6 4.3 8.6 6.1 4.0 8.0 6.1 3.6 7.9 6.0

-0.2 0.1 0.1 7.5 19.2 11.0 3.5 4.6 3.4 28.7 14.3 7.822.2 38.3 30.1 224.9 350.6 245.4 97.6 142.8 112.4 199.7 293.7 200.642.2 50.2 41.4 26.3 20.5 16.0 39.8 35.0 29.2 38.9 30.4 22.3

242.0 234.7 224.1 99.6 59.0 50.7 177.5 145.4 137.2 133.0 90.1 78.724.8 19.1 20.6 20.0 10.5 11.4 28.7 20.2 22.9 21.4 16.0 17.0

a. Estimated.b. Excludes official transfers.c. Net disbursements.

Policy requirements of the High case demand for money and greater investment, the

prospect is that both short-term and long-term real

The difference between this basic Low case (vari- rates of interest will remain high in comparison

ants of which are discussed below) and the High with those of the 1970s.

case hinges on the performance of the industrial Inflationary expectations have not disappeared.

countries. If they could regain the productivity In the major industrial countries, the "core" rate

growth and high employment they managed in of inflation-measured by the rise in the GDP

the 1950s and 1960s, the High case would be deflator-is running at between 1 percent a year in

achieved. There is little sign that they would be Japan and 9 percent a year in France; in the United

prevented from doing so by some fundamental States it is about 4.5 percent. While low by recent

deterioration in the rate of technological progress. standards, these are not rates that can be ignored,

On the contrary, in some fields-telecommunica- especially in the light of past experience of the

tions, electronics, biotechnology-the pace of tech- inflation cycle.

nical change appears to be accelerating. It there- Given the unfavorable context, neither higher

fore seems probable that faster growth depends on employment nor lower interest rates is likely to be

tackling the problems that dogged the industrial brought about in any durable way merely by

countries in the 1970s. increasing nominal demand. Moreover, in the long

run, the financing of public spending will probably

Deficits, savings, and interest rates become still more difficult in developed countries.In many, the political will to increase taxation is

Economic recovery is likely to stimulate higher limited, but the pressures for more spending

saving in industrial countries. But since the oil remain strong.

exporters' surplus has disappeared and the United If they are to avoid a resurgence of inflation,

States is running a large budget deficit, global sav- most industrial countries will need to maintain

ings rates are unlikely to regain their level of the tight monetary policies. Given the fiscal pressures,

early 1970s, at least not in the immediate future. To the real cost of borrowing is likely to remain high.

the extent that industrial-country recovery in the For that reason alone, budget deficits will tend to

context of lower inflation leads to increased grow as the real interest burden is compounded

39

over time. The main focus of industrial countries in the real incomes of certain groups, they also pre-the years ahead should be on developing ways to vent the adjustment to a country's emerging andreduce budget deficits. changing comparative advantage, which alone can

ensure growing real incomes of all groups in the

Microeconomic flexibility economy. The maintenance of an open trading sys-tem is, therefore, an important means of reducing

In several areas of their economies-subsidies to microeconomic distortions. For example, protec-obsolescent firms and industries, wage and other tion is costly to the country using it. The cost ofpolicies affecting labor costs-industrial countries "saving" jobs is higher consumer prices and ineffi-need to introduce greater flexibility in the way they ciencies in production (see Box 3.1), as well as lossaccept and promote economic change. Though of potential jobs in export industries, particularly ifprotectionist policies might temporarily maintain other countries increase protection as a response.

Box 3.1 Costs of protection in textiles and clothing

1,l-r. .,rd &i- , dtir .. ':- 3ob, n ina I ii t -4., Tin . tr iTr.T $1 for every 7 cents gained by workersZ.- rrn.rr- -t ind t,rtri;e ba hr., o-rd t ri ri aj mubh ir - r. h-rr II d-rE pr; ri'i J

r'rr: *.i i-.j r-; . r r-r,dnt - ain'i bin t- *r' Th- pr.-ril r Au'- . Tb.: --- 1 hri um studies estimated the

jt% - I. p.nr ...- uir i p! ri .,n,. 1. .. 1 tn .' % h r e.h -..rler i., p.Frnl.i - costs (i .-ii Th I'll,: on the clothing

.I -lr-' Th, ni. u-r -F. rint it lii½. r- .rl-. I-r. hr iU s.r her' . tr.iinal t.. '., . trade, which were much higher than.1'iIe 5l :andi -. irhnrr and h-. *:- F n .111 el--rt :_ ir-mm fT T ir irLt - it.. of tariffs alone. The cost per job

Irrp It-I r!i nit u r h - !.lIIi rt- Ilii- i-ls ti- r b l. tl-; tE t p.rnlintli controls was esti--\ranecnrn. in -i i, .u I-a1 I . rhir.t- ran.d ,...i r, J -r- C$390,000 in the late 1970s.

ih.ar t,ich t'rr3rrni, .rE und.-'raitl P.-r pr-i-at h . I. t thrc--qu,aricr-j . di§- Because the individual worker lost onlydr -i. lili ander- n d ' d .' *:rk-r. ir. r ti .hi-; i, riduTr. * 14 1i0) (before welfare benefits), the

i.-;i i- .urlt ind lrhin .ii.l zihd ll 1. T nd n i L Ilr-., erL untnipi.-C t r nrl e- n. . -i-ie , was about C$375$000.

ani'41ls !II ptr b not ' thf i'nT. Iiirci zr-ni in *v L .O. -tII 1-d Ir,cil n v. .3 zr. Thi" -i:ac n eeded to save each wo rkerp r - . .: -Lin'-, T.-, i(i.il bIll. -mr1n., i ti-I- i ..iC...nn ill 111 ;ratio of over 70 tol. For every

t.:r :r. .. -r.n ail -i-p .0 Ihi. ad1. r T-i. pi:* ,i rl i , m u r -1r hib.i .,i--'di-rci one and a half cents by which the worker

I ir p * 1. I.-i .r ni. r ila:.,uf rt UIli tr. Ir,.nr. i high -- C ! 4 'liii icr rh-i.: :. rr;; would be better off, one Canadian dollar*hb: rIb-i k..t- .rr, n hr h,.r. .r-enrtr . n rnn r, -ur- , t- iI- ., would be wasted.

-ntur. r i F in rh th ri. rt..tr h t-nr-lh i, .-. C I-. , r .!.i n -'. K- cib..Thr Develnpinz countries also use various

.;n -i-r. n-; - rh. InJ : li d l L-i Ihhil t... ib tsslt.mc. 1-.1i-rt t'cr.r l' Th, h.gh--s t.irmirT l, ,n i4olhilai.ar. .:restrictions(along

rI t-r r -r; c., -i n I' lirge ;ppi- I. - * .Lird in .iih,r I Ilit 1-. . m '-r.; with foreign exchange controls and

- m ati I, r rh-r I. h .. , i r .ia.. n--it. I.r I I). broader measures such as industrial

ii.'- -- Ih rA Si t d' 7,in 1,4 *-......urilrie-' .. i-*Td tr e Olti as - k.:-i ,.- I- ie .1 .cr -.r.c Ird r. -* irr,nt incentives) to:i,h, 1.i r, I snI.4 r,;n,1 ' l.,.nu- rl".- ,1 ir.- I, -.r r lord r lIh t LI. rir, I rT,,nrr p,, -.t Irridol'iJL t.rr- CC n,r.iil, such

lm iilr,_ I t Il. il fi r-31i-l -r-. nl: t ir-.i t t-h, c . r .r- ,-. ,r; sIt r- .- ., >. r Ii'iit' h:a . -r-i production forrli-c uS ut i-anti: i . i t. It.. nel - -- i ver production foT export

Mob I';-I.:- krn.-- n ar, ti),, n pr d . -irrpl. Ba,.vd narlket and r.jfa. irir over agri-.r: I' -r rt, ti iiI _. ,fi lr .r -.iri r , n 1 0 : arIII i, n? I tb.r r. .:1 I h, n ( , Ir ir .rd culture. FT I- rk-n and other measuresb, n;i- . tl - * F. r if L -nted I -t- n '* luI.- t- *n ; .a .l*niai-l117. L ; 42'- oilii,.i I T .il,.Trl..I,fl.i Ir.r. .Trr.-wr,- .pro-

- i. r.:l-. -n rr . .TbIr dir T-i lt ir,.lr ' r.,. i 1. 14 i r.*,r.c duction, - .in;lT-l.ii and trade; thesehi Ii . tt-reih. ir T..:..I,d . ni. ihe lrm ld .t.'. *d1.,itrnn Il; p1.-uCI *.-i no ni r : r.- i.s ,I, .. i, -ri.e ..T.lCgrowth.Studiesof

-l'' m r ! .5i-ifl-.. m - r..,! mi 1--I lol i dclt!.-T-l-Tnu fh_ nr-r- nT, .'lu- -I 11'. I- - l -.. .h protection, such asT- I -.- . l e, r I-r, I,. Ic r I, Iitl-u i - l .- - I tid hr. ,r, t i-I' t.- I l- TI i. lit lfriv .s . SUi;c and Canada,

Ii- ' In rhi -lIt tli: TIl,et rmni.1-lri .. li,-. r 'hitE irni Ii. itr TalliT r, . i-n I r n . -. ne in developing coun-r-ltind.ri Ir-nCr- -r. , tI , rind .iro rd ,-...i Tr. i t l r.- 1t*- Ttn. But j,nO--fC n -d-T-.p- countries,

_ Ir. .:. 'i, ii Tit ,1 h.- d.d (i. .T p.rni.mn,ntflT F ri-u . fl, I' r-I- i 5 ..i rl;.,1r :-ni more uniform and

I, - -r .- .. i T 11) -T ri M -I,I . , ci --- e o..,ld tr ;1- -1n ri' I ii - .. ..- 0. ut',i patterns of incentives have per-

m I-p-ri-c : it. n lb.;,, Ia-.br. 1.-b I hrh fra 31': t'r.- lii i ie n.j.-. I,d.il .' k.r , .t i.,i tic-J r in ir:rms of economic

ni. a n .-. un,n,i l-ir ri-rr TI _--ol i-c i-i'l_ a 15Th.. r.. 14 I-, I I-t St-Ti-. -,- - - ilh t rrn.iI

cci, .1-.. at... ., t1U .-hii -- .i T--..-....iii. A-iptircari i- fl,. i iSTIT -. 2k-

.t .-1...i: I -cr1 , . ,rI I hs 1 .- ard I! r I- i... r r- h, r.-T t-, I '-tI'

40

An open trading system is also a way of capturing terms. Low-income Africa grows at 2.6 percent athe potential for increased integration between year, -0.7 in per capita terms. Even major exportersdeveloped and developing countries. And, last but of manufactures manage GDP growth of only 4.4not least, it is a sine qua non of a resolution of the percent a year, while growth of GDP in the otherdebt problem. middle-income oil importers falls to 3.5 percent a

For the more advanced developing economies, year.the next stage in their progress will carry them into Overall, developing-country exports grow by 4.0industries that have hitherto been the preserve of percent a year under Low I compared with 4.7 per-the industrial countries. Unless the industrial cent in the Low case; manufactures grow by 6.1countries keep their markets open, they will percent compared with 7.5 percent; and primarythwart the newcomers' progress. By seeking to commodities, 2.2 percent as in the Low case. As aretain a monopoly of such industries, the indus- result, the developing countries reduce the growthtrial countries will also be holding back their own in their imports, from 5.1 percent a year in the Loweconomic growth. case to 4.3 percent in Low I. All regions are

affected: exports by the major exporters of manu-

The threat of increased protectionism factures grow at only 5.2 percent a year, by othermiddle-income countries at 2.3 percent a year, and

Slow growth in the industrial countries is the most by low-income Africa at a disastrously low 2.1 per-likely trigger for a significant increase in protection cent a year (see Table 3.6).directed against developing countries. It is also inthis context that the adverse effects on the devel- The benefits of improved policies in developing countriesoping countries would be most serious, since a fur-ther decline in their exports would slow their over- just as industrial countries might make mattersall growth even more. To illustrate these worse (even within the Low scenario) by resortingimplications, the Low case contains a variant (Low to protection, so developing countries can partlyI) which assumes that governments in industrial offset the effects of slow growth in the industrialcountries step up protection against imports from world by improving their own policies. This isdeveloping countries (see Table 3.5). In other illustrated in Low lI-a second variant of the Lowrespects, the industrial countries' policies and per- case which assumes slow growth in the industrialformance are assumed to be unchanged. Under world but an improved performance by the devel-these circumstances, low-income Asian countries oping countries. They would achieve faster GDPgrow at 4.2 percent a year, only 2.6 in per capita growth by raising savings and investment rates, by

increasing and diversifying their exports, and byusing imports more efficiently as well (see Box3.2).

TABLE 3.5 As Table 3.5 shows, the improved policies ofGrowth of GDP in developing countries, Low Low II would allow GDP to grow in developingscenario and variants, 1985-95(average annual percentage rhange) countries at an average rate of 5.1 percent a year,

recovering half of the difference between the LowIncreased Improved and High cases. Low-income Asian countriesindustrial- developing- would grow at 4.9 percent a year as against 5.3

Loa' country countrylCountnjgroup case protectionism policy percent under the High case, low-income Africa at

3.0 percent as against 3.2 percent in the High case.Developing countries 4.7 4.3 5.1 Major exporters of manufactures would manage

Lowincome 4.6 4.2 49 5.7 percent a year, and other middle-income oil

Africa 2.8 2.6 3.0 importers 4 percent.Middle-income oil Developing-country exports of primary com-

importers modities would grow at 2.4 percent a year, butMajor exporters exports of manufactures would grow at 8.0 percent

Other 3.8 3.5 4.0 a year (Table 3.6). That would give the developingMiddle-income oil countries overall export growth of 5.1 percent a

exporters 4.7 4.6 5.0 year compared with 6.4 percent in the High case,a. Low 1. but 4.7 percent in the Low case; adding inflation,b. Low II. export earnings would rise at more than 13.0 per-

4-1

TABLE 3.6

Growth of trade in developing countries, Low scenario and variants, 1985-95(average annual percentage change)

Exports of goods lInports of goodsand nonfactor Exports of Exports of and nonfactor

services manufactures primarygoods services

Low Low Low Low,vCountrygroup case Low P Low Il case Lozni P Low II' case Low P Low II' case Low I Low II'

All developing countries 4.7 4.0 5.1 7.5 6.1 8.0 2.2 2.2 2.4 5.1 4.3 5.4Low-income 5.2 4.3 5.6 7.1 5.6 7.6 3.1 3.1 3.3 4.1 3.4 4.4

Asia 5.7 4.7 6.1 7.1 5.6 7.6 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.6 3.9 5.0Africa 2.2 2.1 2.5 6.5 5.0 7.1 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.8

Middle-incomeOil importers 5.7 4.7 6.2 7.6 6.1 8.1 2.4 2.4 2.6 5.6 4.5 6.0

Major exportersof manufactures 6.3 5.2 6.8 7.6 6.2 8.1 2.9 2.9 3.2 6.3 5.2 6.8

Other 2.8 2.3 3.2 7.2 5.8 7.8 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.4 2.1Oil exporters 2.4 2.2 2.7 7.6 6.1 8.1 1.9 1.9 2.1 4.5 4.2 4.7

Note: These projections are based on a sample of ninety countries.a. Increased protection by developed countries.b. Slow growth in developed countries but improved policies in developing countries.

cent a year. Many of the big debtors would experi- Capital flows and debtence growth of export earnings above that aver-age-major exporters of manufactures would have The discussion thus far has considered the effectsthe value of their exports grow at close to 15 per- of the performance of industrial countries and ofcent a year-comfortably above the interest rate on developing-country policies on trade and thetheir debt of above 10 percent. growth of GDP. Almost as important as trade in

What is needed to achieve these improvements? the long term, however, and far more critical in theThe developing countries-and the industrial short to medium term, are the interrelated issuesworld-will suffer from any action that reduces of capital flows and debt. It is through borrowingtrade (see Box 3.3). They therefore need to avoid from abroad that developing countries are able toovervalued exchange rates, to provide attractive supplement their own saving as well as to offsetincentives for exports, and to promote efficient shortages of foreign exchange. Borrowing is animport substitution. Such policies would be twice opportunity; but in certain circumstances it is alsoblessed. Faster growth of exports and GDP would a snare.also generate a larger inflow of foreign capital. This Under the Low case and its variants, interestwould supplement the extra saving that improved rates would be higher and the growth of exportspolicies would bring, all of which would then be and GDP lower than in the High case. If lendersinvested more efficiently. The key to more saving wish to avoid debt expanding beyond the servicingand better investment lies in maintaining positive capacity of the borrower's economies, net lendingreal interest rates in the developing countries. would then be lower while the real cost of borrow-

It is also imperative that developing countries ing would be higher. For the indebted sovereignincrease the flexibility of their budgets-another borrower, the service of debt is a matter of politicalclose parallel with the industrial countries. Many will, and strength of will depends on the cost ofof the difficulties faced by middle-income coun- exercising it. The long-term prospect of receivingtries in the past decade have been due to height- capital inflows that are not large enough to coverened public spending commitments, financed interest payments, combined with slow growth ofeither through external borrowing or through export earnings (as is threatened by the Low case),windfall gains from higher commodity prices. implies that the service of debt is economically,When these sources of finance diminish or dry up, and therefore politically, costly. For this reason theit is politically difficult to cut public spending, and long-term prospects for the world economy, andinflation results. hence for capital flows, depend heavily on creating

42

Box 3.2 Trade as an engine of growth

F- rci-n trade a.r h ,-r anengim .td -:r,iitih te%p-,rt4I iet Ch3pter 5ih bh' - en am-rnr_ EWprt srt-chure oi ewleced developing

inm die 1pin, mentri' inrouch ii4 ifett -*-ur.iri-s that traditicinalle specialized in countries Iperenhtn. ir npr- rd . iuri:e l all'atic-n and a ,ngle pnrr.arv e -port manulataure-.

i rene-i-ad prc-iducri' i, But dt -eliping are gainin.g a .cantfi:.. char.: .\ grAup-

*:-uiti-ps *:port ;ire nc- me-`:hinc alI, *-t -e r. ,uch *-u tLntrie including

linke-il I t., r..-. ih and le.:l oi Pr, India .hich ,cc-unt lr.hr athcul t .u -i

prtin ad,anco.d n.rinii:. thrd ti deeliping-c-iuntr pipulalie-n 4n. ;

In rhe n,net-. nrh -:Enrtir mn the- U nited it -ldding Ch,nai has managed tc- rirsr ; 4

iat-.:s chani-- irn e pnrt; ILcgad hEhind the .h3rt .t rmanutacturt. in abcoutli

c:l-nge, in rir- m rt r-h, e:.intmu per-ent .l nontuel .p-nt mee chrtti

F -.-. rr.tniaintd a mnall and reline ':le Atri-- is he .inl r. gi r in e- ht, h 1i

-nin,,snt ;hrt i-.(reice,Frnti In d .:pindonic i-n a ;inglt primat | p ii . .Ci- t

Au'rrtiit. r Jr-i th .- dirninated bi, his n.-i i,mini,h-d

ntrt Inal r1ar.--r .\Ith..h \rzntn I hi- d r-,iatin a-. tri.m primr. a n. oiid 'r1

ei-'- mier- --i -1rcv. p-i riTt lb r y, h l. pr-i-ucts di-es r,r mcan bhar te-retci,.n

: n,,Iar - ih.,v -.t thI: Uniii..d tai,s .rd Jan.-,nd n--- lingEr matlar, 4.l. Fng.r r :9,

*-pitted ;.mmli r p iidu - in ih, Ie' i ball o, iuntri, Japenid ..n de. -iiect-p c-iinlre ' tF -;

t ii r-, ninctr-rith -.nrtir. it krei ltil mnrkte r.hr lh.ir manita. turtd r ki-rt-

In the tree, i r h-ur decades pr-cedintg .h. irt -ri n 1lc-tiat,.n, in ihe dnand ir i..r

* rId I \ : rItra.de -il de. nl-pIng cu.Ln- t hi.:it r pi-tsr due ru , iuctuatI.: , ine fl ]

tri4 r'c. alro,-i:it1- tait .i th,i -i da.-c-l- :r. i- ti inr indu;tril ci-iintrie; ctisu e , .i,- can !l r! .. iic... n -,. i ,.H i.c

d d.. intrlie; I Fpercent d-..-id .:..n- imprrintr ut thB . dri.:r iti.in ,,i k-l -c--i -Heir-re .;.ii- It. *

3 r i. ii 4l, prtcen rI In rtlattcin t1. epxprtt te.- ar-i rnnuil3tures ha- ,- - *

Crij'J -r. Zn tr.ad'- a i. r, mLmirt rtia- h.1-an-ii thr medium.- nd lc-n g-ricon;.-

.il,. in the dt; 1i.pina . -untite- than in paite pi.,in a dae-:I-pirg-cc:unirx I|ji I lior d ..ini- r p-rri -n Ji E-eli.ip .-:iiiirnir malrl , .i ni-me in de.e-l, I ..p. -untrnit in the,

Thb- p- -prtinc ..- r le .-pn lilie Thi maneiactut-:d \po.itt ac*r-unt i.'.. 1I-l's and r id : 1 .InD- I-n-: -c ;

rInc - \ar 11 tuth,:c thai lie--ihar. tani -r pFpartintci-nsunip- e p.V. ircteae-dt. ia-t in Irnraiin

-mn-.pi,: I,ni* L- -,i e--:en ic- r epn- ir in de: lI.p-e Ltiunir4es and are sut- I.- de-. -l 1ip. -.-untrt in-:- m in ih

tr. * pit-' ind inci-,t zii..rh it- ili ilirtites i9r c.--.d- pr.idu-Jd , thir. I blc. tir eai:h I per-:--nt -:hange- inn rnl

ini -t.3rial -2--uniri-:; d-- nit ad-: -.ale . i-i' , d-1 , .dn tien- s lcing a- ,r-arkt I- nt. me in de elIc-ped .. c-unirne- th, * *o

| ~l-.pI r. .n - pinperti-.rncn.:e Th. e nene i. ir .r -dcping cnun tilutured ti .i.t li-m ! ),-piny-c -untr e p rr ittI

I.1 : I -. Pe t c c, t V-e.i, hi p.m-n- r, ep itt tena.in relai i ira: crit prciect- inctr-ased bh -nl-. u p:r:.-en' ir. th

i-c th-a. dJ . I--pin,-cc-Lir. --pL-ris Ir it tartjr- T*r - rnil demiand nr iin- Ie-ilt- bu th, I - per:e.r in iht I

pr.imir p iil t, rgu in -- i n- l iunit -je.i-I-png unri Nanitactiur-d pi:rts ir- .niei.eliiir,

InI . ill. acJien.d-.1 --- .iu. inc .-rie But c.:untrtas intreas,d .t I.- iclt rhi am- !-manutct.t:ur-- tiida-. act-: tint rtt ahc-tit thee peri-ence fltt t he In -- arnd i c-nrc on the d.-te--pad cip t nrie- in th,

|h .it: :u'.- - ni n-u . .:-.I p-ri r.-.n; heat- this .ut Thir- h3a han nc lathl- 1bm1, tut had 3lrn,.-. i.e mn th- JIJr rate

di elp-inc muntrie* t iem, .c.unr % . r,- the i.l tluti hrt .r.. e u at -inc--me c-t Jle--ped c.i-unrrie in ll: I

ac:cmunt i. r a lar i p r, un rt iiin .trVi, de.-cntr.r-. epirt - and re il1CiC

and maintaining cooperation on debt problems, rowers. While adjustment requires action by therather than confrontation. indebted country itself, the degree of retrench-

In the short term, the position is somewhat dif- ment and its cost to the country also depend on theferent. Given the effects of the recession and the external environment in the next few years.growth of debt, debtors have to show that they are Because of the large current account deficits ofprepared to pay interest out of their own income. many developing countries in the early 1980s, sub-This is necessary not only to anchor the value of stantial adjustments have been required to coverdebt in the willingness to service it but also-in the interest obligations. The best way to have adjustedcontext of high real interest rates and of low would have been to combine cuts in spending withgrowth in indebted countries-to avoid explosive policies to switch production into exports and intogrowth of capitalized interest in relation to GDP. efficient import substitution. Switching usuallyAn adverse world environment, however, makes requires a real depreciation in the exchange ratemore costly the adjustments required of many bor- (see Box 3.4). The process is less costly if it does

43

Box 3.3 Delinking from the world economy?

Ha.i:r an :pen riding and pajrrncnt4 mor, uil,rahle in p.:.i.:r, -i*ul;till bt .,rpuail, n.:.ne ,n !-r.-' ,. n.r, thiar $15

rq gInr *:n.-ura,: -;u .:.pr,ntp u:n e l a', -A - t'eiaj r tii-an und,r cii r. n.Jnre tIhe k,ll, r. in i'-'^ ID1 the *ame per. i Irdcl-I

,tl, In-.-,rmrn1 re,--ur-: Thi a , t a 'n.r..bir. pcrindt. d& rilc.pn^ n i....,ieur ,d r% ro-C 0.1-I-' n.Ini F.,]

stronger argument s.-r Irte.-Tatin, inic C.uflhnt. . hich AF,. IUlIfTr Initgr3tu:.r lion to only $4.1 billion. India and Korea

the world economs trr.an rh.ir hich i,r. th, orld C, nom. i. i- unai .,d- were different in several respects:claims that demand from ;ndu.trial :1'!.. ti mr..-n, c.n.-1uenc:, -..tr.- e. -, Korea's literacy rate in 1960 was more

countries provides an "-cgir.r of erbatcd tr in:-pprr.riar, -.1.nmilleam p h- than twice that of India; foreign capital

growth" for the developing . 'rid AII cit i. .cr'AIu,d ': h3ng. r3n, Oclot,. to Korea were larger; and, ofcountries have to trade to some extent. un-u;rtinub., putl, .p-prndn- i.rt -ni. course, India is a much bigger countryMore inward-looking -Mcr. e airc nt icnt. rrI l.nlFrkni poi,cs ill ,-eniutiu,J the with a I,rg-r domestic market, so its

lessbuffetedbyexternal t,h.-,:,. ai. - 1A . ri-run -'r,,.n-,t-: c.:t :pr. '.. itt, exports as a percentage of total GNP"utward-looking nne' The nmre iaril, 'rd would n,i b .pt rpid to be as high as

:,rd,-Xit. .:.In- .r. .- rh.*I-mhe h,rh To r I.:. ,h,c ;I'jt' ,ht tit .l -ri.,i: k r. :, ih huch they m, :ht well be inth, pni .Or n n Dap-iral cc*od; in inc,. ni. ht t . ir Ir-in ., .. a.) : ah...:it,.-JUtt rm.

3ri mi he ,,rEar,:r Il-- -:r- u. u.: rid e-.n,--m: -in -ik3 . I.' .r .,ra-r- Nevertheless, there were important

pci I *:. 'n-,-,ns !r,E n.imp-t n-.r. 1- n;,iarh .,,Zc nc.'rre thin it 1ih l., d.:,r.cn.,r'm '.rnllarTi.:- hr example, in 1960 the

rt..: ni .re Jill,tcuir ^t,.h r. e..n. r nil, rl .. r 1 t r .- r, iti,,,irl. Fr share of manufacturing in GDP was 14.1t.n e -Fa.ntr t-'.....: u 0-- , th- ntrr,n' r' 1l -. , -i percent in both countries, and the share

mrr.l-lr rhe pr,-p"-r,.r. i.t i-.t . pn,enr h:t', ,rDl, -. 'r., . r, 1. of the labor force in agriculture was 66r*et,d,I. trria.W-I. F.-r iht,- ra3-.:nr. .h 'I n.Jr. Irt...tm .nra rn.it-'nal .'nr. percent in Korea and 74 percent in India.

3rd.l..ir. t u curi.n, h ; F .n al ., rii,.. I nd i I-, , nrit ar..n., J r nerd ir. Both countries had followed an inward-h id r, .t , .r, nl, I-.: r zr. o' th but al ;. . cr_,- ih,t t ..i ,n-,.r;,.aI -t _t.' . t- It.. ii looking development strategy in therr,t,r-r d3iticulit, in .h , fkrcrni ., ;r:..r rhr- -thr. Je,g 8 ur it -'- For countries with pressure of

nd nv-rd n.ri.-.. Jtebr pr'tleni- th.ur. the I,I- ,t,b-It' E a- t-.L 1t at , tr n- i p.-p.ul3t rn ....- I land and a rapidly grow-1rW.1r : ut:U. :,rci -1-- .' im, en :r--* Tb.,. ri.- up:inz It, .iar.5 Ir-n-, n.t n t :,tr:nor, ,r, t1,. ing labor force, labor-intensive manufac-

t:.-nr-t bt .t.- 1. ,r,n Anrrir, urdr x ,rd e-. rr,-.n-rl .urinc rhr -t;rti p.ri,.d turing is a major means for providingE. ;r i -i.in n,,ddI.,-,rc,.n r . -,jtr ir, ..i' th-a r h rd e,,- rr .. -. ,r . r in:, employment. The relatively poor perfor-the 1980s,; rn-utru,: r. a - i ri ii,r rtrl, ri .I Y.,; i, n l-'u i-., mance of Ird... in. i-r.,ni;;n.it manufac-

Ailth he ,,hir.- t.* : ,:. rr. .m it-.-lt *,. . a - n-r.uiCt,rin.- tured -F'-rz meant that employment

an ('it ,a rJ-.rr,t-,li z-trr.,t.ci i *..bi . -cur ' 3 . .i *uari'tr e indi; - n -lr.ii t outside .r, h-:uli,rr ha, rr ..- much lessousiy dlinin,,h it tr.dc, sit. i r.7.nr -. .- nt...rt rhan r-11 p-r,:nr .-, ind,. , than it could have.increase or ,-eimnil tiinir,n, .n-.-, t--- .r.:,n -n,,rrui t r-,i C --p-ri,:e i1-r,.

not occur too swiftly, if a large proportion of ing-country trade balances, the amount required todomestic output is easily tradable-that is, if meet debt service payments, is equivalent to only 5domestic and international prices are reasonably percent of world exports. Some of the exports ofclosely aligned-and if it is easy to expand exports debtor countries, however, face actual or potentialrather than necessary to compress imports. Unfor- restrictions in foreign markets. Equally important,tunately, many of the principal debtor countries the domestic system of incentives is biased againstgot into difficulties just because these conditions exports in many of the developing countries,did not exist: their exchange rates had become seri- which makes it more difficult for them to exploitously overvalued; their producers were heavily the opportunities for exports that do exist.protected, often by import controls that reduced Partly because of the difficulty of expandingthe incentive to sell abroad; export industries were exports and partly because of this domestic policyrelatively underdeveloped and, in addition, faced bias against exports, imports have been cut dra-growing restraints in foreign markets. matically instead, with adverse implications for

Because the major debtors account for only a growth. Moreover, there is a difference betweensmall fraction of world trade, the transfer of reducing imports by reducing domestic spend-resources abroad needed to improve their current ing-painful though that is-and reducing importsaccounts should in theory be accomplished reason- by imposing direct restrictions on imports. The lat-ably smoothly. A shift of $100 billion in develop- ter is likely not even to produce the needed exter-

44

Box 3.4 Exchange rates and price adjustments: lessons from theexperience of developing countries

Xl-- rIo . -rnni-nt intr. -r ntr in ttin R. i: 1-- I imp. -rt had rt- . t" 14 -per- Iumrrd r,mont more than i practnt t: i

*s Ih.imgt rat.-.... -h, re;ulis are tat-r a h- .-nri and e.port had til 2 pr I thar 2 prer .i h--t it3n 'th

in,. ~'e-erl it. -. aiu,d rei .. e'.:haniciv cent Th~ r-r'ai .arc ' a ttmprarrl t3bie Iir c;.t the r iug-la ednim.rart Ihere de hnvd a- t1u 'i mfdcre. iinanced r-. lari: capital ntl-o-- that aln¾',t it ice a; much in tern-'; t .im e-I l prcee ;I- t,*r-it-n prices t-n'.rald at re;p,..nd1d to capt al mark-i deregitla- ti: res-'urceth to e3rn it ot tor txgnih prt . hlirn. nomimal nut II i tlt- rt tr-rcd e-chanec Ithr-. ugh inport *u. -ilutin

*hiri t- ur-.Ut-- ........ - ard 1 - ci: rtad-'d at.'j .1 ,ari te1l by 12 4 percenr T- --- alt than thr ugoih , \prtt

vt~:r' *r' and indu:e c t- dtmard ltr thr pr,announ:ed e\chan_ c rat.: p--It Turke% repre;:nt4 3n-ther intere;tling

imp- -rt fhc- recLiin, -hrirag .-i fcr- .1- a aban3Ncned at--: Pt 1Li a- ., .et t. rern e change

i4n -hiuatin nma. al t- irr rE and .ih. rlttc'liic brcught eco-rti nlpg.ri-i nmp d Additir'r-.uI c-cciir -h-n gi:trnnieni' i-Hot-. the n'nmic r-'-v Ih to J hIall Rapid increart;rncaura,r t i rat3-n r:-rvign e changt Iquiteo mimnoni p ot h-Idrne th. real in ihe prtice It'.el had tat ''utp3aed theTlh- p hli,i. r-udlie ettiC n-:i I\ .rtat- echang^-. r.lt mn-ranr ,n the pre- n-:- or rapid - opreciat'r -t ht lange te

in .n-rn:tie. I 1, In. ;'ilt r-- -urce, tc- ad er-, e.ernal *hack; Th- impl-. arIer 1 c-; anrd L-intinu:d ic- d- .' until

inr-irt -ub;vtutir.g act-tl rle. %- hil- *--.n rt d c t t-. underl r arl1 i F -npcund niarter iherequiret nir Im r'mu -rin: rt-uurce' ti 'rt iulibriint r,al cUhangrge rate alth'gh cOu"i1' iL an i-I ir--rF 'tler and ih, .il

a; unit -ti a. :h n t hanig - that- d- therE nc- ctmplt ru-latin beit%etn the pr.cc inmr.-ace AI l Q rtprr;c .ntcd anit- rTiC and i1 2i ' tpeid .tais niag-ritm3 rde -.t c-* tmril :h .......--A...... - arind li.e ad.3i-z-r-e d e17-' mi rt nr t-tm; ct tradt

d .-nit-ti ri. r-- -.n r--r n e-king - d re t i-ilntrltrin -:hingt r-rteia e-ur ak-nt ic- ome 2 perc,ni -it COrthe' prtrl otl'- protitai- acr I-t, n-Ip lit- urn ln -.- 'l main.- lamrt.r in ljanar, i o-rh r.'rm trtprarn. parr ,r the rent tr--rn ac to: tamned a c,-n,lanr rerIl ectri'u tle r.r-tttd r;r-..:.orrtt the ituatn . ;-heJp Oit r.itu-nt-di otrc -m t r-grr tI- underhln m equilibruim rait --a tall- ht .- n in thu tIt tire n-mra l31

| *- clr-lize mi, In I') the 'IUgL-;lda echanriae rite rcant r.tt d: pre aIttd 1.hatirl in thei ei' Alutd 1- I-ihan ran-- .-an aribe. r in , m' torr i pccn -.Cr'-,aid hl I-" s ar- F6r atid m1l I reducing thu degr e

i rerali '. a l CI.-il': th- n--min 1-A lIar -a -tr alua .-n had tcac.Ich-:d 42 prc--nt . -1 -.e:r- ilu3tmi-ri h- . I It hut ii, -t.t lFi8

| clrt:hanlce til -ti.... a- p-tu;nnin~ and anrd -................ .lhan_e- raw- had ,urpas- 1 pit- It. l I ii en t raking r-tI accoun the o

tiedJ n lur.r 1"" 'a tll ani tm- cent -ut CFIP In t i) tht unrtr- -t -r - hinge f cede h-.auc- ot the .-.I Frice-.a3,r .-iC ini-t..dr tpr -- mt Ilul. l ru e I nc-i a hrtr: -r-- range 'hi d-l * nr. te: ; e B, l-iSi Furklt,h .rc.-I ih

Fp-c 'mali--i il p.i-i ranou - in tL.n*Ltim r .- ir r-e.-pinc t. dN ric * \t rnal rr unritd and c xp.- 1i tIe,an irt-'- ingF-ric - m' -rh I.lin bLr *a,ll high duon' ;- h. h t ihi:h an -- unit.t I - ---* t 3 .. r.a-idl-tIa rth~ -;h.in,. rait at a rtu3a1;-

t,c milau .n th r al e m in tit r--. p'rctnt - 't DGEP durinng -~l ur-'-, th ti II-.-ell~~~~~~~~~ra rav pr:n . l

Exchange rales and GDP growth in Yugoslavia and Turkey, 1976-83

C- -. -;-ud .z. r---' lrn! lu--~ iu- 19- -¾'i^ ';'Žl i m imm'a

\u.lgc-;lasiaIL,I-hange rate = dinar; dollar; I> 2 1is. It n 1 I 24 3 3m 3 42 iNlar.el cl!arin, rat- 223i 2t1 4 22 r' 2b 34 R

Qsyrt alu.atitn IFp- trentI 2 I i it 11 21 1 42 n ?j iInipi,rt ront; rIl'i i erct,I s I 4 '- 4 t 2I'eal :DI ri-- ro th rate per--nt i 5 3 4 $ n r 3 2 I4 I -_ I

Turk -

E-L hange rite = Lira dollirs r1- I. lti t 24 3 31 1 I 1 1112 1-2 n 225Marker clearinn rt- 31.3 -2 4 l3 ii 112'C'% er%aluatn!r' Iprc:1-nti n t, C -h 4Q 4 0 i 1 I 4Nlarket c-aring ratt %' ithout

-:-il prica rise 3S 3 hIll "I r .I Real C-P' 4r.nitlh rate ipercenti 7 4 3 2 I -] '4 -t!.- 44 4 I 1

r I. F crmnrate, ri. :na.le cl[ea-ne rate; percentage o en aluat l -n and tat. n le t-- ( n nl- in:-- tercc r-~ Inc -E i] ntularthe uz-1s i-a nd Turkich c- -.n rmlecduring lLCr- ir 1%ii an V i ) rt -pclr t I-l; rC-tl di amIaXbl

45

nal surplus. The resulting rise in protection intro- 33 percent in real terms between 1983 and 1995.duces a further bias against exports but does not Under the Low case they fall by 7 percent. In 1995do anything to cut spending in relation to output, net exports of goods and nonfactor services toas is required. Most of the major debtors have, developing countries are $70 billion under theunfortunately, adopted this second method of High scenario, a real increase of 544 percent overreducing imports. 1983; under the Low case they are only $29 billion,

Adjustment also needs to be accompanied by a real increase of 169 percent. Net disbursementschanged financial attitudes. In dealing with of medium- and long-term loans less interest pay-debtors, commercial lenders tend to push for more ments are $22 billion in 1995 under the High case.rapid repayment. This preference arises from their In the Low case the figure is negative: developingperception of risks and perhaps from their failure, countries pay in interest $9 billion more than theyacting as individual lenders, to associate a higher receive in net loan disbursements. Finally, debtprobability of default with fast repayment. At the outstanding and disbursed rises at 3.7 percent aother extreme, governments try to postpone year in real terms in the High case and at less thanadjustment as long as possible, to minimize con- 1 percent in the Low case.sumption losses now even if this means larger In the Low case, the nominal interest rate is 9.5repayment humps-and hence consumption percent; but because this is the rate for prime bor-losses-in the future. rowers, many developing countries would face a

The achievement of an adjustment "package" higher rate. With a spread of 1.5 percent, for exam-implies the recognition by both parties of an inter- ple, the interest rate for many borrowers would bemediate solution that does not jeopardize either 11.0 percent a year. Developing countries' exportsthe probability of repayment or the consumption in the Low case are expected to grow at only 4.7of future generations. One important means of percent a year in real terms, at 12.8 percent takingachieving this solution would be to increase the into account the projected increase in exportflow of equity investment to developing countries. prices. It is assumed that developing countriesNext year's World Development Report will examine reduce their debt service ratios from the high levelscapital flows to developing countries, including of the mid-1980s to the 1980 level by the end of thedirect private investment. forecast period. But because export revenues grow

Many developing countries have been meeting only slightly more rapidly than the interest rate,their interest obligations and are likely to go on the growth of net disbursements must bedoing so. If this process is too protracted, how- restrained to meet the target debt service ratio.ever, it might affect their willingness to persevere This restraint on net borrowing means thatwith their adjustment. They start from low levels imports can grow only slightly more rapidly thanof income and face a period of slow income and exports (5.1 versus 4.7 percent).consumption growth because of their need to use Under the Low case, the developing countriescurrent output to service past debts. That is why would fall into three categories.the longer-term prospects for the world economy 0 Low-income African countries. Having littlewill help determine whether the present ad hoc prospect of commercial borrowing, they wouldcombination of rescheduling by creditors and aus- depend almost completely on official aid. Much ofterity by debtors proves to be the prelude to a har- the aid would have to go directly into consump-monious resolution or the prologue to a disaster. tion; the private debt they now carry would have

The effect of world economic growth on devel- to be rolled over. Low-income Africa would receiveoping economies is revealed in Table 3.4, which only $2.7 billion of net disbursements of medium-shows the balance of payments of the developing and long-term loans in real terms. Their interestcountries under the High and Low scenarios. In payments in 1995 would be $1.3 billion. Net officialboth cases it is assumed that lenders will wish to transfers would be $2.4 billion. Debt outstandingsee debt service indicators return to their levels of and disbursed would be only 36 percent higher in1980. The slower the growth of exports and GDP real terms after twelve years.of the borrowing countries, and the higher the real * Countries that would be hurt least by a weakinterest and inflation rates in the world economy, world economy. Middle-income countries such asthe smaller the amount developing countries can Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore would boom com-borrow. pared with the rest of the world and would be

Under the High case the loan disbursements and creditworthy as a result. China and India dependofficial transfers to the developing countries rise by little on international borrowing, although slow

46

growth in the industrial countries would squeeze in real terms between 1983 and 1995.the amount of concessional assistance they would To sum up, there are two major differencesreceive. between the High and Low cases: net lending and

* A group of countries that would be in and out export growth. In the High case, substantial extraof financial difficulties for the rest of the 1980s and borrowing is compatible with improved debt serv-possibly beyond. Some of their difficulties would icing for developing countries partly because thebe dealt with through debt renegotiations, the nominal interest rate is lower than in the Low case,most problematic of which would be with the big and because export revenues grow at a higher rate.Latin American borrowers. Having run austerity Mutual cooperation between lenders and borrow-programs for years, some might effectively impose ers is reasonably assured. In the Low case, exporttheir own schedule for debt repayment. The major revenues grow only slightly more rapidly than theexporters of manufactures shown in Table 3.4, (higher) interest rate and net lending falls over thewhich include many of these countries, would period to meet target debt service ratios. As ahave only 9.1 percent more debt outstanding in result, in the Low case, many developing countriesreal terms in 1995 than in 1983. Net disbursements end up transferring resources to the industrialto them of medium- and long-term loans in 1995 world year after year. If there is, in addition,would be $8.4 billion less than their interest pay- greatly increased industrial-country protection,ments. Other middle-income oil importers would then sustained cooperation becomes unlikely.be in a similar position: by 1995 their outstanding Improved developing-country performance on itsdebt would rise by 15 percent in real terms, and own would make the picture brighter. Neverthe-their net medium- and long-term borrowing would less, the slow growth of industrial countries in thebe less than $1 billion more than their interest pay- Low cases would balance the world economy on aments. knife's edge.

The main difference between the Low case andthe variant Low I (increased industrial-country Poverty and low-income countriesprotection) is that the main debtor nations wouldfind it more difficult than ever to service their The implications of the scenarios are best under-debts. They would pay a nominal interest rate of stood if their GDP growth rates are adjusted for11.0 percent, as in the Low case, but the growth of the widely differing population growth rates of theexports would now average only 4.0 percent (Table various regions. Between the High and the Low3.6), with nominal growth in export earnings of 12 case, per capita income growth falls from 3.5 per-percent. Even a developing country exporting only cent a year to 2.7 percent for developing countriesmanufactures might find its export earnings grow- (see Table 3.2). Increased protection makes pros-ing at less than the nominal interest rate. Most pects still worse, with per capita income growthdeveloping countries would be starved of external for all developing countries 34 percent below thecapital. Debt outstanding and disbursed to devel- level of the High case. In all scenarios the majoroping countries in 1995 would be only slightly exporters of manufactures grow fastest, leavinglarger than in 1983 in real terms. Loans disbursed the rest of the developing world further and fur-would be $42 billion (compared with $49 billion in ther behind.the Low case.) Interest payments of $55 billion It is in the low-income countries-especiallywould exceed disbursements as creditworthiness those of Africa-that slow growth does most tofalls because of the protection-induced decline in perpetuate and accentuate poverty. In low-incomeexports. Lower growth of imports would also con- Asia, however, prospects look brighter, especiallytribute to lower overall growth. This scenario, in as population growth continues to slow. Domesticeffect, is untenable. If the situation described policy improvements are essential in enhancingbegan to unfold, the prospect for growth in devel- the prospects of low-income countries. Like theoping countries would surely be worse than that middle-income countries, they would benefit fromimplied by these projections. policy changes that reduce the bias against export-

The improved developing-country policies in ing in favor of inefficient import substitution. Pre-Low II help, although the real growth of outstand- vious World Development Reports have emphasizeding debt remains low for the highly indebted major the importance of prices in determining how well aexporters of manufactures and for the middle- country uses its resources. Because they are soincome oil exporters. For developing countries as a poor, low-income countries have special reason towhole, debt outstanding grows by only 1 percent make the best possible use of their resources.

47

Because the public sector in low-income coun- without excessive cost to themselves, they willtries is large in relation to GDP, cutting imports need to expand their exports rather than justusually means cutting public spending. Although reduce imports. Any worsening of global pros-governments may have scope for reducing spend- pects in terms of increased protectionism and fur-ing without damaging long-term growth, budget ther rises in dollar interest rates would erode thecuts too often damage programs with the greatest ability and perhaps even the willingness, of bor-capacity for raising the economy's growth poten- rowers to service their debt.tial. Some of them may be classified as current As in trade, so in finance there is a need forspending; but education and health budgets are concerted international action. The success ofbetter seen as investments in human capital. developing countries' efforts to deal with the rigid-

Most human development programs have long ities and distortions in their own economiesgestation lags. Their output is not directly tradable depends in part on the actions of official and pri-and often is not even marketable. Commercial vate suppliers of finance. For the poorer countriesfinancing of such investments is therefore unrealis- the main challenge for the international commu-tic. A real increase in concessional assistance is nity is to find ways of supporting policy reformneeded, and has been for several years. Yet, at through additional flows of concessional assist-times of their greatest difficulty, low-income coun- ance. This has been the challenge in the negotia-tries have found that official aid has been falling in tions for the seventh IDA replenishment (see Boxreal terms. This trend must be reversed if low- 3.5), the discussions for possible supplementalincome countries are to make any progress in the budgeting to IDA, and the extension of the Lomeyears ahead and the lot of the poorest people is not Convention.to deteriorate any further. For the middle-income countries the actions of a

wide range of private and public institutions are

International action important. Commercial banks have typically reliedon borrowing countries' agreements with the

This chapter has shown that the world economic International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a basis foroutlook would brighten considerably if every restructuring existing claims and, in selected cases,country took steps to improve its own domestic for committing additional funds. Increases in vol-performance. The onus on the industrial countries untary lending by the commercial banks in theis greatest, because growth prospects throughout long term is an important ingredient in the restora-the world would be transformed if they overcame tion of growth momentum in middle-incomethe rigidities and inflationary fears that slowed developing countries. But the transition back tothem down in the past ten years. Even without fully voluntary lending requires prudent manage-such benefits, the developing countries could do ment on the side of both borrowers and lenders.much to help themselves through policy changes Official institutions, particularly the IMF, thethat increase the flexibility of their own economies. World Bank, and the regional development banks

That said, some measures need to be taken at an can be helpful in this regard both by assisting ininternational, not purely domestic, level and in a the design of more effective developing-countrycoordinated way. A trade-liberalization initiative policies and by expanding their own lending inthat concentrated on the newer and proliferating support of policy reforms (see Box 3.5). Efforts byforms of protectionism-various nontariff barriers, these institutions to encourage private directespecially those affecting developing countries- investment should also continue. Finally, it iswould make an important contribution to restoring important that official export-financing institutionsthe momentum of the world economy. It is also adjust to the greater risks of lending to developingessential to start liberalizing trade in agriculture. countries in a nondisruptive fashion. What isJust as the liberalization of trade in manufactures required need not be very dramatic for any singleprovided a once-for-all but sizable boost to produc- institution, provided they all act constructively.tivity growth in the late 1950s and early 1960s, so Measures that would result in increased financialthe same approach to agricultural trade, combined flows to developing countries to help them under-with the reversal of the recent protectionist meas- take structural adjustment and maintain long-termures on industrial products, could boost productiv- financial viability will help make trade liberaliza-ity in the 1980s. tion easier by improving their short-term balance

Freer trade is also vital for solving the debt crisis. of payments outlook. In turn, liberalization wouldFor the developing countries to service their debt expand exports and would tend to strengthen

48

61'

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.U.:.Uipu _piq qA tciu[~Iov,l .1 j--jL%.ir u.. 1I 44UVo9U, yIl' PxogIC

developing-country creditworthiness, thus in- slow growth, many millions of poor people will bycreasing the developing countries' capacity to definition get poorer. Moreover, lower GDPobtain and service additional capital flows. In growth makes it more difficult for countries toshort, trade liberalization, enlarged flows of exter- finance programs-in education and family plan-nal finance, and improved economic policies in all ning, for example-that reduce populationcountries are mutually reinforcing actions in sup- growth. Thus short-run difficulties have long-runport of restoring the growth momentum of devel- consequences.oping countries. Important as these simple facts are, they do not

begin to capture the links between population

The links with population growth and economic development. Understand-ing those links requires much more than the mere

Modest growth in the GDP of industrial countries counting of heads. It requires consideration ofmeans modest growth in their per capita incomes. education, health, employment, incomes, culture,For the developing countries there is no such easy and personal beliefs-aspects of everyday life thatequation. Their populations are growing by 2 per- explain why parents choose to have a particularcent a year, in many countries by much more. GDP number of children and what their choices add upgrowth of 2 percent or so is merely a preliminary to. Part II of this Report is about populationstep before they can start to improve their per cap- change in developing countries. As will soonita incomes. Governments throughout the devel- become apparent, it is also about development inoping world cannot ignore the literal sense in its widest sense. It is affected by the macroeco-which population growth affects the economic per- nomic perspective of Part I, and it gives that per-formance that really matters-the average incomes spective richer meaning.of their people. If the world is to have ten years of

50

Part II Population Change and Development

4 Demographic change and public policy

Most families in developing countries now have at of children are low, the economic (and other) bene-least four children, in rural areas five and more, fits of children are high, and having many childrenenough to ensure rates of population growth makes economic sense.above 2 percent a year. To cut population growth First, where wages are low, the differencemeans to reduce the number of children in an aver- between children's and mother's earnings will beage family, which many governments are trying to small; income lost by the mother during a child'sdo. India adopted a formal population policy in infancy may be easily recouped by the child later1952, Korea in 1961. China, Indonesia, and Mexico on. In poor rural areas, especially, children canhave developed comprehensive policies in the past help a lot. Nepalese village boys and girls of six toten to fifteen years. But other governments have eight years work three to four hours a day caringbeen more tentative. In much of Latin America for farm animals and helping with younger sib-political support for family planning is ambiguous; lings. Javanese teenagers work eight to ten hours amost countries in Africa have no particular demo- day. Many Bangladeshi children work even longergraphic objectives. Should there be public concern hours; children in the Philippines and in Sriand governmental action to reduce population Lanka, where fertility is lower, work somewhatgrowth? Along with public efforts to reduce mor- less. Sometimes children may also earn cashtality, should governments try to reduce fertility, incomes. In the Philippines those in their late teensand if so, what are appropriate policies to do so? contribute as much to household cash income as

To answer these questions requires an under- do adults. And much of women's traditionalstanding of, first, why fertility is high and, second, work-in farming, crafts, and petty retailing-canwhy the resulting rapid population growth slows be combined with looking after children. Otherdevelopment. Part II of this Report will show that family members, including older siblings, are read-it is the poor, with little education, low and inse- ily available to help.cure income, and poor health and family planning In developed countries, by contrast, a major costservices, who have many children; yet it is also the of children to parents is time lost from work-usu-poor who lose out as rapid population growth ally by the mother-or the cost, inconvenience,hampers development. It is this seeming paradox and uncertainty of finding child care. Nor do chil-that provides the starting point for designing pub- dren contribute much to household chores andlic policies to reduce fertility. income as they grow up. One study of an Ameri-

can city and its suburbs found that children twelve

The setting for high fertility to seventeen years old spend one hour a day doinghousework, those aged six to eleven just half an

Why do the poor have many children? Consider hour.the issue from the point of view of parents and A second reason that having many children canpotential parents. All parents everywhere get plea- make economic sense is the lack of schoolingsure from children. But children involve economic opportunities, particularly from the age of twelvecosts; parents have to spend time and money or so. For young children of primary-school age,bringing them up. Children are also a form of school can often be combined with work in theinvestment-providing short-term benefits if they house or on the farm, especially if there is a schoolwork during childhood, long-term benefits if they in the village. But the choice between school andsupport parents in old age. There are several good work becomes harder as children grow up. If theyreasons why, for poor parents, the economic costs do not go to secondary school, they can work more

51

themselves and, by caring for younger siblings, today's production into consumption many yearsallow their mothers to work more. The apparent hence that is less risky than are bank accounts,disadvantages of secondary schooling are com- credit instruments, and precious metals, all ofpounded if children must live away from home or which are subject to theft, inflation, and the jeal-travel long distances to get to school. ousies of neighbors. Even land has to be managed

As parents' income rises, as schooling opportu- to provide income and, in any case, may requirenities improve, and as education becomes more children to work on it and make it a secure asset.clearly the key to future success for children, par- Fifth, in some developing countries family sys-ents everywhere send their children to school and tems may encourage high fertility. Early marriagekeep them there longer. In turn they often have and childbearing are easier if the new couple canfewer children-because schooling itself and the begin married life in the household of the hus-loss of children's help are costly, and because hav- band's parents. For young women who have fewing two or three educated children becomes a other options, early marriage and many childrenbetter "investment" (for the parents and for the may be the safest route to a satisfying adulthoodchildren too) than having many who cannot be and a relatively secure old age. In Africa, supporteducated. from many relatives for children's education

High infant and child mortality are a third reason reduces the high economic burden of raising chil-for having many children. Although mortality has dren that potential parents would otherwise bear.fallen, in many parts of the developing world it is A sixth factor encouraging high fertility amongstill high. One out of five children dies before the poor is their limited information about, andreaching the age of one in some parts of Africa; access to, effective and safe means of contracep-one out of seven in much of Bangladesh, India, tion. The very idea of birth control may beand Pakistan. Parents may feel the need to have unknown or frowned upon. Modern contracep-many babies to be sure that a few survive. Where tives may be unknown or simply not available. Ifboys are more important than girls-say, for secu- available, they may be expensive, particularly inrity in old age-parents may need to have five chil- relation to the incomes of the poor-and especiallydren to be sure that one son survives. Yet in poor if they must be bought from private doctors. For afamilies many births, especially if they are close poor family, limiting the number of children maytogether, may increase the probability of infant therefore mean sexual abstinence, illegal abortion,deaths by weakening both mother and babies. infanticide-or, at best, ineffective and difficult tra-

Fourth, poor parents are worried about who will ditional contraception. In some circumstances, thetake care of them when they are old or ill. In Indo- psychological or financial costs of avoiding preg-nesia, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Tur- nancy may exceed the costs of having anotherkey 80 to 90 percent of parents surveyed said they child.expect to rely on their children to support them in Discussion of children as an "investment"their old age. In Egypt, especially in rural areas, should not imply that parents in developing coun-poor and uneducated parents are much more tries are influenced only by economic consider-likely to expect to live with (and be supported by) ations. In every society children bring parents sat-their children when they are old than are rich and isfaction and pleasure. In poor settings, economiceducated parents. For many adults, the need for gain (where there is any) need not be the mainsupport in their old age outweighs the immediate cause of high fertility; it is more likely that eco-costs of children. nomic gain (or a small economic loss) simply pre-

One reason parents look to children for help in vents any interest in having fewer children. Thedisability and old age is the lack of safe alterna- social and political functions of large families aretives. In developed countries there are trusted also important, especially in poor rural areas. Forinstitutions (banks, pensions, government bonds, better-off farmers in Bangladesh, children repre-insurance, and mutual aid societies) that help indi- sent opportunities for the family's occupationalviduals to earn today and to save and spend diversification and hence for expansion or consoli-tomorrow. In poor countries, capital markets are dation of its local power; a large family also has annot nearly so well developed. In parts of South advantage in land disputes. In Latin America, byAsia, there is no tradition of community support; the tradition of compadrazgo, or ritual coparent-elsewhere, community support is weakening as hood, families serve as godparents to the childrenmobility increases. For the rural poor, children are of allies and friends, securing ritual bonds that arethe best possible annuity, a way to transform as important as blood ties in cementing alliances.

52

Consequences for parents poorer parents on average. But in Nigeria mostchildren contemplating secondary school would

Despite the apparent advantages of many chil- not come from very poor households, so familydren, it is not clear that, from a strictly economic size probably has some independent influence onpoint of view, parents gain. Children may end up educational performance.costing parents more than they expected. In some In developing countries, a disproportionatecountries girls may require a dowry and thus be an share of children grow up in large families that areeconomic burden. For households close to subsis- least able to take advantage of increased educa-tence levels, food, clothing, and housing for chil- tional opportunities and health services. In Brazildren may be a burden; such costs are in fact the more than 60 percent of all children live in thechief concern parents voice, even in the poorest poorest 40 percent of households, householdssettings, when asked about the disadvantages of which between them have just 10 percent of totalhaving children. How much of an economic gain income. In Malaysia and Thailand about half of allchildren provide may depend on circumstances children live in households that receive just 15 per-that parents cannot easily predict-whether they cent of total income. In Colombia and Malaysia ingain or lose access to land, whether their children 1974, government subsidies for education andare healthy, whether they have the right balance of health were approximately equal across house-sons and daughters. Even old-age support is not holds. But because fewer children lived in richguaranteed. Some children do not survive; daugh- households, subsidies per child were twice asters who marry may move to another village; sons great for children in the richest fifth of householdswho go far to find work may be less supportive as for those in the poorest. Evidence from urbanthan was hoped. Children willing and able to help areas in Colombia also shows that parents them-may themselves face difficulties in finding well- selves, at all income and education levels, spendpaying work. So although parents can reasonably less on each child's education once there are morehope to be better off by having many children, in than four children. Thus children from large fami-the end some may not be. lies receive less from both public and private

spending on education.

Consequences for children In general, children have the most to gain fromfamily income spent on health and education. Yet

Even when parents seem to gain from large fami- family budget studies consistently show that big-lies, children may lose. This is obviously true ger families spend proportionately more on food.when births are closely spaced; the resulting harm Even then they may not avoid malnutrition: in oneto the health and nutrition of mothers can cause Colombian town studied, malnutrition in pre-low birth weight, early weaning, and poor health school children was directly related to the numberof children in the critical early years. Older chil- of children in the family. Of course, high fertilitydren may also be handicapped. Even in developed may not be the direct cause of malnutrition; lowcountries, studies show that children in large fami- income might be responsible for both high fertilitylies and those born close together tend to be physi- and malnutrition. In either case, however, childrencally and intellectually inferior to other children. from large, poor families are clearly disadvan-For middle-class families in the United Kingdom taged.and Czechoslovakia, where food is abundant, the So early difficulties in providing enough goodnumber of children does not affect their physical food interact with later difficulties in supportinggrowth. But in poor families, children with many schooling. As will be shown in Chapter 6, thosesiblings tend to be smaller. In France, the United who receive less schooling will, as adults, tend toStates, and the Netherlands, a large number of have more children than parents who had morechildren in the family has a negative effect on class- schooling. From one generation to the next, anroom performance and test scores. unequal distribution of income is caused by and

The same pattern is found in developing coun- contributes to an unequal distribution of opportu-tries. In Nigeria, among a sample of children tak- nities and skills, as large family size and lowing the secondary school entrance exam, children investments in children reinforce each other.from large families scored systematically lower If parents have many children in the hope ofthan those from small families. In both sets of economic gain, the first step in reducing fertility iscountries, some of this effect may be due to chil- to relieve their poverty and uncertainty about theirdren from large families having less educated or own future. In this sense, the persistence of high

53

fertility in a changing world is a symptom of lack of efits to other families' children and grandchildren?access: to health services, which would reduce the Even when each couple decides to have manyneed for many births to insure against infant and children, and achieves its wish, it might have beenchild mortality; to education, which would raise happier with fewer children if it could have beenparents' hopes for their children and would sure that other couples would have done the same.broaden women's outlook and opportunities; to Poor couples who hope their children will supportsocial security and other forms of insurance for old them in their old age may rightly fear that, becauseage; to consumer goods and social opportunities other couples are having so many children, anythat compete with childbearing; and to family one of their own children has less chance of goingplanning services, which provide the means to to school and eventually of finding a good job.limit births. Assured that each child would have a better

chance of school and work in a less crowded

The need for public policy world, each couple might be happy with fewerchildren.

There are two broad justifications for government In this setting, people will not be confident thataction to encourage people to have fewer children. provision of contraceptives by private suppliersThe first is the gap between the private and social will alone lead to widespread reduction in fertility.gains from having many children. Suppose that, Only through the public sector can people make,even as each couple hopes to benefit from many in effect, a contract with each other: "If each of uschildren, it wishes its neighbors would have fewer, has fewer children, we can rely on governmentso that its children would face less competition for support for nationwide measures (to improveland and jobs. In other words, the couple's wish access to family planning services and to createfor society as a whole is different from its wish for incentives for their use) to ensure that everybodyitself. One reason private and social gains differ is makes the same decision. That way, we and ourthe existence of "externalities": parents do not children will all enjoy a better chance in life." Byinternalize the costs of their children to society as a developing a social contract, the government freeswhole. For example, one family's children will each individual couple from its "isolation para-have little effect on the availability of land; but the dox," from its need to decide alone to have morechildren born of many families will. The same is children than it would want if others were limitingtrue of the effects on forests or pasture. To narrow their family size (see Box 4.1).this gap between private and social perceptions, Private and social gains from children also differgovernments can act as custodians of society. They in the developed countries, although usually in theare meant to have longer time horizons than their opposite direction. As public social security sys-individual constituents, and to weigh the interests tems develop and people have many ways to saveof future generations against those of the present. for their old age, the private economic benefits of

Where natural resources are abundant, so-called children diminish. At the same time their privatecongestion costs caused in part by externalities costs rise. Thus many couples choose to have onlymay not be great, at least at the national level. But one child or even none. In some countries govern-in most countries there is another source of differ- ments use financial and other incentives to encour-ence between the private and social gains from age higher fertility; this too is a population policymany children. Health and education costs of chil- to achieve a common goal (see Chapter 8).dren are heavily subsidized by the public sector, as Private and social gains also differ in areas otherare roads, communications, and other public serv- than fertility. For the common good, legislationices that boost jobs and income. The result, dis- requires that children go to school and that every-cussed in the next chapter, is that high fertility con- body be vaccinated against contagious diseases.strains the amount of resources available for Limits, often backed by financial penalties, areinvestment and hence for future income growth. placed on automobile speeds, chopping down for-Even as some couples have many children because ests, and polluting air and water. Government pro-of a lack of health services and schooling opportu- duces social goods and services, the benefits ofnities, their large families make it more difficult for which individuals cannot capture and will not pro-the public sector to extend health and schooling to duce on their own: police protection, clean waterall. Yet why should one couple, on its own, give up to protect health, parks for common enjoyment.the possible private benefits of children, when its The second justification for government action tosacrifice alone would provide only minuscule ben- reduce fertility is that people may have more chil-

54

dren than they want, or would want had they as rhythm and withdrawal, which are less effectivemore information about, and better access to, eas- in preventing conception, or on abortion, which, ifier fertility control. For example, couples may lack primitively performed, puts the mother's life at(or disbelieve) information about falling child mor- risk.tality-or about their chance to reduce the risks to In this situation, the role of the government istheir existing children by keeping numbers critical. As a start, it can encourage parents in theirdown-and thus have more children than needed desire to have fewer children simply by providingto reach desired family size. They may not know more information-about changing mortality andthat by stopping breastfeeding they risk more the health benefits of controlling fertility. It canclosely spaced births. They may not be fully aware encourage wider provision of modern contracep-of the health risks, to mothers and children, of tives. This can be achieved by private suppliers,

Box 4.1 The isolation paradox

Ir. -*rrT,1 .,11;. in i.ia C \tr : i I .tim . r, burid ur lr IIiI. i riIh ,cr r. l -nr.j r h- n , nm A'. dU.,-irh-r ..t , . ... .n .r.d ei ,aI,.tdr r.. h-.-r h . : r,ik- k ind manr. n '--iIr rca. ntli *r ' r, putb IIr. ncrrt r i..,n

dr.h ni. r .r.. h r.I ir ihrh mir- .r5.1 btflri l § .-- *el.-- h th-ir r. mr3r., .1 i

drr . i I-i.4 r h.. 1r.-1,, I-t .9I. n l.fl . - plan hi th-n. -t_uid i,e.h J. liiiii In rl,-, .t

.r : .- Ia tirC t.-t * i. h .I hi- * r, it ;h rt-h 1 ',h ainm r .t :t ., ri,in *r. tl.- .i- .ihr it i l h.ldr,n hd tl-it,.-,r ,. 3, ro in. i |

.ri r.l h r - n er.. Cr h p ,n ci.,riri: n.i . -utc,d trhr m.ntI.rlt. ih-n'i i.ul i i.h rlier iI.--.,r *' 1.:ray-

rrrp:.rir.s .in.i l:,r : ttrz n,th- I, r,..i l,c .i ,h r t *erm..rI r.:cI i. i.- :I.m.uri rr . - tit- Irri,iiL.

,Jr-d,. 'i .' i_*rh,r I er ir- p.riiku 1nJ l i. rira.. ii i I.|li i.ifliilt- L lir ii-'.. i t, i n- n i it . rnru-* r 1I , i .. e h I':. . htIIr. ri r1 -rr, . .. .r -r. khidr'n ii[ui.;- r.ie' :r and .1. Jiiit Fc-ivil n;. . t.

h* r-i., Air J. th.: lar.1 th-d h -:. ha. .tt ii'.cr.ci,.............. i ul ; . nll .i.uitcrm k.-r ;l hrc a -.. .*. iht Cl T-.:htC.1-,r ..; r ti; - a I.Irl -r,.-

I li, ri:jf prl.,. hr u id t

j' h, :h-r ..t a \1 '-1 (MAt-Cr,n ill *ii-u. 1-r L dr h- .tu,i, u iti .t' i i ' c i P,

rr. r,- uld th .ni,- fu t aiea - ni.'u4h ihe , il,r iIii-.:r- 1,nnr r ii r:h -: i1p31 : p d l I . but

I f. 3 1 ... e .rx. t. ,11 . !1. i- .... .' ani sher d. .r .it. hii .It at- ii-rr lea :--ai t h k l'. m.r rr 11.r a .:ti r.iir. a-I-r the

.1.,t .i. t-c: ¶ li. \ 1.d-ul rk hi: lrd1 iaid tehir 1 rildr.:r. ...,r-.tU .tt ih.r.I rhr. t -r,, ,rii . tt-

'up-r i hern E,.r...rn-i:i .n . ..r,:ei.r,t.i. .. 11t.- Jr .u r, t 1I.- I. I t r i, l r. LuI

tc-ildr.:r . r ha' tatii.r l,il.: Ih- h ir n .1 h--J ie hid,Eii1 ni i l IVh l.: ne.ir- th.'iim ile.h :nipr-... enriie r itrt iin

cr it.- rrca -er C. . tar-r mnir i t ri., - th,: -,ri r., e . . doti d: i[h-. r.. iirt . -r-. .-.u p.:c -pir nm:.)l1 r...r --n-c.-arr. r i.e 1lir ili rid - i ri . e.-'ce eArn r.- r n r i.r p nr, hrriir alddup rA .-r Tartarrr . .r.1 r th. tr.r.A, i r hi,l

t.r r. ,,nincaj. -. rtr and '3 . , K rnir eel.,1 [hr..a. r tl - *4rt t r ira nii.. J rh. r, m. re r.: xi,:.tr.i-i- r at-

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h.ir. ;ti. o It rh- ..Id-r l- r idrnd , h- ii .ir . am c . r.,k- m1 t p'' t,- -i-.,--: ir h.mrrt a-,. ircem thiir * A I

bL-t.t.;.ri- bu; nl I. m _it' IJUit -. il A, rth.iii oIt On, trnm liii i hcfl')rrfl.rr I. ih.. th.., idi nfl.ftir 1cr4- n.. chirar P. eart,

n arn, , r il.-ri -'. .. i. A... - .l-rr r -. a.-.r`. paul.1 - !ni, dual' in r.-ia- ar'd I. it.- .: - , un it ru . But ;h ; rEd

.ubh r ment riirr. ,:nmrnrt. in- hi.-iic in t,,in a .ct e thr, dctrni,rni .-,t Sa li ,ithrr F-" trtt i hardl . tl-: tjheo:ii. i1

ih, . alli e ne.irc . t i. .illidrbrn n c.rri '1.ii, unti .- rhe. i r..-., a i -i th eir i' , ii Ac'l .i,1r'm,ni

* it .Lir. I,t He, itr ii . -A h. ut In Ci J.. : Cr APr-ir that -r-e:* thr g.rnaril

many and closely spaced births. The very idea of especially in towns and, for some methods (suchplanning pregnancies may be unknown, especially as condoms), in rural areas as well. But privateif social norms dictate early marriage for young suppliers are unlikely to provide the full range ofwomen and if couples do not discuss sexual family planning services, especially in remotematters. areas. Many modern means of contraception can

Even if they know about family planning, cou- be made available only with medical backup, andples may not know how to practice it. They may be there is little profit in disseminating informationreluctant to ask questions, especially if their par- and contraceptives where distribution systems areents pressure them to have many children. Or they poor, health care is limited, and demand ismay lack ready access to modern contraceptives unknown and possibly limited. In many countriesand be forced to rely on traditional methods such government may need to subsidize or even orga-

55

nize contraceptive services. As will be shown in agree on the precise nature of that balance, butChapter 7, substantial "unmet need" for family every society needs to consider it.planning information and services does exist inmany countries. The case is strong for support ofprograms to assist the poor to achieve their repro- Lessons from historyductive goals more efficiently and humanely. Thiswould increase the welfare of parents and improve Public concern with population growth is a recentthe chances of their children having greater educa- phenomenon. The transition to low mortality andtional opportunities, and eventually better job low fertility in today's developed countriesopportunities. occurred without any explicit public policy. But cir-

The distinction between these two justifications cumstances in developing countries today are dif-for a public population policy-the gap between ferent, and for several reasons that point to theprivate and social gains, and unmet need for fam- need for policy action.ily planning services-has not been important inpractice. Support for family planning is usuallyhow governments try to reduce fertility, a sensible The agricultural age and beforefirst step so long as there is unmet need for infor-mation about family planning and unsatisfied For much of human history, prosperity and popu-demand for services. Government's role in devel- lation growth went hand in hand. In the preindus-oping and enhancing a social contract to lower fer- trial age, population growth was periodicallytility provides the basis for public subsidies to fam- spurred by increases (often temporary) in the sup-ily planning; family planning programs have been ply of food and declines in disease. In fact diseasesubsidized most where a public policy to reduce kept the number of people well below a level atfertility is strongest. In fact, family planning pro- which starvation would have become a majorgrams have become an important vehicle for infor- cause of death. Fertility in normal times was wellmation about the private and social costs of high below its biological potential, but it could risefertility, and for incentives to encourage individ- quickly if mortality rose. Over long periods theuals to reduce family size. world's population increased slowly (by far less

than 1 percent a decade, compared with 25 percentSuch governmental involvement has expanded a decade today).

in the past decade, since the Bucharest World Pop- Settled agriculture permitted a rise in popula-ulation Conference in 1974. There, governments tle concult ur ba rs in theadopted a Plan of Action which recognized the tion, some concentration in urban centers, and the

emergence of a small nonagricultural class. In thebasic humanri to schs ofreeld rensT - sixteenth century population declined in thebly" the number and spacing of children. There Americas because of new diseases contracted fromhas since been substantial progress in assuring Europe. In other parts of the world, populationfreedom of choice through family planning pro- growth rates increased between about 1450 andgrams-about 95 percent of people in the develop- 1650-to rates higher than 1 percent a decade ining world live in countries that support this China, South Asia, and Europe. Even theseprinciple. increases were tiny by modern standards; over

Should governments not only ensure procre- time and among regions, population growth con-ative freedom but also encourage social responsi- tinued to be irregular and vulnerable to fluctua-bility? The answer in this Report is a firm yes, with tions in mortality. Moreover, life expectancy wasrenewed attention to the ethical implications of probably little higher in 1600 than it had been 2,000incentives and other policies that go beyond family years earlier. Everyone's health was threatenedplanning. A dilemma arises whenever pursuit of more or less constantly by disease. Only a tinyone set of values-improvement of material wel- proportion of people were literate or numerate.fare through lower population growth, reduction Between 100 and 1850, the percentage of theof inequality, insurance of future security-threat- world's population living in towns and cities ofens other values, such as freedom of choice and 5,000 people or more probably never exceeded 6pronatalist customs and beliefs. But there is a bal- percent. In England between the thirteenth andance between the private right of procreation and eighteenth centuries, there is evidence that whensocial responsibility. As discussed more fully in mortality fell so that labor supply increased, wagesChapter 8, different societies will not necessarily fell and food prices rose (see Box 4.2).

56

Box 4.2 The Nlalthusian case: changes in labor supply, wages,and population growth in preindustrial England

P, r. lr.h h-. br. II hI r- llei' rh -: sni - Change, in elcdted .ariablei in England 't'. -r- IrcI-

m.,i.,*n.n ifl tnIr:i-d pr.tl:, trmtl hrenhthteLnn l%n.In 1 ,riz:r.n llri: .i Fr ......................... :.:trorn lhr- Lhmrieenth io lhe L.: -.i,- !

mu n.. rr,.li .in1 ed rl !ii r..irn4 in h.Entiethi entrivir

I n:ir'. l .- , r i- ..--n ti: rr,

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jnanir§3. .nFl i,t raMt-l in d rii'e .1.r A-

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*. Tr.-t II, Lr I l t i nir 't.. l , iti- - -r- - r--

r.r n. n w .. d J,.;- r,. rm pre .pi. m Ilrkd..

mjr,,d ,ir -A I,i .- -il! ho- rat .lnl, icriit- 1|. .. , s..r.,d..... jAis l.;l .:

,1, ............ t:.-.g-1 1lil4 '-iJ -!.1.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~T411-14 W

* Th. .t jr~~li !n L O]itt-rl,j I -ll -% ............ J

i-n .11 rh: Iu. h,:. nth . riturr

L'roui!;1 .n Lre3 In 'hi- Itlhuia.n .: :ie 121 1 4'r 1'.' 'II'" !9

F. i ni.nlJflt t tnil n I Ln. r . r-IIi i-.

iAr i.-|. ,I_rr...ri.. ,r r-.1 r- n.n-.. - .Ji'i .tnh* -.. i.- i..mi, r 1.1t . I .

i d l ilt - rli i. i sti:,nd r..1- i.- rr.-.1

ir t r. ..- r,I,

!. ,n r pr.- td:c it-hi .ki. .n tht i3. - r-

NI1ltrhu, 1.- ir:d F.- ......i.. lt pr-iu Ii ; ii........,, .

* IFi bh Ire m Iircr thu In.-l.rSlllt. 12u t4'' 'Io 1. .t . !L,X|, ,. rE .... .-n * 1 , t t , r -r, n d . I r I I ,. , et . ........ h 1 41

J1,rarr, Ft-rId: i1 * ' ' p P 'I " - n ! .. I._- [ .... i ... t Ilr n,- dt

.sr .r. ii 11.. 1 1.- IJ I . L I i t . n t. n h 4

Irn.r-r I 5-1 th , uri t. r,l,. h .ritur--

rh, R.:F ir D- [h ml th,_ to rr- rth c r,-. 11 111 rl' 2

,ir r- uc hr .' t..l,fr. f] i.t f p. n. ,:.,

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1 p.,t.il;.- 3t m -.r.-,I jiil pj Jrii ; t . -.

,h.r. rC.. trifle ani .. .:.:-i . UIli

;.c h..h rJul:tniFuT.in -ni tem ' i 4ltl lli I-i.r.lir . r i 13n.i . n.1 r- L-n 1 r ; r, r

1t ir. ,:e:lt-,ru .r r r-n [ ilni i l ri-in -n -r. . . .

I. -t II 3, - I c -' r :nI.i 1,,Ir:. .hr .... .,., ll f.r ,1

! r J , - 3n. , , .ln r - L r. I 1-1.3,,n r, . ;. rn.rl. r ,rE r ... . . . ....... -u n J r, .... J::" 4 ,r': -1-.A- n,ilArI lilIIatI ..qr..Itulrilli-r

',1 .r.-.: .1apil-. Ii,- 4;,il- t, . rAilIr dir.' II .,- I nied . i-h li I-,lr-

r.Jn, ..1 rl-,- Ind u-rr,s l Rt .l uhr.nr Li hlie

rI-i ,-i . ,I t.In. i-t l I-'i l. i II .. ilr i IIti* * i d 3 did in cr,*rh. e r t1 .3

-rd .1t 11w nmin.- n1h ilmI,lilt -hare

ir---: rr.j I- : 3nI , rt,sla -.:,-nlr.-

57

Economic transformation: Europe, Japan, areas of many developing countries, where educa-and North America tion beyond a few years is not available, extended

family systems permit earlier marriage. The newIn the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the couple often lives with the husband's parents forearly phase of modern economic growth in north- some time, and the family's assets are shared.west Europe, population and income increases What would be the financial burden of marryingaccelerated together. Populations grew due to young and having children is reduced in the largergradual declines in mortality and, in some areas, to household (though even today marriage doesincreases in marriage rates as new economic come later and fertility is lower among the trulyopportunities opened up. Europe's rate of popula- destitute in developing countries).tion growth rose from 0.5 to 1.5 percent a year. No country in northwestern Europe had a crude

Even that was low by modern standards, for sev- birth rate above forty per thousand in 1800; in sev-eral reasons. First, when the industrial age began eral (Denmark, France, Norway, and Sweden)in the late eighteenth century, fertility was lower birth rates were nearer thirty per thousand. Thethan it is in developing countries today because crude birth rate in England was thirty-four permarTiage rates were low and because those who thousand in 1850, before marital fertility began tomarried did so in their mid-twenties to late twen- decline, compared with forty-seven per thousandties or even in their thirties. In the past two in Colombia in 1960 and more than fifty per thou-decades historical demographers have used sand in Kenya today (see Figure 4.1). By contrast,church registers to compile new and detailed infor- in the Indian subcontinent in the nineteenth cen-mation on marriages, deaths, and births in parts of tury, crude birth rates are estimated to have beenEurope. These studies indicate that as many as 15 between fifty and fifty-five per thousand.to 20 percent of women in northwest Europe never Another reason for slow population growth inmarried and that at any given time only 45 to 50 the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was thatpercent of women between the ages of fifteen and mortality, although gradually declining, was highfifty were married. The mean age at marriage in by today's standards. At the beginning of the nine-the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was teenth century infant mortality rates exceeded 200about twenty-five in Belgium, England, France, per thousand live births in many communities ofGermany, and Scandinavia. Newly married cou- Europe. They were about 250 per thousand inples had to set up their own households and thus Sweden, and were more than 300 per thousand inhad to postpone marriage until they were finan- what is now Germany, compared with an averagecially independent. A common arrangement was of 100 per thousand in low-income developingfor older couples to pass land to the young in countries today. The crude death rate in Franceexchange for a guarantee of retirement support; and England was about thirty per thousand at thesuch contracts occurred between different families beginning of the nineteenth century. It wasas well as between parents and children. twenty-three per thousand in England in 1841,

The poor in particular were forced to postpone twenty-eight per thousand in Germany in 1867,marriage; young adults often worked as servants and more than thirty per thousand in Sweden into the better-off until they could marry. In England 1870, compared with about thirteen per thousandand Sweden the landless married later than those in India today.who owned land, except where cottage industry As a result of low fertility and high mortality, theopened up new opportunities to earn a living. natural increase in population seldom exceeded 1.5Marriage occurred particularly late in Ireland. In percent a year. In England it peaked at about 1.61871 half the Irish women aged twenty-five to percent in the 1820s; in France it never exceeded 1twenty-nine were still unmarried (compared with percent during the nineteenth century.36 percent of English women). Ireland's poverty Finally, these natural increases were themselvesled to late marriage and often to spinsterhood. But partly siphoned off in emigration. About 50 millionreligious beliefs prohibited birth control, so marital people left Europe for Australia, Canada, thefertility was high. Nevertheless, the birth rate and United States, and New Zealand. At its peakpopulation growth were relatively low. (1881-1910) emigration was equivalent to 20 per-

The contrast with fertility patterns today is cent of the increase in Europe's population. Formarked. Now the key to high income is education. particular countries, it was much higher. Nearly 45The rich send their children to school, so marriage percent of the increase in the population of theis delayed and fertility is restricted. In the rural British Isles during 1846-1932 emigrated, about 40

58

FIGURE 4.1

Fertility and mortality transition in developed anddeveloping countries, 1860-1982

Crude rate(per thousand) England and Wales Kenya

60 Births

50

40 Births

30 DeathsDeaths __

20

10

1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1950 1960 1970 1982

Crude rate(per thousand) France Colombia

60

50 Births

40

30 Births

20 Deaths

10

1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1950 1960 1970 1982

Sources: Easterlin, ed., 1980; Habakkuk and Postan, 1965.

percent of the mid-period population. For Ireland dren were shared neither within an extended fam-annual gross emigration averaged 1.9 percent of ily nor by the community. Nor did parents needmean population in 1851-61 and 1.3 percent for the sons to secure the line of descent; they could adoptrest of the century. This was more than the natural sons from outside the family, an acceptable andgrowth of population, so Ireland's population fell frequently used option.between the 1840s and the end of the century. Detailed religious records of four villages in rela-More than 7 percent of Scandinavia's population tively affluent regions of Japan show that crudeemigrated to the United States between 1880 and birth rates rarely exceeded thirty per thousand, a1890; and between 30 and 40 percent of the figure lower than would be expected in a premod-increase in population of Italy, Portugal, and Spain ern society. Death rates tended to move in lineemigrated between 1846 and 1932. with birth rates, assuring slow but steady growth

Japan in the eighteenth and nineteenth century in each village. As in Europe, mean age at mar-presented a similar picture. Fertility was not high, riage was high, between twenty-two and twenty-population grew very slowly, and economic five. About 40 percent of women aged fifteen togrowth, although uneven, exceeded population forty-four were not married. Marriage rates fluctu-growth so that living standards gradually rose. ated with economic conditions: for people in theirOne explanation for low fertility was the Japanese early twenties, from as low as 14 percent to as high"stem family": when they grew up, children out- as 80 percent when times were good. Couples hadside the line of descent were forced to leave the an average of just over three children, and mothershousehold by marrying into another family or sup- tended to be between thirty-two and thirty-eightporting themselves elsewhere. The costs of chil- when their last child was born-evidence of con-

59

scious control of family size, probably by abortion only in an arithmetical ratio." Population growth,and infanticide. If it is assumed that parents did he suggested in his first essay, could be checkednot report the births of infants killed, birth rates only by a shortage of food and a resulting increasemay have been higher than measured. Baby girls in deaths. The proposition rested on two assump-were probably the main victims, since there is evi- tions: technological change could not increase fooddence that more boys than girls survived. supply faster than population, and population

Compared with Europe and Japan, North Amer- growth (at least of the poorer classes) would not beica, rich in natural resources and with good eco- limited by fewer births, only by more deaths. Onnomic opportunities, experienced faster popula- the second assumption, Malthus later modified histion growth in the nineteenth century. Fertility views; universal education, he noted in later edi-was relatively high, mortality was low; these con- tions of his Essay, could give people the foresightditions, together with heavy immigration from to limit childbearing, and improved living stand-Europe, boosted the rate of population growth ards could lead to "new . . . tastes and habits"well above 2 percent in the early years of the cen- before rising income induced a self-defeating risetury. But fertility began to decline earlier than in in population. His first assumption also provedEurope, so the population growth rate fell well incorrect. The Industrial Revolution, beginningbelow 2 percent by the early twentieth century. just before Malthus wrote, brought to Europe, andAbout one-third of total growth in population dur- later to other economies, a new age of technologi-ing 1850-1910 came from immigration of working- cal change, geometrical increases in agriculturalage people. and industrial production, and what has come to

The demographic situation of today's developed be called the "demographic transition": the transi-countries in the nineteenth century differed from tion from high to low fertility and mortality rates.what is happening in today's developing countries What are the lessons for developing countries inin several other respects. During the nineteenth what caused fertility to decline in today's devel-century rural population growth in today's devel- oped world, especially in what encouraged cou-oped countries averaged less than 1 percent a year. ples to choose smaller families? Three decades agoBy 1850 fewer than half of England's population the reasons fertility declined in today's developedlived in rural areas. By the 1880s Japan's agricul- world might have been stated quite simply. Withtural labor force was already declining. In contrast, economic growth, living conditions improve, sothe rural population in most parts of Asia and mortality begins to fall. Contrary to what MalthusAfrica today is still growing by more than 2 percent feared, fertility responds to falling mortality anda year, despite substantial migration to towns and adjusts downward, eventually producing thecities. Technology was less advanced in the nine- slower rate of population growth that prevailedteenth century, so people did not need to be well before economic conditions started to improve.educated (as they now do) to work in the modern There is a lag between falling mortality and fallingeconomy. Nor did technology displace labor, as it fertility, but one follows the other quickly enoughnow tends to do, especially if it is supplied by the so that economic gains are not eaten up by a largercapital-intensive developed countries. Where pop- population, and real incomes rise continuously.ulation growth was most rapid, in North America, In fact the story is not so simple. In Europe, andland was plentiful. later in Japan, the pattern of declining mortality

All these factors-combined with low birth rates, and fertility was not so orderly-nor is it today indeath rates that declined slowly as a consequence developing countries. In a few places fertilityof economic and not merely medical advance, and decline preceded mortality decline; in others, fer-the safety valve of emigration, at least for Europe- tility did not start falling soon after mortality did.meant that population growth never represented And economic growth-if narrowly perceived asthe burden that it now does for developing industrialization, urbanization, and the shift fromcountries. family to factory production-was neither neces-

sary nor sufficient for demographic transition.

The transition to lozvfertility In England fertility within marriage did notbegin to fall until the 1870s, almost 100 years after

In 1798 the English parson Thomas Malthus wrote the start of the Industrial Revolution and at least asin the Essay on Population his now-familiar proposi- long after a sustained decline in mortality hadtion that "Population, when unchecked, increases begun. Why the delay? Average real incomes rosein a geometrical ratio . . . Subsistence increases by more than 1 percent a year in the nineteenth

60

century. But, although unskilled workers and farm During the nineteenth century, the idea of con-laborers (only a small fraction of the rural popula- trolling fertility spread quickly in France. It did sotion owned their own land) enjoyed some increase also in other parts of Europe, though within lin-in wages, at least after 1820, it was the upper- and guistic and cultural boundaries and not quicklymiddle-income groups that captured most of the across them (see Box 4.3). By the 1830s the Frenchincome gains. birth rate had fallen below thirty per thousand.

In addition, the early phase of England's indus- Apart from Ireland in the 1840s, during its greattrialization permitted earlier marriage, which famine, no other European country went belowcaused an initial rise in birth rates as rural industry that level until Belgium and Switzerland in theprovided job opportunities outside agriculture. 1880s, followed by England and Wales in the(Such new opportunities similarly provide a 1890s. France never experienced a long period ofrationale for early marriage and high fertility in falling death rates and high birth rates, which else-transitional societies today.) Rural industry may where produced a surge of population growth. Itsnot have increased the income of any one family, population, once large compared with its neigh-but it increased the number of families by giving bors, is now unexceptional. Perhaps as a result, amore young people the chance to set up a house- large body of French opinion has been persistentlyhold. Finally, for most of the nineteenth century pronatalist. As discussed in Chapter 8, formerthe costs to parents of educating children were French colonies in West Africa still bear that legacy.confined to those at the top of the income scale. In Sweden the demographic transition followedOnly 8 percent of school-age children were the classical pattern more closely. Average incomesenrolled at school in 1851; despite much progress, were rising from at least the 1860s. The death ratestill only 59 percent were enrolled in 1891. When had started falling in the 1830s; the birth ratefertility started to decline, it did so first among the started falling in the 1860s due to later age at mar-professional middle class, which felt most keenly riage. Fertility within marriage decreased in thethe need to educate its children. Only as education 1890s. When fertility began to decline, Sweden'sspread did fertility decline in all groups. economy was still largely rural, with 74 percent of

Though urbanization and industrialization came the work force in the late 1880s engaged in agricul-later to France than to England, fertility began to ture, forestry, and fishing. Nonetheless, the econ-fall in France as early as the 1790s, when mortality omy was changing. Farm productivity had beenwas still high. Parish records show that families in rising rapidly from the 1860s. The percentage ofsome villages were small enough to indicate that farm owners in the agricultural work force roseparents were deliberately controlling fertility. Most from 42 to 57 percent between 1880 and 1930. As inwomen continued to have their first two babies France, fertility fell among landowners. Thosewithin the expected interval of two to three years. without land of their own left for the cities or emi-Soon after the French Revolution in 1789, how- grated to America. Women's wage rates were ris-ever, the intervals between the second birth and ing especially fast. Education was more wide-the third, and especially between the third and the spread than in England; in 1870 almost 60 percentfourth, lengthened substantially. of children were in school.

The decline in fertilitv could not have been con-fined to the educated. In the seventy-nine French Similarly, in Hungary and Poland peasant land-departments for which data are available, only one owners began in the nineteenth century to limitin four people marrying was able to sign the parish their families so that their children could inherit aregister in 1786-90. But the French Revolution pro- workable piece of land. The fertility of landownersmoted what French demographers call social capil- was consistently lower than that of landless farmlarity, the belief that one's children can rise in workers.social status. It brought new aspirations (perhaps Japan provides still another story. During muchincluding the education of children), reduced alle- of the twentieth century, fertility declined gradu-giance to religious norms, and made individual ally as marriage age rose. But fertility within mar-choice (as opposed to family and communal riage was as high in 1950 as it had been in 1930.authority) more legitimate. It also changed inheri- Then, by about 1960, it dropped by half. There wastance customs. French farming, unlike British, pronatalist opinion between the 1920s and 1945 inconsisted mainly of small peasant holdings; under support of Japan's expansionist policies. Afterequal inheritance, fewer children made it easier to 1945 the national mood changed and public policykeep family landholdings intact. started to favor small families. Abortion laws were

61

Box 4.3 The European fertility transitionP.Etur, 1%'' crIrlihi. in IcL e ti I1 c r.-r. -nt -ir. D,nn.irl ( rnr,n . 5Larting dates of Iertilh transition in Qol

,,h. r- inteni n.iiriaiir r!;hril-.s: 3- troIi h r_h :,ntarid L ~r- r. c rhs t. tdih ianat d tI Etropean provincesI Jb-1%h4p . l ii- * r: -. t 11 riI ir gn lI rizr.c,l F -er- .' nd .,r I 1- -rl .u n rEIrrr R. r . -.

ilii el Iiar In Fr,r- I -- ni.map, Thi- [i:z.iprr: *. irI . arr. I i. r, Wr. rt -t. ,; .11-*. L, I-- r . r. n -i Il l3 ' b t . 311 bt r -p- n pF- - - .: h .an Ih,ir r.; i

Ii.t lfr,.inl Fp1 Iin,:,- * ,r,. hay .r- n. . r;d i,rtilir-. drhIim- in Hr.tl rr. . r

pI ii ,rhirii S.;r.trc-nI4 d EI,wr-.i,- G . c, - nIi cn n IP411

i FI r- .:ri.d --Iir.d --rt,:rFrnr,ih- -p.- ng u- -,n f-I wr.::A.d rhn - iniiEIc[.iuI,ni i\ 'll.AIiri -3r.ea i;h.c,r- ciii- Eijr--pr i:-jrichcq, r .3- hc-in un,.ru rI. .

ri~raII ,r... td lir;u, i . y l-c-iL 1--h .,h- I. ir. -: . 1- *r -brrlyrwri . r

Fr- . h r r. r.i i l-r. IcriI . rA d-.i -ri n. n -- i r .Li t ?-..I I*.-Al- .cnl , II Jl - :r i. t-:

p- r. riyal rr. r ril., h I 'ii * r.iurh>J -cr1-ur * :.- in. , i . 1

-Fair i-i liii- n i-f r, - .iri-- 'ret- ri, y-r .1 .dI--p-r1w r - r. --d I lIy?t*Ic h, -c ri . r i y rn r Ih J n ard i-Žr .r i. i-r.r, r t ri i .--.il rri.-r .

190 1950I,r rni V.- II ... ;1 I. i rs. * n Jr,tt .t.-r,r,t luJ ..... . ... r .,r: , -- r. r. , -ir,.t :.- . Il p, ............... ;r,. ..!i#!'1]9095

I1. . Ii u-d nil Iiip ir...ni .lirfl , n r.. in.h.c - .ail j pr--. I, hr. u ' F r-n-- --: yI r r. r n -F r r. ,-,n , .i,. ri,: l ch L r. ; r.. -i -I..n ,. . y lr r.gI rd l. -- ..1

ir ,.-. rus,r.d 1I Itiwlui ri-i tyu.liri r_hIiJi-u :cr.1- ulisrie -lilly. r.--.

['cii r. I I I in .r I 1 . *- h r p1c.;. -

[ ] js.4 ii and careic r L i IS 1 5% L i I r-cu L I u'l and latcr N .- data

m~~~

r~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ i ._ ,i ..u r

t2 I -

1' -I

-

: ~~ ~ - -,

*<ff~~~~ -I-

Fuiy I~ - ;'--v ~ ~~~~~ I -r~r, i.l-\ _ .

liberalized, and contraception, especially use of uted little. But in the early years of the twentiethcondoms, spread. century, medical science found ways to combat

What are the lessons for developing countries? infectious disease. As a result, by the 1920s and* Fertility can decline in largely rural popula- 1930s mortality decline was spreading from

tions; it did so in France, Hungary, Japan, and Europe and North America to Japan, India, andSweden. In France, Hungary, and Japan social parts of Central and South America. With theaspirations and land ownership help explain why introduction of antibiotics, antimalarial spraying,smallholders chose to limit their families. In Swe- and the increased use of vaccination, the declineden fertility decline was associated with rapid pro- accelerated in the 1950s and spread to all develop-ductivity gains in agriculture and with an increase ing countries. Improved communications, the con-in the share of landowners among all agricultural solidation of political and administrative systems,workers. and cheaper transport all made it easier to transfer

* Economic and social opportunities for the the new advances between and within countries.majority of people matter. Fertility decline was Not only did this mortality decline occur rapidly;delayed in England, where the real wages of farm it began from higher initial levels (see Figure 4.2)laborers and unskilled workers rose only slowly, and in societies where fertility levels were higher.and where education was confined to the middle At least initially it was not followed by fertilityclass through most of the nineteenth century. Fer- decline.tility fell as education spread and became more The current demographic condition of develop-necessary to earn a living. ing countries can be summed up in seven state-

* The mere idea that it is legitimate to limit ments.births matters, but it does not spread automati- 1. The postwar rate of population growth in develop-cally. In France and some other European coun- ing countries is without precedent. Though in the past

tries fertility declined rapidly within cultural and two decades rates of population growth in some countrieslinguistic boundaries, but was slow to do so farther have been falling because of birth rate declines, rates of

afield. The spread of the idea that fertility control is growth are still unusually high, and birth rates are notlegitimate occurs more quickly as transport and declining everywhere.communication become easier-a potentially pow-erful force now in developing countries compared In 1984 the world's population will increase bywith Europe before the twentieth century. about 80 million. Most of the increase, about 73

* Low fertility is possible, but much more diffi- million, will occur in developing countries, nowcult, without sophisticated modern methods of comprising about three-quarters of world popula-birth control. In today's developed countries, late tion. The combination of continued high fertilitymarriage and celibacy were important contribu- and much-reduced mortality has led to populationtors; so, probably, were withdrawal and absti- growth of between 2 and 4 percent a year in mostnence, abortion, and possibly infanticide. But once low- and middle-income countries, compared witheconomic and social conditions are favorable, 1 percent and less in most developed countries.modern contraception speeds the decline in fertil- Growth at 3 percent a year means that in seventyity, as the Japanese experience has proved. years population grows eightfold; at 1 percent a

year it merely doubles. Current population growth

Current demographic change in developing in the developing economies is a phenomenon forcountries which economic and demographic history offers

no real precedent.Only in a few developing countries have popula- For developing countries as a group, populationtion growth rates fallen below 2 percent a year in growth rates rose from 2.0 percent in 1950 to 2.4the past two decades. In many, population is still percent in 1965, largely because of falling deathgrowing by more than 3 percent a year. In general, rates (see Figure 4.2). Since then, death rates havegrowth is fastest in the poorest countries. This continued to fall but birth rates have declined evendelinking of population growth and prosperity in more, so that growth has slowed somewhat. Thewhat is now the developing world began after rate of natural increase (and of population growth)World War 1, when mortality began to decline. in developing countries is now about 2 percent aMortality had already been falling slowly in year.Europe and the Americas, largely because of The fall in the average growth rate is due almostimproved living standards-medicine had contrib- entirely to the birth rate decline in China, which

63

FIGURE 4.2

Birth and death rates and rates of natural increase by region,1950, 1965, and 1980 25 42.

Crude birth rate(per thousand)Rate of natural increase

_ (percent)

Deaffis Crude death rate-Deaths (per thousand:

4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4

~ .. - .- . - . ._ . I F-r ¾-)

(excluding China) 10.5

J'',, .I1950 1965 1980

43.8

Sub-Saharan Africa 17.7

10

1950 1965 1980

49.47.9

.4'q 1950 1965 1980

, ,

. 42.9

-, ~ , 40 -

20 24.

18.1 -R_

Middle East and 12.6---- '10 North Africa 20

1950 1965 1980

Caribbean 8.5so -- -- - . .. 1950 1965 1980

44.8 45.4

21.8

20- 18.- -

30 -

2- w ' t II Il%23.9

20

5,outh Asia 14.5 . ... A,I

10 . . . Industrializedcountries

1950 1965 1980 1950 1965 1980

64

alone accounts for a third of all the people in devel- TABLE 4.1

oping countries and where the birth rate has fallen Percentage decline in crude birth rates and inby over 50 percent since 1965 (see Table 4.1 and total fertility rates, selected countries, 1965-82Figure 4.2). Birth rates have also fallen in other Crude birth Total fertility

countries of East Asia-in Hong Kong, Korea, rate decline rate decline

Thailand, and Singapore by more than 30 percent, Region and couintry 1965-82 1965-82

in Indonesia and elsewhere by 20 to 30 percent. In Sub-Saharan Africa

these generally middle-income economies, a Ethiopia 5.6 3.0

demographic transition to low fertility is clearly Kenya +0.2 0.0

under way. Nigeria 3.7 0.0

In the middle-income countries of Latin America Sudan 1.4 1.5

as well, birth rates have fallen more than death Zaire 3.8 E3.3Middle East and North Africa

rates, which has slowed the rate of population Algeria 6.0 5.4

growth. In Brazil and Mexico birth rate declines Egypt 16.3 22.0

have been more modest than in East Asia but have Iran 7.7 18.8

still been rapid, especially in the past decade. In Morocco 20.0 18.3

Colombia, Cuba, and Jamaica birth rates have also Tunisia 26.5 28.6

fallen. But in the poorer countries, including El Latin America and Caribbean

Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, Bolivia 6.1 4.6

birth rates are still more than thirty-five per thou- Brazil 18.6 30.4

sand and population growth rates close to or Colombia 31.4 42.9

greater than 3 percent a year. In Bolivia and Peru Cuba 51.5 55.6

the growth rate is still about 2.5 percent. Guatemala 17.6 21.2Honduras 12.5 10.8

In South Asia the birth rate has fallen barely Jamaica 29.1 37.1

enough to offset some further decline in the death Mexico 23.8 31.3

rate. Sri Lanka is the only country of the region Nicaragua 8.7 12.5with a birth rate less than thirty per thousand. Peru 24.4 30.8

India's birth rate has fallen markedly in some South Asiastates, but much less in others, and is now about Bangladesh 9.6 14.9

India 19.9 18.7thirty-four per thousand; as death rates have Pakistan 15.8 22.7

fallen, population growth has increased, from just Sri Lanka 20.2 30.6

above 2 percent a year in the early 1960s to 2.1 East Asia and Pacificpercent in 1982. In Bangladesh and Pakistan the China 54.0 61.3

birth rate has barely fallen and exceeds forty per Indonesia 22.4 25.9thousand; population grows at about 3 percent a Korea, Rep. of 35.4 43.8pp gr ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~Philippines 32.0 38.2year. In Africa and much of the Middle East (with Thailand 34.0 42.9the exception of Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Tunisia,Morocco, and Turkey), birth rates are above fortyper thousand and have changed little or not at all;population growth rates are generally above 3 increase in the proportion of women of marriagepercent. and childbearing age, the birth rate would have

In most countries where the crude birth rate has risen by 1.1 points from 1971 to 1981, from 36.9 to* fallen, the total fertility rate has fallen even more 38.0, had there been no change in the marriage

(see Table 4.1); the total fertility rate is the number rate and marital fertility. (In fact, it fell by 3 pointsof children a woman would have if she experi- as marriage age rose and married couples hadenced current age-specific fertility rates of all fewer children.)women (see Box 4.4). The total fertility rate hasfallen more because high fertility and declining 2. The high fertility and faIling Infant mortality ofmoralit the bease and f9tls mand taalarge the mid-1960s mean that in developing countries todayproportalioyin ofe todays population in devealonge about 40 percent of populations are aged fifteen orproportion of today's population in developing countries is now of childbearing age. Until this younger.group has completed its childbearing years, overall In countries such as Kenya, where fertility hasbirth rates will remain high, even if actual family declined little or not at all, more than 50 percent ofsize is small. In India, for example, because of the the population is younger than fifteen, compared

65

Box 4.4 Alternative measures of fertility and mortality

rud J.hI rti,h nrA d~ J,iIh r:,t.r p,-r t h.u t .*y nit, -r, n, -I i .-n,c p n.i inrm, bn I it r. I F-r nPI, t- LI.a -. ih, p r. .p.rr. r,r

.r. I r r.I -itI.r, pi .., ,. ~ ni .i- .-I,V i ' .~ ~ rrtn .rt.l ir, ..4 *i-ir.r. .-4 d,ti..r.-r.i .d ..-.n ~ I- I J t-,id a.> r, .1 .4j4 h s been

n i: pq7ur, Li I ,, .. r,-I Ith H ., 1.1I t.-rti I, r3ir irn h t- k.. 1.p. hj, :1in ni. F: d.1.. I1.p,n, :. -.nrrr'.3 in ther ,rul, ryr. - d, ni., ,rnvi--ri, tl-u. ir, I- i .: -ri. ir.: ~ . t-rr F i n..: m i . ji, I.,'r it.. dem ., ruckt :birth r3r.-s have

.7,1 t-,rrh4 ind .1 r - i rh, h-,-. L-k~ ih- i..r I Iril .,rF,i Ii , *fp, t tiIr- 1- tha ri -tr rm iirrdIi r3t : in that

-.1 . rd duiO ic- I Ii- r r-. t,. - r.,.I it t-irrrih - rth.h n- ~ -~ it p. d r-d rrd.:ri ui. -l-. .tvn.7~ in fer-

rn-., .t,r- I, v -,; *r . - IhI pl.rp. .;c ir:- rh-, in1..I,ir-. i-, IF- rrb*.r * i r-. r,..b..r rr, t.,i, Id-t 1. r- .i --..plk. ih,: ame is

r..iI 1 ril a 1.- I-i I 'nn:, ii t ,t . ul- d Li. -- , ~ d i. . I F F r. - 1 I-- n. i.,Irii. I h.. -rud.. death rate

rIb., tlii! P.:ir,,r. - .v.i pmr,il.-ir.j IF..t .. il 'u r h,: th:r ri nd- I, !---l-r than the

Fi-. -ri t i rir. 1-r. I l-F -I.L, r,rir ,-li ,ur. u-p r. 'h s urIrri , e r .-ud,- 1.-0, Fr,i-if -.ri. 1 4 versus 7.2

iir ih. .uin , I th-: 1--ahrib ;i .p:i h.. I. d ,ii ,hil' r, n i r- sr ilh.- it. p- rrh..u,. rndi t:im mu.i-cause the

I. ... i, :- -~.[ , -r-hi. n Ii rc.i, q,-r. p iii. t1,rk F. .t ~, ui. % r .,- pr. -r. rri. -, I l-.- p-Fuii.-' over sixty-

nir r ri rh .r.. -I r-nun -,t,i Ft L-.rti-m o.-., i-t.F,Ld L. it: iCr Tiruol,F . -F.I,s I, - . -r i,r,.. ic :r, t I.in lie Nether-

,- n, hAd I h-, t,rtiliii. i ir. [ h- ni- Ji-rih rFin a F. - r udJ. it- i.r.rh I r-A I tF. P.. -* r, .ir Fin - . --

r tIn~ r .. r-.r 1.: ' I lii. I. .ti, *i. i Ill t.: Ii, . I ti- i-prr du, r, _ . rr I .: 1 . -r, n I. rL,r r- rhu,

,i ri.-I -i ii,- II rn-Fnt I,r i -l t *1 M. .r i..- Fr..up4 , r- ii iz r. nu[.. rtI r. tth l'-. ~ J,iir ~r-'I. r I-, i r . ri I I r

inin . ni, r I.- :,-1 h~.. h,Ti-n ri t r h n1ud r I h, I b--.1 nr m:nr-i

time exr rII r. *.. .1 -,. r -~ r r.

group or .h,.n,. r.1 J..b:. rd . I I iiFrr I>I.-,I..C-

with only 20 to 25 percent in developed countries Colombia, for example, the working-age popula-(see Table 4.2). Although the proportion of old tion will increase from 15 million in 1980 to almostpeople is smaller in developing countries, the 25 million in 2000. In Bangladesh it will almostdependency ratio-the proportion of the popula- double, from 48 million to 84 million. The eco-tion under fifteen and over sixty-four to those nomic implications of this growth are discussed inbetween ages fifteen and sixty-four-is on average the next chapter.higher. In Japan, for example, there are roughly In other age groups as well, population growthtwo people of working age to support one who is in developing countries will be higher than ineither too old or too young to work; in Kenya, the developed countries. The number of people olderratio is less than one-to-one. Other things being than sixty-five will almost double between nowequal, if income per worker were identical in Japan and 2000 in developing countries. In developedand Kenya, income per person in Japan would countries the number will increase by about a thirdnevertheless be at least 30 percent higher. Even (but by about 85 percent in Japan).within the sarm-e country there are comparable dif- 3.Nihrntna oriteainl"igtonfes

ferences in age structure-and hence in depen- 3.a Neiuther iternopl nritration alowh Higiiration offersti

dencyburdns-amng fmilie. Inurba ral populationi increase account more for the rapidMaharashtra state (India), about half the people in prut f iisi peeopncutre thndesrrlthe poorest 10 percent of households are younger growth ofgcitieson. Develping couentriveshnde rural-ubnmgathan fifteen; in the richest 20 percent, only one in urban migrlation. Despivte extnsivea arurasfl-urbancomigafive is younger than fifteen. tsian, populato grothiin ruer als aerceas of low-incomear

The age structure in developing countries means Asia andseAfricalestillavernagesna2 peircetior more apear.that birth rates will remain high for some time Thepreent scaltempofay iontentionesal smigallpootion,bt pereven if each mother has fewer children. It also inaet pouandtemo ary,dveopn consiutires asalpoprinomeans the number of young people entering the teppltoso eeoigcutislabor force will continue to increase for the next Cities in developing countries are growing attwo decades. For countries where fertility began to almost twice the rate of overall populations (seefall in the mid-1960s, the rate of growth of the labor Table 4.3). More than half the increase is due to theforce is now just starting to decline, though the balance of births over deaths; the rest is due toabsolute number of new workers will continue to migration from rural areas and the reclassificationincrease until after the end of this century. In of rural areas to urban status. Historically, the

66

TABLE 4.2

Comparison of age structures in developed and developing countries, 1980

Age distribution (percent) fertility

Country group 0-4 5-14 15-64 Over 65 All ages rate

All developedcountries 7.6 15.5 65.6 11.3 100.0 1.9g

Japan 7.3 16.1 67.7 8.9 100.0 1.8United States 7.9 15.0 66.3 10.7 100.0 1.9Hungary 8.0 13.7 64.9 15.9 100.0 2.1

All developingcountries 13.6 25.5 57.0 4.0 100.0 4.2a

Korea, Rep. of 10.6 22.7 62.7 4.0 100.0 3.0Colombia 14.0 25.4 57.1 3.5 100.0 3.8Bangladesh 17.9 24.9 54.6 2.6 100.0 6.3Kenya 22.4 28.6 46.1 2.9 100.0 8.0

a. Weighted average.

urban populations of some of today's developed today's developed countries only in 1950. Low-countries have grown even faster-for example, income Asia and Africa are still overwhelminglythe urban population of the United States rural; their current urbanization level of about 25increased at about 6 percent a year between 1830 percent was reached in the developed countriesand 1860. But today's developing countries have before 1900.started from a much larger base, so the absolute The world's biggest cities are increasingly in theincreases are much greater. From 1950 to 1980 the developing countries. Between 1950 and 1980 theurban population of all developing countries proportion of urban dwellers in developing coun-(excluding China) increased by 585 million-com- tries in cities of more than 5 million increased frompared with a total urban population in the devel- 2 to 14 percent, growing at a rate of 15 percent aoped countries in 1950 of just over 300 million. year. Sao Paulo, which by the year 2000 could well

Latin America is the most urbanized of develop- be the world's second largest city (behind Mexicoing-country regions. In 1980 about two-thirds of its City), was smaller in 1950 than Manchester,people were urban dwellers, a level reached in Detroit, and Naples. London, the world's second

TABLE 4.3

Rural and urban population growth, 1950-2000

Percentage urban Average annual percentage growthpopulation 1950-80 1980-2000

Country group 1950 1980 2000 Urban Rural Urbani Rural

All developing countries 18.9 28.7 .. 3.4 1.7 .

Excluding China 22.2 35.4 43.3 3.8 1.7 3.5 1.1Low-income

Asia 10.7 19.5 31.3 4.4 2.0 4.2 0.9China 11.2 13.2a .. 2.5 1.8 ..

India 16.8 23.3 35.5 3.2 1.8 4.2 1.1Africa 5.7 19.2 34.9 7.0 2.5 5.8 1.5

Middle-incomeEast Asia and Pacific 19.6 31.9 41.9 4.1 1.8 3.1 0.9Middle East and North Africa 27.7 46.8 59.9 4.4 1.6 4.3 1.6Sub-Saharan Africa 33.7 49.4 55.2 3.1 1.0 2.9 1.7Latin America and Caribbean 41.4 65.3 75.4 4.1 0.8 2.9 0.4Southern Europe 24.7 47.1 62.3 3.8 0.5 2.9 -0.2

Industrial countriesb 61.3 77.0 83.7 1.8 -0.7 1.0 .-1.1

Not available.a. Government estimate for 1979.b. Excludes East European nonmarket economies.

67

largest city in 1950, will not even rank among the two decades, and the urban population couldtwenty-five largest by the end of the century (see increase by 170 million, the rural population willFigure 4.3). still increase by 130 million. The rural population

Despite the rapid growth of cities, the urban of all developing countries is likely to increase byshare of today's developing-country populations is another billion people by the middle of the nextnot increasing especially fast. This is because not century. Both the rates of growth and the increaseonly urban but also rural populations are growing in numbers greatly exceed those of today's devel-rapidly, and in low-income countries from a large oped countries in the nineteenth century, thebase, so that a considerable growth of numbers period when overall population growth in thosewill continue in the countryside for the rest of this countries was highest.decade and beyond. In India, for example, though Compared with rates of intercontinental migra-urban rates of population growth are likely to be tion from Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenthabout four times higher than rural rates in the next centuries, present-day permanent emigration rates

are small: between 1970 and 1980 emigrationabsorbed about 3 percent of population growth in

FIGURE 4.3 Europe and Latin America, less than 1 percent inUrban agglomerations with more than 10 million Asia and Africa (see Table 4.4). For India, a largeinhabitants: 1950, 1975, and 2000 low-income country, the emigration rate was only

0.2 percent. Only for a few countries are perma-nent emigration rates high, and these tend to be

0 Dev oping countries p! h the relatively better-off, middle-income countries:Developing countries Greece, Hong Kong, and Portugal.Developed countries i Permanent emigration has only a limited effect

on reducing the work force in developing coun-i , l r | Ba tries. To take a simple example, even if 700,000

immigrants a year were admitted to the major hostcountries up to the year 2000, and all came from

.. -. c : 1111low-income countries, less than 2 percent of theprojected growth in population in the low-incomecountries between 1982 and 2000 would have emi-grated. By contrast, such immigration would

1950 1975 2000 account for 22 percent of the projected natural

1950 (millions) (millions) increase in population of the industrial marketNew York, northeast economies and 36 percent of the projected increaseNew Jersey 12.2 London 10.4 in the main host countries: Australia, Canada,1975 New Zealand, and the United States.New York, northeast London 10.4 The past three decades have seen a markedNew Jersey 19.8 Tokyo, Yokohama 17.7 increase in temporary migration. By 1974, tempo-Mexico City 11.9 Shanghai 11.6 tmoayB oLos Angeles, Sao Paulo 10.7 rary foreign workers in Europe, numbering aboutLong Beach 10.8 6.5 million, constituted 30 percent of the work2000 force in Luxembourg, more than 18 percent inMexico City 31.0 Sao Paulo 25.8 Switzerland, and about 8 percent in Belgium,Tokyo, Yokohama 24.2 New York, northeast France, and Germany. They came mostly fromShanghai 22.7 New Jersey 22.8Beijing 19.9 Rio deJaneiro 19.0 nearby, middle-icome countries. In the majorGreater Bombav 17.1 Calcutta 16.7 labor-importing countries of the Middle East,Jakarta 16.6 Seoul 14.2 about 2 million foreign workers constituted moreLos Angeles, Cairo, Giza, Imbaba 13.1 than 40 percent of the employed work force inLong Beach 14.2 Manila 12.3Madras 12.9 Bangkok, Thonburi 11.9 1975. Ghana and the Ivory Coast employed aboutGreater Buenos Aires 12.1 Delhi 11.7 1 million foreign workers in 1975, mostly fromKarachi 11.8 Paris 11.3 Mali, Togo, and Upper Volta. Argentina and Vene-Bogota 11.7 Istanbul 11.2 zuela had about 2 million workers from Bolivia,Tehran 11.3 Osaka, Kobe 11.1 Paraguay, and Colombia.Baghdad 11.1 But, as with permanent emigration, temporarySi,rc, United Nations, 1980.S___-_______U__ited_____Nations,_______1980____ emigrants constitute only a small proportion of the

68

TABLE 4.4 some of the countries that achieved relatively largePermanent emigration as a percentage of reductions in fertility between 1972 and 1982. Atincrease in populations of emigrants' the other extreme, fertility rose slightly in a fewcountries African countries.

Latin The association across countries also tends toPeriod Europe Asia' Africa' America' hold within countries. In an individual country,

1851-80 11.7 0.4 0.01 0.3 those with higher income tend to have more edu-1881-1910 19.5 0.3 0.04 0.9 cation, better health, and-for women-more1911-40 14.4 0.1 0.03 1.8 opportunities to work in modern sector jobs. As1940-60 2.7b 0.1 0.01 1.0 Chapter 6 emphasizes, these characteristics are all1960-70 5.2 0.2 0.10 1.9 associated with lower fertility and mortality.1970-80 4.0 0.5 0.30 2.5 It is wrong to conclude, however, that countries

Note: Numbers are calculated from data on gross immigration in must get richer before they can lower fertility andAustralia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.a. The periods from 1850 to 1960 pertain to emigration only to raise life expectancy. Average income is only onethe United States. of the factors involved. As Figure 4.4 shows, someb. Emigration only to the United States. countries have significantly lower fertility than theSource: Swamy, 1984.

norm for those with their income level. Examplesinclude China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Korea,Thailand, and Sri Lanka. By contrast, countries

labor force in developing countries. The total num- with relatively high fertility (given their income)ber of temporary workers abroad in 1980 was include Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco, most coun-between 13 and 15 million. For some countries in tries of sub-Saharan Africa, Venezuela, and eventhe Middle East, southern Europe, and Africa, with its recent decline in fertility, Mexico. China,temporary workers are a large proportion of the Costa Rica, and Sri Lanka have relatively high lifeemigrant country's labor force. But for Bangladesh expectancy. These exceptions demonstrate theand India as a whole, the proportion is less than 1 importance of the availability and distribution ofpercent. The same is true even of illegal migration. health and educational services, the extent toAbout 2 to 4 million immigrants were living ille- which adult women enjoy a status independent ofgally in the United States in April 1980, about half childrearing, and the access of the poor to familyof them from Mexico. At most they would have planning services. The reasons for the importanceconstituted 8 percent of Mexico's total labor force of these other factors, and how they interact, arein that year. discussed in Chapter 6.

4. More often than not, current fertility and mortal- 5. The relation between income and life expectancy,ity rates are inversely related to income-but this rule and between income and fertility, has shifted over time.hzas many significant exceptions. As Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show, the same average

The relation between average income and the income is associated with lower fertility and highertotal fertility rate in developing countries is shown life expectancy in 1982 than in 1972. Since thein Figure 4.4, and between income and life expect- 1920s, and especially since the end of World Warancy in Figure 4.5. In general, the higher a coun- II, the main reasons for rising life expectancy intry's average income, the lower its fertility and the developing countries have been better publichigher its life expectancy. Some of the 100 coun- health systems, educational advances, and thetries used in the analysis are identified in the greater political stability that permitted these. Forfigures. example, a quarter of Sri Lanka's decline in mortal-

Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent ity after 1945 is attributable solely to the control of(Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) have the highest malaria. Rising incomes and associated improve-levels of fertility and mortality and the lowest ments in nutrition and sanitation have in generalincomes; fertility averages five to eight children played a lesser role. As a result, life expectancy isper woman, and life expectancy is as low as fifty higher in developing countries than it was inyears. Countries of East Asia and Latin America today's developed countries at the turn of the cen-have lower fertility (three to five children), higher tury, despite income and education levels that inlife expectancy (about sixty years), and higher many countries are still lower. Life expectancy inincomes. Some countries have moved faster than India was fifty-five in 1982, yet India's per capitaothers: Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and Thailand are income is still below $300 a year and its literacy rate

69

FIGURE 4.4

Fertility in relation to income in developing countries, 1972 and 1982

Total fertility rate

8

KenyaJordan * 1972

7 Bangladesh Morocco \ 1982

Ethiopia, H Sda igeria MlexicoTanzania \El Salvador

6 Nepal hiippines

ZIre PeruXIndia Trkey

5 ~~~~MalaysiaVneu.

4 ;Idnei\ \ i \ Norm for 92 developing countries, 1972

Thailand Brazil_-

Sri Lanka Colombia Costa Rica3 Trinidad and

Tobago

China Korea SingapGreec

2 * Hong Kong

Yugoslavia

Norm for 98 developing countries, 19821

0 $1000 $2000 $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000

Income per capita (1980 dollars)

FIGURE 4.5

Life expectancy in relation to income in developing countries, 1972 and 1982

Life expectancy at birth

80

Costa Rica Greece

70 Malaysia re

Yugoslavi

" China Philippi Trinidad and Tobago

z h < s N Norm ~~~~~~~~~~~~for 92 developing countries, 1972

60 Sri Lanka t Korea

Thailand Egypt ey Norm for 98 developing countries, 1982Kenyal I,Algeria

India vordan

50 .Morocco

Ethiopia Indnei* 1972

71 /Tanzania Nigeria * 1982| Sudan

40

Upper Volta

30

0 $1000 $2000 $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000

Income per capita (1980 dollars)

70

below 40 percent. Life expectancy in England, than 2 since.Sweden, and the United States was still below fifty The reasons fertility has stalled vary from coun-in 1900, although average income (in 1982 dollars) try to country. In Korea fertility is already low-awas more than $1,000 and the literacy rate rate of 2.7 in 1982. Fertility fell as women marriedexceeded 80 percent in all three countries. One later, especially in the 1960s, but the marriage ageanalysis indicates that life expectancy in the devel- for women now averages twenty-four and isoping countries in 1970 would have been about unlikely to rise further. This cause of lower fertilityeight years lower had it not been for the improve- may therefore now be exhausted. Marriage is uni-ments in public health. versal, and most Korean couples want at least one

Fertility, too, has been declining in many devel- son. Until that attitude changes, actual fertility willoping countries faster than it did in today's devel- not fall to replacement level even if the ideal num-oped countries. For Austria, England, and the ber of children falls to two. Some couples will haveUnited States it took about fifty years to go from two girls and go on to another pregnancy.birth rates of thirty-five to twenty per thousand, an In Costa Rica the total fertility rate fell dramati-average decline of 0.3 per year. Birth rate declines cally from 7.0 in 1960 to 3.7 in 1978. But it hasin China, Colombia, and Costa Rica have exceeded fluctuated around that level since. The use of con-one point per year. Education and income growth traception has not increased since 1976, althoughhave been rapid; modern communication has knowledge is widespread: 98 percent of marriedincreased the speed with which the idea and legiti- women know of a source of modern contraception.macy of fertility control can spread; and modern The fertility of uneducated women has fallen, butcontraceptives have lowered the costs and each still has about five children. The family plan-increased the effectiveness of individual fertility ning program has flagged recently for lack of polit-control. ical support. More important, parents still want

Fertility is also declining at lower levels of more than three children-an average of 3.6, sayincome. Marital fertility started falling in most women in their early twenties, while older womenEuropean provinces between 1880 and 1930, when favor even more.average income already exceeded $1,000 (in 1982 Sri Lanka's initial decline in fertility was partlydollars), compared with half that figure when fer- due to increases in marriage age. But since 1974 thetility decline began in Latin America and much of total fertility rate has remained the same or evenAsia. Between 1972 and 1982 there was a further risen, from 3.4 to an estimated 3.7 in 1981. Thedownward shift in the income-fertility relation. country's marriage patterns are sensitive to eco-

These long-term changes encourage optimism. nomic conditions, especially male employment, soLower mortality and fertility can be achieved even an economic revival in the late 1970s may havein the poorest countries. But there is also a new been the cause. But Sri Lankan women have onecause for concern. child more than they want, on average, so

improved contraceptive services could reduce6. Mortality has declined everywhere, and fertility fertility.

has started to decline in many countries. But there is In India the total fertility rate in 1982 was 4.8,considerable variation, and in some regions and coun- down from about 6.5 in the 1950s. It has continuedtries the declines now seem to be stalled at relatively high to fall, but very slowly. Except for the northernlevels. state of Punjab, where the Green Revolution has

Almost all countries outside Africa have experi- brought agricultural modernization, most of theenced some fertility decline in the past two decline has occurred in a few southern states indecades. But since 1975 the decline seems to have which female literacy rates are higher, infant mor-slowed and even stopped in countries such as tality lower, and family planning services betterCosta Rica, India, Korea, and Sri Lanka, where run than in other parts of India.fertility levels are still relatively high (though low In many countries fertility continues to fall with-given income levels in these countries). In con- out interruption. But in most, rates are still high,trast, once fertility started falling in today's devel- and the barriers to continued declines may not yetoped countries, it went on falling more or less con- have been reached. Indonesia's total fertility ratetinuously. Though fertility rose in Europe and the fell from 5.5 in 1970, when the government beganUnited States for two decades after World War II, a vigorous family planning program, to 4.3 in 1982.total fertility rates rose only a little above 3 even It is lowest in Java, where the program has beenduring this baby boom and have declined to less most active. But even there it is still about 4.0; the

71

government goal is a nationwide rate of 2.7 by 1990. thousand and the death rate thirteen per thou-It is of course possible that the stalling may be sand, so Indonesia's population is growing at 2.1

temporary. In Korea fertility decline was checked percent a year. In countries in which desired familyfor a while in the 1960s and then resumed. Yet size is four or more, fertility will fall further onlystalling could also mean that initial, easily met with more social and economic change, along withdemand for contraception has been largely satu- greater efforts to bring better family planning serv-rated at a level of fertility that is lower than it was, ices to more people.but a level that is still relatively high. Judging from There is also some evidence that improvementsrecent research on desired family size in many in life expectancy are slowing down. In developeddeveloping countries, this may well be the case. In countries, life expectancy rose steadily until itthe late 1970s parents still wanted about four chil- reached about sixty; beyond that, rises are natu-dren, even in those countries in which fertility had rally slower in coming. But in some developinginitially declined. The average, for example, was countries, progress has not been so steady (see Box4.1 in Colombia and Indonesia, 4.4 in the Philip- 4.5). Much of the gain in life expectancy has comepines, and 3.7 in Thailand. Yet if each couple in a from various public health programs such as vacci-country has four children, population growth will nation and antimalarial spraying, which generallyremain rapid. Take the example of Indonesia, made a bigger difference in the 1950s and 1960swhere the fertility rate of 4.3 is close to the desired than in the 1970s. This is especially true in Latinfamily size. The crude birth rate is thirty-four per America. In Asia, and particularly in East Asia,

Box 4.5 Is the rise in life expectanc) slowing too soon?

Th, cur. in h~ clh3rr rp!e-.l`rr he Th-, x . ,13le, kl .lara .1,- il.,..r ,1... . to be sure. Some slowdown could alsoir.nd ir, 1m hrc cI.t ir, J.--d. .s 'r di-r nL el-e .h'rr i. Lr, \car,; ;nd have akvr, riac in sub-Saharan Africa;

count,,.r it 4ho . rhir ii h .rit .;b. U l rhr *.uritt b, n m:;i prncr.urn.:e. n 3 in A;, ., ;I......-. .d. n was probably

.si,hi. < .'n . er,. U 1 ra3.z- ii?., k. :<.unrr,e> -ucr a- -'.rcenr,ni B.irb3 ..r modest. The chart does indicate that

e pE.l;n. Irn t rcT -n. Ir *.:r t Eari. t,cuir it .:- Trinidad 3nd i ru,dUn gains t-II ;lilghrI short of the standard in

th it-.51 in L w.; or Ihit.nd d .t:e n -* -D.d ihi- *h-xi-. d ccu. r, ; -, r Sri Lanka in the 1960s, but they were

on. -i' ,i i:'UT Ibu: CUrT rr le, E I rm rrn., h -i t r, K.au.. rV., d t.;ia ire greater in China and probably also in

ind-tr.al ;, Luniro-1 The rh e ,min3il1. m .,h ik.:r,:h,er el e h-re Ii ,. dircic,it India.

.1,. "u.6 up- l'FE .'rwnd ch.Žn er:,LduMI.

.I!a,n The jI, -n fl pai- Trends in llle e%pedtnc-: mhiee de%hoping coudrtriei and the mean tendIrl marird - 1-, pecn: r,;.;

elb : m.e -- enr. -r inhl c hc L.h, -rtrde.eIed .: nt. r cti. tlZ r 3 e

:raounir,h,E c.~ cl- i, ' C. LInr..n:-, .- t he d,-e:.z,E . ihat [ ill F-qlc Irn

:ailu,nr T unrier - ;uch ,; llc arc dit-a-irnd ,a,,cer-xlt,t.-ndi ,,r,I '1,1, h. Pvr- ri7 0-.. 40,1978.

nme.j,al r.-arch "O, I :': 1.' *0 1975.

F'ur.r.17 tre i" m l.an de .1 .pr.c 4- 1 963, 1971

:.-.rr,ur,- r ;,.cer- ;ut,tirmnriaI gain; in

iilk c p-;tanc. ,'.!'ni, ;u:h .. r .I.:.n3,LNite ,o, ind ri Lini,3 outperik.rnredt rhe

*1candard reFrr;ent-c t. tht cur. Thc

r-ord T,.r Th.c l-Q'i 3 nd 1c1ii I, z mr.uc:h

nir- nil Duri., the lanrinth. Fi-

cain. ii '-. .-ac, In iTr. pec3rn. ;

;nms,ll . nd yr rm 1-1 l.; l--. .- I,.n/

t- 4iar,ni '1 3 -eFra ar.nrnull, E e- .all.. . r, r lo.s tr c.,in- t hilhhr. r le. - .I../,h,-, -

.1 their p' ire. . 1'. di pp.i in c

rh,: - ,I .x: EunTr,c h3,d maccl,ed th, 1 .,, 4,' -,

at indird it .- a,t h., t puiled!

1- 4 * .,:ri- ,nn-ill. . .r rh... _r-...t

72

economic development has been rapid enough to tries, has already fallen considerably. But there areoffset the declining contribution of public health other reasons. Mortality declines affect populationimprovements, so life expectancy has gone on ris- growth less when fertility is falling, as is and willing steadily. In India in the past decade, however, be the case in most countries. Long-range popula-poverty and illiteracy in rural areas of the north tion growth is less dependent on the addition ofseem to have kept infant mortality high, slowing people whose lives are saved than on the numberany further rise in rural life expectancy despite eco- of children they subsequently bear. When fertilitynomic growth. In Africa slower economic progress is high, saving a baby's life adds a great deal of(in some countries, even regression) has slowed reproductive potential. To save the lives of anthe rise in life expectancy. Rural mortality tends to infant girl and boy who will go on to have 6 chil-exceed urban mortality, so a slightly slower pace of dren is to add those people plus (perhaps) their 36urbanization in the late 1970s may also have grandchildren, 216 great grandchildren, and so on.slowed progress against mortality. By contrast, the But as fertility declines, so does the amount ofremarkable gain in life expectancy in China-from extra reproductive capacity. The infant girl whoforty-one in 1960 to an estimated sixty-seven in survives, grows up, and gives birth to 3 instead of1982-shows what can be achieved, even by a 6 children has 27 rather than 216 great grand-largely rural society, through a combination of children (assuming that each of her children willeducation, income gains, and a strong health care follow her pattern). Furthermore, as mortalityprogram. declines, more and more deaths are shifted from

For the future, increasing life expectancy seems younger to older ages. To extend the life of some-likely to depend more than ever on improved liv- one sixty years old is to keep the population justing conditions, education for women, and better one person larger than it would otherwise be, nothealth care for the poor. Three indicators lend sup- to boost it by that person plus descendants.port to this view. In addition, as Chapter 6 will indicate, lower

* Mortality from diarrhea in the developing mortality contributes directly to lower fertility. Forworld is two to three times higher than it was in the individual family, fewer deaths usually meantoday's developed countries when overall mortal- fewer births (though the net effect is a somewhatity levels were similar. Diarrhea is a disease of the larger family on average). Finally, because furtherpoor, primarily of poor children. It accompanies mortality declines depend more than before onmalnutrition and is exacerbated by poor sanitation, progress in women's education and on improvedlack of elementary health services, and lack of the living conditions and health care, programs thatbasic education that might allow parents to take reduce mortality are likely to reduce fertility asthe necessary precautions to prevent it. well.

* Infant and child mortality, the major contribu-tors to low life expectancy in developing countries, Demographic prospects and goalsare closely linked to economic and social welfare.In Latin America infant and child mortality rates Demographic projections should not be treated asare five times greater among children whose moth- forecasts. The purpose in making projections is toers have no schooling than among those with illustrate what the future could be, given certainmothers having ten or more years of schooling. assumptions. It is the assumptions that determine

* In countries with life expectancy higher than whether the projections will match reality. Somemight be expected from their average incomes- projections have been wide of the mark; for exam-Costa Rica, Cuba, Korea, and Sri Lanka-income ple, the size and duration of the baby boom aftertends to be more equally distributed than in other 1945 in the United States was unexpected. Butdeveloping countries. Illiteracy is also lower and since the 1950s, when the United Nations beganhealth services more widespread. producing systematic projections of world popula-

tion, demographers have done well in predicting7. Further declines in mortality rates will boost popu- future trends. In 1963 the United Nations pro-

lation growth much less from now on than they did in jected a 1980 population of 4.3 billion, only a shadethe 1950s and 1960s. off the 4.4 billion suggested by the latest estimates,

For most of the developing world, the time when and projections of world population in the yeardeclining mortality produced surges in population 2000 have hardly changed since 1963.is passing rapidly. In part this is because mortality, But projections for particular regions and coun-though still high compared with developed coun- tries have varied. The 1980 UN projection for

73

North America's population in 2000 is 16 percent 1950 and the present by eleven developing coun-below the 1963 projection because fertility is lower tries, including Colombia, Korea, Singapore, andthan expected; the 1980 projection for Asia as a Thailand, where at times the total fertility ratewhole is 3 percent above the 1963 projection declined by almost 0.2 a year. Similarly, rapid mor-because fertility has fallen less than expected (even tality decline is based on the experience of fourteenthough the projection for one country, China, countries, including Costa Rica, Cuba, Hongwhere fertility has fallen more than expected, is Kong, and Kenya, where life expectancy increasedbelow the 1963 projection). by at least one year every two years between 1950

Two critical assumptions guide the World Bank and 1980 (and at a faster rate where initial lifeprojections of each country's population. expectancy was lower).

* Mortality will continue to fall everywhere Three points are clear from these projections.until life expectancy for females is eighty-two 0 Even with rapid fertility (and mortality)years. As Figure 4.6 shows, these projections decline, the developing world's population wouldessentially continue the trends that are already more than double by the year 2050, rising to 6.9well established in the ten largest developing billion. The population of Indonesia would stillcountries. They ignore the possibility of any major increase from 153 million to about 300 million, thatcatastrophe, such as war or virulent disease. of Bangladesh from 93 million to about 230 million,

* Fertility will eventually reach and stay at and that of India from 717 million to 1.4 billion (seereplacement level everywhere. When that will Table 4.5). For countries of Africa, Central Amer-occur obviously varies from country to country, ica, and the Middle East, where the proportion ofdepending on current fertility levels, recent young people is higher and where fertility is stilltrends, and family planning efforts. For most high and would take longer to decline to replace-developing countries, replacement level is pro- ment level, the increases would be much greater.jected to be reached between 2005 and 2025; for Even with rapid fertility decline, Kenya would notmost countries in Africa and the Middle East, it is reach replacement-level fertility until 2015, andprojected to be reached later. For most of the larg- today's population of 18 million would increase toest developing countries, the projections of declin- almost 70 million by 2050. Under the standarding fertility essentially extend declines that have declines, replacement-level fertility would not bebeen happening for several years. However, a few attained until 2030, and Kenya's population wouldcountries, for example Nigeria, have yet to experi- grow to 120 million by 2050. With rapid fertilityence fertility declines; for those countries projected decline, El Salvador's population would still growdeclines are assumed to start in the near future from 5 million to 12 million.(see Figure 4.7). * Population growth beyond the year 2000

The consequences of these "standard" assump- depends critically on falling fertility in the nexttions for the population of all developing countries decade or two. As Table 4.5 shows, the differenceare shown in Figure 4.8. As shown in the figure, in population size between the standard and rapidthe increases still to come are likely to exceed what declines is not great in 2000-less than 20 percenthas happened so far. This is naturally a cause for in most countries. Under any assumption, theconcern, but not for despair (see Box 4.6). The pace populations of most developing countries areof population growth need not be taken as given- likely to increase by 50 percent or more by 2000; ait also depends on policy. And the way societies few, including Kenya and Nigeria, will almostcope with a growing population depends on eco- double. By the year 2050, however, the differencesnomic and social policy as well as on how fast they will be huge. If fertility falls sooner rather thangrow. later in Kenya, population there in 2050 will be

The potential effect of policy can be illustrated by reduced by about 50 million compared with what itcomparing population projections under the would otherwise be, against today's total popula-standard assumptions with two other paths: tion of 18 million."rapid" fertility decline (with standard mortality 0 In determining the ultimate size of world pop-decline), and "rapid" mortality decline added to ulation, fertility matters more than mortality.rapid fertility decline. Country projections and the Rapid mortality decline combined with standardassumptions behind the standard and rapid paths fertility decline would produce population inare explained in detail in the Population Data Sup- developing countries 7 percent larger in the yearplement. Rapid fertility decline is at a rate equiva- 2050 than that resulting from the standard mortal-lent to that achieved in certain periods between ity decline. In contrast, rapid fertility decline

74

FIGURE 4.6 FIGURE 4.7

Actual and projected life expectancy at birth of the Actual and projected total fertility rates of the world's tenworld's ten largest countries, 1950-2100 largest countries, 1950-2100

Life expectancy at birth Total fertility rate

8.080

' - -China

India

70 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Indonesia* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Brazil

I' 6.0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Pakistan6.0 ------ ~~~~~~~~~Nigeria

Bangladesh

60 China ------ United States

// ,2ti / ------ India - \ \ ~----- USSR

/ I ------ Indonesia I\\' ------ Japan

/ | vo / ~ ~~~~~~ Brazil A\ \ 50 /P|at N rlustan 2 \ \4.0

pt / Bangladesh

,'; / ~~~~~~~~United States," \ '

40 ,'/------ USSR'|\ 5

/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~--- japan a V X

2.0 " \ " G- 30

1950 2000 2050 2100

The countries shown were the world's largest in 1980. 1950 2000 2050 2100

Source: Adapted from Demeny, 1984. The countries shown were the world's largest in 1980.

Source: Adapted from Demeny, 1984.

FIGURE 4.8

Population growth of developing countries under alternative paths of future fertility and mortality

Billions Billions

103All developing countries 3 South Asia

6~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~ - - - - - - -

8

6

1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100

3

4 Sub-Saharan Africa

/ ~~~~~~Fertility decline Mortality decline / _

d / Standard

2 ~~~~~~~~~~~~RapidRapid S tandad 1

1900 1950 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100

75

IBox 4.6 Three views of population changeThe cl-.rt' 'in tk3hi.-'~ pr--., U1 hr.: diiopirher.bni- .nd ihiin

ir.rent p~r,p-,c'i - f t ai'n p re3e~Id r .;:t ri ? ii *lh th-s Jt-p iir t I~rrn,n: arId fi.l

p.:-piaI r*n c~rc. ii Ai- Uc,ih :ik hurh:--tndrl. .a n~c- *nd b r.! -7- pc-pFulatc.fl

Tlw t--p ch-art f . I 'hc chVa rzt _,In r h miuch m. qu.LkIk thin *n th~ tir;r

aLt t ..-.rld pi-pultii n irL-m a-- w r---iII--w nt: cr a>i.ib, -lI,tq it I B C i. the b-:cinr-in,. I: ih -. r. flu'I rI I,. r-r-i n rd p-rlii r ri:.l i

iCTIculturilA,. I r . rh, nji ..t rhr pre-ent rjid rtI *n *-r ' 'he it3 IIe-mrr ..i ulir..

c,lue Th, nuiddl, cha-rt ;h.- * p'-:paI.- Edi -i) . - '[ From.r th- lit.... -,lit 1 .nth :e_ntar.ti7 ri L rat-' zr.--r [FE l_;II .T i i 'I'D' l'L .:, th,,fl.ridu ;tr,.I !ciC tr'A!r, -L - third tur-r

The bc-it--iT- chi,rr k 1 i-p -nc -4 r-~--Ptili ---r, r. -. rh It began from a

~h-ch.i.r'cI irt rhe _.i; the hurri,n much higher base and has covered apc-publl *r, L~u' I a,i rt ile r penr, -c- *..Ii~ pll- 1tIiULh rhrer eri-I- ut i 'rth

hac,k to I mflls-n F '_ -.ini *n a i,rt. 111111 t -I taptr nm 1 rpi

CI rle ,ru-clta air4-A rh puttr

Th, th,ree Kirh:w, ige3 4mkrik gl , jii i ht1ch LIrh e~tprt. t pa4ii flU

rtt. n' nipre ~,-.-n 1.tp-g-iaiIjij. *i r. tr [. h *:. rc t tr tr t~u r u.r Ti- p

in ni-'ll-, F-c.-ruIa,tI,- r. I'In -nL, n -rc:. t h cur-l-.~~~gnnnv -rn-lint-~~~ Itvr 1i ̀1I -I ' nt -p,rt-nc, a[-.,ri Irn. mI ht, i rids of

b- c , infli orl I il ke *-utn l age rsi. --n r A _xI,rF r,ii~ ,E ienseLins -rdIt thiL *a itiri i .. pat--ii.r Th, ntl ch irt hizhlgi-hr; the

ntn In-it I he niidile c:hart ri.I-3ti-tt ibiftiae-air in c.r-- 'Ih rites,

'hr,; r 'cenrt darn~at IL in'crca ;, hav-. pai in the p~r qIuarter :-intury,

t'**iripr ~idiuL-LJ 1: %relii3 % , rn-iI 311l ti ~i iL Ihi p r.i~dud tim- e'lar..Žr Jr-L4-,in the

ih- 1cim icc-i-ran ;r- tim rre; -.*A ~-4.I -n.* iittt-lt d1 --.n-ird trrend in -'rie\nn .Ia:i rih a. i t- out ii 4 p-ercErrt l- S- -L 'I -iC. t' h3r lilCIl -if-Lu1 ition

t C':I l - u" 1_1 and Is). i:rcp.r up. 1-ciadd- mi1 ~~ I- p.-i--bI Time h7--FFrI:-r Igure

until 1 it ' O- a Ji II ern e uii I c - * uttierlinf- thm- i-1,Ilih - cl it irn rit.tual

rid th~n r- C -rp . I., I - ..r,n r ... flt be-r . rel at. n d

h-,rI r 1-.fl al 3r.J I TI1-i Ii - :-r h--r -u . -. -It h, r im adlr:Iie in

c rc -I Iit rat-. ;p,-, up,, ird b-ut r h,-i , birth rates or an unwelcome rise in deathr,Erent -i,p arid i, lh--r,t-r, itt-t ai- dr:i. li- It calls attention to the need to

tM ti hr.aI limp: l -e I i-, that n ti i- .-p IF--rm i-e ul.u-brtinrr- by a decline in birthcha-rt r/t

Tim bu .-i Irr. .-ha,r t sh -. 'ha p,-pul- iii

tiri ha Cr i fl t rif -n ,-rm.i. h-t le- than-

li ill,--n --ri rtim o : i t h, ri1UIL It LIIriI i-,tlb-' F. --

in th.. tir.1ri .,, irn ri cut, p,r-puLl- , 0 ' -

r-r n- addcrd l:i. rid th, lin-itr

would produce a population 25 percent smaller in is already low and fertility has fallen, the popula- the year 2050 than that resulting from the standard tion in 2050 would be only 2 to 3 percent greater iffertility decline. Combined with rapid mortality rapid mortality decline were added to rapid fertil-decline, the population would still be 20 percent ity decline. But where mortality and fertilitysmaller (see Figure 4.8). Insofar as mortality and remain high-as in sub-Saharan Africa and Southfertility declines are linked, the combined rapid Asia-rapid mortality decline combined withpath for both is more realistic; it illustrates the rela- standard fertility decline would produce a popula-tively small effect that rapid mortality decline tion in 2050 about 10 percent greater. But even thatwould have on population size, especially ff fertil- difference is much smaller than the differenceity is falling. However, the implications of a faster between rapid and standard fertility decline:mortality decline are not the same for all regions. South Asia's population would be more than 20In Latin America and in East Asia, where mortality percent smaller and Africa's about 50 percent

76

TABLE 4.5

Projections of population size in selected countries, 2000 and 2050(millions)

Population in 2000 Population in 2050

Rapid fertility Rapid fertilityStandard decline and Rapid Standard decline and Rapid

fertility and standard fertility and fertility and stancdard fertility and1982 mortality mortality mortality mortality mnortality mortality

Country Population decline decline decline decline decline decline

Bangladesh 93 157 136 139 357 212 230Brazil 127 181 168 169 279 239 247Egypt 44 63 58 58 102 84 88El Salvador 5 8 8 8 15 12 13India 717 994 927 938 1,513 1,313 1,406Indonesia 153 212 197 198 330 285 298Kenya 18 40 34 35 120 69 73Korea, Rep. of 39 51 49 50 67 63 65Mexico 73 109 101 101 182 155 160Nigeria 91 169 143 147 471 243 265

smaller with a rapid rather than a standard decline standard fertility decline is assumed, the numberin fertility (see Figure 4.8). of people under twenty would be 31 percent of the

These differences between rapid and standard population instead of 32 percent in the year 2020declines in fertility have far-reaching conse- (see Figure 4.9). In absolute numbers, there wouldquences. To take the example of Bangladesh, Table be almost as many young people as there are today4.6 shows what would happen to its population because of the momentum effect of today's youngdensity and the size of its school-age and working- people becoming parents in the next two decades.age population under the standard and rapid As for old people, their proportion does increaseassumptions about declining fertility. Under both, rapidly, but it does so in both projections. Withpopulation and average density will increase for rapid declines in both fertility and mortality, thethe next seventy years. But the pressure on land elderly, now about 4 percent of the population,(reflected in the projections of agricultural densi- would constitute 9.2 percent of the population inties), already high, would more than double by the 2020, compared with 7.7 percent under the stand-year 2050 under the standard assumption; under ard declines-in either case still less than the 12the rapid assumption, it would be higher than now percent obtaining in the United States today.in the year 2000 but would then begin to fall. The The rapid paths of mortality and fertility declinenumber of school-age children would almost dou- would be difficult but not impossible to attain. Forble under the standard fertility decline by the year India a rapid decline implies a total fertility rate of2000; were fertility rates to decline rapidly, the 2.2 in the year 2000 (compared with 2.9 under thenumber would still increase by 50 percent by the standard assumption and about 4.8 today); for Bra-year 2000 but would then stop increasing. Though zil it implies a rate of 2.1 (compared with 2.6 underthe number of people of working age would con- the standard assumption and about 3.9 today).tinue to rise under both scenarios, far fewer new These rates are below those in China (now aboutjobs would need to be created if fertility declined 2.3) and Korea (2.7) today. They require that girlsrapidly; in the year 2050 there would be 100 million who are now growing up in families of about fourfewer people of working age. Of course, Bangla- children have only two children themselves,desh is just one example. And since its current whereas their grandmothers had five or six. Rapidfertility is high, the differences between the two mortality decline would mean, for Brazil, lifeprojections are especially large. expectancy in the year 2000 of 73, compared with

The effects of a rapid fertility decline on the age 69 in the standard projection. In India life expect-structure of a country could, in principle, be a con- ancy would be 65 in 2000 instead of 61.cern. It is often thought that rapid fertility decline The implied declines still produce relatively highcauses a sharp rise in the ratio of old people to annual rates of population growth in the year 2000:young, or a shrinking of the work force. In fact, 1.6 percent in Brazil, 1.2 percent in India, and 2.6this does not happen. In Brazil, if rapid rather than percent in Kenya (compared with 3.9 percent in

77

TABLE 4.6

Population size and density in Bangladesh under two fertility assumptions, 1982-2050

2000 2050

Standard Rapid Standard RapidIndicator 1982 decline decline decline decline

Population densityPersons per square kilometer 646 1,090 944 2,479 1,472Rural population per hectare of farmland a 9 13 12 22 9

Population size (millions)Total population 93 157 136 357 212

Urbanb 11 35 30 157 134Rural 82 122 106 200 78

School-age (5-14 years) 23 43 33 55 30Working-age (15-64 years) 51 84 85 246 139

Urban and rural population (from the table above)

Urban Millions Rural200 150 100 50 0 50 100 150 200

1982 F-- b

2000 Standard declie- ll

Rapid decline-{

2050 Standard __.___.

Rapid decline I

a. Farmland is defined as arable land plus land under permanent crops; the area is assumed to remain constant throughout theprojection period.b. Urban population is assumed to grow at a constant rate of 3 percent a year between 2000 and 2050.Sources: FAO, 1981; World Bank data.

the standard projection; because fertility is veryFIGURE 4.9 high in Kenya and other African countries, it willBrazil's age pyram id, 2020 probably take more than two decades for popula-

tion growth rates to fall to 2 percent). In the longAge group Male Female- run many countries may wish to reduce popula-75+ F, !r.i,l, dIre tion growth to less than 1 percent, already a goal in70-74 ,r..1 China. But for the next several decades most65-69 - developing countries will need to make a con-60-64 certed effort just to reduce population growth to a55-59 rate closer to 1 percent.50-54 Some countries have chosen to set quantitative45-49 |. ' 'targets based on feasible target declines in mortal-40-44 1 ' ity and fertility (see Chapter 8). Bangladesh has

39 1 l l already adopted a goal of a total fertility rate of 2.035- & - in the year 2000, lower than the rate assumed for it30-34 under a rapid path of fertility decline. Thailand is25-29 aiming for a total fertility rate of 2.6 by 1986, and20-24 Indonesia for a rate of 2.7 by 1990. India is aiming15-19 for a crude birth rate of 21 per thousand by 1996.10-14 . The rapid declines in mortality and fertility pro-5-9 vide only one possible set of goals. They take no0-4 real account of national differences in the serious-

_ - ness of the population problem, or of the social,

8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 political, and administrative possibilities in dealingMillions with it. These are the subjects of the following

chapters.

78

5 The consequences of rapid population growth

This chapter shows that rapid population are experiencing growth that, by historical stand-growth-at rates above 2 percent, common in most ards, is faster than that. Even in uncrowded coun-developing countries today-acts as a brake on tries, the long-term benefits of having more peopledevelopment. Up to a point, population growth must be weighed against the immediate costs ofcan be accommodated: in the past three decades coping with rapid growth. In those few countriesmany countries have managed to raise average lacking the people to exploit their natural re-income even as their populations grew rapidly. In sources, immigration from neighboring countries,that strict sense, population growth has been if politically feasible, would be less costly and moreaccommodated. But the goal of development effective than a fast natural rate of populationextends beyond accommodation of an ever larger growth. And the economic success of many smallpopulation; it is to improve people's lives. Rapid countries-Denmark, Hong Kong, Singapore, andpopulation growth in developing countries has Switzerland-shows that urbanization and traderesulted in less progress than might have been- provide other means to achieve the scale econo-lost opportunities for raising living standards, par- mies of a large population.ticularly among the large numbers of the world's There are several reasons why populationpoor. growth in developing countries is today a greater

The conclusion that rapid population growth has economic burden than it once was in today'sslowed development is by no means straightfor- developed countries:ward or clearcut (see Box 5.1). Under certain condi- * Population growth is now much more rapid.tions moderate population growth can be benefi- As Chapter 4 showed, in industrializing Europe itcial. As Chapter 4 showed, in Europe, Japan, and seldom exceeded 1.5 percent a year, comparedNorth America economic growth has been accom- with the 2 to 4 percent that most developing coun-panied by moderate population growth, which tries have averaged since World War II.may have stimulated demand, encouraged techno- * Unlike nineteenth century Europe, large-scalelogical innovation, and reduced investment risks. emigration from today's developing countries isModerate labor force growth, combined with extra not possible.spending on education, can also mean continuous * Compared with Europe, Japan, and Northupgrading of the labor force with better educated America in their periods of fastest populationworkers. In sparsely populated countries, faster growth, income in developing countries is stillpopulation growth shortens the time required to low, human and physical capital are less built up,reach the population size that provides economies and in some countries political and social institu-of scale in transport, communications, social ser- tions are less well established.vices, and production. Some developing countries * Many developing countries whose economiescould benefit from such economies of scale, espe- are still largely dependent on agriculture can nocially in rural areas. And a big population can longer draw on large tracts of unused land.increase a country's economic as well as political This chapter begins by emphasizing that theand military power; in a world of economic and implications of population growth differ consider-political uncertainty, countries such as India and ably among countries, depending on their currentChina can seem to benefit from the sheer size of social, economic, and political conditions. Next ittheir domestic markets. reviews how rapid population growth affects the

But these benefits derive from a moderate economy as a whole through savings and invest-increase in population. Most developing countries ment. It then considers the experience of countries

79

Box 5.1 Consequences of population growth: conflicting views

The trad!tioinal I laithusian a.-neerri re ;.urc:~ lrimi! b-~- aus p-.-pulatrii- human it.n., kdge Ptr c~apita nteasurcs

that ,i -..pulation gr .- th 4- il,cn-nr-r *.,r 4rc--.h ir ,Ell br in- the adt.,mtrnr-t hat trIn-L-mt;h,.uli r.-.r bie uj--W r,-. -

late:r ran up- ~atr.r he, lIrnrt- .,I hF. *- -ritinuall- put -.1 -tij,~m4da-, T.- . iitt tial the denc-mtnaicr pupI c nrrib-

rrth tinii-sr- *.- rtis--urctm I - i' rn. lulain .r.-n- 1.-.n - i Th/. L)II. i'arr Lit . n-_-irhin, t.:. the na,me ratI... r i.-t at

Fitt F; Esa. 'ii I P-rq,it.'-1i N airhu; jrkcued t:- r. ,,r Tin utirnate re-- *ur., -:e p.. ir(,. -n-- N.c.r i- p--)pulIat .-n r-:- lh in and

That the int,r-rri capacit, --i pc%puIaiiinf pk-1-, - ill-i ~pirired and hi-petul pec.- - I oit ni rh-i myanr .:i ur: .-.t na-tura~l

-, cr--i - --ŽdJ`r-s t eIJrih - .-wp.:t-. I'- h.-,--h-. --il r.-ti r1--r .- ill-' inJ tn-ac~,- r,- -- 'rYpr- blems,;-air po-lluti--n i -..I

tAld inra i-n ic-cd b.eia3u-; -t limit;s on i-rn, ittr hert LIf t-enet.r and s-:- d-ec,r dati, .-n e -n i--u-i.. a ailabiit,

ILthe'pi-.-f-~ F i, .. uitt. able- land L- nrc -- s- . tiatnM. ,-ir th- here it .-I UE all iThi, R.ep-r -t her--re ri,t a. -- --

siraijn-d p-,.pular-m-n r.-. ri-ih ~-e :ntua:Il. tine- -n arguA th:-.t natural rt-c'urc-:t- are thati is ne.ther h-:-pd1,s nr it'rl.ipt

ad~,- r atlint- -. aiE:e and rt;-nc ---d tL lim-ited that c tt 'r-ealtd b, fi-t,: Tuie dilti-ultzit -.ad-d i., rapidi

F-ri..: bec us CUe- the: lab- -r t,-rcr p rici andr-ihat pri-:-; -: -- rC arL. p,-pututi--ri r-.-- h are nut prrn.aril - due-par-i -rng rart-:- -4 Labor I.- land rn-:-t riiir-c, .it least nt,'r ., r--t--r- -h iir.t rnaiurai r, -0-u:es ai It-3;t rint

I-ad, .. ,rlrrad sr-alkIIr jn.:rena.ryti rh-V n: - --t tlhe Lirat-fitc-d:re te-Ada a - h-A-I. But ntither .1.--in- uput p r -.-r r i-.pialari- -rn cr--- I l pr.,Lpk mfpl-si --~-li: --- ci4t-- rip-idrp -put ri-- c-.t tl u--a.

ultimatA he:-d b-,rtne i, , rtilt - tl-n n- r 17'kill an14~d thus hor tr t.'h- -- ali tr2rrr-:naC l -id, an-:' and

Inri.. r-, I o.etrer:t .-erit ir . iht - arc,urm-nt ni -l-- -4 tir th- I--rin, run p-:. puIa ,iv.n J .iu.ia Il.. Ii a1r--. thiirdl tpo ~r:.il1.h n t iL- n --t _d Ii - thu,. a - a,lIabtili. Ii . ,I mr---- ih - r-L-iIa prL-bl--n bt-u Ian 1-- h.- a..-muaTi-..t.1-i-i- - -/Isdi ibat

o-s-rg:, in-1 ir-erl h, ere--- rhitr-, .pp..-rtunr. CieL-urc,-. r-:nIccl ad . rant an-i

ii- ir-:nmrnitl p-:-luti--n and r..- In Ths. d-t,rr;ni .w-p-int ejLh :.,in. rtia'rh~r.- an- diner s,htne rrturn:

TI. I Ii- 1-. tl Clb P._m, '',.tnim.I.tIanT Iruih' t,m~ -- f-- tiUi lard ar..l c0 pitai -- tlii, .--e .a.rna

r. -eachr-bult a -imulnticin r-tit,: I *:n ur-. lirmit. -init p r ice ha- - n- c -r-:n-uat.:-ll, TFht I nib -1t -t-bI.- i-u

it-.. r -nap.:- r. t hat t Ihe r-acn . r-i ehrn -r.ta-d I anLi rthr- n-a * a d n -.i the anal - Ic el . h-ire hich tertlit

--ia:harne,, -- -ui I Lii. in- ii-tI- relai-. -r-I i-- n,:.--rn- 5 -utiii hi. L rte-d -an c -nrtriburt t-I, - r 5,rt r lire i- -r

*-r,:rcu--e dninsFr.irih r. iu rri, er - rr cI .tcs Ir r-rI ha - tCCEn I ur.ia,in-:tal -.hldr--r. Buyt ' al iruc trY *:--unrr.-

irm- himiri:i -upplie- --I -'-ntAl -tructural ch.,,r-~ I r In th balIane.-: e-'a~ ,

ri--uLirIt Fen4I nc,-iJ.iard --tI I- vn- a , nd I--nt-I-n ppu I-n r a nd It:..ite le r tt-- t' *- ra,p-idP:.r cputa-3

c--i. ,-r-u in-el- -.i p-.llutt--r- - ~~~~~k id 1 iturn.t--cr-h. n., hi In , atch i.--i ti- A it. dti-jw cr--ail IIt-n-- :-nr.

- r-rut it- n *:ll.e-, tin lii - ate ib--,. c- are s I7- t itnic'hi b-c -&LI- .- I, I. r-,nir% rhT-, -'-i,tr~-i :.: art ri-:-t

r-yii-t1 iI- i i ri-at --- ir---i--e iL-:imaritair. in-:-:-ni .. -- t-- lilt n11-ri; --t LL-ntr-t1I t-. ditc~r-r..:- - ririat ura31

I,n.-i i. r,i:sis i-hclcim:z- th..-udh titecd art '-iPl.i --- .-i Fp-err I -i it m rrr dc .i.i In cc-un.r-r-h-a dt. r-l-~ni,

rn.- -a- - bL It 'hat I ,-Vt :I r- -t Iir-t5. I p- -ri. t r _ t... c. r. -. inh I h i .: acrI-ut uti. a .arc-, L .Iri natural1

-n:i--h~ - j a flia;i;n lAm imit _--or -~u n,pin -n I ch n-. lL i:al chang, budit T Ljc J.--- fajtirt Liu tht ur-i.rl-M.

f-r -Ii Fra, If:--i. h- na-in-,un- b-at nt- tn-n n-.,-dIl ihrtF,I .itr, h e- rI - nc prn-b.ln. iiI- nc--n-i:- n-i I.-- 1, 0.-

I h-.i I, Ji -A tlt l t.ut ni- nti. *iiitiiL iii- m-h 1 futru, ; Th.71 .t-dual-r,. hth-a Cut. -t 'ap"i-

IL-n,-n4uin pr-dJu-tr, I -1 l ani A. p,-;pula- t--. i.ght-. -ta-e an-i in that p Fi - E p -p-ulari-_-n- r.. t riian-- inltn-u

-- ee. -u 'iii nr nd .---n, ri--I e .--n n-i--dnt.r' ipc-pu1ulatnn AtIth raikc rht rnqu-re.i adi-a:md ni, tL- if ni-i..r

ne-rc.aii -.--:i.i.-i -.5t art-it -iCILI 11 II-.-. -., dLtnyrir.ail t-.- htiri7.r. -dIarr I r 1tic,uir Nilu-t -t ihr ---rId pi-pu Tit-

ha . I.. -- Er r- -api r-.- r.t_ n ihr It- r I i n .-i.-a ne,, - L I1--i an-d 1i- c-- i-- u r h-_I. hr n tii t .:.l -I sr ' n l

1i-ng ranFi:tn-,. ni,--- .di -n -h- I-;i--nc mle I arnlii.- it ihi.-_

[F--. -:an-- -- din--iist-irie intuit C. .itir.r.:ai,v nd litil.- - IrA P-i-.-.- at-.i i.trlie ari ihek athei n

tn--ar>- car- c. ~~~~t. I- -:ritu:-ii i-- it: i- a.i r -np-i i--r tie %hIt -- s iiLnt: a-ei dp

IeOuti i. ni- r b--Cm: i-a a- r, -,ur-:: r- I. ru n'h~ L .-n-i -I-,h r- - r A , ihr. .ih a rme r.-'t that ra-pidl piualbisi-t

.tFIpie riin-1 Fc.ii. rtdIi-- - -n ;rtp.. wt.d -. -atrr r -lep-ri it--nr iL .- ipt rNu.r, - that i - h. ra,pi .-- uIat--flr

tI-n . ndl F-.Pee- thr retc.h itr -Ub-iiai --1 r- ni ,Ill I-- r tFL p-ali.: n r--ih Cre.. I/r- A.4 ill ai ir-. p.m.:nt

etrulatire, r.:hr..;l...pLal L~~-hair-L-Thi i.r ihK-. taria tWykr IF.. I- Ilittle du-iU pr--blurf

- t.tn.. nnid leads r-:- thL tg- thaith. e- - -cc-n -nc,, er---, tIn pi--meet ta th-r-- ir n ,..aI 3 ra ,titL. J-i ar~ ..i IFr,. a -ug V.,: .- I pi,t. aJ an-..:

in coping with rapidly growing populations-their discussion of the effects of population growth onefforts to achieve food security, the effects on their countries, this chapter will touch on a theme intro-natural resources, the pressures of internal migra- duced in Chapter 4: the implications of high fertil-tion and urban growth, and the options that the ity for poor people and for income inequality.international economy provides. Throughout this Because the poor are usually last in line for jobs,

80

school places, and public health services, they are population growth itself helps to bring about tech-more likely to be penalized by rapid population nological change: in agricultural societies it maygrowth. help spur the development of new farming meth-

The chapter does not treat a reduction in the rate ods needed to maintain per capita output. In ear-of population growth as a panacea for develop- lier centuries it may even have helped provide thement; macroeconomic and sectoral policies matter minimum population required to support a smallat least as much. But it does show that within most religious or artistic elite.countries, for any given amount of resources, a But throughout the modern technological era,slower rate of population growth would help to there is no evidence that a large or rapidly growingpromote economic and social development. population has itself been influential in promoting

new technology. The money and research skills

Differences among countries needed for important advances-the Green Revo-lution, for example-are overwhelmingly in the

The implications of population growth differ con- rich countries where population growth is slow. Ifsiderably among developing countries. Countries anything, these advances have brought labor-where education levels are already high, where saving, not labor-using, innovations. Althoughmuch investment in transport and communica- adjustment and technical progress can accompanytions systems is in place, and where political and population growth, slower population growtheconomic systems are relatively stable, are well would permit them to raise average incomes all theequipped to cope with rapid population growth. faster.This is true whether or not their natural resourcesare limited or their countries already "crowded," Macroeconomic effects of rapidas in the fast-growing East Asian economies such population growthas Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and morerecently Malaysia and Thailand. But these tend In a crude arithmetical sense, differences in popu-also to be countries where population growth is lation growth rates since the 1950s have helped tonow slowing. perpetuate international differences in per capita

Countries with untapped natural resources incomes. Between 1955 and 1980, GNP grew atcould in the long run support more people. But about 4 percent a year in the low-income countries.rapid population growth makes it hard for them to This growth in general produced modest increasesdevelop the human skills and administrative struc- in income per person (see Table 5.1). However, intures that are needed to exploit their resources. In many of the poorest countries-Bangladesh andBrazil, Ivory Coast, and Zaire, for example, the most of sub-Saharan Africa-economic activitydevelopment of unused land will require large slowed considerably in the 1970s. Coupled withcomplementary investments in roads, public ser- rapid (and in some cases, accelerating) populationvices, and drainage and other agricultural infra- growth, this economic slowdown resulted in stag-structure. Natural resources are not by themselves nating or declining per capita incomes.sufficient (or even necessary) for sustained eco- In most middle-income countries GNP growthnomic growth. has been much faster-between 5 and 6 percent a

Where the amount of new land or other exploit- year-so that even with rapid population growth,able resources is limited-as in Bangladesh, per capita income grew by about 3 percent a year.Burundi, China, Egypt, India, Java in Indonesia, Industrial countries achieved only sluggish GNP

* Kenya, Malawi, Nepal, and Rwanda-the short- growth during the 1970s, but their low populationrun difficulties are more obvious. In some areas growth-1 percent a year or less-meant that theircrop yields are still relatively low, leaving room for increases in per capita income were in generalrapid growth in agricultural production; in others, almost as large as in the high-growth, middle-the expansion of manufacturing industry could income countries. These increases came on top ofprovide exports to pay for extra food imports. But much higher initial incomes, so that the absoluteboth solutions require costly investments, devel- gulf between them and the rest of the world wid-opment of new institutions, and numerous eco- ened considerably.nomic and social adjustments-all easier if popula- The middle-income countries have shown thattion is growing only slowly. rapid population growth can go hand in hand with

In any society, change becomes easier if technol- substantial gains in per capita income. But theogy is advancing rapidly. From one point of view, long-run relation is more complex than that

81

implied by a simple division of total income by though its effects on monetized savings are small.numbers of people. Indeed, that simple division First, the bulk of monetized household savings inimplies, wrongly, that people are the problem. developing countries is produced by relatively fewOne question is how population growth affects the wealthy families. They tend to have few children,distribution of income within countries, and espe- so their savings are little affected by the burden ofcially growth in income of poorer groups (see Box their dependents. In contrast, the majority of fami-5.2). More generally, the question is whether a lies are poor and save little. Parents have no choicerapid pace of population growth helps or harms but to pay for what their children consume byeconomic growth. There are several ways popula- reducing their own consumption or by "dissav-tion growth can affect economic growth: through ing"-for example, by farming their land moreits influence on savings per person, on the amount intensively than can be sustained in the long run.of capital invested per person, and on the effi- If parents have more children than they want,ciency with which the economy operates. their ability to make best use of the resources they

TABLE 5.1Growth of population, GNP, and GNP per capita, 1955-80(average annual percentage change)

Population GNP GNP per capita

Country group 1955-70 1970-80 1955-70 1970-80 1955-70 1970-80

All developing countries 2.2 2.2 5.4 5.3 3.1 3.1Low-income 2.1 2.1 3.7 4.5 1.6 2.4

China 2.0 1.8 3.3 6.0 1.3 4.1India 2.2 2.1 4.0 3.4 1.8 1.3Other 2.4 2.7 4.4 2.7 2.0 0.0

Middle-income 2.4 2.4 6.0 5.6 3.5 3.1Industrial market economies 1.1 0.8 4.7 3.2 3.6 2.4

Europe 0.7 0.2 4.8 2.6 4.1 2.4Japan 1.0 1.1 10.3 5.4 9.2 4.2United States 1.4 1.0 3.4 3.1 2.0 2.1

World' 1.9 1.9 5.1 3.8 3.1 1.9

a. Includes high-income oil exporters and industrial nonmarket economies.

Population growth and private savings do have is harmed. Whether they are restrictinginvestment in their farm, or in their children's edu-

A country's savings are generated by households, cation, or in security for their old age, their highbusinesses, and the public sector. Corporate and fertility contributes to their poverty. But even withgovernment savings do not seem to be related in fewer children, poor parents might not increaseany systematic way to variations in population their savings. Instead, they might simply consumegrowth; governments can, within limits, use fiscal a bit more themselves.and monetary measures to change a country's sav- A second reason for the apparently weak linkings rate, irrespective of demographic conditions. between savings and dependency burdens is thatTheory suggests, however, that household sav- banking and credit systems are not well estab-ings-usually the largest component of domestic lished in developing countries. Poor families (andsavings-should be reduced by the high depen- even the not-so-poor) are unlikely to have financialdency burdens associated with rapid population savings that show up in national accounts; theygrowth. At any given level of output per worker, are more likely to "save" by accumulating land,greater numbers of dependents cause consump- tools, or other assets. Even if families wanted totion to rise, so savings per capita should fall. save in good times (say, before children are born or

Recent empirical studies find only minor support after children are old enough to work) and borrowfor this view. But many factors account for the in difficult times, they probably could not withoutweak link between dependency burdens and sav- paying a steep price in terms of low real interestings in developing countries; all point to the prob- rates for saving and high rates for borrowing. Aability that high fertility is indeed a burden, third reason, as explained in Chapter 4, is that

82

Box 5.2 Prospects for poverty and population growth, 1980-2000

Hi t. v.ould a Ister decline ,n popula- -;i,ng E:.r.mic proTper art ,o limited income than a;4umtd In the prrulecti-f

n.:r. ZT.v ih aielct ihr number k.t pFmr In 1uL.Saharan irnca that Ai prtLIe:iln ms ind a mor. rapid eirminarion ot pci ertx

prople in the %eat 2i1Jii' Mani other tco point In- an increase in poi. ert% it tertilit%

n imic poltical .nd tticial tactr ini dechlne onaurs oni z a; i the r.ndard

addii c.n r,. populaticn -. ill inluence: protection-and cr n that inipliec E t b p h 2

k, ,el; .:-r p)ert% in the ne;t iitteertn .,r' >iderabIe deilint-the nulnTiber FiFIplt? under difrerent tertilih assumphons, b%IBut some 'imple astumpt:.ns alklt dlu- lI. i r.; n pot rr, at th, end it the .:en region

ir.iine C'imaiatc, In a t ,.rld Banki srud. turt .ill till in:rta4e b. nearl. tp Sub-Sahajan Atrita

iht poor %.er. derined as those tith cent %\ih a rapid aIl in lteriltit theI

annual pter :apita in-ime. belom SI3; tin number ci p.-r %-..uld increat,:b It-- rd. iii = dli'

c..n;tant lSil dollarsi Ba-ed .:on the rh3n 2ui percent-in tht circumsta3nc- 1 : sij.-dar iI, r.I. .4t. ..lin;

e -per*ence or rmank countries prit;cted substanti,l ichici 'inten in-.mile gro.vh in each ot Icnt countries In c-juih and F3as A' a e-- c prine 2!. ,.L', ipid druid'. &an)e

comprtving S0 perc;nt or the p ipulanin China etconomi, pr. -pects art b-telr ;C'

cot de.tel,p.ni,- fountries v .ia u-td to ihar u ;amll reduction ir the numbtr .:1

co-nipuit' the change in ,ncome tor th, puttr an be aniipdied e-n assuri,ng Mliddle East. North Attica.- Latin %nmerica

pc-irest groups The hnd , e. ere cc.n; the Ii3ndard tertilit% d..lint 1c-T rtlbined , th 11%orld Bank cc.unirn pr-te .couid be r_duced ii alm:-st 41.1 percent pu

ti.-n' .t pcpul;tiino grew th to .mulatt ho%-:-eer ntih a rapid tall In tertulltr

tuturt shiut; in nccime di'triburtion Groupin4 rt.gether Latin America the '

The e\etrXie 'h-it-ed that the predicted liddJe EU,r and N..rth Aitica-n-here 'raic.- nc. :id

'hare .t inc.:-mt g.--nm to; the poorczt 4 the p-i.nr arc letet th.an in -ia anmd in ti rtdtt. d .dine

pere.:eni *-ould hardli :hranee tTrim 14 the re't at A\tTica-rapid ttriliti decline Asia ieludrng Chinat

pe,rcient in I%CiO io 15 perce,nt in 'tli0 The could help 1o reduce the number in pc -

est.mated number oc poor pe.ople . ould erri ti 70 percent -\ tair China nhere idrd trtlit d..it

tall hov.e er becaute ol income cru;ith teriltiti tI atread. 1 tt the number .i l ;pid r..ti. ..-..lin.:L ,ng th, population ;rv-t.th rart ba'edt p-cr c:.n be expet:ed i:- decline bi Ii,

cr a >t.indard derlint in tertiltif berteen .-N., and 1i perettn b. the i,-ar China

idte4ribed tn Chapter 4i the number a1t Zi)it.

poor in these i-ti...r counrries ituld all The e'er.:- prcbabl. underslates the

Ir.n hs i) milit. In mi IQa) t.. 411W Miill-in in eltect ...r r3pid rtrtili . dJcline im reduc.in;

2LhIi.t With J rapid decitne in tentilit- POV-err; *A fastr rtduc:tirn i tertilts Is

the number ci-utd be alrost lil mrlicin ikelk n:- be a.-ciated .%ih a narrvv ingl- nd .tanircL wi

vten-n-although at 321 milli,cn iiit itould ofi ditterince- in educati.nal mn%-tmert ripd t.-rrIr.L, d-cine

still e-;ceed th, ic-tal number ct p,-ple in t '. .ciomic cia,' and an incrt:.-- 1il

Banrlade-h. Nigeria and Pakistan toda% in . agem' in relti-,n tti rnt nd p-t r Fr n ri--n .:oamir ...n..i..u..r.

eRgno.l ditterences are %eorth emph-a- Thtse mipi' a more equal distributiin . I l

poor people may see children themselves as a way Capital wideningof "saving" for old age. Although rapid population growth does not seem

These reasons explain why high dependency to influence the supply of financial savings, itburdens reduce household savings rates in indus- clearly affects the demand for savings. To maintaintrial countries but not in the developing world. In income, capital per person (including "humandeveloping countries, though there is no direct capital," that is, a person's education, health, andlink from fertility to household savings, they do skills) must be maintained. And as populationsbecome indirectly linked as development pro- grow, "capital widening" is needed to maintainceeds. For example, as more women work in the capital per person. But slower population growthmodern sector, family savings tend to rise and fer- releases investable resources for "capital-deepen-tility falls; as urbanization proceeds and financial ing"-that is, increasing capital per person. Ofmarkets improve, monetized savings rise and fer- course, there may be economies of scale in the pro-tility falls. vision of schooling, health, and jobs in factories

83

and on farms. But the evidence on education sug- because fertility had started to fall in the late 1960s.gests that capital-widening-spreading resources This allowed enrollment rates to rise; as the chil-over more and more people-can be counterpro- dren of poor parents were least likely to have beenductive. enrolled before, the poor probably benefited most

from the spread of education.SCHOOLING REQUIREMENTS AND CAPITAL WIDEN- For high-fertility countries, the situation could

ING. In industrial countries, school-age popula- not be more different. Countries such as Kenyations are expected to grow slowly, if at all, over the face a doubling or tripling of their school-age pop-next two decades (see Figure 5.1). The same is true ulation by the end of the century. The main impli-of those developing countries, such as China, cation is clear. More school-age children requireColombia, and Korea, where fertility has already more spending on education, even if the objectivefallen substantially. In Colombia, the number of is just to maintain current enrollment rates andschool-age children doubled between 1950 and standards. As most developing countries want to1970. But it increased only slightly in the 1970s, improve their schools quantitatively and qualita-

tively, they will have to generate more nationalsavings or curtail other investments in, for exam-ple, power and transport. If a country is unwilling

FIGURE 5. orual1 omk hs sciie pnigmsIndex of school-age and working-age populations, or unable to make these sacrifices, spending mustselected countries, 1950-2000 be spread over a larger group of school children (toIndex the detriment of the quality of education); other-(1950=100) wise a growing number of children have to be700 , excluded.

/t' These awkward choices come after a period of600 Kenya , considerable progress. Over the past twenty years,

School-age enrollment rates have increased at the primary,soo population secondary, and university levels in almost all

400 / developing countries. (The enrollment rate is the400 ," number of students enrolled in schools as a per-

centage of the school-age population.) In some300 Colombia cases, progress has been remarkable. Education

tends to spread as per capita income rises, but200 Korea some of the lowest-income countries-Sri Lanka,

~h i n a Tanzania, Viet Nam-have already achieved, or are100 _-S=iR- China/ fast approaching, universal primary education.

Hungary 7"^~v_,,+" ~'~' Such achievements have substantially raised the

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 fiscal burden of education. For the developingcountries as a group, public spending on educa-tion increased from 2.3 percent of GNP in 1960 to

Index(1950=100) 3.9 percent in 1974, and from 11.7 percent to 15.1600 percent of government budgets. But the propor-

Kenya , tion of GNP allocated to education declined500 / slightly over the 1970s, as did the share of educa-

Working-age / tion spending in government budgets, especially400 population ' in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa,

Colombia and Latin America.300 - The budgetary downgrading of education, coup-

_-- China led with slower economic growth, has reduced the200 quality of education in many developing countries.

Hungary One study showed that in Latin America public100 '-- spending per primary student fell by almost 45

K. percent in real terms between 1970 and 1978. As aKorea share of educational budgets, spending on non-

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 wage items-chalk, maps, textbooks, and so on-fell in eight out of ten Latin American countries. In

84

twenty-five of fifty-four developing countries sur- rapid decline in fertility would decrease the size ofveyed, student-teacher ratios at primary schools the age group eligible for Egypt's secondaryhave risen; of those twenty-five countries, seven- schools and universities starting in the late 1990s.teen were in Africa. Increases in class size often Less rapidly growing enrollment produces con-make sense as they raise the productivity of teach- siderable financial savings; these can be used toers. But in the urban areas of Malawi and Kenya, improve school quality. One projection, forclass size frequently exceeds sixty students. Com- Malawi up to 2015, started with the assumptionbined with a lack of teaching materials, large that recurrent costs (essentially teachers' salaries)classes make learning difficult. were held constant at their 1980 level of $12.50 per

Developing countries have little scope to reduce student. With unchanged fertility, the budget foreducational quality any further. The quality gap primary education would double about every fif-between low- and high-income countries is already teen years, even if nothing were done to improveenormous. Bolivia, El Salvador, Malawi, and the the coverage and quality of primary schools. ThusIvory Coast, for instance, spend less than $2 a year the education budget's share in GDP wouldon classroom materials for each child at primary increase from 0.7 percent in 1980 to about 1 percentschool-compared with more than $300 per stu- in 1995 if the economy of Malawi were to grow atdent in Scandinavian countries. This gap seems to about 3 percent a year. The financial savings frombe widening. In 1960, on average, an OECD coun- lower fertility would accrue slowly at first, buttry spent fourteen times more per primary school build up considerably (see Table 5.2). Costsstudent than did any of the thirty-six countries excluded from the projections-for instance, out-with per capita incomes below $265 (1975 prices). lays for teachers' training and school buildings-By 1977 the ratio had risen to 50:1. would also fall and thus boost these savings.

These differences in educational quality are With the money saved by lower fertility, theclearly reflected in student achievement. Research Malawi government could afford to enroll theon twenty-five countries has shown that, after country's total school-age population in 2005 forapproximately the same number of years in school, less than it would cost to enroll 65 percent if fertil-schoolchildren in low- and middle-income coun- ity did not fall. If the government chose to main-tries have learned significantly less science than tain a 65 percent enrollment rate, its spending perthose in industrial countries. Quality can also pupil could be doubled in real terms by 2015 with-make a considerable difference within developing out increasing the share of the primary school bud-countries. In a study of Brazil, Colombia, India,and Thailand, the quality of schools and teachers-measured by a large number of indicators- TABLE 5.2

explained more than 80 percent of the variance in Malawi: projected primary-school costsstudent scores on standardized science tests. The under alternative fertility and enrollmentpoor are more likely to attend schools of lower assumptions, 1980-2015quality (and to leave school sooner); so rapid (millions of 2980 dollars)

expansion of school systems to accommodate Saving

growing populations often means that the differ- Standard Rapid witd* ences in skills between rich and poor, though fall- fertility fertility rapid

ing in terms of years of schooling, are persisting decline decline fdecliney

because of school quality differences. Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (percent)a

As lower fertility slows the growth of the school- 1980 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 na.age population, it can ease the pressures on the 1995 19.2 26.9 17.9 25.1 7

education system. In Egypt, for example, if fertility 2000 22.5 34.6 17.6 27.1 22

does not fall, the number of children of primary 2005 26.6 40.9 17.6 27.0 34

school age would double by the end of the century. 2010 31.0 47.8 17.3 26.6 44With the standard decline in fertility described in 2015 35.3 54.3 15.3 23.5 57

Chapter 4, the number would increase by 65 per- nl.a. Not applicable.Note: Columns 1 and 3 assume a constant enrollment rate of

cent; with the rapid decline, by only 20 percent. 65 percent. Columns 2 and 4 assume the enrollment rate

The difference between a standard decline and a increases and is 100 percent by the year 2000.rapid one would be about 2 million fewer children a. The percentage cost savings are the same under both

enroled inprimay scools n theyears2000 assumptions regarding enrollment rates. Absolute cost savingsa year enrolled in primary schools in the years 2000 are greater under the assumption of universal primary

to 2015. Fewer births in the early 1980s due to a education by the year 2000.

85

get in GDP. Alternatively, all or part of the savings capital widening. For most countries the same iscould be used to increase spending per pupil or to true of jobs. In contrast to school-age populations,increase the enrollment rate in Malawi's secondary whose rate of growth starts to slow five or six yearsschools which in 1980 stood at only 4 percent. The after a decline in fertility, the growth of working-returns to using the resources saved on account of age populations is more or less fixed for fifteen tolower population growth for improving school twenty years. People born in 1980-84 will be enter-quality are likely to be higher than the returns to ing the labor force in 2000 and will still be thereforced rapid expansion of the system if population almost halfway through the twenty-first century.growth does not slow. But improving quality will High-fertility countries face large increases inbe difficult until a larger share of the population their labor forces. As an example, Nigeria's highhas access to basic education, which itself is fertility in the 1970s guarantees that its working-delayed if the numbers of school-age children are age population will double by the end of this cen-constantly increasing. tury. Kenya can expect an even larger increase.

The potential for cutting educational costs Where fertility has fallen in the past two decades,through lower fertility is obviously largest for the increases will be smaller (see Figure 5.1). Chinathose countries with the highest fertility rates. will experience a rise of no more than 45 percent.Four African countries-Burundi, Ethiopia, Korea's working-age population has already fallenMalawi, Zimbabwe-could save between 50 and 60 substantially and will change little between nowpercent of their educational spending by 2015 (see and the year 2000. In all these countries the actualTable 5.3), whereas a rapid fertility decline would labor force-people who are working or looking forreduce educational costs by only 5 percent in jobs-will grow even faster if, for example, moreColombia, by 1 percent in Korea, and by even less women start looking for paid employment.in China, where there is virtually no difference In countries with growing labor forces, the stockbetween the rapid and standard fertility assump- of capital (both human and physical) must contin-tions. But these lower-fertility countries have ually increase just to maintain capital per workeralready gained considerably from slower popula- and current productivity. Unless this happens,tion growth. For example, if Korea's fertility rate each worker will produce less using the reducedhad remained at its 1960 level, the number of pri- land and capital each has to work with. Productiv-mary school-age children in 1980 would have been ity, and thus incomes, will then stagnate or evenabout one-third (2 million) larger than it was. fall. Wages will fall in relation to profits and rents,Applying actual 1980 costs per student ($300) to and thus increase income inequalities-anotherthat difference gives a saving in a single year of example of how rapid population growth harms$600 million, about 1 percent of Korea's GDP. the poor.

For incomes to rise, investment needs to growGROWTH OF LABOR FORCE AND CAPITAL WIDENING. faster than the labor force, to ensure capital deep-

Keeping up with schooling needs is only one way ening. Capital deepening involves a growingwhereby rapid population growth contributes to demand for spending on education, health, roads,

energy, farm machinery, ports, factories, and soforth. These requirements have to be traded off

TABLE 5.3 against extra consumption. Of course, if educa-Potential savings in primary-school costs under tional levels are rising quickly, rapid restocking ofrapid fertility decline, selected countries, 2000 the labor force with young, better-educated peopleand 2015 can be an advantage. But, as shown above, it is

also difficult to increase educational spending perCost savings child if population growth is rapid.

Totalfertility (percent) Even when developing countries manage toCountry rate (1 98 1) 2000 2015 raise investment in line with the growth in their

Korea, Rep. of 3.0 12 1 labor force, the contrasts with developed countriesColombia 3.7 23 5 are striking. The gap in educational quality hasEgypt 4.8 27 23 already been described. Investment in physicalBurundi 6.5 26 56 al been decied. Ivstment in icEthiopia 6.5 25 60 capital per new worker is also much larger inKenya 8.0 22 50 industrial countries because their labor-forceZimbabwe 8.0 19 48 growth is slower and their GDP per capita is so

a. Compared with standard fertility assumption. much higher. Even a middle-income country such

86

as Korea, with a high investment ratio of 31 per- * It is likely to exacerbate income inequalities,cent in 1980, could provide only $30,000 of gross particularly if many new young workers have littleinvestment per new worker, compared with education. When a large proportion of workers are$189,000 in the United States, which had an invest- young and inexperienced, their productivity tendsment ratio of only 18 percent. (The investment to be lower. Except for those who have more edu-ratio is gross domestic investment as a percentage cation than older workers, their starting wages willof gross domestic product.) If all investment in tend to be lower, and they must compete with eachcountries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nepal, other. Relatively few will receive employer trainingand Rwanda had been allocated to potential new to upgrade their skills. Over time, the weight ofworkers during 1980, each person would have had numbers of the unskilled will hold down theirless than $1,700 invested on his or her behalf (see wages in relation to those of skilled workers. A

* Table 5.4). At the other extreme, new workers in World Bank study of what determines incomeJapan would have had about $535,000 of gross growth among countries found that as overallinvestment available. Countries with the lowest income rises, the average contribution of individ-absolute levels of investment per potential new ual workers without education falls-uneducatedworker tend to be those also facing the fastest workers contribute (and probably earn) relativelygrowth in their working-age populations. Just to less than they once did.maintain the current small amount of investment * It increases various forms of unemployment.per potential new worker, they will have to Although population growth has had a relativelyincrease their investment rapidly. In contrast, small effect on open unemployment in developingdeveloped countries can increase the capital avail- countries, this fact does not demonstrate anyable to each potential new worker in 2000 even if demographic stimulus to job creation. It simplyinvestment grows by less than 1 percent a year. indicates that unemployment is not a feasible

Rapid growth in the labor force has two other option for most people. Open unemployment iseffects. typically found most among educated urban

TABLE 5.4

Gross domestic investment per potential new worker, selected countries, 1980

Grossdomestic Projected

Gross Increase in investment increase indomestic zworking-age per potential vorking-age

Investment investment population' new worker populationratio' (billions 1979-80 (thousands of 1980-2000

Countrygroup (percent) of dollars) (millions) l980 dollars) (percent)

Developing countriesBangladesh 17 1.90 1.70 1.09 74Ethiopia 10 0.37 0.24 1.53 76Nepal 14 0.26 0.21 1.26 78Rwanda 16 0.18 0.11 1.66 99Kenya 22 1.31 0.28 4.70 134Egypt, Arab Rep. 31 7.12 0.80 8.96 68Thailand 27 9.03 0.65 10.66 73Colombia 21 6.21 0.62 10.10 66Korea, Rep. of 31 18.06 0.61 29.85 45Brazil 22 52.35 1.30 40.36 65

Industrialized countriesJapan 32 332.80 0.62 535.04 11Australia 24 35.53 0.16 219.35 19France 23 149.94 0.33 461.34 13Germany 25 204.79 0.43 481.33 1United States 18 465.68 2.46 188.99 15

Note: Countries are listed in ascending order of their GNP per capita in 1982.a. Gross domestic investment as percentage of gross domestic product.b. Age cohort 15-64 years.

87

youths, who are presumably able to draw on fam- high. The two principal reasons for this structuralily support while seeking work commensurate transformation of the labor force are well known:with their qualifications or expectations. Many * As incomes rise, people spend a smaller pro-others are underemployed: "invisible underem- portion on unprocessed agricultural produce andployment" (including part-time and low-produc- a larger proportion on industrial products andtivity workers whose skills would permit higher services.earnings if better jobs were available) is estimated * Increases in agricultural productivity-madeto range from 20 percent in Latin America to about possible by technological innovations and accumu-40 percent in Africa. In urban areas of most poor lated investment-allow output to grow with acountries, occupations that require little or no capi- constant or even declining farm labor force.tal-handicraft production, hawking, and personal As average incomes increase in today's develop-services of all sorts-are highly visible areas of the ing countries, and as population growth ratesso-called informal sector. These occupations have slow, the number of workers in agriculture shouldthe advantage of using scarce financial capital effi- eventually decline. In some upper-middle-incomeciently, but the incomes they produce are often countries in Latin America, including Argentina,extremely low. Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, already less than

20 percent of the labor force is employed in agricul-STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LABOR ture. But the transfer of labor out of agriculture has

FORCE. As shown in Chapter 4, both urban and proceeded much more slowly in much of low-rural populations will increase rapidly into the next income South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Therecentury in the low-income countries of Asia and are two reasons: their high rates of growth of theAfrica. Thus, while the general concern with the total labor force and their low initial shares in mod-provision of productive employment for urban ern sector employment.dwellers is well founded, many countries will also In 1980 the share of the labor force in agricultureface the task of absorbing considerably more work- averaged 73 percent in low-income countriesers into the rural economy. This double challenge (excluding China and India); in most countries ofdiffers from the historical experience of today's sub-Saharan Africa it was between 80 and 90 per-industrialized countries. Their economic growth cent. During the 1970s the total labor force in thesewas helped by a massive shift of labor from agri- countries grew at 2.3 percent a year. The rate ofculture, where the amount of capital per worker growth will increase to 3 percent a year betweenand average productivity was relatively low, to 1980 and 2000. The effects on the future growth ofindustry and services, where they were relatively the agricultural labor force can be illustrated with

some hypothetical calculations.Figure 5.2 portrays a country in which 70 percent

of the labor force is in agriculture and in whichFIGURE 5.2 nonagricultural employment is growing at 4 per-When will the number of agricultural workers cent a year. It shows, for different rates of growth

of the total labor force, the time required for theAnnual growth rate of total labor force size of the agricultural labor force to start to decline4 Kenya in absolute numbers. For example, if it is assumed

Nonagricultuhraltempoymen w that the annual growth of the total labor force is 2.5

3 3 percent 4 percent percent (which, combined with a 4 percent growthin nonagricultural employment, is a fairly typicalcombination in low-income countries), the agricul-

2 "best case" tural labor force would continue to grow in abso-lute size (though declining slowly as a share of thetotal) for about fifty years (point x). If the totallabor force were to grow by 3 percent a year

\ Japan, instead, the time required for the agricultural laborapproximately 1890 force to start to decline would nearly double to

0 150 200 ninety-five years (point y). Although this exampleYears until the agricultural labor force starts to decline oversimplifies-for instance, it does not admit the

Assumes 70 percent of labor force in agriculture. possibility of massive urban unemployment-itSource: Johnston and Clark, 1982, does seem clear that the size of the agricultural

88

labor force in most of today's low-income coun- ture-absorbed more than 80 percent of thetries will go on increasing well into the twenty-first increase in the labor force.century. Agricultural output and jobs must continue to

In western Europe and Japan, by contrast, the grow rapidly in Kenya: the effective demand fornumber of farm workers began to fall when the food is rising at about 4 percent a year, so thatlabor force was still largely agrarian, so there were domestic production-or other agricultural exportsnever any significant increases in the size of the to pay for food imports-must grow at least at theagricultural labor force. In Japan, for example, the same pace to avoid draining foreign exchange fromshare of agriculture in the labor force in the mid- other sectors (if constant terms of trade are1880s was about 75 percent-much the same as in assumed). And the rest of the economy has only atoday's low-income countries, and nonagricultural limited capacity to absorb labor. The public sector

- employment grew at between 2 and 3.5 percent a accounted for about two-thirds of the growth inyear in the late 1800s and early 1900s. In these two wage employment during 1972-80-the number ofrespects Japan was similar to many low-income schoolteachers rose by more than the increase incountries today. But the total labor force was grow- manufacturing workers-but its growth is con-ing at less than 1 percent a year, much slower than strained by fiscal limits. Industry is relatively smallin developing countries today (see Figure 5.2). So and capital intensive, so its work force is unlikelyonly modest rises in nonagricultural employment to expand much.were necessary to absorb the rise in the rural work These constraints are highlighted by the projec-force. Between 1883-87 and 1913-17, the share of tions in Table 5.5. In the "worst" case-essentiallythe labor force in agriculture fell by twenty per- a continuation of recent trends, with the laborcentage points and the absolute number of farm force growing at 3.5 percent a year and nonagricul-workers fell by some 1 million. tural employment at 4 percent-Kenya's agricul-

Kenya provides a dramatic contrast with the Jap- tural work force would still be increasing in abso-anese case. Only about 14 percent of the Kenyan lute size even 100 years from now (see also Figurelabor force is in wage employment in the "mod- 5.2). In the "best" case, which assumes the sameern" economy and about half of them are in the growth in nonagricultural employment but slowerpublic sector. Between 1972 and 1980 employment growth in the labor force after 2000 (implying ain the modern sector grew at 4.3 percent a year, decline in fertility starting in the mid-1980s), struc-higher than in Japan in the late nineteenth century tural transformation proceeds at a faster pace.but somewhat slower than the growth of GDP (4.9 Even so, agriculture must absorb more than 70 per-percent). But the rate of growth of the total labor cent of the growth in the labor force for the rest offorce was very rapid-3.5 percent. There was some this century. It is only after 2025 that the number ofshift of the labor force into the modern economy, workers in agriculture starts to decline. In thesince growth in modern sector employment was meantime, how to absorb these extra farm workersfaster than in the total labor force. But the shift was productively is a critical issue in Kenya and insmall. Nonwage employment-mainly in agricul- many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa and

South Asia.

TABLE 5.5 Efficiency: allocating limited capitalKenya: projections of employment by sector,under two scenarios, 1976-2050 Capital deepening (and associated absorption of(nmillions of7oorkers) labor into the modern sector) is not the only con-

Einployment sector' 1976 2000 2025 2050 tributor to economic growth. Last year's WorldDevelopment Report highlighted the importance of

Nonagricultural employmentb 1.2 3.0 8.0 21.8 making better use of existing resources, as well asAgricultural employment of innovation and entrepreneurship. Promoting

"Worst" casec 3.8 9.9 24.1 56.9"Best" cased 3.8 9.9 12.4 4.5 efficiency often requires policy reform. For exam-

ple, many developing countries have a history ofa. Unemployment held constant in all years and in both cases subsdizng capitl subsiies have discourage(about 1.2 million workers). subsidizig capital; subsidies have discouragedb. Increases at 4 percent a year in both scenarios. labor-intensive production and led to inefficientc. Labor force grows at a constant 3.5 percent a year. use of scarce capital. Even with reform, efficiencyd. Growth of labor force slows from 3.5 percent a year in1976-2000, to 2.5 percent a year in 2001-10, to 1.5 percent a year may not come easily; many technological innova-in 2011-25, and to 1 percent a year in 2026-50. tions available to developing countries are labor-

89

saving because they come from the capital-rich Constraints on agricultural productionindustrial world. But efficiency is even harder toachieve when population growth is rapid. For Food production in developing countries hasexample, social and political pressure to employ increased rapidly in recent decades but has stillyoung people has undoubtedly contributed to the just kept pace with population growth (see Tablelarge government sector in many developing coun- 5.6); in the 1970s it failed to do so in many low-tries, and in some countries to regulations income countries, including Bangladesh, Nepal,designed to stop private employers from reducing and twenty-seven of thirty-nine countries in sub-their work force. Selective government concern for Saharan Africa. Other African countries-includ-educated young people in urban areas has led to ing Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, and Upper Volta-policies such as Egypt's that guarantee employ- managed only a slight increase in per capita foodment to all university graduates. As well as being production. The output of food in China and Indiainefficient, this policy hurts people who are not has also exceeded population growth since theeducated because scarce public spending is mid-1960s, but by only a narrow margin.

In the past, increases in food production weremainly due to bringing more land under cultiva-tion: this is still the case in sub-Saharan Africa and

TABLE 5.6 in parts of Latin America. About 25 percent of theGrowth rates of food output by region, 1960-80 world's land-some 3.4 billion hectares-is(average annual percentage change) thought to be of agricultural potential. Of this,

Total Per capita only about 1.4 billion hectares (40 percent) is beingRegion or Percapita cultivated, so there is little evidence of a globalcountry group 1960-70 1970-80 1960-70 1970-80 land shortage (see Box 5.3).

Developing countries 2.9 2.8 0.4 0.4 For developing countries as a whole, however,Low-income 2.6 2.2 0.2 -0.3 increased acreage accounted for less than one-fifthMiddle-income 3.2 3.3 0.7 0.9 of the growth in agricultural production over theAfrica 2.6 1.6 0.1 -1.1 past two decades. In part this is because land recla-Middle East 2.6 2.9 0.1 0.2 mation is often more costly than intensifying useLatin

America 3.6 3.3 0.1 0.6 of existing land; in part it is because further expan-Southeast Asiaa 2.8 3.8 0.3 1.4 sion of the land frontier is constrained in manySouth Asia 2.6 2.2 0.1 0.0 parts of the world. In sub-Saharan Africa, forSouthern example, the development of vast areas is pre-

Europe 3.2 3.5 1.8 1.9 cluded because of such diseases as river blindnessIndustrial market

economies 2.3 2.0 1.3 1.1 (onchocerciasis) and sleeping sickness (trypanoso-Nonmarket industrial miasis). The latter renders livestock production

economies 3.2 1.7 2.2 0.9 virtually impossible on some 10 million squareWorld 2.7 2.3 0.8 0.5 kilometers of higher rainfall areas, 45 percent of allNote: Production data are weighted by world export unit prices. the land in sub-Saharan Africa. Major campaignsGrowth rates for decades are based on midpoints of five-yearaverages except that 1970 is the average for 1969-71. have been undertaken to free parts of the Suda-a. Excludes China. nese savanna country from sleeping sickness, butSources: FAO; World Bank, 1982b. it has not always been possible to prevent a resur-

gence of the disease. Moreover, insecticides usedto control tsetse flies, which spread sleeping sick-ness, have had undesirable effects on the environ-

diverted for the benefit of those who are relatively ment. For that and other reasons, some countrieswell off. Youth unemployment may also contribute in Africa are reaching the limits of their land (seeto crime and instability and the resulting large Box 8.4 in Chapter 8).amount of service employment as police and pri- In Asia, too, further expansion of agriculturalvate guards in some cities of developing countries. land does not appear to be an option for severalNone of these, of course, adds to national income. countries. For example, in India between 1953-54Crime is tied primarily to poverty and social disor- and 1971-72, a 66 percent increase in the numberder, but tends to increase wherever there are large of rural households was accompanied by only a 2cohorts of young people who are unemployed percent increase in the cultivated area. As a result,(including in developed countries). the number of marginal holdings of less than one

90

Box 5.3 Food supplies for agrowing worid population

Th- t.itid cri;i- Cii 1072-74 cr.Kied an iden in the d,.ct.iping ciuntrie- par- n cilirnal priduttw n but bec.,U5C it

atflii epher..- it inipirndirg di - nJ 31 titularlt be-au-c a-t Ccini-inuc.j rapid. hi;hv2r r. od prwi'r I. hzch thi ciencit

rt ne;"d intrtr-et in \lalthosin pic o- grii.-;h ini pipuLttion rind mn,nic- Cr-,n- atticrd ir beczu4e It inadequjate ar-arr.e~-

nirtrm Mort recent %iv~ poitnt ro the trailk plann,,.d ecoinomie, ma% aso.I twn- men;- i. r markic'ing ta~d PT.1;i dio; tI,ll

;uCc-:-, c-i teichno 'kgic:al h.n in ariz- tinue to hate .r5~i 'Fritali Pritduiiicn In rnpr .-.e tink v hE r tineir *nea e

- 1rlurt, and iti- he connLIutiin that the th, indu'trial tiorid i- prot,iectx ti rise nlirmic -t it, dcc-,

t-irlda-na vh-ic N c3pa1:Ie ti producin, aletnlieettI hantninhe pa~-t %hile ~ ,mt re'i-ardi i-n ;hr gibkal tood --itua-

-nough ti'iod tor tuture g-:neratioin~ ,eit the grit', th in its demand is projected to tnor ha' loi--ked -,'rl bet nd the cnd -it

- inn the ne' t ci'ntur\. rhr main i54ut I, level .Olt thie ceniur% [SLr iard Cilland to; ,sarni-

no-i th,_ i-r irtdide at ail0 bti;s o'i liod On a national anid ho usehltId ha- is the pi.: teirnrair th-~ matiniLiun gli hdl 'tlt-

but the capakrt itt nation; grtiups outl..1,k is etn mocre 'aid -N number pa tt ) . rP;oii)rnilIh,.n itin~ griin-

iiitin n.m"in- and ind iduals ti. *.bur. 'it indu4trial countries di' ni it pri 'ductu -quit aleni Iiti A, . ear Thi; tigur. it

tnt ujgh rt -od ii;ra health, diet cmn'ugh grain or tcu'd I' satiisi d4 inei,tc i-btaine'10 k Mulitphittn a reai, i

ln mist ciuntri..- pairtic:ulciri;t li.. dtnnand But their national t,.-.d se-Aictri,% ii u' M tc e htaI, tr.n;

-i -mit ,..m, - orc; Kb 'tapit ic-.d ic crrcil , Ci i' a-ured -iia, ttw i.aiue ot their nn.m the prtc;inn .tt3cra ot _' toee pi:r hiechirt

-iiatgri thee -iiiour.i tir about halt t....Ii icx.-rt'i, i~uu-u ciii more than adc_ tbs i 5- billion hectaric -cdi:.-. ing ii; a

i-t rural t-,.d rniiiun-ipti.n in de'%l-ping; quate iio tinance ;i'id lmprri, These 4Iigbt in:rra~,r .-tr r ht -imit'.it'd 1 4 bit-

-ii'ntri,- lit-; the pa-I thirtt -ir, oiiintrir-s at.. ha,.tr ettecti, ne erthod4 it ion heci ire- '.t 1and iarrt. il, is ;;

i.ohat grain priidu-.t;iin has doubt~d distributitng ;ioid. iho'ugh their piiri rdprorductin- An idditonal tit' tt

m.d acii-.rding it- the FA') reptiri 1 ;fliii- F'itpk maI bt- uiier ilt [tir rmn tf nr %a' added i.;r r ingtLnan and mn ireI It ' I-, :IIL "I) cJiutd U tible again bi 'he din eliping iiluntrit' the - it uatn is priductsiln rr.:-t ntIs era,s ci m

hbe ti-ar 2iA3i 'n Nnirican ~tud. 1ir. 1I. '-i ure F:itnai, M bt'he F tCO -.ug- ti,r. oi plan; tn 5rgtz ti; aiil purpi;-z4-

Iii11Oiiia :1l r1f it7.t ii tin flu r(in..:oiitl ag re- gtst thatin in: iictar iliui1.l trtnit%-rnin tiid --ed ~nd ainimraliedrnc

,i.ith ' ahl i-?esn men; - dicuhtintz Cit dnc.%-lI -ping c ninire' rnt-t br- unabir- to trom 3iiiciri;prpe,ilper da% in

iii rid grain priduoctio'n oiier i-.e nit teed them-iel. e- trom their s.-.n land ,.auth Asia t.. FB1liii calorie- In ii n,rh

ear- it ~ii ineiunt~ k'an annintit gr-n. th aitih input; ii ltertdlizer x LEtl-J anti t. Anic r,ai \tstratia Nc%. Zealand mnd

rate .It cit'ut 3 pericini i,n at InI intermeudiate let el it tte.hn,ii. Fm Inc.:i iin-anuop;iiri ~.t rneat ral;v-

On [he demnand side t-rlmr [oIsc. 0 'gt ia ba,mct package .it terrjhmzer;.. c-iin:um pt i. n iii ptaot n,rnen. becau,iŽlcon indicated that drmand in .ert-1; mm[rinpro d cd arid irnrple C nt.-r% ;itiini th.: ci'nti-r- iin -it i,at-n to' nn ai thri.ugh

aind griin' tir b.-ith human tone2uniption nie-asiure-; Mans, i-I h;hc si- untries- ar- ti--ding ~tl -tIck intitii,ni ti-ni-

,intlvi-to-,~i~ teed ii. i.utd teev ai bet'- -tn irn -Atnicci.- ,here te hnottt-gt i pri'hbitb partil .,ith d;t-act c i:-ncanptiton .i tgrtnIt

iii and 3 1 perct-ni d itar, de-pti-nding i-n bhciii il-i inte-rnirdiate ii- ci I 1c lii d-d,.tc cmtset sa -

.is-timpiiiri tcir pi-pulatiinm and lnc''me [Si- itS 41 Outside Atrica the~ group ior% %tcragt dait pt-r cap;;; alit'.' ance

grsor,;h P.ire rtttni pri -iv-tion - ~uig-~ - incluti- .\fghani;;an Bangladesh. 1-t It `4 in i attires -It ptan;r -sner,

a ninth-tnt. i Cr ii. ih iit gloal tltr md Sa' idcrHaiti and licrdan iliniplting 5 ink~m5 at i.nsuniptioni ian-i

I-ar ic anipts the 1nitr rrIiaiinat t hr-at tnrc-igdti,ti rd tiirittiU 'nud-tht eeahi -i-.c patit~

Cotuncil ; ~cc.:nt Lon. -Ten-i Lldiit iluiiii4 .~ no,t the iir.I; -niutiiin Nfim'. dvetettp- it. upport -ibcut billion [r.opie Thie

put- ,tibai c:-rti1 dt-nannti up 5- ps~rcrni inz .iunititz i-.iih a chr-ni- ti-d dlrhci; [[Ut huh"l i. Ill prb.kl:..I he i:ai licd II-

.s 21il tIiC -luInalt nt 1-ia ricOt aboiui 2 ha.l -A he r ,pipur -. the- main tnt hng ihc- -.Id ii.d ti h~ ce~ entuts

[itecteni a tar3 repiirt puHi- hed bt th.Ž- iii nmra4-si ec t[itrt, it in-minti t gu--d, ~-' On , sit per CUF-iti alil-itt du .It i-u iii 11

t'~ Oepartmeiit ot A-c7riciuItute taint tii a~ to tuna,nie,- t',od imnpout Fur the-t i-ii ir- i plant ..nriirg -the: -urre:ni

siniolar cii, luitIOns Pith cit iThe-c a-~e- - ciuntriv. -a ih tran Siti r,Icii delicii ; a oirid at ra4t -the * arih %,.,.u,d be cip i-

nit-ru:m. inclu1ded pritta-tioni ot rcnthat LL'ntbiriatii'n iit mnirt, ti\pirt- arid E,.t-ti, bt~ it suppirlitucib lb't It 4 bdhlin p,rr

iiiuld hii ted i' annimate AItt ',rid l5 ,n[, arran4.:mintnis; ti i~ itning tuicd wai b.- -i n, fit nunmh,, nI ri ugh Fit -ta i

- Ldt piiiit-a ira.gtiiinl- the- 3n~tter Fir s. -ni, cta-ntr- in Aticva rht procie.ted i-. i rid siati mrart iiua

,Jr-min ii'r grail; iii ab-ut 2 i' pcrct ri a oi ieni a iticd crlil; ,ill riaqiirt ettrrnat lion tCulti.ai,-d lirid Ci oLld ble incr. ae1

tair rid-ti, itnancr t-ici imporit ir. iF. 'hirt niirt- and land--a-. rIng uihigc at

[hi- .-tirtnimeni tir il-it glihal -liua;ii in run ind i- et r-And in. ;inre,nt in d~ : nce- -specuall.-dn o in,, in i.net-c

-tandsu In ~harp tciitras;t ttu ihe-a'-~ ping lugrun pctcntiai tii to-.d ind rngine-ting -uld tran-ttirni th, -ut-

ment, 1-In grIup; Cit ciorntr`c-' mdi%i dual nntidprtiidu,tiiin . alloviiing; iiir better dirt' i;a

c:iuntrie. anti lieu -,hi d, karti-u;eui iu lltinmalel% ii is r. i c-untrit blat irndi- p. pualiti..tn !ri ii- ,BLut there ar- ~14.'e~ -u hge t ;-a ths- gap tirt. cnn dint-- - ecida.id, u.;, hi utte r l ram a. sh.iriagr Cit di n,d i,i it- ile , trcp iat- -ii i

tic: uppl. anti den-and te pri 1--ied io ii-d -nit Vi;cau- -.ict lua.u cliiiin ini en--n and .-lunate ichInpin

acre increased from 15.4 million to 35.6 million and Easing constraintstheir average size fell from 0.27 to 0.14 acres. Totake another example, the average land-man ratio Multiple cropping-more than one crop a yearin Bangladesh is estimated to have declined from from the same piece of land-is a typical way for0.40 acres in 1960-61 to 0.29 acres in 1979-80. More societies to cope with rising populations. In Asia,people have been absorbed into agriculture, but where the proportion of potential land under culti-incomes have risen little if at all. More people are vation was an estimated 78 percent in 1975, about 7probably having to earn a living as landless labor- percent of the cultivated land is cropped more thaners. As their numbers have increased, their wages once. For some Asian countries the proportion ishave tended to fall in relation to those who own (or much greater. In the late 1960s 52 percent of culti-even rent) land. The agricultural system has vated land was cropped more than once in Korea.adapted, but in ways that have probably increased In Bangladesh in the late 1970s, 43 percent of theincome inequalities in the countryside. land was cropped more than once.

Another constraint on the use of potential Multiple cropping increases production and usesagricultural land is shortage of water. In many more labor, so that the chief resource required todeveloping countries, any large expansion of agri- feed the growing populations of developing coun-cultural production would require some form of tries is provided by the people themselves. Farmirrigation. Worldwide, the area under irrigation studies in Africa and Asia show that, on average, aexpanded by almost 6 million hectares a year dur- 10 percent increase in farming intensity (defined asing the 1960s. India has shown the most dramatic the percentage of time in the rotation cycle that isgrowth, with the irrigated area increasing from 28 devoted to cropping) involves a 3 to 4 percentmillion hectares to 55 million hectares over the past increase in the amount of labor per hectare. Labortwo decades, an average of more than 1 million input per hectare increases because, under inten-hectares a year. In the 1970s, however, worldwide sive farming systems, the extra hours required forexpansion of irrigation slowed to just over 5 mil- land preparation, sowing, weeding, and plant pro-lion hectares a year. This slowdown occurred tection more than offset the reduction of hours-because some countries, such as Pakistan, started essentially for land clearing-associated withto run out of land that can be irrigated at an accept- shorter fallow periods.able cost. But the combined benefits of more employment

Shortage of water in many parts of India, in the and more food do not come automatically. WithoutNile Basin, in Brazil, and in most of the developing modern technical packages-including purchasedcountries is constraining irrigation development, inputs such as fertilizers and improved seeds-andand water transfer projects are being planned on effective price incentives, the amount of labor usedan even bigger scale than those recently built in can increase faster than output. Less fertile landPakistan. Countries are also putting more empha- may be brought under cultivation; good land maysis on groundwater development, on the com- be given less time to regain its fertility. Researchbined use of ground and surface waters, on water into farming systems and increased use of agricul-economy, and on more advanced methods of tural extension services can help ensure that newwater management. Poor water management is farming methods are compatible with availableconsidered by many specialists to be the most resources, including labor. But population pres-important single constraint to irrigated crop pro- sure is likely to continue. In parts of Africa, and induction. Bilateral and multinational agencies are China, Bangladesh, and Java in Indonesia, popula-now trying to arrest the decline in management tion pressure has already forced people to workstandards, and an International Irrigation Manage- harder just to maintain income in traditionalment Institute has recently been established to agriculture.promote better use of water. The challenge will, In most developing countries, however, laborhowever, remain formidable, especially in some productivity has been maintained. To forestallcountries of sub-Saharan Africa, where little or no diminishing returns to labor, intensification of landirrigation has been used in the past. This is particu- use has usually been accompanied by better farm-larly true for the Sahelian countries, where pro- ing methods, the use of fertilizers, investments ingress has been limited mainly because of high con- irrigation and drainage, and mechanization. How-struction costs ($10,000 to $15,000 per hectare ever, such measures are possible only where rain-compared with $2,000 to $5,000 in Asia), low fall is favorable-or where water is available forfarmer response, and poor project management. irrigation-and where topography and soils do not

92

impose constraints that cannot be eased at accept- rural Bangladesh-one of the most crowded areasable costs. in the world-transport, marketing and storage

Higher population density, by permitting econo- facilities, as well as extension services, are allmies of scale in the provision of infrastructure and inadequate.services, can sometimes help to induce improve- From one point of view, it is no small achieve-ments in agriculture. In the United States, for ment to sustain an increase in population on theinstance, rising population densities stimulated scale that has occurred, and continues to occur, inthe development of the transport system during many developing countries. But keeping the pro-the nineteenth century. An improved transport duction of food up with (or even ahead of) growthsystem, in turn, greatly facilitated the growth of in population is no guarantee that people have aagriculture by lowering transport costs and by rais- healthy diet. Where incomes are low and une-ing the farmgate prices of agricultural products. qually distributed, and increases in food produc-But the potential benefits to be gained from higher tion are just barely ahead of increases in popula-population densities are not always realized. In tion size, poor people may not be able to afford the

FIGURE 5.3

Foodgrains and population in India, 1950-83

Population(millions)700

Average annual600 growth rate

2.1pre_

500

400

3001950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Production of foodgrains(nillions of tons)130 Pr,

average annual ,k110 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~growth rate of,110 2.7 pe rc e n

90 i

70

50 - s

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Production of foodgrains(kg. per capita)0.20

Al~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

../

0.101950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Years shown are end years for the agricultural season. Data for 1983-84 are estimates.

Sources: World Bank data; adapted from Cassen, 1978.

93

food they need. Although the amount of labor matching what was achieved in Japan. Becauseused in farming has risen in most developing these countries also use land intensively, theycountries, many families have had little or no need larger inputs of fertilizer to increase food pro-increase in their income. They are particularly vul- duction. A second group of countries are likely tonerable when harvests are poor. As Figure 5.3 go on importing food indefinitely because of con-shows, India has managed to expand its food pro- straints on land, irrigation, and so on. For a thirdduction faster than its population has grown. But group, although the constraints appear lessoutput per person has varied considerably, and in severe, the process of agricultural modernizationbad years when food prices have risen, the land- may take several decades. In the meantime, theyless poor probably went hungry. may need to increase their food imports.

Most developing countries still have potential foryield increases (see Table 5.7). But in some land- Population and the environmentscarce countries-for instance, Egypt, China, andKorea-yields are already high. Paddy yields in Rapid population growth can contribute to envi-Egypt in 1979-81 averaged 5.6 tons per hectare, ronmental damage, especially when combined

TABLE 5.7

Cereal yields and fertilizer use, selected countries, 1969-81

All cereal yields (tonis per Fcrtilizer use (kilograms perliectare of harvested area) hectare of hlarvested area)

Countrny roup 1969-71 1979-81 1969-71 1978-80

Industrialized countriesUnited States 3.50 4.20 172.4 192.5Denmark 3.85 4.02 331.0 331.0Netherlands 4.02 5.69 868.0 1,121.5Japan 5.04 5.27 426.2 532.6

Developing countriesAfrica

Burundi 1.04 0.99 0.6 1.1Cameroon 0.89 0.89 7.9 11.6Egypt, Arab Rep. 3.85 4.01 115.0 188.5Kenya 1.47 1.50 18.4 18.4Malawi 1.00 1.18 6.6 16.1Zimbabwe 1.08 1.36 54.3 64.2Tanzania 0.78 0.70 3.3 6.1Zambia 0.76 0.74 25.4 47.5

AsiaBangladesh 1.66 1-96 10.7 31.9Sri Lanka 2.40 2.42 53.3 70.2India 1.11 1.34 12.5 31.7Korea, Rep. of 3.50 4.77 193.1 354.5Malaysia 2.39 2.82 45.3 102.3Pakistan 1.21 1.61 23.1 61.2Philippines 1.30 1.59 23.5 30.7Thailand 2.01 1.94 9.9 20.1

Latin AmericaArgentina 1.71 2.20 3.3 4.4Brazil 1.33 1.50 24.0 72.6Colombia 1.72 2.46 43.0 69.0Chile 1.86 2.12 106.2 84.2Costa Rica 1.55 2.25 141.9 177.9Ecuador 1.04 1.61 17.5 48.5El Salvador 1.57 1.72 104.2 105.3Guatemala 1.12 1.51 25.8 65.2Mexico 1.52 2.11 38.7 79.8

Notc: Harvested area covers all cropped areas including tree crops.Sources: FAO, 1982; World Bank.

94

with certain nondemographic factors. For exam- areas such as in Nepal (see Box 5.4). Forests alsople, an unequal distribution of farmland, by protect power production from hydroelectricrestricting access to better soils, can help to push schemes. When watersheds are cleared, damsgrowing numbers of people onto ecologically sen- often start to silt up. Less electricity can be gener-sitive areas-erosion-prone hillsides, semiarid ated (because less water can flow through thesavannas, and tropical forests. One example is the turbines); thus the economic life of the investmentmigration to the Amazon rainforests from rural is reduced. For example, the useful life of theareas of northeastern Brazil, where 6 percent of the Ambuklao Dam in the Philippines has been cutlandholdings account for more than 70 percent of from sixty to thirty-two years because ofthe land area. Social changes can also bring eco- deforestation.logical threats: in Kenya and Uganda pastoral Satisfying the demand for firewood is a majorgroups, whose political power was destroyed cause of deforestation, particularly in the drier andunder colonial rule, have seen their closed system higher regions where trees grow slowly. To meetof communal management converted into open their daily energy needs, an estimated 1.3 billionaccess to their land. With added population people must cut firewood faster than it can begrowth, overgrazing and severe environmental replaced by natural growth. Unfortunately, thosedamage have followed. Population pressure is not who are exhausting the forest seldom recognizealways the main culprit, but it almost always exac- what they are doing. The depletion becomeserbates the problem. apparent only when obtaining adequate supplies

Of course, the environmental problems of the requires more physical effort or greater expense. Indeveloping countries are not confined to the coun- the Gambia and Tanzania population growth hastryside. Industrialization and urbanization have made wood so scarce that each household spendsalready led to severe air, water, and noise pollution 250 to 300 worker-days a year gathering the woodin some cities. Although such pollution is a hazard it needs. In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the price ofto public health, it does not pose as immediate a wood increased tenfold during the 1970s and nowthreat to the economic life of low-income countries claims up to 20 percent of household income.as does deforestation and desertification. In dry The scarcity of wood has profound implicationscountries, these two threats are closely linked. for everyday life in developing countries. When

there is not enough fuel to heat food and boil

Deforestation water, diseases spread more rapidly. In Chinamore than 70 million rural households-about 350

Forests are central to the economic and ecological million people-suffer serious fuel shortages forlife of many developing countries. They help to up to six months a year when crop residues arecontrol floods and thus protect roads in mountain- exhausted and wood is unavailable in deforestedous and wet areas. Floods and landslides have areas. In much of West Africa, families tradition-become serious problems in steep, deforested ally cooked two meals a day. Now, because wood

Box 5.4 Reclaiming the Himalayan watersheds

fli,r .,nge. r..,hr h1. 1- throu li r i .t,' r i-.jm n, icpho .p .L . l,,.:,,I. .- . d i-e d ud.: t IiI. id.- hi .... 11 al , -e C., -lr.iie

Indii- aind H,,ng d, mh t.i....1 . . r i i . l-h rlm,: in th.: path .'t tIi.: ;inuai .1311 tekr11 11 i Iot . ':k 1 .:I. t I .I.... .h 1 , a I t

c3u .ng mill- .n. ni . i 1* 1,r:..L .magx ti . \ I. -d . ;lihn.n, t,. thE flh:l:i oL ih, dan:.-. dr i.. -n, i,.- n, *n -: .ii;

,k .n..a!.-uI.;t h,.in,rh -utna r'r... u pU I .,Iir gr,Bu. ih ptht .E .o-i,1 tA. .i-..] .l111 i- h.n`.. rr.3:d 1 -. %. . n

h.: i l, . iw h rr .l'nr d:,n..,s ar e rt 1... r incr,.-d .-.p .nfniiaII x ,.. r th, - zr. n,n \i Inh .. *n1-lun .f thr, .-., ir,r-

n-.,,,h -. rz, ri-in hr'e. n,-r .h,- In thE F ' p t t .%tr, v.,r, ,. n th.,u h r.hE nkeni; 1 fiani.ad- h Indi.i .rnd \.-pal

ni, Lin. *u .n L, - r . h, d .rh 1 n-- ri l r.ntn ,'r'nu.Iruniall h.ie l;rd u, cIr,rnv .Lk. r.ur..t rpt ... . ..d. i

ir.d,i md ,i . .pl r i Ul i r lr. . II- haw T.-. .lh p .. inbal thei lo odin-, th, MA rld p- .3I Fl. n ar *. I .1 S .intnbuin... it .ci.r

:Ertll r1..^ I-'.,rr d*ir'i.-.i.T,Ii"i3 i.h,.h .. I-;,3rL p.>, i.3r g a I rr.'irl r, Ihr .. d.-p..r I. r .M t .. J . ,1l.:-. 11 i, hich p..pul.-

ms,;Il:.-d ih, ;r I h- . ramn. i rur, .ii lndial' Xij.:- or tiTar PrAd. ht, h d-. .rIp u- n d,.slr, , In th, il. ......-.r..- r.' ar-1

rith.-r ,h.i,. . ..... thc -,nt., In th I- l Ii rh 1........- i,,. -nul.l ..a...,lr.ho.i . 3\.rn 12 I-NII.............. t_h.pi,r "

Undi. r -r , -urT.'undin; i rei (L3nia,- pp iivp.i.3i'r , pldflanIrni rr-,c. .er .i , ,Ie

ulalirn !r... rh a.nr.l c..nr ..-n rv,t-. n,.r lI,nd r.r-a til p,oje(i ill lttump? t. r.cl.irn -

95

is so scarce, they can do so only once a day or once nutrients and organic matter, thereby exposing itevery other day. A more specific example is that of to erosion from the sun and wind. These directsoybeans in Upper Volta. They are a new crop, are causes themselves spring from the pressures ofexceptionally nutritious, and have grown well, but rapid population growth. In trying to obtain morethey are not popular because they have to be food for themselves and their livestock, growingcooked a long time. Similar experiences have been numbers of people frequently overstretch the car-reported in Haiti. rying capacity of semiarid areas: keeping produc-

Managed village woodlots, fuelwood planta- tion high during drought reduces the land's natu-tions, or more efficient wood stoves could do ral resilience and sets it on a course to permanentmuch to ease shortages. For example, a well-man- degradation.aged woodlot planted with fast-growing trees can Although some 100 countries are affected byyield as much as twenty cubic meters of wood per desertification, the process is most serious in sub-hectare annually, six times the yield of an unman- Saharan Africa (particularly the Sahel), northwest-aged natural forest. However, these and other ern Asia, and the Middle East. Every year an addi-measures are not easy to introduce. They require tional 200,000 square kilometers-an area largerlocal testing and adaptation, large numbers of than Senegal-are reduced by desertification to thetrained staff, and adequate economic and institu- point of yielding nothing. And the process is accel-tional incentives. But the returns from forestry erating: more than 20 percent of the earth's sur-development can be high. In Ethiopia, where fuel- face-now populated by 80 million people-iswood shortages have become critical in some directly threatened. The human costs of desertifi-regions, estimated rates of return on investments cation often include malnutrition, threat of famine,in rural forestry are on the order of 23 percent. and dislocation of people who must abandon their

Another major cause of deforestation is the lands to seek employment elsewhere.expansion of agriculture. According to the FAO,agricultural growth involves clearing more than 11 Urban population growth and internal migrationmillion hectares of forest a year, primarily inresponse to popuiation pressures. Unless these Beyond a common concern, perceptions of themarginal lands are given much commercial atten- problem of the distribution of population vary con-tion-fertilizers, irrigation, and so on-they soon siderably among developing countries. Some seetend to become eroded and infertile. When this the countryside as overpopulated in relation to itshappens the settlers clear more forest, a destruc- natural resources. Others complain of labor short-tive and unsustainable process. Fertilizers are ages in remote but resource rich areas. Most com-often an uneconomic remedy, being expensive and monly, however, maldistribution is described inineffective in the soil and rainfall conditions of terms of "overurbanization" caused by "'exces-many tropical areas. sive" migration. In some developing countries,

rapid urban growth has undoubtedly caused seri-

Desertification ous administrative difficulties. Urban life requiresa complicated set of services-housing, traffic,

The effects of gradually spreading desert are often sewerage, water, and so on-that cannot quicklyconfused with those of drought. But droughts, no be scaled up as population grows. City administra-matter how severe, are ephemeral; when the rains tions are usually short of money, and may anywayreturn, the land's inherent productivity is lack the managerial skill to cope with a city thatrestored. With desertification, even normal rainfall doubles its size in a decade. Where this happens,cannot fully restore the land. In extreme cases, the results are familiar: unemployment, substand-land may remain unproductive for many genera- ard housing, deteriorating public services, conges-tions unless costly remedies are taken. tion, pollution, crime, and so forth.

While drought can help to turn land into desert An overriding concern with the negative aspectsand make the effects more obvious to people living of urban growth, however, has often led policyma-there, most scientists agree that changes in climate kers to overlook some of the benefits to be gainedare not responsible for the vast areas of semiarid from internal migration and urbanization. As aland going out of production each year. The direct result, many governments have chosen to carrycauses of desertification include overcultivation, out costly-and often economically inefficient-overgrazing, and deforestation. These practices programs to redistribute population. They wouldstrip vegetation from the topsoil and deprive it of have done better to have concentrated on rural

96

development in areas already settled, on improve- interest loans to promote capital-intensive indus-ments in urban policies and management, on elim- try, for example-may also exacerbate urbanination of price distortions (such as keeping food problems by encouraging rural-urban migrationprices low) that encourage urban population without creating enough new urban jobs.growth, and on development of effective family Whatever the cause, the drift from countrysideplanning programs to reduce rates of natural pop- to city is a concern to governments. A 1983 UNulation increase. survey of 126 governments of developing coun-

Projections of urban growth (which were shown tries found that only 3 considered the distributionin Table 4.3) are not meant to predict what will of their populations "appropriate." Moreover, allactually happen-merely what would happen if three were governments of small island nations:historical trends continued. As such, projections Barbados, Malta, and Nauru. Concern was great-are sensitive to small changes in trends. There is est in Africa, the Middle East, and low-incomeevidence that the rate of urban growth in develop- Asia: virtually all governments in these regionsing countries slowed slightly after 1973 in response considered population distribution either "parti-to the world economic slowdown. That decrease ally appropriate" or "inappropriate." As a rem-could produce a much smaller urban population edy, more than three-quarters of all respondentsthan shown by the projections. Though this would stated that they were pursuing policies to slowmake urban growth easier to cope with, it would down or reverse internal migration.(without a compensating decline in the overall Between 1925 and 1950 at least 100 million peo-population growth rate) imply faster rural growth. ple in the developing countries-about 10 percent

of their rural population in 1925-migrated from

The benefits and costs of urbanization the countryside to towns and cities. During thefollowing twenty-five years, the numbers rose to

Urban growth gives rise to economies of scale. an estimated 330 million, equivalent to almost aIndustries benefit from concentrations of suppliers quarter of the rural population of the developingand consumers, which allow savings in communi- countries in 1950. Population movements withincations and transport costs. Large cities also pro- rural and urban areas, and temporary migration,vide big, differentiated labor markets and may have undoubtedly involved even more people,help to accelerate the pace of technological innova- although their numbers are not reliably known.tion. They also allow economies of scale for suchservices as water supply and electric power to be The role of internal migrationexploited. Evidence from India suggests that sub-stantial economies of scale are found in cities of up Current high rates of urban growth in developingto 150,000 inhabitants. The point at which dis- countries are only partly due to rural-urban migra-economies creep in, because cities are too big, has tion. Natural population increase is estimated tonot been clearly demonstrated. account for 60 percent of the rise in urban popula-

Against these benefits, unemployment tends to tions, according to a UN sample of twenty-ninebe higher in urban than rural areas. In a survey of developing countries. Perhaps another 8 to 15 per-fourteen developing countries, only one (the cent is attributable to the reclassification of ruralIslamic Republic of Iran) had a higher rural unem- areas to urban status. Additional evidence fromployment than urban unemployment rate; in six India, Kenya, and several West African countriescountries the urban unemployment rate was more confirms this pattern.than twice the rural rate. Surveys confirm that air Although fertility rates are on average lower inpollution, congestion, social disturbances, crime, urban than in rural areas, differences within coun-and similar problems also increase disproportion- tries between urban and rural fertility tend to beately with city size. But these problems are often small (see Chapter 6). Thus the effect of urbaniza-aggravated by poor urban management. Typically, tion on aggregate fertility is limited in the shortgovernments reduce the absorptive capacity of cit- run, especially because migrants tend to be ofies by intervening in labor markets (for instance, childbearing age, raising the number of births inthrough minimum wage legislation, and licensing cities even when the rate of fertility is lower. Natu-requirements and restrictions on small busi- ral increase in urban areas is therefore substantial.nesses), and by pursuing inappropriate pricing Migration then puts even greater strain on thepolicies for public services. National economic pol- capacity of cities to cope with rapidly growingicies-which provide fiscal incentives and low- numbers. In broad perspective, the shift of people

97

from rural to urban areas mainly reflects the proc- source of innovation, but only if opportunitiesess of industrialization and the changes it brings in exist to exploit their ideas. Studies in Guatemala,the demand for labor. Certain conditions in rural Papua New Guinea, Peru, and Tanzania, for exam-areas-unequal land distribution, landlessness, ple, have shown that returning migrants can intro-agricultural mechanization, natural calamities, duce new crops and techniques. Other studiesand, in the past, forced labor migrations-have have found that experience gained in modern fac-strongly influenced population movements in tories is largely irrelevant to the needs of smallmany countries. But, by and large, people move to villages.towns and cities for higher incomes and better jobopportunities. Redistribution policies

For individual families, these attractions can beconsiderable. Once in the city, perhaps three out of Governments have employed many differentfour migrants make economic gains. A move from approaches to the task of slowing down rural-the rural Northeast of Brazil to Rio de Janeiro, for urban migration, ranging from direct controls onexample, can roughly triple the income of an population mobility to efforts to improve economicunskilled worker; the family income of a manual conditions in the countryside. Few of these poli-laborer in Sao Paulo is almost five times that of a cies have achieved their demographic objectives,farm laborer in the Northeast. The higher cost of and their social and financial costs have been high.urban living may narrow rural-urban wage differ- Moreover, they have often been undermined byentials in real terms, but urban dwellers also gen- national policies in agriculture, industry, and for-erally have much better access to basic public eign trade.services. To take one example, in rural areas of Direct controls on mobility have been most com-sub-Saharan Africa only about 10 percent of the mon in centrally planned economies. China, forpopulation has access to a safe water supply, com- example, has employed controls since the earlypared with 66 percent of the urban population. 1950s in an attempt to stabilize its urban popula-

Most studies conclude that migrants are assets to tion. These controls have taken the form of travelthe urban economy. They are mostly between the permits and food ration cards that can be usedages of fifteen and twenty-nine and are better edu- only in specified areas; also, restrictions have beencated and more motivated than those who stay placed on labor recruitment in rural areas by urbanbehind in the countryside. Evidence from Brazil, industrial enterprises. In some cases large num-Colombia, Kenya, Korea, India, and Malaysia bers of city dwellers have been exhorted to moveshows that migrants with long urban residence to the countryside. The "rustication" program, forcompare favorably with urban-born people in instance, resettled some 10 to 15 million urban sec-terms of employment and income. A World Bank ondary school graduates in rural areas betweenstudy of Bogota, Colombia, found that migrants 1969 and 1973. Administrative measures haveearned more than nonmigrants at all educational probably helped to slow urban population growth:levels. Overall, income and employment levels are the proportion of the population in urban areasmore a function of age, sex, and education than of has changed only slightly over the past thirtywhether a person has migrated or not. years. But the costs were high to individuals, and

Evidence about the impact on rural areas of emi- the economy also suffered from misallocations ofgration is mixed. Emigration seldom causes a drop labor.in farm output. In villages of East Kalimantan, Less stringent controls have been used in Indo-Indonesia, for instance, women have adjusted to nesia and in the Philippines. Starting in 1970,the departure of male emigrants by working migrants to Jakarta had to comply with an array ofharder at rice and vegetable production. Other bureaucratic requirements, including cashreactions include shifts to less labor intensive crop- deposits and licenses for various business activi-ping patterns, increased use of wage labor, and ties, however informal. To limit the growth ofagricultural mechanization. Manila, the city government in 1963 decided to

Urban-rural remittances clearly benefit rural charge migrants a sizable fee to enter the publichouseholds. Village studies in India, Malawi, and school system; free education was available only toThailand, however, show that net remittances- bona fide residents. In both cases, the controlsmigrants receive as well as send money-usually proved hard to enforce, gave rise to petty corrup-account for only a small proportion of rural tion, and failed to slow urban growth significantly.incomes. Returning migrants can be an important A variant of such controls has been periodic expul-

98

sions of unemployed migrants from cities, a prac- tion. But costs have been high (about $15,000 pertice that has been attempted in parts of Africa, family in the 1970s), and "second generation"notably the Congo, Niger, Tanzania, and Zaire. problems-increasing social differentiation in set-They too have had little visible impact. tlement areas, and renewed pressures on land as

Population redistribution is commonly a major settler families increase in size-have begun toobjective of land-settlement schemes. The transmi- appear. Although land settlement may havegration program in Indonesia, for example, aims to important political and social objectives, a reviewease population pressures in rural Java-with only of World Bank-assisted schemes concluded that, inlimited success, it seems (see Box 5.5). Similarly, economic terms, it is usually more efficient toBrazil's TransAmazon Program did little to further intensify production in already settled areas thanthe goal of reducing population growth in the to move people elsewhere.semiarid Northeast. Evidence suggests that the Governments have also tried to modify popula-Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) tion distribution by making small and medium-settlement scheme in Malaysia has succeeded in size towns an attractive alternative to the majorslowing down intrarural and rural-urban migra- cities. Evidence from India, Peru, Thailand, and

Box 5.5 Indonesia's transmigration program

in.;.rr.eqa * p pulatw f-s ;Iini.ited . 1x I rarvd .%u per.:Pent III th rural poipu I.a, aI * na.iwual p 'pulai ._.n inC h,3 ,| 'r'U.l in In 2-is ur,.fi.nl'. di,tru'ute' 131.in, t rhv. oth,tr i-;I.,nd'. -l.,nd - rai vt p,pup la-. n ,r :.. Ih a3a

.,-r jl noti 1l ind& -ci .rinz a 3iit I 4 Thes tig den;. graphi, and -i-nrnim:Ai 31k incr.atJd dit,hilu tkrm I p F:r. nl .

mill-. r- quarv kiln.msirr din ter,nc:. cn,.mrig th. '.lai'ld t-l ind .nc \ar in l,J--l I. 2 pvrc:'ni J %3r inI.Lnd i3 .. a:-ufnli hr ibi '-ur - ,a hta. e pr-rnpt-d nar.% pr,:cr3m- tor 1'- I _;i

th.r. .t i.i -.t 11n1- r.pulalr bur nli nii1 rpI-.ple. rIn ai.a 1:. li1- .ther .Our, I I.h, tran4nilgrl i'n pr.,.n131ra

! .nl, - p r,i: 1i thu 1jr .1 arc.. ia3a ha. isljnd. ThL l-ui.:h hcgan 3 r-etlo-ir rn.r n h*huld r.ut bt udtged s e-; V L-rn u- ibili'.i an a' ..rau .1 ` III p-11pIc per -ciuare r ki- pr.i;rarn in n"'l' nk lr,,n 15 limilk- ti .ai- p .pul.at,.r. pr,,urui-r Ir. la

mrn-lr ihighu.r than Ra3ndAe'hi II lrTi- lr.r, .:nrri,i lix . II. Lam 1 ini prt.n :, n...l`ranm. ha% e b.erin drat.' rri I h.P_ai:d .,r.:., the dn-i s i-. t, i.2 rli i ' -- I r eun..unr.i B. Pl'12 *mr 27 iii i.iple p. r4i gr.uF m : ard pr i.u13 r. nr. rhe rno.tpl, p. Fiu .3uar liIin,.ir Im r c.r,nrrJs .... i r. ;hi I i0t' F''1r %eari had tt'ii .U I..i ln,llr udnr3bk ,reds FsRtle.;O.Irgi .vrea3 '.'t th, .ilI'r r..larrd - i.I ,1,rA in. ed tlot .r' '132 ,nd Inrthe p tht ih . ,rT..jir c:zrried uil tV. th, t rl'iLin- .ira Kalimn3ntan s.ulate-'. ar nd- bn ..rn-. h t c-amn krsi,,%n a' Trai.s- F..n; nlurid that tht,' ,.i:itlr5 %-*r. tbet-iri.In 1 .1'._, ar r pupul1 r.rI n Zi ,iir, in 1`-I"'1 .l1,.%- r I 4a .t h., r .:'d t.,r .i...t .ir l ?`T.in-rniur.ti:n s,it- i h

Li .1 ii.;- itrill. . k.nk l, ' I,s hi,ch rn mi ntUni B% I'-,-,' at-,ui '5 i i- Ig 'rn. rT h.. hal, b.r ' in, I-.- . r -all-, nlen nit a-.rh:ulIur .I. ,lh"ui p-FI.l taur I1 l Fi per ear h.d bteer a. 3. cr' p . i- .i.....r.t inc. mn,inlis im , appli.. o in r ii teilL..-r -0iiil il resrIrlid 11li sinre 'i.a Fp' .piiladliC.r. pland jir:- ha.i- hs-*Irai I-and, .ar,nitl,

- --r . -e nr .. thu n.lnrel ...ulii. un.:' Ih-i.. c's'.r lin., lii .n.' Cr.-, eri th rer... .ur'. .cd ir, munne;-nh.r i4 i3 nd- h, C-.r ha% e 1 .:n nr.ill'. lIhe ir.wr-n'irriin pr. :ran, had nnl. J, diwp ndcnt .r. ra.nltrd il_griculturr .oni'.

Fp,. r -r.-pi.:.i .. il -C", r rhi 'tyar-. nmuch ri-ir-n i F'* percsrii r.:p.5.rl ,l p dd d ..t mdrt-I - hI p. pulari gr.i'.rh in rural l.a I\I i th ih, F.r i i' -l -. .. r Plan i 1---4- t rLn s tn.- tn I. tirrl I.

hJsa birn ai,.-rbt.d rhr- *,h ' ari.uinii;l rr. lrrnsniyra 'n r . r.rT, becarne I Itic I cn-I.sii . . rn i.r ri I.- ,eiin'luii.r -.l pr.-c- Throt.14h %'hi,h idrii . :,- ilurlhnr 3.rnb,ti''n' i.ir1.,i,-c 1ni.' C sr I,, 1n me!il-lad r. ii ii. iu ra-d b, -,ddiniL .- xpnd.i d Thr V ,-rld b3nr h- ;rLip I-n ian-ihh. Ir. -m ix.y :-.ei ; iu:-r.l-II- . a n.i But r -r. rih.- rIs c.pgr.,n -. i-, i. . .r..r ..Fd , i-. r ihi, IRmmirail, sulur,

F" 'Pu1ar-n pr 5I-I -urh ½ r,t .i r- -iribuedii n: ar.r ii.- -r. ital .uI * il- r !.ernn;e n nr,:r, ar ie.i-r r. nair-;'.1 I > . -:ail. h:.rn,lul l;n,sn j rrain.t- p i......... .... .hir srie I'r'a 1-'* '11 lansili i Ihi. r mn ihi.- Third Fuy. .l;r-u,h a. th., -.larin2 . nd .as ii,ai an ci appi..inll :' 4 rs.irs pipli . i h lar .51- 4i .4 lii ,iiii laml a*-a.1tet. hdluli.id-.. NIMr.- ih.in " m llh,.n t-.-n lati la- 'i ,i r .sr, --1'a ar .im' . r . . rn .s' jnmd

4 Ii ':ttJ 311.S alrei. heerr JQ'jr3d.sd *.:.'-s-i ;.,r ianvul . mst. r,! ~In_- . rt .4 i4 m n-in.t ren-. re irr.a ar. p.ned up aindLab r pr. du '1 It$ and rur.il sr, r n 1. , T'h, rn-.-r . 3 ni ha- al- I ih, .h ul. u .'r,!r.aI n-t hr mrczr.rm dnn, .-l-

h.% .naed in, part, I1.h -1arr th ind .p.n..rn...r. . ,,lirrrI and en: ',r..d s-n;.- p. p.- ,n. nra-'.'...T....rr. . sr r-.-r-l. irai-micr3,nnIanln n,ni.-, . nd ir ia31 u nderernpi I . rr .-n -limiti. 1i J I mtIr.hsm pe.pI.e .im c.- i l .Iriru t- r.n rcc.a'... a hl' pFrnIIrIir--n Ir -.r. .disF.r-;d Ir. ari .,. I6, U ..'. lli"h vi , t"..- lran-mm.rri n rr. i.-xn. .pF rnnicni pr-.r.mi4 ni. I.siria di 4- p-:r;. mi -r rur.l 1,.n arn.s-,cr- .-r. i rs ,n , r:m,.ar, *u ..:tu:ie.i it -rr'a3ui - t I-l .- F it can d.. i . alvkxiat

eli. 1b. .l r. --s-Wr lin.: - p.is.i.r......ii c.'nr -nililir- ini, itI' iqu,, .ieni .'i .1 1-i.a,iT. r ' -ri .

99

other developing countries suggests that this a cause of migration.objective is seldom achieved. One exception is Despite the growing income gap between richKorea: through the introduction of special tax and and poor countries and the widening gap in thecredit incentives in the early 1970s, industrial activ- size of the labor force, the scale of present-dayity and people were successfully attracted to migration is relatively small and unlikely tosmaller cities. One result was that population increase dramatically (see Chapter 4). The mostgrowth in Seoul slowed from 9.8 percent a year in important reason is the immigration policies ofthe 1960s to 4.5 percent a year in the 1970s. But this host countries. Their policies vary according toachievement was helped considerably by a combi- their economic needs, but they generally placenation of circumstances possibly unique to Korea: some limits on immigration because of the effectsa rapidly declining rural population, a stable gov- on the wages of natives and because of social andernment, a wide range of social services, and a political tensions that are often created by large-booming economy. scale immigration.

Population growth and the international economy CONSEQUENCES FOR THE RECEIVING COUNTRY. Ingeneral, immigration becomes controversial when

Demographic change is tending to increase eco- new workers reduce wages-usually because thenomic disparities between developed and develop- demand for urban labor is not rising fast enough toing countries. Between now and the year 2000, for ensure that an added supply of labor will not causeexample, the number of people aged twenty to wages to fall. For example, increased resistance toforty will increase at about 2.6 percent a year in the immigration in the United States after the 1890sdeveloping countries, roughly ten times faster was partly the result of a decline in the growth ofthan in developed countries. In absolute terms, the farmland, retardation of capital accumulation, anddifference is even more striking. Numbers in the technological change that favored capital- andtwenty to forty age group will increase by 19 mil- skill-intensive sectors-all of which reduced thelion in developed countries, less than one-third of growth of demand for unskilled labor. Morethe increase from 1960 to 1980. In developing recently, restrictions on the use of migrant labor incountries the increase will be 600 million, one and western Europe increased when the 1974-75 reces-a half times the 1960-80 increase. The size of the sion began.working-age population in China and India- Host countries generally benefit from immigra-which was about 60 percent larger than the total tion; in the Middle East migrants form an indis-for industrial countries in 1960-will be more than pensable part of the labor force. Host countries can150 percent larger by 2000. Even if per capita also select immigrants whose skills and qualifica-income grows faster in developing than in indus- tions suit their pattern of demand (see Box 5.6).trialized countries, the absolute income gap will Immigration, often from developing countries,not decrease significantly because the initial differ- thus provides a flexible source of supply, enablingence in per capita income is, for many developing receiving countries to adapt more quickly tocountries, so large. To what extent can interna- changes in demand than they could do withouttional migration and trade reduce these disparities immigration. But the economic gains to host coun-and alleviate the problem of rapid population tries must be balanced against social costs. Immi-growth in developing countries? gration can create social tensions, often concen-

trated locally: whole neighborhoods exist in

International migration European countries and in the United Stateswhere adults are predominantly first-generation

The motivation for most international migration is immigrants. Of France's 4 million foreigners, 40the same as for internal migration-higher wages. percent live around Paris; in some sections of theHistorically, some migration may have been city, more than half the primary-school childrendirectly related to population pressure, but today have foreign parents.wage differences are the main driving force. For One response of host countries has been toexample, in the late 1970s, an unskilled emigrant shorten the stay of immigrants through temporaryworker from Bangladesh earned up to ten times recruitment rather than permanent immigration.more in the Arab gulf states than he did in his own These efforts are not always successful: in westerncountry. To the extent that population growth Europe, for example, the same workers returned,affects those differences, it is, of course, indirectly and the average length of stay increased.

100

As immigrants increase as a proportion of the to $27 billion in 1980. In 1980, remittances pro-population, they receive increasing attention and vided almost as much foreign exchange as exportspublic resources. In the long run, these factors are did for Pakistan and Upper Volta; they were morelikely to be more important than purely economic than 60 percent of exports for Egypt, Turkey, andfactors in maintaining limits on immigration. Portugal, and about 40 percent for Bangladesh and

Yugoslavia.CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SENDING COUNTRY. A Many countries have special schemes to attract

substantial part of recent migration has involved remittances. India and Yugoslavia allow foreignunskilled workers. Migrant workers from the currency accounts, with interest and capital with-Yemen Arab Republic (constituting more than 30 drawable in foreign currency. Bangladesh issuespercent of the national work force in 1981) were import permit vouchers, which carry a specialpractically all unskilled. So were a large proportion exchange rate and may be freely negotiated.of emigrants from other countries that sent labor to China, Korea, and the Philippines have mandatorythe booming Middle East in the 1970s-ranging remittance requirements.from about 30 percent for Bangladesh and Jordan Migrant workers tend to save a lot. The averageto about 50 percent for Egypt. About 50 percent of propensity to save by Turkish emigrants was 35immigrants into Ghana and the Ivory Coast are percent in 1971 (compared to a gross domestic sav-employed in agriculture, usually as laborers. ings rate of 16 percent), and as high as 70 percentUnskilled laborers in western Europe and the for Pakistanis in 1979 (compared to a gross domes-United States may be more skilled than those in tic savings rate of less than 10 percent). The aver-the Middle East, but they comprised 30 percent of age propensity to remit, which may be more rele-migrant manual workers in Germany and more vant to the emigrant country, was lower, but stillthan 40 percent of temporary workers admitted to 11 percent for workers from Turkey and about 50the United States in recent years. Illegal workers in percent for workers from Pakistan.the United States are largely uneducated and With this new source of income, the living stand-unskilled. ards of many families improve significantly. A

In some countries emigration has contributed to large part of remittances (about 60 percent, accord-substantial increases in wages of the unskilled at ing to one survey in Pakistan) is spent on food,home. For example, real wages of unskilled con- clothing, rent, and other standard householdstruction labor in the largest cities of Pakistan items. Many of the consumer durables areincreased at an annual rate of more than 15 percent imported. Beyond using remittances to increasea year between 1972 and 1978 (faster than the rate their current spending, families tend to repay debtof growth of wages of carpenters or masons), after and invest their extra income, mostly in urban realremaining stagnant for several previous years. In estate, and in agricultural land and housing. A sur-the Yemen Arab Republic, which experienced vey conducted in 1977 in the Indian state of Keralaheavy international as well as rural-urban migra- showed that land and buildings accounted for antion, real wages of agricultural labor increased average 75 percent of the value of assets owned byalmost sixfold between 1972 and 1978. During emigrant households. In Pakistan 63 percent of1975-79, they rose from 56 to 63 percent of urban investment from remittances went into real estate,

. wages; urban wages rose from 45 to 67 percent of including agricultural land; in Turkey 58 percent ofthose in Saudi Arabia. In Egypt the rate of increase migrants' savings went into housing and land.of real wages in construction was about 6 percent a Investment in equipment and financial assets has

* year during 1974-77, after stagnating in the pre- been relatively small, although in Mexico and Tur-vious ten years. Considering the low wages that key some remittances have been invested inthe unskilled earn (for example, less than $2 a day family-owned commercial and manufacturingin Pakistan in construction in 1977-78, less than $5 businesses. How remittances are used depends ona day in Egypt in 1977), these wage increases must the same factors that determine other private con-be considered beneficial, particularly since there is sumption and investment decisions.no evidence that output declined. In short, emigration by the unskilled generally

An additional benefit is the money that emi- leads to no loss in production, and if there is agrants send back home. It serves not only to scarcity premium on savings and foreign exchangeincrease the incomes of their families but also to (generated from remittances), then net benefitshelp finance their country's trade deficit. Workers' from emigration are likely to be large. In fact, itremittances increased from about $3 billion in 1970 may even be beneficial for countries to facilitate

101

emigration by providing information to potential form a large part of both temporary and perma-emigrants and organizing recruitment on an offi- nent migration (see Box 5.6).cial basis. Many countries, including Bangladesh,Korea, and the Philippines are in fact doing this. International trade: growth and limits

However, emigration is not totally costless. Tem-porary migrants and their families often suffer Trade offers more opportunities for reducing inter-long periods of separation, although there is evi- national disparities and absorbing labor in devel-dence that women left behind efficiently manage oping countries than does international migration,the household and family assets, including agricul- but the effects of increased trade on labor absorp-tural land. Emigration has led to a rapid rate of tion have, until now, been limited to only a fewmechanization in Yemen Arab Republic without a countries.significant increase in productivity, and neglect of Unlike international migration, world trade hasinfrastructure has led to a collapse of farm terraces. grown rapidly in the past three decades, at 6.7 per-In Oman underground water channels have dete- cent a year, compared with less than 4 percent ariorated. Emigrant countries may also lose when year in 1800-1913, and only 1.4 percent in 1913-50.skilled and professional workers emigrate; these Trade has provided developing countries with

Box 5.6 The brain drain and taxation

E... tl -rn l- n' I ; -lr 1','- It,. Ln II k Ih.- ,n.1,.d 3. ni,[la - I J pr:rcn r ur. *..I:ly by the loss of the money

., .lr: i!i.- i,.. ,rI. prIri Fri. .. j r n r...r... :it- n*'r. r.d rn-Ji - .1 their services. Emigration also

. -jr.A r.: hr. . -. *rk.r Thre - .. 'ri;rinr '1w r he h J . I jr.- riln "internal diffusion"-skilled

.. rrir r . r.--n-. ..- Ir r.-- .-l. . t. ..--. n il-i. ihnIipp, i-.l ..ri'i,- r.,rk-m.. a-,. p :i,. tu -'. .rd areas within

.. ,lr, 'i.<,l "p. -r.rrlt ir,,rl \1... . ........ -r.ii.-d .. . r. Iir,,i.d T,r-;. ,:.n-.r,[r,,rt ,.-...u......... -r,r;r.

l[L'r;Ir: In,. b l1r. I .:.unn, . *r 1h ' 1 r,.- 'I. 1 I cw , r1.- ;-- rI ihrrr 1I,,,- Th, c.sts are hard to quantify and

P.r.,nr . *1 r- r.h, - l, tw -:r h r. I. .r , ,rh a- iii 1 kpr ad .nd each economy's institutional

* . ar .I . rl, nB ph;-t ... r.rlt- .......ld r,r.nn In jar.-l.id r r -, rr.- , J rd r.Our._. K-vm. of them can be reduced

,,- . .r. r .an Ih,. L nil- Ir, I .., 1: re. I-,irn..I perp-:nn. I n.: r.-nk .1 - p.: r .vr .-'i- rm 1 change in the policies 6f

p.-rc.- n :r ih. r,r.-a.r I,n I,,r inJi .jt fl . I .fl n i, n r n. I i- r ndlng countries. There is, for. r.:., ni * .-1 rt- r, r, ..- rci ri . n..h....n.h.. dp r r ... . ... . .imnplr little justification in subsidizing

*i~ .i r,ur. * Ih., rrn-,..*. ri *. lid n; n- . ....riri tLn ,d 11-3 ma rh. ri.r . I *-:- *:r,l ,F-; j..- ..hrhr .-d,cation when the beneficiaries;hr-r , a i ..:iinrI. . t- \ :llrw . ..... -I pnr.-r,,. n:, l ; Ir, -:r- I r ,..,h,r , rr.r . Ire I. rr.-,.:her elite, or when the probabil-

* i., pr . r. s. ;- .*n-,l -dmi- .1. ,,t ....... le --.~ r,.31 ii; l .- ,.. .~,r, ~ha t-,, -,rrg .n r T., .it ih- r emigrating is high. Govern-

*.t,,-. *-, ,1-.,, 4 p.- r. nt .i r r... .-rn.- 1 r3h- lj .L .r.. hi,! ni nirc.3r,l, in nn.-nt n-iy also feel that they have a~.r,-lir *n n. . I h Ir.,r .. mrn,n: I.- rhn- r. l.,ir .- r,rn: t r I.- ,. riM in t re-,hnI ,. I r.khi r. rax the incomes of skilled emi-

I Itj1 ri. t.- r r ,-, h,r le ir F pii ti. r th, I- fn ti r . r.i.nllr if emigrants remain cit-.-ri-,m. 'i :.nn. s.rl v r-. ..,m,lnr, .r,,: ,- *-n ,- t ..h,r,r,. lm.]'J -. -r. Ir. r h in n:. - .1 I heir home country. The United

hn p., r Ln, : Z h-. .: p. r...' ar .rnZ. rIt:rc r. r nh,ir -un-I-r..t r i -lc. , -n.t Philippines, for example, tax

* i,;.- I.nil Iri.--. *. i F . :i r.1in,- -r - - ,lh. -, r . .i r. -l .-in,.r.i- ri.emr, ,.-n.-nswhentheyliveabroad.

.,r,a . ih,, , ;rr,,rldi- .i, e I.. *. .-- riw l,t -I M,. ,l . Ttr- .. , .... r -. of how muchIn dir , t r;. F. r,. ;,j.j. Ih- Ir.t-n Fr I.-,, hI .:mr 3rr, 1 ii, r. . r .u*- ,.'ould be raised by taxing emi-

.h;~r.-. .r pl. .,.. ,n ..inIt rr l *.1 r:r- LIroer 'laT.nir r. r-n- t--r.r,' I plr,-nr .. :r.,nn. i it is assumed, however, that 90

I.- n- i in pm-.: , - r:rrd3 rI r -. ,i-I i; i I p,r,:nlr sf all professional immigrantsn h.. rl,.-d- 1 ,-.1 rr,.n, .rnn,l* r mr.In. . , a-nir-r ' rmi.rn dnwg Am-irr-i.1 to the United States during

, L;ri.-. 11 'c Lr .:r.l r ln' r. .:| r 1. :, -i,rrr,r r.-.i Ih31 1-r-gr-n,, 1! hani,il ['Jn" -' er. still there in 1979, and that

r.,jrl, 2' r.-r.- ,In I--3 tr jr J,FL-.' b.-.p, .h' -..bmitd.' thr, ni,.rinit -r hir-, ich major occupation theyr. 11 Frif.,11 ' ,- --, V''-n i-.I II, ,n-,'.- .t .i i It'.r'nn! :- Jii- .-pp. r i - ii narch '. ; i_~n- ,r a ngs of Ameri-

1 1,',n'.-.1I r . -.n hit ;11 . rr.,r . . .hnri 'I.....I . . .:i nrl,.r; Cr irk... rh-u r.nrh,i .-nr n ings in 1979

-r .- .t .- uJ .l kdn .rFrr n-. h.:.-'n,. . ..idt hv *: been about $6 billion. A 10

I r- .. r .r i.-a .: . uri . .: ' *r n; 1: un,nipl-- co-,iim nr.,.% Pl 3 p,rsri 1 .. u. ul' i nbui have yielded

!-. - I,r. I h- ;. r.r,dr, a i,n, h,;.h :. .:l .-i, n th, :-r. 'r ,.r 'S1,nil n,,il,..r-.,n,n. ] percent of Offi-

lrp,.<r. - nr .1 r n ; F r.rarri. m.: r;rI-d pui .i,' C . . lE-,m KID ... pn;ir1r .-.. i.Si-r;-.- from the

pr. * - tr.ni.l in in rn ni, m,il rr tn.- t e, . 1 , hiZJm 1 ih ,.n .m n : m -i:

102

extra jobs, directly in the export sector and indi- by inward-looking trade policies and price distor-rectly as demand for inputs and services has tions. Ironically, employment has suffered as aincreased. In Korea an estimated half a million jobs result: there is now ample evidence that industriesin 1970 (about 60 percent of them in manufactur- geared to import substitution create fewer jobsing) were attributed directly and indirectly to than do export industries. Evidence from Brazil,exports. For all developing countries, however, Indonesia, and Thailand, for example, shows thatmanufacturing exports have added few jobs in labor employed per unit of value added was twicerelation to the increases in the size of the labor as high in export industries as in import-substitu-

* force. Most of the increase in manufactured tion industries. In Korea in 1968 manufacturedexports (and thus in total exports, since nonfuel exports were 33 percent more labor intensive thanprimary exports have grown less rapidly) has been domestic manufactures, and 50 percent more labor

* in the (now) middle-income countries. Between intensive than import-competing industries. The1965 and 1980 manufactured exports of all devel- unskilled labor component in export industries isoping countries increased by $128 billion, but also generally high-50 to 100 percent higher thanmiddle-income oil-importing countries, with a in import-competing ones.population of 600 million (out of 3 billion in all The accumulation of human (and physical) capi-developing countries), accounted for 80 percent of tal necessary to expand export capability is, asthat increase. Five countries-Brazil, Hong Kong, shown above, made more difficult if population isKorea, Singapore, and Yugoslavia, with 200 mil- growing rapidly. Even simple manufactures suchlion people-accounted for 55 percent of the as textiles and clothing (the commodities thatincrease. Manufactured exports of low-income developing countries typically export to start with)countries, with a population of 2.2 billion in 1980, require skilled workers and versatile managers andincreased by only $14 billion, and those of low- entrepreneurs who can keep up with changingincome Africa by $0.5 billion (see Table 5.8). Total fashions and preferences. Modern textile plantsexports of low-income countries also grew slowly, tend to use expensive equipment: fixed capital perreflecting (with a few exceptions such as India) employee in Indian firms using nonautomatictheir dependence on primary exports, which grew power looms in 1963 was $1,600, more than sevenat only 6.8 percent a year in volume. To the extent times the per capita income in that year.that export revenues determine imports, primary Table 5.8 gives some indication of the differencesexporters have gained little, particularly in the face in human capital between low-income Africa, theof large increases in population. least successful exporter of manufactures, and

middle-income oil importers, the most successful.EXPORTS AND EMPLOYMENT- Export success does In both groups the labor force has grown at about 2

not rely solely, or even necessarily, on a large labor percent a year. But in 1960 the (now) middle-force and low wages. Of greater importance are an income countries had, on average, a higher adultoutward-looking trade policy and a relatively literacy rate, a higher index of human skillsskilled labor force. As discussed in Chapters 2 and (defined as the secondary-school enrollment rate3, exports of many countries have been inhibited plus five times the enrollment rate in higher educa-

TABLE 5.8Export structure and human capital

Percenttage ofmnanufactures ValueRoftmanufactu red exports Aduilt Index of Rath of

Exports GDP (billions ofdollars) literacil rate humani skills' grtorforce

Countriy group 1965 1980 1960 1981 1965 1980 1960 1980 1960 1979 (1960-81)

Low-income Africa 9.8 9.3 6.2' 8.7k 0.2 0.7 15 39 2.4' 19.0 2.0Low-income Asia 37.4 41.8 13.00 17.0' 1.9 15.4 36 53 30.0" 58.4' 1.8Middle-income non-oil 23.0 51.6 22.0 25.0 4.3 108.9 58 72 38.0 109.0 2.2Industrialized countries 69.6 73.5 30.0 25.0 86.9 902.3 96 99 144.0 274.0 1.3

a. Defined as the secondary school-enrollment rate plus five times the enrollment rate in higher education.b. Based on a limited sample.c. Secondary-school enrollment rate.d. Excludes China.

103

Box 5.7 Coping with rapid fertility decline: supporting the elderly in China

s'lI..i. Cr pi-iulillin gr.- Ih can hilp but the pirrlhn n ltl ri , ti Ti. .-r -ri tre t'urdtnn ill be crral

dJ, F. .mg i:..Uirnic. rai-' I'. ig *- i.and.- . ' -wuld b, :1 per.:,: n I . ihen a :u-t t,h 1th* War.c -,h.rl- *,r the te la-t andard- m.'re -.u l :i p,i a r:,p.d lratr..li.rln milliin p,,prl. Thze 1-tl cidcr e .r l . ii, b. E n-, -lnnir.,C I

reo *1... S i..th d-. r-tt;rtr adiciu- dJpt ndnrw . *- unprl-td?nrcd * t ri in. t tr ilt lbi.r h,rtt Penr;-i: luni.lr r.

meill-n-t zmp.rtnrIvl. pnre iding lit dei t. prh, e ur.pd c. *ur-tr; C htre hit Pro-.:. .. r lrh rrtirrm-n .n r rheot , .r.-e.urile , thc elderi. China * u-ltic.1a p.rItli' a.ld- i e and o".er rnanz- .. r h 'F'P' rtunlii .. I.: irt nlIrt and

J,tti rraphi, tr,r call' 1r.-r a pT.pLii.r. rm abt trce'nl in I pan tI. lv p.re- rein.Eml Ir.e *ubztriSiial ri.i lntcrne ih.i

.-I I t,ll.n b. ihk itar tii It'.tii1irir.; .:-r.l in r...J -JdII In jIi a nd I .-, ti . lun ..i' -ul L re,i in. tr. rheir r3 lr

Ii3r th, trl lerill, r.-ite '7.. bel.- ' 1 r ptrt-,n i. tlt Llnil-d rMats -t eharil :tar, art ur,:cli it prr-cnl p..pul... n

th, r r .li rhie ctntir'. and ih. mnill. Th, mu.-h !arc:r pri .p..rti...ni i i h.: pL.l.e.-. -.rnuc i.Je:d ri,t n.;, .- -11ij

cuple' ha. e ni. ionf child Etlerl, I.i -. r be , ni... .- hat .itbet 1e . ., n.ct ,iri , u5i.lnfl- t srrttd-

\I hlt are the I-:. .rimi(, mph . al. .1 dteai'nt in rhi number' .tf .un pe l pie ' len:iinr r ru' Ilk :tl- bdirti ull t...

1.- cr,no gIrriliit, veil reln. rrpla:emtrnt tri .ii r'err:,nt ir. I.>ilc,: t pcrcrnt ir rin3 at Chin.a . -t,ll reai.. hc,.

1 E.:1' ia,r.n4 IF. rm-minder ,r IIIr, -n l 2J it-ung a3dults t uld rP.,n ha.e ni-.ne ee in. I .i*: . l...p d .:..uinrr--

iir% Ihtr. .t uli t.: :.rot re!m'ni.n. t-3. Cr ill.hrtlrI- ri -upp.rl til I-r rh--: IIIl, n:,:..,; cr i rker r,. t- rr.

jd. a.i at - but ihit atnm not dra-aiit.: Irtn ..n.i c chIld lanluIltt r- .n.. sIinza t* lime' erirr ri- an in hna c r. .'-

rn,.- lilal tcriilirr rate , . rr i u .ed . an hIr., .upp..rl * h ir parn,ni ti, .r.urn.p- ii :! Fri .upp.ttJ n! h-,lI ar,;rn

:.. tr.1 I, i - tj't, ccr. JiA.; and iiiiii rin re IjIair ...II..l:.,i ti- .id.:rI , rt pLr. r...n.t. r r. , a ,. . .rkc r ir. khina . .

1i hich -. .iid lF p.-pularic..n t. I 2 bil- ah,ur d uble th.'-t ... c:h,ldrer, and il hi...: i. Il il thilrtirE .1 pre ,tr.d ne.

1,01r in 2 l.iil ac.-irding t. % %.'rld Fiai;, precent tev. (Ch,nt^e :.rkers -ni. I.. ul rar phic gi'ai' arev - ilitl rI t. n niim

3 rr it-ch n' Ith- ech iia. popul.-lit n 15 p'nce Firtin t iF, lhbIr a :ei are c:.. er,d in de eiop:d ti.iin1

tit leer, ar: p'.[..

-. ald decline nI:. ab,urt I -thirdJ. h i 1 hi e n ni,m '-r,t r;t .1r t- 1. rth. .: ,th putl ,flC.r,t.i- :r. l.A-aet'

14 Ic le ltil rh a ii.i, 'iu. The dLclines *¾ ocred ar.e n rural a*e.4

r urr:i .,m

' ,rldL be rearcr ,n rhc-e regilni I' h-re

mra3ne :-upFie haie 3air,ad, pled4td t.' Population p%lamids. China aid Lned Stale, IcfOand 205"

i hia' no n.rt thin .fl eh,lJ rieee B.c

'a '-i * ins 'i'iiuld be allcledi ,' ll ie- -i l 'c ar' I i.e.h

hal rn ire rap,d pmnelinn :r *tc.'ndart - r f- e'. '.lilr r -r..;k

.'duc.i.in r Buin, thil InImz ru n thc i.: ri h,ne -1 -

Fl rl-- t .irin t F'pFit 'f.luid be = _I I _ LL*Zlttl tb .1 I1ir-;, ncr,a3i .n the pr,p-ir ril j 1, It r.n tI the ueldei. * -uminic rleIlvlI i = _ J L F

, i- gin rI. rtplacmenit let a ;rtr _- JI

2i thiile puipirili nr i :1 n prsons n th - ]. r, norlf l .- j.ld l' r p. . V iJd ia,-.i I1 II r.1d0 44 [ j

the . l raII depenirnn... . . -ralit r... uld P ' [.n..rel'. in IFh . n- etitur, Bat It- r 4 .! 4

ziIrL,..li. 1j depe nidetic -.c.:ul d t n;irk- F | [-di1 dmlterrnt-i. l the a3b.-r tir.rt *UF -1 - _ L Lpp.irr.ne ih t, p itnn aId ratht r than ___ i .the dtpen-d,nt ;une Inr.1 nil pnr-14 L L 9*-rnr at tilt pliullt'X .. :4 ; o.:rktiic _ _ f L

3C I I teen 1.1 I tC Ilulr t ilu I and on I% 4 !

;t lfrtr I b' ut 4; nl.illiCtS........: pt:oIlt i. .. . . . .. I L I . I I I I _f

a:.d ri.t-i e ,nd -.r Ir, thit ear , 4 - i - 4 j . J 4

2n1l-,.il. h:r. i d . * ntttecn-ee..ar 'I. as- rt , l. r. .t ...- i..it., -F�'' 11 . , l.,, . . r s. Is -pi-..iarn'

.ige.. F. I Ih. : p r-iih pr. rI.. .. h i-r - -.uin-... r, r'"ii i .,. i-Au

mg-age t.l-:p i- uI.i 'till b.- ri per..-nr

104

tion), and a larger share of manufactures in output large families, and because they benefit less fromthan low-income Africa. Low-income Asia occu- government spending on the programs they usepies an intermediate position on most indicators; most-health and education, for example-whenin 1960 it had a nearly comparable level of human public services cannot keep pace with populationskills and a higher share of manufactures in growth. At the societal level, as this chapter hasexports than middle-income countries. The com- emphasized, it weakens macroeconomic perfor-paratively slow increase in exports of manufac- mance by making it more difficult to finance thetures from low-income Asia is as much attributable investments in education and infrastructure thatto inward-oriented policies in the two largest coun- ensure sustained economic growth.tries (China and India), at least until recently, as to Population growth eventually slows as parentsany lack of export capabilities. decide to have fewer children. The factors behind

These simple correlations should not be carried parents' decisions, discussed in the next chapter,too far. Even among the successful exporters, then work their way through to benefit society as asome countries have fared better and others worse whole. But it does not follow that slower popula-than their skill index in 1960 might suggest. Never- tion growth will be an immediate panacea fortheless, these comparisons show that factors such developing countries. Declines in fertility, foras a literate and educated labor force, accumula- example, will cut the growth of the labor force onlytion of physical capital, and economic diversity are after fifteen to twenty years.important for growth of manufactured exports. In the meantime, there are various nondemo-

graphic measures by which countries can ease

Conclusions those development problems made more difficultby population growth. The adoption of trade and

Population and development are intertwined in exchange rate policies that do not penalize labormany ways, not all of them fully understood. and the dismantling of institutional barriers to cre-Moreover, the effects of population growth may ating jobs would ease the employment problem.vary widely, depending on the institutional, eco- Pricing policies in agriculture and more resourcesnomic, cultural, and demographic setting. Slow allocated to rural credit, agricultural research andpopulation growth itself requires new adjustments extension, and so forth, would increase agricul-to support the growing burden of dependent tural output.elderly (see Box 5.7). The complexity of the subject In short, policies to reduce population growthmakes it tempting to be agnostic about the conse- can make an important contribution to develop-quences of rapid population growth. Neverthe- ment (especially in the long run), but their benefi-less, the evidence discussed above points over- cial effects will be greatly diminished if they are notwhelmingly to the conclusion that population supported by the right macroeconomic and sec-growth at the rapid rates common in most of the toral policies. At the same time, failure to addressdeveloping world slows development. At the fam- the population problem will itself reduce the set ofily level, as Chapter 4 showed, high fertility can macroeconomic and sectoral policies that are possi-reduce the amount of time and money devoted to ble, and permanently foreclose some long-runeach child's development. It makes it harder to development options.tackle poverty, because poor people tend to have

105

6 Slowing population growth

Experience has shown that as development pro- fertility declines of the 1960s, which were largelygresses fertility falls. Yet, because current rates of confined to the industrializing economies of Korea,population growth are so much greater in the Singapore, and Hong Kong. But fertility declinesdeveloping world than they were at comparable beginning in other developing countries in the lateincome levels in today's developed countries, 1960s, and spreading to more in the 1970s, havemany developing countries cannot afford to wait been related to a different kind of development:for fertility to decline spontaneously. This message education, health, and the alleviation of poverty.is not without hope, however, because some Birth rate declines have been much more closelydeveloping countries have already shown that fer- associated with adult literacy and life expectancytility can be brought down significantly. This chap- than with GNP per capita. Despite high averageter examines the forces behind their success and incomes, rapid industrialization, and fast eco-considers the role of public policy in strengthening nomic growth, birth rates fell less in Brazil andsuch forces. Venezuela between 1965 and 1975 than in Sri

It was once assumed that reducing fertility in Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey, where income gainsdeveloping countries would require a typical and social services have been more evenlysequence of economic advance: urbanization, distributed.industrialization, a shift from production in the This association is not surprising. When theirhousehold to factory production, and incomes ris- children have a better chance of surviving and ofing to levels enjoyed by today's developed coun- enjoying a wider range of opportunities, parentstries. This view seemed to be confirmed by the are willing to devote more money and time to edu-

FIGURE 6.1

How government decisions influence family decisions

Famil$ decisionsl_ Govemment

decisions j Socioeconormic O i.m. .renviromnen.t 5 N,rr.tvr ,, ! rhjr,e.

11 1~~l z hdlfrn e^3-, *:hddfrr.Polm, and-, TSending Lxprogr.rn1 . i, .d cU trT3rr.ae iSt 0 Educatlio,n o F3mLIs a.s, 3Inc, Ci Educabtinal D .rk in-,e hpc oRr~e3fEdin: o Pnrnar. helth C tIr C U;cr 0 ,r Fei, l.. r h.I.

I c- .i,n-n 'rulu ri Famrd% planninr Iarer ianPi*es a Availability ot T _

Oi Children 0 in,entEi es !or ~laatdI h servic*e§ Proximate-du, shc.n ard3 ':..rk ien:,'zrv ,ontrr1 0. nhat evcsPomt.duC .hon t:d A 1,ar0mon) tvomnen's status delerminanisci 01Id .at e v arl! . D Fjnanciaf and of fertilih,

i ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~labr-rniarke s~

I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c 5 ..rdrri., .se. ,, . Ln~~~~~ B1erlireedirns

_ . O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c C -.:.n rrcpi)D _

Fertility

106

cating them. The gap between the private and -for example, for health and education-has greatsocial costs of children narrows where income potential for affecting such decisions. Educationgains are widely shared, credit and labor markets and primary health care account for between a fifthare working well, and people are receiving a fair (Malawi) and a third (Tunisia) of public budgets inreturn to effort and skills. Income gains often coin- low-income and middle-income countries. Taxescide with an increase in opportunities for women similarly affect behavior through, for example, tax-outside the home and for the poor, and associated free allowances for children and fees or subsidieschanges substitute for the benefits of having many on services that children use. The effects of taxeschildren. and subsidies can differ depending on the situa-

But such changes come only gradually. Educa- tion. Tuition and book charges might discouragetion, for example, cannot be transformed over- parents from sending children to school and sonight. Nationally, literacy rates today are strongly indirectly contribute to higher fertility. But once itinfluenced by their level in the past; in house- is clear that education is valuable, such charges areholds, children are more likely to attend school if likely to encourage people to have fewer childrentheir mothers did, regardless of family income in order to give them a better education.level. Expanding opportunities for women relies in Some of the ways in which government canpart on educating women-but this occurs more influence family decisions are illustrated in Figureslowly where parents see only limited opportuni- 6.1. The influence can be direct-government canties for their daughters. In rural areas, credit and make laws and issue proclamations, for example,labor markets cannot be transformed overnight. that clarify social goals about marriage age andAll the more reason, therefore, to act now-espe- children's schooling. But government influence iscially because some of these changes also take time likely to be stronger and more enduring when it isto lower fertility. indirect; for example, through various entitlement

Other complementar policieand tax programs, government can affect the socialOther compalementary policies can have more

immediate effects. Promotion of later marriage and and economic environment, which in turn affects

longer breastfeeding can reduce the birth rate at people's decisions about marriage, children, andthe same time it raises welfare. And the experience education. These indirect effects are so powerfulthe same timelopitnraises welarie. A the t experienc because fertility itself is but one of a set of interre-of many developing countries shows that public .ae hoshl .eiin: aigcnuigsupport for family planning programs, by narrow- working, raisin children, and sending them toing the gap between actual family size and what sool. Main ohiesn,al sentgou to

couples wol wan if thycudmoeesl school. Many of the signals sent out by govern-cooules wouldcwantr iferthy quicould moere easily ment affect fertility by altering the decisions aboutchoe,cng lerv fertilit qickly. Whr afoaml children's education, mother's work, and the rela-planning services are widespread and affordable,fertility has declined more rapidly than social and tive attractiveness of spending now or saving for

one's old age. Figure 6.1 also shows that all theseecnmies progress aloneia, would pRca,dict. Som- influences alter fertility through what demogra-eamplTs ar l, CostaeRica, Indonsia Tai phers call the proximate determinants of fertility-ldTico s breastfeeding, age at marriage, contraceptive use,

Mexico. and abortion.

By taxing and spending in ways that provide The complexity of these relationships is both acouples wvith specific incentives and disincentives virtue and a drawback. It is a virtue because spe-to limit their fertility, government policy can also cific government programs can have multipleaffect fertility in the short run. Government can effects that enhance their overall impact on familyoffer "rewards" for women who defer pregnancy; behavior. This is clearly true of family planningit can compensate people who undergo steriliza- programs and other development programs. Suchtion for loss of work and travel costs; and it can efforts work best in concert; they work only halt-provide insurance and old-age security schemes ingly when they work alone. When various pro-for parents who restrict the size of their families. grams all work together, they make possible the

Each of these public policies works through sig- steep declines in fertility achieved by countriesnals which influence individual and family deci- that have simultaneously benefited from rapid eco-sions-when to marry, whether to use contracep- nomic growth, improvements in education, risingtion, how long to send children to school, and life expectancy, and expanding family planningwhether and how much family members work. programs. But the complexity is also a disadvan-The level and pattern of government expenditure tage; no one program or policy is enough to reduce

107

feTtility; nor is it easy to judge the importance of tality. As shown in Chapter 4, many of the less diffi-one program compared with another. cult ways to reduce mortality-through antimalarial

campaigns, for example-have already been

Socioeconomic factors and fertility exploited; further progress against mortality requireschanges in people's behavior. Family planning serv-

One possible remedy for population growth can be ices are an obvious example. Though primarily seenruled out at the start: accepting a rise in death as a way to reduce fertility, family planning can be arates, or even a slower decline than is possible. major contributor to lower mortality-both of infantsHigh death rates do slow population growth. But and of mothers (see Box 7.1 in the next chapter). Thethe main reason for wanting slower growth is to same is true for the education of women; women'simprove people's well-being-to move quickly education can lower fertility by delaying marriage, bytoward a balance of low death and birth rates, thus increasing the effectiveness of contraceptive use, andcompleting the demographic transition. by giving women ideas and opportunities beyond

childbearing alone. Women's education is also a

Reduicing infant and child mnortality major contributor to lower mortality.

High infant mortality is part of the setting that pro- Raising incomemotes high fertility (Chapter 4). Parents whoexpect some children to die may insure themselves Since children are a source of satisfaction, oneby giving birth to more babies than they want or might expect richer parents to have more of them.expect to survive. High infant mortality can cause Within the same socioeconomic group, this is oftenhigh fertility for biological reasons as well: breast- so: among small farmers, for example, those withfeeding delays the return of regular ovulation, so more land often have higher fertility (althoughthe interval between a birth and the next concep- their fertility is lower than the fertility of the land-tion may be shortened if a baby dies. less-see Box 6.1). Rising incomes are also associ-

In the short term, the prevention of ten infant ated with decreased breastfeeding, which raisesdeaths yields one to five fewer births, depending fertility unless contraceptives are used. Whereon the setting. Thus lower infant and child mortal- marriages are delayed by the need for a dowry, ority leads to somewhat larger families and faster by the costs of setting up a household, risingrates of population growth than otherwise. But incomes permit earlier marriage and earlier child-effects in the long term are more important. With bearing-and thus higher fertility. But these effectsimproved chances of survival, children receive are transitory and may be avoided altogether. Theymore attention from their parents, and parents are can be offset by the social changes that accompanywilling to spend more on their children's health economic growth-such as education and familyand education. Lower mortality not only helps planning programs-and that work to lowerparents to achieve their desired family size with fertility.fewer births, it leads them to want a smaller family This relation adds up to a well-established fact:as well. in the long run, people with more income want

The 1980 World Development Report reviewed poli- fewer children. Alternative uses of time-earningcies and programs to improve health and reduce money, developing and using skills, enjoying lei-mortality. This Report focuses on measures to sure-become more attractive, particularly tospeed the decline in fertility for three reasons: women who are primarily responsible for bringing

* Fertility will henceforth have a much stronger up children. Parents start to want healthier andinfluence than mortality on population size; this was better-educated but fewer children. Education ofdiscussed in Chapter 4. A rapid fall in fertility is all children becomes more attractive as job opportuni-the more urgent to ensure slower population growth ties depend less on traditional factors-class originwithout compromising efforts to reduce mortality. or family background-and more on education and

* High fertility and unplanned births contribute to associated skills. And children's work becomeshigh infant (and child) mortality. Many children, less important to family welfare. Higher incomeborn close together, weaken the mother and the baby means an increased surplus to invest in land orand make it harder for the family to afford health care other assets, a greater awareness of alternativeand food. investments, and the spread of social security and

* The policies and programs that reduce fertility pension schemes that guard against destitution inare more than ever those which will also reduce mor- emergencies or in old age. In short, it is not higher

108

Box 6.1 Landholding and fertility.|

I ,r,d r-.r',rr 'r.- .,rrI1rn *u. 1i, I II,nd I.uidM.l, tI ;Ijre * hiI J rb.I c .1& f:,n 7r, . . . l tLr,ril .mmun'ilrh

. r I'rdr I .r. . ,rir ;r.r..l. n...r,,. di,n,- .,, a- s,. n I hl.r in .- l .311:d .; l ..r; . . rv 3r nri ,r

r'u r.r, ,r , rur,l -rt ind 1 .. : r. 1'.'.- dre n ...r-.prd . ... n:aI 4 -r:rr.r :I .I I r r,j,:I r,;hr -. r , .

.-ir *u. .^u.nr eurr ,l,IiIh r- 1111,1 .tr ;lI *. i ih r... rr- .r. -,r I-d I 1,.h.r TrrtillL. tn...l nl.

.lr.juI -rti1 ..: * rriri'. b..h,. jr ,r r * - r I-r r,r . ,. - .n L,nJ . ..:r th., I.ir,,h Idh ,i. .I -1 a b.t

r,,ri I,r.e.t- I 1 - II,n i .t.rnr. , r , - ; n h., . ;, .-.I r ;,,;;. r n,.-, rii r .. n....n......... r: I . 4 nrIh.h u.rl, , rIIT, C e,-, V I ,-U I|1 . .. tirradl -r,.r\ r% .-. . .1, t,rr,1,t jr..? *...1 :..-nJ:rr T *n h, -L.rni. u l t*. in. ., . I h.- I 1 .ird rh1 J 1i'. , -- * t

* C. iih n.j. r .- rIrrr,r, r.,- iJ . r . : .rk r n.:-r U th, I rni Th. ci r in ; - , lr.- I -, r r. ,I r .. I,r T. r, 1ii,

,Fr 1 .. 'rk it h,: *..rrrr,rur,. n .. 1 .....-*,r,t r ld IJ r,,,I k , r.l hIm ., I ,r.il

.IriIdr.- L.. I Iid , .r. .lu,, LI V, 1_ I .. - d r,nd-_nr or hr- .hidri :'r,- -. *iu-.I. ,n * urthrr, E.,p h . .d rhi.

I . l:.rrri.'r. *r.. ,l-,. hi m .. tit- -,rf r i lt. ....n rh Irar, t *LIf.i rhIj -!l.Ci-.. L,nd rrt.rrrr TTr-

i-rd Ior.-r ilnnr,l-'rr r.! tui,r,n I Ir,.r..1 11r t iln - nd. Er.,nt...r . .hr.lr.r .r. .. ;Tin) trd tF

J.-Ph in,ir 1,-in i I l-, hib r p ..hIip.in ..:z hod .Irr .. II... .,r -, 1- -h IFT r in.d ,rim!i - r.iL, ml rn

I nd Th ,,I.,rrd I I,.i lb. I. ,r r' .-. 1 ;.- 1 n I .J 1: , r -. r ly- jr .. l. . .;r,n. rr ,n rI. J Ilk I t JI. I I I I -

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li'. 1,r, in ir,: C 7I r -l,rl . . irh ,rri- . Ir. ..1-. ni. rJn.i-i I.. i r.c.p. n- n .1 .n I... .i.ne. h, o r-n rL.r r - t ch,l-

|:,Trd l;nJ- h . .r- , ill. hn,.-, J r. ;.. ..... l.. l r ir,Irl, r ...- ri . , -l,,h r..r .11 :r.. .1 I,r

W niulr,lIr .r.- fnl, t l; hrl;: Iabct I,. * r i h, ..r.r.-. I,t, I 1,: . rI r. .- h .r L,niil d nr.r-! .d . 1, t.,r*l. -.:

.1W.. ri-i,- -,...- r,L V -r IrI t rh,rr 7- .r'. L, i t;l;Indr .urr. r;- i,.r 1Dir, ;. 1.:7 . .r-.... y-r . -5,n i.,d r1I h.uI 1-.I A t I rf

lrrn-r . rli r7,,nit-.1 ind Ir .i -r, . pi I ur * n.r-rt... .1 . tr .- - rr.r , lf'I -ri fl. h. - ri.nd Ik- ' , n.j

Tl I l.rLid I i py-rc nr .1 rn,.I,.-. h -hi .1.n -t l, I i1;. 3 i.I. . II r , Ii V .r i .-ri, rn- ,n , I.rt -

income itself, but the changes it brings to people's in breastfeeding not offset by greater use of contra-lives, that lowers fertility. ceptives.

The association of income and fertility varies In time, however, the effect of education inaccording to absolute levels of income. Below reducing fertility becomes increasingly clear. In allsome minimum income, increases in income are countries, women who have completed primaryassociated with higher fertility (see Figure 6.2). In school have fewer children than women with nothe poorest countries of Africa and South Asia, education, and everywhere the number of childrenmany families are below that threshold. Above declines regularly (and usually substantially) asthat threshold, further increases in income areassociated with lower fertility-for a given increasein income, the reduction is greater for low-incomegroups. Raising the incomes of the rich (be it of Relation between fertility and income per person

rich countries or of rich groups within countries)reduces fertility less than does raising the incomesof the poor. There is, however, no good evidencethat the distribution of income has an independent Threshold

effect on fertility; it is influential only to the extentthat poor households usually have higher absolute

incomes ~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Increasing .- Decliningincomes if their share of the total is higher. fertility ferinity

Fertility

Educating parents

More education for women is one of the strongestfactors in reducing fertility. It is true that, in poorercountries, women with a few years of primary At diminishing rateschooling have slightly higher fertility than dowomen with no education at all, especially in rural Income per person

areas. Some education may be associated with a Source Birdsall,1980lower rate of sterility, and it often leads to a decline

109

the education of mothers increases above the pri- Womez's employment and statusmary-school level. The differences can be large-about four children between the highest and low- To women in developed countries it may seem thatest educational groups in Colombia, for example employment leaves little time for childcare. This is(see Figure 6.3). seldom true for peasant women in developing

Studies also show that educating women makes countries. Family agriculture and cottage indus-a greater difference than does educating men in tries keep women close to the home and allow con-reducing family size. There are several plausible siderable flexibility in working arrangements. Inreasons for this. Children cost women more than addition, village life often ensures that there arethey do men, in time and energy (see Box 6.2). The many other people, young and old, who can lookmore educated the woman, the more opportuni- after babies while mothers are working. But theseties she gives up if she chooses to stay at home to conveniences do little to modernize a woman'sraise children. Education delays marriage for outlook or to develop a commitment to continuedwomen, either because marriage is put off during employment that would discourage high fertility.schooling or because educated women are more In towns and cities women have less scope forlikely to work or to take more time to find suitable resolving the conflict between childcare and work.husbands. In ten out of fourteen developing coun- Although there are many exceptions, researchtries studied, a woman with seven or more years of tends to show that urban women who work fulleducation marries at least 3.5 years later than a time, particularly in "modern" jobs, have fewerwoman who has never been to school. children. They restrict fertility in part by using con-

Educated women are also more likely to know traceptives. But of equal significance is that theyabout and adopt new methods of birth control. In delay marriage-by one and a half to two years,Kenya 22 percent of those with nine or more years according to one study of five Asian countries.of education use contraception, as opposed to only Delay seems to affect even informal unions: a7 percent of those with five or fewer years of edu- study of Jamaica confirmed that women who expe-cation. In Mexico the comparable figures are 72 rienced no prolonged unemployment on leavingpercent and 31 percent. Such differences among school entered informal unions later than did othereducation groups are only slightly reduced when women. Even if they eventually end up with theother socioeconomic characteristics are taken into same number of children (which is generally notaccount. The contrast between these countries is the case), the delay in the start of childbearingdue to other factors, including access to family reduces population growth by extending the inter-planning methods. The differences in contracep- val between generations.tive use among education groups tend to be small Although employment seems to have an inde-in countries where average use is either very low pendent effect on fertility only for women in well-(Bangladesh, Kenya, Nepal, and Pakistan) or very paid, modern jobs, more job opportunities shouldhigh (Costa Rica, Fiji, and Korea). affect the fertility of all women indirectly, by

FIGURE 6.3Total fertility rate by education of wife, selected countries Years of education of wife

Total fertility rate ZI U m m

l l 0 1-3 4-6 7+

6

4

2

Kenya, 1978 Colombia, 1976 Philippines, 1978 Korea, 1974

Source: Adapted from Casterline and others, 1983.

110

Box 6.2 Women's use of and control over their time

ri.,r, .iti- un, b,Idrzn ri3:, :.U -r -' J- Chidxirc drv. nI r ..ut in z . ib,rr . .1 r 1t r,, ..*r,t- 1Ih- ir rrrn,- in ..n. -1- DailJ time allocation for %ormen hI`1l1r h.hId ..: r .rnd rJdue- m -rk.I

in Laguna. Philippines. bs age -rk n.nI ien ths hild un&r .,r,1.,p- ,r, L ,r- , li.tc '""-'; *F'e' - .o 0% soungeut child

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increasing the incentive to educate girls. The pro- Economic dependence on men entails specialportion of girls enrolled in school is low in many risks for these women, risks that go beyond thecountries of the Middle East, where employment natural disasters or the process of aging to whichand other activities outside the home are extremely both men and women are exposed. Widowhood,limited for women. In other Muslim countries-for divorce, separation, incapacitating illness of theexample, Indonesia-female education and female husband-these are serious threats when womenemployment tend to rise together. Once they are have few ways to provide for themselves. Theable to earn an income, women may acquire higher most obvious insurance against the risk of losingstatus in the home, thus enabling them to talk the economic support of a husband is to have sev-more openly about birth control with their hus- eral sons. Such a preference is likely to raise fertil-bands. Although a significant number of women ity, particularly if a target number of sons is con-use contraception without the knowledge of their sidered essential.husbands, open discussion leads to longer and In addition to encouraging better education and

* more effective contraceptive use. work opportunities for women, each governmentThe "status of women" is a phrase covering can lay the groundwork for improvements in

numerous social and economic characteristics that women's status by guaranteeing women certainaffect a woman's life. In northern India, Pakistan, rights-of inheritance, marriage, divorce, litiga-Bangladesh, and many countries of the Middle tion, and property. In other areas, too-such as theEast, a woman is separated from her own family at right to participate in the choice of a husband-marriage and required to develop new allegiances much remains to be done to reshape deep culturalto her husband's family. This ensures that she will beliefs so that women can play their full part in thenot become a liability to her own family. Her per- economic and social life of their countries. In thesonal contacts and relations with strangers are lim- process, much will be done to reduce fertility.ited. Typically, she cannot inherit property fromher husband's family, nor can she pass it on. Urban residenceOften, her chief role is to produce sons; in thatway she most effectively secures her own position Urban dwellers generally enjoy many advantagesin her new family. over their rural counterparts. They have access to

better education and health services, a wider range charge exorbitant rates are undersold by banks andof jobs, and mote avenues for self-improvement credit unions so that the price of credit comesand social mobility. They also face higher costs in down. Trustworthy institutions gradually establishraising children. As a result, urban fertility is lower themselves and offer means to save and borrow.than rural fertility, on average by between one and The benefits of education in leading to highertwo births per mother. This is true of migrants income emerge; contacts and kin matter less asfrom rural areas as well as of long-term urban resi- guarantors of jobs and of help with the harvest.dents. Indeed, recent evidence shows that Greater market efficiency affects fertility in sev-migrants in Colombia, Korea, and Thailand (and eral ways. First, the logic of investing in children,immigrants in the United States) often have even especially in their education, becomes clearer. Sec-lower fertility than that of their urban counterparts ond, children become less important as safeguardsof comparable education, perhaps because they in times of disaster and as old-age security. Theirare particularly interested in providing education greater regional mobility makes them less depend-for their children. able as a source of support, and other instruments

Apart from these advantages, is there a purely for old-age security, such as provident funds andurban effect on fertility? One feature of urban life is social insurance, come into the picture. A study ofwider and more varied personal contacts. These a rural area of southern Mexico where a socialencourage people to search more widely before security program was extended to cover sugarcaneopting for a marriage partner. In ten out of four- workers demonstrated that program coverage ofteen developing countries studied, the urban half the working population led to a 10 percentwoman marries on average at least one and a half decline in fertility. In India participation in a provi-years later than does the rural woman; the gap is dent fund is associated with later marriage and, inshortened, but not eliminated, when socioeco- nuclear households, with lower fertility. In bothnomic differences between urban and rural women India and Malaysia, women more so than menare taken into account. In addition, in urban areas look to children for support in old age. Informationthe idea of controlling fertility and the means of about programs to provide insurance and securitydoing so is spread more quickly. And, by being should probably be directed more to women thanexposed to new consumer goods, urban people are it is currently.encouraged to delay or limit their childrearing to There is little question that socioeconomicincrease their incomes. change in the long run lowers fertility and slows

But living in towns and cities is certainly not a population growth. At the same time, the evidencesufficient condition for lower fertility. Nor is it is that socioeconomic gains from a low level do noteven necessary, to judge by the declines in fertility slow population growth much-and can even raisein rural areas of China, Colombia, Indonesia, and it. A small drop in infant and child mortalitySri Lanka. The changes that do lower fertility- results in more mouths to be fed. In some settings,increased education, better opportunities for chil- a couple of years of primary education lead todren, and so forth-can occur just as well in the slightly larger families. Employment of women incountryside. In largely agricultural countries, dif- cottage industries or in other low-paying part-timeferences in fertility between urban and rural areas jobs permits households to support additional chil-are small anyway. In much of Africa and South dren. Living in small towns does less to reduceAsia, which are largely rural, it is clearly futile to fertility than does living in larger cities. That manywait for urbanization alone to reduce fertility. It is of these changes take time to have an effect onlyonly in the already more urbanized societies of underlines the need to begin them now. At theLatin America and East Asia that further urbaniza- same time, other measures that complement andtion will lower fertility quickly. speed socioeconomic change can hasten a decline

in fertility.

Markets, security, andfertility

One feature of development is that markets Marriage, breastfeeding, and contraception

become more efficient. Markets for labor, for capi- Where fertility has fallen significantly, it has beental, for land, and for many goods enlarge and regulated significantly-by methods that havediversify. Better transport helps this process along, included contraception and abortion. In the earlyas does the increasing scale and interpenetration of stages of falling fertility, however, marriage timingrural and urban life. Local moneylenders who and breastfeeding practices can reduce fertility.

112

FIGURE 6.4 measured), delayed marriage contributes little,Average timing of reproductive events in selected types and contraception virtually nothing. In Bangla-of societies desh, Pakistan, and Nepal the pattern is similar.

Bangladesh has the longest period of breastfeedingsociety Conception Birth (twenty-nine months) and the youngest average

Y Marriage eation F sterility age at marriage for women (sixteen years). In other

Modern t ! I - countries, such as Thailand, Korea, and Mexico,developed I breastfeeding does not last so long, but later mar-

riage partly compensates. In Costa Rica and SriLanka delayed marriage accounts for a substantial

HistoricalIadeaemaraeacutfoasutnilEuro ean ] part of the low fertility rates, which are below four;

in Sri Lanka breastfeeding is also important.Over time, reductions in breastfeeding have

Traditional ' I l l slowed the decline in fertility in India, Indonesia,developing L i 7 Korea, and Thailand. Delays in marriage have con-

tributed to the decline, roughly offsetting the effectTheoretical oi I' !11 I 1 111IlI 11 -I Of less breastfeeding. The major factor in fertilitymaximumrnI111I I I III decline in all four countries, however, has been an

fertility " increase in contraceptive use. Averaging indicesI I I l I l I | for many countries provides a composite picture of

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 change over a long period (see Figure 6.5). Of theWoman's age reduction in total fertility of almost 5 children over

Source: Bongaarts and Potter, 1983. the whole period, delay in marriage contributes areduction of about 1.4 children; reduced breast-feeding works in the opposite direction, raisingfertility by about 1.5 children. Increased use of

Even without directly altering desired family size, contraception contributes the most, about 4.5, andthey can help make the goals of individuals more increased abortion contributes about 0.5.compatible with those of society at large. Breast-feeding reduces fertility by suppressing fecundity; Raising age at marriageit also reduces high infant mortality. Later mar-riage reduces population growth by lengthening The younger women marry, the earlier they startthe interval between generations; it also fosters a childbearing and the longer they are exposed toclimate that encourages women to expand their the risk of conception. They lose the chance ofhorizons beyond the family. longer schooling and of employment, and they

Figure 6.4 illustrates how the childbearing span enter marriage with less motivation and fewer per-is affected by age at marriage, breastfeeding, and sonal resources to plan their families successfully.fertility regulation. Traditional developing societies In addition, early marriage means a shorter gapachieve high fertility through marriage that is rela- between successive generations, significantlytively early and waiting times to conception that increasing the birth rate.are mostly short. Fertility would be even higher In South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa about halfexcept for lengthy breastfeeding, complemented in of all women aged between fifteen and nineteensome instances by sexual abstinence. Today's are, or have been, married; in the Middle East anddeveloped economies achieve low fertility by later North Africa the proportion is close to a quarter. Itmarriage and long periods between births, made falls to less than 20 percent in Latin America and inpossible by contraception and abortion. East Asia, and to less than 5 percent in Hong Kong

All these factors have played some part in reduc- and Korea. Still, variations among the countries ining the number of babies per mother from the the- each region are considerable. In Tunisia only 5 per-oretical maximum of seventeen. Their respective cent of women aged fifteen to nineteen have beencontributions have been calculated for twenty-nine married, in Libya more than 70 percent. In Bangla-countries covered by the World Fertility Survey desh the mean age at marriage for women is six-(see Table 6.1). In the five African countries, where teen; in Sri Lanka it is twenty-five. If Bangladeshtotal fertility is high, breastfeeding accounts for the could immediately adopt the Sri Lankan marriagebulk of forgone fertility (sexual abstinence was not pattern, with no other change in fertility practices,

113

TABLE 6.1Total fertility rates and reduction from total potential fecundity due to different determinants of fertility,selected countries and years

Total Reduction from total fecurnditl due tofertility Marriage Breast- Contra- All octher

Counitry and year rate delay feeding ception factors

Sub-Saharan AfricaGhana (1979-80) 6.22 2.16 4.31 0.86 3.45Kenya (1977-78) 7.40 2.69 4.22 0.67 2.02Lesotho (1977) 5.27 3.05 4.34 0.47 3.87Senegal (1978) 6.90 1.72 4.65 0.20 3.54Sudan, North (1979) 5.93 2.88 3.87 0.44 3.99

Latin America and CaribbeanColombia (1976) 4.27 4.71 1.53 4.20 2.29Costa Rica (1976) 3.17 4.70 0.83 6.92 1.52Dominican Republic (1975) 5.39 3.72 1.63 3.60 2.55Guyana (1975) 4.78 2.93 1.10 3.18 5.01Haiti (1977) 5.15 4.38 3.20 1.42 2.84Jamaica (1975-76) 4.67 2.59 1.60 4.19 3.95Mexico (1976-77) 6.27 3.43 1.82 3.43 2.04Panama (1976) 3.84 4.21 1.45 6.71 1.18Paraguay (1979) 4.56 4.48 1.99 3.23 2.74Peru (1977-78) 5.35 4.66 2.68 2.80 1.51Trinidad and Tobago (1977) 3.18 2.90 0.97 4.70 5.25Venezuela (1977) 4.36 4.17 1.39 5.06 2.02

South AsiaBangladesh (1975-76) 5.96 1.21 6.84 0.77 2.32Nepal (1976) 6.12 1.74 6.09 0.22 2.83Pakistan (1975) 6.24 2.26 4.52 0.43 3.55Sri Lanka (1975) 3.70 5.05 4.26 2.26 1.73

East Asia and PacificFiji (1974) 4.14 3.47 1.67 3.60 4.24Indonesia (1976) 4.51 2.62 5.25 2.50 2.12Korea, Rep. of (1974) 4.23 4.72 3.32 2.55 2.17Malaysia (1974) 4.62 4.33 0.99 2.97 4.09Philippines (1978) 5.12 4.99 2.61 2.97 1.31Thailand (1975) 4.55 3.98 3.86 3.49 1.12

Middle East and North AfricaJordan (1976) 7.63 3.28 2.53 2.62 0.94Syria (1978) 7.46 3.43 2.77 2.10 1.24

Souzrcc: Computed from WFS data.

families would have an average of 2.2 fewer typically transitional stages preceding legal mar-children. riage; while in such unions, women tend to have

Marriage practices vary widely from country to few children.country. Parentally arranged child marriages, still Among developing regions in the recent past,common in parts of South Asia, contribute to age at marriage has changed most in Asia. Koreahigher fertility; though consummation is often provides a striking example. Between 1925 anddelayed and fecundity is lower among very young 1975 the average age for a woman at marriage rosegirls, the long-run effect of these arranged mar- from 16.6 to 23.7 years. This rise started slowly andriages is to reduce young women's exposure to gradually picked up speed, especially in the yearsopportunities outside the family and to encourage between 1955 and 1966, when mean age at mar-them to have many children. Polygamy, practiced riage was rising at a rate exceeding two months ain parts of Africa, has a mixed effect on fertility. year. In Korea the tradition of early marriage wasInformal unions, common in the Caribbean, are substantially undermined by considerable migra-

114

tion into and out of the country and from rural to These changes were accompanied by legal andurban areas, as well as by the social unrest con- social measures affecting women: polygamy andnected with World War II, liberation, the partition- repudiation of wives were outlawed, family plan-ing of Korea, and the Korean War. Increasing edu- ning services were gradually provided, and educa-cational opportunities for both men and women tional opportunities for women were expanded, soand compulsory military conscription also played a that the proportion of girls enrolled in primary andpart. Manufacturing has provided more and more secondary schools rose from 27 to 47 percent dur-jobs for women, in a society where factory work ing the 1960s. The president was a strong sup-has been considered incompatible with marriage porter of these reforms and a stern critic of keepingbut quite compatible with continuing to live at women in seclusion. These and other factors, suchhome to contribute to the support of parents. as heavy emigration of male workers, contributed

Development itself serves to raise the age of mar- to a decline from 42 percent in 1956 to 6 percent inriage, as does improvement in the status of 1975 in the proportion of women married in thewomen. Those governments which have tried to age group fifteen to nineteen.raise the legal minimum age for marriage have China legislated minimum ages for marriage ofusually done so in conjunction with other meas- eighteen for women and twenty for men in 1950 asures that would work in that direction anyway. part of an overhaul of marriage laws and anTunisia introduced legal minimums of fifteen for attempt to provide equal rights for men andwomen and twenty-one for men in 1956 and raised women. The Chinese considered raising the mini-the minimum age for women to seventeen in 1964. mums again in 1957 but, recognizing the limited

FIGURE 6.5

Accounting for fertility decline

Composite of 31 countries

Total Reduction infertility fertility rate i`,r.exntL,oe .ai r,duocnon b%. .:,)rIntnbutng tactorrate7,_

6

5

4

t-thi ,~ R-cIu.:d h1.fs'tu we -I

1kl'rE in.lu,ed 'dl-t. I..

at as pra5.e tre ~.It,_drng .sntT--_Ph1.-n t.'n .. t I,. t.

Initial Finalfertility fertility

Selected countries and years Percentage of reduction by contributing factorInitial Final Higher Reduced More use More All

Country fertility fertility age at breast- of contra- induced otherand period rate rate marriage feeding ception abortion factors

India (1972-78) 5.6 5.2 41 -58 114 . . 3

Indonesia (1970-80) 5.5 4.6 41 -77 134 . . 2

Korea (1960-70) 6.1 4.0 50 -38 53 30 4

Thailand (1968-78) 6.1 3.4 11 -17 86 16 4

not availableSource: Bulatao, 1984 b.

115

effectiveness of existing laws, instead increased declines in breastfeeding in the last three decadesinstitutional and community pressure for later slowed the decline in infant mortality.marriage. In 1980 the government raised the legal At least 70 percent of women in developingminimum ages to twenty and twenty-two-less countries initially breastfeed their children,than the widely and officially propounded mini- although this proportion is falling. How long theymums of twenty-three and twenty-five. This was continue to do so varies widely, from two monthsinterpreted as a relaxation of controls on marriage, in metropolitan Malaysia to twenty-nine months inand it may have contributed to a recent increase in rural Bangladesh. The trend is toward less breast-marriage and a spurt in the birth rate. feeding: in Thailand, for example, between 1969

With the possible exception of China, efforts to and 1979 mothers reduced the average length ofraise the age at marriage by persuasion and edict breastfeeding from 22.4 to 17.5 months in ruralhave not been particularly successful. Legislation, areas and from 12.9 to 8.4 months in the cities. Inhowever, is a way for governments to encourage Malaysia the percentage of infants initiallysocial support for later marriage; and governments breastfed dropped from 89 to 74 percent betweencan link the idea to specific programs, especially 1960 and 1974, and the percentage breastfed moreschooling for girls, which affect fertility indirectly. than three months dropped from 75 to 53 percent.In countries where early marriage is common, gov- Some decline in the duration of breastfeeding isernments need to go further, giving women more a natural consequence of economic developmentrights and encouraging men and women to sup- and may be a reasonable choice-if for example, aport expanded women's opportunities within the working mother's income more than compensateshousehold as well as in society at large. in improved health care and nutrition for the fam-

ily. Studies show that mothers' employment initself does not affect whether mothers initiate

Providing information about breastfeeding breastfeeding, but employment may affect howlong they continue to breastfeed. Malaysian

Full breastfeeding and frequent suckling are good women who had recently been employed off theguarantees that resumption of menstruation will farm tended to wean their children completely atbe delayed, though protection decreases with each an earlier age. Filipino women in a semiurban set-month after childbirth. Failure to menstruate is a ting breastfed if they worked close to home, butgood, but not an absolute, guarantee against preg- started mixed feeding earlier if they worked in anancy; about 7 percent of women conceive without different area. In addition, employment mayhaving resumed menstruation. As a basic form of lengthen periods between sucklings, leading to acontraception, breastfeeding has a well-estab- briefer amenorrheic period. But especially wherelished reputation in developing countries. In one breastfeeding is being shortened only moderatelystudy three-quarters of Guatemalan mothers knew from long periods, say, of a year or more, thethat it could postpone conception; in another, 60 mother's and infant's health is unlikely to suffer-percent of Malaysian women knew it made con- as long as families can afford proper nutrition andception more difficult, and 20 percent thought it couples can use contraception to avoid anmade it impossible. Women who breastfeed and unwanted immediate pregnancy.who want to avoid pregnancy are 10 percent of all But evidence shows that in many cases breast-married women in Mexico, 15 percent in Peru, and feeding is being curtailed simply because mothers16 percent in Honduras. Only ten years ago breast- do not know how to do it; the chief reason givenfeeding provided more months of protection for stopping breastfeeding is insufficient milk, yetagainst conception in the developing countries that is biologically implausible for all but a fewthan did family planning programs. women. Some mothers switch to bottlefeeding

Aside from its effect on fecundity, breastfeeding because they lack guidance and information aboutavoids the considerable health risks connected the health benefits of breastfeeding, and theywith bottlefeeding-particularly where the pow- believe bottlefeeding is more "modern." In Malay-dered milk may be improperly prepared, adequate sia women who live with parents, in-laws, or othersterilization is not possible, and families cannot adult relatives are less likely to abandon breast-afford an adequate supply of powder. Though feeding.after four to six months mother's milk should be Evidence that behavior will change in the light ofsupplemented with other food, continued breast- information comes from the industrialized coun-feeding still benefits a baby's health. In Malaysia tries, where medical opinion did not clearly favor

116

breastmilk until the late 1960s. As the advantages abortion, physical well-being. Moreover, exceptof breastfeeding became better known, breastfeed- for complete abstinence and infanticide, they doing increased among better-educated women. In not always work. Under these circumstances, risk-the United States, for example, college-educated ing an additional child may seem less costly thanwomen are now most likely to start breastfeeding preventing a birth, and even the stated "desiredand continue it for the longest periods. family size" may be higher than it would be if birth

Apart from providing more information on the control were easier.advantages of breastfeeding, medical authorities in It fo]lows that programs to provide publicly sub-developing countries can restructure hospital and sidized information and access to modern methodsclinic routines that discourage breastfeeding by of contraception can reduce fertility. They do so inseparating mother and child and offering unneces- several ways: by making it easier for couples tosary supplementary bottlefeedings. In Malaysia have only the children they want; by spreading thegovernment family planning clinics that encourage idea of birth control as something individuals canbreastfeeding have a positive effect; women who do; and by providing information about the pri-give birth in nearby private maternity clinics are vate and social benefits of smaller families, whichless likely to breastfeed, all other things being may itself alter desired family size. The next chap-equal. Legislation to control the promotion of pow- ter looks at how family planning programs can bedered milk can also be effective. In Port Moresby, run to best meet people's needs for safer and morePapua New Guinea, changes in hospital practices effective contraception. The rest of this chapterand restrictions on the advertising and distribution examines the evidence that support for familyof powdered milk increased the proportion of planning services (delivered by both public andbreastfed children under two years old from 65 to private agencies) has helped to reduce fertility.88 percent in just two years, between 1975 and1977. EFFECTS OF FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS ON

Without such efforts, breastfeeding seems likely FERTILITY. Measuring the impact of family planningto go on declining. In this case-unless contracep- programs is less straightforward than it seems. Totives are used more widely-fertility will rise. As distinguish the specific impact of a program, ana-an example, reducing the duration of breastfeed- lysts must estimate how fertility would haveing from an average of three years to one month changed in its absence. That requires systemati-could double a mother's fertility from five to ten cally eliminating other possible causes of a coun-children. In the mid-1970s, if all mothers in Thai- try's fertility decline-such as increases in income,land had started menstruating three months after education, and life expectancy in the same period.each baby was born, contraceptive use there In addition, information on the change in the avail-would have had to double to prevent fertility from ability of family planning services is needed (not onrising. In Indonesia, contraceptive use would have change in the use of services, since use is related tohad to more than double; in Bangladesh it would people's fertility goals and does not indicate thehave had to increase sixfold, and in Pakistan difference services alone would make to peopleeightfold. who now have no access to them). Such informa-

tion has, until recently, been patchy and inade-

Making conttraception easier quate.Given these analytical difficulties and the lack of

As shown in Figure 6.5, fertility declines every- good information, it was not surprising that awhere have been eventually tied to increasing use decade ago policymakers and planners could notof contraception. Use of contraception is partly a completely agree on the relative importance to afunction of a couple's wish to avoid (or to post- fertility decline of the supply of family planningpone) additional children; the number of children services versus the "demand" factors-increasingdesired is related to the social and economic factors education, lower infant mortality, and the like.discussed above. But use of contraception is also Early family planning programs in Korea, Hongrelated to its costs, that is, to the costs of limiting or Kong, and other areas of East Asia had been estab-postponing births. People have regulated family lished in countries where a marked fall in fertilitysize for centuries-through abortion, withdrawal, was already in progress; some of the continuedsexual abstinence, and even infanticide. But these decline might have occurred even without officialmethods are all costly in terms of reduced emo- programs. In other countries (such as India andtional, psychological, and, in the case of traditional Pakistan), where programs were also established

117

in the 1950s and 1960s, fertility was changing little 1977 rather than levels at one point in time duringduring the late 1960s. the period.

But family planning programs spread rapidly in One objection to this type of study is that thethe late 1960s and early 1970s, and more systematic family planning index may itself be the result of ainformation on them is now available. demand for contraception that already existed as a

* A country-level family planning index was byproduct of development. In this case, familydeveloped in the mid-1970s. It was based on coun- planning services provided by the governmenttries' performance in 1972 on fifteen criteria, such may simply displace traditional methods of contra-as the availability of many contraceptive methods, ception or modern methods already availableeither through government programs or commer- through the private sector. Indeed, analysis doescially; inclusion of fertility reduction in official pol- show that in the early 1970s family planning pro-icy; adequacy of the family planning administra- grams were more likely to be instituted and weretive structure; and use of mass media and more successful where demand for contraceptionfieldworkers. The index has been updated for this already existed: Korea, Hong Kong, and Singa-Report to 1982; countries are classified into groups pore. The existence and strength of early programsby this index as of 1972 and 1982 in Table 6 of the is closely related to the proportion of educatedPopulation Data Supplement. women (itself a measure of demand for services),

* Household and community surveys con- and to the degree to which fertility had declined inducted within countries during the 1970s provided the late 1960s. But these factors do not completelyinformation on the distance and travel time to explain differences in the family planning index; toservices for household members. Those carried out some extent, indices were stronger or weakeras part of the World Fertility Survey (WFS) project because of other factors-political leadership, forin over forty countries, and of the Contraceptive example. And the change in country effort betweenPrevalence Survey (CPS) project in about fifteen 1972 and 1982 is not at all related to earlier declinescountries, have several advantages: most are rep- in fertility or to levels of development; it has beenresentative, nationwide samples and, because sim- more clearly the result of government initiatives.ilar questions were asked everywhere, are largely Furthermore, although family planning programscomparable among countries. are in part a response to preexisting demand,

These two sources, supplemented by the results recent studies show that such programs do haveof small experimental field studies, have provided an independent effect on fertility. Cross-countrythe basis for careful analyses of the effects of family analysis shows that, for the average country, pre-planning programs. They leave little doubt that the vious fertility decline accounted for 33 percent ofprograms work. the total fall in fertility between 1965 and 1975;

socioeconomic change accounted for 27 percent;CROSS-COUNTRY STUDIES. Using the family plan- the family planning index accounted for more than

ning index, along with indicators such as literacy, either: 40 percent.life expectancy, and GNP per capita in about 1970,research in the late 1970s found that birth rates STUDIES WITHIN COUNTRIES. The cross-countrydeclined most (29 to 40 percent) between 1965 and studies are complemented by several examples of1975 in countries such as Costa Rica, Korea, and apparent family planning success in individualSingapore, where socioeconomic development countries. In China and Indonesia, per capitawas relatively advanced and family planning pro- income is low and the population still overwhelm-grams were strong. There was a modest decline in ingly rural, but governments have made a con-birth rates (10 to 16 percent) where development certed effort to bring family planning services towas relatively strong but the family planning index the villages. In China the birth rate at the end ofwas weak, as in Brazil and Turkey. There was also 1982 was estimated to be nineteen per 1,000 peo-a modest decline where development levels were ple, down from forty in the 1960s. The current fig-low but the family planning index was moderately ure, based on birth registrations rather than on astrong, as in India and Indonesia. (Indonesia's census, may slightly understate the actual birthfamily planning program, now one of the world's rate; but it would still be well below current ratesstrongest, had been operating for only two years in South Asia, Africa, and most of Latin America.by 1972, the reference year for the family planning Up to 70 percent of Chinese couples of childbear-index.) The same results emerged from using mea- ing age are estimated to be using modern contra-surements of socioeconomic change from 1970 to ceptives. The government believes that its family

118

planning program is critical to reducing fertility. adopted economic incentives to reduce fertility;Indonesia's current birth rate is estimated at family planning services have provided couples

thirty-four per 1,000 people, which is a notable with the means to respond. In Colombia and Mex-drop from an estimated forty-four in 1960. In Java ico work opportunities and household incomes ofand Bali, the two most densely populated islands women with little education were probablyof the country, the percentage of married women increasing in the 1960s and 1970s, which alsoof reproductive age currently using modern con- encouraged the use of contraception.traception more than doubled between 1974 and In several low-income countries family planning1976 (11 to 24 percent), nearly doubled again to 42 programs have not been effective in reducing fer-percent by 1980, and by 1983 had reached an esti- tility-for example, Ghana, Kenya, and Pakistan.mated 53 percent. Lack of demand has been a factor, but so has lim-

Other developing countries and regions have ited availability of services and weak governmentalso had remarkable increases in contraceptive use support for the programs. Comparisons withinand rapid fertility declines, even among women countries show the difference actual availabilitywith little or no education. In Colombia a strong can make. In Mexico, Korea, Thailand, and Indiaprivate family planning program was under way contraceptive use is higher in communities withby the late 1960s, and the government began sup- more sources of family planning supplies, evenporting family planning in 1969. In urban areas the when differences in development levels are takenproportion of married women using contraception into account. In one district in India a 10 percentincreased from 43 to 53 percent between 1969 and increase in the number of clinics per hundred1976, with a big switch from less effective meth- thousand people was associated with a 3 to 4 per-ods, such as rhythm and withdrawal, to pills and cent increase in the combined acceptance rates ofIUDs (although the increase since then has slowed); intrauterine devices (IUDs) and sterilization; simi-in rural areas the proportion doubled, from 15 to larly, a 10 percent increase in the number of exten-30 percent. As Figure 6.6 shows, the drop in fertil- sion workers raised acceptance rates by 4 to 6ity for Colombian women with little schooling has percent.paralleled that of better-educated women,although fertility levels are still higher among FIELD PROJECTS. Experiments conducted inthose with less education. Fertility had begun to widely different communities have also revealedfall by 1965, before family planning services numerous examples of the effectiveness of familybecame widely available, but it declined faster in planning programs.Colombia in the early 1970s than it did in Brazil or * In Matlab, a largely inaccessible part ofMexico, where family planning services were less Bangladesh, trained local women provided com-widely available. (Colombia has a somewhat lower prehensive family planning services in seventy vil-per capita income than does Brazil or Mexico, and lages. For the four years prior to the project, fertil-similar literacy and urbanization rates.) ity rates for these villages were comparable with

In Mexico, as in Colombia, fertility began to fall a those for seventy-nine other Matlab villages; overfew years before the establishment of extensive the two subsequent years, rates were 22 percentfamily planning programs, both private and gov- lower (see Box 7.6).ernment-sponsored; but as those programs gained * In San Pablo Autopan, Mexico, maternal andmomentum, the fall in fertility accelerated. The child health services and contraceptives weregovernment adopted a policy to reduce population delivered to individual households in 1976-77.growth at the end of 1973-an abrupt shift from its Contraceptive use rose from 5 to 9 percent in theearlier pronatalist position. Rates of contraceptive surrounding areas, and from 7 to 25 percent in theuse among married women aged fifteen to forty- area covered by the project.nine more than doubled between 1973 and 1976, * On the island of Cheju, Korea, family plan-from 11 to 29 percent; by 1982 they had reached an ning staff distributed oral pills and condomsestimated 48 percent. Public programs accounted through home visits in 1976-79 and also referred tofor virtually all of the increase. The total fertility clinics women who wanted IUDs and subsidizedrate fell from 6.7 in 1970 to about 4.6 in 1982. sterilization. Over the period, fertility in the sur-

Of course, the availability of family planning rounding areas fell by 29 percent; in Cheju it fell byservices has not been the only reason for falling 35 percent, mainly because of sterilization.fertility in these countries. In China the govern- * In some parts of the island of Bohol, Philip-ment has exerted considerable social pressure and pines, village workers (including midwives and

119

FIGURE 6.6

Fertility dedine within female education groups in selected countries

Completed Totalfamily fertilitysize Jordan rate Colombia9 ---------- Illiterate 9

*_ U --------- Primary andsecondary school

6 6

Did not complete---------- Secondary primary school

school

3 3

Completedprinmary

0 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1967-68 1972-73 1978

Total Totalfertility Brazil fertility Brazilrate (rural) rate (urban)

9 9

---------- No education

6 --------- 1 or more --------- No education

years ~ l---- - --- 1-4 years

--------- 5 or moreyears

0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0

1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978

Total Totalmarital India marital Indiafertility rate (rural) fertility rate (urban)9 9

Illiterate

Literate below Illiteratesecondary-school Literate belowlevel secondary-schoc

Completed level3 secondary 3 Completed

secondary

1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978

Sources: Cochrane, 1983; Birdsall, 1980; Merrick, 1984; Zachariah, 1984.

120

traditional birth attendants) provided maternal reducing infant mortality and of providing moreand child health care, as well as family planning schooling for children can be rapid-but these costservices in 1974-79. In those areas, fertility de- more in most settings to produce the same effectclined by 15 percent; elsewhere on the island, it fell on fertility. With respect to the single goal ofby 9 percent. reducing fertility, one study concluded that family

* A comprehensive rural health program was planning programs were at least seven times asundertaken in an area in Maharashtra, India, from cost effective in reducing fertility as were nutrition1971 to 1978. In a nonprogram area, fewer than 10 programs or education schemes for rural women.

a percent of eligible couples used contraceptives in In Bangladesh, Korea, and the Philippines family1976, and the crude birth rate was thirty-seven per planning programs are estimated to be five timesthousand. In the program area, contraceptive use as cost effective as health programs that reducerose from 3 to 51 percent, and the crude birth rate fertility through reducing mortality. But wherein 1976 was twenty-three per thousand. mortality is high and demand for family planning

Unfortunately, experiments such as these are is limited, as in Kenya, reducing infant mortality isdifficult to replicate. They often cost more than a a more cost-effective way to lower fertility.government could spend on a nationwide effort; Emphasis on the cost effectiveness of familymore important, they may work because of the planning should not obscure the third point notedintense involvement of research and other staff. above: that family planning and social develop-Indeed, not all field projects work well; effects of ment complement each other. Analysis of fertilityprojects were small in a condom-marketing change across countries done for this Reportscheme in Kenya, and nonexistent in one in Rio de shows that between 1972 and 1982 family planningJaneiro, Brazil (the only project conducted exclu- programs have had minimal effect where femalesively in an urban area, where contraceptives were education is low, in part because it is difficult toeasily available). But the results still suggest that operate such programs without some educatedgood services reduce fertility significantly, by clos- women to staff them, and in part because of lack ofing the gap between actual and desired family size. demand for contraception. Equally, female educa-

tion has had minimal effect where family planningCOST EFFECTIVENESS OF FAMILY PLANNING PRO- services have been unavailable. However, the

GRAMS. By increasing the supply of services, fam- effect of the two together has been powerful. Theily planning programs reduce the cost of using decline in fertility in Kerala, India, provides a goodcontraception to potential users. By contrast, illustration. Education levels have been higher inincreased education, lower mortality, and other Kerala than in most other Indian states for manysocial changes increase the demand for contracep- years, and infant and child mortality rates havetion. For the single goal of reducing fertility, been lower. Around 1980 the literate proportion ofspending on family planning services turns out to Kerala's population was twice that of India's as abe more cost effective (that is, it leads to the same whole, and the infant mortality rate less than halffertility reduction at lower cost) than does spend- the national rate. The fertility rate fell from 4.1 toing on education, health (which reduces fertility by 2.7 between 1972 and 1978 in Kerala (comparedreducing infant mortality), and other programs. Of with a fall from 5.8 to 4.9 for India as a whole), incourse, this comparison does not take into account part because investment per capita in family plan-(1) that education and health programs have other ning in Kerala has been high, at times almost as

.objectives in their own right, independent of great as in Hong Kong. But this investment would'effects in fertility; (2) that family planning has have had much less impact in less favorable condi-other benefits-including reducing mortality; and tions of education and health.-(3) that these different approaches are not reallyalternatives but complement and reinforce each Incentives and disincentivesother. At low levels of education and high levels ofmortality, the underlying demand for family plan- To complement family planning services and socialning will be low. The same amount spent on a programs that help to reduce fertility, govern-program in a high-education, low-mortality setting ments may want to consider financial and otherwill induce a greater increase in contraceptive use. incentives and disincentives as additional ways of

One reason family planning is cost effective is encouraging parents to have fewer children.that it has an immediate impact-at least where Incentives may be defined as payments given to anthere is underlying demand. Similarly, the effect of individual, couple, or group to delay or limit child-

121

Box 6.3 Mleasuring the value of children

I' r,-nrr31 par-,I i t r %Tng I.. , ,tfnLmt F.r Ii. - ri.,I '1I Th, c t I Th,: rtr:m , r. i 4p.r. In;- cr .ncd:rn , ,.n s p-,,,ni.

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f_* TI t. r F.,sIdIi..T T ,bIdr. -Ii.t L r.i,*l -.s, . I-.~.,.rs, ,.r,.- rij, drs I IIn rL i. r i.n.,rT rid irL :,

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bearing I TI It ortoueo Urcetie.1 theyrxten fur- and may, threor affec..1-,rt deiehail ie(ether the subsidy governments prov~~~~~T ideI I whenthe Box 63).t t Incentives offe atrnativ way,t

use public resources to, de-liver. , famil plannin ensure .. thebenefit chlren might otewsrr-services.~~t .- .1 -1- -r Disncntiesareth .w t hholding j of ide dis-F'.Incentives raise thecssochlrn

teaiongtorfamily planning,eprieadin informationfur uatio goals andeor thfectdamaingd effectysiof rapid

considher itbmore soeriosl,ends rompdwenstngte o for3Paym ntstceoplves wofe voluteernafor sterisiza

cstsviand Diincnentivencae that mightodn o ie discorae ioeae tsullvesante tocomesate ofo thlrael.

potniesad iincealiessusers.eain idnd workntimes lost; lkerincentivesy andn fre feamilpurTheysle. h ot nbnftfcide plnninge serviaces,so theyh perovideai ubidyta

122 vecuaebrhcnrlbycligatn hyhl nfr epeaotsceyspp

| 1, !,,, ,;. .I s r - a i l r , ! l. n -, ;a. .

Prt,ei%ed %alue t childdren in t ledled countrieI/

& "lF *l | r ,r1 I :~cpro u 1,;, , - It/ \ I / \ I

|~~~~~~~r I.,; th ;Ilr n t h -, 1 -r ,Ih. i ,,l ir, p r :.[........ . .,1- , ih- ''L Id L".

Pe,csyuued ti hacs -I r -n in ll-ir c n m a rr,ele.aed countries I

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r encourages smaller family size (though they are Examnpies and experienceusually offered to all clients regardless of family

-size). Some population programs also provide Although various forms of incentives and disin-bonus payments as incentives to family planning centives now exist in over thirty countries in theworkers; they are meant not to increase demand developing world, it is still not possible to estimate-for services but to improve supply, and are dis- exactly howv much influence they have had on fer-cussed in the next chapter. tility. In countries in which they have been tried,

Incentives and disincentives give individuals a they have been accompanied by social change,choice. They provide direct and voluntary trade- family planning services, and (in the case of China)offs between the number of children and possible various social pressures that make it impossible torewards or penalties. But choice will be preserved distinguish their separate effects.only if programs are well designed and carefully Disincentives built into benefit or tax systems areimplemented. The ethical questions raised by the most common. Ghana, Malaysia, Pakistan,incentives and disincentives are touched on here and the Philippines limit income tax deductions,but discussed more in Chapter 8. child allowances, and maternity benefits beyond a

123

few births; to encourage spacing, Tanzania allows normal fifty-six days of paid maternity leave. Sinceworking women paid maternity leave only once 1979 the central government has been encourag-every three years. But these policies affect only the ing, even requiring, each area and province tosmall minority who are public employees or who draw up its own rewards and penalties. Sichuan,pay taxes. Singapore has disincentives which for example, provides for a monthly subsidy toaffect more people because of the country's higher one-child families of five yuan (8 percent of theincome, comprehensive health services, urbanized average worker's wage) until the child is fourteensetting, and extensive public housing. Singapore's years old. The child will have priority in admissiondisincentives include limitation of income tax relief to schools and in obtaining a factory job. In ruralto the first three children, restriction of paid mater- areas in Hunan, parents of only one child receivenity leave to the first two pregnancies and an annual bonuses until their child is fourteen yearsincrease in childbirth costs after the first two deliv- old and private plots and housing lots big enougheries. Singapore also gives children from smaller for a two-child family. In some urban areas, a sin-families priority in school admission and ignores gle child is allotted adult food rations. Most factor-family size in the allocation of state housing, so ies and other work units give preference in thesmaller families enjoy more space per person. Atti- allocation of scarce housing to single-child fami-tudinal studies suggest that these disincentives, lies. In some cases, medical and educational enti-particularly the school admission policy, are much tlements are granted preferentially to parentsmore influential in Singapore than are the more whose only child is a girl-one way, the govern-common tax disincentives. Disincentives were ment hopes, of overcoming the preference forintroduced gradually in Singapore beginning in sons.1969, more than a decade after fertility had started Penalties for excessive fertility also vary by areato fall. The timing and pattern of the fertility in China. In some places, couples who have a sec-decline thereafter suggests that they have had ond child must return any bonuses obtained forsome impact. the first child. A couple having a second child may

In 1984 the Singapore government shifted the be required to pay for the privilege. (In one brigadeemphasis of its population policy. While it still in Beijing studied by foreign researchers, severalencourages most women to have only two chil- couples have been willing to pay more than twicedren, women university graduates are encouraged the annual collective income distributed to eachto have more. If graduates have more than two, brigade member in order to have a second child.)the government will now give their children prior- Parents may have to pay a higher price for grainity admission to state schools. This approach is that they buy for a second child whose birth hasbased on a belief that highly educated parents are not been authorized under the planned-birth pro-more intelligent than those with less education, gram. Some areas and provinces impose taxes,and that children inherit intelligence from their which can be as high as 10 percent of familyparents. Were this the case-since better-educated income, only on third and later-born children.parents have typically had fewer children, at least Similarly, mothers may not be entitled to paidfor the past 100 years-the average intelligence of maternity leave for a third child, and parents mayhumankind would be falling. But it does not have to pay all its medical expenses. In 1983 theappear to be. In any event, local newspaper polls State Family Planning Commission proposed a taxindicate that the policy is not popular, even among of 10 percent of family wages on urban dwellerswomen who could benefit from it. Many such with two or more children, unless one or the otherwomen have said that priority in school admission partner is sterilized.is not enough to persuade them to have more than In addition to China and Singapore, Korea is theone or two children. only other country with a national system of -

China has the most comprehensive set of incen- rewards and penalties for individuals to encouragetives and disincentives, designed (most recently) parents to have few children. Korea offers freeto promote the one-child family. Since the early medical care and education allowances to two-1970s women undergoing various types of fertility- child families provided one of the parents has beenrelated operations have been entitled to paid leave: sterilized.in urban areas fourteen days for induced abortion; Incentives do not have to be provided just by theten days for tubal ligation; two to three days for state. A private group in Thailand offers technicalinsertion or removal of an IUD; and in the case of assistance in farm production and marketing topostnatal sterilization, seven extra days over the contraceptive users or to those who commit them-

124

selves to birth control. Rates of contraceptive use an incentive, yet they cannot be stopped fromhave risen to as high as 80 percent in some villages claiming it; and they may be those least in need ofthat receive, or hope to receive, the benefits of this an incentive. Disincentives that work through taxprogram. Qualifiers have been given credits for and benefits systems affect only a few people, yetlivestock, feed, and construction materials, and broader disincentives might unfairly burden thehave been offered lower prices for fertilizer, seed, poor, who gain most from children. Disincentivesgarlic, dressmaking, hairdressing, and medical tied to school admissions may affect children whotreatment. Some communities have also been have no control over parental decisions. Verifica-allowed to use a "family planning bull" for servic- tion (was a child born and not reported?) can being their cattle. The scheme also offers pig-rearing administratively difficult, and the money tocontracts: a woman acceptor gets a piglet to fatten reward compliance may be improperly used. Pay-over a period of eight to nine months and is given ments for sterilization have little impact on fertilitya share of the profits. Should she become preg- if families have already had four or more children.nant, the pig is not taken away, but she may lose The cost of incentives is also a consideration inthe opportunity to get another one in the future. judging their effectiveness. From a national

In the past decade, a few countries have started accounting point of view, incentives are transferoffering small-family incentives to communities. payments and in themselves do not use upThe Indonesian program gives prizes and popular resources. Their economic impact will depend onrecognition for meeting fertility targets or for per- the savings and consumption patterns of thoseforming better than other communities. In Thai- who are taxed and those who receive payments.land the government rewards villages that achieve The principal question is likely to be a budgetarycertain targets with anything from a biogas plant to one for the government: is money available anda cooperative store. Community incentives work might it be better spent in other ways? If conven-where there is a well-organized, community- tional incentive schemes absorb funds that mightbased family planning system and where the vil- better go to investments, the cost to an economy inlage or hamlet is an important social or political terms of long-run investment and growth may alsounit. matter. This is clearly a problem in China, where

Several other countries, including Bangladesh, incentives large enough to ensure one-child fami-India, and Sri Lanka, have offered rewards to peo- lies would become a heavy burden on the econ-ple who volunteer to be sterilized, primarily to omy, unless those who received them in turn usedcompensate them for the cost of travel and loss of the incentives for saving, say, for their own oldwork time. These programs are easier to adminis- age.ter than incentive systems tied directly to lowerfamily size. In most cases, volunteers have been Deferred incentivescarefully screened to avoid any possibility of coer-cion or of changing their minds when it is too late. Deferred incentive schemes overcome some,In Sri Lanka, for example, the couple must have at though not all, of the difficulties of conventionalleast two children, the youngest at least a year old. incentives. They have not been tried on a nationalThese facts must be certified by the village head level, but two local experiments demonstrate theirand reviewed by a medical officer at the clinic feasibility. A township in China began a deferredwhere the operation will be performed. The volun- bonus scheme in 1971, offering to pay the high-teer must sign a statement of consent; he or she school education of children of two-child families.receives the equivalent of $20. At their peak in No specific family planning service was involved,1980-81, sterilization payments cost an amount but parents had to show that they agreed with theequal to 3 percent of total government spending on terms of the entitlement when their children werehealth; that much could easily have been saved in ready to enter high school. Two-thirds of familiesthe costs associated with abortion and unwanted enrolled in the program; its effects on fertilitybirths. could not, however, be differentiated from a gen-

eral decline in fertility.Unresolved issues A no-birth bonus scheme developed on three tea

estates in India also provided a deferred payment.Payments and penalties raise a host of issues not Each woman worker had an extra day's pay cred-yet resolved. Some people may be willing to defer ited to an account for every month she was notpregnancy or to have fewer children even without pregnant. Her benefits were suspended for a year

Box 6.4 A deferred incentive scheme in Bangladesh

The; . rnn,,nti 'i Far.azI.d h i.; v,,, ,.,I I rrad.- Thr maruri *alue . i Fhr , b:irin, 4r in rhte ar- a .' er, i IJ-n

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.-T r-r. 1 \i .in. i,mr .durinn, br-i wrr .5.r rir-i, -3rr ilr.r Marn,- I p.-:ccrr --i 1 '2-_ -.pend,iurt ti

rhi; ri. d t,b.. .r.-n c..ldrr -r. hId el. .v . - d.&I,, !rd and bhird b.rih tor e .tr.i: d the ,:h'.. t., : ntr ihc snnire

i.. n !t.,,. r. i:.-r. 1. r jn r,r,, l F r .r .rI..ii. .w.- -r V.. .Aii. r, Th,; .uld. :l-ear r-.qui,e an

r:,r, 1 ih bnl * 3iu- ! .r ph. htnd z . lu - L F t h. rr, -n,I.A niiI bt nipi.- n, r.p34- r -.-. r r a, rii I. rhr p-.p.

iu~ t ru. jr. u ,h 1: p ur.l, -. :. .l i. r r,;nr i-- In r, p 1.'. pr,.i.. .... . . .... .... niD

i trIiz, .r- ..r ,- I .llmwn ..i rr,nr,. I rri ..n th p r ,-n r 1 h .e.ur,rr;, [-uli-

pU.MP- f ..lir. r rrnr,r, . 1.h c, uliur. r r-, i Ii Iri, p, ra -i ;11 . .<I,s h,I J

for each pregnancy and she forfeited a part of her about it. If many people were do this, they mightaccount for each birth beyond two. She could provoke a general reaction against sterilization.claim the proceeds when she retired. An evalua- The second merit of a system with delayed pay-tion conducted several years after the start of the ments is that it avoids the need for a large numberprogram showed that it had helped to accelerate of cash payments to be made by junior officials andthe declining trend in fertility. thus minimizes the potential for corruption.

Both these programs were designed to cover Deferred incentives, however, are not withouttheir costs and to produce some saving-through their own problems. For example, it is not certainlower educational expenses in the first case, and that potential recipients would trust the govern-through lower child care, medical, and work-loss ment's ability and willingness to provide benefitsexpenses in the second. in the future. The administrative requirements of a

Deferred incentives have an immediate financial deferred system are also considerable. Foradvantage: the payments by government to bond- schemes not tied to sterilization, individualsholders come in the future, at the time when the would have to be registered and their births moni-saving to society from fewer births is being reaped. tored. For many developing countries, keepingHowever, they can still be costly. For example, an track of all births in circumstances where parents,incentive scheme proposed in Bangladesh would may wish to conceal them would require a moreprovide a bond for all couples who agreed to steril- effective administrative system than now exists.ization and who had only two or three living chil- Despite these possible shortcomings, deferred-dren. To fully fund the scheme nationwide, the incentives have much potential. If they could begovernment would have to set aside a substantial made to work, they could provide for a transfer oLproportion of its budget now (see Box 6.4). income to the poor that would reduce fertility.

There are also practical arguments in favor of Nepal is trying deferred incentives in a few areas,deferred schemes, especially for sterilization. The and Bangladesh is now considering such schemes.first, alluded to above, is that a deferred payment They could also be tried in those rural areas ofavoids the risk of people volunteering simply India and Indonesia where family planning serv-because they need money immediately. If they ices and administrative systems are adequate.later regret their decision, they can do nothing

126

7 Family planning as a service

Some eighty-five countries in the developing who are often caught in a vicious circle in whichworld, representing about 95 percent of its popula- too many children mean too few opportunities fortion, now provide some form of public support to other kinds of activity, and vice versa. By enablingfamily planning programs. Tremendous progress women to control their fertility, family planninghas been made in improving couples' access to frees them to become better educated and toinformation and services. But in all countries more increase their own and their children's contribu-could be done. Nearly all programs still fail to tion to development.reach most rural people; even in the towns and * Family planning offers the greatest potentialcities the quality of services is often poor and dis- benefits for the poorest people, whose mortalitycontinuation rates high. In many countries the and fertility rates are usually the highest of anypotential of the private sector to provide family group.planning services has hardly been tapped; in oth- For all these reasons, programs to support familyers the gap in services provided privately can be planning deserve a central role in the social andfilled only by enlarging public programs. Twenty- economic strategies of governments throughoutseven countries have yet to introduce family plan- the developing world. Properly designed, pro-ning programs. Almost half of these are in Africa, grams need not be particularly expensive. But lackwhere incomes are the lowest in the world, popu- of finance is one of the reasons family planning islation growth is the highest, and the potential ben-efits from family planning may be greatest.

The benefits of family planning, moreover, TABLE 7.1

do not depend on the existence of demographic Percentage of currently married women aged 15 toobjectives. 49 using contraception, by region and for selected

* Family planning improves the health of moth- countriesers and children. Both infant and maternal mortal- Region and country Total Urban Rural

ity in developing countries could be substantiallyreduced if pregnancies were spaced at least two Sub-Saharan Africa (6)ayears apart, and if pregnancies among teenagers Ivory Coast (1980-81) 3 4 2and women over forty were prevented (see Box Kenya (19 77-78 )b 7 12 671) C l th to family lannin serv Middle East and North Africa (22) a

7.1). wouples witn access to ramlly planmng serv- Egypt (1980) 24 40 12

ices can prevent unwanted pregnancies that might syria (1978) 20 34 5

otherwise result in poorly performed abortions East Asia (65) a

and the risk of serious, even fatal, complications. Philippines (1978) 36 47 31

Family planning services were recognized as one Thailand (1981) 57 64 55

of eight essential components of primary health Latin America and Caribbean (40) a

care by the International Conference on Primary Colombia (1980) 49 54 37

Health Care in Alma-Ata in 1978. Mexico (1979) 39 51 27

Family planning makes responsible parent- South Asia ((9 419) 36 17hood easier. Parents can have the number of chil- Sri Lanka (1982) 55 57 54dren for whom they know they can provide ade- Note: Numbers are based on recent surveys, except for India

quate food, health care, and education. and Indonesia, which are based on recent program statistics.* Family planning enlarges the choices available a. Average weighted by population for all countries in region

to people, a central purpose of economic and social bw Ever-marred women aged 15 to 50.development. This is particularly true for women, Source: World Development Indicators, Table 20.

127

Box"7.1 Family planning for health

Earl, ..nd lr.squ,~t .hi1d1be3r,n.: c,,nhrh- Iniant mortalih, per lOOt) Ii%e birlhis. Peru ~hdd mrn..rAlt, .,.bi J.- hre t I-

.1li- -ih iarbl.lI. r., ii1n,. :wd *J,., th I. .r,T In Jr. r~ In nieni m, .ria,r, cur.

.rit.ir-r. . un.Z chiddrEn and n-,. .ih,r- in r,r-ilr. 14'1 Pi.r rI- 4.,3-,d -.idl till b, 'II

pr,.-grani. 3n i,k, ri he;,i pru-Ne ni lhirlv *Si\ mrnr,l -adud be 1,r2_r1-.eni-J to

thr.-uoh r..ur ri- in in-hr'i hirr. -ci. i .*.e*rn r,h

* L..rCrh,nin, rh. inl-r%al hiiiina Piri-irrin. hrth. I-r..-ni. n ,der-

pr ri:i hild rP3,irn i Thexr,r -l'.i . I.. fnt. ind . r r thni .t. *ur ,3. .Ir i-

* .:i-n pri-cran~.' ' ar. npnrari Jr. lh.;,, ... zr..up; m.w.u . h

do ri-ttn,n inr o -t.tr. v.3i1 tr kthb rht ni-. ' it J.-r ii. p.,r rl rr : ~ r.tr nt. I

b.-.rn t-A% .ini rhi- *r 11,~r . ~1-r I ni- l1.,; cc nd -.1. tl Lvib i, .r oni-I

Ir,.nten rnd sh,IdrE:r. . hglti-,r r,4 Jr-i Ihr. r .:hddri-n I nIart 3nd iiler

,. ih-,r- IF-. ., b.-rrn I i- hen mn, r IT1 ir. hul--i ne1 -i. .e

;p.nir ii-- t,rr charti Th,4 riI-ri,r- .d,M m.hnr In lri - np

-rder ne i h,,r in m,.rlei-.r i-Ju, r [wnrc nil gn.-at-r .h ncr -I 1-J in.~ th.rr .l

.rhen or rLr.u! ri - id.enr.- 3rd ih . i i.. .' i Ih. r, ir.- .C.S-ri o

TV hi r, ari- rI. , nn - e n planari,T-n Ior p, r ri ri-.rr I h.r: .-r.- i-1i-i t. rn.I

ti.i: i-rk Iin .- rniu.r,t rlw. 3nd 1iacir c h, I p r lIlI I ii,II I .. h,rrl.

F'h- t Ir t I hi h,r I h .i n -i - Ind r. t-e. 1 i in. Iir leI L- 1 l-,ie

-u r. i h..Id m u t impni i Ior h, r Izi:n1.d -I. ii rhi- iu,d - '' .. .-i-prid

ti .n. i-~ tentil . ed is-ni th_ tn I hb 4i-i ir *..Jfl-ui- r I-r, ti

-i .t th, - .i 'hi- INh, nfl .~ -- ir . r 1i-ei -n Ine, -.- ni- CIl.irt I' lul :.

*-nl p n r. ins,r i ~r. '.. n al t.r! 2I h.. I.t- pl.i nituur t.-ii.r .:..nt ra 4t a I . i i

IOL! birth th, -un,: cbdd n13-, b~~~~~_ prrn.ic -i- .ic n hth -r. nT . a hi- ph u -alle

-- credJ monc :-in,: the, rid. hat ' '-ni utiri- L, r c t, r * 3ii- preniu.

hi - r *-h.e ill1 -it.r ir.n- n .lnuri -ruii *n J..ldiru. ni:;q ..I thi-ir ir,th- irre l,r;rgait-l r.1-urie.fnil int.-cii-rn d.rrh.ei, nc inrh- e. rbriI,- r n b3 - I rin- ii, u t nr h- .h.:h t.. r, rn. j hji, ir rid -. 1

ri-,.. r llne.;i- z C.:...ni , rn.eprd iJc-. ..r-ent.--I,t dzi ,- i.punr c r i- CuC. mirtni ir.i ni'rer.rr.. Ji.rie : t,n ri-til-

, -n ti ..g .Ir : s thr, a- r 1ed in g uc n E L ti ih-ci it L,xh-h , tr 4i.i- O t'-1

., r, -n -r; h,rt -ti' i-a -r -Idl rh~iri I:--l.&-

i Kn ,nir.-nr- pri-cin.ei:.,~.Ie tIh. 'I~ -t',r ip3rt -nhiln mi.rt.alr . *..uid tr, Sr, rcae..-d r,k. niiie

rnithi-r )nd I.lnked iclo - birth ,i4ihuIt d.-'Jun b% iin -ra- i Ii .r:* r ed IA-: ti-rh i.. Di...t. ii n r .r,.- I.: in

being neglected in some countries and is making about 25 percent. Contraceptive use is lowest inonly slow progress in others. Aid donors have a sub-Saharan Africa, at less than 10 percent of mar-major contribution to make in ensuring that family ried women, and this estimate excludes manyplanning programs receive the money they need to countries in which use is negligible but data arebe effective, unavailable.

Contraceptive use varies widely within countries

The use of contraception as well. In most, a higher proportion of urban thanrural couples use contraception; the distinction is

Surveys of married women of reproductive age particularly stark in Syria, where 34 percent of -(fifteen to forty-nine) show wide variations in con- urban, but only 5 percent of rural, women weretraceptive use among developing regions (see using contraception in 1978. In the Ivory Coast,Table 7.1). In East Asia nearly two-thirds of the Kenya, and Mexico, contraceptive use in ruralmarried women in that age group use contracep- areas is roughly half the rate in urban areas, and intion; in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore the Egypt it is less than a third. Regional differencesproportion is 70 percent or more, as high as in the are also great: in Indonesia, contraceptive useUnited States and western Europe. Latin America ranged from 53 percent of couples on the islands ofhas reached about 40 percent, whereas the propor- Java and Bali to only 16 percent in some of thetion in the Middle East and South Asia is only outer islands in 1983. In Maharashtra and Gujarat

128

-li, :r,i j hr t ,rl d ... ... ,lrr. r .. :r- ,i, :rr'i F.. ... rrnrl in r; ' n. r.:, .rr ... :,rn.I pr. ur, 1,,dirr,.n I- . ...

n:ir..rr ,rr.r:rirrd ,Ir. n,r. :- ts r . -rud. In . r,iiz- 1 I .- ur. ,r, .m -r r,.-

r...th, r. if, lh,, r rh,r,-.stlIlt ....... . ... ,v.:l lj,rt ,,, jr. i l L ri trn.~l- ill; t' . pr.,Vd b, 1. iItgiIl )r,d ih r-f. ........... r. Ll.

* B.r ur, ;r.. :r Lr ,h4 :rrr- i1r--.d.. r' h.f.-r ii. . - nrpprr 1,- t p.:r- t..i. . r. - irnr-..,:rcd - p m.rrmrn-ed

t. 11r:! 1 t ti , I L rItrr . h,r t.. h L,r c,z r i, I. I.nr i i nrrd Fr.;r n r..I n ; 1 iii . 1- Li .- I h' uIr , n-d O- r.' IT .. r. p .rr Ir,II . dl IIrT T I-.. rI|r .h..ur p.r .. nr rn I, .: - i h .i. cd rl ; -- Lc7 I-I.. . , ur .,' b . rm.n. r :Ir r. r I t lh I .ri V h,. $ .

* ulLih; .inl , I. ,-int,l -r .L.,:......,,: -r. a.,d tll, Lri,d ?.1 1 1. rh, .rl , l C :ii.n,I -r. .- pii. ar- -s h i

.11 ,rIrsrrtr, ind chii.. n; rrrr rt.- F.r r-.ton'l nil d Ai,,ld hlnr-, - nrr [.,,pn .n ,r r. - r. r u ni_.rrhi.z

If' rn I- Ilt r..r.. 'uld J,.Iir , L n-. t .n r: LLr It I cU,-rr,nl%, Im tr t ,.r. .1 ht.- ..:-rr - pollr.rairnl 1

nln p1 r.. r-I in rI it.. ,i, Phi -1, i r bar h *.n ru . II tU- LrT,rU .r mr .r,n iTh .- j

. rr rL ihw ihitIF.rpn,- TlI- r it,:i *- *livit.r. 1: riil r ha..- .rchiC- inn- 'ri. r.-uir hv.pr.iir.-.lrz-'r' wrid

.tr- 1- Ir .n r T1 nir .uArn,, Ti.' n.1. &:ma,- r. n,.r...r - irliu. r tin-

tree . t1 InIrri 3ul ntr..rrrniA nt-. rnut, -n-i.r . Tin, ,rnr kLI. hL.!.1i.rrmaJ mort31ih; Fxer (ItlhitJL)O Iive birth-. -M1atlab. BangW e.;3h Inl. * ., r::p,d......1. It. r-,r II- hird .-urili . r b 1--a t- &-ri.,r n ,; 11 Z,l 1 r

'tri- cl-rid In I ;..11- - I rtr ._-rpl, .untrri- fh- ,urni,:.r, - :r,r :.tr,dr .-Lhrrrt, ..r.-r.

-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r .n,ii n; ri l in 1. I,t nto h .i,nd I ,I,r ..h... . ......... ,tl,- . ,Ljlt ,11 n I .Jr sItn3l 1'.c-I .I -t

:-: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I, 1 t, .ni. rL 1;,1-I- th-.I II -n i- ............ .. -.,nr,; \ 11-1IL: i't -'1 n[.31. ri.

- r l1:-id 'hrd .h1kd Inn - iIj hr.; rt. s r. in I rh. ... . .5:u-r r

r. rnnj.r1.-.L h ni.ti.rr. ninr.rtilitr. i ijr..ut . n i'd 4r. pcr,:'nr t all r..r-

;I - _ . r n1,'"' , , uII.I i. lrh- t. r rt., ; g:...J Ir,d riur.rnInr -r -1t 1 1 rhr L-.,

irj thid Lrrh -L-rr t [ i-. i -Lr 4;il V-.r r,-r,d ,J. n,- Ir -n; tr. uz t :1- rilr

11111 (IrI thr Ih. r nurtlr :nrd tt - h,rril h.-pr .l :1 s A' - I-r n-Ir: iu. n

Th,-v r..Iiiri.- hl..d - -. r; I..; - ilt.,r ir, -.luc h T1 .- . r. n rLn;rrrn!

1 liii ,.-, rI, m .i ri.- hr t-s nrn - ,r Ti-; -., r ;n.j rh t r dt r..p.trnnn, rn, nunrnL.r .n

t h, t. i It all L.rrh, *r r n.,-ri, In.1

I.,nr i-,.r-. -r, ar ,: r,. r.-r- [In.- Inr -rn-,

ri n f, F '.. Ir Li- d t,CI.-rtl - rr r.,,l I'i.mr ,d ' r. a nht h I-- .-d .;

'l, '1 d-ln, t- t. h r .- C ^i1 l Ii TIIi ..rrn.ed r l I,- , I r I-ni- l-ar

il_ .... pr.-r-t rt P- Ir,d1.-r. -,, I .rl.hI.jfl tir. [Ii- 4 rn-r-n r- 1,11`.H.. 4 r11r1r .runndi, .rii, trn. mn cr nip;-,

,, .. iir'r- ;,,.1 -r,n L ,1ik s. r-n- 3w,, 5-r i r rirx li 11; i r-- -i. ni.. t -

S [r 'I, .- -ri .iir - j d- J . r. r,ir n ,i n :r. ,,ntr rr,r1r.- I r.. ir.. r,n :,- ,.iL.inn.r

:11,1 4nr- ,rr i l si i niL rc ir, ....rr rn-.:r.;trr,- … in :Ct -iL-rn -n an............d : .rr 1,f-ll-. it .s\rnrr ..npirrrr :. ul, pr.:-- - - -r-.-. -, * JEt .rrrr,n.,I . -,r Irn p.-r r, rn_,.1 ri:n r- nr n-n ii, t -,rri r, :, ..-,pir; . u a;nr

________________________________________ I rn rhr, . r. rh rt- .r r. C-n rn .II i .| Urn ;1 rr.I-

states of India, 35 percent of couples were using These survey-based estimates may underesti-contraception in 1981-82, compared with only 11 mate contraceptive use because they do notpercent of couples in the states of Uttar Pradesh include use among unmarried men or women andand Jammu and Kashmir. sometimes exclude use among couples in informal

Among countries for which more than one sur- unions. There may also be underreporting byvey estimate is available, contraceptive use has some women of the use of contraception by hus-increased fastest in East Asia and Latin America bands, and some respondents may be reluctant to(see Figure 7.1). In Thailand, for example, the pro- admit to using contraception themselves. At theportion of married women aged fifteen to forty- same time, these figures may overstate the numberfour using contraception rose from 15 percent in of people protected by contraception because not1970, the year the official family planning program all couples using a method are equally protectedwas launched, to 59 percent in 1981. Progress in from the risk of pregnancy. Some are using "effi-South Asia has been slower, with contraceptive cient" contraceptive methods such as sterilization,use increasing by about 1 percent of couples a year the pill, the IUD, injectable contraceptives, con-in Nepal, more quickly in Bangladesh, but not at doms, spermicidal foam, and the diaphragm. Butall in Pakistan. In Egypt and Kenya contraceptive others are using less effective methods, such asuse has remained unchanged, despite longstand- douche, rhythm, and withdrawal, or are abstain-ing public programs. ing (see Box 7.2). In Peru, 53 percent of those using

129

FIGURE 71 88 in Romania (1979). Resort to both legal and ille-Trends in contraceptive prevalence in 197043, gal abortion often results from lack of informationselected countries about, and access to, safe and effective contracep-Percentage of married women aged 15-49 using contraception tive methods.60

hailand'

Unmet need50 _Clmi

50 olombia In the surveys from which data on contraceptiveKoTea' 7use have been drawn women were also asked

40 / / wMexico whether they would like to have more children.Forty to 75 percent of married women of childbear-

30 ing age in East and South Asian countries and inLatin American and Caribbean countries want no

/ Egypt more children. In a few countries women were20 also asked whether they wished to delay their next

Banglades pregnancy for a year or more. Nineteen percent of10 women of. childbearing age in Bangladesh and

Kena_ Nepal Thailand, 25 percent in El Salvador, and 32 percentPakistan in Guatemala said yes. In countries where both

0

1970 1975 1980 1983 questions have been asked, from 50 to 90 percentof women want either to limit or to space births.

a. Wife aged fifteen to forty-four. In virtually all countries surveyed, the number ofb. Ever-married women.

Sourres: For Egypt, Kenya, and Pakistan, UN 1983; for others, CPS and women of childbearing age who want no moreWFS data. children exceeds the number using some kind of

contraception. Some of the women who want nomore children or who wish to delay a pregnancyare not using a method because they are currently

rhythm or withdrawal had an unwanted preg- pregnant or because they have been breastfeedingnancy within three years after a birth, compared for less than one year and therefore are affordedwith only 29 percent of women who used the pill, some (but not total) protection. Others are unablethe IUD, or injectable contraceptives. The 1978 to conceive, or their husbands are away. ThesePhilippines Fertility Survey found that 36 percent women are not "exposed" to the risk of preg-of married women of reproductive age used some nancy, so they do not need contraception, at leastmethod, but only 16 percent used an efficient not immediately.method. In contrast, in the Dominican Republic in The remaining women-those who would like to1975, contraceptive use was 32 percent for all space or to limit births, who are not using contra-methods and 26 percent for efficient methods. ception, and who are exposed to the risk of preg-

Contraception is not the only method of birth nancy-are said to have "unmet need'" for contra-control. Induced abortion is widespread, even ception. By this definition, 6 to 12 percent ofwhere it is illegal. There may be as many as 30 women of childbearing age in Egypt, Kenya, andmillion to 50 million induced abortions performed the Philippines have unmet need for contraceptionannually worldwide; this wide range is due to to limit births (see Figure 7.2, low estimate). Inuncertainty about the number of illegal abortions. Bangladesh, Korea, and Peru, where both limitingIllegal abortion carries with it a high risk of compli- and spacing questions were asked, 16 to 33 percentcations and death and can affect future fertility. In of women of childbearing age have unmet need formany developing countries abortion is illegal contraception. If women who are breastfeedingunder any circumstances or is permitted only to and those using inefficient methods of contracep-save the life of the mother; China and India are tion are also considered to have unmet need, moremajor exceptions. Elsewhere legal abortion is an than 40 percent of women in Bangladesh and Peruimportant method of birth control-in Cuba, have unmet need for limiting and spacing births;Japan, Korea, the USSR, and eastern Europe. 22 percent of women in Egypt, 10 percent inLegal abortion rates per thousand women of child- Kenya, and 29 percent in the Philippines havebearing age range from 11 in Canada (1981) and 25 unmet need for contraception only to limit birthsin the United States (1980) to 84 in Japan (1975) and (Figure 7.2, high estimate). Estimates for other

130

FIGURE 7.2

Contraceptive use and unmet need for contraception, selected countries, 1977-81

Unmet need for The charts on this page show unmet need for contra-limiting births ception among married women aged 15 to 49. In the

> .! -. .+ R -- 'i.--ziL :: itop pie and bar chart, unmet need for contraception tolimit births is shown among women who want no morechildren. In the bottom pie and bar chart unmet need isshown for women who want no more children or whowant to postpone a birth. In each case, the low estimateof unmet need is the pencentage of women using nocontraception. The high estimate is the percentage

:-; l 93nt n.o using an inefficient method (withdrawal, rhythm, andthe like), breastfeeding (within a year of a birth), orusing no method.

Estimate ofunmet need

~~~'ni~~~~~~~~ ~~~~, ,~~~~~~~~h ~~~(percent)Percentage of married women

aged 15-49 - High Low

Egypt ~'1 24 1.(1980) 22. 4 12.3

Kenya .t 9.9 5.9(1977-78)

Philippines | .,,. . .. . 29.0 11.1(1978) .I ' l ;': -

0 10 20 30 40Unmet need forlimiting and spacingbirths Key

methd lhrs' "i -

K- Low

mor,. ch-kirts L ~ ~ ~~~~~~~HighEstimate of unmet need

Estimate ofunmet need(percent)

Percentage of married womenaged 15-49 -. High Low

Bangladesh | , | ,,:4;' 41.3 32.6

Korea | | 1 ;i^, iN ;^¢-; 26.2 16.1(1979) .

Pe9ru | .. -5. 46.2 16.3

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Source: Boulier, 1984b.

131

Box 7.2 Birth planning technology

-t.cril mit Fei,dz --- birth c,introl ha', e plc .:' childb-tatir.c a,;, Thi-m 31 i-r :ic-fl' it c-)frr,.Ilcd 4rtidi,, in de'. i1,-Ii,.,ed

hi-tn pracliced lthroughe-ut humian 111; 1*C--t.n ti- thii4 palttirn are 7-pairw, t'ticc tt~ [, n, ttc' :. cn rcor% -abt-tiri-n c at-irtion ti--r.-d hal., arid the E.;te-rr. Ei,r,pe:ar. c.-uritr-i-~ t4li-tc e*r, pre'. rtn,n pr rn 'in,:.hrE,,ttle-dtng a-rd c.'tiur ilttrruptur At ' FItjriza,r, I %. ltcrc ,I hdrfl%.'--d i-fol , liii_ pr-cc'nr t..,r mt-.i. 1it-iri thie

tit. Atdrai-. ili-but %. ith uncertain et& hthmli .r abltrin-ncc x,, still th, rn'.'t p,il anti iniei-t altec p,§rcti. fit lr the

ro,ne'- and pa hica rd h-ialth pre' al.'rt n'etho'd' L Et andJ a- much iaz c, perc- Tit ti-r t hedaia C-C.ntra..'piii C re.,atch in the \mhingJde-.e1upin4 ciuritrie! r , r.ii.7. .:.n-jo..rirand ihi-.t, ham

1i. ..ni--

pacti thn-,% '.'ars hi.; made aati a ti.-r it thi- ntc'-l co ilm..r. n Itt -cit rf .ear ~.I ue Biut utethi- 'tc'ft.nirAd

MUCh gret'atr r-. 't MLcrc rtetc niehi-d in BanclIadi-ah El ~-.i td.'r I-tude' -n c metrhid, .:arn F-- 'igniti-

mni_thids; L-mbinwd estrcg,en and pt's' India kc're:i Ne.pal Pa,-~rian rar-ania cantl'. eta viretc-ct".e - n itlitCt

ge;incrat fi'taipi' th pill I -7-rt Lankl,a Thailand and funi--.a T he- in. *n'i'rent iu-c In iih, L r,tt..3 M at.:s,jt~d ~an-usnirutrin de i.c'I LE' pill t- thi- ni. -t ta.I red nicihod iaE.p rtin IIIci-p. 'iCtcpl 'l

-tc the tir-t nflute-r breakthr-'i'ghs in l rdaart'. n,,ra much o-t Latin \n'eric.i precnanrc% a a' hin on, -ata n'.-re~ thanrthe late l~i,and earl, l%i3e1 &incc i her. Niala, -- i nd Ir-Jdint ;ii Ir-iicc.&ib.-i . ipe u4tr-'. the ILILi i. ~lic u singether ritehiidJ 'ta%t L'cen de' :-Jpi-d iracipro c .t: ir.dl usi-i in l3rn-iic the -ni -m or iliaphrani aind ri- "ni;i

inletabk c IA IntL epi 0 iti,-Kt tc-r I.. ill! p.:r,..:ri -1 ltbki 'mentEi Thtad u'grh, [hr., ina hi-, Fhl'lippn'. rnice

tc- thre- -in. nhs moCrK tcc c c.oppi-r t7percenti) Trinidad a,nd T.ibtag. i pet- than, thre .c.ntn -UtIt_ liiit, usin etihi-r

and I *n*n.-rol-.t-i ILiEz nien-rrira c,- nr I a nd Mc 'i':. 3 pc r.c~ni i th-.. he giE). r tht pi11 an-1 t-rt'r, -thri-.:'- ia 'ing

ri-ataimi artnIcint- as0 piratton -I the: mi-tbh-d iS. .--r.-. er-nri ti'u'- t,n rur at r . thn. .i1-c n pri:Friinrt t-. thin

utri .'. thn't-' i. ti-urteenl da .' t : -. r.:r nd Unliki- lit pill cit ni-t car Thc 'Ti-t i'ic c.v .-iiF7.le t-pi

rnit-- Ic per-cdi raale stntrdaa,t -n- ai-n intert,rc -iih Iicarlatin K. rh tih,eN'..rid -tnt pncgnan.'-, 'a imr-. riant *ni the. tIc't-

pItted til- irliTr hi apanir,: - H'ealth Ort a.n- ration ard ii'i'F h.)' - ti' en- it .:.tr.tt es (' Luple'~ .-. hi

F'-ar-ij mttnilap-it.-m -, it-c--trorgen appr'.. .d wtr't itali .-teal in mn-rr- thanl .atit n -. nt-..rc i hitldr,:ra arc tik-,lur. I u-c'pill, ith eicie-r .,di- ttec' i a prii lii 'r'uriri--bt r-Tatcn u'e tID di c-I- ritiEi- d- nit- Itt'..cII el - Thar. rh.'e

'etr-nk -rn' mr..p'l B arriLr mc'thi 'd, ''p'n rf '[ninrsris ii' iarant h -pae'F'ciflkbirths

cuLh i- 'he- r,'nd -m liaphr.a$ntl andI thi r-cmoh-adc limite,_d a.alhlTi Thc' *, f'.l tj- !' lb ~-ral -icle lI -i-at' a

-pctrnti'ride; hir aI r.- beet; iniri. i-i 1 n-ij Malt, the rniaiirr noiiriCi .- min iab''f thrt fc-flCp ' i- . r zvtc-p

In ItiSil the m.i-t cinrmonli uTcd m.cth- diin.r .-.i rltu' Lit- i-ann. d-r1.r ti-' mirit. I usi'-, c.ra, Fiic r i.a.in-,m ni-ath,d' .Ii btrth c.-ntrrd -trld e ti , ir- rttr -abl- i-aie tn retire p -Ii.:. F-ri- 'h,cl'n-.r hea,lil ri-k, it p-n.'

il,airand the pill .rm.'ng dcli eloped hibtbir 2ucppi; oii drug- ii spr ' ti i I n 7.ric. Liac arc unkni'i' n NMih-t.dm su.rh

c-tnni hr-- pl11 ii tht nii-'t u-ed d-rm~;.c ii u - ; ihe. I'D andi mi-ttial-' %i hi.I.i aitcrnit,hi,d F-ut ;teril'zatt, n has vained in Pcoi tecr, jt.' rc? .tc.ia -lttrptciat''' 4.trug bt i-e-rt

p.puiar.t. -in th~ L nited StaIt- arid in .picinh.d'n-n'- -a. atlable 1 l.. t ha-e peri,.. -d creased ..a li-r, imt.' 1'. i .-r

Crej,i britan -tca it :icc."a1nt - t.n.r at-,ur hc,h-rr~n..ict amr,rrrh- a-nia. - - u,trl- u nai-3 cjtiJtt~ -I -'iaiu-K anl-ino nticI -w F ri ,t--i- Ltn-ii-r hI-l 'delr A-ni .-piLabe --r rt,tt. hi- c-t .ic at u-er'

Box 7.3 Nleasuring unmet need for family planning

(ti, --icep LI rinn , n..i- used,, in rt'k -it pr-mm'n.. -;t' :'aid.j c-'It tai.111 'mI It iu'ilI. it- e- a. ti.hIIa F''rp,-t' -; b,ed .I I tn- :.uiJ't.i-t-r I the~m tF...- h.~. -- r, 'I- us.nc am.-. ii,, riun.b-.ai Ji-ildrer- i-Žu a-r' --ni

aki-k-i --t mrnri,-.J ,i 'nicn in tpeiaa -..- ntr acepiti -cP- ncit 'd er, l.~ji- dihrad ite hi nii mar,'. -i --uld that he' i Th-

It- inn- nti- ni i de a-ar% i-.s~ during the: pa at ha,-n, unnici rn-cd t..r si-e'.1: Firith- qi, cL,h-ra contain -znriti ant tap-tb.

il-na-dc Ic, n-irthan,r tor. cc.n'rntri- -n-i- , nii-a.r- ha. ,-ig-rt' j a : ii..ln ~inni- ..i'ntr. cant-i,

-men -i-re m5k-cJ l - a- it ant iddt- thatI rep..n'' r.. a uch .,r. ciJ'"n an, I-t-t ctI . I tati- n II c a.nn-i.

ti-'tial childrt n' \mc'rag it .'ner -'I-c' mean-n~l~-~ er ii hisi ttrareliahhm~ Th~'.Unr.hetIc"crThh l-r -n,ichrldrlti-h.. airl a.;I-d ii he rI it 1-ncrarr :'tehFat na.ni iiirci - d 1-'c-pin.: hi,. i and'act -niag,ni-atrctCIi

th.at i' Ill,% -er-. riitt.t,r pregnant n.-r r'iin art n-- icit-'d ipwnig -,l - c,tti.ri,, dittereni linan-l 'i.-.

rite.rtteiv -i'm-c -t-iiFat rih, -. did n-it 'hi-i ta riai are utim--ni-rntI1. 1 r iepnnari '&--tt uch- 1 ttin ar..r.t c--n-

a,a,nr ,i-i hId,renl k' i-em th.-'s i- h.- hI-i- 31-atci the nun;-bt-r i-t bir,th, - r.. 5i5r' ntii cin - hi-n ----ire n at- jaked ihi..

i e re i-..;i ! ina,i min c.nt racr-pm1.i-- ~.J ll i-rtiaiht 'Tha~tect. i,nit at i Ii i,-tI. -r at Litei -II~ r rIt i ,c I Fr

tici~h,d -.~c-re' clitit-ti a- Fhat tniz unnti-t appl. ni.-.. 4lrc.ngl, ri tluetttiin' ii pre- e'tpm rlid.rii:;.at -'ro 4r'p-i.n. i

r.i,--, t.ir '-a. 'rirbt, In '-.me --un 1, irnTi 1tam-il.5d itup-' .rem --mter retnm,r.r- 'i'd ti-jr rimnrith; Atti-t

ci'. e- r .-n.uiiri.: i -me.,:n -i crc la. r-centi; marrir-d arid r nil'l I--i- F-a an, inta r un- -r,a1 u% g, an .,I. I' r-,- -

.I Ced [I. .'''i i. I h tI -dela, p-rt-nanc:. lust Ithc nurnb-eroct chddrlti- ii -u riat- i p'-i- 'c- U' 'ti -nn deir-tn IantI'.

t-ir aear i.mi.r re' \mn-nt: v--m,-ntr ai lit' n-a,n. "''uli that 1-C i arnd A-k,rid 'L'& trn a rir-ilar 'ti-Id'. 1'ciihfrt: --nl..

132

\%orldwide expendirure on reproducit'e ire -mpItt- rcr ltiNE tuil Ia' t1h-c ni.riur4i.-1 cheia)m, stertizi-m:-n t ,rrresearch and conbaceplie detelopment, rctrirn t.- tertihi' t.ir -At ralnr.,.nth nm.r. Ind "-mren a matl p.i an-i an !

S -1....,;* rit.iiii, T. . i ak-ir. - 1t.preonancl. ' ,i-ne h,r . -'men -mtnr. and ;rTlL-aLlori are rO'!l-,u-' ur ci them_ ne.: mr:h .ds- u-h a; th.-: Liar.

r,.-'I -Iciltic 1i 1 iraIk Ejil.mnacccp'at--lr- 'Trrtr. mc, nn lmrI.in i the arnm, niprro- ed

-re, ird .c.nl% 1 tmintn.- -.r rh,thn-. . L ; h ainl . ng . Žr- ca-.t p14,' ,-' ~ pUic n -i-mna.,:tPt3tie .n.d diaphraJm; . htch rel-t r.ermi

,~~~~ fDrIi;'r4 ilr-ill lcrii ride-...............l rnrtr ... lit' x., In.deli a. ada'Ihe inthe nira

I121 iiid . ...rurier-it / ," " c-rnent r-uire- ,Ltld medical .r lutiuc 'ther, i uch a. n:-. ml,t mr-,.-'-_' par.,mmeit,il .italti ho are- -tien *,lC in *-d' and an anriprgn.nci a1 -in' rr-

1. d- el i 'lpine t-ILIntrie Th- iTTD inttct- i4urt nriuh mn-re r.iar,i h and areable- and the pill require t endt-I unhleh ht b niarL t -lr. e he,n-.l

'-. ant at it.. bac3Ckup it. r .-. m.Ii.h:at. n- rhi, -r,lur.-nil~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~r dJ/I \_ t.sitl 1: i I t riU, I Ilr. _r3,- t7.h !-A'5 L Tn hL rh, ; i-l ird,iad-

/ n-c-it thc c-n' .. -:it-t- a F-il and ptrn'icd3l thr pa.-- r.t tchnr -Itg;,c der.IcFmt I;

tanm rT.:L3urv ., g-.d ni:.t--rL. oI euppl - i .n .,'rld.-.-dt tundtm: I.-r c'ntra-pintrl- t-pil 'n-n t Ae1d r-Eren:h -.'l a I; r millir.r

: N. . *If_l4Icmtth.v1 '1 -d *'t c.ir;vtFrc1 pi' 3......r...Kr. inirur, , ,, )uK bitt Ii:; -n dr1Intrri; riI rtaliprnr.rr;att -;thenrr.dt .r all p|t.:pl n.-r tctin4mi flCci'- - i 'i :hcirr .'r" ut 3')

,- ..ne rh' t- crplerl, -3te p-rctnt h-i al L.fl triVia;

I jr.~ r -' -1 -- -~ ~., r;r'rr.ibtc ctt'cti\l e inrd rt rCn-t ii.cr dcrelr. 11'.I.n a .1rtnii -tudie theN1-' ,. such r *d-. - s rh ,Imt,.d ie tI re .t t. - trainingrn -- re ierch

- llrn --a *.ih. ', i -teF in mh, nc-i t. -- nt ,eir- i.n hum.,r. rcprc.du'.rrc.in t-.-nw -. p-r-

Farn,l), planningm pr- 'gran; t ill ha.re *. cent .- th-. t.ril . n . ;pcnt r. rhr Lrn.t.:dret'. Kr.; - ne--t .! 4ti;rin; n,Th-:-id- an. a ttatr-- *. -t Sil pr ' it ith t--t.1 i.a-

Ic: '.-. fle- rir; *r.-hi,-e etc lprntnt I i.In-n1 d r: thc F-''1 li -ctc-r rrdu;tr -

* In. 'c ;-'i...> . B3rncr r mr:hi.dm ih-n- , Ir--d 1 ;i11I 3d'n. incd .hare ha- -hrur1, trrn 32 pc rcem i IIjdimn dt.ipl'rnm -p,rrn'ici-i F-.-e- tr - - r-taK .- t'-i.Z e'n..-r'rrte.d in r%. ' i-:' Ic-- thai, 3 leillnt -per.,l icinm ndbu.- -td ac:h Ktm,- c.:upk r,3 .- nirtar 1r: n mpn-'.. I; IE-.;.rt c - Ir- r

.rIr,r- In h-.u- Il i l-pii ie -i itt -pan .'t! _ |rtirni nrlth,lrcr ,p-r-duct-labrlit- pri blern; ha.-. len,tlr-c--u-c' pitt.c; .nd drlphta,Zim ,r.-i- : uch r.h- ID_ pil in.-rlt, '. ard cnid rr. tn', bet.rr F-r.cduic ducl ci p.cult tc .ir, rnd c-ndn-rni dirlfuli i.- dt-- tn:.), bjrr.,r meth.-d and it'. Ln.F'in n-i .nd i- Jtrng r,Lr. ned ih- -- Itp.-Sei'it-i nith;--d. ;ticK r .r.h rn.'rhl, pUtl w-. .-I rl:pu --. pr-di.tJ ar, d ni-t

* icn.-, '-P-*k. ster.I.?atii'r s hr,it. induce nttrr.tru.i- r-r' bln d.-- th-- uturt Fri tiiart-.it i r.c. mirKnctit-nt- e [abut rmre-. ri-,riIt- tnirt.bi- .;raia h.-rn;.nal irrplirt- -. - -ntrn .rtatn t r prin at, tirni-

r,c :rt ..I i' h -- rcint-r. ,---. cd atar \-.- r r F- Ftrni. . -tre'. :c-nir.-: t rpt u .-- ur - it . n.;tiirr at-c.. -u. ' l.LT ir -n i *.nr, monith n. a ,r.n identi:a.l r-i r .. -:-t.- mir. -.. m, rrn .Kh-. tI d t1i-- u.rc fu rnri, - ttitudt-t i, hIrr t.i-i-ri 4' p --u-qi.,t -m ri ._.r. F-rt:rr-.. I ri l a . 'ic ri.ri ci,ldr,i, ci-n,-ttrn'. c-iecded ul,r ha ,..t--etr-.i.l.c.X.i..-.d.'he ditrcr. r- *rIn .:,.ntr a -c-nmitr, r-p-tnd c--n- -i- aniimn-ri i-Tin -. |nnir. cr Jidre-n Lw t - 1nhem ticnd, r. - e anll rhut

i. tr t'.r ., pt-c 'rur. .- r -. 1lt,-i r %)t-i r,u-i n- l . .,11 i,. n -. h.K . .rnt it-e, art dtit-r nc-. - ir-r r,t c r. ri-.r nt tbI. .3nt aldit-cnal .-hildrvi- arid ni-r, _ic-lttdcn n crntrac.ptir.n and - pcr.r.hi- i- iii huljdren pi,, .ra.i 1 -their r. pli- rt. a-tl - i prd,,- r.nct at) Ten... -n -n -- tnr tv-. 11uni,t th .rr.d ent--- - h.ld.l -.1%ini ut: - -r

i ..-h ,. FIF ci-ntrie:F-Fri u ., and .i ran-, - a- be.rnn.c ..hil.irn 1`c--- hur-vnC Ir r .-. c rupt -

tuture Itntitl. -The I ',-r.ular.-n Dara tra1 lt-r- mi. a-I-curt t.mr th-r d .1- tihr ih-r plai-. F-.urth cer.- nhitcrn

UppiriTictit A -t 1--unr. it -- i ititt-rna,- cr-F' nti;c o-hiic-s tr ard a .. ...tra1-p.- .. K- -n,., cnr th l . ,. I al'i-n n-n rh. .-rc -e to K-, .- r,u..n I ln .ir Fir- -- me -omit n rr.-.a ni- .or--r-i1 r ---fli . -I h. ; nit tahie-

'hr tud- in .- hi, iI .: -- tI-rd . -r ih - c- ri ; n birth er,r.- in an.; ie-Ir.c d, -pit Iri-c. r -un Ii-crIrr ni-i t,' i. re -I

r:tp-r-.-t -. n .-a -cu,-tic n cr pri-rr-rid qu-ti -n'r. ianAl 'ice it the hen>:htu c mil' aI-.tar,n,-t n-c ii.o cit nc ri--te-nf -'i' r -nl t ar,- ;nial -r-r retar,i . t|-*I 1 . n;ur:nu *-erU c- -rititerni in ai .rn er.r. It--. --- -1 c.-tra-.;.pr..n .- mrr-, r-a 9 u-^rt..fl nte-larut - ar-tur-;adduii-nani Kh-- I' liar .iC. nt1,'' .- r,lilrr.n iii pe ttil ni-r.i-

drrn In-.-untiti-- r cd a- part -t it'- i-rn It-- -i-c conir a-e-pri-n -nd ih;

133

TABLE 7.2

Percentage of married women aged 15 to 49 practicing efficient contraception among those who want nomore children

Residence and education

Urban Rural

Seven years' Seven years'Country and family No education No educationplanning indexI education or more educationl or more

Strong or very strongKorea, Rep. of, 1979 58 62 61 63Colombia, 1980 35 69 30 52

ModerateMalaysia, 1974 37 . . 27 49Thailand, 1981 72 83 53 58Philippines, 1978 22 45 15 38Tunisia, 1979 50 60 45Bangladesh, 1979 21 55 16 37Mexico, 1978 40 71 17 53

Weak or very zneakNepal, 1981 40 71 15 45Egypt, Arab Rep., 1980 53 72 24 70Ecuador, 1979 17 60 6 58Pakistan, 1975 17 35 6 17Venezuela, 1976 53 67 18 54Kenya, 1977-78 13 44 12 32Honduras, 1981 53 58 15 49Ghana, 1979-80 11 30 8 25

Note: Efficient contraception includes male and female sterilization, pills, IUD, injectables, diaphragm, and condoms. Women who arepregnant or infecund are excluded from this table.. . Not available.a. Family planning index is interpolated from 1972 and 1982 data to year shown. See notes for Table 6 of the Population DataSupplement.Souirces: CPS and WFS data; Lapham and Mauldin, 1984.

countries are shown in the Population Data Sup- percent of married women of childbearing age inplement, Table 3. 1976.

These high and low calculations of unmet need The concept of unmet need is not static. Unmetprovide rough estimates, given existing prefer- need may decline as more people have access toences for family size, of the potential for additional contraception or as the nature of services changes.contraceptive use. Some analysts, however, have It may increase as people want fewer children, orquestioned the validity of estimates based on the as the better availability of services raises interestresponses of married women to survey questions in regulating fertility faster than new services can(see Box 7.3). Others have noted that even women meet new need. Many women who say they wantwho are pregnant may have had unmet need in more children might be potential users of servicesthe past that resulted in an unplanned pregnancy, if given the chance to plan their births. To someand that such women may shortly be in need extent family planning programs do more thanagain. Nor do these surveys include unmet need simply satisfy unmet need; they actually generateamong unmarried people. Clearly, use of contra- and then fill such need. In this sense "demand"ception depends not only on accessibility and cost, for contraceptive services is not easily measured; itbut also on how intensely a couple wishes to avoid is partly a function of their supply.a birth. This factor is difficult to measure in sur- In most countries women in rural areas and withveys. Whether unmet need can ever be completely less education are less likely to want to stop child-satisfied is debatable. But in the United States, bearing than are urban and more educatedwhere contraception is widely available, unmet women. But of the former, those who do want toneed for limiting births was estimated at only 4 to 8 stop are less likely than their urban and educated

134

counterparts to be practicing contraception. Gov- restrict their activities. Some methods increase theernment plays a central role in narrowing these risk of developing serious health problems; highergaps, especially between urban and rural areas risk of pelvic inflammatory disease among IUD(see Table 7.2). In Colombia and Korea, which users and of cardiovascular disease among users ofhave strong family planning programs, rural the pill have been reported. (These risks, however,women who want no more children are as likely as are small compared with those associated withurban women to be practicing contraception. In pregnancy and childbirth.)Kenya, Nepal, and Pakistan, which have weaker * Social disapproval-the private nature of fam-programs, the contrast between rural and urban ily planning and the difficulty of discussing it withareas is much greater. providers of services or even with spouses. Family

planning may violate personal beliefs, create mari-

Reasons for not using contraception tal disharmony, or be socially, culturally, or reli-giously unacceptable.

Couples who wish to plan their families face cer- Surveys of contraceptive use in ten countriestain costs-financial, psychological, medical, and asked married women not practicing contraception

- time-related costs. If these exceed the net costs of why they were not doing so. Unless they wantedadditional children, couples will not regulate their another child or were pregnant, their reasonsfertility, even if, ideally, they would prefer to post- included lack of knowledge of a source or methodpone or to prevent a pregnancy. To individuals, of contraception, medical side effects of methods,the costs of contraception include: religious beliefs, opposition from husbands, and

* Information-the effort to find out where con- financial costs. In Nepal lack of knowledge of atraceptive methods can be obtained and how they source was the main reason. In Honduras, Mexico,are properly used. In Kenya 58 percent of married and Thailand half of the women who did not prac-women aged fifteen to forty-nine who are exposed tice contraception but were exposed to the risk ofto the risk of pregnancy do not know where they pregnancy either knew of no source of contracep-can obtain a modern method of contraception; in tion or feared side effects. In Bangladesh, Barba-Mexico the figure is 47 percent. dos, and Nepal as much as a quarter to a third of

* Travel and waiting time-the money and time all married women were not using contraceptionneeded to go to and from a shop or clinic and to for these reasons. Contraceptive prevalence clearlyobtain family planning services. Average waiting could be increased by better information and serv-times are as high as three hours in hospitals and ices-directed to men as well as to women.family planning clinics in El Salvador. Family plan- Discontinuation rates tell a similar story. Accord-ning programs in Bangladesh, India, and Sri ing to surveys in thirty-three countries, as many asLanka compensate sterilization clients for their 30 percent of married women of childbearing agetransport costs and lost wages. have used contraception in the past but are no

* Purchase-the financial cost of either contra- longer doing so (see Table 7.3). When contracep-ceptive supplies (condoms, pills, injections) or tion is being used to space births, some discontinu-services (sterilization, IUD insertion and periodic ation is normal. But many who discontinue contra-checkups, menstrual regulation, and abortion). ceptive use do not want more children. As the

* Most public family planning programs provide second column of Table 7.3 shows, as many as 10supplies and services free of charge or at highly percent of all married women are discontinuerssubsidized rates. Purchase costs from private sup- who want no more children and are at risk of get-pliers and practitioners may be substantially ting pregnant. In Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica,higher. Korea, and Pakistan, the proportion exceeds one-

- * Side effects and health risks-the unpleasant third (column 3). Follow-up surveys of womenand sometimes medically serious symptoms that who have accepted contraception typically findsome women experience while practicing contra- that much discontinuaton is due to medical sideception. Users of the pill may gain weight or feel effects. In a follow-up survey in the Philippines,ill. The IUD may cause excessive menstrual bleed- for example, this reason was cited by 66 percent ofing, persistent spotting, and painful cramps. In those who stopped using the pill and 43 percent ofaddition, in some countries women are forbidden those who stopped using the IUD. Reducing dis-for religious or cultural reasons from cooking dur- continuation among women who want no moreing their menstrual periods; spotting and heavier children could increase contraceptive use by atmenstrual flow caused by the IUD can further least one-fifth in eight countries (column 4).

135

TABLE 7.3

Discontinuation of contraception, recent surveys

Percentage of married women aged 15 to 49 Percentage ofall Discontinuers who

Used contraception Discontinlued use, discontinuers who are are exposed and wantbut are not exposed' and exposed and zwant no more children (2),

current users want no more no more children as a percentage("'discontinuers'") children (2 divided by 1) of clrrent users

Country (1) (2) (3) (4)

Sub-Saharan AfricaCameroon (1978) 6 (.) 1 2

Ghana (1979-80) 30 2 7 23Kenya (1977-78) 25 2 7 24Lesotho (1977) 18 2 10 33Sudan (1979) 8 1 8 15

Middle East and North AfricaEgypt (1980) 17 4 25 18Jordan (1976) 22 3 12 10Syria (1978) 14 1 9 6Tunisia (1978) 15 3 18 9

South AsiaBangladesh (1979) 9 3 30 21Nepal (1981) 2 (.) 8 2Pakistan (1975) 5 2 43 42Sri Lanka (1975) 14 4 29 12

East AsiaIndonesia (1976) 12 2 16 7Korea, Rep. of (1979) 24 8 33 16Philippines (1978) 23 4 19 12Thailand (1981) 21 5 26 9

Latin America and CaribbeanBarbados (1981) 28 10 36 21Colombia (1980) 20 4 22 9Costa Rica (1980) 23 3 14 5Dominican Republic (1975) 18 3 17 8Ecuador (1979) 20 4 20 12Guyana (1975) 22 8 34 22Haiti (1977) 17 3 15 14Honduras (1981) 15 2 10 6Jamaica (1975-76) 26 9 36 24Mexico (1978) 15 3 20 8Panama (1976) 21 4 17 7Peru (1981) 20 3 14 7Paraguay (1979) 21 3 12 7Trinidad and Tobago (1977) 27 8 28 14Venezuela (1977) 20 4 19 8

Note: Figures in columns 1 and 2 were rounded after computing columns 3 and 4.(.) Less than half of I percent.a. Not pregnant or infecund.Souirce: Ainsworth, 1984.

Supplying family planning services ing for government support. Once persuaded,governments typically provide family planning

Family planning programs have evolved in various through the public health system. But becauseways, but a typical pattern begins with services health care is often underfinanced and concen-being provided only by private family planning trated in urban areas, and because family planningassociations and a few concerned doctors and competes with other medical priorities, the qualitynurses. These groups gradually show that family of services is uneven and available to only a smallplanning is feasible and acceptable and start press- proportion of people. Eventually programs are

136

extended to the countryside, often by paramedical example-have long-established programs toand semiskilled staff with backup support from reduce fertility. About half the countries in thehealth centers. More attention is paid to increasing Middle East provide family planning to improvethe range of contraceptive methods, providing fol- child spacing and to promote health; only Turkey'slow-up services to clients, and working with com- program seeks to reduce fertility. In a few Middlemunity leaders to encourage local support. Com- Eastern countries, contraception is illegal. In oth-mercial organizations are also encouraged to ers, cultural practices often confine women to theirprovide family planning. Private associations are households, which makes it difficult for them todelegated major responsibilities within the seek out family planning services. Programs thatnational program for certain services or target include home visits by family planning workersgroups and continue to test new ways of providing are not well developed.services. * Sub-Saharan Africa. Of forty-one governments

Public family planning programs are now at dif- for which data are available, only nine have demo-ferent stages of development in different regions. graphic objectives. Most governments that sup-

* East Asia. Governments have a longstanding port family planning do so for health reasons, andcommitment to reduce population growth. They twelve countries still provide no official backing forhave been extremely successful in improving family planning. Where services exist, they areaccess to family planning services and in widening provided through health care systems that havethe range of contraceptive methods available. only limited coverage, particularly in rural areas.Large numbers of field workers have been Throughout Africa couples want large families,recruited to provide family planning, and some- and infant mortality is high. There is sometimes basic health care, in villages in China, Indo- demand for family planning but it is poorly met bynesia, and Thailand. Contraceptive use has existing programs. As traditional ways of childincreased dramatically during the past decade. spacing (prolonged breastfeeding and sexual absti-

* South Asia. Official commitment to reduce fer- nence) erode, the demand for modern contracep-tility is strong, but results have been mixed. Con- tion increases. Private organizations have helpedtraceptive use is highest in Sri Lanka and several to demonstrate that demand and to press for gov-states in southern India, and is lowest in Nepal ernment support.and Pakistan. The demand for contraception is stillconstrained by high infant mortality and by a pref- The management of family planning programserence for large families. At the same time, recentsurveys have revealed substantial unmet need for Perhaps more than any other social programs,both limiting and spacing births. Most programs family planning programs can be effective only tohave yet to achieve the rural spread found in East the extent that they meet the needs of individuals,Asia and have tended to emphasize sterilization. both for better information about the benefits ofOther methods have been largely supplied controlling fertility and for better services to facili-through subsidized commercial outlets. tate doing so. At the same time family planning

* Latin America and the Caribbean. At first, wide- programs, like all public programs, operate withinspread demand for family planning was met certain constraints: the availability of manpowerlargely by private doctors, pharmacies, and non- and finance, the capacity for training and supervi-profit organizations, primarily in urban areas. sion, and the transport and communications infra-Government support was weak, in part because of structure. Medical backup is necessary to deliveropposition from some religious authorities. The some contraceptive methods. The challenge for1970s saw a growing interest on the part of govern- family planning managers is to address individualments and a greater tolerance by religious authori- needs within the confines of these constraints, andties. Most governments now support family plan- in the longer term to ease such limitations.ning services for health and humanitarian The personal nature of family planning servicespurposes; Barbados, Colombia, the Dominican has several important implications for designingRepublic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, and managing programs. First, programs must beMexico, and Trinidad and Tobago do so to reduce able to accommodate local and individual needsfertility as well. In rural areas, access to services is and a variety of users. Potential clients includestill inadequate in most countries. men and women; those who are married and un-

* Middle East and North Africa. Some countries married; those of different social, economic, cul-in North Africa-Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, for tural, or religious backgrounds; and those who

137

may be delaying a first pregnancy, spacing effects are assured, resupply is convenient, andbetween children, or preventing additional preg- the opportunity to switch methods is available.nancies. Staff must be discreet, sensitive to the Medical backup and referral is critical, as is theindividual needs of clients, and familiar with local capacity to follow up on clients. Managers needcustoms and beliefs. This requirement has been information not only on new acceptors but also onaddressed in several ways: by selecting staff from continuing users, dropouts, and nonparticipantslocal communities, by training staff in the environ- (see Box 7.4). Indonesia is one country with anment in which they will work, and by making spe- effective monitoring system, including acceptorcial efforts to hire female workers. Special services records, quarterly follow-up surveys of acceptors,have also been targeted for specific client groups: and periodic sample surveys of households inadolescents, women who have just given birth, which information on fertility and contraceptiveand mothers with young children. use is collected.

Second, programs must encourage clients not Third, because information about the benefits ofonly to accept a method of contraception but also family planning and of small families may not beto use it effectively and continuously. In societies widespread, programs must create an awarenessin which people marry young, couples who are of services and their benefits, as well as spreadspacing and limiting births may have to use contra- information about the proper use of methods.ception for twenty years. Prolonged, effective use Information and education activities are necessaryis easier if information and support regarding side both within and outside the system for delivering

Box 7.4 Management information systems for improved service delivery

The rTangenmenr. tIr pri iding tamili health and tamil plnning s-erx ic* %tre repcris ton irrded i', prc.gram nianager;planning s.et lce- in man% *:untrie- are ;pending as muchas il! percent mt their ere replsced t a ,sinlm nmrothk reportplagued b. Iack ;t reliable intormaijon tirre on 3in ti;es not direcil% rtlated tn b, *a-:h riieldschrker a sciln,ic report b,

on- ihich to base m3r3gement dei,ions delering rhtir ser ices keeping rec- each uptriscor an a ;inglc r.eport tr:m

Requiremenis tor data collection are .-rds and 3rtend.n,; mretings %,ere the each primarN health enter F3mil, plan

imposed on .o,rburdened ;t3tl and m *;t common e%traieous actiities ;A ning statf %serc n.ld imrr'edi3te1 hci.

;upErni;ed b% medical or other technical total ot tn *si reilsters t ere mair.. the%i %ere mea;uring IP Wc predetvr-

personnel untrained to mAke u-e cit the tamiied bLs i.te itpes t * elds%orkers r.mine target- T- encourvt- :c.nmpet-

.niormatinrr \Iud tIre .- spent collect- relating tc. a range c1 sublects tamil ion teedtack repc.rtz irom lh d. tric to.

r.g intormation that is ne'. er used planning maternal and child health ihe pnmars health cernters Also ranked

A mn3ragemenrr ntcirm3aion ;sstem immunuiati.n mnalara conirohl :nd %. iuh crnters on rhe ta,-i- .-1 tn indJia3t,r;

,iNll-t an' ;n ztem %%hich l rganizet the c..nsider3ble uuorlap ot the da3t the% ;uch as the rumb,r .I immunia3tion-

,:.'I1,ciicn ind interprrtation )t daia reccrded An 3s'ist.,nt nurse-midi. it and IItIh number it srcr,h3Iiatons 3S a psr-

n dted b% managers Lo ma3e decisions ai-rn, mainrtaind ti ent- iio reiords centage ot annual r3rget-

The rural h,alth .uprrtis.r re% ie%uing 3 and prepartd tssei e rep-rts a month In thre d,ztrictr in ih *tai31 ...t .2nrrhra

ulker; Iteurd 1c1 ds-e-- perttrmance The untu.rrnmuitn 'a.il nni u.ed bh super- Pr-d;7h i htr thi; ., 7ti at s- -rir.-

and the health mini;ter resie ming intor- i ;irs 3nd manager4 nor did ti curkers diced the timt spent .- n re .-eptng

mation on hiring and depl% ment ot statl recei%e ans s%stematic teedhack on the.r and reporting ha,; btrn reduid consid-

are both usingan \11- For a family plan pert,amance compared nith oihers erabls An assistant nure-mtdi tie t.r

ning propgar. an Nllc could include There %sa3 little incenti%e t.. maintain Exarrple rso's spends inlk abL.ut halt an

untorm3tli-n r.n r3rgtt group size and g.-sod records and to. rep-Jrt regOtlarl and h.,ur a da s ith the nes ;s% stem com-

haratl3r3;1ristics ness and continuing on iime p3red us th tsc. hours beo-tre Pe ar

a.:eptor rates ind c:haracteri;tics. numr Follc, ing a re% ie- . thei sem cu-mplcts and are subhmtted on timre i

bers and ispes ot tollcns up jsist birth reccurdkeeping and reporimti is ere ;ther diztrcts reporting is abh.t thre

rStes stattmng patterns. and aailahilNts stre3rilined The number ct registers rronths behind schedultI and managers

-. rupplie FheTe data all,%s managers kept bs ieldsorker. .sas reduced Irom ite retsp:cdin: beCitcr I.- 1.:c31 neWd

tc mak decisucins based on up to-dare to-rtL-u t; sis 3 reg,.ter ot elh,ible .:c!U* ct ps toe.pand the si tem t;-r states.id~

3nd reiiable imtcrnaiion that is colleted ples and children, a maternal and child ine are no%% being taken in indhra

aS a matter o.t outIne health register 3 r-port on blood srmears Pradesh and the g.o%,rnmtErt ot India Is

:'tudiez in ii criarcs in India Karna. r i malaria a birth and death register. a recommending that all 'taies adopt thE

r3,3 and Lrrtar l'r3desh in the mid 1lt!s stock and issue register and a diari ot neis KIP1

sho, ed that tieldcs orkers pros iding dailk acti%.ties The tarious separat,

138

services. Program staff recruit potential clients and of family planning services, and medical staff mayoffer information on proper use of methods. The give priority to curative rather than preventivemass media can be used to inform people of the services. Multipurpose workers who are over-benefits of small families and how to obtain contra- loaded with responsibilities will do none of theirceptive methods. Instruction on human reproduc- tasks well. If an integrated delivery systemtion, family planning, responsible parenthood, employs single-purpose workers, friction mayand problems of rapid population growth as part arise over differences in training, seniority, sala-of school curricula can inform young people before ries, and promotion. For example, in addition tothey marry; such instruction can also be offered their salaries, family planning workers have some-through nonformal education, such as adult liter- times received incentive payments based on theacy programs. These efforts complement other number of acceptors they recruit, whereas healtheconomic and social policies, discussed in Chapter workers receive only salaries. In Kenya family6, to create demand for smaller families. health field educators (with family planning

Because of the need for medical services for pro- responsibilities) were paid more than the enrolledvision or follow-up of many contraceptive meth- community nurses to whom they were to report.ods, most family planning programs are linked to These personnel issues can seriously affect workerthe public health system. The nature of these links morale and performance.varies among countries and has often changed. In Although family planning programs need somesome programs, family planning workers provide link with health systems, family planning servicesservices through clinics administered by the minis- need not be confined to them. When services aretry of health, but are responsible to some other provided through a maternal and child health pro-body. In Pakistan primary responsibility for family gram, important client groups may be overlooked:planning lies with the Population Welfare Division men, adolescents, unmarried women, and non-of the Ministry of Planning and Development, pregnant women. Ministries of health may beusing the division's own specialized facilities and poorly equipped to organize social marketingworkers. Elsewhere family planning is directly schemes (for subsidized commercial distribution ofadministered by the ministry of health, through a contraceptives, discussed below), to develop massspecial department of family planning (as in media programs, or to coordinate public, private,Egypt) or as part of preventive or maternal and nongovernmental, and commercial activities.child health services (as in Botswana, Kenya, and Some of these responsibilities are often delegated,Malawi). Staff may specialize in family planning for example, to information or education minis-(that is, as "single-purpose" workers), as in Kenya, tries. Many programs have boards within or out-Pakistan, and Indonesia; or they may be responsi- side a ministry to coordinate the wide range ofble for general health or maternal and child health family planning activities. In Mexico the semi-services in addition to family planning (that is, as autonomous Coordinacion General del Programa"multipurpose" workers), as in Bangladesh, Bot- Nacional de Planificacion Familiar monitors andswana, and India. coordinates all family planning activities; it is

There have been obvious advantages in integrat- located within the Ministry of Health but has directing health and family planning in the delivery of access to the president and works closely with the

* services. The health benefits for mothers and chil- National Population Council (CONAPO), a sepa-dren of spacing and limiting births clearly establish rate body responsible for population policy. Infamily planning as a valuable component of mater- Indonesia the National Family Planning Coordi-nal and child health services. For both services the nating Board (BKKBN) is an autonomous bodymain target group-married women of childbear- that collects data, produces information and edu-

- ing age-is the same. Joint delivery can reduce unit cation programs, coordinates activities, and has itscosts, and in countries where family planning is own fieldworkers who promote family planning,controversial, integrated services make the pro- refer clients, and set up community distributiongram more acceptable. points. In some countries these family planning

But integrated services also present difficulties. boards are also responsible for overall populationHealth ministries are often understaffed and policy-a role discussed more fully in Chapter 8.underfunded; they cannot always mobilize the In conclusion, there is no simple formula for thepolitical and administrative wherewithal to imple- best organization of family planning programs.ment an effective family planning program. Heavy Programs that differ widely in structure can bedemands for health care may eclipse the provision equally successful. Workers in India deliver both

139

family planning and maternal and child health duras, and 62 percent in Nepal live more than anservices and are under the general guidance of the hour away from the source of supply. These barri-Division of Family Welfare within the central Min- ers-lack of information and distance-are particu-istry of Health and Family Welfare. Indonesia pro- larly high in sub-Saharan Africa: more than halfvides family planning as part of maternal and child the eligible women in Senegal and Sudan arehealth services within the health system, but also unaware of modern contraceptive methods, and inuses single-purpose fieldworkers responsible to most African countries contraceptives are availablethe BKKBN. The Chinese program relies on joint only in urban areas.personnel in the health system but has a separate To reach the rural areas, family planning pro-policymaking body for family planning and overall grams have placed special emphasis on extendingpopulation policy. No matter how service delivery the work of health centers into communities andis organized, all programs need some health households through the use of fieldworkers andbackup. other outreach staff. Access has also been in-

Other significant factors in the success of pro- creased in many countries by encouraging the pri-grams are the degree of political commitment and vate sector to provide family planning services.the overall administrative capacity of governmentto coordinate the deployment, training, supervi- EXTENDING PUBLIC SERVICES THROUGH "OUT-

sion, and availability of staff. These influence the REACH." Until a decade ago almost all public familyeffectiveness of three program strategies for planning programs provided services from cen-expanding contraceptive use: increasing access to ters-usually clinics-and relied heavily on medi-services, improving service quality, and ensuring cal staff. Because health services were not wellsocial acceptability. established in rural areas and medical staff were

scarce, access to family planning as well as to med-

Increasing access ical care was limited.Today many large family planning programs

Perhaps the greatest achievement of family plan- have succeeded in using their health centers as aning programs in the past decade has been to springboard for taking services and supplies intomake information and services more accessible to the villages.those who need them. In twenty-three of twenty- * Paramedical workers have been trained tonine developing countries in which surveys have provide many methods formerly provided only bytaken place, more than 80 percent of married physicians. In Thailand, for example, auxiliarywomen are aware of at least one effective method midwives insert lUDs and administer injectableof contraception. In urban areas of almost all of contraceptives. Elsewhere nonmedical workersthirty-six countries examined by the World Fertility distribute the pill; they receive careful training onSurvey (WFS), family planning methods are avail- screening for contraindications, proper use, howable within an hour's travel from home. In Costa to deal with side effects, and referral procedures.Rica and Thailand most people in rural areas are * Staff based in clinics have been supplementedalso less than an hour away from services. Further- with fieldworkers who provide a link betweenmore, most public programs provide services free the clinic and the community (see Box 7.5).of charge or at heavily subsidized rates. Fieldworkers periodically visit homes and outlying

But there are still many countries and areas in communities to refer clients to service outlets; towhich information and travel costs are major distribute nonclinical methods such as the pill,obstacles to satisfying the unmet need of clients. condom, and spermicidal foam; and to reassureAccording to household surveys in Guatemala and users. In some cases fieldworkers also supervisePiaui State, Brazil, 15 percent of married women of local volunteers.childbearing age said that they would like to use 0 Official outlets have been increased by orga-contraceptives but did not know where to get nizing local supply depots for nonclinical meth-them. In Nepal half of married women do not ods. Such local outlets in Mexico and Indonesiaknow of a method of contraception; about 15 per- assist the work of field staff and reduce costs tocent know of a method but not of an outlet. In clients.Honduras about a quarter of women are unaware The advantages of outreach are considerable:of either method or outlet. Of those women in fieldworkers take less time and money to trainrural areas who know where to obtain contracep- than do medical professionals; health staff cantives, 32 percent in Colombia, 42 percent in Hon- spend more time on health care than they other-

140

Box 7.5 Family planning fieidworkers

C'itrr-- a,dI I ee,ni-- u ;ir. T Id- id.-rl,,cr; health cirrirmzittcs ti, pr,-~idJr pill; ca-n- z,Tnial, %tiunri-er -mnciudinA ;atistied

ha-3. h t, , ki- T. . : %_. ; ; In , t Ja)n-~ arnd rhcr ba; h.-aitP ¾ ' Ie - i-nt'~ 1:arb-r. andti t,ahers-t,i)nixirm

narri,.n ii anl plann.Trnl, pr--cr3mni- i -lac~ \iIner are -tler -a ha O.upl.- about a-. ilablE serict" reach

r- nfl th r elan-n icTr .. I - t -I it-It. t paid .-ri-r, aiiid -- I.: F-3itaii rh.rn Th.i ad-. nta,-c c:i itamil . plann-tnns

-'tian-iid Co.-igtr -- ~ :-- cn- aLntractpir' e pr.. ,i f-:n-:~ has nc:-'ura:e hr.-atit ding~ and c:hiidspa

ra.:~pi i. u-:- I-..t br inging 'el '-3 r h,djl- 2's p,-reent c,-mnpar-d i.iith rare ing diisrithu nltiiilinical .-ncth,.d, andi

J dric,ri.. r-. h,-r,ri.,ari,- F - in - 1'percent In lth rest ot thte c-untr. ret-jr c:I...-ta r. ramil. -ilittI cente-r, ic,r

dirt..r, ni t-urittir- rllu, tr.tre~ a di'. er'. Full-tnme Faid iamil, plan. ,- he r ni, rt-i.d ThE olunt-aer, art

* * hpprliTLh t-hi tra-rine Ju r ad n"-tic -ld1.rr - ua mid.t irained and upc~r'.-d tC. n-n male aind

- iji I race . *i tie lii.- 1 -rk-:r- ~~and nr-t ,r de,-aru a, ,gned iu h,aith onr lrmale -i srkcr at The lanmik -.altar..

* ir F.rnid planning ~.: r ice- at- ~ub- ni, r- it, -m v.%hich the, -p['td at center

,.,I -b rtdj hi mialt and in rle d muiLJtipu.r 1,-a-i tlir,n *iaa-, ach mnnrth niak'rir * Plhi-Ii'p'?. lit-_ut 3 iii .u -tr-a.ah

p.>c . ni-i-i, Femak ni~~~rI~er. r'~ .i ide in-rm, . sir. arind orzanc_in,z g~-'ap mee -. r,r n: ie -e. 2h1legiN iau.

pr..- an-i p -ia ic ri-c._ rN' fluiher- in.-rIt'. drii .:gh. c.ui- fh1K ali- pe t.-i.a ull-iimt vzi-.rnnienl

~pr-i d 1,amil p-l.inn.r.g, fl. fai- iIi r.ribur,. cundint-~ eind p11'~ and ret.: r imp.hiov-.c £a~ ac- IC-rk-r rec,ruit, train,

Ir bthi , -n.lc.ni - ,r.ij dIv. :r b-.bi.- fi i,- ILr riand ;t,.rd.Iz: an-n cli,nt~ T- i. d, 'ig - nd-~ur-r r-. i., aklut ,'.ertr Ci -mmur'ith

IT.,rr, rit has r,-..r. tI-, -ai ri.n,-dr- .r: i-. planiii., cilK .'-raz. .liit---h- r-i. itrati t-.

li- triOur ,IT it ,c-i ml -.-. 'r,ra-epi,~t. I..- Li.pra.'i.:ied-.rir -*.11i mat- cOupir- suppla .'nim aid pill, Ininial',-kr-i rIir- 3tiirain-,d iT., i nl.ni "-rouc-.ae atii-n utErrci u,,.r' and moake~ retenral, rc. en -

:dii-,n -i,ii-Ntetranir n and - IMht Lli- r.ai in rural area,-I ionen p.. r ,rnm- n-i health ,lni. I'ME ;i (iih 1,J

,-.i,.h aic.pt-:.r nir-i.t. be rmi, - a 'I-2III ct0F-i- than in, ure.cne ptr Linttier - aln.iz:ii hre~-j.)urler: oii

d..i. r t1hin ihIr,-. n)i.;t, tial,,- irk- r -iii -..uple'i b-au.- t gl-ate,r dis- the natic-n r h,lgbe.t pe The lunar,

ti. trnniair.. -. , n o.r.-nm-roai ta3r..,., in. tnt .1 oI3 'thr .iair'r h preigran I- un-:triain.-ant ,i- -nhUt .1- pr.. ii.. tanila plaiio I T-. n, ut-aipi-rm pr-.. -,cau.- -a,t-:rnAl lundin: I' Ill t,minate I

nri. n i,,rtinat.in and disiribiate .ioi- i-I.- urr-,,ch -,-r i,thr.ugl-, ti.ur dii. in iu,5 rz .,rd 1-cil g.i.--tnmc-tir hra%-.. ni-it

di,n. H r..tf' h-nr tII- ire t rptcr,i ~ ,,dvt-nt % irtnr ni.n a.4-n, I, TI-, ere - 1.--,.f.nAit: I,. ii a,--r ii ct ,.t tih,i.. :.,rit 1 Flipulatii.n .-Ii5iiii i 3- Ilii in t,ri:t i-i Hv-aith and.J i-, liar'. tri3, I h,eld.- CItktc ,ar i. as arapidl a

rn h,I I - and tr IbalI ar Ea a tI -i,- u kh in"ITIprkirp-l.: Iwiid-.I,tl,,:t - lit. c -nleer -. ..pecred

Iri,.- -nan iri I t Indi JIa tI I I....lat h cira,t,. mai,nl ..-r- t,if-mil pI-nnIng Tih., a TbaItt.'i L n t II r:,-n,il.. ti-, Tha.

nI, ..t 1',-en ac-,r-. ii lo-cal . -lr.,--..ho- rcri.- 'n-,all na,ii,.-nal pr-otani ha' It-_ r. dmi: ba-ed6 i111. ii.. a.. i n the I l,,rd .- I Ia. -aard inc-:ni- e pa-. n-tnt- I i --. a -.cutt n u -mulipurp.,-t ila t3iulth -A un-

ha.lt ri-.r tI- jt. ..-ut -n; lan-ai1 , planning tnIttit.t- rut',a pr- -iran- Ii tread i-.a-l i- 'r-in nearla halt di th,. rati,-n .

Ii. ld,-rI-i't T.. ri :-ONit elgiht, cou n, ' rann tradittnil-rinImi.v r'L lg.~i.I ,en rraii-JI I-.. prit tdc

r-',- Th-,- i,ld. rIi' I-,at-. n- riticil. arni It-ithc I-cA uriiutc.rtTi-I prc-i itk antil planning tr-ilirmati,.n arid jalt--IInhJIr. -Y..hoi -rau-ie - r.-:ruit ni.i ni,--woi atin and -uppbe- i -hag:tot ,atre I--, re..uppl. p-ill and -~-iii

Fl" --- i. Pr d : iYb, niana~-r,,i lml i_rarran Pti mai anrd ti-, N,Jmri-n I 5'. ient- tltr a nt-i,L],: 5t';.lit-Ctii._

I--ri-i.-. ri lacaih .lini. ' an.1 prt- ii-T,. tr-nt tI trlu'ttgrai-dl Fani ' e-.-ri.n iii: Tht IJ hid, tpat:ir-4 arni

ll.1-40lot-r.' Ii.ilrur. illap- and a:-i'- .--- p ij sen.ic-. rhr--rig -urJ.a- Fanail l'Ia'rnin, iuCl.1prsaa

- liii ~~t II - itra- ,~1~flt r- -uppl. irt,r--ir-r under III,.- Nirnitta ol H.aith rr.--, d,-i

Itriarici.. ii-'1-r.iiril-h.-i pr-.liid-d1 * P,4 ireu ln l'$is the -timn ni,n-, ..I thb..~r si-'cta a'd ha-j ab,ut 3iuiittlI n - paid iiliir-.,In r-,roni r.tv toaiiiid it, pr-niarm ii- nr.lUdr -, tuil-tinme sizer.ip- , -utIva, ..h .--r

- i-il.-it- I~..t hi-. pro4rtiti. rib.- ih, --ihv r r,m .i iiel.li:..kti-,t-,ard ...lmnifnufldt --I .rŽ- ,h. 7upp, ~-ral -nmtr:c..ptii es t

i. land. t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rite,-r..I- ir : atler .i ;i,- n ..as b.-a-l d rnaal ilUit-tht-.ughi r-..gular It- 'r -

a N I., Th,- pri- wi,t,, ru.n Ch-p-tn tr-l-r~, -ti p.ttd1 Iiti. i-,rI-t-r' %F hiL it. A~ r, Pt,I-tt i-il train 3rt.)ilttt ;i'.'

ii.d -. ler ..1 -t -_-,1,Jn h~ 1l-t.-al pr. -irani 1i;-' --all retturi-d n'.I,- arid

wise would; and community-based fieldworkers to maintain the quality of services. They shouldare often most aware of local needs. But the exten- concentrate on a few main tasks; additional res-sive use of fieldworkers requires regular, support- ponsibilities must be introduced only gradually.ive supervision. They must be trained well at the Fieldworkers also require a good medical backupoutset andi must receive periodic refresher courses and referral system so that any side effects that

141

clients may develop can be promptly treated. quarter of couples who used contraception in 1983:Finally, supervisors and fieldworkers must travel it accounted for 67 percent of total condom use, 12frequently, and contraceptive supplies must be percent of oral contraceptive use, and 70 percent ofmade available in an increasing number of remote spermicide use. In 1981 about half of all pill usersoutlets. Money for transport is often first to be and 80 percent of condom users in Sri Lankasacrificed when budgets are cut, yet the whole obtained supplies from the social marketing pro-strategy depends on extensive travel and good gram.logistics. Reliance on commercial distributors does not lift

all the burden off the public sector, however. TheENCOURAGING PRIVATE SUPPLIERS. Another way in public sector still has to provide advertising, pro-

which governments have increased access to fam- motion, contraceptive supplies, distribution, andily planning services is by encouraging wider pri- medical backup. Some training is necessary forvate involvement. This strategy makes fewer commercial suppliers to dispense oral contracep-demands on scarce public funds and on adminis- tives and to advise clients how to use them prop-trative capacity. Policies include subsidizing erly, as has been done in Jamaica, Korea, Nepal,commercial distribution of contraceptives, coordi- and Thailand. Failing that, some system of referralnating with and encouraging private nongovern- or prescriptions must be developed.mental organizations (NGOs), and removing legal Although government subsidies to the commer-and other barriers to private and commercial provi- cial sector are usually provided for contraceptivesion of contraception. supplies only, some governments also subsidize

Subsidized provision of contraception through IUD insertion, abortion, and sterilization by pri-commercial outlets-often called social market- vate physicians. In Korea more than 2,300 physi-ing-has been tried with some success in at least cians have been trained and authorized by the gov-thirty countries. Social marketing programs use ernment to provide family planning services. Theexisting commercial distribution systems and retail government pays the entire cost of sterilization,outlets to sell, without prescription, contraceptives but the cost of IUD insertion is shared-two-thirdsthat are provided free or at low cost by govern- by the government, one-third by the client. Thements or external donors. The first social market- involvement of private physicians has been a cru-ing scheme was in India, selling subsidized cial factor in the success of the Korean program,"Nirodh" condoms. Almost all countries with although in 1978 about 60 percent of rural town-such schemes sell condoms, and at least seventeen ships still had no authorized physician.are known to sell oral contraceptives, sometimes Access to services has also been increased by col-several brands. Spermicides, in the form of sup- laborative efforts between government and NGOs.positories, creams, pressurized foam, and foaming This collaboration has taken many forms: subsidi-tablets are also commonly sold. Until recently, zation of or grants to NGO services, coordinationsocial marketing schemes have been limited to of NGO and government services to assure maxi-methods that do not require clinical services for mum coverage and allocation of responsibilty fordistribution. But Egypt now sells subsidized lUDs critical functions or services in certain regions tothrough private doctors and pharmacies. And in NGOs. In Bangladesh and Indonesia, for example,Bangladesh there are plans to test-market inject- government services are allocated to rural areas,able contraceptives through social marketing leaving NGOs to provide a large share of urbanarrangements. services. Since 1973 the Brazilian Family Planning

Social marketing makes family planning sup- Association (BEMFAM) has worked with the gov-plies more easily accessible by increasing the num- ernments of several states in Brazil to establishber and variety of outlets through which they can community-based programs for low-incomebe obtained: pharmacies, groceries, bazaars, street groups in the Northeast. The private nonprofithawkers, and vending machines. In Sri Lanka some program in Thailand acts as an extension of the6,000 commercial outlets sell subsidized condoms government's rural health service and recruitsand pills-more than five times the number of gov- local distributors to promote family planning andernment family planning outlets. In the late 1970s sell subsidized contraceptives donated by the gov-social marketing schemes accounted for more than ernment and international agencies. By mid-197810 percent of total contraceptive use in Jamaica, there were some 10,000 distributors covering one-Colombia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. In Bangladesh quarter of the 600 districts in Thailand. In Kenya inthe social marketing program supplied about one- 1980, NGOs were operating 374 out of 1,204 rural

142

health facilities. But less than 1 percent of the forty years old, who smoke and are over thirty-fiveNGO facilities offered daily family planning serv- years old, who are breastfeeding, or who have aices, and only 7 percent offered part-time services. history of stroke, thromboembolism, cancer, liverA new project is creating family planning service damage, or heart attack. The IUD is undesirabledelivery points in at least thirty of the NGO facili- for women with pelvic infection or a history ofties. In addition, both government and NGO rep- ectopic pregnancy. Some women cannot be prop-resentatives will sit on a National Council on Pop- erly fitted with diaphragms.ulation and Development that will coordinate * If the side effects of one method cannot benational efforts in population information, educa- tolerated, the availability of other methodstion, and communications. improves the chance that couples will switch

Governments have also removed legal and regu- rather than stop using contraception altogether.latory obstacles that restrict commercial distribu- For example, in Matlab Thana, Bangladesh, 36 per-tion. In Egypt the sale of oral contraceptives cent of women had switched methods within six-through private pharmacies does not require a teen to eighteen months after initial acceptance.physician's prescription, although their provision And a study in the United States showed that mar-through government clinics serving rural areas ried white women aged twenty-five to thirty-ninedoes. Several countries-including China, Mexico, had used an average of more than two methods;Morocco, the Philippines, and Thailand-allow more than a third of those aged twenty-five topills to be distributed in facilities other than phar- twenty-nine had used three or more.macies or health centers. Other options for stimu- * Couples' preferences are influenced by their

lating the private sector include removal of import fertility goals-postponing a first birth, spacingtariffs on contraceptive supplies (Korea recently between children, or limiting family size. Womeneliminated a 40 percent tariff on raw materials for using the pill tend to be younger and to have haddomestically produced contraceptives); active gov- fewer births than those protected by sterilization;eminment promotion of condoms, spermicides, andpillsnth beomeasilyof supplied therougicomer - many of the former are spacing births, while thepills that can be easily supplied through commer- latrhvcopedteifmlescial outlets; and training of private pharmacistsand physicians who frequently have little knowl- * Some methods of fertility control may be reli-edge of modern family planning methods. giously or culturally unacceptable. Two-fifths of

the world's countries, comprising 28 percent of itspopulation, either prohibit abortion completely or

Improving quality permit it only to save the life of the mother. For

The quality of family planning services matters in religious reasons, sterilization is illegal in severalall phases of program development. In the early countries. When couples regard periodic absti-stages services are new, and contraception still nence as the only acceptable form of birth control,lacks social legitimacy. Once programs are well programs should provide information on properestablished and accessible, quality counts because timing of abstinence, although this method carriesother costs of family planning-such as physical higher risks of unwanted pregnancy.side effects-have replaced access as the factor lim- Due to sheer lack of alternatives, early familyiting the success of the program. Three ingredients planning programs offered only a limited range ofof quality-the mix of contraceptive methods, the contraceptive methods. In the late 1950s and earlyinformation and choice provided, and program 1960s, the Indian program had to rely on rhythm,follow-up-have contributed much to program the diaphragm, and the condom. Today, mostsuccess (see Box 7.6). national programs offer a wider variety of meth-

ods, although the number available at any givenTHE METHOD MIX OF PROGRAMS. The number and outlet is often fewer than that implied by official

characteristics of available contraceptive methods statements. Some governments still promote a sin-affect the ability and willingness of clients to prac- gle method because such an approach is easier totice birth control. Additional options are likely to administer or because certain methods, such asincrease acceptance, permit switching, and reduce sterilization and the IUD, are viewed as morediscontinuation rates. 'effective" and require less follow-up over the

* Some women have medical conditions that long run than do other methods. For example,rule out certain methods. Oral contraceptives India, Korea, and Sri Lanka continue to emphasizeshould not be prescribed for women who are over sterilization. Until recently, Indonesia had almost

143

Box 7.6 The impact of service quality: NIatlab Thana, Bangladeshr&13rl3b Thana 1-an adntin;;ri'.rt't di '

Comparison of the cumulatsse conba.epti'e acceplance and user rates in the fir- 18-24;9-.r. -t 'N' 11(ik r'pIl 1i rtr3l areai ..t months. torehe sample household Contraceptise Distribution Project tCDPa and the

danxldL-h In p',:pularw.n der-ni, -^ Famili Planning-Health Serices Project IFPHSPi

1 1HI i pcKjl, per atuare mile Tran;P. r1

"dirt.ici-mi-il b , b.ai-ar..i ..,,m- Pr . -'a g. . .-.! rni. r. -. nr . r-n,:i r .n1 .- 1;,I-...n

Air 1. F,hin- 3and tarmine arc thr 4l, '

mnn,aiin aD'FHi

Bl: 1.r r. 1'-- and l'"Al thf Inierna. 1.:*jr*' - IL,;

rw.nal '.Zenrrr tl:'r l),rii4 ih 'cl ['ler.l -.................

PJr,-ar.:h B-ngl:dc-h .-.ndu,red r,,-

*-rirr.nIn F ir. Nl.,ilaI' Thana 1.. nIca-ur.

Ih 1 -tit:' I; ahi l ah' lii .1;.v. and Iquilj .-,I larr.ilk r'latinn'R 'ter'c.; h,, d /W jen c..r.ir.lcIept'. U; .tU h'rt 1"'>; tamil;. !,I I'

plArIr.PLz . r'.<. .c~ -r' t'i;;d In a g. * t- r

rrlnm n rur., .rrr ,n fl .,tla to.n r \;n,aill 'tit pin lld.:d a; ' lifi r nr:.n Il rariF,

j I. rt-. rr pi. ' r.i [ -' ..- t rii. h. u '-' *:rl -; A 3 r. at I

ri,.e r.,, '. .tp t'. .I. t n3u nll.r- it* ' .r.1i;, -. , 1.1 r,i, h. U,c 1 1l .t..mndu'. v.1 n.rit.n.........ail r. -h .s.r*tF. Frl.'lX-., I .b..:. ...... hr ir' -'..'... II| ; 'I II-1!.|l. :1

iiar . i hr. .ui ..r BnarB tadr>-.l h unmett

d i.r , -nirat pi'*n cniark - z,td

narr.'nal 'art' in I -. h .at i..;r..p.:ied ,'d- c.:l- and -impi.: rI ruLiii :.epr -r reeupplp king t- a3rn

trla ''; ptr.:er.i oi rird, m itrici ' -r..,tn ... flirrrr, T : r .'n .tt- r 1h-n.: I ... .tr.nt I d; n-,t

aril .t In r.. r-. ct..ldrer. and that l ni.t.;i. dldl. .-. .Jo... ed and licrm a T- the 'r.pa.:i ..- i he '1131.. a- t-, At a.t

i', p. r.:vni . -u I 11 J,,tt - r . .i-L ,-nir; ......... . ,m-n . ab 31lm.- r.. ptrf; -n l t-xp r *.ri l..d l. i, u rL^ u l, th, r.l

cepti.n hLdui h i h -n.l I , p. rcnit r-t *:n.:. -'I ... ft iJ.nn 't' Bt fmlIg in :ci area lumped i n. ni I 1 rI 17 ` pr-..t

,-u n nil'. uir1.r ' h-. kiiti- 1-'5 the, ti-iil eaca h.-L,. .r.nhr- n;..ntl;' hut .J-cn-:d IL. 11 ptr-

I i,.. i "i, i, .1'i-. L .T hi'.lat. ,1' li.d i, th, pr-ic. I ma -I Ihi .. ii.n. .re. nt .t r .. --i- Ruair.g lhe 'ainm

I..... ,i. ,1P, Th, 1- 1 -! 't r.I , r . D'u'inc .; I u i.. ii-nli ; r. Icr.. -.-ro.:'d bl iat -.l . .:. nnrarcrpi.r ut- 'r-

nri r. l t juN ic 1 -- Id tr...n. Ir i,.e I. nd i- . acI ,ng anti 'i-It i- ; Pilitti ditn .'',r- ar ti.-r- ,7

lle .7 iluh -t. -.h-U -l l tiiI.- ' i .*I liwn;ir-;,tr-- p'F ' u -Žr u.- 3I pil l nd * 3 t [-er- ri r¶i.:t :. .ai '. 4 p , rc r.ni '.i

!.12 .i-ira...... P,ln.e311-t ..- .i .r iart .,i p.-WiLe 'ei l- It i.-c Tl;';. h* tir- nai 2r *.. r,tn in .h pri.l t.r-a lhad

*:.d.l- F.-r- rF nate A i i ',ir .;i'. . Fi -. nit. rtt ..r. i. end-.-n,-nth .up - -ept,d r hut -.nl5 42 per.

F 1A l d ;. mrr,3on.-n-, r oi, pr,.Fpor - ...i pl Fl l.l r, p,1.1; or th ri, n-r Sh .-.nl .,1 th-. ............... -- m r. %. r;,; .rDrA ;L

I;-. c--rd--i .. t,.; h il, l d..:.- ,J , nr , t .. ... . .. i . - e a ,.-.r1 ca.r,1 "- . ten ;- i.Uri.-:n

exclusively promoted the pill but now is giving approved for use in the United States. Because ofmore emphasis to the IUD. the limited number of donors that supply inject-

Supply constraints also limit the availability of able contraceptives, Thailand almost exhausted itsdifferent methods. Most contraceptives are supplies in 1982, raising the prospect that manyimported and are often provided free or cheaply by clients would have to switch methods or discon- -donors; China, India, and Korea, which produce tinue altogether. Difficulties can also arise if donorsmost of their own contraceptives, are major excep- change suppliers, since the hormonal makeup oftions. Heavy reliance on one donor can cause oral contraceptives varies from one manufacturerproblems, since some donors can supply only cer- to another. Other factors restricting method mixtain types of contraceptives. The United States include shortages of trained staff to perform sterili-Agency for International Development (USAID) is zations, poor transport and logistics for timelylegally prevented from financing abortion training resupply, and the great distances that clients mustor services and does not finance Depo-Provera, an travel to obtain some methods.injectable contraceptive, because it has not been To improve the method mix of programs, male

144

ni nth' into tht prc:-rani IertdIit had i4,;.:d .-nce a t-ratnighi rt>3rdle;. in u4t in timelI c,.fnditionf t, pical uI rural

de.,InEd tb, 11 Io 1- per:ent but thb i* hether couFplt . rt usi,., critracep- Bangladt,h But it mn3a be h.ird t. repli-

ent-i hI-red oni .n ne %ar Tht proi.Ot; t-. S ,ide ttrct *trt n3ar.aged c.ite Sn a lareer caIe be,ause the FPHSFP

lin,i-d rpT..i ' .1 AutiriL uted t- F-' r r-r-.uh rea44urancr.: Irequent rieib.-d- -a' abIl I.- dra. in n tra re-ucuree4

ninal-inrnt .t id. ttr.crt4 rnadru.vrte -d0:hini an. rned1Lal relkrT 1I -r tr.,,t- una.iflal,bi,. Ic th national lamil" plan

Ir3,rmin .-.I rjlf ,riient irt.nr, nmi in..n n L .:rlkr- also ai, red a'pirir. i Ia fminr prcrgram F,.r -anmpkl athc.u4h

pr-.. idd t Jit-ni' tht n.rr-c.. ranre ci rran- arnd r.-n tablo: th..reb. gaining tield..orker- in tht proicct recei,e sala-

.-nIra: pii-. e ni.,h-ic -h(h d,-c-ur. .as- io hou,eh'ld- that hid prt . sul., rie- e ule3kni t .: ,:-rkr in tht nralirnal

i'gd rieihid,d ;i rtchin gi and t,-:i littlr rci,-cted t3mil planning pre..rnm thtir 4up.rr%-.-r; .alar, are

-uptrs r.i. n In riF tin-u Ihrhe nmionrh§ .n.rtratieF tii much hicher Th, prtlect akl- u-cd ;th

Ti,. r,i.; .. , Ll.- r i- Ll. ir. rh. pr ier:t ara r.>.. urn, . L. '1 ;p....dbo:at I. nic.t 4upe.r r-or- and

f r FP,i In O ;n-br l-' .:.n .p-rcrnr Unlik, rht Itr.nd irn rh, CR' re .tar:h ;rall round rh, art3 And mrn

Lprmnl, ni ai... t-frtd houh.-.. . .-. :.. h.- er the rire c,_.ntirw-d t. cI,nrC a2eni,:nt ..,. dlec,nlraliztd 1- an e'rtnl

d,-ir,bi*u,n ot -.-nrrac;pri.- r but %xnh *I. . n -4 p-rc.:ni L. nirtnua,-.n rart rarel, tourd in nil. nal pri- T an;- The

much bktr r -uii. -.t *,-..- e- nl.;' I ,i rn drarrai-AlII .n,pr. ..d .ltr,nr air Mr3anirl l rnd *rgani ni-n3l -ru.-tur.

IL* rlii... ..rk.. r er.- rrt.1.rIod I,rI 1 pr.:,ni -r liI I. mar .n rht . in .h.. thai cura.ni- 1.- .UP- sUrti'- .p- r

.an rr-rr-ri 3 r-n ii w-.kt pro r-ri:a I-F'rt-i-' hid 3c.-:ptd -..ntrac:,pt,,..n and . - .r. %- rl er a ctunta*ilit, ;.cntinu.

t,ainn .n nd . . Ir,.. in-rirr.-.nnnv ZI prr:..nt ci lh-.. ..m,n. %. c:re -,nntnrr II. rraininc tg-d raccrdl-ping mdni

'i: ; . ni Th . r., lit.rite niarried ng t.o ai... n- i- n. chart) 1[.ur,n; the tirli c-ntinu u; iedJback t--. .-.:rker4 sh.uld

,ilh htl.ir.i had sitr -......p....i.ri- -rr.. Iprr r %-r! trt,lit.. d,:clin-d h'2 7 t al n.ch ot the .-rd,i for ih. pr.ie:t s

vr- and .:.amr- r. m r"Fr-o-l tamilite r. ': p..rsert cmpared th: iIII; i. - -

EIhut . t, -Ir- n, p--r I liii I p-ple- ;.d1 i.. [r:iet ar.. .Nttr a thri-..r Ihr go..rnmevl .I Li BangiadEh and

r-c.i-.r .id rc h1ni- .l up.. r i^n ind meidi- i'.t.;, 3t4 p, knt -..nrac.qpuiie u-e the tnr.rnati.ral n1 f ire ar n... -t

*- 1'~kp it-,ul n. rur cdna-:C 4iarl,d L, tan r r:. arid nr..-r,tnd, .t 41 per- -mb.n.mri .:n an -renvrn proFect rt.

;1 aiii1-d . nr- p ;rnedrcs and .idmini -.. r r-:i.., el C'.i l .i' .d- rn n,rh- rrar.-tr -..rr-- .1 thc nmanage mrint tech-

i-trr.;a .tlF-,. n Ir... ..... r,-rn m .m n; lrnr..r .d- I h-I inIatl [p...I.. raNri nz.u.. .t u-. Nlaui.,b pr.lect l t ... nhM. gk vern-

hr aith -*,-r.mz -r,i ..i... n ~toir ailn-.r lialt -t nt r rnpriine m. nt heMlth .nd; tniii0 plannin*. rk-

1-b. FFH t-1 pr I. id.d . mIprt'hn ;. .. i- Ir th. r.e,t .t rhr.: ..-umrr. n 1iH.3 r .r -r. ; v rraI rhan.- in n4. rih B.. nr;iI and

*r I. eS i rr th, spe:1l3 n-ed; Ci -air nr -i; d-rn nr:rhold; un ?i-.r .nl% 14 p.r- n. mea3 ure ih, rmpa.t -t the.-r hangt j

r,nu an.id 4r-pn-ii. .Ilct rhcn mrh d - ..r -r.pri.:. ot u reanu r,I -. u r trrriliti n-I'rr., arw ind :oritracaPri

,.ti,-rcd ,rcludd nrii .nl phill and c. r. . ad n i r. h dra3n:-n th,rap. ha-... ue. Th, Frt-lt .. Ill rnake nl.n}nial

din- m-t i. an, ra.ler- and tt r. en dd. .dr,d I- th. \sti ,n rie. r- .sha: ng.r n rhn-rinh pr-gr;r;n iriu:-

Ir add.m.in -.-n.n . rtr: rterr.-. r en- ...loc - - pack 1g- *. ire 3pF..r,,nil nt , . t urt u nd thandth .r 1 bI - nb - .p-:rcal iipurs

icr. -. ;ri- lift St-. EL' ir -s ti--n ... r -.i nr..ed hlt r r han r ir tranin. r r inn,cn.-

ind n- - -UtrI rts.ul-in ild b. pr-ur p.i:e % 3. n en,. Vuildinis and - arcI

Itlrnc. and ..l h,r, their hu-band; -.... hi ' TILh FPHP 1i' . b-,i,-r-.inre NII h-..-, hld-. ih. ld.rt-.. in -icr-i4in.. c.ntr-.-

and female sterilization and IUDs can be made short supply or that cannot be offered by the offi-more readily available through mobile facilities cial program. Finally, governments can sponsor(such as sterilization vans in Thailand) or periodic local research on the effectiveness, side effects,"camps" (such as vasectomy and tubectomy and acceptability of methods that might be intro-

-camps in India and IUD "safaris" in Indonesia). duced into the national program.Careful attention must be paid to providing follow-up services in the case of complications, however. INFORMED CHOICE. Although family planningParamedical workers can be trained to provide the workers may know more about the advantagesIUD and injectable contraceptives in clinics and and disadvantages of each method, clients are besteven in homes. Referral procedures can be equipped to choose what suits them-providedstrengthened so that clients are informed about all they have information on effectiveness, sidemethods available from public, private, and com- effects, reversibility, and proper use. In the earlymercial sources. Private suppliers can be encour- stages of the Indian and Pakistani programs, theaged to offer contraceptive methods that are in side effects of the IUD were not fully explained, a

145

medical examination was not always conducted who attracts and retains the most clients for a vari-before insertion, and there was little in the way of ety of different methods.treatment or referral for side effects. For yearsafterward, IUDs were shunned. With a fuller FOLLOWING UP ACCEPTORS. In their early stages,explanation of side effects and greater care paid to family planning programs devoted much time toscreening and medical backup, the IUD is now recruiting new clients. It is now obvious that sus-regaining popularity. When private pharmacies in tained use cannot be assumed-follow-up supportColombia provided their customers with pam- is needed. Follow-up support includes medicalphlets explaining effectiveness, proper use, and backup and referral for side effects; encouragingside effects, sales of contraceptives increased. clients to change contraceptive methods if their ii-

Virtually all family planning programs provide tial choice has caused problems or if their needssome information to clients about methods, but have changed; reassuring them that they are usingfully informed choice is still only an ideal in many contraceptives properly; and reminding them ofcountries. Family planning workers still tend to the benefits.doubt the ability of couples to use effectively meth- Follow-up is most important in the first fewods such as the condom and pill, thereby discour- mo st incertant is whe sideaging their use. Staff may also fail to mention months after acceptance, since this is when sidemegthodefwic h. Sth y dispo such as m th effects are first experienced, when clients are learn-metho n, o r stherilizatin.Wen inctvs are ing to use methods properly, and when they need

offered to staff for recruiting acceptors of some reassurance in the face of social disapproval. Amethods but not of others, the information pro- study in Calabar State, Nigeria, found that 11 per-methds ut nt o oters,theinfrmaton ro- cent of pill acceptors never took even the firstvided to clients may be biased. Sometimes clients c ent of p ill accep s ne d o n percent

are ive inccurte r icomleteinfrmaion month's allotment of pills, and only 53 percentbause famenilypannurateoringcstaffparetheirmse no were using the pill three months later. A lack of

properly informed about methods and their side concern with follow-up is believed to be the majoreffects, A survey of the Dominican Republic, contributory cause of the low continuation ratesKenyt, .. A hey P p bte Uominited Ntio among IUD and pill users in Korea. According to aFuaand f Pop l pionA es . UnFPAd .int survey of contraceptive acceptors, only 24 percentFund for Population Activities (UNFPA) in the weefloe'pathm rrtre tohatmid-1970s found that workers felt that their train- were followed up at home or returned to healthing in methods had been inadequate. A study in centers for consultation on side effects. Korea'sIndia, Korea, the Philippines, and Turkey demon- program sets targets for the number of acceptors,strated the strong influence of providers of serv-ices on clients' choice of method: clients given a Follow-up cannot be left to clients, who are likelythorough explanation of all available contraceptive to return to the family planning center only if theymethods chose a very different mix of methods are living close by or if they experience severe sidethan did those prior to the study, who had not effects that they cannot correct even by abandon-been given this information. ing contraception. Follow-up is best provided by

From the manager's viewpoint, what are the crit- fieldworkers and by community-based services.ical requirements for better information? First is But in areas in which family planning is stillappropriate training. Workers must be trained to regarded with suspicion, some clients would likeexplain properly the methods available to clients to be spared the embarrassment of a follow-upand to encourage them to participate in the choice. visit from a family planning worker. Some pro-Informal explanation works better than formal pre- grams have managed this by having fieldworkerssentations that use technical or anatomical terms. deliver health services as well.As new contraceptive methods are included in With or without an extensive field network, fam-programs, staff must receive prompt training. Sec- ily planning programs can improve follow-up.ond is more and better supervision of workers to 0 They can change policies that encourage staffensure that they are not holding back information to recruit new acceptors but not to follow up onon methods because of their own prejudices or them. Targets and incentives can be offered to staffbecause they are receiving financial incentives for on the basis of the number of current users of con-encouraging some but not all methods. The incen- traception or of the number of checkups, rathertive structure might also be altered by offering than only on the basis of the number of new accep-financial or other awards (such as educational tors. Training must also emphasize follow-upopportunities or additional training) to the worker procedures.

146

* Where the burden of follow-up rests on cli- ment schemes of the Federal Land Developmentents, programs can experiment with various ways Authority in Malaysia and through women's ruralof encouraging clients to seek appointments. For credit cooperatives and vocational training inexample, financial incentives might be offered to Bangladesh. Profamilia, the private family plan-clients who return for a follow-up visit within a ning organization in Colombia, extended its serv-specified period of time, just as South Asian pro- ices to the countryside through the National Fede-grams offer compensation to acceptors of steriliza- ration of Coffee Growers. In China, India, and thetion for the costs of transport, food, and work time Philippines family planning services are organizedlost. The media can also be used to reassure accep- in factories. Both the Indonesian and Chinese pro-tors about side effects and to encourage them to grams have used strong political organizations,return for checkups. which extend into rural areas, to provide many

* The quality of follow-up can be monitored by economic and social services, including familyperiodic sample surveys of acceptors. planning.

Private family planning associations are well

Ensuring social acceptability suited to implement these approaches: they aresmall, decentralized, well staffed, highly moti-

To be successful, family planning programs must vated; have greater control over service quality;have the support of the clients and communities and are less confined by the bureaucratic con-they serve. But in communities in which modern straints of government. But many of thesefamily planning has never been provided, there approaches have also been tried on a larger scale.may be little evident demand because potential cli- For example, the Planned Parenthood Federationents are not aware of the benefits of the service, of of Korea pioneered the highly successful mothers'smaller families, or of longer child spacing inter- club program. At first these clubs served asvals. Services introduced by an "outside" agency sources of contraceptives, of reassurance for accep-with few local links and little appreciation of local tors, and of information on the benefits of familycustoms and needs may not be readily accepted. planning. They now have merged with theThe absence of links to the local community can be Saemaul Women's Association and are alsoa weakness for family planning in particular, involved in agricultural cooperatives and commu-because it is a personal matter and may conflict nity construction projects. Mothers' clubs havewith social norms that favor high fertility. also been used by programs in Indonesia and

Private family planning associations and NGOs Bangladesh. The national program in Indonesiahave led in experimenting with new ways to has successfully involved village headmen, reli-involve clients and communities. Their strategies gious leaders, and local volunteers on the islandshave included consultation with local leaders, of Java and Bali, where more than two-thirds oftraining local people as paid or volunteer workers, Indonesia's population lives. In the Philippinesconsulting and training traditional midwives and some outlets for contraceptives are organized andhealers, establishing local management or review run by local volunteers.committees, encouraging local contributions of Where communities and clients are involved,money and labor, and organizing groups of family they are less likely to see family planning as being

- planning acceptors to reinforce effective use and to imposed by outsiders. Use of traditional midwivesengage in other community development projects. and volunteers, and local contributions in cash or

In communities where there is no apparent in kind also reduce the cost of services. But thesedemand for family planning, it can be introduced strategies require certain managerial qualities notjointly with services in greater demand. The Hon- always found in larger public programs: decentral-duras Family Planning Association includes a ized decisionmaking; technical and organizationalplanned parenthood theme in its community- expertise to support local organizations, volun-based adult literacy program. In Awutu, Ghana, teers, and clients; skilled managers and field-family planning is promoted for child spacing as workers who can identify local leaders, stimulatepart of a maternal and child health project. Family community activities, supervise volunteers, andplanning is provided with agricultural extension to reconcile local needs with program capabilities;a population of 100,000 in Allahabad (in the state and, sometimes, workers who are technically com-of Uttar Pradesh, India) and as part of the nation- petent in more than one field. Finally, social accep-wide Integrated Rural Development Project in tance of family planning takes time and is a contin-Pakistan. It has been offered through the resettle- uous process. There is no benchmark for

147

measuring social acceptability, or easy formula for the amount spent by its formal layers of govern-ensuring it. ment-central, provincial, prefectural, and

county-on providing contraceptive supplies free

Financing family planning to users; reimbursing service fees for sterilization,abortion, and IUD insertion; and providing train-

Public family planning programs, like programs in ing and information on family planning. Theseeducation and health, are heavily subsidized, and costs amount to $213 million annually, about $0.21services are often offered free of charge. Although per capita. In addition, the rural collective systemthe private sector makes a significant contribution finances the family planning staff at the communeto providing services in some countries, public or brigade level (at an estimated cost of $0.34 perfinance will continue to be critical, especially in capita) and pays incentives, in the form of foodlow-income countries and in backward regions, supplements and reimbursement of travel costs, towhere contraceptive demand is limited and health holders of one-child certificates ($0.25 per capita)services are weak. and to individuals undergoing sterilization ($0.15

per capita). Finally, additional time is spent by

Ptiblic spending barefoot doctors on family planning work (thoughnot much: in Shandong Province they allocate an

China and India-the two most populous coun- average of 1.5 percent of their time to family plan-tries in the developing world, with approximately ning, valued at approximately $3 million). Healthhalf its population-spent roughly $1.00 and $0.30 workers and midwives probably spend more timeper capita, respectively, on population programs in on family planning. Adding all these contributions1980. In most of three dozen developing countries together produces a figure for family planningfor which rough estimates are available, spending expenditure in China of nearly $1 per capita.fell within this range (see Table 7.4). If other devel- Although governments finance a large share ofoping countries with programs were spending their population programs, the amounts spent areequivalent amounts, the total spent on population still trivial-both in absolute terms and in relationactivities in all developing countries in 1980 must to other government outlays (see Box 7.7). Inhave been about $2 billion. China the state budget for the family planning pro-

Practically all spending on population in China, gram absorbs only 0.4 percent of total currentand close to 80 percent of the total in India, is spending, compared with 5.2 percent for healthfinanced from domestic resources. For all other and 13.1 percent for education. In India anddeveloping countries combined, government and Mauritius spending on family planning in 1981foreign donors each contribute about 50 percent. accounted for only 0.5 percent of total governmentThe government share tends to rise the longer a expenditure. The figures are even lower in Koreaprogram has been in existence. Three out of four (0.2 percent) and in Malaysia (less than 0.1countries with programs less than five years old percent).were contributing less than 10 percent of the costs Foreign donors spent an estimated $491 millionof their programs, in contrast to an average of 54 for population programs in developing countriespercent among twenty-seven countries with pro- in 1981; about two-thirds of this amount was forgrams at least ten years old. Nepal is one of the family planning and related programs. In real-rare exceptions: the share of domestic government terms, population assistance grew at almost 6 per-financing fell from 80 percent of its spending on cent a year during the 1970s but fell 3 percent in-population in 1975 to 40 percent in 1980. 1980 and 6 percent in 1981. The prospects for

Even among well-established programs there is increased assistance are not good: UNFPA, a majorwide variation in government spending. Domestic channel for population assistance, expects its,budgetary outlays in 1980 are estimated to have spending to rise by barely 1 percent over the nextbeen $0.42 per capita in Sri Lanka, about $0.71 per four years. Population assistance from donors iscapita in Korea, and $1.45 per capita in Costa Rica. discussed further in the next chapter.But these estimates probably understate the truegovernment contribution. The cost of health work- Private spendingers, whose functions often include family plan-ning, is not always imputed to the population pro- Important constraints limit the growth of privategram-nor are contributions by local government. suppliers of family planning, especially in rural

The estimate for China of $1 per capita includes areas. The most severe constraint is the need for

148

TABLE 7.4Public expenditure on population programs, selected countries, 1980

ExpenditureTotal Per capita per current

public public contraceptiveexpenditure expenditure user

Region and country (millions of dollars) (dollars) (dollars)

Sub-Saharan AfricaGhana 2.8 0.24 16Kenya 11.8 0.71 68Liberia 2.3 1.22 aMauritius 1.7 1.81 24Sierra Leone 1.5 0.44 aSwaziland 1.8 2.89 aTanzania 3.3 0.18 aZaire 1.8 0.06 aZimbabwe (1978) 1.9 0.27 13

Middle East and North AfricaEgypt, Arab Rep. 34.1 0.81 22Iran, Islamic Rep. (1976) 50.6 1.30 38Jordan 2.5 0.78 21Morocco 13.3 0.66 aTunisia 8.3 1.31 32

South AsiaBangladesh 45.1 0.51 26India 226.9 0.34 10Nepal 10.6 0.72 69Pakistan 24.5 0.30 33Sri Lanka 6.2 0.42 7

East AsiaChina 979.6 1.00 10Hong Kong 2.0 0.40 3Indonesia 86.2 0.59 11Korea, Rep. of 27.1 0.71 9Malaysia 16.4 1.18 19Philippines 37.6 0.78 11Singapore 1.8 0.74 7Thailand 28.1 0.60 7

Latin America and CaribbeanBolivia (1977) 0.1 0.03 aBrazil 10.6 0.09 aColombia 8.1 0.31 4Costa Rica 3.3 1.45 15Dominican Rep. 3.8 0.70 11Ecuador 6.3 0.75 15El Salvador 8.1 1.77 35Guatemala 9.3 1.28 47Haiti 3.9 0.77 27Honduras 3.0 0.81 20Jamacia 4.8 2.19 27Mexico 61.3 0.88 15Panama 4.4 2.42 26Paraguay 2.1 0.69 13Peru 5.3 0.32 5

Note: Expenditure includes funding from domestic and foreign sources on population activities, including (but not limited to) familyplanning services.a. Contraceptive prevalence rate unavailable or close to zero.Source: Bulatao, 1984a.

149

Box 7.7 Military versus social expenditure

\Iitir. vFn,nding Il; n :a4% I.. me.-urE E'4penditures on detense eduaation, and %erar e go%ernrmeni per capita r%perndilure

l 4ha r - nmate- ihtr- ar- rdic.art that health a- a perrc-niageni lGNIP ' l41i ,n defen,e educartion and health, IeI l

gi-Al'.] rr,dl,ar,% t pendiLiur, In er-n-tantl

Ii xb' Joillar, h34 ri-, tr, I.m j bt i tli m n t;,;- - . li

m.:'r- , hn I har. 1,illi n , the par Ienr'.

tari ThŽ irr,.,ur,I -G:eri in th, drxd.'p ,i iprX

in4 . rid qu.adrupled tr. mn :At, L,IIh.n I El

mvre 'than $I1 .s billi.:n In !,i1l &i.ti

pF.ed *--untri, * penm mtire than 4 Q per -

-nt .5t, P t.n J ene and Iiout II

PtrkeF,r ,n t ., .N' L 'n aid I. t--'cpn.

6.p-irli - n 1r''. th, Linited iart-

Tent n npt r- i it GNP .n deEn-,|

aim', ^Wit'!" bho.rn and 11 ". perCfentl_

ifN 2 b'ili.ni .r .d In Jtt I-p-np-. :Ialun- ~~~~~~t. .rl.1 L'.. 1.F-. -I .... t. , 1,1 0. 1-.1 .'..1

tr,e. 31m.:-t a. nuJe I; spent .-n kte

a, r edu.:arr,n ;nJ hoalth .rnhn.,d

I-. chirt I

medical backup for providing contraceptives. the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil (a country with someAlthough prescription regulations have been liber- state, but no central government, programs), thealized in nineteen countries, making condoms and proportion is as high as 63 percent.oral contraceptives available through nonclinical Private spending on family planning services assuppliers such as pharmacies, the demand for a consequence equals about a fourth of publicIUDs, male and female sterilization, and abortion spending on these services in the developingcan be met only by trained health workers. Very world. In some regions private spending isfew of them work in the private sector. In addition, greater: in Latin America it may in fact be slightlythe cost of providing family planning services is above public spending.high in rural and marginal urban areas, whereas In urban areas some commercial suppliers maythe ability to pay for commercial services is low. be displaced by publicly subsidized contracep-Private suppliers cannot appeal to the national tives: half of the initial users of an official programinterest the way governments can to stimulate of oral contraception in Piaui State, Brazil, in 1979demand for contraception and cannot use commu- had shifted over from the private sector. Yet pri-nity institutions and pressures to spread family vate suppliers do benefit from family planningplanning. Finally, the development of private sup- advertising financed by the government. It is prob-ply is often inhibited by a combination of govern- ably not a coincidence that they flourish in severalment policies, including price controls; prohibition countries, such as Korea, Mexico, and Thailand, .of, or tariffs on, the import of contraceptives; and where government strongly supports birth con-'restrictions on certain kinds of family planning ser- trol.vices, especially sterilization and abortion in Mus- The activities of private suppliers demonstrate-lim and Catholic countries. that many people in developing countries are will-

Despite these constraints, private suppliers pro- ing to pay for contraceptive services. Althoughvided more than 20 percent of all family planning charges for publicly subsidized services are usuallyservices in more than two-thirds of the countries low or nonexistent, data for twenty developingstudied in recent surveys (see Table 7.5). In some countries show that private sector prices can becountries private suppliers play a major or even high enough to absorb a significant fraction ofdominant role, especially among urban con- household income. The cost of a year's supply ofsumers. In Korea 42 percent of all contraceptive oral contraceptives averaged $25 in 1980, rangingusers are supplied by pharmacies or physicians; in from $5 in Mexico and $6 in Egypt to as much as

150

$90 in Nigeria. Across countries, the various forms 300,000 users of commercial sources of contracep-of contraception cost an average of $20 to $40 a tion spent an average of $30 each in 1981, theiryear. total outlay being several times what the govern-

In the better-off developing countries, the cost of ment spent. Private spending on this scale-whichbuying commercially available contraceptives is understates the total because it excludes accesssmall in relation to average income per capita costs-is not typical of all developing countries,(although even in those countries the cost may be but it shows a widespread willingness to pay forrelatively large for the poor). For example, the contraception.retail price of a year's supply of oral contraceptivesin 1979 was equivalent to only 0.3 percent of per Allocation of public expenditurescapita income in Mexico and to 0.5 percent inBrazil. But in low-income countries the cost can be The bulk of public spending on population-prohibitive-equivalent to 17 percent of per capita almost 50 percent in seventeen countries reportingincome in Bangladesh, for example, and 18 percent details of expenditures-goes directly to providingin Zaire, or about 3 percent of total income for the contraceptive services. Progressively smalleraverage household. All these figures understate shares are taken up by general program adminis-the real cost of obtaining family planning services, tration, information-education-communicationwhether private or public, because people also activities, research and evaluation, and personnelhave to pay for the time and travel needed to training.obtain their contraceptives. With all public spending on family planning

In Korea some 1.2 million users bought contra- taken into account, expenditure averages aboutceptives commercially in 1979 at an average annual $0.70 per capita across all developing countries.cost of about $12-a total outlay of $15 million, For each contraceptive user, spending is muchabout $0.40 per capita for Korea's entire popula- higher-around $21 a year. But most users are intion, and roughly equivalent to the $0.42 per capita China and India, where programs spend less perspent on the domestic government budget, exclu- user, so the weighted average is lower at $11. Add-sive of foreign donor contributions. In Peru about ing private expenditures could easily double the

TABLE 7.5

Source of contraception among currently married women aged 15 to 44 and their husbands1 | ,|,, a I .t of current contraceptive users)

Government Other publicly funded or Private No source orRegiion and countrjil programs subsidized programs sector other'

East AsiaKorea, Rep. of (1979) 36 0 42 22Thailand (1978) 37 35 18 10

Latin America and CaribbeanBrazil

Piaui (1979) 59 0 23 18Sao Paulo (1978) 16 0 63 21Bahia (1980) 27 1 48 24Rio Grande do Norte (1980) 57 0 22 21

Colombia (1978) 21 27 33 19Costa Rica (1978) 57 0 28 15El Salvador (1978) 73 8 12 6Guatemala (1978) 44 11 26 18Jamaica (1979) 63 27 7 3Mexico (1978) 42 2 36 20Panama (1979-80) 71 0 19 10Paraguay (1977) 41 8 28 22

North AfricaTunisia

Jendouba (1979) 91 0 5 4

a. Applies to rhythm or withdrawal; other may include contraceptives obtained from a friend or in a foreign country.Sou rces: Morris and others, 1981; Merrick, 1984.

151

costs per user. Public cost per user varies among cent. For the projections of a "rapid" decline incountries, as Table 7.4 shows, depending on many fertility, which imply a total fertility rate of 2.4 infactors, including local salaries and program effi- 2000, contraceptive use would need to reach 72ciency and quality. percent.

Cost per user tends to be very high in the first How much would this cost? To achieve thefew years of a family planning program; it then standard decline in fertility, and assuming 1980falls sharply as the rate of contraceptive use rises costs per user, total public spending on populationabove 5 percent. At higher rates the cost per user programs would need to reach $5.6 billion (in con-tends to stabilize, or perhaps to rise slightly. stant 1980 dollars) by the year 2000-a rise in realBetween 1965 and 1980, while contraceptive use in terms of 5 percent a year. To ensure the rapidKorea rose from 12 to 30 percent, cost per user decline, spending would need to total $7.6 billionfluctuated (with little apparent trend) between $7 by 2000, a rise of 7 percent a year in real terms.and $13 (in constant 1982 dollars). Growth in spending will have to be much

In any country with contraceptive use of at least greater in some regions than in others. Average5 percent, current cost per user is a conservative real increases in spending of 2.5 percent a yearguide to costs at higher levels of use. Marginal would be enough to meet targets in East Asia as acosts could rise if new users are in inaccessible whole (though not for individual countries), and 5rural areas with high delivery costs, though they percent would be enough for Latin America andcould also fall if services are more intensively used. the Caribbean. In South Asia, the Middle East and

North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, however,

Fuiture financial requirements population spending would have to grow 8 to 10percent every year to achieve a standard decline in

What would it cost to satisfy the unmet need for fertility, and in sub-Saharan Africa as much as 16limiting births? Some idea can be obtained by percent every year to support a rapid decline.extrapolating levels of unmet need-the propor- Because spending on population currently repre-tion of women exposed to the risk of pregnancy sents less than 1 percent of government budgets,who want no more children-in thirty-five devel- small increases could go a long way toward meet-oping countries in the mid-1970s to cover the ing the requirement for higher spending. Thedeveloping world as a whole. That extrapolation same is true for external assistance. Only about 1suggests a possible increase in the rate of contra- percent of official aid now goes for populationceptive use of 13 percentage points. If the public assistance (and only a part of that for family plan-cost for each additional user were the same, coun- ning). lncreasing spending by 50 percent could filltry by country, as the cost per user in 1980, such an "unmet need" today, but larger increases will beincrease would require another $l billion in public needed in the future. In many countries thespending (see Table 7.6). required increase in public expenditure for family

In the next two decades total spending for family planning would be more than offset by reductionsplanning programs will need to increase because in public expenditure in other sectors. With con-of the growing number of women of childbearing stant enrollment rates, rapid fertility decline wouldage and the increasing proportion of them who are generate per capita savings in education expendi-likely to want modern contraceptives. World Bank ture in the year 2000 of $1.80 in Egypt, $3.30 in-projections indicate that the number of married Kenya, $6.00 in Korea, and $6.60 in Zimbabwe.women of reproductive age in all developing coun-tries will increase from about 500 million to more Obstacles to program expansionthan 700 million between 1980 and 2000. About 40percent of these women used contraception in If the financial resources to expand family plan-1980. ning services were made available, could they be

The 'standard" projections in Chapter 4 imply put to good use? Program expansion may be diffi-an average total fertility rate of 3.3 in developing cult for a variety of reasons, including administra-countries in the year 2000. If it is assumed that the tive and logistical obstacles, scarcity of personnel,fertility effects of later marriage and of shorter and limited demand. These tend to limit the rate atbreastfeeding will largely cancel each other out which a good program can be expanded, but notand that the abortion rate will stay constant, expansion itself.achieving this fertility decline will require an The administrative and logistical obstaclesincrease in the rate of contraceptive use to 58 per- include many of the same constraints that hamper

152

TABLE 7.6

Fertility targets and estimates of population program expenditures, 1980 and 2000

ExpendituresFertility targets Total

Total Contraceptive (millions offertility prevalence Percapita constant

Region and scenario Year rate (percent) (constant 1980 dollars) 1980 dollars)

All developing countriesCurrent estimate 1980 4.36 39 0.62 2,016With unmet need filled 1980 3.54 52 0.90 2,961Under standard decline 2000 3.30 58 1.14 5,569Under rapid decline 2000 2.32 72 1.66 7,591

Sub-Saharan AfricaaCurrent estimate 1980 6.59 11 0.29 112With unmet need filled 1980 6.03 20 0.76 297Under standard decline 2000 5.81 24 1.07 791Under rapid decline 2000 2.69 73 3.72 2,353

Middle East and North AfricaCurrent estimate 1980 5.70 24 0.66 142With unmet need filled 1980 4.98 35 1.04 222Under standard decline 2000 3.73 59 1.94 726Under rapid decline 2000 2.39 74 2.43 812

South AsiabCurrent estimate 1980 5.22 20 0.35 315With unmet need filled 1980 4.15 38 0.77 688Under standard decline 2000 3.43 51 1.10 1,517Under rapid decline 2000 2.42 67 1.50 1,873

East AsiaCurrent estimate 1980 3.02 61 0.87 1,238With unmet need filled 1980 2.27 72 1.04 1,480Under standard decline 2000 2.28 75 1.09 2,022Under rapid decline 2000 2.16 74 1.08 2,015

Latin America and CaribbeanCurrent estimate 1980 4.28 40 0.59 209With unmet need filled 1980 3.53 51 0.77 274Under standard decline 2000 2.80 63 0.95 513Under rapid decline 2000 2.17 72 1.07 538

Note: The fertility targets and per capita expenditure figures are population-weighted means. Because of lack of data on contraceptiveprevalence for many countries, regional estimates include country rates which were estimated based on various social and economicdata.a. Includes Republic of South Africa.b. Includes Afghanistan.Souirce: Bulatao, 1984a.

other development programs. For example, a fam- services on a larger, national scale. In areas whereily planning program requires a system for obtain- health services are scant or nonexistent, a familying, storing, and distributing contraceptives. If a planning program will be extremely difficult toprogram attempts to provide a mix of methods, implement.this system can become complicated; it may The personnel requirements for an extensiverequire more than one distribution network-com- family planning program are not large in relationmercial, clinical, and nonclinical. Where overall to the supply of educated people. Desirable ratiosgovernment administration is weak, roads are are about 1 fieldworker to 300 families, and 1poor, and communications slow, even the best-run supervisor for every 8 fieldworkers. For Upperprograms will appear inefficient and incapable of Volta, a country with extremely low literacy, a pro-sustained expansion. These limits may not be evi- gram could be fully staffed at these ratios by aboutdent in small pilot projects, but they can become a tenth of a single year's primary and secondaryimportant when an attempt is made to extend school graduates. The conclusion becomes less

153

sanguine, however, as soon as one takes into some years much less. Despite the unpromisingaccount specific requirements for fieldworkers: for conditions-per capita GNP between $100 andinstance, they should be village-based rather than $300, adult literacy rates as low as 20 percent, andcity-based, belong to the appropriate ethnic, lin- infant mortality rates as high as 150 per thou-guistic, or caste group, and be favorably disposed sand-spending on family planning was effectiveto contraception. The Pakistani program has faced and economical.recruitment problems of this sort. In the late 1960s Furthermore, many of the factors that hamperonly a seventh of the midwives assigned as effectiveness can be overcome as a programfieldworkers believed in the efficacy of modern develops. Culturally acceptable solutions tocontraceptives. In the early 1970s they were administrative and personnel problems, and toreplaced by a group including many unmarried limited public interest, take time to develop, as dowomen from urban areas who did not have the the quality improvements discussed above. But inconfidence of the villagers. If finding appropriate every part of the world where an effort has beenfieldworkers in each area is difficult, finding made, there has been progress.higher-level supervisors can be even more of a Foreign funding has been largely absent in theproblem. early stages of some family planning programs, as

Program expansion also depends on the demand it continues to be in China. In other programs itfor contraceptive services. A principal task of pro- has played a catalytic role-for instance, throughgrams is to generate some of this demand itself, stimulating pioneering research of demographicbut where initial interest is low or nonexistent this problems. Local finance, however, eventuallytask can take time. becomes critical; most of the older, more effective

Taken together, these limits to rapid expansion programs in 1980 had 40 percent or less foreignmight seem to suggest that programs could not funding. For one thing, local finance demonstratesmake good use of more money. But such a view political commitment to family planning, the sub-would be wrong. During the 1970s India, Pakistan, ject of the next chapter. Many of the obstacles toBangladesh, and. Sri Lanka were spending as expansion of family planning can be overcomemuch as $2.50 per married woman on family plan- with sufficient commitment, and most of themning programs and were still producing contracep- cannot be overcome without it.tive users at acceptable cost-under $20 each, in

154

8 The policy agenda

"Population policy" is the province of govern- change the signals that otherwise induce high fer-ment. By choosing how many resources and how tility. Effective policy requires action by many min-much political authority to invest in a policy, a gov- istries, and thus an interministerial approach toernment determines the policy's effectiveness. In setting policy and monitoring its results. And itits broadest sense, population policy is concerned requires clear direction and support from the mostwith population distribution as well as with popu- senior levels of government.lation growth. This chapter discusses population Family planning programs and other socioeco-policy to reduce population growth. In the area of nomic policies that can reduce fertility are oftenfertility reduction, inaction is itself a choice which pursued by governments to achieve overall devel-has implications for both future policy and the opment objectives, irrespective of their effect onroom for maneuver that a government will later fertility. What distinguishes countries with a popu-have. Religious and cultural conditions cannot be lation policy from those without one is an explicitignored in designing an effective policy to reduce demographic objective and the institutional mech-fertility; actions culturally and politically accept- anisms to translate that objective into effectiveable in one country might be rejected in others. But policy.religious and cultural characteristics do not ruleout effective action. In every part of the developing Policy stepsworld during the past decade some governmentshave made significant progress in developing a Table 8.1 summarizes the current state of popula-policy to reduce population growth. tion policy in twenty-six developing countries with

Choosing from policy options is a matter for local 15 million people or more. In the table, an x showsdecision. But foreign aid for population programs those countries which have already taken a partic-can help developing countries meet their popula- ular policy step. Countries are listed by region,tion policy objectives and can increase the impact and within regions in order of their 1982 familyof aid in other parts of the economy. This chapter planning "index," explained in Chapter 6.examines the elements of an effective population Developing a population policy takes time.policy, the main policy issues in each region of the Countries in which the policy to reduce populationdeveloping world, and how aid donors can com- growth is recent tend to have taken fewer of theplement the efforts of developing countries. policy steps listed in the table. Others-China,

India, Korea, and Sri Lanka, for instance-have

Population policy had longstanding policies and tend to have takenmore steps. But there are important exceptions.

A population policy to lower fertility needs to be Countries such as Indonesia and Mexico havedistinguished from public support for family plan- developed strong programs in a short period. Inning services. Family planning support has wider contrast, programs in Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, andsocial goals than fertility reduction but more lim- Pakistan have made little progress for more than aited population goals than overall population pol- decade. Progress can also be reversed. In fiveicy. Family planning programs provide informa- countries not shown in the table-Chile, Costation and services to help people achieve their own Rica, Fiji, Jamaica, and Panama-family planningfertility objectives. By contrast, population policy indices have declined by as much as half in theinvolves explicit demographic goals. It employs a past decade. In some countries population policywide range of policies, direct and indirect, to aims to increase population growth (see Box 8.1).

155

TABLE 8.1

Population policy indicators for selected countries with populations of 15 million or more

Policy indicators

IncentivesFamily Demo- Politi- andplanning graphic cal comn- Institu- dismcen- Birtl7

TFR index data mitment tions Familil planning tives quotas

Region and country 1982 1982 A B C D E F C H I X K L M

Sub-Saharan AfricaKenya 8.0 OL x x x x xTanzania 6.5 L x xNigeria 6.9 E xZaire 6.3 ElSudan 6.6 I x xEthiopia 6.5 _

Middle East and North AfricaEgypt 4.6 FL x x x x x x x xMorocco 5.8 Cl x x xTurkey 4.1 Fl x x x xAlgeria 7.0 El x x

Latin America and CaribbeanColombia 3.6 L x x x x xMexico 4.6 L x x x x x x x xBrazil 3.9 DI x x xVenezuela 4.3 El x x xPeru 4.5 FL x x x x x

South AsiaSri Lanka 3.4 L x x x x x x x xIndia 4.8 L x x x x x x x x xBangladesh 6.3 FL x x x x x x x x xPakistan 5.8 1F x x x x x xNepal 63 L x x x x x x xx xx

East AsiaChina 2.3 U x x x x x x x xx xKorea, Rep. of 2.7 * x x x x x x x x x xIndonesia 4.3 U x x x x x x x x xMalaysia 3.7 L x x x x x x xThailand 3.6 L x x x x x x x xPhilippines 4.2 El x x x x x x x x x

Notc: The following countries with greater than 15 million population were omitted because of lack of data: Afghanistan; Argentina;Burma; Islamic Republic of Iran; Democratic Republic of Korea; South Africa; Venezuela; and Viet Nam.TFR = Total fertility rate.Key: * = very strong index; U - strong; Fl - moderate; wl = weak; 1 - very weak or none. For explanation of index, seePopulation Data Supplement Table 6 and notes.A Published census data and data from other household surveys on fertility, mortality, and contraceptive use (such as WFS or CPS) lessthan ten years old. B Official policy to reduce population growth expressed by high officials and in a national development plan,sometimes including specific demographic targets. C Existence of a population planning unit that integrates demographic projectionsinto current economic plans and considers the effect of policies on demographic parameters. D Existence of a high-level coordinatingbody, such as a population commission, to set population policy, oversee implementation, and evaluate results of multisectoral policies.E Government financial support of private family planning associations. F Public family planning services. G Family planningoutreach, including community-based distribution svstems and!or fieldworkers. H Active use of mass media for information andeducation to promote family planning and small family norms. I Publicly subsidized commercial sales of contraceptives. 1 Eliminationof all explicit and implicit subsidies that encourage large families (tax reductions for each child, family allowances, free or subsidizedhealth and education services). K Incentives to individuals or communities to have small families. L Strong disincentives to discouragemore than two births per woman, such as reduced services or an income tax for third and later-born children. M Policy to set quotas onthe nunmber of births permitted annually in a community under which couples must obtain permission to have a child.

156

Box 8.1 Pronatalist policies

In r. I- c. 'unrI, LU t r',ritcn - it-c I ,, 3,ZE c it ing.lt.ic Fr incl 71 Fertilih and abortion in Romania

Ih.ai 1FirtiliT., r.itr - a r. F..I I,. F ,, - pe r,.-r.rt pv, p I'-.~l pr.kFFI L,f n c.iEr.)j- I -

-'-' '.. -ralEur, p&-i; *.uor,rrji- ,U, h .pi* .i. ,r,. U'.,iI.A :in .311,7t, rirm il..1I.F aric-. H,,ng ia r . ardJ 1<, -rnThfn.A -u.h '4it. F ir l CII nrd IUP I

,li .'3 ir. i.4, FIT in l' I.1, - Biurnro Iujr~rc .r, r'ns Fi F Icc I.-'-

I ,l id u iii: lAd~ I *-r . I F ri tdji,c h, TIiFr.i, b-u' ri.. ii.: .unl-t.._-r 'F

in. npu.:.1-a birth- 11:0'''pI ir,c ha'. irn': tEa: 3rn njrumh.-.' , Id r.-r bit ..... r..r Th,:I rii aI tr-

tHungair% iIia r-,Fr ncrdau-I Fn-n- I 'Ir F,WH t.-. 4 -i ..

Ti'.g,:i r, I n 'I-I Il:IT - .c-.r..)i IA .lrrtIr F 'a4r- 17'3 n'LT-Fc LI F,iI,t - :1is- r . e-riF,Fi,d BUt ithad ialhrn baL,- F' 1. '- I 1.

.,,rd',I.- , p.r-' F, (SF- F _hInr, iF.th i am i 1 ti5rc'l-i K, 5.*r .:.F.iFL i'il~ FL rum, - n.sn-t . .-r .lo h i'm-s -.., F licr.i F nrI, -

IrrF.F pro it, . ri - c hd-r~lr.Ih-n f,tF. h. r FrFC1- **i ul-

U .,FT--r i',A. Fr, Fr, .. r-.,r~ i'. -r In 1-17.2 ifi[,i.- r ii f i.tirF

* r,-~~~~ -ri F' rr: itn rr..r, I,:F It -C 1 -U d5 r. t 1'. I T IT,RnmTn a

i T-ih. I IT-,rTiF F r, - I.- , T--iF -sFrd F. p t IIsrn 't,. r.. i,r. n-- i- n tal- I. i .

iIII,b, n-Fi i- Tun-u pr11.1i~ii -r.irac.Tin-'s I \b. ii' r. I i Jn T.iI.c I .

iF-1 ag -r i.. Lint .1..- rp:. r.h r "s t.r'--iir. l ri - t'rtt. In h:rcF- r- c-i.r rw:.i,1.rai

i.r,-. - .1. 1-- LITr n.. - i l. rcj .rr -. t 11 I.-'- 's hn-r IJ -- n ab~. rr.'.rtF-rrsFr - r.Lu'r'nH-,r raiIn. '..r

FiFri d i Fr, J I h -ni .h- r i-.--i-' Fr.. ,, . tr, :e, rtio s , rsiT-I. n, .r,J, i.rr.-., g -. 'g i.* i.. r:U ' a sIFI

r-i- LIIII uInii. in dirnt J- t p5c h-- 1-n i,,F .. .-1 . : -:ndain ._rt.:d iar.'.1.-tFsd~

T h,hC-A I -- . i-~t - iVrhvil 5-i-tii,r-Ii sr F.--T-. h.I, fi..n.r.Ar-.in - inr'h. - i.r 1 i.dAs .i*i'I m - -'-

-I. F h hr,F r. r Ih-U -irl J -Ia - Li F 'c-sit-- raI-N---ir,:r~rd L-n-UrTime:- 1-ab-l.ii P-v'. ., . L

r i -lh T I- -~.- I. P,r- . n . o n .1 , r sA -. -.i. n - Ih.-.l IIr .- r, .r i ':- In ho .I' i- .1 biiTr FL '-,tr r ITrT 14,~ ~.r. p

E l t-~, . p1 .- :ei '-.,-Fr.:, i. -Urh I. .. t r'., 3 il,. r F-- -'r rni'-. d nal rn L-s- u rl-ir,r H . r ''---id F~- Fu

sI it, i-'- iii' - .i-r.- ri, F. l.:...rAr -r-- is. I'-i- F.n'i- Fr, ss.s.. iraF r- iFu .- Tri-i :r.,,ir..diFF '..1..isr.- I

I ITrs,-. n s in '.id.i .r. -p. rh 1 g-. J. Ir- T T th ir h ti. .I -'F w -r 5 Frn ,iiirn. .r h -n- .- A c tll- rrn.tni c..d u

i..r i..,-r-ra. ,'t s rc, hoiF- ;Fr.- Fnih rFi -Fin. i.rs- - -. hi ai.- ri t-., Hoiil i ir'.~ \-_ - p,r Hir:,r- r.s 1

F;,i '.r, -u.n. ns~- -.1 n..t h.:'r -'2- sr'. n--iF ' rn 4nr.t n.- t - hi .r,. rimi. uiii', ti-.. r--FF.rlitiwA-, ui

i,- ri I- ur::.-A 1 st ii-U -1.1 -r r.,-- - i Fr-r-' i h'.F mr-.r .;u rFsi- sr -td I - ,-i rit , I i- rIn- t.. F,

I.. rs .1 s r,,. .' -tr,-is-.r nF FuF .-Ib h i,-- ir 3...ssi. d.. T . in,n r- ;.i h .. iru-i-r; n.. I-F-u n.. -

The. develomentIo p ultopolicy includes-r r - , % tion oF, i.ts. I coseuncs Thisinoratoniscrtithe following steps cal toI,td I r. T,n geertig ndsutanding, t7rhe poliTica :rl cm

mt-itmen--.t o edrs t lwe rwh

popula tion.-,-r sie frtili dTy11r h n,and mortality jr,I- I ), .,..,IF- doumnt noicplnn ng,IpolIcytr formulation , ai Ind4r , eau-I

Th eIstneo rapi gurowth and allowm.- pro.-jec. - tion (seed Box, 8.2. Data need include% r n pbise

r. . n~ih. d .I :.-tr3~~pIt- -IT - .:r. ii III, ri n-u-h r. ,n,r, .,17

Box 8.2 China's census: counting a billion people

C Ina ,, ri-, ,r, hi-tori. jj p pulat,on st3- 3Th,-tan; .t t \JFF ih. g - r nrnm,ni n1 L-.t ..r. i--' n I'n-.- ii. tip,

t,;ti:; Ii ti e; inr i -, o r ' Inmatt e.p.- to publish *..unllri r re Ii l.- r . rnd d. .. n- ,n taminn ,r, d ran * . rie;|ir,.,hing back to the Zhou d,r.3;r . I:.-:aid ajmin,-rr.ai.t un,r; b.ir. ilhe .rd bci. rr r-,inn,n, it,n ir,n-,i,.:,r, I....

ih,A., 3nd e,r5- b: nore ih.e -onan.,.:. n ..iI' t*idu'. ,nr, l-C. F;'IIl, had rea"d.d

|U*u' But cenl iu9 iAI.,n dt ri.iratd in I'. ih *u:h : , arc. undtrral inc ;.in, 1-. .A at*t 2 2 in I'" th,hn r..- b, 1I

rhc moderr era There .ai . bead ;!unt .-.npr.ri.-.:- had Ic. bhe mad.:-heet- r . pr..:.rit n IuSI In tha .ear mn.r, than a

U I t . er 4111 minilkn Ch,r.e- in 1'.-, rapidi ,eedlaci. I rc 'ull, and c. : k ih,rd 1 .hrn1 .. r, nr u; ..... ncr i-

|D.a tronm Thc I'n .:Ir.;u- r nlu re.rnri ,- iragt Fo-r -impl, r.it er-I Ji,d.d c.leio.n and de-p.r. rl, .e-.:hi.i p.1k

rJeaI ed .hJ ed a p. pulan.on *1 iu;i not .- r-t 4ien.:.: A but rit. 5.n. .- J...d ,3n -..er halt -'t .fll birlh . .-rc r n . r

under -iII1 million r,.z Epn'eu .r pic; .- - .. ,rk r.id oth.r h,. F..r .-rdr ThL ;ur e. ih-. J rt,t,.d

In ihe t i... .r- e- .-.I lul- lS2 thr ctraT:ii a 1r;. .-til r- I.-.ti,n- a le -. iti-tac. r. daia -' -t - .rcbi . . uh ih eouit.n .,t

Ihinme- .,: rnment rnr-hllied a r. ree ce lt'.n n.ith. .d A -ub at - ,,r. p pu.p. i i -:l*

1niliic.r. ;n'uz taiker- nd th-ir -S.'. tel., *L,L'tC i I ,b-ut I njil- Th, .ibc.%: - ni,nnend r hndir.4 ir.nn

,uper'. r..r.. .:arr.. ur :, n.r. *:nwu; -.I.... M,.r. in... ha, . been rni-. di tn ihL. tlh..- :e u- .r.d rtIe : r.E m ...n-np1renf

tF-, arc-.. e.er -i,me.i an,. here . car;u. count .i.h .*rr..r and -- .. .....1: l ph.:,

h, .. ri mi'l ripid hand-pr.ec-;ng ir. 5-pitniNr 1' k - I h..n th re' fdhrn.:'. inror t,rew p.'pulai-n. r h pc,.:.

th, !o-.rnnrn p,blrt LI ]h d in.,tal r-Lt M*ultil rtir ,rt. llpr.kFtinF th, .:r- the ........... 11-, lie .,. -al -c 3.-rol ln ctt-..........ri; ;,re r,.nl.r-

in,reicr her ' jir rr n .n.. .. . . . ....... .-.. n , t ,cu:E China

ni,".t c.n;uz . 3r -n,.:,t,.:.n- in %Ir... -in.:. pe.:i'.e Ner1i ~U .r .: r -'n, mnil l-- h... h , iri- t-'r Ss of e- p.'rwi.n- that

ouni ; iin'l. r,.t1 p-.-puialion rN..Jd . n.n t..:. p ron, rnm ...i i -n. hn-n r1 -... %r - ..- uTri,. -' i ;h a Ir i.- have in such

tilhnon pers..n; ii, ,';n, ad -, ancd C..ni- n .irJ in rh,r h. ni- h, in-rn. C.'.it ' tvlri ili;i 'ik

p...r-n t. hr.t.'i..z' .uF... pliled1 .. itilt ih i- Iii., t lund rb:. irr,l. rt.;m b. "

and analyzed census data not more than ten years experience of countries shown in Table 8.1 sug-old and other national sample surveys document- gests the importance of institutionalizing two func-ing current fertility, mortality, and contraceptive tions:use at more frequent intervals (item A in Table 8.1). * Relating demographic targets to the policiesLack of reliable demographic data has hampered and resources necessary to achieve them. A popu-the growth of political support for population poli- lation policy should include consideration of thecies in sub-Saharan Africa. Data collection and demographic benefits of a wide range of social pol-analysis is a continuous process, necessary to icies, in education, health, and social security, asmonitor trends and the effect of policies over time. well as in family planning. It should also consider

the complementarities among these policies. ThisPOLITICAL COMMITMENT. Support for slowing is fundamentally a planning function, one which

population growth has been expressed in public relates demographic variables and policy alterna-statements by the head of state and other national tives (item C). It is usually the responsibility of aleaders, and in written statements of national pri- specialized unit within a planning ministry, suchorities, such as a national development plan (item as the Manpower Board of the Ministry of FinanceB). These statements can range from a general and Plan in Ghana, and the Population Planningcommitment to reducing population growth to Section within the Planning Commission inspecific demographic targets (see Box 8.3). Coun- Bangladesh.tries with strong policies have been able to mobi- * Coordinating and evaluating the implementa-lize visible and sustained political commitment, tion of population policy. This may require fewnot only at the highest levels of government but new institutional arrangements if the scope of pop-throughout the political and administrative hierar- ulation policy is limited to, say, wider provision ofchy, down to those who are in immediate touch family planning. In this case, the policy coordinat-with the public. This commitment helps to forge ing body may be the one that also coordinatescooperation among the numerous sectors and min- multisectoral family planning activities. But asistries involved in population policy. population policy becomes more complex, it is

likely to involve the joint efforts of other minis-INSTITUTIONS. The role of institutions is to trans- tries: education (for population education and

late political commitment into effective policy. The female literacy); information (to encourage breast-

158

Box 8.3 Demographic policy objectives\i I .ar tn. -I r -I . rI-pr -.u ri e -re par th.Žr: -,hm i.-ih Ihr-- Ir.: Ut- .r rI , I ..lr 211 p r ccnt - iiil n .r

*.r.-pr inrt : n.-r. -r. thr-.p.i ,r ..r . :1-m:- tn.ipiid bh Pt. u§ c LiŽartd{ a c-rr t . ra I . I 12 r. pir, Ir, It Innbc ti h'.'PUI itr ii I rt, n.1 L fl 1 .Un- V. -nrid Kink ,-1t1nt`i * sta0 da1; rd a n. i l" Irh d.-1l ii.ial tar -r in -hima, - a pt--p

X tnii-h ; .....id. pl.d *.ttii. - .1 r.-il d-ain- -i ith3ptr 4i Lil.i,-,r. in I 1 2 L nil i.r, I. '2ili-ii Fr

rtl. J t hr rih b r. i r'r - ulr - ..tu.. zrc.'.r.- I- Ti tjr4l.in r rl t -i in t,rmn; th-:4t .unRr , -c rFr; *,r tRiR i,' *rn in

ICr ,,,nir, un.. )i nI ttlt. t.i4 . a rtrl.rk rar, 1 IFRI ..r thl dhl, titt- jrpro.- lti r.|r F11ud 1t-

.ir r,rn,- .r aclti,- nfl a pirih ulit total njitr b, rth rI: Chl'. r ,, r-d 1U tt d ' .. :i -'IIt i.

t~rkriin ric- crurde birth rai r,.% rcpr.- i- .. I ih, .-. 'urlrmt P . ii hI. H SpI- in mo,!t ctntrir- lheb Q,-Qernflf ,n .,3 ,a!

tu,t,..r Tat, rinc I-.t p-p. liti..n ,-r. rh ib d I i- I lr;-tI ir. dIticrni nr . S plcp -hiat i e, ar.: ..tn;para tl r. r.

- r F-Psin *|.r p*p'H t'. ,r. a ci- n %rar Thh.. burI1a,d *h. hnd Itrr.a,i I hIp, r- i-chi,n r II.u. tI n I1 rt- u an , -i

' l' *un.nijracr .IIt.nl *iWrI- r iccrapli. . rEt I.pcn .dcrriLnlpalt 1, Fr Ir r tir a IiItI 1 1. :,:h i ,:; aI rpIc d d :hni i,n

-n- r. r -,-I i] .-r-:' l,cil .;un- t ..n .tn 'Iy I I.. r it , hanri,, . .;lh I- 3 .'pulitl I ..1t I. i ttIII I

Demographic targels and projections of fertility declines, selected countries and i-ears

~~~~~~~~, rFra i r F TI ' h.t.' i n' - I nd I,, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c-t to i

Ind. -nL-.Ia ~ ~ ~ ~ V! - (r' (T (F T Pati^ia P -p h 2111 ' I -, R- * 2 2' ;

1,di la-il.- 21[ 2' 2 2 1Ind, nt s, 1"'@l ' ' ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 2 . ;|: 5 'J -'4~~~~~~~~~~4'i ' '-. -

kR- [ot, i'm" 2 1 2hI 4 2 2 2''A rpal r l 23 -. 1 2 * ' 24

uk- i :it '- '; ^,s, ln- n' 4 4; '' 2 "-

ih,.IF ,n,l. IUNn 2' 34 11 .ui _

Gh lln1I'n. it it I 'AI 4n

TsIr.. n 1 - 1%v1tE

HZF 'r 2l% 2' I 4 -'

.;i-- 21411 4 n ii 41 . '

I!:1 it u rn hr,"i . 2 r It

T.,n-,a 21ri 22 *I'l 'r

L utin Andi idevelopmen p.i e iL'n ,n

F.;iti 2i0I: 2u 34 2' - 4cm.;n .;- 2i1u.1 :' I 2 2 2n' 2 I 2

F ,:t1' 'ii1 i rl1. ,1 ,,

feeding and use of family planning); justice (age at pendent base in the government (item D), separate-marriage, incentives and disincentives); women's from the delivery system for family planning. Theaffairs, rural development, and cooperatives (inte- institutional arrangements vary: a unit within angrated population and development projects). For existing ministry of health or planning but withexample, very few countries now give much prior- representatives from many ministries (Tunisia,ity to raising the legal age of marriage as part of Panama); an extraministerial committee (Egypt,demographic policy-more likely because the insti- Mexico); or a separate ministry devoted entirely totutional framework to do so is poor than because multisectoral population policies (Indonesia).the costs of implementing such a policy are high. There is no consensus on what works best; sus-

As the task of coordination becomes more com- tained political commitment seems to matter moreplicated, the responsible body may need an inde- to the outcome than organizational structure.

159

FAMILY PLANNING. In many countries-such as of countries, even among those with the strongestBrazil, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania-subsidized programs, have more broad-ranging incentivesfamily planning is provided as a basic health mea- and disincentives.sure for mothers and children although the gov-ernment has not formally adopted a policy to BIRTH QUOTAS. China is the only country to havereduce population growth. But once the objective implemented a system of assigning to communi-of reduced population growth has been estab- ties (sometimes employees of a particular factory)lished, support for family planning services inten- a quota of births to be permitted each year (itemsifies. As noted in Chapter 7, family planning poli- M). Individual couples within communities arecies tend to evolve in similar ways. Government then given permission to have a child, with prior-programs are often preceded bv private family itv given to couples who have followed the recom-planning organizations which eventually receive mendations for marrying only after a certain age,government financial support (item E). As political and who are older. The system of quotas, and thecommitment increases, government assumes a accompanying pressure to have an abortion whenbigger role, providing public services (item F), a woman becomes pregnant without permission,family planning outreach (item G), educational are an additional policy "step" over and above theand informational activities (item H), and subsi- extensive system of incentives and disincentives.dized commercial distribution of contraceptives(item I). Policy anld ethics

Policy steps E to I help couples have the numberof children they want. Virtually all countries in the Birth control is not just a technical and demo-table could reduce their fertility by increasing the graphic issue; it has a moral and a cultural dimen-availability and quality of family planning services. sion. Becoming a parent is both a deeply personalCountries with moderate and weak programs have event and-in virtually all societies-central toyet to generate any outreach services; many with community life as well. Procreation is held bystronger programs, including outreach, fail to many to be a right which is personal and funda-cover the entire population. Subsidized commer- mental, superior to any "good" which might becial distribution of contraceptives is not widely bought and sold, and subject to challenge only byused, even among countries with relatively strong some other right. The tradeoff between the rightsprograms. Based on estimates of "unmet need" and welfare of the current generation and those ofdescribed in Chapter 7, there are about 65 million future generations, insofar as a tradeoff exists, willcouples in developing countries who want to limit differ in different settings. But regardless of set-or space births but do not have effective access to ting, a public policy to reduce fertility must be sen-family planning services. sitive to individual rights today as well as to long-

run social goals, and must recognize theINCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES. By ensuring that distinction between encouraging lower fertility (by

people have only as many children as they want, changing the "signals" which influence people)governments can slow population growth. How- and coercion. Governments need to recognize thatever, this might not be enough to bring privately once they are actively involved in reducing fertil-and socially desired fertility into balance. If a pri- ity, the methods they use require careful and con-vate-social gap still exists, it cannot be reduced tinuous scrutiny.simply by providing more family planning. Eco- Virtually all the programs to lower fertility rec-nomic and social policies are indispensable to ommended in this Report would also improvereduce this gap in the long run. They may take individual welfare; they pose no obvious tradeoffsome time to have an impact on fertility, however. between present and future welfare. Programs toItems I to L are policies that close the gap more raise education and reduce mortality raise welfare.quickly: eliminating all implicit subsidies for large Family planning programs expand the optionsfamilies (item J), offering financial or other incen- available to people, allowing couples to realizetives for small families (item K), and imposing dis- their own fertility objectives and improving theincentives for large families (item L). A large num- health of mothers and children. In many countriesber of countries have disincentives built into their current fertility exceeds desired family size; withintax system and their benefits system for public most countries, there is "unmet need" for familyemplovees, but these are generally mild and affect planning. Incentives and disincentives, carefullyonly a small part of the population. Only a handful designed, can also meet the criteria of improving

160

welfare and allowing free choice. Incentives com- grams, disincentives alter the balance of costs andpensate individuals for the economic and social benefits of having children. Rather than raise thelosses of delaying births or of having fewer chil- benefits of having fewer children, however, theydren. Those who accept payment for not having increase the cost of having many. They have there-children do so because they find this tradeoff fore the disadvantage that they might unfairlyworthwhile; they are compensated for some of the penalize the poor. The rich will find it easier topublic savings from lower fertility. Similarly with accept the additional costs of more children, yetdisincentives: those who elect to pay the higher the poor may have greater need of children. Andcosts of additional children compensate society as children, who have no choice in the matter, beara whole for the private benefits of more children. the costs of certain disincentives-those which

But incentive and disincentive programs require give preference in schooling to the first born and- extra care to avoid unfairness and abuse, not only which heavily tax family income. It is essential to* in their implementation but also in their design. design disincentives so that they avoid inequality;

Some benefits from an incentive program are with care, however, they need be no more objec-bound to go to people who would have deferred tionable than any other taxes or subsidies.

- pregnancy or limited births anyway; public subsi- Even policies that are theoretically voluntary candies may therefore benefit the rich unnecessarily. be implemented in a coercive fashion if not prop-When payments are offered as an inducement to erly monitored. Many countries set performancesterilization-which is usually irreversible-care targets for family planning workers in recruitingmust be taken that the poor are not being tempted new acceptors. While some criteria for evaluatingto act out of short-term economic necessity con- workers' performance are clearly necessary, exces-trary to their long-term interests. Such payments sive pressure to achieve unrealistic targets threat-are usually quite small, since they are meant to ens the voluntaristic nature of programs. This iscompensate for time and travel costs. Govern- the lesson of the Indian Emergency of 1976-77,ments that offer them have generally established when workers were subject to extreme pressure toprocedures that make written consent mandatory, achieve high sterilization quotas and many peopleand have imposed criteria that potential clients were pressured to be sterilized against their will.must fulfill (such as having several children Consequently, the party in power lost the nextalready). A waiting period between the decision, election. In more recent years, this program, oper-the sterilization, and the payment can also be a ating on a strictly voluntary basis, has proved verysafeguard-though in inaccessible rural areas a successful.waiting period may be impractical, since those To repeat an important point noted in Chapter 1,seeking sterilization may find it hard to make even the ultimate goal of public policy is to improveone trip to a clinic. Deferred incentives, as in the living standards, to enhance individual choice,case of educational bonds or an old-age security and to create conditions that enable people to real-payment, have the advantage of building in such a ize their potential. Lower fertility is only an inter-safeguard. mediate objective; a commitment to achieve lower

Incentives that offer schools, low interest loans, fertility must not mean a willingness to achieve itor a tubewell to communities where contraceptive at any cost. The successful experience of manyuse is high also directly link lower fertility to countries already indicates that it need not.increased welfare. To the extent that all memberscan benefit from community incentives, individualwelfare is improved. Care must be taken that the Policy priorities in developing regionsbenefits of community incentives are distributedequitably, however. There is the danger that, in The differences among developing countries, bothclosely knit communities, some couples will be in their demographic situation and in the evolutionpressured to use contraception against their will. of their population policies, are profound. In sub-But community pressure always exists, and usu- Saharan Africa, few countries have yet to take theally influences couples to have many children even first steps in developing a population policy. At thewhen they would prefer not to. In Indonesia and other extreme, in East Asia family planning serv-Thailand community incentives are only loosely ices are accessible, political commitment is high,tied to actual use of contraception and are thus and governments offer incentives for couples toprimarily promotional. have small families. In all regions there is scope for

Like incentives and various socioeconomic pro- reducing mortality, increasing literacy, and

161

improving the availability of family planning serv- FIGURE 8.1

ices. But in taking the next steps in population Fertility in relation to income: selected developingpolicy, each region faces a different set of issues. countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 1972 and 1982

Total fertility rate

Sub-Saharan Africa: how to increase public commitment 9* 1972

Sub-Saharan Africa has the fastest population * 1982growth rate and the highest fertility in the world. 8 KenyaBetween 1970 and 1979 population increased at 2.7percent a year, up from 2.5 percent a year during Ethiopla

the 1960s. In a few East African countries popula- - udan l

tion is growing at 4 percent or more a year. Of the .. Nigeria

thirty-three sub-Saharan countries with more than 6 Zaire1 million people, thirty have a total fertility rate of Norm for 92 developing countries, 1972

6 or more. Kenya, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe havefertility rates of 8 or more. Probably fewer than 10 5percent of married women of reproductive age areusing modern contraception. Sub-Saharan Africa 4

is the only region in which fertility has not begun Norm for 98 developing countries, 1982

to fall, and in which population growth is expectedto accelerate in the next decade. 3

Africa is also the poorest region, with a per cap- 0 $1000 $2000 $3000

ita income averaging only $482 in 1982-or $354 if Income percapita (1980 dollars)

Nigeria is excluded. During the 1970s per capitaincome grew in real terms by just 0.8 percent ayear; if Nigeria is excluded, it declined. Theregion's gross domestic product stagnated in 1981 The poor economic performance of sub-Saharanand 1982, while population rose 2.7 percent in each Africa cannot be blamed on rapid populationyear. Fertility in most countries is higher than growth alone, nor will slower population growthincome alone would predict (see Figure 8.1). But solve all its economic problems. External economicwhen Africa's high mortality, low literacy, and shocks, as well as inappropriate domestic policies,largely rural population are taken into account, fer- have contributed to the region's economic crisis.tility is not unusually high. About a third of the But rapid population growth is creating severeadult population are literate in sub-Saharan coun- strains in some countries and, throughout thetries, compared with half of adults in all low- region as a whole, it is holding back improvementsincome countries and two-thirds in all middle- in living standards.income countries (see Table 8.2). Life expectancy at The strains are acute in a few countries and areasbirth is forty-nine years, ten years less than in that are already overcrowded-Burundi, Kenya,other countries at the same income level. Malawi, eastern Nigeria, Rwanda, and parts of the

TABLE 8 2

Development indicators: Africa compared with all developing countries

Per capita Adult Lifet Primaril-schooli)coC01e literacy cxpectaicsl Cenrollminent ratio, femialc'1982 1980 1982 1981

Cooitry yroup (dollars) (perce(lt) (years) (perce77t)

Sub-Saharan AfricaLow-income 249 38 49 57Middle-income 777 35 50 70

All low-income countries 280 52 59 81All middle-income countries 1,520 65 60 95

Note: Averages are weighted by 1982 population.a. Number of females enrolled in primary school as a percentage of all females of primary-school age.

162

Sahelian countries (see Box 8.4). These and other lation policy in sub-Saharan Africa? Populationcountries, such as Ethiopia and Upper Volta, have control is a sensitive political issue wherever reli-neither the physical capital nor the skills to com- gious and tribal groups are competing forpensate for a shortage of natural resources. A few resources. And much of the pressure for smallercountries-such as Angola, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, families has come from (or is perceived to comeZaire, and Zambia-are rich in natural resources, from) western aid donors; this pressure can causebut need extra skills, as well as heavy investment local resentment.in roads and storage and distribution systems to Even if these factors were less important, politi-exploit those resources. cians would still be hesitant to propose smaller

In all sub-Saharan countries, the labor force is families when the demand for children isgrowing rapidly, by more than 3 percent a year in extremely high. Recent surveys in six countriesmost countries, meaning a doubling about every found that women wanted between six and ninetwenty years. Government revenues are growing children in their completed families. Dependingslowly as a result of slow or no economic growth, on the country, only 4 to 17 percent of currentlyso countries have had to struggle not only to pro- married, fecund women wanted no more children,vide jobs but to provide basic services such as edu- and most of them had already had at least six. Incation. In 1978 education was taking 16 percent of much of the region the concept of self-determinednational budgets, but reached less than two-thirds family size is unknown. Modern contraception isof primary-school-age children. Only a tiny frac- poorly understood and lacks social legitimacy. Intion of the people can obtain modern medical care. this atmosphere couples who wish to use familyHuman development in all its forms is essential to planning services are discouraged from doing so.future economic progress but, as Chapter 5 And, compared with other regions, infertilityshowed, population growth makes it hard to affects a disproportionate number of Africans,achieve. These difficulties will remain, because tragically depriving some women of any childrensub-Saharan Africa's current population of 385 (see Box 8.5). The threat of infertility discouragesmillion seems set to double by the year 2005. That couples from controlling their childbearingmuch is almost inevitable. The real question is through modern contraception.whether populations will merely triple in size in Policy development and political commitmentthe next half-century or increase even more rap- are constrained throughout the region by a lack ofidly, to five or six times their current size. recent and reliable demographic data needed to

Few sub-Saharan countries have explicit policies demonstrate the magnitude and consequences ofto reduce rapid population growth. Kenya was the rapid population growth. Many African countries,first to adopt such policies in 1967, Ghana followed particularly in Francophone Africa, do not have ain 1969, and Mauritius in the early 1970s. There are long history of census-taking. In some countriesrecent indications of heightened concern about where censuses have been conducted, the resultsrapid population growth in Burundi, the Comoros, have never been published because of politicalMalawi, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. About controversy. As a result, the size and growth ratehalf the governments in sub-Saharan Africa pro- of population for countries such as Ethiopia,vide family planning services for health and Guinea, Nigeria, and Zaire are not known within ahuman rights reasons, but without any explicit reasonable degree of certainty.demographic purpose. Limited services are pro- Yet census results are important in demonstrat-vided by a few private associations and through an ing to political leaders the need for population pol-already overstretched public health system, with icy. The results of the 1976 Senegalese censuspoor coverage of rural areas. Twelve sub-Saharan implied a population growth rate of 2.9 percent acountries neither have population policies nor sup- year, much higher than the 2.2 percent annual rateport family planning. Most are in Francophone in the 1960s. This prompted the president to createAfrica-Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mada- the National Population Commission in 1978 togascar, Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta- consider a population policy and family planningwhere anticontraception laws from the colonial services. The 1960 census was a catalyzing factorperiod are still in effect. These countries have no for population policy in Ghana. The World Fertilitytradition of private family planning associations, Survey, conducted in Benin, Cameroon, Ghana,which are elsewhere active in lobbying govern- the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania,ments for public involvement. Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan, has made an impor-

What explains the limited development of popu- tant contribution to improving demographic data

163

Box 8.4 Africa: how much land, how many people?

A.rr,a .- lien porrra. ct1 a- an urndtrp -p

utait,d rE.o,n t , .r, crt. I 'I un-

rapp,.d Lind it i iru., that i :r a. eraic

p 'pularlln dtn,ir Is .-,i-es; it -n e,r,ei,Ltl i A ;3a s Bujt .: n-!d rinc lhc rud-

meniar% larnlinl prictiCr in ni-ir " -

A.Irw , *.,niE ni tie .. n tr.. .br. .-...:-min, A * -

di- d:d at 1 ma,i in th, -rnfe .I hInm,id - i L i

tc-cod pr,.ducti pcritnnal Thi' ,- on.: _

'he ,ain ti,nJine; .7i the FAO . ee:unitkj ...npleied p .,ted Land R-vuurce nortA.,.. , I *l

II F-iur (;... T, -, -

in rii-~~ ~~~ r& ~ . *

nh -, pr.,l.J t.-: al I nr.l t: r-: n- B u I_ t h. h i __ At--'anp-ductn annul btnough' .u'..- T~i'n; rndrd r i all -.nhri: Fut rh. -;e .-t her ;,i - i Aw.c:< R'r

d~.i.r n;ar,nd it niu-u :ener.:lt en'%u:h l..i.i S " r 'rn-lB ,_--_. -* -

Ratio t population . ii.i" R i1i mnp. r1i 1. td ' hrt ih~ pt". -- tl supporting apactv r o r: r.,

.ririnuine p.. lJ,-nd1 rn crlidr ao,d r actual population -:t-r;. .

r,-inc matn,jinrii-n I :. -r man. Atri,can deniit I 4l-'rT

uriri.. ,,unfl-. crict,it:il,r,1 -l p .r', -ar- Ltx;thar 1 .i *t Ar..j.Ii j, r;l,k.-t: i:. pr.,- a.t *aJ . sb-r-ri............ irn t I ii-5 ft L- F' 0 ,A tll,

* -. r. 't-I i- lr-n,n. er....c....an, .x ~' .>. .r r IJ ,

Th- F;v.- : - -rnpnrtd pLiphilda. - 1 aInd at" e ur.. J 6 M

rin.-pp-r.-nc -F-i ic sne--derernined Data r3i' a ait3ble |

. X,1 rid cin,-.r ...- nlii:- . n I.I; -':r** 1

irr'dm rchn,A-l-v%e - to aciu d indl Fr.:.-

e Clei p...pulai.. r.- c ..n -i --

AXlir a' a i-.h.'le .:."niirm rh, irar..

1,ur.ii , ,d. nrr. ien at iub: 51.: larm.

rlc,n t.-. ijraI- ln.. u;- , 1 terll.A'r -.r

p.> .lOde; rdricni. l .er.i ..ir:.-ri,: 5 and

in the region, but periodic sample surveys have child. The principal aim is to protect the health of

generally not been institutionalized. children and maximize the number who survive.

In the long run, social development-especially Throughout Africa, there is potential demand for

the education of women-is essential to reduce contraception to space births in both urban and

desired family size. More and better schooling for rural areas. But spacing practices appear to be

women will help to lower infant mortality, reduc- declining most rapidly in urban areas-where

ing the uncertainty about child survival which desired family size is likely to fall first. In Senegal,

keeps family size high. An all-out attack on infant for example, both breastfeeding and postpartum

and child mortality and on infertility is imperative; amenorrhea are six months shorter in the capital -

as long as fate seems to govern family size, prona- city of Dakar than in rural areas. In Lagos, Nigeria,

talist norms will be reinforced and individual traditional childspacing practices are in decline and

choice discouraged. intervals between births are shortening. Unless

In the short run, family planning services could contraception becomes a more readily available

do more on two fronts, even in the face of rela- substitute, total fertility may increase and the

tively little unsatisfied demand for birth control: health of mothers and children may worsen.

* Childspacing. Extended breastfeeding and sex- Programs in Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire have

ual abstinence have long been practiced in Africa recently been set up to promote contraception for

to guarantee two to three years between each childspacing. In Zimbabwe, the Child Spacing and

164

tr..Fr.rirz pmt1cn- and n.. *¾.r'-.rx -ll-fn in,r-I I F fi li ; I i rmin.l : rri,rrh. d - ta-d -t .cn,.--rci;,-- -iIm I ., ~ til 1. r. gr-r i h

I,-a. 3-Lire,i hIrI F .' r tn-Lr. -Ij nj 1. il., ni hiLth r and hi:rla,. .r ilpuit L'-i [--r. ug:h iritnli ni ,ZrIai - i ,-.i V

I- ttiYiiCCi , h -- uair U- Ih r wt-rnc.tr-E ii th, c i i'nid Tthi hni,t- f .)li i al 5-nil a_- iI mri..-

rim- Iair4tr il.-an it -Ritb J j' paa. r, i itrri in rni~k, \ - u du- unctrairilt ..*-n --h.'rc .. *- ni

~.h:n ihe r. li- ,i~ iiL'ilffiieul hi a ai'-nit.l i ,nif._.-L. , p t hiiii . 1--1,mli r t> n,lii.1. t- >iL,- :t.rJir.p' -N.,i r-i', ri.4

-ilrihi-. , r tr .1 niui:h fli. ir ie .ruiua and nri-.iiriciil1Iurai r-ri --.uniiri,- .--ild 1t. ~ cr- r n.. I,tt nli

[chine cnr-r,i-o- i.pp.-.rrUn,ii- , ild ti-u ; Oi -- p hr 0 -L -n Lhai.aij.rIr.- ii. N .,:eri

I1'l itr. " I b~ t-U h arr lrirt iiud- irp..riinc. I.. d L,-- r3a,riJ i-. j i ni-, -,- F-r.:- d, - ,r. m-.

Ifl - Pliib-ui.mnd ihi - smalle,r itland ros- il ..' In-ar- .-. r,d-1~rihle pr.tvl~m, T IIr u-u:h.-uit tt-~iiaiai.i.Ic-h

1,0-1; I.-Liri-ri U. r-tn- i.aa E nr,uzh tr S sh,liar. ..-uniru.- lik- N,cLr - - -It i.imrn.c r.:quir ni.-.r land p-r

lar-d-a;,un.na ~~-ul:-- icn-.- It,! t.irri- Ni -crih.-k- he-Ir, ire 1l-Ž- .-n. c-un ciphit lhi-n ii r,-- i.e.- -d..h -i; Aii

iTtc-IrO -upp..rr r-ri a :u4ij,nahlt- Li 7- irie- LircolI, iri .eniral \kiric:a -'il he~re ri.i.i ..ui.:.p.n r

[:piil.iii.fl- a, lirci- a, iii,-'.- airtad 'tiri~~~ t.itn.t' art-., -i jndcrui-o-i fli.rt .- r,n.n F. I-- -Ud .Ii,I

iiaa ;ti .. It Th, li uri-i- art )ri-Ei- Li-U i t-- r F\e' rh. lInd -a [L.t3l -iJIPUI V.r - r I~rd,ac

u.. ti Bau ril. it- I--pa K-n.j tbh -..-nc,, an- th.. rC.rr;it \iri.x. n .nriN-Ill r, 4uire .

NI ircr It ,r I: R. anila ~nc-.,I I-n I -n- rC. ire arh ,., -.rt- t.n, r i.- nnrc i--h.-'i: p -.r ..i 1I-- p r -

Ia I. md l14a-n.iaI i-.- ni--. a i r- up h l.- a r II-'- ii-Ire 1 -rh - n.rcp e t--.n- uti. 1 i'u i.' -1r

rti:..<.i in, c-nc-ibid -.r hev Lind Cat--i rn i niuli-p-i r-,ii.-h- I'-di -1muh m,it ur.- al-n.- . rat- I ri It Cii1', . -I A~a.ra -- U- a- b-! 1-;it ii ai-lunar c re i :r-i , \.r. i.c, rf-.i F\(

I-al1 --I I1- -'lalp.piaii-. -trrrl \n: s t--ia !II Per- rions -- :n -Lit.- -, ir. -n uflhiti-

Ir -n,-I Iie' u ii [-F1~m, : -nt .il it. -i .e. ; lai ILI,..u, [.r huunrdi k, r, Lrz-ili.. u .1 1.i1 i r :. ErhIF, -p Ia ard \a tr iJ .n -ia-ii - r -i, .puar-'J.O,.T R .. l- in in-i n M . uir--

It .: -A n r i- ir-J E- ra- h-i_,re in ar- -ica Lct ...r.ii:m -!1 ut---31,ibaI r --h-l C h iiJi - -ii-fi h-i-n, c ,,-bi-.I F glithi

ni. rit 7rKOPli art ir a t,n -uippuricd Bui \ifr.. , rhi preLsUrt r- *r p'-alt I-, mri- rarai ril -n [-tieJ I. -1`eaLIi At.."i iIm i--

il-dc t,tiiiiiie-t~iIi Mt3- ir-~, ii - ot- il r-:- hlad a-aia -uir; -ill n,-.iiwi i-n 4r.tu icriu t.si:-

-uli- a. picruiatiwin dc.ullk nia.n n iht- pa3ricularil. .' htre iht-, hil :.1 - mnl,n I,. - l h .ih--n- - rd -r

0I -er-i . iIhi' - seairs hilnd- liK 'li1-grain- li :Ir-i [nina-. iiul ii1, i - ar.\.c

-.-k -ulriri. ; su.h -.i. I-aad.i il-d I-er-aii I,- i'ii!: u-.ii - iN: . .

Family Planning Council provides 40 percent of effects will be critical. Such programs also providenational childspacing services, in addition to in- an opportunity to encourage breastfeeding, whichservice training and contraceptive supply procure- is still almost universal in Africa but declining inment for the Ministry of Health's childspacing urban areas.program. Among women of childbearing age, con- S Adolescents. In many countries-not just in

-traceptive use is estimated at 15 percent. Formerly Africa-there has been a sharp rise in premaritala private association, although heavily subsidized adolescent pregnancy, abortion, and sexuallyby government, the Council recently became a transmitted disease (see Box 8.6). Family planningparastatal under the Ministry of Health and is services and advice can avert these unwantedintensifying its activities with funding from births, abortions, and health risks. In Ghana edu-USAID; a doubling of field staff, recruitment of a cation about family life is now part of the schoolfull-time information and education staff, and curriculum. Eight other sub-Saharan countries areexpanded research capability are planned. considering this step.

The emphasis on spacing means that programsthroughout Africa must offer effective, reversible Middle East and North Africa:methods of contraception. Since most people will rural outreach and expanding women's opportunitiesnever have tried modern contraception, carefulexplanation, reassurance, and treatment of side The countries of the Middle Fast and North Africa

165

Box 8.5 Infertility: a challenge to programs in sub-Saharan Africa

5,ur.e%- in the l.'s and 1ialX ti,urid c.ntual lertilit, dechnE rnEr- bting irerr,le in the rentiring 'i"

rhit an t-eragee Ar 12 per.:ent cit i,orren Ur . hat c3ue, h,gh le.ei, ot interrilit% ' Ferccnt .,r cdcE 1%hen the interrilir!

.h,, had pa;Ed their childbeaidng sear Sccu ill, tranmin,tted dcl.a4c- partICu u... aued b:, m' uall trncniirthed di;e3- i,

ir e,ghteen ;ubt -aharan ciuntrie- ..ere lark gcnrrl-rrhea and ;. phdili 3rc malcr , e;-;ential that both partner; e med,

hildle;,: c.mpar,cld 1 ih . rate et 2 t. :ius;e- nIt b-ih pr,m.ir and eo. mdar, All. rtarekd kther cau e, ol Inenr,

r%:rEnr onher. rr de'elvpinc countri-; intert,lr: C,.nnhea it elit untreiled can be pre%enicd b, imprc.'. ing rhe qu3a

Childl -ne - primar inlerrilir - can kLad t! ireteribek bk --c a thc t, r i cb.:tctr:iclcare 1`h a 1b. 1rain,ng .

a3 grc.ati.t 1' the Cenlral Airic3n lai-pia3n 'jabc in ir rmen and *t the a- rradre.nal rmid, ._ nd * n.:reacric

Reputblic 1 percenti C rmer-. inr l-per. deicren, in men Bcau;,.- the * mptirr.; rhc a.1l-ibnLr, t in trct.,n 'c that

crnt Zaire 21 pttcrrnt I C:.:neŽ: 2'1 per ..Tc nof rcdt, nti,eabl1 in i, cnmen .1 i ,-upl,c can pr-.em un an,cd pr.gn;n

centi ,nd Cabnin ' percrnIi ir par; -1 ma3. g ti:r tral sear; ..,ithciut irrat- :,e h.ht rm,ghi rculi, n airrticn

Za.ire ; ma;nn 3; no per cnt CI o-mnn nicnt -;,tphili; c.au-e- rmi,carr.age 3nd Er_,r arv l*e. ;pcciali-r;r itenirc I -r

a:ed Itt. -ni I c tc -r. -nine . erc child. ,tillb,rth i i *bt--erical c:,re and unh' . dlair. -- ind rr,atrt-in m. nrrilrn ,n |r

1 hi; ldldkrne'm in ,ciunZer 3ce ieni. alb-rtion arc additinal ca3ue;-t 4Lib,a3haran Mnru.. ,ince riei

.ri.up; 4 I:.' .g-r,m ,n Hpre;unm,abl dJui ncc.ndJr ,nit. NI lnruiitiriir con- lin,c' hi E been ,et up irncniii..n

ni- in-pro. cdmnedical carei but cull higb cittldetcct; gental tuberctulo;i; ind K;en% ,a 1an-3n,ai and Uanda P'r-c.ram

In Lnr,er-.,-n lit prienl .:. Kie % n.i a.d aric-u' uter.ntin a nal rid u;re-r 1 cnt. rihc ;pnicad - ' ir;*

rthi. r.. thiri% I ur 3rc childle;- in the in-ctic-.n- a;! c.ntribure nm,tred d ;ea,c h., e bten niaunched ir lt.h

% .:.ngc- the rigurec ar- 12 t... 13 perceri in TrcaITi,cnt kir intierlii. ,- *. i and cntrral : rtcan republi,c Erhicip,a and

aditrin larg-e number- .t pe-ple ;uttir dtl,cult e .e ri then the mutecn-me - Zannm, Th, Aec.tarn r. r \ilurtar-

Ir.,m ,ec.ndar. niertilir., -the nabil. uncerta,n Dependring irn ithe *3u" ...nl teriiar-i.-n h.a- pro rided a rant; t,.,r

t1, batncei-. .Krree r'h again th-u.lv nte Huarter tU cinehiltr .I c- upie; re -3rch trearnierrt irainin.a publ c

,n, an carlter hirth 5uudiem in Ken a treated m,i ;ubceq.uenis ha e a I,.e ,du-:icn n in . n \,icera 5K-tn

h.a,e .h.-- .n rbir prim3ri 3nd ;econdar. t[,rrh Three malnir cau,.-;-e ual. d Lear-c anld budanr,

rnerirliti, Occur i rh appro\.n,iaielt irin;rmired dr-ca'., pi)-r c-betrical Re-ource; arc necded i.r revearch u,.

cjulji trcquenc: . h,le rn imuch ! L\esr -arc and ilegtl abortion-can be pre rhe cau;' anid treatment c-I nilert,itl. a;

itrica 4eciindar. intertilt acccunts; Tor \ented ar le-; cc;i Public carnmpain; an .ell a; i-r better d3ta .in ,r- pre\i aenc;

up 1k. -trdlr0ol di3gno;ved a;e;. inlcrm couple;o hecauce; c-iutintwrilit Al-kui 94 r,llion oIi a total 41 in m,ltwin

i)ridri inittrr,lt, arrlici, 14 iT... 3,- ptrcc nI ihc ;,rnpt-mr ii ;e-.uall. Iran 'mnwted ;perir bi th public qector .-Kr. ,r,ert,lt

c.i .-.K.men i gzd tateer. c la.rs in ditrtrent d-ctae tic prc .enti,:n thrKouigh linliting re-earch i- .rld . -ide in Ps1i tnt cri

reon; ci I a3metnr-in .e\ual parrner; and ue :Il bNrrier meth t r;e 3rch inr . urinapla,ned cau-; -.t

The cc.n;e-rquence; it unrlenrilrti are3 p3r . d; .-,I cc-nira:epiin lenpecuall c:n- inerlilir thc bulL 1rh,-. -irk a c.-.cn.

:iularls ;e. re lor %ornicn V. hicr mas be dim 4i and rbe a. abilt i.t tra3rmt nt uctedL- b, the rinter iKr Ponpulai ii r

-cra c ized 3binj.ned ir. n d iir cd Fear The;- irli.rmari,,nal ettori; r-ned to be Re>i. arch in the Unit- l i tre Tlitjal

.-.t ,nernilt, mace' o-cuple; rtluctant I., drrtcid tr mer in partiular ;ince th, t endin. c:n intetlri.h re;atch b- 'he

pract ,e modern c-nirt racepticin Thu arc rr.i.rc rcluciani ti:. utbmit t. inierTliht i.'rldl ,iealr h Uran,ii ,1.a. in

although hi.,h ntertillr\ kecp; Iertdio. ie;i' anrd 'rearneni Thougth in-men arE .Ph, rl:fi I i!iil The i. nir-i rati-%n; De-

tI.er th3n ,r then .,ie o ,uld be-e% tr. u-uall, htd rn^pon;,Lile Idr childles- . c-pmnten Pr.uFrjarnrrn,e ha; pru.p:irc

-rctni rin-.rcrmnent r, hildle ;;ne-; nc-n iln t;.c Ihc i ccount tiir abour 4iJ increac,ng thi; 3mn:iunr r.:. 1-4 rnli-in 3

rducte -total lertilil bn atout 1-ut 3kS percent c: interrilitt c:3e; 't lnr account %ar ~.rer 'he nce\t le t r -ci en -. tar;,nhibir; cicntracepn. e u c and 'Ic-u i.- r an..rh,r 4i1 pe r:ernr .ith t-oth prt-

are quite diverse, ranging from one of the world's percent a year; the total fertility rate in 1982 waspoorest (Afghanistan) to five of the wealthiest 5.4. Migration is common, both into and out of the'(Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the region and among countries within it.United Arab Emirates). But 90 percent of its 260 In most countries fertility is higher than wouldmillion people live in thirteen middle-income be expected given per capita income (see Figurecountries. All share a common cultural heritage 8.2). Five high-income oil exporters, with per cap-and are predominantly Islamic. Countries in the ita incomes of $14,820, had a fertility rate of 6.9 inMiddle East and North Africa have the second 1982. In the past decade incomes in Jordan, Syria,highest rates of population growth and fertility in and Algeria have risen strongly but total fertilitythe world, after sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1970 has remained at more than 7. Income growth inand 1982 their population grew at an average 2.9 these countries is recent and social development

166

has come more slowly. Low literacy (particularly Government family planning programs began inamong women) and high infant mortality help to 1964 in Tunisia, in 1965 in Egypt and Turkey, andexplain high fertility. Also responsible are cultural, in 1966 in Morocco. According to recent surveys,religious, and legal pressures that confine women 24 percent of married women of childbearing ageto the home and restrict their property rights, in Egypt, 38 percent in Turkey, and 41 percent inrights within marriage, and ability to seek work Tunisia are practicing contraception. Later mar-outside the home. riage has also contributed to fertility decline. The

Three countries in Figure 8.2-Egypt, Tunisia, change has been most dramatic in Tunisia, where-and Turkey-have had a marked fall in fertility in the proportion of women aged fifteen to nineteenthe past decade; in all three, fertility is now below who are married fell from 42 percent in 1956 to 6what would be expected for their income levels. In percent in 1975. In Egypt the proportion fell fromMorocco, fertility has declined more modestly. 32 percent in 1960-61 to 21 percent fifteen years

*Unlike most other countries in the region, these later; in Turkey, the decline was from 33 percent tofour have policies to reduce population growth. 22 percent.

Box 8.6 Teenage pregnancy

Te,i- rae- p.r~crian.- ,.,trr.n in- hch *h* -.. rii B.., - I pr 'ip .f-n.r Ar 'nc r, -ai-r h-.-1-1i1. ' ad thn:, arcIt ...l..pcd ariA t A-: .:i.p. unitt- b,irh un,til hi-.~ a;~ _it i.-r.% .r _.idcr mri rti c.L rlv.r-.3 ; t., It) .. ih,tiAre

.i'lhizrc-r X0AhirI' ii, I; pat,onr ul icntr.anrii, redraci. n-.arnrriai and ~ J. lIr tIl c -Id iccn r

hi ,rrh; . r id.,j d-% An - .,a i rh3 j rrd rt ac,E wintr. nac.-rtal.t . raic- Tn.. r nar.t irb . re

rh, pw.t.M 'inc.C nanjr tEin.ir-I prc,- . c..iina , r-ginc-.-pari..A- Vi hcr. I a r-ru, ia',.-rr *: are: o.

nanca..i4rr. trmmrnhinrcd h. tctrd, riler,- 1,ri . . hi-nt ..ur'd n -irria2i---ndin k-m.nd a. Tie maternal nrd lhdd hx,Ni-h4.11 ab.-.'r.:n tectau~eci-urI., 3 l di-r eli .* ah*. 'it n Ii p.-i.:.ri . irtib.el Jirn,i n prn-...er.ln; i nt*_rn-arr..n :h *' t.ani11

'4~ c *uinirre tcrnd r. . nc-rv, earlier ni, -it I. hiihl, rr4~ * rind ma.. r.IP.i,r Iltutra. ror- rinni c, r c- r ar

ui-riae prrŽ~riant .I- iri , artria ,e Jrn 'ititt NEari .11 ii :ct n' an,.e . --fl -Men -.h, 3l'~, cd- ba-, *:hid,reri. Ti.icr -I, li-cl C~flhti.-~ Lit ti' r Ccc ti precnaii:ri:r in the Lnuic 3i,t- i-ndcd b-. a an in'wr.a: f t.flac pre4nan-..

nicirn-rdc.-. urritir ri-. rI. 4 pr cn.ri .t pr,criinabirriri in, It?> *[uJp-.p - rh.id. 'hrih

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167

FIGURE 8.2 upper Egypt want no more children but are notFertility in relation to income: selected developing using contraception, and that more than half ofcountries in the Middle East and North Africa, 1972 these women would like to use a method. In Jen-

douba, Tunisia, 46 percent of women who wereTotal fertility rate not using contraception wanted no more children,8 and 22 percent said that they would like to space

the next birth. When women in Marrakech,Jordan Algeria Morocco, were offered supplies of oral contracep-

tives through home visits, the rate of contraceptive7 use rose from 18 to 43 percent. In the Sfax region of

Tunisia, household distribution increased the rate\ 1972 from 7 to 18 percent.

6 \\ Tunisia * 1982 Continued progress in reducing fertility in thesecountries will depend both on better family plan-ning services and on measures to improve the sta-

Norm for 92 developing tus of women.countries, 1972 * Family planning programs. Access to services in

5 / rural areas is still restricted. The Tunisian programhas had difficulty reaching a dispersed rural popu-

Egypt lation, which includes half of the married women

of reproductive age. Services in Morocco and4 *Turkey Egypt rely heavily on physicians and are clinic-

based with little outreach. In Egypt only physi-Norm for 98 developing countries,1982 cians may prescribe the pill and insert the IUD.

The few outreach workers in place are not permit-

0 $1000 $2000 $30 ted to distribute contraceptives and are supposedIncome per capita(1980dollars) to motivate only women who already have three

children. In Morocco, nurses were only recentlyauthorized to insert IUDs, and nonclinical distribu-tion of the pill is still frowned upon. Yet experiencein South and East Asia as well as in Latin America

Despite these achievements, population growth indicates that carefully trained paramedicalremains rapid and acceptance of family planning fieldworkers can deliver many methods andslow. Total fertility, although reduced, is still 4 to 5 increase contraceptive prevalence dramatically.in Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey, and about 6 in Use of the media to promote family planning andMorocco. In Egypt and Tunisia, an increase in the small families has been limited in Morocco: notproportion of women of childbearing age has kept until 1982 were the Ministry of Public Health andthe birth rate high. Mortality has declined, and the the private family planning association permittedrate of population growth has changed little. Pop- to broadcast family planning messages and showulation pressure has been eased in both countries films.by emigration, but poor economic conditions in The limited range of contraceptives availableEurope have reduced emigration from Tunisia and in Egypt and Morocco also restricts their use.caused many emigrants to return. The rate of con- Although the IUD and condoms are theoretically'traceptive use has remained at about 25 percent in available, both programs favor the pill. Only one-Egypt for several years; increases have been slow quarter of outlets in Egypt are staffed or supplied-in Turkey and Morocco. The number of new accep- to provide IUD insertions. Only one brand of pill istors of family planning has barely risen in Tunisia offered. Sterilization is legal but not promoted byfor about five years. the official program; abortion is prohibited. In con-

There is ample evidence of unmet need for fam- trast, the Tunisian program has made the pill, IUD,ily planning services. Low and high estimates in female sterilization, and abortion (in the first threeEgypt ranged from 12 to 22 percent of married months of pregnancy) more widely available.women of childbearing age in 1980. In certain areas * The status of women. Increasing the number ofunmet need is even higher. One study found that educated women could do much to reduce fertility82 percent of married women in rural areas of in the region. Enrollment rates for girls in 1980

168

FIGURE 8.3

Gross enrollment ratios by sex:selected countries in the Middle East Enrollment ratio Enrollment ratioand North Africa, 1960 and 1980 120 120

Egypt Morocco

80 M, 80 Mr-M Males, primary enrollment M,

- Females, pnmary enrollment F F,

…----- Males, secondary enrollment 40 , ,- ' 40

------ Females, secondary enrollment ,- ,,

0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~F,1960 1980 1960 1980

Enrollment ratio' Enrollment ratio Enrollment ratio

120 120 120

Tunsia M, Jordan M Entire region Mr

F,

80 F, 80 m 80

FM. F,

40 40 ,, 40 -M,

____ --- - -- F, ; ,0 -- - - - - - - - - - -0 0 -- .-

1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980

a Enrollment ratio equals the number enrolled as a percentage of a particular age group. It can exceed 100 percent because some pupils are below or above theofficial primary-school age.b. Mean weighted by 1960 and 1980 population (includes high-income oil exporters).Sozxrce: UNESCO, 1983; World Development Report 1982.

were still only two-thirds the rates for boys at both other legal changes are under discussion: theprimary and secondary schools (see Figure 8.3); in repeal of a husband's automatic status as head oftwenty years the gap has not narrowed. An impor- the family in favor of a system of "joint responsi-tant exception is Jordan, where primary-school bility of spouses" and abolition of a husband'seducation is now universal and about three-quar- right of consent for his wife to be gainfullyters of secondary-school-age children of both sexes employed.are enrolled. In Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisiauniversal primary schooling for girls has yet to Latin America and the Caribbean:be achieved. Female primary enrollment has reducing social inequitiesincreased steeply in Tunisia, and the male-femalegap has been somewhat reduced. In Egypt the Almost all of the countries in Latin America andincrease in primary-school places has barely kept the Caribbean are middle-income, but with greatpace with population growth; the primary-school demographic diversity. In four countries with perenrollment rate has remained low and access is capita incomes exceeding $2,500-Argentina,

- particularly limited in rural areas, where fertility is Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay-popu-high. At the same time, much has been invested in lation growth has slowed to below 2 percent a yearexpanding secondary schooling. and total fertility is nearing replacement level. The

Women's status can also be improved by raising highest fertility in the region is in six lower-mid-the minimum age of marriage and by changing dle-income countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salva-laws that restrict women's social and financial dor, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Totalrights. The legal minimum age of marriage for fertility in these countries exceeds 5 and popula-women in Tunisia was raised to fifteen in 1956, and tion growth ranges from 2.5 to 3.4 percent. Fertilitythen to seventeen in 1964. The legal minimum age is high in the Caribbean, with the exception ofin Morocco and Turkey is still fifteen. In Turkey Cuba, but emigration moderates population

169

growth. Fertility has declined in the three largest percent, compared with 78 percent in the townscountries-Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico-but and cities.population will still double in about twenty-five Provision of family planning services is alsoyears in Mexico and in about thirty years in the greater in urban areas, especially in Brazil. Theothers. national government has not assisted or promoted

In short, population growth is rapid throughout family planning services, so most users rely on pri-Latin America and the Caribbean and will remain vate suppliers. In the well-to-do southern state ofso until the 1990s at least. Populations are pro- Sao Paulo, 63 percent of women obtain contracep-jected to grow by at least 2 percent a year in most tives through a private doctor or a drugstore. Thiscountries, closer to 3 percent in much of Central is difficult or impossible in rural areas. The Brazil-America. Only in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay ian Family Planning Association (BEMFAM), a pri-will growth rates be lower. The labor force will vate nonprofit organization, does provide servicesgrow by more than 2 percent a year until the end of to the poor. In the poor states of Rio Grande dothe century. Urbanization will slow somewhat Norte and Piaui, where BEMFAM is active, almostfrom its recent fast pace, but in some countries 60 percent of women use contraceptives. In Bahia,(Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela) 80 where BEMFAM does not operate, only 40 percentpercent of the people are already living in cities. use contraceptives.

No single issue is so important in Latin America How is population growth related to inequalityas the manner in which opportunity and access are in these countries? Fertility is consistently andshared. Because of inequalities of income and inversely related to household income and to edu-wealth, and despite rapid economic growth in the cation. Surveys in Brazil indicate that poor ruralpast quarter century, millions of people still live in women bear twice as many children as do womenpoverty. As economic growth accelerated after from the upper 40 percent of urban households.1950, some areas and socioeconomic groups bene- Brazilian women who neither have paid jobs norfited more than others, widening income and have completed primary school have more thanwealth differentials. As development proceeds, twice as many children as working women whothose differences may start to narrow. One aim of completed secondary school. Similar differentialspublic policy, particularly in health and education, occur in Mexico and Colombia. The well-to-do areis to promote equality of opportunity. Population able to spend more per child than are the poor andprograms have a related role to play: they can they have fewer children.improve the chances of the poor by making it pos- The extent of these differences was described insible for them to devote more resources to each Chapter 4. In both Brazil and Colombia, the poor-child. est 20 percent of households have almost one-third

Three countries, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, of all children-but only 4 percent of total incomeaccount for 60 percent of the region's 370 million in Colombia and 2 percent in Brazil. The richest 20people. Economically and demographically they percent of households, in contrast, have 10 percentare more advanced than the northern Andean of the children and 60 percent of the income incountries, most of Central America and the Colombia, 8 percent of the children and 64 percentCaribbean, but (except for central and southern of the income in Brazil. These differences are farBrazil) less advanced than Argentina, Chile, and greater than those in such countries as India, Thai-Uruguay. land, and Malaysia.

As is true elsewhere in Latin America, a major Population policies have helped to reduce fertil-characteristic of these countries is their urban-rural ity in Latin America. In 1966 Colombia's Ministry-contrast. In Colombia health facilities are concen- of Health signed an agreement with a private med-trated in the urban areas; per household, public ical association to provide a program of training,subsidies to rural health are less than one-seventh and research that included family planning. Bythe national average. Life expectancy for urban combining low-key public support with privateColombians is sixty-four compared with fifty-eight family planning programs, the Colombian govern-for those in the countryside. In Brazil current ment has helped facilitate a rapid fertility decline.spending on education is as much as ten times The Mexican government adopted a populationgreater per child in urban than in rural areas; policy to reduce fertility in 1973 and began provid-urban teachers have on average more than eleven ing family planning services in 1974. By 1976 con-years of education, compared with six years for traceptive use had doubled, almost entirelyrural teachers. Literacy rates in rural Brazil are 48 because of public programs. Between 1970 and

170

FIGURE 8.4

Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1972 and 1982

Total fertility rate

8

* 1972

* 19827

< ~~~~~~~Mexico 6

\) * ~~Peru\

Venezuela

5

ColombiaR!

4 Norm for 92 developimg countries, 1972

4~~~~~ 4 I ~ ~~Braz ~ ~ __

Costa Rica Chile3

Norm for 98 developing countries, 19822

0 $1000 $2000 $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000

Income per capita (1980 dollars)

1980 fertility fell in both Mexico and Colombia by 1965 and 1975; in the 1980s the number of childrenabout one-third; in contrast, it declined by less in the primary-age group will grow by less than athan 20 percent in Brazil, a country in which the million, easing the strain on the education budget.national government had not committed itself to a By 1990 the Colombian labor force will be growingpopulation policy or program (see Box 8.7). by 2.2 percent a year, well below the 3.5 percent

This contrast becomes even sharper when it is rate of the 1970s. With fewer new entrants to thenoted that per capita real incomes nearly doubled labor force, a larger proportion of them can expectin Brazil but were up by only 50 percent in Colom- to qualify for high-wage jobs.bia and Mexico. Whereas Colombia and Mexico Looking ahead, Colombia and Mexico need tomanaged a sharp decline in fertility in relation to extend public family planning programs to theincome growth, Brazil's fertility decline was more rural poor, and to do more to integrate populationmodest (see Figure 8.4). If Brazil had followed the policy into the overall framework of developmentpattern of Colombia and Mexico, its total fertility planning. Brazil's popular private sector pro-rate would have fallen to 3.0 by 1982 given its grams, long tolerated by the government, do notincome growth; in fact it was 3.9. With a popula- have adequate resources. There is significanttion policy no more vigorous than that of Colombia unmet need for family planning in the poor North-and Mexico during the 1970s, Brazilian fertility east. Brazil spends more than 4 percent of its GDPmight now be one-quarter lower than it is. Most of on health; by devoting a tiny share of that budgetthe difference would come from lower fertility to family planning, it could extend family planningamong the poor, since it is they who would be coverage to the 40 million people of its poorerassisted most by a public policy. regions.

The advantages of lower fertility are already Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico are not the onlybecoming apparent in some Latin American coun- countries in Latin America where population poli-tries. In Colombia the number of enrolled primary- cies could be effective against poverty and inequal-school students increased by 1.6 million between ity. Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and the Central

171

Box 8.7 Changing policies and attitudes toward familyplanning in Brazil

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ri.), r - ---. I T o rt. - ri', T i .-I rh..j - fi p.-.rh u-_i', .lu u ii, I .~ . 'r, T 'I., l re i. h i I' nEtod lb

...h ... i r '.'I.i r -mr',m .n U, -r3 ' - I. 'I,iiiln1in Sra Ii h. r .. tr vd- -\- i rd.:tI . -i .-

[ri .1Br- I i.4n-ii lini mu iar..i ri.-f (Fir af-1---rn n.i-a lrmiF.r- cI ,dn TI ,r -x,--

n 1172- , n r m ML- t~nl p j ni, r..r, . 3 , - . , O tP ;I h

American countries could all benefit from stronger FIGURE8.5

policies. Rapid population growth in El Salvador Fertility in relation to income: selected developinghas been identified by many as a partial cause of its countries in South Asia, 1972 and 1982

civil war. In Bolivia and Haiti, the poorest coun- Total fertility rate

tries in the region, initiatives to slow population 8

growth are among the most urgent policy needs to 1972combat poverty. U 1982

* 19827 Bangladesh

South Asia: expanding and improving programs Pakistan

The 930 million people of Bangladesh, India,Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka comprise one-fifth 6 Nepaof world population and one-quarter of the popu- Norm for 92 developing countries, 1972

lation of developing countries. Although incomesin South Asia are among the lowest in the world, 5the region's fertility has already fallen substan- India

tially (see Figure 8.5). In Sri Lanka, for example, riLanka

the total fertility rate fell from 5.5 in 1960 to 3.5 in 4 S L

1974; in India it dropped from 6.5 in the 1950s to /4.8 in 1982. The rate of contraceptive use (both Norm for 98 developing countries, 1982

modern and traditional methods) is 55 percent in 3Sri Lanka, the highest in the region. About 28 per- 0 $1000 $2000 $3000

cent of couples in India use modern contracep- Income per capita (1980 dollars)

tives. No other country at India's level of socio-economic development-measured by low literacyand per capita income and high infant mortality-has a lower level of fertility. Bangladesh and Paki- Progress in South Asia has not been uniform,stan have had more modest declines. In Bangla- however, and rapid population growth is a sourcedesh 19 percent of couples use either modern or of continuing concern. In India and Sri Lanka mor-traditional methods (see Figure 8.6). tality has declined as fast as, or faster than, fertil-

What accounts for this impressive record? Con- ity. As a result, population growth has increased intinued progress in raising female literacy and low- India-its population is now increasing by 16 mil-ering infant mortality, as well as a concerted effort lion a year, more than in any other country, includ-to expand access to family planning, have both ing China. India's birth rate has remained at 33 tobeen important. Within India there is wide varia- 34 per thousand since 1976; contraceptive use,tion in fertility and in contraceptive use, a variation steady at 23 to 24 percent since 1976, has onlywhich closely corresponds to patterns of social recently begun to rise again. Total fertility hasdevelopment. For example, in the state of Kerala, stopped falling in Sri Lanka, and has been fluctuat-which has the lowest total fertility (2.7 in 1978), 75 ing between 3.4 and 3.7 since 1974. In Bangladeshpercent of rural women are literate, infant mortal- contraceptive use increased from 8 percent in 1975ity is 47 per thousand live births, and 32 percent of to 19 percent in 1981, but appears to have madecouples are protected by modern contraception. In slow progress since then (though the share ofcontrast, in the state of Uttar Pradesh total fertility modern methods has apparently risen). In Paki-was 5.6 in 1978, infant mortality is almost four stan only about 5 percent of couples practice con-times higher (171 per thousand), and female liter- traception, and in Nepal only 7 percent. Both ofacy and contraceptive use are, respectively, one- these countries lag behind others in providingseventh and one-third the levels found in Kerala. health and family planning services, although both

The experience in Sri Lanka is similar. Despite a show signs of a renewed political commitment toper capita income of only $320 in 1982, infant mor- curb population growth.tality had been reduced to 41 per thousand and The experience in Sri Lanka and in some Indianvirtually all primary-school-age girls were enrolled states suggests that much more could be done toin school. Of a contraceptive use rate of 55 percent, bring about fertility decline. In every country therealmost two-thirds comprised modern methods; is considerable scope for reducing infant mortality,total fertility had declined to 3.4. raising the legal marriage age, and increasing

173

FIGURE 8.6 childbearing age have unmet need for contracep-Contraceptive use by method: Bangladesh, India, and tion to limit or space births. Pilot projects thereSri Lanka, 1975-83 have achieved rates of contraceptive use of 35 to 40

Percentage of married women aged 1549 percent with modern methods, three to four times60 the prevalence of these methods nationwide. In Sri

Lanka 44 percent of women of childbearing agewho want no more children are nevertheless not

50 practicing contraception.To satisfy unmet need, family planning pro-

grams must resolve important issues of access and40 quality.

* Access. Better family planning outreach could

30 go a long way to increase contraceptive usethroughout the region. Access is most restricted inNepal and Pakistan. In Nepal there is unmet need

20 . for contraception among 22 to 27 percent of eligiblewomen. About half of currently married women in

* w | | | Nepal are unaware of a modern contraceptive10 1 method, and an additional 15 percent who are

aware do not know where a method can be- 1 t [ j ~~~~~~~obtained. In Pakistan, three-quarters of married

_women of childbearing age knew of a modern1975 1983-84 1975 1982-83 1975 1982 method in 1975, but only 5 percent were usingBangladesh India Sri Lanka one. A quarter to a half of these women had unmet

need for contraception to limit births. Since then

Method contraceptive use has stagnated. The government* Traditional (rhythm, abstinence, - TUD plans to meet the need for contraception by greatly

withdrawal, other) _1 IUD expanding and upgrading services.- Injectable contraceptives and - Pill * Method mix. Family planning programs in

vaginalmethods Sterilization (male South Asia have continued to emphasize steriliza-i: Condom _ and female) tion to the neglect of reversible methods of contra-

ception, particularly in India and Sri Lanka (seeFigure 8.6). Sterilization accounts for more thanthree-quarters of modern contraceptive use in

female education-all of which would have a pro- India and Nepal, two-thirds in Sri Lanka, andfound effect on fertility. In Bangladesh family plan- about half in Bangladesh. Sterilization is clearly inning and greater economic independence of demand among couples who want no more chil-women are jointly promoted through credit coop- dren. But other forms of contraception are usederatives for women (see Box 8.8). A few countries less, largely because they are not widely available.are moving beyond schemes that compensate Given the high rate of child mortality in Souththose who adopt contraception to consider posi- Asia, reversible contraceptive methods may betive incentives for small families. Bangladesh has more desirable for couples who have had two orcontemplated offering bonds to sterilization clients three children but who do not wish to be sterilizedwith two to three children and to couples who immediately. To maximize contraceptive use, bothpostpone a first pregnancy or space children at reversible methods and sterilization need to be,long intervals (see Box 6.4). India is considering a made available.scheme to give "green cards" to couples sterilized The only widely available reversible method inafter two children; these cards would entitle them India is the condom, which is provided throughto preferential access to social services. 400,000 retail outlets in the social marketing pro-

Desired family size in Bangladesh is now about gram as well as in family planning program out-four; actual size averages about 5.5. Sri Lankan lets. The pill, important in countries such as Indo-women are having on average one child more than nesia, is not offered through social marketingthey want. According to a 1979 survey in Bangla- arrangements, and in 1981-82 was being distrib-desh, as many as 41 percent of married women of uted through only 4,500 rural and 2,500 urban out-

174

Box 8.8 Family planning and women's credit cooperativesin Bangladesh

Tb, Ba.-ng!lide'h Rur.id LW el- rpmenr turn tak, their memrbher; priNIM 3n111 .-.: n:.ni h.- -at t.-e t ri.ed cl tikedB,ard ha; bn rp- 'ri*rin :r'- di c"ip -j -Fi n;r-h t .hetrining ;e;iiri ...-it ur mezdi,:al help

rartr .-- ir rural i.rnkn ;ir-cr ism. 5 Ar . riiu. [- rhe program Vhad -tab- A cud b. th.. Bangihdth iPlan.n,ning

tin.arwet 1b42 I and rilr:l-:.tianc:i- r4 h-ihrd I 1 R *>'t-perati\ lith 4 3-r.o C,.mm'i.n. it-.r. i> ccimprrd 1h

a c imtpinem n. .i" populati-n prc-i- mcme r ,hare 3pitpal -l abu *u3 1*1kmL knm .ltd-g and practlce .o tarnil-. plan-

e-:t- P., p- *-i dinc raiiili.g and 'ncc,.me- .1nd a.ingr .I u I + Oit, TKh tiing anb'r, :- '..pc rant mecnLtr- ardi

t3rrinrg pporiunitie the pr-.gram demand 1 .r lcan' tar .-ult;rip4 the ni-rianniblr4 t- ith ;intilar ;l.eiimC-ili |

*-el to r-du.-e ,.:men * dt-pndrn-:: on .miurin a- ailabl- alith -uh the o-nih .l I bckgrui'd; in. the pr-le,r .area in bmih

-:hmld-:itinc tor tirtr h..rat .ind jor.g Bank h3 '; rt.lt agreed ro r- i de n: -. grtup- m-p -r i-mn had pouiilt a3r,.

tern -t u-r,L. t e ha. al di"-. capitali Trh rtpa. mrmnt r.tt ha; been iudtr: t:nimt, plinning Iu: .tpera-

been u- d ti. trjnsmri ft,n'armt- .-n ir:,but nrernrl, high alt a:, - el J rrrcen I u menltrhIr-n - rtn,- ..L'-ut Trh dit-

t.irnil% pl3nning Thti pru- Jd .3 'ial mit.n nr-r 11.111 pertent 1,m-m n h.-i tb-e nt, nlnvrh1,., and a larier pr-pi-rnti--n

- jr*tiin that enLc-urae acc :pat3rnct and taktr' n--an-; tr pricetaing pajdd mutt .i re practit.i m .:rltraepr.tm.n \inc.-n:

i-nr.tintrd u;-It .ct:-nirac: pten turmt ri: mu -tard -o:il dal 3:hili ti,hJand Mll mencrnbrt rca<irdi;, - -.1 a - prec -

1.ntrer -hip i- i-pen t-.3ii all c'nmnr Ih pe inur- t. r bt in i.e ;l1 t- is;.: alId nrar.n:, r mrn.rial -atu, M prrc tr -. r

purchba-e a ihire in the *: - p.ramr. e at -1I I-r 'mall -nlt rprir - -uch 3a- pi. u-n4 I-,rnml planninmng ltb rh---r .t .- h.

ten t3l..i i roug-hl, 9 1 liili Nlrnitb r niiu;I tr-. jUt.: o,id' ir t-rn .- mat- , . nd in ,- L-aId othr,- i-: ht 31 ri4 mt pregrnafrc:.

-* ,e r.-ul.rlv and attend ,etdl : c- -cr- lr*.- i- -r busing %-. at rt tC. irin ire ar irarried l- p-e.ed in tht chmldb-rinc,

ati- , n--ceting, in their m illage In i- r- --r rla.: r .lr.d t- -r ulio aiitmn In.-- ag.-'i ii t th,rd, -., r,- u :,n, a mith.:-d

.c-cierit. - all ni3rmt--; art I,.aned rt li,it l no-~t Ic-:n' ha-.-: g--n. t-' mi. id- hI c. ntra t ab-ut 1 per-.nt - t marriedamne am.runt in .- ihrr 'hr a.,munt 3rr- .l, ',a- -lrtir-rait i- mrnmtd, ,tc rrrurn cr.-n n;r t *: childbearing aoe, t it:- F-rt,tt.

t;- -irpndi --n the truniber at share- a traditi,-nnal skill -ucli a- paJd pn;r- .- ,- in .r.ntrac - rI.in IB,ing_alde;h a:r-,tal 'a' n,-- or lengti *r mnrmbtv-r;hp *ng s. tim r hi-h,rr hi.-It in 1 *l

'edit t' -ttrl,d toindi' -dual; a; trll a' Frtpirtiin is zilig t,.. -rcJup, ..- memr- Ar .-t l.r 'ri.-.t nibin,nz imr. hr

r-. gr-Li r ntt-rpriset _ Li-an; c3rr% tn ber' t.r r -ti itie that pr-i: ,3e a li-n'- -men .r an tanili, r-lannin.-- in - .1ar

inr-:re;t ra,-t at 1 3 p.r:ent Ihana-le-,r run r turn -u:h as t-h t-r-:edtng en; nt_ , n.; .uth ul.3 c Inr.den ,a It

FrIledW * -Il-:er; rr -i-.. .:-ach c: p.r-nerat - , .m.ercil:. p.,ultr-; and marnwri tardening han .ln-r: r t .,dmr--:-n lIr-,- p ulhr, r a--

I-an pr.-grarim. \il idepu pr- -icc tticcr4 F3mil. pIwlaninc -. .'n the .g:nd.:. -. ing and ir.p-pldc.ne aiic:i use annr.c

rt. -- int ri - h- I-a-. rt:,e-d 4 . r n c.cperati: t cr1 i1 riICe,:ifiu4% the f ib n,i- I r, arI ' traitt -l.-nniin a-;m ci-ri-inih; ;p-:al trairin,g n--th--d, . l' lalaNl : sidt -lI,: .ti hr ii- in ihiri-.. r- i ritfr :,.un ir -ri,

E3 ht -:-- -per-lt-.; senrd-. --ne -c--man t.- -pe-:te-i and hi-. -t.- ,--an c: -nrrta-p- i 1w, en r. tht c nan-.b hjna , nx -.;rtlI, thana-le%el T.uirng and d lI- i- t'; an1 nitde.:al aitent-n Thc.;e int,r- it- -h- lh,a 'c.r rli, N. agem

-pmin.: entri- t ral m tr-1 mrh'm 'he-- t-:.iJ in re.: i. ingm E:riit- i r ridte rrI J t .c irri r-nre ran: im, T.- -u, L nd.

ac ThefSr rrp-rc;-tnt3n i' art trained in ..:a rainima planning ard reealth I-ftc; --nd Z, ,-. arl-J -p --n;-rint plot -rol

p u-lir rai;ing; hicil'ire health and .. tphrai.- r leader- kntp Ira:k . 1 th . :t fbi pr- .-rt :- plannd pat-: nib- -namil-. planrn-n4 lianp p-lc and -. pt'r- -:.nra, pi:r statu4 .I nmembr- pr-A- almrn.- I- i- r

IJ-. :,nil pri-ceIur- The. p -n - l.in- the-. rna, hate in c-mni .h. n -h -.- thi. -rni. ivnlnttr in i --- ei- r lrcl t - . it,h Irrirh id. and -p-01-

during their rrtl. i-ttin and in -rrace,ni:.r,ni that need t- -t n-..ade lint

lets. There are plans to train health and family fertilty regulation (rhythm, withdrawal, and so on)-planning workers to insert IUDs; they are not yet in 1981, a doubling of the percentage since 1975.permitted to prescribe pills. Although access to Such an increase in use of traditional methodsabortion was liberalized as a backup service for attests to growing unmet need for more effectivecontraceptive failure more than ten years ago, safe spacing methods. Only 664 centers offer the IUD;abortion is still difficult to obtain. An estimated 4 public health midwives have not yet been trainedmillion to 6 million abortions were performed ille- to perform insertions. Injectable contraceptives aregally by unauthorized persons in 1981, compared popular in rural areas because of their conven-with 376,000 performed legally. ience, but are available at only 120 centers.

In Sri Lanka 25 percent of married couples of Although Bangladesh continues to stress sterili-childbearing age were using traditional methods of zation, its social marketing project has made avail-

175

able several types of condoms, pills, and spermi- East Asia: incentives for small familiescides. And the program has recently put moreemphasis on IUDs by offering financial incentives The countries of East Asia have experiencedto staff and compensation for travel and lost wages marked declines in fertility in the last decade (seeto acceptors. There are plans to train more Figure 8.7). Total fertility (less than 3) and rates offieldworkers in IUD insertions and menstrual reg- natural increase (about 1.5 percent a year, 2.2 per-ulation, but not all fieldworkers are in place, and cent excluding China) are the lowest of any devel-not all of those who are have received adequate oping region. For the most part, recent declines intraining. Injectable contraceptives have proved fertility have occurred in countries where fertilitypopular in pilot projects, but are available on was already lower than would be expected, givenonly a limited basis under the supervision of a the region's income. The most dramatic reductionsphysician. have been in China: total fertility dropped from 7.5

* Follozv-up. As South Asian programs try to to 2.3 over the past two decades, despite a permeet the demand for a wider range of reversible capita income of only $310 in 1982. Indonesia, themethods, following up acceptors will become even Philippines, and Thailand have also experiencedmore critical. The emphasis on sterilization has remarkably rapid falls in fertility with only modest -

meant that staff have had little continuing contact increases in income.with clients. Lack of follow-up services greatly Population policy is more developed in East Asiareduced the acceptability of the IUD throughout than in any other region. In most countries, politi-South Asia in the 1960s; it has only recently cal commitment to reduce rapid populationregained public approval. At present, family plan- growth is high. Family planning programs are wellning staff are judged (and are rewarded) according established, with outreach to rural areas and a rea-to the number of acceptors they recruit, not by the sonable mix of contraceptive methods. Many gov-number of users they assist. Programs will have to ernments, irrespective of level of income, haveadopt new performance criteria and incentive been highly successful in improving socio-arrangements to stress regular contact with clients. economic conditions favorable to fertility decline.

Certain administrative and operational difficul- Ninety percent or more of all girls of primary-ties also need to be resolved. Family planning serv- school age are enrolled in China, Hong Kong,ices have undergone major reorganization in some Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,countries. In Bangladesh, for example, health and Singapore, and Viet Nam. Overall, secondary-family planning services were initially separate, school enrollments are also high in a few coun-then integrated, then divided, and are now reinte- tries-53 percent in Malaysia, 63 percent in thegrated. The program in Pakistan has also recently Philippines, and 85 percent in Korea. Life expect-undergone a major reorganization. Whenever ancy in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore hasthere are such upheavals, staff morale and perfor- risen to seventy years or more and in most othermance suffer. Other problems are manifest in all countries exceeds sixty. In almost all countries,programs. In some cases salaries are so low that infant mortality has been reduced by half or morestaff have to take on other work to support their over the past twenty years. Nevertheless, furtherfamilies. Inadequate training, incomplete staffing substantial reductions could be made in Indonesiapatterns, and lack of supervision have also low- (where the rate exceeds 100 per thousand live -ered morale and performance. Where it exists, births), China (with a rate of 67), and Thailand, thesupervision takes the form of enforcing account- Philippines, and Viet Nam (about 50).ability and targets rather than supportive training Despite dramatic declines in fertility, populationand advice. in the region will double in about forty-five years.

Program managers have tried to overcome prob- Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thai--lems of morale and supervision in two ways: by land, and Viet Nam all have annual rates of popu-paying workers according to their performance in lation growth of at least 2 percent a year. At itsrecruiting acceptors, but this system carries the current growth rate of 2.4 percent a year, the popu-risk that follow-up services will be neglected; and lation of the Philippines will increase by half (25by setting high program targets. But neither incen- million people) by 2000. Even in China, with antives nor targets can substitute for better training annual increase of 1.2 percent, population willand supervision-the two requirements that are continue to grow rapidly for a long time because ofcritical to improving the performance of family the momentum of past growth. According to theplanning programs in South Asia. standard projection, China's population will

176

FIGURE 8.7

Fertility in relation to income: selected developing countries in East Asia, 1972 and 1982

Total fertility rate

8

* 1972

* 1982

7

6 Philippines

N for 92 developing countries, 1972

5

4

Indonesia

Thail\nd Malaysial Thailand \

\ \ Norm for ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~98 developing countries, 19823

l i ~~~~~KoreaChina

2

0 $1000 $2000 $3000 $4000 $5000 $6000

Income per capita (1980 dollars)

increase by almost half, to 1.45 billion by 2050. half the level on Java and Bali-in some placesReplacement-level fertility is still a long way off for much less. There are also marked regional dispari-Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thai- ties in access to services in the Philippines.land and Viet Nam, with total fertility rates of at In addition, some countries have overlookedleast 3.6; total fertility in Korea, at 2.7, is also still potentially important methods. The Indonesianabove replacement level. program, for example, does not offer sterilization.

Though contraceptive use is higher in East Asia Yet this method has been very popular in Souththan in most other developing regions, there is still Asia, Korea, Thailand, and some Latin Americanconsiderable unmet need for contraception. Low countries. Injectable contraceptives have beenand high estimates of unmet need are 19 to 49 much favored in Thailand but are only recentlypercent of married women of childbearing age in gaining ground in Indonesia. The Korean programthe Philippines (1978), 20 to 31 percent in Indone- has emphasized sterilization; wider promotion ofsia (1976), 15 to 26 percent in Thailand (1981), and spacing methods might also lower fertility. Theas much as 30 percent in Korea (1979). Actual fam- potential demand for spacing methods is demon-ily size exceeds desired family size by one child in strated by the high resort to abortion in Korea. Inthe Philippines. More than half of eligible couples the Philippines, improving the effectiveness of tra-who want no more children are not using any ditional methods and promoting more effectivemethod of birth control. And among the 36 percent alternatives could have a substantial effect.of Filipino couples using a method, more than half Given the relatively advanced state of popula-are using less effective methods such as with- tion policies, more use could be made of incentivesdrawal and rhythm. In some countries family plan- and disincentives. Among the countries of Eastning programs have not achieved complete geo- Asia, China, Singapore, and to a lesser extentgraphic coverage. In Indonesia, for example, Korea, have made greatest use of measures to pro-contraceptive use in the outer islands, where one- mote small families. Sometimes they have reliedthird of the country's population lives, is less than on individual incentives (such as giving priority in

177

housing schemes to parents with only two chil- same bias in favor of sons exists in Korea, and hasdren). Some countries have also offered incentives been partly responsible for keeping total fertility,to whole communities that reach specific targets now at 2.7, from declining to replacement level. Tofor contraceptive use. Some governments also counteract this bias, governments need publicpenalize those who have more than a certain num- information campaigns and legal reforms of inheri-ber of children-for example, by the withdrawal of tance, property rights, and employment. Incen-maternity benefits, tives might also be offered to one- or two-child

China has a complex structure of incentives, dis- families with girls, such as lower educational andincentives, and birth quotas to promote a one-child medical costs or preferred access to schooling.family (see Box 8.9). Most governments have notchosen to promote such drastic measures as those Donor assistance policiesin China. And few have the administrative controlnecessary to implement national schemes of International aid for population programs has twodeferred payments or social security to promote major objectives: to assist governments and pri-smaller families. vate organizations in providing family planning,

In China the one-child policy has been chal- information, and services, and to assist govern-lenged by an apparent preference for sons. The ments in developing population policies as part of

Box 8.9 China's one-child family policyBirth fitha; h-tn . ail.-fnal pr-Mit'. p.r.'n t tr;t birihe e'ce'1d e-i it.' .Vet- -'-tII -..Ah It-C,I. p't.i

in C. brd3 ;in, e l' -J.,en the ;o- crr- cent in cac' -it h th,i-ree lar4, urban. nc,'tr.hr zc.n; : .3 .i.. : cLtura'npd-

menu la)ur.chc.d a r.p.ca i pr..-- mun.c:ipattttcr'-Bcjijng Sia n c h:, and m lenu I. * ha. 1fln-, ri-. in, chilld I,

m. 'it late r marri .~e i, tr qepricing Tinl-adi . trrpi'fc t..Y I -'nc-child I ram.tt. inAnhu.

bt.' -.n birth; and i. trchdiren- I ra But 'c rat ta3c tc-re 3r~ .crkifnic .Zaif zan I -,rc..fc ,u that. rlI pcr-nr .,i the

h~ lat.. lumi; it became, .J..r that .. it' the vr~chrt'ilhd pc.lic. .hildrEni .-I n-ie-child cii t h. 'Id. r.

rheiag. nu.mttr ..I ('rO c-- n rtEring * Lt.i. -- 't. \ cL'mr-pulzo.r'. pen. ~. r, Lbc- Th.e prc;-ur.. i. ha c' ''fI

chii.ibearin, age a, rt:r-,ult -I past ht4h '.-n Se itemr appitee OnL'. i-, cMFlZ -t- --t *.htld i ard the e .'-.T ~i t ah. tID ma,ha.

(rtiht, andt tailing mcr:'ralir, etr .ni ta..nierpr.;.. in urban art.a, -h.-.I. t'd rc. rye it al ot rh~ pta-lie... e-t

pliarcc , *th a t.ri dtanil, norna c,-n-ttule at ft'i 1pren i hr 1ah..r nianticide atk-ut .h,ut i`b.. (hnt

rI..ud not r_iu:du 'tie rate .I p..-puiatirwniorc, A 1-zurx -.'. -.i rujral prcuin .o- e-inernt h a;t. pn;.dc.niiral

p .-. th iug ri~ met tie' nati.,nal -_al brireade', c-e r ifct~ e nd uniorlc - ,-ncvrrn bTh lc.42 cen,u; at .-.n birth;4

I2bIllio:n p.'-plc b, th.. car Jti.Wl In. p tti.. titnd that i ri. I pcrc..nt ..t rrEen in '-K zrot- cwci that th..re i 14 1

l-,iU-tchuaf r'.cen ~ iuc a pii. -u t.trc ad -Tnen -,%,- 'it- o.; tIr -e,r. 11iii ~rte at tŽ.rih, anr

dcE'-I ?ned Ii.. perc uadei mrt.~r rIed c --upFice, t.. tcc,,c'.cd U-..i'hi-. ptn...fl paid h- .. ci- itnotrnaili, hich tiiurt

ha~ , eti. n-...rc bar. cn:-fir:cid Eb-', p-tic. tar, lund' F.-'r the. rural mat. rr . chdl- * -. '..t'-.i- i cp.ri'

,,a, had ..d i-n a ; trnm ot e.c .n.-mtc drcr. rcrnain the. imin C-trce .t -Id~-a. t.r tinanc.ng ritncc ri' tall; .-n local

tc,- ar-i' r.' parcnt *th ra.,r 'rh iau 'it e..curit aea nut the -..e ir'at 2 -rr'enmcier C4 a

chit- -.-.h ... c'-'n;rntit d then-i P- I. *ii h.a. - TI,, r i-ie. -- IF,, The. -Je- rceuit th rm, i, Zrcma .3arati,-n .n iht' Y%\r,...m,;re and pe,nalie, -,-r it.... -prread tnr.utc ltcpid ucttc'w.n and . lu ci nct.nti-e;Ia cd.. i

hadi mn.rc than I- .- Thi- icr-,'n beca1me a reepcn-itbtit.r. e,t..nl ha; itin tahit- a oluntt -. n tIn rPr.:-,rce in I' anilk

nti-, rna p-at.-% and -di d ul at p.:- ~rc- I dittcct -zcntcincc~r.tA e v.~ ha-~ nrc. ptedzinz t.; h~a'- -ill. Im: chtid r,i.a'.. ait capected nir i mnpemnt ruch - : -hiidr..n tc.r .',reas,-n-i irn ic'-na area' crantedana 'n-, tanu it

tcn, Inr%) e. '-~, iht~-:,-prem.tr .1t aed a, land t:-r h,.u'eh-.-di.eJ I- ; aii catd rn u3n-r:-.ui aienr r. - percent ita.. a,

;p:tcai,th-at -- F"-,rccnt ri n-r.ar'tl.d a per capita ha-, ., -na,rc ch,ldr~ n ru'.ai *nc'n'c-u L-a;rt ior ithee n-~r-Il;in ith.. cite' -n. Upcr,eni n ithe en ;u.ri acce~ Ic' mi,re a3nd In addi.n..r ind e'i-.e ,ui .p' t i

-L.ntr% -de~ ,c-ui-Jd ha'- c -:'ni'. -nE h.ld v.hate. r -:cumlt ,-ttr tic ..Idt.rl% Ii prc-- Ftr their ',irgiechi the, r..ct.i' c an

P mi"n.;r pr"-_ .nce~ eand municipali- idc c.r actie i. h; 'ltI adult oriiratflall.*. anice~ and aep~atIc' had irntr'-dJu :d tnt r'.e,ad den- reduced a; _I'ecti. e in.,.n): -me d.t, r.; in health rat a11-. . ari,c ,c InEt~r HL .- it.

cn It. It' pr -nr-it.- ri ht -ne~-ch IId nir a n elit-mt to ccontL'at hi --- ebad. -th,p. in.. nu,c adr- p'tr

Ea,rl, 1e l,. ei.rtli anacr h-.3C- minrod.uc-d a d-b. C niH-tn .- cre n-uch ---. e- -nc-tnt., pa. nren

;.-n' -r,ritlo Th~ prcr.pcrtic.n i2t tir..t ;,~t..ne under hich hc.u-hc.ld, are 'Ii i.n ir I. nter-. .ua'- a it,- i.t' 1a

birth. .'ut *~~t ictat btrtb; ncr.. aled from ure.iicd bcr,h Ir. deli cr their ol..4'. 'ta i ti,-n.'br.e ~-me r-, .; -a ah bi-a n

2! t re c*n *n ... 42 percent in 1%)l 1 rm curput rc the r'at- and I., rr..urn .rc .cn n-hig t l

anJI 4- percent in lw a4l B'. r h..r' -. tr-r.m ha' rf in. ur.-au,h-.t,.'c. t''rrh

178

their overall development strategy. Population FIGURE 8.8

assistance now amounts to nearly $500 million a External assistance for population programs in

year, equal to about 1.9 percent of OECD aid and developing countries

about 1.5 percent of OPEC aid. At its peak, the Dollars per capitapopulation assistance share of aid was consider- Current dollars (1982 constant prices)

500 0. 20ably larger-2.2 percent of OECD aid.

Since Sweden's first population grant in 1968,donors have transferred more than $7 billion in 400

population aid (in 1982 prices). In terms of per cap-ita receipts in the developing countries, assistancefor population programs was lower in 1981 (the 300 / \

latest year for which complete data are available) nstantdollars- than in 1974, the year of the World Population (per capita)

Conference in Bucharest (see Figure 8.8). The 200

United States remains the biggest supporter of dollarspopulation programs-its government, along with (millions)

private American foundations, provides about 40 100 0.I

percent of all aid for population. But its contribu- 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981

tion has been falling in real terms since 1972. Japanis the second largest donor. Japan and other Source. UNFPA, 1983.

donors, including Canada, the Federal Republic ofGermany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden,have increased their share of the total. All gave $10million or more in population assistance in 1982.

The main role of donors has been to provide sup- vide a local base for social and economic researchplies and training for family planning and related as well as for contraceptive research.health programs; about two-thirds of population Donor assistance is provided both directly toaid is devoted to family planning and related country programs and through multilateral andmaternal and child-health programs. Donors also nongovernmental organizations. The two largestsupport basic data collection, operations and social organizations are:and economic research, information and education * The United Nations Fund for Population Activitiesactivities, and policy and institutional develop- (UNFPA). More than 130 countries contribute to itsment. In Asia and the Middle East, over 80 percent annual budget of about $140 million. About 100of assistance goes toward family planning services, developing countries have requested and receivedin Latin America and Africa about 60 percent. In UNFPA assistance. To guide its programming,sub-Saharan Africa, almost a fifth of assistance is UNFPA has assessed the needs of more than sev-used to finance data collection; as Table 8.1 enty countries. It receives requests for assistanceshowed, data development is often an early step in that far exceed the money it has available.heightening consciousness about population * Thle International Planned Parenthood Federation

-issues. As shown in Chapter 7, program develop- (IPPF). A nongovernmental body of more than onement is often constrained by limited training, the hundred national family planning associations,

-absence of local institutions, and poor demo- IPPF had a 1983 program budget of $90 million,graphic information. Development of local capabil- over half of which came as contributions fromity must continue to be a priority for donors. OECD countries. About one-third of its budget

- About $150 million is spent by donor govern- support is raised by member associations in theirments for research on reproductive biology and own countries. Countries receiving its largestcontraceptive technology; such research contrib- grants in recent years are Brazil, Colombia, India,utes to methods that can be adopted in developing Mexico, and Korea.countries as well. Developing countries could ben- About one-quarter of the population aid fromefit from larger sums spent on research and prod- the US government is administered through moreuct development. Support by donors is critical than twenty nongovernmental organizations insince spending by the private sector in developed the United States, particularly universities andcountries has fallen (see Box 7.2). Donor support research institutions. They cooperate with organi-could hasten development of institutions to pro- zations in developing countries in service delivery

179

and training, data collection and analysis, special extremely important for effective use of populationprojects, and biomedical and operations research. assistance.Family Planning International Assistance, a branch One sign of the success of international assis-of The Planned Parenthood Federation of America, tance is that many local governments now helpthe American affiliate of IPPF, provides population pay for programs that only a few years ago wereassistance in more than forty countries. The Popu- supported by international grants. Colombia,lation Council, with a budget of $16 million from Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand are picking up aboth public and private sources, provides technical progressively larger share of the costs of their pop-assistance and supports social science and contra- ulation programs. India has for many years paidceptive research. The Pathfinder Fund is an exam- for a large share of its program, and China hasple of smaller nongovernmental organizations. always completely financed its own program. ThisPathfinder manages about $7 million in public and trend toward self-financing makes it possible toprivate funds, which are spent on innovative fam- reallocate aid budgets to countries that are onlyily planning services, women's programs, and starting to develop their population programs. Forpopulation policy development. These small pro- example, the share of the UNFPA's budget goinggrams, and similar programs in other countries, to Africa rose from about 12 percent during theadd to the flexibility and responsiveness of popula- 1970s to 23 percent in 1983.tion assistance. Asia continues to receive the bulk of population

The World Bank supports population activities assistance (51 percent of the total), followed bythrough IDA credits and loans to borrowers. Over Latin America (20 percent), Africa (15 percent),a period of fourteen years, the Bank has committed and the Middle East (14 percent). Given the$355 million for population projects, and had dis- emerging pattern of needs described in Chapter 7,bursed $215 million by the end of 1983 (including a substantial increase in assistance is needed, espe-$38.4 million in fiscal year 1983 itself). World Bank cially for Africa and South Asia. To meet unmetfinance is not available on terms as easy as most need in all regions in 1980 would have requiredpopulation assistance, much of which is given in spending $3 billion rather than the $2 billion thatthe form of grants; nonetheless, Bank operations was actually spent (see Chapter 7, Table 7.6). Bygrew in real terms by more than 5 percent a year the same yardstick, spending for population pro-between 1977 and 1983. Over the past three years grams in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asiathe largest disbursements have gone to Bangla- should have been more than double what it was.desh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Since Africa and South Asia are the poorestand Thailand, which together accounted for more regions and most in need of external assistance,than 90 percent of Bank lending for population. the bulk of the extra program support would have

The World Bank also supports an active program had to have come from international aid.of economic and sector work aimed at enhancing The analysis in Chapter 7 led to two estimates ofunderstanding of how population growth affects required public spending for population programsdevelopment prospects and how population pro- by the year 2000. If developing countries are tograms can contribute to overall development. The achieve a "rapid" decline in fertility, $7.6 billionBank cooperates with other UN organizations, (in 1980 dollars), almost a quadrupling of 1980especially UNFPA and the World Health Organiza- spending, would be needed. The "standard"tion, in research and analysis requested by mem- decline would require $5.6 billion. With two-thirdsber governments. of external population assistance going to support

The predominance of foreign assistance within family planning, foreign aid now supports aboutthe population sector in many countries means 25 percent of all family planning costs in develop-that the attitudes and priorities of donors become ing countries. Assuming these proportions do not'significant. At the same time, the great number of change, population assistance will need to tripledonors-private, official, bilateral, and multila- (standard decline) or quadruple (rapid decline) itsteral-means that their priorities may not always current level. A quadrupling would raise popula-coincide. They may send conflicting signals to tion assistance to an annual level of $2 billion (1980host governments, fueling internal controversies. dollars) by the year 2000. With no other changes inFurther, their numerous activities may not be official development assistance, total aid for allcomplementary or represent the most efficient assistance programs would increase by 5 percent,allocation of resources. Coordination among by no means an unmanageable addition to aiddonors and with the host government is therefore budgets. With the expected growth of industrial

180

countries as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, and aid from donors can, given effective policies in recipi-as a constant share of their GNP, expanded popu- ent countries, make a big difference in populationlation assistance would by the year 2000 need to change. Sustained progress, however, requires notequal 3.3 percent (to achieve standard fertility just donor funds; it also requires a commitment bydecline) or 4.3 percent (to achieve rapid fertility the international community to population pro-decline) of total concessional assistance. grams as a critical part of the effort to improve

Thus, small differences in financial assistance people's lives.

181

9 Ten years of experience

Much that is new about the two themes of this another group of middle-income countries. ManyReport has been revealed in the past ten years. In of them, principally in East Asia, have managed to1974, with oil prices quadrupled and the world maintain rapid economic growth without runningsliding into recession, there was pessimism about into serious balance of payments difficulties. Thethe economic prospects of the non-oil developing most successful-Korea and Hong Kong, for exam-countries. In 1974, at the World Population Confer- ple-had GDP growth of more than 10 percent aence in Bucharest, there was debate about the rela- year in 1974-79, slowing down to about 6 percent ative merits of development and family planning year in 1980-83. Although they increased theirprograms as alternative ways of slowing down external debt in the past ten years, they expandedpopulation growth. Today, both these issues are their exports so rapidly that their debt serviceviewed in a different light; neither economic pessi- ratios never rose as much as did some in Latinmism nor the development-family planning America.dichotomy captures what has actually happened in The contrasting performance of these twodeveloping countries. The achievements of the groups of middle-income countries is the result ofdeveloping countries have been much more var- their contrasting policies. East Asian countriesied, but they do point to one general conclusion of have in general adopted policies to promotegreat importance. In both economic growth and exports, largely by maintaining competitivepopulation, differences among countries are exchange rates. This has enabled them to expandlargely attributable to differences in policy. their exports rapidly, has restricted imports on the

basis of price rather than by quota, and has not

Economic adjustment made foreign loans seem attractively cheap indomestic currency terms. East Asian countries

Much attention has been paid to the difficulties of have also tended to maintain positive real interestdeveloping countries that borrowed heavily in the rates, which have encouraged domestic saving and1970s but then found that they could not service have ensured that investment has been directed totheir debts. Many of those countries have had to the areas of highest return. Their future prospectsseek the support of the IMF and the collaboration depend largely on their maintaining the same suc-of banks and governments in rescheduling debts cessful mix of policies. But those policies willand arranging new credits. Most have also cut achieve their full potential only if the industrial -

back on imports, a reduction that has improved countries eschew the trade barriers that wouldtheir external accounts but at considerable cost to hold back exports.economic growth, investment, and employment. A third group of developing countries has expe-This short-term cost has underlined the priority of rienced only slow economic growth in the past tentheir longer-term task-to redirect their economies years, and its future looks little brighter than itsto earn more foreign exchange so that growth, past. This group includes many of the poorestalong with external accounts, can be restored to countries in the world, mainly in sub-Saharanhealthy levels. Their efforts deserve the support of Africa. These countries have been badly affectedthe international community, both in providing aid by slow growth in the industrial world, which hasand trade credits and, above all, in resisting any weakened the prices of many of the primary com-protectionist measures that would hamper the modities on which they still depend for about 90debtor countries' exports. percent of their export earnings. They have had

Prominent though they are, the problems of big difficulties in servicing the little commercial debtdebtors should not obscure the achievements of they have; their capital inflows are largely in offi-

182

cial aid, which has risen in real terms at only 6.5 end of the scale, middle-income major exporters ofpercent a year in the past ten years, not much manufactures would enjoy GDP growth averagingabove the rate of growth of population. 6.3 percent a year in 1985-95. The diversity that

The problems of sub-Saharan Africa are of a dif- has been such a prominent feature of the worldferent order from those faced by the middle- economy in the past ten years seems likely toincome countries. Most African countries still lack persist.the institutions and human skills that are prerequi-sites for rapid economic growth. These resources Population change: success and new challengeneed to be developed as a matter of urgency, andsubstantial foreign assistance must be forthcoming The accumulating evidence on population changeto finance the effort. Nevertheless, African coun- in developing countries underscores the strongtries could do much to improve their prospects by link between fertility decline and the general levelreforming their policies. Even among the poorest of socioeconomic development, and the contribu-countries, some have done better than others, tion that family planning programs can make tolargely by raising producer prices to farmers, by slowing population growth. Differences in fertilitymaintaining competitive exchange rates, and in among and within countries are related less togeneral by using prices rather than government income per person than to life expectancy, femaledirectives to allocate resources. literacy, and the income of poorer groups. They

The need for adjustment is not confined to the are also related to availability of family planningdeveloping countries. Part I of this Report argued services. Thus Sri Lanka has lower fertility thanthat many of the failings in the world economy India, and India has lower fertility than Pakistan.have their roots in the industrial countries, whose Colombia has lower fertility than Brazil, and Brazilfinancial and economic weight greatly influences has lower fertility than Peru. Egypt has lower fer-economic prospects in the developing world. To tility than Morocco. Countries which have made avarying degrees, the industrial countries have substantial and sustained effort in family planningbeen unwilling to tackle the rigidities in their econ- have achieved remarkable success; where educa-omies. They have maintained capacity in obsoles- tion is widespread, the success is even more strik-cent industries, by subsidies or by restricting ing. The evidence accumulated in the past decadeimports. Their macroeconomic policies caused, is especially convincing. Contraceptive use tripledfirst, a rapid inflationary buildup in the 1970s and and fertility fell by 30 percent in Mexico betweenthen, in the past three years of disinflation, high 1974 and 1979. In Java, Indonesia, contraceptivereal interest rates resulting from the conflict use rose from 11 percent to more than 50 percentbetween monetary restraint and relative fiscal and total fertility fell from almost 5 to about 4laxity. between 1974 and 1980. In Kerala state of India,

Until the industrial countries correct these the total fertility fell from 4.1 in 1972 to 2.7 in 1978;underlying weaknesses, the prospects for the per capita income is low, but female literacy is highworld economy will remain clouded. Some sce- and family planning services are widespread.narios presented in Chapter 3 suggest that, with- But there is also evidence that further fertilityout an improvement in the performance of the decline, and the initiation of decline where it hasindustrial countries, GDP in the developing world not begun, will not come automatically. There areas a whole would grow at only 4.7 percent a year in two points to bear in mind. One is that in most1985-95. Within that total, growth in sub-Saharan developing countries desired family size is aboutAfrica would be as low as 2.8 percent a year. This is four. It is higher in rural areas and among the lessless than the likely rate of population growth, so educated. Without sustained improvements in liv-that people in many of the world's poorest coun- ing conditions, desired family size could remaintries would get steadily poorer. Among developing around four-implying population growth rates atcountries as a group, improvement in domestic or above 2 percent. The second is that family plan-policies could raise growth to 5.1 percent a year if ning programs, successful as they have been, haveindustrial-country growth is weak. Even with by no means reached their full potential. In virtu-faster growth in the industrial countries (and no ally every country surveyed, many couples whochange in domestic policies), Africa's prospects say they want no more children do not use contra-would not brighten much; GDP growth of 3.2 per- ception-usually because they have poor access tocent a year in that region in 1985-95 would not be modern services. In many areas where services areenough to raise per capita incomes. At the other available, discontinuation rates are high-often

183

because few effective methods are offered, and which in turn means new investments just tobecause follow-up services are limited. maintain per capita output. In cities, rapid popula-

It has been almost two decades since the peak of tion growth heightens the organizational andpopulation growth in developing countries was administrative difficulties of managing urbanpassed. But the turnaround to slower growth has growth; redistribution policies offer little relief atbeen slow and has not occurred everywhere. high cost.Increases in population size are projected to mount Population growth would not be a problem iffor another two decades, and in many countries of economic and social adjustments could be madethe developing world, populations will triple in fast enough, if technical change could be guaran-size by the year 2050, even assuming substantial teed, or if rapid population growth itself inspireddeclines in fertility. Two decades after the turn- technical change. But rapid population growth, ifaround, the slow pace of change and its uneven anything, makes adjustment more difficult. Itincidence point more than ever to rapid population brings at best only the gradual adaptation that isgrowth as a central development concern. typical of agriculture, maintaining but not increas-

ing per capita output. The money and research

A development problem skills needed for modern technological change areoverwhelmingly in the rich countries, where pop-

The focus of this Report has been different from ulation growth is slow. If anything they produceneomalthusian descriptions of population as a labor-saving, not labor-using, innovations. Inproblem. World population has grown faster, to today's developed countries fertility was never ashigher numbers, than Malthus would have imag- high as in developing countries now, and mortal-ined; world production and income have grown ity fell more slowly. Population growth rarelytoo. The future may be more difficult; in the very exceeded 1.5 percent a year; rural populationlong run, history may seem to vindicate Malthus growth had virtually ended by the beginning ofand the problem of population may indeed be one the twentieth century.of numbers outrunning world resources. But forthe next five or six decades, the problem goes Appropriate policiesbeyond one of global resources and is less easilyamenable to any technological fix. It is a mismatch Part 11 of this Report dwells at length on the mean-between population and income-producing ability, ing and implications of a paradox. On the onea mismatch that leaves many of the world's people hand, the social costs of large families are high,in a vicious circle of poverty and high fertility. In and in some families children suffer directly fromthis Report rapid population growth is associated, having many siblings. On the other hand, poorat household and national levels, with slower parents make a reasonable choice in having manyprogress in raising living standards, especially of children. High infant and child mortality and poorthe poor. At the national and the family level, educational and job opportunities mean that par-rapid population growth exacerbates the difficult ents with few children cannot feel secure aboutchoice between higher levels of living now and their own future until they have had four or fiveinvestment, for example in children's schooling, to babies-including, in some settings, two or threebring higher levels of living in the future. It is the sons. The very idea of planning pregnancies maypoor who have many children; caught by the pov- be unknown, and modern contraceptives may beerty of their parents, those children carry their dis- unavailable or expensive. In such a context, each.advantages into the next generation. Still rapid individual family's decision to have another childpopulation growth in most countries-2 percent to seems rational. Yet added together, these separatemore than 4 percent a year-means up to 50 per- decisions make all families, and especially chil-cent of populations are under age fifteen, so job dren, worse off in the end. There is a gap betweencreation for many years will be a formidable task. the private and social gains to large families. TheFor some countries and many rural families, high gap is caused in large part by poverty and thefertility means extra resources must go into agri- resulting lack of access to opportunities that wouldculture just to keep pace with food requirements. encourage small families.In many countries still largely dependent on agri- The process of economic development itself gen-culture, there is little or no unused land that can be erates new signals that lower fertility. Decisionscheaply brought under cultivation; raising produc- change as women become more educated, as moretion means increasing yields on existing land, children survive childhood disease, as children

184

become less valuable as workers and sources of As Chapter 7 showed, if current public expendi-old-age security, and as information about the pos- tures on family planning in developing countriessibility of birth control spreads. Parents time the were increased by 50 percent, it would be possiblebirths of children, have fewer of them, and spend to meet the need that more than 65 million couplesmore on their health and schooling. now have for family planning services. Quadru-

The gap between the private and social gains to pling the funds by the year 2000 is necessary tohigh fertility provides additional justification for bring the "rapid" fertility decline described ingovernments to act in areas that already merit gov- Chapter 4. These targets are ambitious but noternment action. This Report has emphasized pol- hugely expensive: quadrupling the foreign aidicy measures to increase people's welfare as well spent on population programs would mean spend-as (and as a means) to reduce fertility: education ing a total of about $2 billion (in 1980 dollars),(particularly for girls) and more primary health equivalent to about 5 percent of all aid programs incare for mothers and children. But it has also noted 1982. A new generation of programs is now build-that measures to raise living standards take time to ing on the past, emphasizing easier access throughlower fertility. On the one hand, this underscores outreach programs, and, to reduce discontinua-

- the need to act now to improve education, to tion, greater choice of methods, follow-up of cli-reduce mortality, and to improve women's oppor- ents, and better communication between pro-tunities, so that a sustained decline in fertility can viders and clients. These programs are notbe realized in the long run. On the other hand, it expensive but will require new financing to reachalso means that other actions with a more immedi- growing numbers of users.ate payoff are desirable. Virtually no developing This Report has shown that economic and socialcountry is yet doing all it might to promote later progress helps slow population growth; but it hasmarriage and to inform people of the health and also emphasized that rapid population growthfertility benefits of breastfeeding. And in countries hampers economic development. It is thereforein which parents have only as many children as imperative that governments act simultaneouslythey want, but the desired number of children is on both fronts. For the poorest countries, develop-still high, carefully designed financial incentives ment may not be possible at all, unless slower pop-provide an additional mechanism to encourage ulation growth can be achieved soon, even beforelower fertility. higher real incomes would bring down fertility

At the same time, new data on fertility and con- spontaneously. In middle-income countries, a con-traceptive use show that many couples still have tinuation of high fertility among poor people couldmore children than they want and do not benefit prolong indefinitely the period before develop-from adequate family planning services. The gap ment significantly affects their lives. No one wouldbetween actual and desired family size means that argue that slower population growth alone willa public policy to provide family planning informa- ensure progress; poor economic growth, poverty,tion and services will bring fertility closer to and inequality can persist independently of popu-socially desirable levels at the same time that it lation change. But evidence described in thishelps couples have the number of children they Report seems conclusive: because poverty andwant. Though the private sector might be expected rapid population growth reinforce each other,to fill this need, and has done so to some extent in donors and developing countries must cooperateurban areas, it cannot make much progress in rural in an effort to slow population growth as a majorareas, where backup health systems are poor and part of the effort to achieve development.information about birth control spreads onlyslowly,

185

Population data supplement

The six tables and two maps in this Supplement culated by applying a schedule of age-specific fer-provide demographic and policy-related data in tility rates, scaled to agree with the given totaladdition to those presented in the World Develop- fertility rate, to the female population, classifiedment Indicators, Tables 19-25. In the tables of this by age group, for the period. These births enter -

Supplement, countries are listed in ascending the population as the youngest cohort; each cohortorder of 1982 income per capita, except for those grows older in accordance with assumed mortalityfor which no GNP per capita can be calculated. conditions.These are listed in alphabetical order, in italics, at The fertility assumptions were entered in thethe end of the per capita income group into which form of total and age-specific fertility rates, andthey probably fall. An alphabetical listing of coun- mortality assumptions in the form of expectationstries and the reference numbers indicating this of life at birth or mortality levels based on stan-order can be found in the key to the Indicators. dardized life tables. Migration assumptions were

Tables 1 and 3 through 6 include only low- and entered in the form of the number of net migrantsmiddle-income countries for which data are avail- in each five-year period by sex and age; the ageable. In Tables 3 through 6, countries with fewer distribution of migrants was obtained from athan one million inhabitants are listed under a sep- model on the basis of their overall sex ratio. Migra-arate heading in ascending order of 1982 income tion assumptions do not vary for alternative fertil-per capita, except for those for which no GNP per ity and mortality scenarios, but for most countriescapita can be calculated. The latter are listed in net migration was assumed to reach zero by 2000.alphabetical order, in italics, at the end of the table. The sources of data for base-year population esti-

Figures in the colored bands are summary mea- mates are discussed in the technical note to Tablesures for groups of countries. The letter w after a 19 of the World Development Indicators.summary measure indicates that it is a weighted For the standard projection, the future path for fer-average, the letter t that it is a total. Figures in tility is based on the experience of a group of coun-italics are for years other than, but generally tries for which a judgment regarding the futurewithin, two years of those specified. The symbol year of reaching replacement-level fertility could(.) indicates less than half the unit shown, . . not be made with relative confidence. The assumedavailable, and n.a. not applicable. All data are sub- year for replacement-level fertility in these coun-ject to the same cautions regarding reliability and tries was regressed on several predictors: the cur-cross-country comparability that are noted in the rent total fertility rate for each country, the changeWorld Development Indicators. in this rate over the previous ten years, the propor-

tion of couples using contraception, and the cur-

Table 1. Population projections rent female life expectancy. On the basis of this,regression, a year for reaching replacement-level

The population projections here as well as in Table fertility (constrained to fall between the years 200019 of the World Development Indicators were and 2050) was calculated for every country. (Fertil-made on the basis of a World Bank computer pro- ity in industrial countries already below replace-gram that uses a modified cohort-component ment level was assumed to rise to replacement bymethod to simulate the effects of various fertility, 2000.) For each country a curve was mathemati-mortality, and migration assumptions on future cally fitted for the course of the total fertility ratepopulation size and age structure in successive between the current year and the year of replace-five-year periods. Births for each period were cal- ment-level fertility. The curves were chosen to pro-

186

vide accelerating decline early on (in some cases Table 2. Population compositionafter a few years of constant fertility), followed bydecelerating decline as fertility approaches replace- The dependency ratio is the combined populationment level. Fertility is assumed to remain at under fifteen and over sixty-four years as a per-replacement level once it has been reached. centage of the population between those ages. The

The future path for mortality is based on the dependency ratio for 2000 is derived from theassumption that increments to life expectancy standard World Bank population projections useddepend on the level reached. Changes in female in Table 1 of this Supplement and in Table 19 of thelife expectancies between 1965-69 and 1975-79 World Development Indicators.were regressed on the initial life expectancies, sep-arately for two groups of countries: those withfemale primary-school enrollment percentages Table 3. Contraceptive use and unmet needunder 70, and those with percentages of 70 ormore (including developed countries). Estimates Current use of contraception is expressed as the per-of one-year increments were obtained by dividing centage of currently married women aged 15-49the estimated ten-year increments from these two using each method of contraception. For El Salva-equations by ten. dor, Thailand, Guatemala, Jamaica, Korea, Pan-

Alternative projections build in more rapid fertil- ama, and Venezuela the base is currently marriedity and mortality decline. For rapid fertility decline women aged 15-44; for Kenya and Sudan it isthe future path of fertility is based on the experi- ever-married women aged 15-50. Sterilizationence of eleven developing countries, including includes both male and female sterilization. VaginalChina, Colombia, and Thailand, that have had methods include spermicides and the diaphragm.rapid fertility decline since World War II. Once fer- Other methods include rhythm, withdrawal, absti-tility decline began in these countries, the total fer- nence, and in some cases douche and folk meth-tility rate fell by a roughly constant amount-about ods. The sum of prevalence for each method may0.2-every year. A constant linear decline at the not add to the total because of rounding.average pace of these eleven countries provides Low and high estimates of unmet need for contra-the path for rapid fertility decline, with the added ception are calculated only for women who wantproviso that decline ends when replacement level no more children; they do not include women whois reached and fertility thereafter stays at replace- wish to delay a birth. The loul estimate includesment level. married women of reproductive age who want no

Summary measures for country groups may dif- more children, are not using any method of contra-fer from those in Table 19 of the Indicators because ception, and are exposed to the risk of pregnancyprojections were not computed for all countries. (that is, are fecund, not pregnant, not breastfeed-

For rapid mortality decline, a logistic curve was ing, or breastfeeding more than a year). The highderived to represent the trend in life expectancy estimate includes, in addition to the above, thoseamong developing countries between 1960 and who are using less effective contraceptive methods1980 (see the chart in Box 4.5). Fourteen countries (rhythm, withdrawal, and the like), as well asthat substantially outperformed this curve (and those breastfeeding less than one year.had initial life expectancies above forty) were used Data for contraceptive prevalence and unmetto derive a second logistic curve. This second curve need are all from nationally representative Worldprovided the time path for rapid mortality decline. Fertility Surveys (WFS) and Contraceptive Preva-

The rate of natural increase is the difference lence Surveys (CPS) for the years specified. Thebetween births and deaths per hundred popula- figures for contraceptive use may differ from fig-

.tion. Summary measures are weighted by popula- ures in Table 20 of the World Development Indica-tion in 1982. tors because more recent estimates, based not on

The total fertility rate represents the number of surveys but on family planning program statistics,children that would be born to a woman if she are included there. Figures in italics refer to earlierwere to live to the end of her childbearing years years than stated: Bangladesh (1979), Sri Lankaand were to bear children at each age at prevailing (1975), Tunisia (1978), Jamaica (1975-76), Panamaage-specific fertility rates. The rate for 2000 is given (1976), and Mexico (1978). Surveys in three coun-under the assumptions of both standard and rapid tries did not achieve national coverage: Sudanfertility decline. Summary measures are weighted (northern population only); Mauritania (sedentaryby 1982 population. population only); and Malaysia (peninsula only).

187

Table 4. Factors influencing fertility percentage of males aged fifteen and over who canread and write divided by the percentage of

The mean number of living children includes children females aged fifteen and over who can read andliving at the time of the survey. Desired family size is write. Data are from UNESCO, WFS, and CPS.based on the response to the question: "If you The percentage aged 15-49 ever enrolled in primarycould choose exactly the number of children to school was estimated by assigning past primary-have in your whole life, how many would that school enrollment rates to five-year age groups ofbe?" Figures are the means for survey respondents the 1980 population aged 15-49 and weightingwho gave numerical answers. these rates by the proportion of each five-year age

Both the number of living children and desired group in the total 1980 population aged 15-49.family size generally pertain to all ever-married The singulate mean age at marriage is the mean agewomen aged 15-49, with the exception of Sudan at first marriage among people who marry by ageand Kenya (aged 15-50), Costa Rica and Panama 50. It is calculated using data on the proportion(aged 20-49), Venezuela (aged 15-44), and Mauri- ever married in each age group of the current pop-tania (aged 12-50). Desired family size figures for ulation, and thus does not reflect the experience ofGhana and Turkey are for currently married any particular age cohort. The sources for thiswomen, and for Barbados for all women of child- column are Smith (1980) and Balkaran and Smithbearing age. Living children data for Barbados, (forthcoming), as cited in the notes for Table 4, andKenya, and Nigeria are for all women of childbear- various WFS country reports.ing age. The economically active population includes the

The percentage of women aged 15-19 ever married armed forces and the unemployed but excludesincludes common-law and consensual unions, as housewives, students, and other inactive groups.well as legal marriages. Data are from the US Bureau of the Census.

Mean duration of breastfeeding is the number ofmonths a woman would breastfeed, on average, if Table 6. Famnily planning policyshe followed current practice. It is derived usinglife-table techniques and survey data on current Support for family plantning exists if a governmentbreastfeeding status for all births. subsidizes family planning services. Governments

Sources for this table are WFS and CPS surveys are characterized as providing support for demo-for the years specified, as reported in country graphic and other reasons (that is, specifically toreports and in the following publications: Maryson reduce population growth, as well as for other rea-Hodgson and Jane Gibbs, "Children Ever Born," sons), support for health and human rights reasons,WFS Comparativye Studies no. 12, 1980; Robert E. or no support.Lightbourne and Alphonse L. MacDonald, "Fam- Indicators of support and year the official familyilv Size Preferences," WFS Comparative Studies no. planning program started are based on the following14, 1982; Benoit Ferry and David P. Smith, "Breast- sources: Dorothy Nortman and Joanne Fisher, Pop-feeding Differentials," WFS Comparative Studies no. ulation and Family Planning Programs: A Compendium23, 1983; Hazel Ashurst and John B. Casterline, of Data through 1981 (New York: Population Coun-"Socioeconomic Differentials in Current Fertility," cil, 1982); John A. Ross, ed., International Encyclope-WFS Comparative Studies: Additional Tables, forth- dia of Population (New York: The Free Press, 1982);coming; David P. Smith, "Age at First Marriage," United Nations, Department of International Eco-WFS Comparative Studies no. 87, 1980; and Sundat nomic and Social Affairs, Population Division,Balkaran and David P. Smith, "Marriage Dissolu- "Population Policy Briefs: Current Situation intion and Remarriage," WFS Comparative Studies: Developing Countries and Selected Territories,Additional Tables, forthcoming. Figures in italics are 1982"; and World Bank sources.for years other than those specified: Bangladesh The family planning index for 1972 and 1982 is(1975-76), Indonesia (1979), Korea (1974), and adapted from the background paper by RobertTunisia (1980). The figure on percentage of women Lapham and W Parker Mauldin. They assigned aaged 15-19 ever married for Indonesia is from the numerical index to countries on the basis of1979 National Socioeconomic Survey. responses to detailed questionnaires of individuals

familiar with family planning activities in each

Table 5. Status of women country. An average of three respondents percountry assessed such factors as official political

The ratio of adult mnale to adult female literacy is the commitment, availability and quality of family

188

planning services (public and commercial), the maximum possible index are recorded as A, 60method mix, outreach, use of mass media, local to 79 percent as B, 40 to 59 percent as C, 20 to 39financial support, and record keeping and evalua- percent as D, and 0 to 19 percent as E.tion. Countries that received 80 percent or more of

Contraceptive prevalence

;-w f ~ - ;- '-C;

a_ --- |i Jo

~~. -,- r

_ 0-9 percent - Colors on this map represent the per- which also gives prevalence rates by_ 10-34 percent ~~ centage of women of reproductive age type of contraception, and Table 20 of

_. 04 ecn (15 to 49 years) who use any type of the World Development lndicators.U 35-59 percent contraception. Countnies colored yel- The range of contraceptive prevalence

* 60-100 percent low, for example, have fewer than 10 for Brazil has been estimated, basedDaantavial percent of married women using con- on data from private sources and sur-

_L aant vial traception. The data are from Table 3, veys in several states.

These charts show the prevalence of Colombia Sri Lanka Thailandspecific contraceptive methods in three Sterilization 1978 1982 1978developing countries. The method mix Fmlvaries greatly across countries, though Mleffective modern methods generally >-<-Ax2F!-->2Wpredominate. Similar variability exists Pill / .'ii\ /,,,6f across developed countries. \/ ; ¢

IUD t -

spermicide Rhythm, withdrawal,and other

A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~8

Births and total fertility

=Iceland

= nada IrelandEl Norwa

United Kingdom Swede

United States a

2 _ F~~~~~~~~~~~~rance Czechoslovakia [ I_ , Spam ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SwitzC Pusg,ry Romania|

0 Bahamas

F C: I t g Lt 2 Puerto Rico (US) garia Turkey

~~~~~~~~~~~~r3rl-. .. -. ?...rnP,al : ,.Irv.^tp,

.r St. Lur ; 1

E. Grenadae. at

--- Trinidad and Toba r

Panam C = m lG[me CGa - ?C ,nn- - . .

Colombia Venezuela e er -i

Argentina i-.,s :. |. I - I 2 rR |>,zh3rLr L arazil I L<L ll ger & f ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Etroox,.a

|~~~~~~~~~~- tr.. It r

L r Paraguay | nnwai AIrr a n Pe- | ..... ,,

Chile| | ; U ruguay E I...'.'.- tt3 erJ - hilrana |

rgent na ~ ~ 3to4.

Number ofr i rt hs~ ;r

3 to4.44.5 to 5.9

|6 or more

Number of births

-1,000,000

- 50,000

190

I I_ 1, . z . ., . -,, | z ' ' ! .~~~~~Chin Re. o

M C. Ko~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rNewa leoiGAram (US)

Western Saa

U Fili

c3New Caledonia

Countries on this map are drawn in Australia (Fr)

proportion to the number of births in []New Zealand

1982. Thus India, with more than 24million births, appears as the largestcountry, and China, with about 21million births, is slightly smaller. Thecolors represent each country's totalfertility rate, which corresponds to thenumber of births a woman wouldhave if during her childbearing yearsshe were to bear children at each agein accord with current age-specific fer-tility rates.

191

Table 1. Population projections

Rate of natural Total fertilityProjected population (millions) increase, 2000 rate, 2000

Population Standard Rapid fertility Rapid fertility and Rapid Rapid(millions) projection decline only mortality decline Standard fertility Standard fertilitymid-1982 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 projection decline projection decline

Low-income economies 2,276 t 3,107 t 5,092 t 2,917 t 4,021 t 2,931 t 4,225 t 1.6 w 1.1 w 3.0 w 2.3 wChina 1,008 1,196 1,450 1,196 1,450 1,185 1,462 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0Other low-income 1,268 t 1,911 t 3,642 t 1,721 t 2,571 t 1,746 t 2,763 t 2.0 w 1.2 w 3.9 w 2.6 w

1 .Chad 5 7 17 6 8 6 9 2.4 1.0 5.6 2.72. Bangladesh 93 157 357 136 212 139 230 2.6 1.3 5.1 2.83. Ethiopia 33 57 164 48 77 50 84 3.0 1.3 6.1 2.94. Nepal 15 24 54 21 31 22 35 2.4 1.1 5.3 2.85. Mali 7 12 31 10 16 10 17 3.0 1.3 6.0 2.9

6. Burma 35 53 99 48 73 48 77 2.0 1.2 3.6 2.37. Zaire 31 55 136 45 73 46 79 3.1 1.4 5.8 2.78. Malawi 7 12 35 10 17 10 19 3.3 1.9 7.1 4.09. UpperVolta 7 10 25 8 13 9 15 2.9 1.3 6.0 2.9

10. Uganda 14 25 67 21 35 21 39 3.3 1.7 6.4 3.2

11. India 717 994 1,513 927 1,313 938 1.406 1.5 1.1 2.9 2.412. Rwanda 6 11 34 9 17 9 19 3.8 2.2 7.6 4.513. Burundi 4 7 20 6 10 6 11 3.0 1.3 6.0 2.914. Tanzania 20 36 93 31 51 31 55 3.2 1.5 5.8 2.815. Somalia 5 7 16 6 8 6 10 2.5 1.1 6.1 3.1

16. Haiti 5 7 13 7 10 7 10 1.9 1.4 3.4 2.417. Benin 4 7 18 6 9 6 10 3.1 1.5 5.9 2.918. Central African Rep. 2 4 10 3 5 3 5 2.7 1.1 5.6 2.519. China 1,008 1,196 1,450 1,196 1.450 1,185 1,462 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.020. Guinea 6 9 20 7 11 8 12 2.4 1.0 6.1 3.1

21. Niger 6 11 29 9 15 9 16 3.1 1.5 6.4 3.222. Madagascar 9 16 42 14 22 14 24 3.0 1.4 5.9 2.823. Sri Lanka 15 21 31 20 28 20 28 1.4 1.3 2.3 2.124. Togo 3 5 13 4 7 4 7 3.1 1.4 5.9 2.925. Ghana 12 24 66 20 36 21 39 3.5 1.9 6.3 3.2

26. Pakistan 87 140 302 120 181 122 197 2.5 1.2 4.8 2.527. Kenya 18 40 120 34 69 35 73 4.1 2.7 7.1 4.228. Sierra Leone 3 5 11 4 6 4 7 2.4 1.0 6.1 3.129. Afghanistan 17 25 55 24 38 25 42 2.1 1.5 5.6 4.230. Bhutan 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2.0 0.9 5.1 2.9

31. Kampuchea, Dem. 7 10 17 9 12 9 13 1.4 0.7 3.9 2.732. Lao PDR 4 6 14 5 8 5 8 2.9 1.3 5.9 2.933. Mozambique 13 24 63 20 33 20 35 3.1 1.5 5.9 2.834. Viet Nam 57 88 154 81 125 81 130 2.0 1.4 3.1 2.1

Mliddle-income economie, 1.120 t 1,o45 r 3.144 1 1.542 t 2.321 r 1. 35 t 2!43' l 2.0 & 1 4 ; 3 5 2.4 ;

Lot%er-middle-income ,73 1 1,023, r 1Mt 4'- t 1.40h. t 93- , j,491) t 2.1 . 1.4 3. ;. 2.;

35. Sudan 20 34 86 29 46 30 50 3.0 1.3 6.0 2.936. Mauritania 2 3 6 2 3 2 3 2.8 1.1 5.9 2.737. Yemen, PDR 2 3 9 3 5 3 5 3.2 1.5 6.3 3.138. Liberia 2 4 10 3 5 3 6 3.2 1.6 6.2 3.139. Senegal 6 10 26 9 14 9 15 2.8 1.3 6.0 2.9

40. Yemen Arab Rep. 8 12 32 11 17 11 19 3.0 1.4 6.2 3.141. Lesotho 1 2 5 2 3 2 3 2.7 1.2 5.2 2.442. Bolivia 6 9 18 8 13 9 14 2.2 1.4 4.2 2.743. Indonesia 153 212 330 197 285 198 298 1.5 1.2 2.8 2.344. Zambia 6 11 29 10 16 10 18 3.3 1.6 6.1 3.0

45. Honduras 4 7 14 6 11 6 12 2.6 1.7 4.1 2.746. Egypt, Arab Rep. 44 63 102 58 84 58 88 1.7 1.2 3.0 2.347. El Salvador 5 8 15 8 12 8 13 2.2 1.5 3.3 2.2

192

Rate of natural Total fertilityProjected population (millions) increase, 2000 rate, 2000

Population Standard Rapid fertility Rapid fertility and Rapid Rapid(millions) projection decline only mortality decline Standard fertility Standard fertilitymid-1982 2000 2050 2000 2050 2000 2050 projection decline projection decline

48. Thailand 49 68 102 64 89 64 92 1.5 1.3 2.6 2.249. Papua New Guinea 3 5 8 4 6 4 7 2.0 1.3 3.6 2.450. Philippines 51 73 116 68 100 68 103 1.7 1.4 2.7 2.151. Zimbabwe 8 16 49 14 28 14 30 4.0 2.7 7.1 4.252. Nigeria 91 169 471 143 243 147 265 3.3 1.7 6.3 3.1

53. Morocco 20 31 59 29 45 29 49 2.2 1.4 3.8 2.554. Cameroon 9 17 50 14 23 14 25 3.4 1.5 6.4 2.855. Nicaragua 3 5 10 5 8 5 8 2.5 1.7 4.0 2.656. Ivory Coast 9 17 44 15 23 15 26 3.0 1.5 6.4 3.257. Guatemala 8 12 22 11 17 11 18 2.2 1.4 3.4 2.2

58. Congo, People's Rep. 2 3 8 3 4 3 5 3.3 1.5 5.7 2.559. Costa Rica 2 3 5 3 5 3 5 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.160. Peru 17 26 44 23 34 24 36 1.9 1.3 3.2 2.261. Dominican Rep. 6 8 14 8 12 8 12 1.8 1.5 2.7 2.262. Jamaica 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.1

63. Ecuador 8 13 24 12 19 12 19 2.2 1.4 3.5 2.264. Turkey 47 65 101 60 86 61 89 1.6 1.2 2.7 2.265. Tunisia 7 10 17 9 14 9 15 1.9 1.3 3.1 2.266. Colombia 27 38 57 35 49 35 51 1.6 1.3 2.6 2.267. Paraguay 3 5 8 4 6 4 7 1.8 1.4 2.7 2.1

68. Angola 8 13 32 11 17 12 19 2.7 1.2 6.0 3.069. Cuba 10 12 14 12 15 12 15 0.9 1.0 2.0 2.170. Korea, Dem. Rep. 19 27 42 25 36 25 37 1.6 1.3 2.6 2.171. Lebanon 3 3 5 3 5 3 5 1.5 1.4 2.4 2.172. Mongolia 2 3 5 3 4 3 4 2.0 1.4 3.1 2.1Lipper-mididle-income 44 l b- 1 1;1 I I b1I 1; t 01 I Q4'1 I Ls ; I 3 3.1 ;1 2.3-

73. Syrian Arab Rep. 10 17 37 17 32 17 33 2.7 2.3 4.0 3.474. Jordan 3 6 14 6 10 6 11 3.2 2.4 5.2 3.675. Malaysia 15 21 31 19 28 19 28 1.5 1.3 2.4 2.176. Korea, Rep. of 39 51 67 49 63 50 65 1.1 1.1 2.1 2.177. Panama 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 1.5 1.4 2.3 2.178. Chile 12 15 20 14 19 14 19 1.1 1.1 2.2 2.179. Brazil 127 181 279 168 239 169 247 1.5 1.3 2.6 2.280. Mexico 73 109 182 101 155 101 160 1.9 1.5 2.8 2.181. Algeria 20 39 97 33 58 34 62 3.5 1.9 6.1 3.283. Argentina 28 36 50 34 43 34 44 1.0 0.8 2.5 2.184. Uruguay 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 0.7 0.6 2.2 2.185. South Africa 30 52 106 44 67 44 69 2.6 1.2 4.4 2.187. Venezuela 17 26 43 24 36 24 37 1.8 1.4 2.7 2.189. Israel 4 5 8 5 7 5 7 1.2 1.1 2.3 2.190. Hong Kong 5 7 8 7 8 7 8 0.7 0.7 2.1 2.191. Singapore 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 0.8 0.8 2.1 2.192. Trinidad & Tobago 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1.4 1.1 2.4 2.193. Iran, Islamic Rep. 41 70 139 61 97 62 102 2.5 1.4 4.2 2.394. Iraq 14 26 57 23 39 23 41 2.9 1.8 4.9 2.9H.gh-incomeoilexporlers 1-t 3I t -- r 30i 4bt 30r . 14 3.l1;b I -. 57.;- 32 32

95. Oman 1 2 3 2 3 2 3 2.1 1.7 4.0 3.3@96. Libya 3 7 17 6 10 6 11 3.4 1.9 6.3 3.497. Saudi Arabia 10 19 49 17 27 17 29 3.3 1.7 6.3 3.398. Kuwait 2 3 5 3 4 3 4 1.9 1.4 3.0 2.399. United Arab Emirates 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2.2 1.0 4.8 2.4

193

Table 2. Population compositionIndex nutmbers for relative sizes of age grouips

(size of age group in 1980= I00)Dependency ratio Aged 65

(percent) Aged 0- 14 Aged 75-64 and over

1960 1980 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000Lows-incomne economies

1. Chad 76 78 87 64 151 71 171 66 1782. Bangladesh 90 83 86 63 159 58 191 74 1843. Ethiopia 87 93 95 63 167 66 198 64 2094. Nepal 74 85 85 59 147 68 178 75 2055. Mali 86 100 99 56 158 64 186 57 196

6. Burma 69 82 71 61 137 70 173 47 1887. Zaire 89 93 99 61 170 62 207 67 2228. Malawi 92 96 108 56 191 59 200 35 1349. Upper Volta 84 96 95 65 147 70 173 69 183

10. Uganda 86 102 104 55 172 60 215 53 208

11. India 84 78 60 64 116 61 162 97 20412. Rwanda 89 94 114 55 208 56 203 56 22313. Burundi 83 89 96 69 164 73 191 67 200 14. Tanzania 84 99 100 51 178 59 212 55 21215. Somalia 87 88 87 58 158 57 164 58 187

16. Haiti 81 89 63 68 123 75 160 81 15717. Benin 87 99 102 57 188 62 194 55 20118. Central African Rep. 73 83 95 66 164 74 179 63 18919. China 78 68 41 82 75 64 141 64 20320. Guinea 81 89 86 68 145 73 170 69 157

21. Niger 90 92 101 50 182 54 196 54 21122. Madagascar 81 96 98 60 170 65 196 61 20223. Sri Lanka 84 70 56 78 117 61 155 58 20024. Togo 87 98 101 55 169 61 207 57 21525. Ghana 89 101 106 56 188 62 230 57 238

26. Pakistan 93 89 82 53 146 57 191 87 17827. Kenva 101 117 120 47 231 51 245 53 22928. Sierra Leone 82 82 86 66 146 73 172 71 17529. Afghanistan 82 89 82 58 143 66 175 81 18330. Bhutan 79 77 77 74 135 77 167 80 170

31. Kampuchea, Dem. 89 55 71 . . . ..

32. Lao PDR 77 98 91 60 135 77 194 63 21533. Mozanbiqiuze 78 90 100 50 179 58 207 51 21734. Viet Nam . 87 68 .. 133 .. 185 .. 175

Nliddle-income economies

I o% er-middle income

35. Sudan 88 91 93 58 1 64 59 191 65 20736. Mauritania 87 88 99 61 161 67 172 62 18337. Yemen, PDR 91 95 98 63 151 67 207 74 23738. Liberia 92 81 102 52 180 53 214 54 26039. Senegal 84 90 93 59 175 63 188 66 207

40. Yemen Arab Rep. 84 96 97 55 147 63 200 60 21241. Lesotho 76 83 92 61 161 67 182 68 18542. Bolivia 83 88 74 59 140 64 179 65 18743. Indonesia 78 82 60 66 124 64 157 65 19944. Zambia 90 103 102 54 194 59 207 54 214

45. Honduras 91 102 80 50 152 56 210 42 22646. Egypt, Arab Rep. 83 76 62 65 120 59 166 54 20247. El Salvador 92 95 71 53 132 54 198 52 22248. Thailand 90 77 55 62 107 55 172 51 20749. Papua New Guinea 77 90 67 62 134 67 166 57 177

50. Philippines 91 82 58 57 117 56 179 56 18051. Zimbabwe 93 113 121 50 207 54 261 56 27852. Nigeria . 99 103 58 177 64 219 59 24053. Morocco 90 96 72 59 133 63 187 49 18554. Cameroon 75 91 106 58 174 65 216 57 194

55. Nicaragua .. 99 78 53 145 53 215 56 22256. Ivory Coast 86 87 94 41 186 42 218 55 33957. Guatemnala 96 88 69 58 141 52 185 49 22258. Congo People's Rep. 79 95 108 54 200 63 210 59 23059. Costa Rica 102 73 55 69 117 48 173 46 228

60. Peru 92 85 65 60 133 56 172 72 17561. Dominican Rep. 103 88 61 59 120 53 182 61 20662. Jamaica 85 87 62 77 101 76 155 54 13763. Ecuador 92 92 70 58 137 58 193 60 19064. Turkey 81 76 61 65 113 61 167 49 195

65. Tunisia 91 82 67 69 115 63 183 75 22466. Colombia 99 75 57 78 115 51 159 54 213

194

Index numbers for relative sizes of age groups(size of age group in 1980=100)

Dependency ratio Aged 65(percent) Aged 0-14 Aged 15-64 and over

1960 1980 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000

67. Paraguay 97 86 59 62 126 58 180 59 19168. Angola 80 89 91 60 160 67 185 59 20069. Cuba 64 63 49 76 94 73 133 50 151

70. Korea Dern. Rep. 89 78 59 64 122 56 170 54 19171. Lebanon 87 84 62 71 102 67 143 83 14972. Monigolia 84 86 66 54 115 57 197 70 224Lipper-middle-income

73. Syrian Arab Rep. 93 102 82 48 162 55 233 53 180-74. Jordan 94 III 100 55 172 59 246 89 26075. Malaysia 95 74 55 65 105 55 176 63 20576. Korea, Rep. of 86 60 49 82 103 57 144 56 20677. Panama 93 79 54 64 109 57 169 60 191

-78. Chile 77 61 50 82 103 62 143 55 18979. Brazil 86 72 58 63 123 58 165 46 21280. Mexico 96 93 63 54 123 53 186 52 18781. Algeria 91 104 104 53 178 62 237 63 18482. Portugal 59 57 54 99 101 90 116 72 126

83. Argentina 57 62 58 81 109 74 132 48 18184. Uruguay 56 59 58 91 101 89 116 66 15085. South Africa 81 75 83 61 179 60 184 62 19786. Yugoslavia 58 52 50 102 101 78 113 59 15587. Venezuela 95 82 60 53 135 45 188 39 247

88. Greece 53 57 57 100 102 88 108 56 12789. Israel 69 72 53 59 116 55 151 32 14890. Hong Kong 78 46 48 88 120 52 133 27 20091. Singapore 83 45 42 101 102 56 127 31 19192. Trinidad and Tobago 89 65 59 101 112 67 150 66 225

93. Iran, Islamic Rep. 96 91 81 52 141 52 216 71 19094. Irail 94 97 89 51 160 52 224 51 256

High-irncme oil exporter~

95. Oman . 87 70 49 154 54 202 50 21496. Libya 90 96 94 42 193 47 265 80 33697. Saudi Arabia 85 86 92 42 180 46 233 41 23998. Kuwait 59 79 55 16 168 26 227 34 50699. United Arab Emirates .. 45 58 .. 183 . 241 .. 200

InduWtiai marketeconomies

100. Ireland 73 70 55 84 105 83 136 85 ill101. Spain 55 58 55 85 101 83 116 63 138102. Italy 52 55 52 100 95 91 103 64 118103. New Zealand 71 58 49 89 96 70 118 72 124104. United Kingdom 54 56 53 103 100 95 101 75 108

105. Austria 52 56 50 99 96 96 104 74 97106. Japan 56 48 48 103 90 76 109 54 174107. Belgium 55 53 51 106 98 92 102 80 i11108. Finland 60 52 46 137 97 85 102 58 121109. Netherlands 64 51 46 108 96 75 109 65 123

110. Australia 63 54 50 82 106 67 125 65 150I'l. Canada 70 46 46 105 110 66 121 63 153112. France 61 55 52 100 99 82 110 74 111113. Germany, Fed. Rep. 47 51 49 101 95 92 98 66 104114. Denmark 56 55 48 107 94 89 104 68 104

1 Y5. United States 67 51 48 108 105 72 116 68 125116. Sweden 51 56 53 100 97 92 104 68 103117. Norway 59 58 51 101 96 87 108 68 103118. Switzerland 51 49 55 99 94 84 101 64 113

East Europeannonmarket economies

119. Hungary 52 55 52 ill 97 93 102 64 116120. Romania 57 59 55 93 100 83 115 58 145121. Albaniia 86 73 52 64 110 55 164 62 177122. llulgaria 51 52 56 105 99 89 103 57 141123. Czechoslovakia 56 58 52 103 99 90 113 62 112

124. Gennan Deni. Rep. 53 54 51 109 101 105 106 88 94125. Poland 65 52 51 115 104 76 116 49 141126. USSR 60 52 52 100 105 77 114 58 147

Not available.

195

Table 3. Contraceptive use and unmet need(Percentage of currently married women aged 15-49)

Current use of contraception Percentage Unmet need for

Condom and who want contraceptionSterili- Pill and vaginal Other no more Low High

Year zation injectables IUD methods methods Total children estimate estimate

Low-income economies2. Bangladesh 1983-84 7 4 1 2 5 19 50 25 284. Nepal 1981 5 1 (.) (.) (.) 7 41 22 27

16. Haiti 1977 (.) 4 (.) 1 14 19 50 13 3017. Benin 1981-82 (.) (.) (.) (.) 17 17 .. .

23. Sri Lanka 1982 21 4 3 3 25 55 67 18 31

25. Ghana 1979 1 3 (.) 2 4 10 20 5 826. Pakistan 1975 1 1 1 1 1 5 50 17 2727. Kenya' 1977-78 1 3 1 (.) 2 7 25 6 10 -

Middle-income economiesLower-middle-income35. Sudan, 1979 (.) 3 (.) (.) 1 5 27 6 936. Mauritania 1981 .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. .39. Senegal 1978 (.) (.) (.) (.) 3 4 .. .40. Yemen Arab Rep. 1979 (.) 1 (.) (.) 1.1 1 29 8 1241. Lesotho 1977 1 1 (.) (.) 3 5 26 5 9

43. Indonesia 1976 (.) 15 6 2 3 26 49 10 1545. Honduras 1981 8 12 2 1 3 27 48 9 2146. Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980 1 17 4 1 1 24 58 12 2247. El Salvador, 1978 18 9 3 2 2 3448. Thailand, 1981 23 27 4 2 3 59 68 13 17

50. Philippines 1978 6 5 2 4 20 36 59 11 2952. Nigeria 1982 .. .. .. .. .. 6 .. .53. Morocco 1980 .. .. .. .. .. 19 ..54. Cameroon 1978 (.) (.) (.) (.) 2 2 23 1 156. Ivory Coast 1980-81 (.) (.) (.) (.) 2 3 12 2 3

57. Guatemala" 1978 6 7 1 1 3 18 ..59. Costa Rica 1981 18 23 6 10 9 65 55 6 1160. Peru 1981 5 6 4 2 24 41 75 13 4161. Dominican Rep. 1975 12 8 2 4 6 32 56 21 1262. Jamaica' 1979 10 35 2 7 1 55 67 21 25

63. Ecuador 1979 8 10 5 3 8 34 59 13 2664. Turkey 1978 (.) 7 3 3 25 38 ..65. Tunisia 1983 14 5 13 3 6 41 56 10 1966. Colombia 1980 11 19 8 3 8 49 69 7 2467. Paraguay 1979 2 14 5 2 12 36 39 9 17

Upper-middle-income73. Syrian Arab Rep. 1978 (.) 12 1 2 5 20 44 7 1574. Jordan 1976 2 12 2 1 7 25 48 7 1775. Malaysia 1974 3 16 1 3 10 33 51 15 2376. Korea, Rep. of' 1979 20 7 10 6 11 54 77 . 2377. Panama' 1979-80 30 20 4 3 4 61 66 9 1880. Mexico 1979 9 16 6 2 6 39 61 14 2287. Venezuela' 1977 8 16 7 6 12 49 56 10 2290. Hong Kong 1977 19 25 3 17 9 72 .. ..92. Trinidad and Tobago 1977 6 18 3 20 6 52 58 14 19

Countries with less than one million populationGuvana 1975 9 9 6 (. 7 31 62 23 29Fi)i 1974 16 8 5 6 5 41 55 10 15Barbados 1981 14 18 4 8 2 46 53 .. 19

Note: Figures in italics are for earlier vears than specified; see technical notes.Not available.

(.) Less than half of 1 percent.a. Age or marital status differs from that specified; see technical notes.

196

Table 4. Factors influencing fertility

Among ever-marriedwomen of Total fertility rate

childbearing age Percentage Mean among women witlh

Mean number Desired of women duration of Seven years'of living family aged 15-19 breastfeeding No schooling

Year children size ever married (months) schooling or more

Lc.*-income economie4

2. Bangladesh 1981 3.0 4.1 63 29 6.1 5.04. Nepal 1976 2.4 3.9 59 25 .

16. Haiti 1977 2.7 3.5 16 16 6.1 2.917. Benin 1981-82 2.5 . 44 19 7.3 4.323. Sri Lanka 1975 3.5 3.8 7 21 .

25. Ghana, 1979 . 6.1 31 18 6.8 5.5-26. Pakistan 1975 3.2 .. 38 19 6.5 3.127. Kenya, 1978 3.2 7.2 28 16 8.3 7.3M¶iddle-in,ome esonomiesLower-middle-income

35. Sudan' 1979 3.5 6.3 23 16 6.5 3.436. Mauritania' 1981 3.1 9.2 39 1639. Senegal 1978 2.9 8.8 59 7.3 4.540. Yemen Arab Rep. 1979 . .. 61 11 8.541. Lesotho 1977 2.6 5.9 32 20 6.2 4.843. Indonesia 1976 2.8 4.1 29 24 .46. FPvpt Arab Rep. 1980 3.1 4.1 22 1948. i -i: .-.J 1975 3.4 3.7 16 19 .50. Philippines 1978 4.1 4.4 7 13 5.5 3.852. Nigeria' 1982 2.5 .. 44 18 .

53. Morocco 1980 .. .. 22 15 6.4 4.154. Cameroon 1978 2.7 . . 53 . . 6.4 5.256. Ivory Coast 1980-81 . . . 56 17 7.5 5.859. Costa Rica, 1976 3.8 4.7 15 5 4.5 2.560. Peru 1977-78 3.7 3.8 14 13 7.3 3.361. Dominican Republic 1975 3.5 4.6 28 9 7.0 3.062. Jamaica 1975-76 3.3 4.0 27 8 6.2 4.863. Ecuador 1979 . . . 19 12 7.8 2.764. Turkey' 1978 3.1 3.0 16 .65. Tunisia 1983 3.8 .. 5 14 .

66. Colombia 1976 3.7 4.1 15 9 7.0 2.667. Paraguay 1979 3.5 5.1 17 11 8.2 2.9

Lipper-middle-income

73. Syrian Arab Rep. 1978 4.2 6.1 23 12 8.8 4.174. Jordan 1976 4.7 6.3 19 11 9.3 4.975. Malaysia 1974 3.8 .. 11 6 5.3 3.276. Korea, Rep. of 1979 3.1 3.2 3 16 5.7 3.377. Panama, 1975-76 3.7 4.2 20 7 5.7 2.780. Mexico 1976-77 4.0 4.5 19 9 8.1 3.387. Venezuela' 1977 3.3 4.2 20 7 7.0 2.690. Hong Kong 1976 2.9 .. 4 ..92. Trinidad and Tobago 1977 2.9 3.8 20 8 4.6 3.2CounIries ith le,s than tone million populal ionGuyana 1975 3.6 4.6 28 7 6.5 4.8Fiji 1974 3.5 . 12 10 ..Barbados 1981 1.7 2.4 52 .. ..

Note: Figures in italics are for years other than specified; see technical notes.. . Not available.a. See technical notes.

197

Table 5. Status of women

PercentageNumber enrolled Percentage aged economically

Ratio of in secondary 15-49 eoer active among urbanadult male to school as enrolled in Sin gulate mieani populationadult female percentage of primary school age at marriage aged 10-64

literacy, age group, 1981 1980 1977 19781980 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female

[ov%-incrnme economies2. Bangladesh .. 24 6 68 32 24 163. Ethiopia .. 16 8 21 9 .

4. Nepal 6.3 33 9 40 9 21 17

6. Burma 1.4 . . ..

7. Zaire 2.0.........8. Malawi .. 6 2 ... .. 69 239. Upper Volta .. 4 2 15 8.. ..

10. Uganda .. 7 3........11. India 1.9 39 20 84 48 ...

12. Rwanda 1.6 3 1 75 49. ...

13. Burundi 1.6 4 2 32 14...14. Tanzania 1.1 4 2 47 32..15. Somalia 3.7 16 6 17 7...16. Haiti .. 13 12.....

17. Benin 2.4 26 10 50 22 .. 18.18. Central African Rep. 2.5 20 7 70 26 .

19. China 53 35.20. Guinea . 23 9 44 19 .

21. Niger 2.3 ... .. .. 83 11

23. Sri Lanka 1.1 49 54 100 92 28 25.24. Togo .. 46 16 85 39 .

25. Ghana .. 44 27 ... 27 1926. Pakistan . 27 7 54 19 25 20 27. Kenya 1.7 23 15 74 48 . 20.

29. Afghanistan 5.5 17 4 .. ....

30. Bhutan .. 2 1 .......

32. Lao PDR 1.4 22 14 ........

33. Mozamnbique 1.9 9 4 ... ..

34. Viet Nam . 53 43 ........

lkliddle-income economies

Low er-mnid die-incomne

35. Sudan .. 20 15 42 23 .. 2136. Mauritania . 16 4 19 7 28 19 37. 'Yemen, PDR . 24 11 . . .

38. Liberia . 29 Il 58 27 ...

39. Senegal . 16 8 .... .

40. Yemen Arab Rep. 18.0 9 2 . 22 17 41. Lesotho 0.7 13 20 . 25 20 42. Bolivia . 37 31 84 58 . 65 2543. Indonesia . 36 24 89 68 24 19 63 254-4. Zambia . 21 Il. ....

45. Honduras . 29 30 79 79 .....

46. Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.3 64 39 84 55 27 21 .

47. El Salvador . 19 21 83 80 . ..

48. Thailand . 30 27 . 25 23 66 4649. Papua New Guinea .. 17 8 ... ..

50. Philippines . 58 68 . 26 25 73 4551. Zimbabwe 1.3 18 13 ...... ...

52. Nigeria 2.0 ..... .

53. Morocco . 31 20 71 34 26 21 .

54. Cameroon . 25 13 . 26 18 56 22

198

PercentageNumber enrolled Percentage aged economically

Ratio of i.n secondary 15-49 ever active among urbanadult male to school as enrolled in Singulate mean populationadult female percentage of primary school age at marriage aged 10-64

literacy, age group, 1981 1980 1977 19781980 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female

55. Nicaragua .. 38 45 76 78 ...

56. Ivory Coast 1.9 25 9 .... 27 18.57. Guatemala .. 1 7 15 57 46 ...

59. Costa Rica .. 44 51 100 100 26 23 71 3260. Peru .. 62 52 100 86 26 23

61. Dominican Rep. ..... 98 98 25 21.-62. Jamaica .. 54 62 ... .19.

63. Ecuador .. 39 41 .... 26 22.64. Turkey 1.6 57 28 100 77 ...

65. Tunisia .. 37 23 100 63 28 24.

66. Colombia .. 45 51 96 97 26 22 72 3869. Cuba 2.0 72 77 . ....

71. Lebanon .. 60 56.... ...

72. Mongolia .. 85 92 ...

Uipper-middle-income

73. Syrian Arab Rep. . 59 37 95 53 26 22.74. Jordan .. 79 76 ... 26 2275. Malaysia . 56 53 99 84 ...

76. Korea, Rep. of .. 89 80 100 97 . .74 3677. Panama 1.0 60 69 100 99 26 21 78. Chile . 3 62 100 100 .

79. Brazil 1.1 ... .

80. Mexico 1.1 54 49 97 92 24 2281. Algeria . 42 29 79 51 .

83. Argentina . 54 63 .....

84. Uruguay . 54 61 100 100 ...

87. Venezuela .. 41 38. . ....

89. Israel . 69 80 . .. 63 3490. Hong Kong . 62 68 100 97 ..

91. Singapore 1.2 65 65 100 100 ..

93. Iran, Islamic Rep. . 54 35 . .. 64 994. Iraq .. 78 40 ...... 62 8

High-income oil exporters

95. Oman . 30 13 ... .

97. Saudia Arabia 2.9 37 24 . ..

98. Kuwait . 80 71 ... ..

99. United Arab Emirates . 57 66 ... ..

Cou ntries %% ith les-~ than one million populat ion

Guinea-Bissau 1.9 33 7 . ....

Comoros . 33 27 ... ..

Gambia 2.4 19 8 .......

Guyana . 57 61 .... 20 Botswana . 21 25 ... ..

Swaziland . 41 40 ........

Mauritius 1.2 52 49 ... .

Fiji . 60 64 .. ...

Barbados . 81 90 ........

Bahrain 2.1 61 54 ... ...

Qatar . 63 75 .......

9uriname 1.l .. .. ..

Note: Figures in italics are for years other than specified; see technical notes.Not available.

199

Table 6. Family planning policy _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Support for family planningDemographic Health and Year official Family planning

and other houman righits family planning indear'reasons reasons only No support program started 1972 1982

Low-inc_ome _economies

1. Chad x n.a. E E2. Bangladesh x 1971 E C3. Ethiopia x 1981 E E4. Nepal x 1966 D D5. Mali x 1972 E E

6. Burma x n.a. E E7 . Zaire x 1973 E E8 . Malawi x n.a. E E9 . Upper Volta x n. a. E E

10. Uganda x 1971 E E

11. India x 1952 B B12. Rwanda x 1981 E D13. B3urundi x n.a. E F14. Tanzania x 1970 E D15. Somalia x 1977 E E

16. Haiti x 1982 E D317. Benin x 1969 18. Central African Rep. x 1978 E E19. China x 1962 A A20. Guinea S n.a. E E

21. Niger x n. a. E E22. Madagascar x n.a. E E23. Sri Lanka x 1965 C B24. Togo x 1975 E E25. Ghana x 1969 E E

26. Pakistan x 1960 D C27. Kenya x 1967 D D28. Sierra Leone x 1978 E E29. 11'. I;'x 1970 E E30.1'... x 1979

31. Kaniipuclzea, Dem. x 1977~ bF E32. Lao PDR x 1976 b E E33. Mozamnbiqjue x 1977 E E34. Viet Nami x 1977 B C

Middle-income economies

Lower-middle-income

35. Sudan x 1970 E E36. Mauritania x n.a. E E37. Yemen, PDR x 1973 E E38. Liberia x 1973 E D39. Senegal x 1976 E E

40. Yemen Arab Rep. x n.a. E E41. Lesotho x 1974 E E42. Bolivia x 17 E E43. Indonesia x 1968 C B44. Zambia x 1974 E E

45. Honduras x 1966 D D46. Egypt. Arab Rep. x 1965 D D347. El Salvador x 1974 C B48. Thailand x 1970 13 C49. Papua New Guinea x 1968 E D

50. Philippines x 1970 C C51. Zimbabwe x 1968 E D352. Nigeria x 1970 F E53. Morocco x 1966 E 1354. Cameroon x n.a. E E

55. Nicaraguia x 1967 E F56. Ivory Coast x n.a. E E57. Guatemala x 1975 13 1358. Congo, People's Rep. 5 1976 F E59. Costa Rica x 1968 B 13

200

Support forfamily planning

Demographic Health and Year official Family planningand other human rights family planning index,

reasons reasons only No support program started 1972 1982

60. Peru x 1976 E D61. Dominican Rep. x 1968 C C62. Jamaica x 1966 B C63. Ecuador x 1968 D C64. Turkey x 1965 D D

65. Tunisia x 1964 C C66. Colombia x 1970 C B67. Paraguay x 1972 E E68. Angola x n.a. .

69. Cuba x .. C C70. Korea, Dem. Rep. x71. Lebanon x 1970 E D72. Mongolia x n.a. E EL'pper-middle-income73. Syrian Arab Rep. x 1974 E E74. Jordan x 1976 E E75. Malaysia x 1966 C B76. Korea, Rep. of x 1961 A A77. Panama x 1969 C B78. Chile x 1979b C C

79. Brazil x 1974 E C80. Mexico x 1974 E B81. Algeria x 1971 E D83. Argentina x n.a.84. Uruguay x n.a.85. South Africa x 1966 .87. Venezuela x 1968 D D89. Israel x90. Hong Kong x 1973 B B91. Singapore x 1965 A A92. Trinidad and Tobago x 1967 C C93. Iran,Islamic Rep.94. Iraq x 1972 E EHigh-income oil e%porters95. Oman x n.a.96. Libya x n.a. E E97. Saudi Arabia x n.a.98. Kuwait x n.a. E E99. United Arab Emirates x n.a.Counirie, % ith less than one million populationGuinea-Bissau x 1976Cape Verde x 1978Gambia x 1969 .. DSt. Vincent and Grenadines x 1972Solomon Islands x 1970 .

Guyana x 1977 .. DSt. Lucia x 1975 .Grenada x 1974 .Botswana x 1970 .. DSlwaziland x 1975 .

Mauritius x 1965 B BFiji x 1962 B CBarbados x 1967 .Cyprus x n. a. .. DGabon x n.a.Seychelles x 1975 ..Western Samoa x 1970 . . D. . Not available.n.a. Not applicable.a. A = very strong; B = strong; C = moderate; D = weak; E = very weak or none. For explanation of the index, see technical notes.b. Year in which previously existing program was canceled.

201

Bibliographical note

This Report has drawn on a wide range of World Bank documents and Sub-Saharan Africa: ProgressBank work as well as on numerous outside Report on Development Prospects and Programs.sources. World Bank sources include ongoing eco- Quantitative analysis of the link between budgetnomic analysis and research, as well as project, deficits in industrial countries and global "crowd-sector, and economic work on individual coun- ing out" is in Lal and van Wijnbergen. Alternativetries. Outside sources include research publica- views on macroeconomic stabilization are sur-tions and the unpublished reports of other veyed in Haberler. For a review of public expendi-organizations working on global economic and tures and budget deficits in OECD countries, seepopulation and development programs and Hakim and Wallich.issues. Selected sources are briefly noted by chap- Box 2.1 comparing the 1930s to the presentter below and listed alphabetically by author in draws on Maddison. Box 2.2 on protection intwo groups. The first includes background papers industrial countries is based on UNCTAD data.commissioned for this Report; these reports syn- The analysis for Box 2.3 is in Mitra. Box 2.4 andthesize relevant literature and Bank work. Most Box 3.3 are based on Bank macroeconomic model-include extensive bibliographies; the sources cited ing work summarized in Sanderson and William-in these papers are not listed separately. Those son. Box 2.5 on Latin American debt problemsissued as World Bank Staff Working Papers are made use of the background papers by Sjaastadavailable from the Bank's Publications Sales Unit. and others, and by Lawrence. Box 3.1 is based onThe views they express are not necessarily those of Wolf and others. Box 3.2 on the engine of growth isthe World Bank or of this Report. The second based on Riedel and on Lal. Box 3.3 is based on Lalgroup consists of selected other sources used in and unpublished work by Srinivasan. The discus-the preparation of this Report. sion of IDA lending in Box 3.4 draws on the Bank

report IDA in Retrospect.

Selected sources, by chapter Chapter 4

Chapter 1 The description of the setting for high fertility isfrom Birdsall (1980). For additional sources and

and, for this century, United Nations data to 1950 evidence on the advantages of children in poorand World Bank data thereafter Historical data on communities, see Cain.andcor Ban dataewed theMcGreafter. Historicalpdaa oThe historical discussion is based on sourcesincome are areviewe in McGreevey . cited in Cassen and in McGreevey. The discussion

of present trends is based primarily on World Bank

Chapters 2 and 3 and United Nations data. Mortality trends are.analyzed in Hill; Preston; and Bulatao and Elwan.

Data used in these chapters draw on GATT, IMF, Work on causes of mortality decline includesOECD, and UNCTAD publications as well as DaVanzo and Habicht; and Cochrane and others. -World Bank data. For analysis of the extent and The stall in fertility decline in selected countries iseffects of labor market rigidities in the economic analyzed in Gendell. The evidence on interna-performance of OECD countries; the causes of the tional migration is surveyed in Swamy.productivity slowdown; and the effects of protec- Box 4.1 on the isolation paradox draws on thetion, see Lal and Wolf. The discussion of debt writings of Sen and of Cassen. Box 4.2 was assem-problems is based on papers by Kindleberger, bled with the help of Peter Lindert and members ofLawrence, and by Sjaastad and others. The discus- the Graduate Group in Demography at the Uni-sion of the problems faced by developing countries versity of California, Berkeley and Davis. Box 4.3in a volatile world economy is based on internal draws on data assembled by the European Fertility

202

Transition project at Princeton University, which China, on Jacobsen, and on the 1974 World Bankresulted in the book edited by Coale and Watkins. publication by King and others. Boxes in this chap-

ter discuss articles by Stokes and Schutjer (Box 6.1),Chapter 5 Ho (Box 6.2), Lindert, and Bulatao, 1981 (Box 6.3).

The literature on macroeconomic effects of popula- Chapter 7tion growth, including effects on income distribu-tion, is surveyed and reviewed in McNicoll. On On contraceptive use and unmet need see thethe relation between fertility and savings, see papers by Ainsworth and by Boulier (a). Data usedHammer. Projections of schooling costs are based in this section are from World Fertility Survey andon Bank data on current costs and a projection Contraceptive Prevalence Survey data tapes pre-model of The Futures Group. The structural trans- pared for this Report. Some of the information isformation discussion is based on Porter and on available in publications of the World FertilityJohnston and Kilby. The discussion of food and Survey (published by the International Statisticalagriculture is based on the FAO study Agriculture: Institute, The Netherlands). Program issues-Toward 2000; Bank work on Africa; Porter; and management, access, and quality-are discussedPingali and Binswanger. Kirchner and others ana- in Ainsworth and in Jones. Bulatao analyzes thelyze the links between population and natural costs of family planning programs. Examplesresources; for related discussion, see Muscat. throughout the chapter come from World BankUrban population growth and migration are dis- sector reports, other background papers, andcussed in Linn and in Standing. Redistribution materials furnished by the International Plannedpolicies (including Box 5.5) are analyzed in Mahar. Parenthood Federation, the Pathfinder Fund, andWork on the international economy as it relates to the United States Agency for Internationalpopulation is in Sapir and in Swamy. Development.

Box 5.1 discusses the works of Meadows and Box 7.1, on the health benefits of family plan-others, who prepared the book ascribed to the ning, is based on Trussell and Pebley and otherClub of Rome, and of Simon. The analysis used for analyses surveyed in Ainsworth. Sources for BoxBox 5.2 is described in Kamin. 7.2, on contraceptive technology, include Atkinson

and others; and the US Congress Office of Tech-Chapter 6 nology Assessment study. Sources for Box 7.6, on

the Matlab projects, are cited in Ainsworth. BoxThe discussion of socioeconomic and proximate 7.7 onmltr 'xedtrsi ae nSvrdeterminants of fertility is based on recent an Woldtank data.reviews, including the background paper byBulatao; the compilation of Bulatao and Lee; Chapter 8unpublished papers produced by the Fertility PDeterminants Group at Indiana University; and This chapter draws heavily on Bank operationalBirdsall, 1980. Important conceptual contributions experience and sector work. The discussion ofinclude those of Becker, Bongaarts, Easterlin, population policy uses information gathered andFreedman, and Schultz. Essential data were summarized by Lapham and Mauldin. The Africanobtained from the World Fertility Survey Com- section is based in part on the papers by Ascadiparative Studies series, especially the paper by and Johnson-Ascadi; and by Faruqee and Gulhati.Casterline and others. The links between fertility The background papers by Gendell, Jones, andand mortality are reviewed in Bulatao and Elwan Zachariah contributed to the section on Southand in Gwatkin. Cain analyzes the link between Asia, and that of Merrick to the section on Latinthe status of women and fertility. Policy recom- America. Herz summarizes information on donormendations affecting marriage are discussed espe- assistance.cially in Henry and Piotrow and on breastfeeding Box 8.1, on pronatalist policies, is based onin McCann and others. For analyses of the effects Denton. Demographic policy objectives in Box 8.2of family planning on fertility see Boulier; are drawn largely from official government state-Wheeler; and Lapham and Mauldin. Merrick ments and development plans. The FAO report bypresents evidence on family planning and other Higgins and others is the main source for Box 8.3.factors influencing fertility for Latin America, and Studies on infertility in Africa (Box 8.4) includeZachariah presents such evidence for India. The that of Frank. Box 8.7 was prepared with help fromincentives section draws on Bank sector work on Judith Bruce of The Population Council.

203

Background papersNote: Source references to these papers carry the publication year 1984.* An asterisk after a citation indicates a background paper that will be published in a volume provisionally entitled

"Perspectives on the Global Economy."t A dagger after a citation indicates a background paper that is forthcoming as a World Bank Staff Working Paper.

Ainsworth, Martha. "Family Planning Programs: The Client's Perspective." In Ainsworth and Jones.Ainsworth, Martha, and Huw Jones. "Family Planning Programs: Client and Management Perspectives.'Birdsall, Nancy, ed. "Three Cross-country Analyses of the Effects of Organized Family Planning Programs on Fertility.'Boulier, Bryan. a. "Family Planning Programs and Contraceptive Availability: Their Effects on Contraceptive Use and

Fertility." In Birdsall, ed.Boulier, Bryan. b. "Unmet Need for Contraception: Evaluation of Measures and Estimates for Thirty-six Developing

Countries. "'Bulatao, Rodolfo A. a. "Expenditures on Population Programs in Major Regions of the Developing World: Current

Levels and Future Requirements. "tBulatao, Rodolfo A. b. "Reducing Fertility in Developing Countries: A Review of Determinants and Policy Levers.'Bulatao, Rodolfo A., and Ann Elwan, "Fertility and Mortality Transition in Developing Countries: Patterns, Projections,

and Interdependence."tCain, Mead. "On Women's Status, Family Structure, and Fertility in Developing Countries."tDaVanzo, Julie, and others. "Quantitative Studies of Mortality Decline in the Developing World."tDaVanzo, Julie, and Jean-Pierre Habicht. "What Accounts for the Decline in Infant Mortality in Peninsular Malavsia,

1946-75?" In DaVanzo and others.Denton, Hazel. "The Declining Growth Rates of the Population of Eastern Europe."'Gendell, Murray. "Factors Underlying Stalled Fertility in Developing Countries."tGwatkin, Davidson. "Mortality Reduction, Fertility Decline, and Population Growth.'Haberler, Gottfried. "The Slowdown of the World Economy and the Problem of Stagflation: Some Alternative Explana-

tions and Policy Implications.-Hakim, Leonardo, and Christine Wallich. "OECD Deficits, Debts, and Savings: Structure and Trends, 1965-80. *

Hammer, Jeffrey S. "Population Growth and Savings in Developing Countries."tHerz, Barbara. "Official Development Assistance for Population." t

Hill, Ken. "The Pace of Mortality Decline since 1950.'" In DaVanzo and others.Jones, Huw. "National Family Planning Programs: A Management Perspective." In Ainsworth and Jones.Kamin, Steve. "New Poverty Projections for the Developing Countries."Kindleberger, Charles. "Historical Perspective on Today's Third-World Debt Problem."tKing, Timothy, and Robin Zeitz. "Taking Thought for the Morrow: Prospects and Policies for Aging Populations." t

Kirchner, J. W., and others. "Two Essays on Population and Carrying Capacity." t

"Carrying Capacity, Population Growth, and Sustainable Development." In Kirchner and others.Lal, Deepak, and Martin Wolf. "Debt, Deficits, and Distortions: Problems of the Global Economy.-Lal, Deepak, and Sweder van Wijnbergen. "Government Deficits, the Real Interest Rate, and LDC Debt: On Global

Crowding Out.'-Lapham, Robert J., and W. Parker Mauldin. "Conditions of Fertility Decline in Developing Countries, 1965-80." In

Birdsall, ed.Lawrence, Robert. "Systemic Risk and Developing Country Debt.`Lluch, Constantino. "Investment Cycles, Saving, and Output Growth."Maddison, Angus. "Developing Countries in the 1930s: Possible Lessons for the 1980s.'*Mahar, Dennis. "The Settlement of Tropical Frontiers: Some Lessons from Brazil and Indonesia."tMcGreevey, William. "Economic Aspects of Historical Demographic Change."'McNicoll, Geoffrey. "Consequences of Rapid Population Growth: An Overview and Assessment."tMerrick, Thomas W. "Recent Fertility Declines in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico."'Muscat, Robert. "Carrying Capacity and Rapid Population Growth: Definition, Cases, and Consequences." In Kirchner

and others.Porter, Ian. "Population Growth and Agricultural Transitions."tPrescott, Nicholas. "Financing Family Planning Programs." t

Preston, Samuel H. "Mortality and Development Revisited." In DaVanzo and others.Sanderson, Warren C., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. "How Should the Developing Countries Adjust to External Shocks in

the 1980s? Looking at Some World Bank Macromodels." t

Sapir, Andre. "Some Aspects of Population Growth, Trade, and Factor Mobility."tSjaastad, Lawrence, Aquiles Almansi, and Carlos Hurtado. "The Debt Crisis in Latin America.-Standing, Guy. "Population Mobility and Productive Relations: Demographic Links and the Evolution of Policy.'Swamy, Gurushri. "Population, International Migration, and Trade."tTan, Jee-Peng, and Michael Haines. "Schooling and Demand for Children: Historical Perspectives." t

Trussell, James, and Anne R. Pebley. "The Impact of Family Planning Programs on Infant, Child, and MaternalMortality. "t

Wheeler, David. "Female Education, Family Planning, Income, and Population: A Long-run Econometric SimulationModel." In Birdsall, ed.

Zachariah, K. C. "Determinants of Fertility Decline in India."t

204

Selected bibliographyAscadi, George T., and Gwendolyn Johnson-Ascadi. 1983. "Demand for Children and Spacing in Sub-Saharan Africa."

Background paper for the "Report on Population Strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa." Washington, D.C.: World Bank.Atkinson, Linda, and others. 1980. "Prospects for Improved Contraception." Family Planning Perspectives 12, 4.Becker, Gary S. 1980. "An Economic Analysis of Fertility." In Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries.

Universities-National Bureau Conference Series, no. 11. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Bhatia, Shushum, and others. 1980. "The Matlab Family Planning-Health Services Project." Studies in Family Planning

11, 6.Birdsall, Nancy. 1980. "Population Growth and Poverty in the Developing World." Population Bulletin 35, 5. (Also

available as World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 404, 1980.)Bongaarts, John. 1978. "A Framework for Analyzing the Proximate Determinants of Fertility." Population and Develop-

ment Review 4:105-32.Bongaarts, J., and R. G. Potter. 1983. Fertility, Biology and Behavior: An Analysis of the Proximate Determinants. New York:

Academic Press.Bulatao, Rodolfo A. 1981. "Values and Disvalues of Children in Successive Childbearing Decisions." Demography 18:1-25.Bulatao, Rodolfo A., and Ronald D. Lee, eds. 1983. Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries. 2 vols. New York:

Academic Press.Cassen, Robert H. 1978. India. New York: Holmes and Meier.Casterline, John B., and others. 1983. "The Proximate Determinants of Fertility." Unpublished paper. World Fertility

Survey, London.Chen, L. C., and others. "Maternal Mortality in Rural Bangladesh. " In Studies in Family Planning 5, 11:334-41, November

1974.Coale, Ansley, and Susan Watkins, eds. 1984. The Decline of Fertility in Europe. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University

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Lee, eds., Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries. New York: Academic Press.Cochrane, Susan H., Donald J. O'Hara, and Joanne Leslie. 1980. "The Effects of Education on Health." World Bank

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Chicago Press.Faruqee, Rashid, and Ravi Gulhati. 1983. "Rapid Population Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues and Policies." World

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Frank, Odile. 1983. "Infertility in Sub-Saharan Africa." Center for Policy Studies Working Paper no. 97. New York: ThePopulation Council.

Freedman, Ronald. 1979. "Theories of Fertility Decline: A Reappraisal." Social Forces 58, 1:1-17.Gilland, Bernard. 1983. "Considerations on World Population and Food Supply." Population and Development Review 9,

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Press.Henry, Alice, and Phyllis T. Piotrow. 1979. "Age at Marriage and Fertility." Population Reports, Series M, no. 4.

* Higgins, G. M., and others. 1982. Potential Population Supporting Capacities of Lands in the Developing World. Rome: FAO.Ho, Teresa J. 1979. "Time Costs of Child Rearing in the Rural Philippines." Population and Development Review 5:643-62.Jacobsen, Judith. 1983. "Promoting Population Stabilization: Incentives for Small Families." Worldwatch Paper 54. Wash-

ington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute.Johansson, E. 1977. "The History of Literacy in Sweden in Comparison with Some Other Countries. " Educational Reports

Umea, 12.Johnston, Bruce F., and William C. Clark. 1982. Redesigning Rural Development: A Strategic Perspective. Baltimore, Md.:

Johns Hopkins University Press.Johnston, Bruce F., and Peter Kilby. 1975. Agriculture and Structural Transformation. New York: Oxford University Press.Keyfitz, N., and W. Flieger. 1968. World Population: An Analysis of Data. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. World in Recession. Berkeley: University of California Press.King, Timothy, and others. 1974. Population Policies and Economic Development. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University

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-1984. "The Malthusian Case: Preindustrial England" (unpublished bibliographical note).Linn, Johannes. 1983. Cities in the Developing World: Policies for Their Equitable and Efficient Growth. New York: Oxford

University Press.McCann, Margaret E, and others. 1981. "Breastfeeding, Fertility, and Family Planning." Population Reports, Series J, no.

24.Meadows, Donella H., and others. 1972. The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of

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206

Annex

WorldDevelopment

Indicators

I I

Contents

Key 212

Introduction 213

Maps 214

Table 1. Basic indicators 218

Population rG Area E GNP per capita b Inflation E Life expectancy

Table 2. Growth of production 220

GDP n Agriculture b Industry b Manufacturing E Services

Table 3. Structure of production 222

GDP b Agriculture E Industry b Manufacturing [l Services

Table 4. Growth of consumption and investment 224

Public consumption E Private consumption El Gross domesticinvestment

Table 5. Structure of demand 226

Public consumption L Private consumption bl Gross domesticinvestment b Gross domestic saving z Exports of goods andnonfactor services I Resource balance

Table 6. Agriculture and food 228

Value added bl Cereal imports -- Food aid bl Fertilizer consumption ElFood production per capita

Table 7. Industry 230

Share of value added in food and agriculture E in textiles and clothingb in machinery and transport equipment bl in chemicals b7 in othermanufacturing bl Value added in manufacturing

Table 8. Commercial energy 232

Growth of energy production bl Growth of energy consumption b

Energy consumption per capita bl Energy imports as percentage ofmerchandise exports

Table 9. Growth of merchandise trade 234

Export values E Import values El Growth of exports El Growth ofimports El Terms of trade

209

Table 10. Structure of merchandise exports 236

Fuels, minerals, and metals 3 Other primary commodities 3 Textilesand clothing 5 Machinery and transport equipment 3 Othermanufactures

Table 11. Structure of merchandise imports 238

Food 3 Fuels 3 Other primary commodities 5 Machinery andtransport equipment 5 Other manufactures

Table 12. Origin and destination of merchandise exports 240

Industrial market economies 3i East European nonmarket economies3 High-income oil exporters 5 Developing economies

Table 13. Origin and destination of manufactured exports 242

Industrial market economies 3 East European nonmarket economies: High-income oil exporters I Developing economies = Value ofmanufactured exports

Table 14. Balance of payments and reserves 244

Current account balance 5 Receipts of workers' remittances - Netdirect private investment 3 Gross international reserves 3i in monthsof import coverage

Table 15. Flow of public and publicly guaranteed external capital 246

Gross inflow of public and publicly guaranteed medium- andlong-term loans 3 Repayment of principal 3 Net inflow of public andpublicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans

Table 16. External public debt and debt service ratios 248

External public debt outstanding and disbursed 3 as percentage ofGNP 3] Interest payments on external public debt 3 Debt service aspercentage of GNP 3 of exports of goods and services

Table 17. Terms of public borrowing 250

Commitments 3 Average interest rate 3 Average maturity 3 Averagegrace period

Table 18. Official development assistance from OECD and OPEC members 252

Amount in dollars 3 as percentage of donor GNP 3 in nationalcurrencies 5 Net bilateral flow to low-income countries

Table 19. Population growth and projections 254

Population growth L Population size 3 Hypothetical size of stationarypopulation 3 Assumed year of reaching net reproduction rate of 1 3Population momentum

Table 20. Demographic and fertility-related indicators 256

Crude birth rate 5 Crude death rate 3 Total fertility rate 3 Percentageof married women using contraception

210

Table 21. Labor force 258

Population of working age 3 Labor force in agriculture l in industry3 in services L Growth of labor force, past and projected

Table 22. Urbanization 260

Urban population as percentage of total population 3 Growth of urbanpopulation b Percentage in largest city 3 in cities of over 500,000persons b Number of cities of over 500,000 persons

Table 23. Indicators related to life expectancy 262

Life expectancy 3 Infant mortality rate 3 Child death rate

Table 24. Health-related indicators 264

Population per physician 3 per nursing person , Daily calorie supplyper capita

Table 25. Education 266

Number enrolled in primary school as percentage of age group 3 insecondary school 3 in higher education

Table 26. Central government expenditure 268

Defense 3 Education b Health b Housing and community amenities;social security and welfare 3 Economic services 3 Other 3 Totalexpenditure as percentage of GNP b Overall surplus/deficit aspercentage of GNP

Table 27. Central government current revenue 270

Tax revenue 3 Current nontax revenue b Total current revenue aspercentage of GNP

Table 28. Income distribution 272

Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups ofhouseholds

Technical notes 274

Bibliography of data sources 286

211

Key

In each table, economies are listed in their Figures in the colored bands are Not available.group in ascending order of GNP per cap- summary measures for groups ofita except for those for wvhich no GNP per economies. The letter l after a (.) Less than half the unit shown.capita can be calculated. These are listed in summary measure indicates that it is All growth rates are in real terms.alphabetical order, in italics, at the end of a weighted average; the letter m,their group. The reference numbers below that it is a median value; Figures in italics are for years or periodsreflect the order in the tables. the letter t, that it is a total. other than those specified.

Afghanistan 29 Hong Kong 90 Paraguay 67Albania 121 Hungary 119 Peru f40Algeria 81 India 11 Philippines 50Angola 68 Indonesia 43 Poland 125Argentina 83 Iran, Islamic Republic of 93 Portugal 82

Australia 110 Iraq 94 Romania 120Austria 105 Ireland 100 Rwanda 12Bangladesh 2 Israel 89 Saudi Arabia 97Belgium 107 Italy 102 Senegal 39Benin 17 Ivory Coast 56 Sierra Leone 28

Bhutan 30 Jamaica 62 Singapore 91Bolivia 42 Japan 106 Somalia 15Brazil 79 Jordan 74 South Africa 85Bulgaria 122 Kainpuchea, Democratic 31 Spain 101Burma 6 Kenya 27 Sri Lanka 23

Burundi 13 Korea, Democratic Republic of 70 Sudan 35Cameroon 54 Korea, Republic of 76 Sweden 116Canada 111 Kuwait 98 Switzerland 118Central African Republic 18 Lao People's Democratic Republic 32 Syrian Arab Republic 73Chad 1 Lebanoni 71 Tanzania 14

Chile 78 Lesotho 41 Thailand 48China 19 Liberia 38 Togo 24Colombia 66 Libya 96 Trinidad and Tobago 92Congo, People's Republic of the 58 Madagascar 22 Tunisia 65Costa Rica 59 Malawi 8 Turkey 64

Cuba 69 Malaysia 75 Uganda 10Czechoslovakia 123 Mali 5 Union of Soviet SocialistDenmark 114 Mauritania 36 Republics 126Dominican Republic 61 Mexico 80 United Arab Emirates 99Ecuador 63 Mongolia 72 United Kingdom 104

Egypt, Arab Republic of 46 Morocco 53 United States 115El Salvador 47 Mozambique 33 Upper Volta 9Ethiopia 3 Nepal 4 Uruguay 84Finland 108 Netherlands 109 Venezuela 87France 112 New Zealand 103 Viet Namt 34

German Democratic Republic 124 Nicaragua 55 Yemen Arab Republic 40Germany, Federal Republic of 113 Niger 21 Yemen, People's DemocraticGhana 25 Nigeria 52 Republic of 37Greece 88 Norway 117 Yugoslavia 86Guatemala 57 Oman 95 Zaire 7

Guinea 20 Pakistan 26 Zambia 44Haiti 16 Panama 77 Zimbabwe 51Honduras 45 Papua New Guinea 49

212

Introduction

The World Development Indicators, a by-product are in constant prices and were computed, unlessof the World Bank's statistical and analytical work, noted otherwise, by using the least-squaresprovide information on the main features of social method. Because this method takes all observa-and economic development. Most of the data col- tions in a period into account, the resulting growthlected by the World Bank are on its developing rates are not unduly influenced by exceptional val-member countries. Because comparable data for ues. Table entries in italics indicate that they are forindustrial market economies are readily available, years or periods other than those specified. Allthese are also included in the indicators. Data for dollar figures are US dollars, derived by applyingnonmarket economies, a few of which are mem- the official exchange rates, with the exception ofbers of the World Bank, are included if available in the GNP per capita figures, which are derived bya comparable form. applying the World Bank Atlas method described

Every effort has been made to standardize con- in the technical note to Table 1. Conversion ofcepts, definitions, coverage, timing, and other national currency values in this manner results incharacteristics of the basic data to ensure the great- some inevitable distortions; the technical note toest possible degree of comparability. Nevertheless, Table 1 also discusses this problem.care must be taken in how the indicators are inter- Some of the differences between figures shownpreted. Although the statistics are drawn from in this year's and last year's editions reflect notsources generally considered the most authorita- only updating but also revisions to historicaltive and reliable, many of them are subject to con- series.siderable margins of error. In addition, variations The economies included in the World Develop-in national statistical practices mean that most data ment Indicators are classified by GNP per capita.are not strictly comparable. The data should thus This classification is useful in distinguishing econ-be construed only as indicating trends and charac- omies at different stages of development. Many ofterizing major differences among economies. the economies included are also classified by domi-'

The indicators in Table 1 give a summary profile nant characteristics-to distinguish oil importersof the economies. The data in the other tables fall from oil exporters and to distinguish industrialinto the following broad areas: national accounts, market from industrial nonmarket economies. Theagriculture, industry, energy, external trade, exter- groups used in the tables are 34 low-income devel-nal debt, aid flows, other external transactions, oping economies with a GNP per capita of lessdemography, labor force, urbanization, social indi- than $410 in 1982, 60 middle-income developingcators, central 'government finances, and income economies with a GNP per capita of $410 or more,distribution. The table on central government 5 high-income oil exporters, 19 industrial marketexpenditure is an expanded version of an earlier economies, and 8 East European nonmarket econ-table, and is complemented by a new table on cen- omies. Note that because of the paucity of data andtral government current revenue. differences in the method of computing national

Most of the information used in computing the income, estimates of GNP per capita are availableindicators was drawn from the data files and publi- only for those nonmarket economies that are mem-cations of the World Bank, the International Mone- bers of the World Bank.tary Fund, and the United Nations and its special- The format of this edition generally follows thatized agencies. used in previous years. An important difference,

For ease of reference, ratios and rates of growth however, is that economies for which no GNP perare shown; absolute values are reported only in a capita figure can be calculated are listed in italics,few instances. Most growth rates were calculated in alphabetical order, at the end of the appropriatefor two periods: 1960-70 and 1970-82, or 1970-81 if income groups. All other economies are listed bydata for 1982 were not available. All growth rates group in ascending order of GNP per capita. The

213

same order is used in all tables. The alphabetical measures are separately shown for China andlist in the key shows the reference number of each India and for other low-income economies. Andeconomy; italics indicate those economies placed because trade in oil affects the economic character-at the end of a group due to the unavailability of istics and performance of middle-income econo-GNP per capita figures. Countries with popula- mies, summary measures are also shown for oiltions of less than a million are not reported in the importers and for oil exporters. Moreover, thetables, largely for lack of comprehensive data. The group of middle-income economies is divided intotechnical note to Table I shows some basic indica- lower and upper categories to provide more mean-tors for 34 small countries that are members of the ingful summary measures.United Nations, the World Bank, or both. The weights used in computing the summary

Summary measures-totals, median values, or measures are described in the technical notes. Theweighted averages-were calculated for the econ- letter w after a summary measure indicates that itomy groups only if data were adequate and mean- is a weighted average; the letter m, that it is aingful statistics could be obtained. Because China median value; the letter t, that it is a total. Theand India heavily influence the overall summary median is the middle value of a data set arrangedmeasures for the low-income economies, summary in order of magnitude. Because the coverage of

Groups of economies

The colors on the map show whatgroup a country has been placed in on ,the basis of its GNP per capita and, insome instances, its distinguishing -~ - - ,

economic characteristics. For example,all low-income economies, those with ..

a GNP per capita of less than $410, are ;. colored yellow. The groups are thesame as those used in the 28 tables ' ,,,,,,n.-that follow, and they include only the126 countries with a population of i

more than 1 million. I

Low-income economies -M_2 Middle-income oil importers aS

Middle-income oil exporters ElSal adoN: rage ,

High-income oil exporters Cosa aRi a ,

Industrial market economies

East European nonmarket economies

Z Not included in the IndicatorsTokelau (0NZ,

Western oSamoa, Amenan Samoa

(US) - French Xb BolWv,a

.Noe (NZ) Pc ysesraTonga (Fr) P .uerto RKri S

: (US) St .Its-Nead c le * aragoo

.AoaMgua andBatSada-! ' .-t Montse-rt I UK) Argerrsa

" / Guadelo.pe (Fr)

N aDomn-ica UNetlhesa,ds A,files tMat~,,ue(Fr)

(NethJ St. [Lcre a B abados

Grenada, S

214

economies is not uniform for all indicators and gross domestic product (GDP). The Eckert IV pro-because the variation around central tendencies jection has been used for these maps because itcan be large, readers should exercise caution in maintains correct areas for all countries, though atcomparing the summary measures for different the cost of some distortions in shape, distance, andindicators, groups, and years or periods. direction. The maps have been prepared exclu-

The technical notes should be referred to in any sively for the convenience of the readers of thisuse of the data. These notes outline the methods, Report; the denominations used, and the bound-concepts, definitions, and data sources. The bibli- aries shown, do not imply on the part of the Worldography gives details of the data sources, which Bank and its affiliates any judgment on the legalcontain comprehensive definitions and descrip- status of any territory or any endorsement ortions of concepts used. acceptance of such boundaries.

This year's edition includes four world maps. The World Development Indicators are prepared. The first map shows country names and the under the supervision of Ramesh Chander.

groups in which economies have been placed. Themaps on the following pages show population, life

- expectancy at birth, and the share of agriculture in

r -, eN _,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. ,. , ,;

Chna

t~~~~~~~Ron

> iE ;; , X " ,' ;_, h ~~~~~~~~~NepalBhtn2-. ' ' t. i' ,; ,;t _ _~~~~.~r BangladeshP

A ' India .Burma Zong Kong (UK).Maca Port

.~~~~~~~~~~ -* * : .* ' , a'-',\t1,,, --. !:,i , .: Guam tUS)

- F VoAa \ | 8 | j ; * 6 ) D T Tust Territory o the

a Leo - Ethiop,a |S LanKa Pacioc Lslaods

- G--;>lr '- - §W~~~ Son ala daldives -Togo- 1.1 3 "" ;' /'r-iba rirlat

Equatorial Guiea aTome ad P,ioopeZae Uai- Ji rsRep oMfthe Co ngo Seeychelles Solomon

_' lands Tuvalu

t S t , ~~~~~~~Comoros ~~..'~~ 1~

Vanuatu

Mauriliuse . * .- fa nar -, .e ¢ r

n3 ,New Culedania

S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~e Ca ..

P, (Fit

215

Population

* S: X ' ' l - .S I C' - .,I~~~~ - ~ ~-' -- =' -,

t~~~~~~~- v. It

= 0-1S millionH 15-50 million The colors on the map show the gen- lation for each of 125 countries; the

_ 50-100 million eral size of a country's population. For technical note to that table gives data

100+ million example, countries with a population for 34 more countries with a popula-of less than 15 million are colored yel- tion of less than 1 million.

Data not available low. Note that Table 1 gives the popu-

The bar chart at right shows population Population by country group,by country group for the years 1960 and 1960,1982, 2000 Shares of total population, 19821982 as well as projected population for I _ _the year 2000. The country groups arethose used in the map on the preceding _ 2000

pages and in the tables that follow.Millions

The pie chart at right shows the propor- 3000 jtion of total population, excluding coun- ltries with populations of less than 1 Lmillion, accounted for by each country ! s .onn.e Igroup. "Other" refers to high-income 1982

oil producers.

2000 Fao Eur-,pin

ICe

1960

1000

OeconomiesLow-incomeeconomies

216

Life expectancy

-~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --, _ -K_

50-49 years The map classifies countries by life ex-L4 50-59 yeas =pectancy at birth-that is, by the num-

60-69 years ber of years a baby born in 1982 can70+ years expect to live. For example, life

m not available expectancy at birth is less than fiftyL Data not available years in countries colored yellow.

Share of agriculture in GDP

* --- ,

09percent -The vaueadedbyaoutr'sagi- arcloedds-; ' , .- l,-:S _># ' I - - 3.-

£ Sp0-O9 percent ~The value added by a country's agri- are colored dark green. The shares sayS 10>19 percent cultural sector divided by the gross nothing about absolute values of pro-20-19 percent domestic product gives the share of duction. For countries with high levels_ 20-39 percent agriculture in GDP. The map classifies of subsistence farming, the share of

40 + percent countries by those shares. For exam- agriculture in GDP may be underesti-ple, countries whose shares of agricul- mated due to difficulties in assigning

z Data not available ture in GDP range from 0 to 9 percent subsistence farming its proper value.

217

Table 1. Basic indicatorsGNP per capital

Average LifeArea annual Average annual expectancy

Population (thousands growth rate rate of inflation' at birth(millions) of square Dollars (percent) (percent) (years)mid-1 982 kilometers) 1982 1960-82b 1960-~70c 1970-82d 1982

Low-income economies 2.65 991 2030 '3 1 59China andlIndia 1 72,52,i 12 849 t 290., 3 5 62.Other low-income 541 3, 16 248 1 250 1 1 3 2 II . 51

1IChad 4.6 1,284 80 -2.8 4.6 7.8 442 Bangladesh 92.9 144 140 0.3 3 7 14.9 483 Ethiopia 32.9 1,222 140 1.4 2.1 4.0 474 Nepal 154 141 170 -0.1 7.7 8.9 465 Mali 7.1 1,240 180 1.6 5.0 9.8 45

6 Burma 34.9 677 190 1.3 2.7 9.7 557 Zaire 30.7 2,345 190 -0.3 29.9 35.3 508 Malawi 6.5 118 210 2.6 2.4 9.5 449 Upper Volta 6.5 274 210 1.1 1.3 9.7 44

10 Uganda 13.5 236 230 -1.1 3.2 47.4 47I11 lndia 717.0 3,288 260 1.3 7.1 8.4 5512 Rwanda 5.5 26 260 1.7 13.1 134 4613 Burundi 4.3 28 280 2.5 2.8 12.5 4714 Tanzania 19.8 945 280 1.9 1 8 11 9 5215 Somalia 4.5 638 290 -0.1 4.5 12.6 3916 Haiti 5 2 28 300 0.6 40 92 5417 Benin 3.7 113 310 06 1.9 96 4818 Central African Rep 2.4 623 310 0.6 4.1 12.6 4819 China 1,008.2 9,561 310 5.0 . 6720 Guinea 5.7 246 310 1.5 1.5 33 3821 Niger 5.9 1,267 310 -1.5 21 12 1 4522 Madagascar 9.2 587 320 -0.5 3 2 11 5 4623 Sri Lanka 15.2 66 320 2.6 1.8 13 3 6924 Togo 2.8 57 340 2.3 1 3 88 4725 Ghana 12.2 239 360 -1 3 7.5 39.5 5526 Pakistan 87.1 804 380 2.8 3.3 12.7 5027 Kenya 18.1 583 390 2.8 1.6 10.1 5728 Sierra Leone 3.2 72 390 0.9 .. 122 3829 Afghanistan 16.8 648 .. 11 9 .. 3630 Bhutan 1.2 47 . 43

31 Kampuchea, Dem. .181 .

32 Lao PDR 3.6 237 4333 Mozambique 12.9 802 .. 5134 Viet Nam 57.0 330 .. 64

Middle-income economies 1 1583,t 43.031 1 1 520 3 A 30' i28 ,. 60 wOillexporters 519 5, '5 036.- 1260. 36.b 30- 139 57 wOil importers 638 8 27 995 r 1710LI 35. 3 0 12 7' 63 z'

Lower rmiddle-income 669.6,i 20.952, 8410;, 3 2; 2 9 ' I 1 7 ,56 zw35 Sudan 20 2 2,506 440 -0.4 3.9 15.2 4736 Mauritania 1.6 1,031 470 1.4 2.1 8.7 4537 Yemen, PDR 2.0 333 470 6.4 4638 Liberia 2.0 1ll 490 0.9 1.9 85 5439 Senegal 6.0 196 490 (. 1.8 7 9 44

40 Yemen Arab Rep 75 195 500 5.1 . 150 4441 Lesotho 1.4 30 510 6.5 2.7 11.4 5342 Bolivia 59 1,099 570 1 7 3.5 25 9 5143 Inoonesia 152 6 1,919 580 4.2 . 19.9 5344 Zamnba 6.0 753 640 -0 1 7.6 8.7 51

45 Honduras 4 0 112 660 1.0 2.9 8.7 6046 Egypt. Arab Rep 44.3 1,001 690 3.6 2.6 11 9 5747 El Salvador 5 1 21 700 09 05 10 8 6348 Tha land 48 5 514 790 45 1.8 9.7 6349 Papua New Guinea 3.1 462 820 2.1 40 8.1 5350 Philippines 50 7 300 820 2.8 5.8 12.8 645t Zimbabwe 7.5 391 850 1.5 1.1 8.4 5652 Nigeria 90.6 924 860 3.3 40 144 5053 Morocco 20.3 447 870 2.6 2.0 8 3 5254 Cameroon 9.3 475 890 2.6 4 2 107 5355 Nicaragua 2 9 130 920 0.2 1.8 143 5856 Ivory Coast 8.9 322 950 2 1 28 124 4757 Guatema a 7.7 109 1,130 2.4 0.3 101 6058 Congo, People's Rep. 1 7 342 1.180 27 4.7 10.8 6059 Costa R ca 2.3 51 1.430 2.8 1.9 18.4 7460 Peru 17.4 1,285 1,310 1.0 104 37.0 5861 Dominican Rep. 5.7 49 1,330 3.2 2 1 8.8 6262 Jamaica 2.2 1 1 1,330 0.7 40 16.2 7363 Ecuaoor 8.0 284 1,350 4 8 61 14 5 6364 Turkey 46.5 781 1,370 3.4 5.6 34 4 63

Note For data comparability and coverage see tnetechnical notes.

218

GNP per capitaaAverage Life

Area annual Average annual expectancyPopulation (thousands growth rate rate of inflationa at birth(millions) of square Dollars (percent) (percent) _ (years)mid-1982 kilometers) 1982 1 9 6 0 -8 2b 1960-70e 1 9 7 0 -8 2 d 1982

65 Tunisia 6.7 164 1,390 4 7 3.6 87 6166 Colombia 27.0 1,139 1,460 3.1 11.9 22.7 6467 Paraguay 3.1 407 1,610 3.7 3.1 12.7 6568 Angola 8.0 1,247 .. 4369 Cuba 98 115 .. 75

70 Korea, Dem. Rep. 18.7 121 ... 6471 Lebanon 26 10 .. 1.4 6572 Mon golia 1.8 1,565 .. 65

Upper middle-income '188 7'i 22.079 i 2,490.. 4 1. 30 ., i64 6 5

73 Syrian Arab Rep. 9.5 185 1,680 4.0 2.6 12.2 6674 Jordan 3.1 98 1,690 6.9 . 9.6 6475 Malaysia 14.5 330 1,860 4 3 -0 3 7.2 6776 Korea, Rep. ot 39.3 98 1,910 6.6 17 5 19.3 6777 Panama 1.9 77 2,120 3.4 1.5 75 7178 Chile 1 1.5 757 2,210 0.6 33.0 144.3 7079 Brazil 126.8 8,512 2,240 4.8 46 1 42.1 6480 Mexico 73.1 1,973 2,270 3.7 3 5 20.9 6581 Algeria 19.9 2,382 2,350 3.2 2 7 13.9 5782 Portugal 10.1 92 2,450 4.8 3.0 174 7183 Argentina 28.4 2,767 2,520 1.6 21 4 136.0 7084 Uruguay 2.9 176 2,650 1.7 50.2 59.3 7385 South Africa 30.4 1,221 2,670 2.1 3 0 12 8 6386 Yugoslavia 22.6 256 2,800 4.9 12.6 20.0 7187 Venezuela 16.7 912 4,140 1.9 1.3 12.4 6888 Greece 9.8 132 4,290 5.2 3.2 15 4 7489 Israel 4.0 21 5,090 3 2 6.4 52.3 7490 Hong Kong 5.2 1 5,340 7.0 2.4 8 6 7591 Singapore 2 5 1 5.910 7.4 1 1 5.4 7292 Trinidad and Tobago 1.1 5 6,840 3 1 3 2 17 8 6893 Iran, Islamic Rep. 41.2 1,648 . .- 0.5 .60

94/Irap 14.2 435 ... 1 7 .. 59

High-incomeoillexporters 17 0 4 312, 14 820. 56. 16 0. 58.

95 Oman 1.1 300 6,090 7.4 ... 5296 Libya 3.2 1,760 8,510 4.1 5.2 16.0 5797 Saudi Arabia 10.0 2,150 16,000 7.5 . 22.5 5698 Kuwait 1.6 18 19,870 -0. 1 . 15 6 7199 United Arab Emirates 1.1 84 23,770 - 0.7 . 71

Industrial marketeconomies 7229. 30 93' II1070. 33 43. 9 9. 75,,

100 Ireland 3.5 70 5,150 2.9 5.2 14.3 73101 Spain 37.9 505 5,430 4.0 6.8 16.0 74102 Italy 56.3 301 6,840 3.4 4.4 16 0 74103 New Zealand 3.2 269 7,920 1 5 3.6 131 73104 United Kingdom 55 8 245 9,660 2.0 4 1 14.2 74

105 Austria 7.6 84 9,880 3 9 3 7 6.1 73106 Japan 118 4 372 10,080 61 5.1 6 9 77107 Belgium 9 9 31 10,760 3.6 3 6 7.1 73108 Finland 4 8 337 10,870 3.6 6.0 11 7 73109 Netherlands 14.3 41 10,930 2 9 5 4 7 4 76110 Australia 15.2 7,687 11,140 2.4 3 1 11.4 74I11 Canada 24 6 9,976 11,320 3.1 31 9.3 75112 France 54 4 547 11,680 3.7 4 2 10.1 75113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 61.6 249 12,460 3.1 3.2 4 9 73

tl114 Denmark 5.1 43 12,470 2.5 6.4 9 9 75115 United States 231.5 9,363 13,160 2.2 2.9 7.3 75116 Sweden 8 3 450 14,040 2.4 4.3 9 9 77117 Norway 4.1 324 14,280 3.4 4 4 9.0 761l18 Switzerland 6.4 41 17,010 1.9 4 4 4 8 79

East Europeannonmarket economies 383 3.- 23 422 i

119 Hungary 10.7 93 2,270 63 3.2 71120 Romania 22.5 238 2,560 5 1 71121 Albania 2.9 29 . 72122 Bulgarna 8.9 ill.. 72123 Czechoslovakia 15.4 128 . , 72

124 German Dem, Rep 16.7 108 . .73

125 Poland 36.2 313 . .72

126 USSR 270.0 22,402 . 69

a. See the technical notes. b. Because cata for the early 1 960s are not always avaliable, figures in italics are far periods other than that speci-fiea. c. Figures in italics are tori1 961-70, not 1 960-70 a. Figures in ital cs are for 1970-81, not 1 970-82

219

Table 2. Growthi of productionAverage annual growth rate (percent)

GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services1960-70a 1970 82b' 1960-~70a 1970-82b 1960-70a 1970 8 2 b 1960-70a 1970 8 2 b 1960-701 197 0- 82b

Low-income economies 4 5 , 4 5.. 2 2 2 3 6 6pit 4.2' I SS 3 4 4 2' 4 5,China and India 4 5 4 9:. 1 i8 23' 8 3'- 6 3 ti' 52". 49,Other low-income 4 5. 3 4. 2 7 2 3' 66"m 4 0'. 6 3". 32-" 2,' 45,'1 Cnad 0.5 -2.6 . -1.0 . -2.0 -3 2 -5.52 Bangladesh 3.7 4.1 2.7 2.3 8.0 8.7 6.6 10.4 4.2 5.53 Etniopia 4.4 2.2 2.2 0.9 7.4 2.0 8.0 2.9 7.8 4.14 Nepal 2.5 2.7 . . .

5 Mal 3.3 4.3 .. 3.8 2 1 5.46 Burma 286 5.0 4.1 5.0 2.8 5.8 3.4 4.7 1.5 5.67 Zaire 3.4 -0.2 . 1.5 .. -0.9 .. -2.3 -0 48 Malawi 4.9 5.1 . 4 1 . 5.4 5 4 6.09 Upper Volta 3 0 3.4 . 1.4 . 2.9 . 3.4 5 4

io Uganda 5.6 -1.5 .. -0.6 . -8.7 -8.9 1 31 1 India 3.4 3 6 1 9 1.8 5 4 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.6 5.51 2 Rwanda 2.7 5.3 . . .

13 Burundi 4.4 3.5 .. 2.3 . 8.6 . 6 4 . 4 01 4 Tanzania 6.0 4.0 2 8 . 1 5 . 05 . 5.81 5 Somalia 1.0 3.8 -0 6 . 3 4 .. 4.0 .. 4.21 6 Haiti 0.2 3.4 -0.6 1.2 0.2 7 3 -0 1 7 5 1 1 3 31 7 Benin 2.6 3.3 .. ....

1 8 Central African Rep 1 9 1 4 0 8 2.3 5.4 4 0 . -4 3 1.8 0 31 9 China 5.2 5 6 1 6 2.8 11 2 8.3 . 5 7 4.320 Gu nea 3.5 3 821 Niger 2.9 3 4 3.3 -2.4 13.9 10.8 . () 6.922 Madagascar 2 9 0.2 0 3 -0 7 0 423 Sri Lanka 4.6 4.5 3.0 3.2 6.6 4.2 6.3 2 4 4.6 5.224 Togo 8.8 3 0 . 1.7 . 5 5 -100 2 925 Ghana 2.2 -0.5 . -0.2 . -2.4 . -1 5 -7526 Pakistan 6.7 5.0 4 9 2.7 10 0 5 9 9 4 5.0 70 6.227 Kenya 5 9 5.5 . 4.1 . 8 1 . 9.0 .. 5.628 Sierra Leone 4.3 2.0 .. 2.5 . -3.1 . 3 9 . 4 529 Afghanistan 2.0 ... .... ...

30 Bhutan31 Kampuchea, Derm 3.1 .. .

32 Lao PDR33 Mozamnbique.. . .

34 Viet Nam 3~8 .

Middle-income economies 6,:,' 54. 35, 7 4" 8' 3' 5 5' 5'Oillexporters 63. 60.. 29" 30' 74', 76" 7I 96. 48.' 68B.-Oillimporters 58. 71 5' 8 0' 5. 7" 3' 5' 5.

Lower middle-income 4 9 5 3 30.'. 3 1., 62.. 58. 6o ,5. 55. 5 2' 54'.35 Sudan 0.7 6.3 . 4 1 .. 5.8 . 6.0 . 8.536 Mauritania 6 7 2.0 1.4 3.4 14 1 -3 5 9.2 5.2 7.4 5.237 Yemen, PDR38 Liberia 5.1 0.9 . 3.5 . -0.7 4 5 . 1.039 Senegal 2.5 2 9 2 9 2.3 4.1 3.8 6.2 0 8 1.8 2.840 Yemen Arab Rep . 8 5 . 3.6 .. 13.6 13.1 .. 11 241 Lesotho 5 2 6 6 0.3 21 1 13.4 . 5 542 Boliv a 5 2 3.7 3.0 3 7 6 2 2.3 5 4 4 4 5 4 4.443 Indonesia 3 9 7.7 2.7 3 8 5.2 10.7 3.3 13 4 4 8 9.344 Zambia 5.0 0.9 . 1 9 . 0 4 . 1 4 . 1.345 Hlonduras 5.2 4 2 5.8 2.4 5 3 5.7 4 5 5.8 4 6 4.746 Egypt,Arab Rep 4.3 8 4 2.9 3 0 5 4 8 3 4 8 9.3 4 7 11.747 El Salvador 5.9 2.2 3 0 2 0 8.5 2 0 8.8 1 1 6.5 2.448 Thailand 8.4 7.1 5.6 4.4 11.9 9 3 11 4 9.9 9 1 7 449 Papua New Guinea 6.7 2.0 .. 2.6 . 4.9 . 5 550 Pnil ppines 5 1 6.0 4.3 4 8 6 0 8.0 6 7 6.6 5.2 5.251 Zimbabwe 4 5 2.2 .. 1.8 .. -1 9 .. -4.1 .. 2.952 Nigeria 3 1 3 8 -0.4 -0.6 14.7 '4.8 9.1 12.0 2.3 6.753 Morocco 4 4 5 0 4.7 0.1 4.2 5.3 4.2 4.9 4.4 6.354 Cameroon 3,7 7.0 . 3.4 . 12.2 . 8.4 . 7.255 Necaragua 7 3 0.6 7.8 2.5 10.4 1.7 11.4 2 5 5 8 -0 956 Ivory Coast 8.0 5.7 4.2 4.5 11.5 8.6 11.6 5.4 9.7 5.457 Guatemala 5.6 5 0 4.3 3 9 7 8 6.7 8 2 5.3 5.5 5 058 Congo, People's Rep. 3.5 6 8 1.8 1 9 7.4 12 0 . 3.3 2.8 5 159 Costa Rica 6.5 4 5 5.7 2 3 9.4 6 1 10 6 6 0 5.7 4.660 Peru 4 9 3.0 3.7 0.7 5.0 3.3 5.7 2 5 5 3 3.461 Dominican Rep. 4.5 6.0 2.1 3.3 6 0 6.9 5.0 5.9 5 0 6.562 Jamnaica 4.4 -1.1 1 4 -0 2 4 9 -3 5 5.7 -2.3 4 6 0.163 Ecuador - 8.1 2 9 .. 11.3 . 9.9 . 8.464 Turkey 6.0 5.1 2.5 3.2 9.6 5.6 10.9 5.2 6 9 5.9

Note: For data comparability ano coverage see the technical notes.

220

Average annual growth rate (percent)

GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services1960-70a 1 9 7 0 -8 2 b 1960-7Oa 1 9 7 0 -8 2 b 1960-70a 1 9 7 0 ,8 2 b 1960-70a 1970 8 2 b 1960-70 1970-82b

65 Tun sa 4 7 7.0 2.0_~b 3. - ___10'.9 80___H _7.8F 11.6 2.6666 Colombia 5.1 5.4 3.5 4.5 6 0 4.4 5.7 5.2 5.7 6.567 Paraguay 4.2 8.5 . 6.7 10 7 7.8 8.868 Angola69 Cuba..70 Korea, Dem. Rep... . . .. ..

71 Lebanon 4 9 . 6.3 . 4.5 . 5.0 . 4,872 Mongolia. .....

Upper middle-income , 4 5-. 4 0 2 E. 92.1 5' 8 4 5 8" b3.73 Syrian Arab Rep. 4.6 8.874 Jordan 9.3 . 0.2 . 13.5 10 9 .. 9.475 Ma ays a 6.5 7.7 . 5 1 . 9.2 10 6 .. 8476 Korea,Rep.of 6 6 866 4 4 2 9 17 2 13 6 17.6 14 5 8 9 7.877 Panama 78 4 7 5.8 20O 9 9 4 4 10.5 2.7 7 7 5.378 Chile 4 4 1 9 3.1 3 1 44 0.6 5 5 -0 4 4.6 2 779 Brazil 5.4 76 . 4.5 . 8 2 . 7.8 . 7 780 Mexico 7.6 6.4 4.5 3.4 9.4 7 2 10~1 6.8 7.3 6.581 Alger a 4.3 6.6 0 1 3.9 11.6 7.0 7.8 10 9 -1 1 6.482 Portugal 6 2 4.5 1 3 -0.8 8.8 4.4 8 9 4 5 5.9 6.183 Argentina 4 3 1 5 1 8 2 2 5 8 1 0 5.6 -0.2 38 1 784 Uruguay 1 2 3.1 1.9 1 2 1 2 4.2 1.5 3 4 1.1 2.685 South Africa 6 3 3 6 ..

86 Yugoslavia 5 8 5.5 3 3 3.1 6.2 7 2 5 7 8 2 6.9 4.587 Venezuela 6.0 4.1 5.8 3.0 4 6 2 4 6.4 4~8 7 3 5 388 Greece 6.9 4.1 3 5 1.9 9.4 3.9 10.2 4 8 71 4.989 Israel 8.1 3.1 ...

90 Hong Kong 10 0 9.9 .

91 Singapore 8 8 8 5 5.0 1 6 12 5 6 9 13.0 9.3 7 7 86692 Trinidadand Tobago 4 0 5 5 . -1 8 . 4.0 . 1 3 6.993 Iran, Islamic Rep 11.3 4.4 13 4 12.0 . 10 094 Iraq 6.1 5 7 4.7 . 5 9 8.3High-income

oillexporlers 1 6. SC. S61 2 5 124.

95 Oman 19S5 5.8 . .

96 Libya 24 4 2.4 10 5 . -3.1 . 14 7 . 17.397 Saud Arabia . 9,8 5.6 . 8 9 . 6.8 . 12 498 Kuwait 5 7 2 1 . 5 5 2.8 . 95 . 9 699 UJnited Arab Emirates ..

Industrial marketeconomies 51. 2 8 o 14. 18'.. Sq'" 23' 9 4 5

100 Ireland 4~2 3.8 0 9 6 1 .4 3101 Span 71 3 1 2.0 . 3.4 . 4.1 3.9102 Italy 5 5 2 8 2.6 1.2 66 2 7 8.0 . 5 1 3 2103 New Zealand 3 6 1 8104 United Kingdom 2.9 1 5 2.2 1.9 31 0.2 3 3 -08 2.8 2 4105 Austria 4.6 3.3 1 2 1.5 5.4 3.0 5.2 3 2 4 4 3 8106 J.apan 10.4 4 6 2 1 -0.2 13.0 5.6 13.6 6~6 10 2 4.1107 Belgium 4 7 2 7 -0 5 1 5 5 5 2 2 6.2 2 3 4 6 31108 Finland 4 3 3 0 0.5 ) 5 2 3 3 6.1 3 8 5 0 3 5109 Netheriands 5.2 2 4 2.8 4 3 6 8 1 2 6 6 1.9 5.1 2 9110 Aistral a 5 6 3 1 2 0 2.5 5 9 1 6 5 5 1~5 4 0 4 1111 Canada 5.6 3.4 2 5 2.0 6.3 2 3 6 8 2 5 5 5 4.0112 France 5.5 3.2 1 6 0.8 7.1 2.4 7~8 2.8 5 0 3.9113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 4.4 2 4 1.5 2 2 4.8 2.0 5 4 2 0 4.2 3.2114 Denmark 4 5 2.1 01 3 1 5 2 0.9 5.2 2 9 4 6 2.5115 United States 4 3 2 7 0.5 1 7 4.6 1.9 5.3 2.4 44 3 2

.116 Sweden 4 4 1.7 0.8 -038 6 2 0 7 5 9 0.5 3 9 2 6117 Norway 4.3 4 3 0.7 1.9 4.8 4 8 4.8 1.1 5 0 41118 Switzerland 4.3 0.7

East EuropeannonmarKet economies

11 9 H-un g a-r y 5.3 4 8 3 2 3 2 6.2 5.5 6.5 5 7 6.0 4 8120 Romania' 8~6 7 6 1.7 5~1 12 8 8 6121 A/bania 122 Bu/garia123 Czechoslovakia124 German Damn Rep.. .

125 Poland . . ..

126 USSR . .

a. Figures in italics are/for 1961 -70, not 1 960-70 b Figures ir italicsare for 1 970 81 not 1 970-82. c Serv ces ncude tne unallocated snareof GDP d. Based on net matarial prodouct

221t

Table 3. Structure of productionGDpa Distribution of gross domestic product (percent)

(millions of dollars) Agriculture Industry (Manufacturing)' Services1960c 1982d 1960c 19820 1960c 1 9 8 2 d 1960c 19 8 2 cd 19600 1 9 8 2 d

Lo-noeeconomnies 49 .- 37.. 26. 32 Q 13 14. ,, 25.1_ .- "1China and India 48,, 36; 28; 35 .. 24,.. 29Other low-income 48.. A4 ; 3., 16 9., 9,. 39,. 40

iChad 180 400 52 64 1 1 7 4 4 37 292 Bangladesh 3,170 10,940 57 47 7 14 5 7 36 393 Ethiopia 900 4,010 65 49 12 1 6 6 1 1 23 364 Nepal 410 2,510 .

5 Mali 270 1,030 55 43 1 0 10 5 5 35 476 Burma 1,280 5,900 33 48 1 2 13 8 9 55 397 Zaire 130 5,380 30 32 27 24 13 3 43 448 Malawi 160 1,320 50 I 10 5 409 Upper Volta 200 1,000 55 41 16 16 9 1 2 31 43

10 Uganda 540 8,630 52 82 1 2 4 9 4 36 141 1 India 29,550 150,760 50 33 20 26 14 16 30 411 2 Rwanda 120 1,260 80 46 6 22 1 16 1 4 3213 Burundi 190 1,110 .. 56 1 7 . 10 . 2714 Tanzania 550 4,530 57 52 1 1 1 5 5 9 32 3315 Somalia 160 .. 71 .8 3 .. 2116 Haiti 270 1,640.7 Benin 160 830 55 44 8 1 3 3 7 37 43

18 Central African Rep 110 660 51 35 1 1 1 9 3 8 38 4619 China 42,770 260,400 470 37 330 41 .. 200 2220 Guinea 400 1.750 .. 41 23 2 3621 Niger 250 1,560 69 31 9 30 4 8 22 3922 Madagascar 540 2,900 37 41 10 15 4 53 4423 Sri Lanka 1,500 4,400 32 27 20 27 1 5 1 5 48 4624 Togo 120 800 55 23 1 5 29 8 6 30 4825 Ghana 1,220 31,220 41 51 1 0 8 5 49 4126 Pakistan 3,500 24,660 46 31 1 6 25 1 2 1 7 38 4427 Kenya 730 5,340 38 33 1 8 22 9 1 3 44 4528 Sierra Leone . 1,130 . 32 .. 20 .. 5 4829 Afghanistan 1,19030 Bhutan31 Kainpuchea, Dem32 Lao PDR33 Mozambique . .

34 Viet NamMiddle-income economies 24. 15. 30 38 21 Li20 416 .

Oil exporters 27;, 14;,' 25; 40., 14. iT;7 48 . 46Oil importers .23., i7;, 32... 35. 22, 23 . 45., 48

Lower middle-income 37 23. 22 ..- 35. 15: 17,., aI . -42

35 Sudan 1,160 9,290 .. 36 I . 1 4 . 7 s.o536 Mauritania 90 640 44 29 2 1 25 3 8 35 4637 Yemen, PDR .. 630 .. 12 . 27 . .61

38 Liberia 220 950 . 36 .. 28 .. 7 . 3639 Senegal 610 2,510 24 22 1 7 25 12 15 59 5340 Yemen Arab Rep. . 3,210 . 26 17 7 7. 5641 Lesotho 30 300 .. 23 .. 22 . 6 5542 Bolivia 460 7,160 26 17 25 27 15 14 49 5643 Indonesia 8,670 90,160 54 26 14 39 8 13 32 3544 Zambia 680 3,830 1 1 14 63 36 4 19 26 5045 Honduras 300 2,520 37 27 19 27 13 17 44 4646 Egypt. Arab Rep, 3,880 26,400 30 20 24 34 20 27 46 4647 El Salvador 570 3,680 32 22 1 9 20 1 5 1 5 49 5848 Thailand 2,550 36,790 40 22 1 9 28 1 3 1 9 4 1 5049 Papua New Guinea 230 2,350 49 .. 13 .. 4 .38

50 Philippines 6,960 39,850 26 22 28 36 20 24 46 4251 Zimbabwe 780 5,900 1 8 1 5 35 35 1 7 25 47 5052 Nigeria 3,150 71.720 63 22 1 1 39 5 6 26 3953 Morocco 2,040 14,700 23 1 8 26 31 1 6 1 6 51 5154 Cameroon 550 7,370 . . 27 .. 3 1 1 1 42

55 Nicaragua 340 2,940 24 21 21 32 1 6 26 55 4756 Ivory Coast 570 7,560 43 26 1 4 23 7 1 2 43 5157 Guatemnala 1,040 8,730 ... .

58 Congo. People's Rep 130 2,170 23 6 1 7 52 1 0 5 60 4259 Costa Rica 510 2,580 26 25 20 27 14 20 54 4860 Peru 2,410 21,620 18 8 33 39 24 24 49 5361 Dominican Rep. 720 7,230 27 18 23 28 1 7 16 50 5462 Jamaica 700 3,180 10 7 36 32 1 5 16 54 6163 Ecuaoor 970 12,330 26 11 20 40 16 12 54 4964 Turkey 8,810 49,980 41 21 21 31 13 22 38 46

Note. For data comnparability and coverage see the technical notes.

222

GDPa Distribution of gross domestic product (percent)(millions of dollars) Agriculture Industry (Manufacturing)b Services

19601 19 82 0 1960c 1 9 8 2 d 1960c 1 9 8 2 d 1960c 1 9 8 2d 1960c 1 9 8 2d1

65 Tunisa 770 7,090 24 15 18 36 8 13 58 4966 Colomb a 3,780 34,970 34 26 26 31 1 7 21 40 4267 Paraguay 300 5,850 36 26 20 26 1 7 1 6 44 4868 Angola69 Cuba70 Korea, Dem. Rep.71 Lebanon 830 11 20 13 .69

72 MongoliaUpper middle-income 18, Ii, 33 , 41 ~ 25 Ž22. ;9 .8;.73 Syrian Arab Rep. 890 15,240 .. 19 . 31 ... 5074 Jordan 3,500 . 7 . 29 . 14 .. 6475 Malaysia 2290 25,870 36 23 18 30 9 18 46 4776 Korea, Rep. of 3,810 68,420 37 16 20 39 14 28 43 4577 Panama 420 4,190 17 .18 10 .. 6578 Chile 3,910 24,140 9 6 35 34 21 20 56 6079 Brazi) 14,540 248,470 16 .35 26 .. 4980 Mexico 12,040 171,270 16 7 29 38 19 21 55 5581 Algeria 2,740 44,930 16 6 35 55 8 10 49 3982 Portugal 2,340 21,290 25 12 36 44 29 35 39 4483 Argentna 12,170 64,450 16 .38 .32 .. 4684 UJruguay 1,120 9,790 19 8 28 33 21 26 53 5985 South Africa 6,980 74,330 12 40 .. 21 4886 Yugoslavia 9,860 68,000 24 13 45 45 36 32 31 4287 Venezuela 7,570 69,490 6 6 22 42 . 16 72 5288 Greece 3,110 33,950 23 19 26 29 16 18 51 5289 Israel 2,030 20,490 11 5 32 35 23 .. 57 6090 Hong Kong 950 24,440 4 .. 39 26 .57

91 Singapore 700 14,650 4 1 18 37 12 26 78 6292 Trinidac and Tobago 470 6,970 8 2 45 52 24 13 47 46

93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 4,120 . 29 33 .11 3894/Iraq 1.580 .. 17 51 .. 10 .. 32

High-incomeoil exporters I., ;

95 Oman 50 7,110 74 .8 1 .. 1896 Libya 310 28,360 2 . 68 . 3 .. 3097 Saudi Arabia .. 153,590 .. 1 . 77 . 4 .. 2298 Kuwait .. 20,060 . 1 .. 61 .. 7 . 3899 United Arab Emirates . 29,870 . ..

Industrial marketeconomies 6, 3.. 40' 36 30, 24., 54 61.

100 Ireland 1,770 17,180 22 . 26 .... 52101 Spain 11,430 181,250 . 6 . 34 . 22 60102 Italy 37,1 90 344,580 12 6 41 41 31 29 47 53103 New Zealand 3,940 23,820 . O 33 . 25 57104 United Kingdom 71,440 473,220 3 2 43 33 32 19 54 65

105 Austr a 6,270 66,640 11 4 47 39 35 27 42 57106 Japan 44,000 1,061,920 13 4 45 42 34 30 42 54107 Belg um 11,280 85,240 6 2 41 35 30 25 53 63108 Finland 5,010 48,930 17 8 35 35 23 24 48 57109 Netherlands 11,580 136,520 9 4 46 33 34 24 45 63

110 Australia 16,370 164,210 12 6 40 35 28 20 48 59111 Canaca 39,930 289,570 6 4 34 29 23 16 60 67112 France 60,060 537,260 11 4 39 34 29 25 50 62113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 72,100 662,990 6 2 53 46 40 35 41 52114 Denmark 5,960 57,000 11 5 31 24 21 17 58 71

115 United States 505,300 3.009,600 4 3 38 33 29 22 58 641l16 Sweden 13,950 98.770 7 3 40 31 27 21 53 66117 Norway 4,630 56.080 9 4 33 41 21 15 58 55118 Sw tzerland 8,550 96,730 .. ... .

East Europeannonmarket economies

119 Hungary' 20,710 28 21 39 45 . . -33 34120 Romania 53,020 . 18 . 57 25121 Albania .

122 Bulgaria .

123 Czechoslovakia 124 Germnan Dem. Pep.125 Poland126 USSR

a. See the tech nical notes. b. Manufacturing is a part of tne industrial sector, but its share of GDP is snown separately because it typically is themostodynamic part ofthe industrial sector. c Figures in italics are for 1 961 not 1 960 d Figures in italics are for 1981, not 1982 e Based onnet mater al product. f Based on constant price series. Serv ces include the unallocated snare ofGDP

223

Table 4. Growth of consumption-and investmentAverage annual growth rate (percent)

Public Private Grossconsumption consumption domestic investment

-1960-70a 1 9 7 0 -8 2 b 1 960-7Oa 1 9 7 0 ~8 2 b -1960-.7Oa 1 970-82bLow-income economies 4 0 3 2 .. 3 .3 ' .9m 3.

China and India 3 2 3.7 m 7.3 m 5.9 mOther low-income -1 ~ . 4.2 mn 3 2. 3~3 m 4.6 rn 3.2 mn

1 Chad 4.4 -3 8 -0.7 -1.8 2 3 -5.42 Bangladesh c c 3 4 4 2 11 2 2 93 Ethiopia 8.1 7 7 4.3 2 7 5.7 0 74 Nepal 5 Mai 6 2 6.5 2 8 4 4 4 9 3 1

6 Burma c c 2 8 4.5 3 6 9 47 Zaire 8 5 1 0 3 5 -33 9 6 5 78 Malaw 4.6 8.0 3 7 4.1 15 4 2 09 U pper Vo ta 8 7 2 8 3 2

1 0 Uganda c c 5 6 -4 0 7 5 -680

1 1 India -0.2 7.3 3.9 2 2 468 5 31 2 Rwanda 1 1 1 18 4.3 3.2 3 5 14~913 Burundi 19 2 4.2 3 2 3.3 4 3 15 014 Tanzania c c 6 6 4.4 968 3.415 Somalia 3 7 0 4 4 3

1 6Hait c C -1 0 4 7 1.7 8 01 7 Benin 1.7 2 6 4 9 3 1 4 2 12 21 8 CentralAfrican Rep 2 2 -29 3.0 2 7 1~3 - 7.5l 9 Chna c c 2.5 5 1 9 8 6 420 Guinea

21 N ger 2 0 2.4 3 9 3 4 3 0 6.622 Madagascar 3 0 2 0 1 9 -05 5 4 -1423 SrLanka c c 2 1 2 6 6 6 11 024 Togo 67 9 4 7 6 4 0 11~1 6 325 Ghnan 7.2 5.7 1.7 -0 4 -31 -5 1

26 Pak slan 7.3 4 0 7.1 5.3 6 9 3 327 Kenya 10 0 8.4 2 9 5.9 10 3 2 128 Sierra Leore . -22 . 3 5 .- 1.129 Afghanistan c 2 0 -1 030 Bhutan31 Kampuchea, Dern 2 6 .3 2 0.332 Lao PDR33 Mozambique34 Viet Nam

Middle-income economies a. .' 0Oil exporters 63. c6, :3,.. 1 .icOil importeFS h. 62' E4. 6* , ___ __

Lower middle.inconie . 8, ~ 46,I''

35 Sudan 123-25 - 78 _32 9 036 Mauritania ) 8126 3 1 - 20 6637 Yemen. PDR38 Liberia 5 6 2.5 0 7 3 1 -39 2 139 Sene-gal -0 2 6 4 3 3 3 3 11 8

40 Yemen Arab Rep 12 3 8 7 22 24 1 Lesotno (1 15.5 6 5 8.0 20.7 19 642 Bevia 8 9 5 3 3 8 4 8 9.6 -1 943 Indonesia 0.9 1' 9 4.1 9 0 4 6 13 744 Zanbia 11 0 1 0 6.8 3.0 10U6 10.5

45 Hionduras 5 3 6.4 4.8 4.3 10 2 4.746 Egypt,ArabiRep c c 6 7 6 6 3 1 15.547 ElSalvacrer 6 4 5 0 5 7 2 4 3 5 1.448 Thailand 9.7 9 1 7 0 6 1 15 8 6 449 Papua New Gu nea 6 0 - 13 5 7 3 3 23 2 3 250 Philippines 5.1 6 2 4 7 4 9 8.2 9 351 Zimbabwe 9 9 . 2 9 2 552 Nigeria 1 00 'I 7 06 5.6 7.4 8853 Morocco 44 4 1 8854 Cameronn 6 1 4.7 27 61 93 9,4

55 Nicaragu~a 22 i0 6 76 ()10 9 -2 156 Ivory Coast 11 8 9 8 8 0 5 3 12 7 10 157 Guatemala 4.7 6 5 4 7 4 6 7 9 5 658 Congo People sRep 5.4 6 3 1.9 0 3 1.1 12 259 Costa Rica 8.0 5 3 6.0 3 5 7 1 2.960 Peru 6 3 4.8 7 1 3.1 1 0 3 461 Dominicar, Rep 1 9 4.8 6 3 5 9 11 4 7 162 Jamaica 8 6 5 4 3 0 1 5 7 8 -7 663 Ecuador . 12 4 . 7 3 8 864 Turkey 67 5 9 51 3 6 88a 56

Note For data comparability and coverage see tne technical notes ___ _____

224

Average annual growth rate (percent)Public Private Gross

consumption consumption domestic investment1 960-70 1 9 7 0 -8 2b 1 960-70a 1 9 7 0 -8 2 b 1960-70a 1 9 7 0 -8 2b

65 Tunisia 5.2 8.7 2.3 8.5 4.2 10.966 Colomba 5.5 5.7 5.5 53 4.5 6767 Paraguay 6.9 71 53 7.6 68 17.268 Angola69 Cuba70 Korea, Dem. Rep71 Lebanon 5 9 4.4 6.272 MongoliaUpper middle-income 7 0 6 3 55. 6 1 7 6 7 3,

73 Syrian Arab Rep74 Jordan 10.6. 8.8 21675 Malaysia 7.5 10.5 4.2 7.2 75 11 476 Korea, Rep of 5 5 7.4 7.0 6.8 23.6 11.077 Panama 78 5.2 6.4 4.6 124 1 078 Chle 51 1.7 3,7 1 0 9 9 0.479 Brazil 3.7 7 1 54 8 0 6.1 6.580 Mexco 8.8 8 2 70 5.9 9.9 8081 Algeria 1.5 108 2.3 9.3 02 11 082 Portugal 7.7 8 2 5 5 3.8 7 7 2.383 Argentina 11 3.4 4 5 1.2 4 0 1.084 Uruguay 44 3.9 1 3 1.4 -1 8 10685 South Africa 7.0 62 9.486 Yugoslavia 0.6 3.6 9 5 5.2 4.7 6.387 Venezuela 63 6 0 5.0 8.5 7.6 4.988 Greece 6.6 6 3 7.1 4.2 10 4 0 989 Israel 13 8 2.7 7 3 5.2 5.7 -0.790 Hong Kong 8.6 10.3 8 6 10 0 6.9 13.691 Singapore 12.6 6 2 5 4 6 2 20.5 8.792 Trnidad and Tobago c c 4.8 83 -2.3 10.593 Iran Islamic Rep 160 . lO.0 12.294 Iraq 81 . 4 9 . 3 0

High-incomeoilexporters 12 9 187. '

95 Oman96 Libya . 15.6 18.7 10.797 Saudi Arabia . c 19.6 35 598 Kuwait 101 13.1 17.599 United Arab EmiratesIndustrial market

economies 4 2, 3 2'. 4 3 . 2'. -5 8C 6 -100 Ireland 3.9 5.4 3.8 2.5 9.0 4 2101 Spain 38 5.1 70 3.3 113 07102 Italy 4 1 2.6 6 1 2 7 3 7 06103 NewZealand 3.6 29 33 1 5 32 -0.1104 Unted Kingdom 2.2 21 2 4 1.4 5.1 0.3105 Austr a 3.3 3 7 4.3 3.3 5.9 2.0106 Japan 6.2 4 5 9.0 4.1 14.6 3.3107 Begium 57 39 38 34 60 02108 Fnland 50 5.0 40 2 7 41 01109 Netherlands 2.8 2 6 5 9 2 9 7 4 -1.3

110 Australia 7.1 5.0 5.0 2 7 6.7 1.1111 Canada 6 2 2 3 4.9 3.9 5 8 3 3112 France 4.0 3 1 5.3 3.8 7.7 1.3113 Germany, Fed Rep 41 3.2 4.6 2 5 4 1 1 1114 Denmark 5.9 4.0 41 1 7 59 -20115 United States 4.2 1.0 44 34 50 1.3116 Sweden 5.4 32 35 1.7 5.3 -08117 Norwvay 6 2 4 0 3.7 4.8 5.0 -0 3118 Switzerland 4 8 1.7 4.3 1.4 3 9 -0 6

East Europeannonmarket economies

119 Hungary c 4 0 3 1 3.8 78 4 1120 Romania 11.2 7 4121 Adbana122 Bulgara . .123 Czechoslovakia . . .

124 German Dem. Rep.125 Poland126 USSR

a. Figures in italics are for 1961 -70, not 1960-70. b. Figures in italics are for 1970-81, not 1970-82. c Separate figures are not available forpubic consumption, which is therefore included in private consumption.

225

Tadble 5. Structure of demandDistribution of gross domestic product (percent)

Exportsof goods

Public Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor Resourceconsumption consumption investment saving services balance196Oa 1 9 8 2 b 1960a 19821, 1960a 1 9 8 2 b 19601 1 9 8 2b, 1960, 19821) 1960a 1982b

L-Co-w-income economies 8 I 1 78 73. 19- 24, 18 I1 . -China andlIndia -7, 69; 21- 27 0 27 4 B -. i

Other low-income 10 1 82.. 86 1 .3, 13.. 10. 7 13. -

Tbndhad -13- 23- 82 -102 I11 _ 9 _5 -25 23 35 -6 -342 Bangladesh 6 8 86 95 7 14 8 -3 10 8 -173Ethiopia 8 16 81 81 12 1 1 1 1 3 9 12 -1 -84Nepal c I . 91 . 15 9 I1-5 Ma.i 12 25 79 79 14 15 9 -4 12 19 -5 -19

6Burmna c a 89 85 12 23 11 15 20 6 -1 -87Zaire 18 c 61 90 12 16 21 10 55 29 9 -68Malawi 17 16 87 71 10 20 -4 13 18 21 -14 --79 Upper Volta 10 20 94 89 9 15 -4 -9 9 14 -13 -24 -

l0 Uganda 9 a 75 95 1 1 8 16 5 26 5 5 -3

1 1India 7 1 1 79 67 17 25 14 22 5 6 -3 --312 Rwanda 10 17 82 75 6 22 8 8 12 12 2 -113 Burundi 3 13 92 86 6 14 5 1 13 9 -1 -114 Tanzania 9 22 72 70 14 20 19 8 30 11 5 -1215 Somalia 8 . 86 - 10 . 6 13 - -4

16 Haiti c c 93 98 9 1 1 7 2 20 15 -2 -917 Benin 16 13 75 87 15 37 9 ) 12 30 -6 -- 3718 Central African Rep. 19 12 72 97 20 9 9 -9 23 18 -11 ---18l 9Clh.na c a 76 70 23 28 24 30 4 10 1 220 Guinea 17 - 66 - 13 17 - 28 4

21 Niger 9 9 79 79 12 26 12 12 9 21 ( 122 Madagascar 20 15 75 81 1 1 14 5 4 12 13 -6 -1023 Sri Lanka 13 8 78 80 14 31 9 12 44 27 -5 -_1924 Togo 8 17 88 78 1 1 26 4 5 19 28 -7 -2125 Ghana 10 7 73 92 24 1 17 1 28 2 -7 (26 Pakistan 11 10I 84 85 12 17 5 5 8 10 -7 -_-1227 Kenya I11 19 72 64 20 22 17 17 31 25 -3 -528 Sierra Leone - 9 - 92 - 12 -1 14 - -1329 Afghanistan c - 87 - 16 13 - 4 -330 Bhutan -

31 Kampuchea, Demn. -

32 Lao PDR - -- -

33 Mozambique- -

34 Viet Nam - -

Middle--inc-onmeeco-nonies -11 1-4 7. 1- 68. 20-l., 24 -1 9;, 2 .?t i 7. -2. -J

Oillexporters II Q 70., 64., 18.. 25. 11,4 . 4. 21 . 24 I 1.Oil importers I, 18; 70, 71, 2(1 , 23 I C4 19.. 15 . - -4

Lower middle-income 1I, 3. 7. 70 ¶, 2- 14. il 18; 0. 1 -

3_5_ Sudanr 8- 1-3 -81 -89 _9 1-6 -1-1 --2- -1 5 9 2 -136 Maurtlania 25 31 71 64 38 41 4 5 15 43 -34 -337 Yemen, PDR -

38 Liberia 7 23 58 57 28 22 35 20 39 46 7 -239 Senegal 17 20 68 74 16 20 15 6 40 31 -1 -14

40 Yemen Arab Rep 27 - 95 . 43 -22 10 - -6441 Lesotno 17 31 108 146 2 29 -25 -77 12 1 4 -27 -10642 Bolivia 7 13 86 73 14 14 7 14 13 14 -7 ( )43 Indonesia 12 10 80 71 8 23 8 19 13 22 1) -444 Zambia 1 1 30 48 65 25 17 4 1 5 56 27 16 -12

45 H-onauras 1 1 13 77 72 14 16 12 15 21 27 -2 -146 Egypt, Arab Rep. 17 21 71 64 13 30 12 15 20 32 -1 -1547 ElSalvador 10 15 79 80 15 1 1 1 1 5 20 22 -4 -648 Tnailand 10 13 76 66 16 21 14 21 17 25 -2 ( )49 Papua New Guinea 28 27 71 66 13 29 1 7 16 36 -12 -22

50 Philippines 8 9 76 70 16 29 16 21 1 1 16 (~-851 Z)mbabwe 1 1 20 67 59 23 27 22 21 - 1 -652 Nigeria 6 13 87 71 13 25 7 16 1 4 19 -6 -953 Morocco 12 22 77 70 10 23 11 8 24 20 1 -1554 Cameroon .- 8 -. I 65 25 27 31 - 2

55 Nicaragua 9 24 79 69 15 19 12 7 24 15 -3 -1256 Ivory Coast 10 18 73 58 15 24 17 24 37 39 2 157 Guatemala 8 8 84 82 10 14 8 10) 13 15 -2 -458 Congo, People's Rep 15 15 97 37 53 56 -12 48 21 55 -65 -859 Costa Rica 10 15 77 58 18 23 13 27 21 43 -5 4

60 ~Peru 9 15 63 71 25 17 28 14 20 19 3 -361 Domninican Rep 13 10 68 74 12 21 19 16 24 14 7 -562 Jamaica 7 23 67 69 30 20 26 8 34 40 -4 -1263 Ecuador 11 13 78 63 14 25 11 24 16 21 -3 -164 Turkey 11 11 76 73 16 22 13 16 3 11 -3 -6

Note For data cornparability and coverage see the tecnnical notes.

226

Distribution of gross domestic product (percent)Exportsof goods

Public Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor Resourceconsumption consumption investment saving services balance

1960a 1982b 1960a 1982i' 1960a 19820 1960a 1982b 1960a 19820 1960a 1982065 Tunisia 17 16 76 61 17 33 7 23 20 37 -10 -1066 Colombia 6 9 73 69 21 26 21 22 16 11 (.) -467 Paraguay 8 7 76 78 17 26 16 15 18 8 -1 -1168 Angola69 Cuba70 Korea, Dem. Rep.71 Lebanon 10 85 .. 16 .. 5 27 -1172 Mongolia

Uppermiddle-income 12 . . 7 6' 6' 2-, 21:, 18 2. , -1

73 Syrian Arab Rep. .. . .. .. .. . .74 Jordan . 25 . 86 .. 46 . -11 . 49 -5775 Malaysia 11 21 62 54 14 34 27 25 54 51 13 -976 Korea, Rep. of 15 13 84 63 11 26 1 24 3 39 -10 -277 Panama 11 21 78 56 16 29 11 23 31 40 -5 -6

78 Chile 9 15 79 77 14 10 12 8 14 22 -2 -279 Brazl 12 c 67 81 22 19 21 19 5 9 -1 ()80 Mexico 6 11 76 61 20 21 18 28 10 17 -2 781 Algeria 15 15 60 46 42 38 25 39 31 30 -17 182 Portugal 11 16 77 76 19 27 12 8 17 27 -7 -19

83 Argentna 9 18 70 60 22 19 21 22 10 13 -1 384 Uruguay 9 13 79 75 18 15 12 12 15 15 -6 -385 South Africa 9 64 22 27 30 . 586 Yugoslavia 19 16 49 51 36 34 32 33 14 23 -4 -187 Venezuela 14 14 53 61 21 26 33 25 32 25 12 -1

88 Greece 12 18 77 69 19 23 11 13 9 18 -8 -1089 Israel 18 34 68 60 26 21 14 6 14 37 -12 -1590 Hong Kong 7 8 87 67 18 29 6 25 82 100 -12 -491 Singapore 8 11 95 48 11 46 -3 41 163 196 -14 -592 Tr nidad and Tobago 9 c 61 69 28 34 30 31 37 36 2 -3

93 Iran. Islamic Rep. 10 . 69 17 21 18 494 Iraq 18 . 48 . 20 . 34 . 42 .. 14

High-incomeoil exporters 20 2- 26 53 65 2

95 Oman96 Libya .. 25 29 32 . 46 . 57 .. 1497 Saudi Arabia . 19 24 . . 25 . 56 . . 68 . 3198 Kuwait 20 50 . 23 . 30 . 59 . 799 United Arab Em rates . . ..

Industrial marketeconomies 15. 18. 63 62 , 21 20. 2 21*., 12.I 19 1. ii,

100 Ireland 12 21 77 57 16 27 11 22 32 62 -5 -.5101 Spain 7 12 72 70 18 20 21 18 10 18 3 -2102 Italy 13 18 63 62 25 20 24 20 14 27 -1 ()103 New Zealand 11 18 68 61 23 25 21 21 22 29 -2 -4104 United Kingdom 17 22 66 58 19 18 17 20 21 27 -2 2105 Austr a 13 19 59 57 28 23 28 24 25 42 () 1106 Japan 8 10 59 59 33 30 33 31 11 15 (.) 1107 Belg um 13 19 69 67 19 17 18 13 33 69 -1 -4108 Finland 12 20 60 55 28 24 28 25 23 32 () 1109 Nelherlands 13 18 59 61 27 18 28 21 48 58 1 3

110 Australia 10 18 65 62 28 22 25 20 15 15 -3 -2111 Canada 14 21 65 56 23 19 21 23 18 27 -2 4112 France 13 16 62 67 23 21 25 17 15 21 2 -4113 Germany Fed. Rep. 13 21 57 55 27 22 30 24 19 31 3 21-14 Denmark 13 28 62 55 26 17 25 17 32 36 -1 ()115 United States 17 19 64 66 19 16 19 15 5 9 () -1116 Sweden 16 29 60 54 25 18 24 17 23 33 -1 -1117 Norway 13 19 59 49 30 26 28 32 41 46 -2 6iT8 Switzerland 9 13 62 62 29 24 29 25 29 35 (.) 1

East Europeannonmarket economies

119 Hungary c 10 74 61 28 29 26 29 38 1120 Romania . . 29 . 23 . 4121 Albania122 Bulgaria123 Czechoslovakia124 German Dem Rep.125 Poland .. ..126 USSR

a. F gures n talics are for 1961, not 1960. b. Figures in Italics are for 1981, not 1982 c Separate figures are not available for public consump-tion, which is therefore included in private consumpt on

227

Table 6. Agriculture and foodValue added Food aid Fertilizer consumption Average index ofin agriculture Cereal imports in cereals (hundreds ot gram s of food production(millions of (thousands ot (thousands of plant nutrient per prapita

1975 dollars) metric tons) metric tons) hectare of arable land) (1 969-71 = 1 00)1970 1982a 1974 1982 1 97 4 /7 5 b ~1981/820) 1970c 1981 1980-82

Low-income economies 2? --I 29 26'.) 5,611 t 3,8851 t 184wzt 581wzt 1 10wzChina and India '447 22 - ... 4941 230wzt 772wzi 114 wOther low-income 8 3.~7: P. 1713, 4,0291t 3,391 t 85 it 187wEi 97wzi

1 Chad 246 211 50 57 13 25 7 13 952 Bangladesn 9,475 ~1 027 1.719 1,375 2.130 076 142 436 943 Ethiopia 1.128 1,286 118 273 59 178 4 33 824 Nepal'01 1,183 19 23 0 10 30 94 835 Mali 260 369 281 143 114 67 29 64 83

6 Burma 1,479 2,671 26 14 14 5 34 165 1137 Za re 397 479 343 323 () 93 8 12 878 Malawi 181 311 17 668. 2 52 106 999 Upper Volta 217 262 99 96 0 82 3 19 9510 Uganda 1,926 1.952 37 66 16 49 13 1 86

11 India 28 962 33,565 5,261 2,402 1.582 416 114 338 10112 Rwanda 394 3 21 19 1 3 3 3 10513 Burunde 239 291 7 20 6 9 5 8 9614 Tanzania 842 1,058 431 360 148 254 30 56 8815 Somalia 357 . 42 406 110 175 31 12 60

16 Hart, 83 '97 25 90 4 65 8517 Benin)23 8 115 9 8 33 15 10018 Central African Rep 120 152 7 29 1 2 11 6 10419 China 44 235 65,540 9,1 76 20.365 78 418 1 50, 12420 Gj nea 647 63 110 49 41 18 18 89

21 Niger 440 327 155 120 75 71 10 8822 Madagascar 691 729 114 392 7 78 56 23 9423 SriiLaaka 841 1.178 951 461 271, 195 496 769 15424 Togo 145 183 6 61 0 5 3 24 8925 Ghania 2,358 2.279 '77 211 43 46 9 112 72

26 Pakistan 3 258 4.406 1,274 361 619 368 168 53' '10527 Kenya 706 1,247 15 194 2 '15 224 344 8828 Sierra Leone 192 236 72 124 10 29 13 19 8129 Afghanistan . .5 75 10 93 24 46 9630 Bhutan . 23 32 0 1 () 11 107

31 Kampuchea GDem .223 75 226 44 13 62 5532 Lao PDR 53 27 '3 1)4 45 12233 Mozambi quae 62 298 34 126 27 117 6834 Viet Nam . 1.854 322 6 41 512 409 '14

Middle-income economies 41 418: 66303: 2 290' 4e, 46' 06r 2f, jOil exporlers I' ~4i 3052 1>4 :225r 15 il-

Oil importers .2 7 477 -ji :1 : A8 238 C.11Lower middle-income IC.,W I01 27.4Ž3 I541 1: 'I

35 Sudan 1,367 2,127 125 6_11 50 - 15371 - 60 - 87316 Maur tania 117 152 115 219 48 86 6 1)7337 Yem-en, PCR 149 271 38 25 () 88 9238 L beria 142 205 42 109 3 42 55 92 8839 Senegal 491 625 341 492 28 77 20 47 93

40 Yemen Arao Rep. 221 401 158 560 0 13 1 43 9341 Lesotho 48 46 49 III 14 34 17 151 8442 Bolivia 348 550 207 293 22 44 13 20 10043 noonesa 7,696 12,593 1,919 1,912 301 107 119 744 11744 Zamnba 278 325 93 225 1 100 71 166 87

45 Honduras 312 422 52 89 31 34 160 176 7946 Egypt Arab Req 2,683 31878 3,877 6,703 610 1 952 1.282 2,475 8547 El Salvador 328 374 75 179 4 132 1.048 1,220 9748 Tnailand 3,591 5,837 97 '33 0 5 76 177 13849 Papua New Guinea 345 466 71 164 76 326 99

50 Pnlooines 3 682 6,342 817 ' 287 89 54 214 324 12451 Zimbabwe 451 685 56 3 . 1 466 682 8752 N;ger a 9,061 8,563 389 2,280 7 1 3 70 9253 Morocco 1,725 1,836 891 1,913 75 465 130 239 8454 Cameroon 732 1,134 8 1 117 4 11 28 60 10255 Nicaragua 265 367 44 70 3 103 184 480 7756 ivery Coast 876 1.421 172 592 4 i 71 132 10757 Guatema.a 138 105 9 'I 224 537 11458 Congo, People's Rep. 93 108 34 6' 2 () 112 8 8159 Costa Rica 338 436 110 164 1 45 1,086 1 514 10060 Peru 2,232 2,417 637 1,524 37 76 297 375 8761 Dom nican Rep. 667 1,022 252 302 16 59 354 471 10462 Jamaca 199 196 340 405 1 78 886 718 9063 Ecuador 628 914 152 327 13 5 '23 262 10164 Turkey 7,691 11,442 1 276 546 70 () 166 454 115

Note For cate cornparabD lity and coverage see the techn cal notes

22t

Value added Food aid Fertilizer consumption Average index ofin agriculture Cereal imports in cereals (hundreds of grams of food production

(millions of (thousands of (thousands of plant nutrient per per capita1975 dollars) metric tons) metric tons) hectare of arable land) (1 969-71 = 1 00)1970 1982a 1974 1982 1 9 7 4 /75 b 1981182 b 19700 1981 1980-82

65 Tunisia 480 816 307 946 1 96 82 180 12866 ColomTbia 2,848 4,593 503 886 28 3 310 504 12467 Paraguay 419 821 71 38 1 0 1 58 48 1l168 Angola . 149 311 0 68 45 35 7769 Cuba .. 1,622 2,241 .. 1,539 1,872 113

70 Korea, Dem. Rep. .. 1,108 585 .. 1,484 3,486 13271 Lebanon .. 354 529 21 11 1,279 1,006 13472 Mongolia .. 28 100 .. 18 112 95Upper middle-income 24.517: 2 8.880 i 849, 5.39, 243,.. 470 ¶ 15,

73 Syrian Arab Rep. 595 339 426 47 8 67 232 16874 Jordan 92 132 171 668 63 73 20 53 7075 Ma aysia 2,049 3,738 1,017 1,447 1 436 923 15076 Korea, Rep. of 3,995 5,812 2,679 5,538 234 429 2,466 3,513 12577 Panama 193 248 63 110 3 3 391 521 103

78 Chile 440 565 1.737 1,425 331 18 317 202 9879 Brazi 8,737 13.429 2,485 4,492 31 3 169 375 13380 Mexico 8.501 12,538 2,881 2.194 246 666 10481 Algeria 952 1,375 1,816 3,831 54 5 174 262 7582 Portugal 2,242 2,025 1,860 3,504 0 0 411 767 7383 Argentina 3,523 4,676 0 0 24 27 12284 Uruguay 387 425 70 122 31 0 392 333 10985 South Afr ca . 127 302 425 904 19386 Yugoslavia 3.584 5,493 992 1,267 766 1,284 12687 Venezuela 1,362 1,861 1,270 2.575 165 388 9588 Greece 2,851 3.711 1,341 717 858 1,335 13189 Israel . . 1,176 1,599 53 () 1.394 1,996 10790 Hong Kong 171 166 657 879 . 7191 Singapore 100 123 682 1,819 () . 2,667 6,714 9192 Trinidad and Tobago 80 65 208 272 .. . 640 417 62

93 Iran, Islamic Rep 3.739 .. 2.076 3,183 76 423 itl94 Iraq 1,172 . 870 2,510 1 35 141 87

High-incomeoil exporters 1 379~ 7 371 r 58~ 467 . 42 ;

95 Oman . 52 217 () 395 9596 Libya 126 388 612 849 64 375 12797 Saud Arabia 331 616 482 5,584 44 602 998 Kuwait 20 30 101 439 () 5,00099 United Arab Emirates . 132 282 () 2.812

industrial marketeconomies 65.494 r 66 103, 955 I 191 114

100 Ireland ,. . 631 386 3,573 6,094 103101 Spain 7,945 9,689 4,675 7,402 595 672 126102 ltaly 14.093 15,430 8,100 6,506 962 1,633 1091 03 New Zealand 92 22 8,875 10.241 114104 Un(ted K(ngdom 5,386 7,297 7,541 3,943 2,521 3,296 126

105 Austria 1,806 2,325 165 93 2,517 2,393 129106 Japan 24,218 25,012 19,557 24,336 3,849 3,872 91107 Belgium" 1,854 2,120 4,585 6,370 5,686 4,902 107108 Finland 3,188 3,017 222 1,030 1,931 1,938 107109 Netnerlands 3,173 5,313 7,199 4,843 7,165 7 674 120110 Australia 4.351 5,107 2 9 246 279 98111 Canada 6,743 8,770 1,513 904 192 419 119112 France 17,077 20,459 654 2,482 2,424 2,984 121113 Germany, Fed Rep 11,567 15,924 7.164 4,977 4,208 4.184 118114 Denmark 1,641 2,618 462 377 2,254 2,330 125

115 United States 46,300 55,400 460 399 800 1,024 119116 Sweden 3,133 3,219 301 112 1,639 1,639 119117 Nor-way 1,409 1,676 713 726 2,471 3,033 127118 Switzerland 1,458 1,156 3,842 4,122 127

EsEuropeannonmarket economies 18A43, 50 406 O35. 09e8 10-.

119 Hiungary 1,619 2,551 408 24 1,485 2,793 147120 Romania , . 1,381 1,305 559 1,541 152121 Albania . 48 12 745 1,114 104122 Bulgaria . 649 397 1.446 2,506 127123 Czechoslovakia .. 1.296 681 2,402 3.327 120

124 German Gem Rep.. 2,821 3,313 3,202 3,442 129125 Poland 4,185 4,566 417 1,715 2,481 93126 USSR . 7,755 40.108 437 826 101

a Figuresinitalcosareforl1981, not 1982. b. Figuresarefortnecropyearsl974/75andl1981/82. c. Averageforl1969-71. d IncludesLjuxemboourg.

229

Table 7. IndustrDistribution of manufacturing value added (percent; 1975 prices)

Machinery ~~~~~~~Value addedTextiles and i auatrn

Food and and transport Other (millions ofagriculture clothing equipment Chemicals manufacturing 1975 dollars)

1981a 1981a 19810 1981a 1981a 1970 1981Low-income economies

China and IndiaOther low-income

1Chad 49 34 .1 7 37 212 Bangladesh 30 38 4 1 6 1 2 647 1,2903 Ethiopia 27 27 2 44 236 3494 Nepal...5 Mali ... 44 556 Burma 31 1 4 1 4 50 287 4567 Zaire ... .186 1638 Malawi 54 1 0 .. 36 44 819 Upper Volta 74 7 1 1 8 67 961 0 Uganda 54 25 .. 21 222 871 1 India 1 3 1 8 20 1 4 35 10,232 16,1902 Rwanda 58 ... 2 40 . 1061 3 Burundi ... .. 23 441 4 Tanzania ... .... 190 2021 5 Somalia 421 6 Haiti 35 17 . 1 471 7 Benin . .56

1 8 Central African Rep. 66 21 ()2 1 1 44 2919 China .....

20 Guinea . .26

21 Niger 54 17222 Madagascar 27 39 2 10 22 295 27223 Sri Lanka 46 10 . .44 556 71424 Togo 50 28 . .22 30 1425 Ghana 28 ... .72 591 50526 Pakistan 46 14 7 16 17 1,492 2,49627 Kenya 24 10 33 6 27 167 53128 Sierra Leone ... .25 3729 Afghanistan30 Bhutan31 Kampuchea, Dem.32 Lao PDR33 Mozambique34 Viet NamMiddle-income economies

Oil exportersOil importers

Lower middle-income35 Sudan .253 42136 Maurilania .. 21 3637 Yemen, PDR ...... 5938 Liberia 22 ... 78 25 3939 Senegal 43 15 8 34 276 29840 Yemen Arab Rep. .. 25 10241 Lesotho 3 1042 Bolivia ...... 237 39043 Indonesia 28 8 7 12 45 1,517 5.99844 Zambia 16 22 10 14 38 319 44445 Honduras 47 14 1 7 31 138 25446 Egypt, Arab Rep. 20 22 14 10 34 1,835 4,54447 El Salvador .. 252 27048 Thailand 31 26 15 3 25 1,675 4,63649 Papua New Guinea ..... .. 71 132

50 Philippines 40 11 10 7 32 2,816 5.70651 Zimbabwe 19 19 10 11 41 564 96952 Nigeria 33 18 12 11 26 1,191 4,02053 Morocco 31 12 9 10 38 1,138 1,96054 Cameroon 41 .. 2 7 50 199 47755 Nicaragua 52 15 .. 33 262 36056 Ivory Coast .,....398 70657 Guatemala .....

58 Congo, People's Rep. 37 5 .7 51 73 10459 Costa Rica ... .. .261 531

60 Peru 27 14 10 11 38 2,911 4,03861 Dominican Rep. 72 4 1 5 18 483 95662 Jamaica ....... 429 35963 Ecuador 27' 14 10 7 42 322 88764 Turkey 24 11 15 12 38 3,678 6,532

Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes.

230

Distribution of manufacturing value added (percent; 1975 prices)

Machinery Value addedTextiles and in manufacturing

Food and and transport Other (millions ofagriculture clothing equipment Chemicals manufacturing 1975 dollars)

1981a 1981a 1981a 1981a 1981a 1970 198165 Tunisia 20 20 8 16 36 222 82066 Colombia 32 15 11 12 30 1,800 3,26067 Paraguay 34 14 10 4 38 183 43068 Angola .6 . 1. 3.69 Cuba 36 16 1 17 3070 Korea. Dem. Rep. ..71 Lebanon72 Mongolia 23 29 5 43

Upper middle-income73 Syrian Arab Rep. 27 32 4 4 33 575 1,31874 Jordan .. 91 28675 Malaysia 21 8 18 6 47 941 2,91876 Korea, Rep. of 16 23 18 11 32 2,346 10,54277 Panama 51 12 2 6 29 204 28078 Chile 15 5 14 12 54 1,881 2,16179 Brazil 15 10 24 13 38 18,819 40,67380 Mexico 19 8 20 12 41 14,592 31,11581 Algera 24 16 10 3 47 1,068 3,12582 Portugal 12 18 22 14 34 3,496 6,10983 Argentina 12 11 23 13 41 10,693 10,61284 Uruguay 26 23 11 8 32 726 96085 South Africa 14 11 18 11 4686 Yugoslavia 15 14 20 9 42 4.832 12,60587 Venezuela 27 6 8 8 51 3,419 5,53188 Greece 20 26 9 9 36 2,540 4,54089 Israel 15 12 25 8 4090 Hong Kong .. .. . 1,620 4,96691 Singapore 5 3 55 4 33 827 2,55692 Trinidad and Tobago 14 4 9 7 66 404 43493 Iran, Islamic Rep. 14 20 10 . . 56 2,60194 Iraq 22 22 .. 56 522High-income

oil exporters95 Oman .. .. . .96 Libya 14 .. 21 65 154 54497 Saudi Arabia 4 . . 96 1,726 3,56898 Kuwait 9 . 17 74 368 98699 United Arab Emirates . . .

Industrial marketeconomies

100 Ireland 23 10 13 15 39 .101 Spain 13 14 17 10 46 18,331 28,734102 Italy 10 15 29 8 38103 New Zealand 24 11 16 4 45104 United Kingdom 13 8 34 10 35 58,677 52,963105 Austria 15 9 24 7 45 9,112 13,355106 Japan 7 5 39 8 41 118,403 252,581107 Belgium 18 8 27 12 35 14,386 19,164108 Finland 12 8 25 8 47 5,636 8,919109 Netherlands 19 4 28 13 36 18,684 23,760110 Austral a 17 7 22 8 46 20,206 25,379111 Canada 14 7 23 7 49 25,748 36,978

j112 France 17 7 33 7 36 75,800 104,907113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 10 5 37 10 38 149,113 182,717114 Denmark 24 7 25 8 36 5,858 8,139115 United States 11 6 33 12 38 328,200 446,700116 Sweden 10 3 35 7 45 16,743 18,138

'117 Norway 16 4 27 7 46 5,322 6.309118 Switzerland 20 8 21 13 38

East Europeannonmarket economies

119 Hungary 11 10 29 10 40 3,244 5.984120 Romania 12 15 33 12 28121 Albania . .. . . .122 Bulgaria 25 16 16 6 37 .123 Czechoslovakia 7 9 38 8 38124 German Dem. Rep. 18 10 34 9 29125 Poland 5 19 32 9 35126 USSR 12 11 29 6 42

a Figures in italics are for 1980, not 1981.

231

Table 8. Commercial energyEnergy consumption Energy imports

Average annual energy per capita as a percentagegrowth rate (percent) (thousands of kilograms of merchandise

Energy production Energy consumption of oil equivalent) exports1960-74a 1974-81 1960-74 1974-81 19600 1981 1960 1981c

Low-income economies 6 2.. 5 7 58., 5 5 140,, 253. I11F China andlIndia 5 9.. 5 7 5g.. 5 7 148,, 307.Other low-income 14 3 6 5 5. .3? 52. 80 10, 12,1 Chad 9.8 3.8 7 20 232 Bangladesh . 117 .82 .35 .. 173 Ethiopia 14.1 5.6 14.2 62 7 23 1 1 444 Nepal 26.9 7.8 12.6 5.9 3 10 105 Mal 41.2 70 6.3 51 10 21 136 Burma 5.6 10.2 4.3 55 41 59 47 Zaire 3.0 12.2 50 2.0 65 76 38 Malaw 32.8 9.5 .4.5 . 46 .15

9 Upper Volta .. 7 8 13.1 3 22 38 7110 Uganda 52 -3.2 9.2 -8.0 27 23 511I India 49 5.4 5.4 56 79 158 1 1 8112 Rwanda 23.7 2.3 7.0 10 1813 Burundi . 30 5 .106 6 1514 Tanzania 10.6 67 10 8 2.4 30 50 .50

15 Somalia . 10 2 19.2 1 1 90 4 216 Haiti 27 1 11.0 3 7 8.3 29 5517 Benin 10 0 -15 26 38 1618 Central Afrocan Rep 14 1 3 7 7 7 7 3 20 33 12 11 9 China 62 57 6.0 53 191 41220 Guinea 15.9 ()3.4 1.3 35 54 7

21 Niger .15.1 10.9 3 31 6 2322 Madagascar 72 -58 11 4 - 5.4 27 41 9 1323 Sr Lanka 10 1 7.4 44 1 7 122 123 8 4524 Togo 24.2 132 16 1 15 125 10 1825 Ghana .. 3.0 12.3 -01 72 161 7

26 Pakistan 92 9.1 4.8 7.8 97 179 17 5227 Kenya 9.6 15 0 64 25 114 147 18 6328 Sierra Leone .68 -0.5 74 121 1 129 Afghanistan 38.9 -4.7 10 3 2.3 16 48 1230 Bhutan 31 Kampuchea, Demn . .. .... 59 932 LaoP8DR 24.6 13.5 10 1 1 1 6533 Mozambique 32 29 5 6.4 -0.5 76 85 1 134 Viet Nam . 53 . -0.2 .. 103

Middle-income economies 124. -38 80O., 54. 317, 921..Oil exporters 1.3. -6 69. 65 25; 93 Oillimporters 6 4 5 844. 5.. 84. 13., 7.

Lower middle-income 2 8. 23.. 64. 55 146 3162. 8. 27

35 Sudan 29.7 96 13.1 -3.9 40 70 8 4436 Mauritania . . 20.9 4.2 12 131 3937 Yemnen, PDB 8.5 . 79138 Liber a 31 9 -09 19 8 1.6 66 373 3 2439 Senegal. 1.9 -2.0 381 206 8 77

40 Yemnen Arab Rep . 17.1 571 1 Lesotho42 Boliva 171 -01 68 82 122 326 443 Indonesia 85 51 4.4 87 88 191 3 844 Zamnbia . 4.5 .02 .. 443

45 Honduras 29 4 8 1 9.2 3.5 102 206 10 1846 Egypt, Arab Rep 9.3 20 4 2.6 10.8 197 448 12 1 047 E Salvador 51 19.8 7 3 59 98 210 8 2748 Thailand 280 8.1 165 73 44 284 12 4349 Papua New Guinea 12.3 14.9 17.1 46 37 240 7 . -

50 Philippines 29 25 2 9.9 56 109 281 9 4551 Zimnbabwe . 25 .1.4 . 57852 N geria 36 6 -23 92 17.2 20 143 753 Morocco 20 47 7 9 7.4 118 283 9 5054 Cameroon 1.1 554 4.7 8.5 61 122 7 1355 Nicaragua 26.5 5.3 10.4 03 125 271 12 4156 Ivory Coast 97 35.1 149 7 9 50 191 5 2157 Guatemala 9.9 20 9 6.6 50 124 199 12 6258 Congo, People's Rep 15 8 9.3 5.9 18.5 89 139 25 759 Costa Rica 9.5 82 1 0.8 5.5 208 592 7 21

60 Peru 3.5 15 1 63 2.4 315 534 4 161 Dominican Rep 1.8 -7.0 14.0 -1 2 108 349 .40

62 Jamaica -07 -0.1 9.6 0.2 449 1,182 1 1 5163 Ecuiador 19.1 3.8 8.5 13 6 151 571 2 164 Turkey 84 46 10.4 5.0 170 569 16 83

Note For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes.

232

Energy consumption Energy importsAverage annual energy per capita as a percentage

grow th rate (percent) (thousands of kilograms of merchandise-Energy production Energy consumption of oil equivalent) exports1960-74a 1974-81 1960-74 1974-81 1 9 6 0 b 1981 1960 1981c

65 Tunisia 72.2 5.5 9.8 10.0 119 497 15 3166 Colombia 3.5 2.5 6.3 4.7 355 690 3 2567 Paraguay . 10.4 9.0 78 54 172 368 Angola 35.5 -1.8 13.0 5.2 46 21069 Cuba 21.2 5.3 4.7 4.1 624 1,051 670 Korea, Demn Rep. 9.4 3.0 9.6 3.7 833 2,05471 Lebanon 12.7 0.9 7.6 -1.9 512 812 6872 Mongolia 10 4 10.9 11.1 364 1,161

Upper middle-income 9 3 - 59;, 7 8 5.3. 540;, 1 209., tO. 2773 Syrian Arab Rep. 86.6 2.2 9 0 13.1 218 771 1674 Jordan . 6.8 16.1 130 706 79 10175 Malaysia 37.5 19.6 9.5 8.3 222 689 2 1876 Korea, Rep. of 5.9 4.2 14.7 10.4 143 1,104 70 3777 Panama 14 7 53 6 18.5 4.6 306 2,192 . 12578 Chile 4 0 0.8 6.2 1.1 569 754 10 2079 Brazl 8.3 8.4 9.1 5.9 264 740 21 5280 Mexico 5.8 17.6 7.4 9.3 540 1,340 381 Alger a 11.2 5.1 8.0 17 6 221 931 14 282 Portugal 4.5 0 7 7.8 4.3 363 1,145 17 5883 Argentina 6.5 4 7 5.5 3.0 808 1,445 14 1184 Uruguay 3.7 9.3 2.2 2.2 703 853 35 4485 South Africa 3.6 10 0 5.2 5.0 1,512 2,392 9(.86 Yugoslavia 4.2 4.0 6.7 5.0 659 1,844 8 3587 Venezuela 1.1 -2.3 3.7 4.4 2,176 2,439 1(.80 Greece 13.5 7.3 11.3 5.0 361 1,699 26 4689 Israel 41.8 -39.4 9.3 2 1 932 1,847 17 3690 Hong Kong .10.4 5.5 443 1,314 5 991 Singapore 9.4 1 6 1,448 4,492 17 4492 Trinidad and Tobago 2.8 2 3 1.1 7.8 4,420 6.378 35 3293 Iran, Islam-ic Rep. 14.6 -19.7 11.0 -1.7 522 808 194 Iraq 5.0 -2.9 5.1 11.8 411 855(.High-income

oillexporters 171, 0 9 a 7 1 3.367 ,

95 Oman 44.0 -1.0 -2.6 . 914 . 796 Libya 29.1 -1.0 15.4 20 9 198 2,309 288 197 Saudi Arabia 14.0 4.0 14.6 7.6 874 3,326 1,271(.98 Kuwait 4.5 -6.8 . 1 9 . 6,261 (.

99 United Arab Emirates 37.9 -0.5 .. 18 1 . 4,985 . 5Industrial market

economies 40, 22; 5 3 i 1.1; 3,1411~ 4i-985, 1-2 30.100 Ireland -0.4 10.8 5.3 4.6 1,218 2,480 17 20101 Spain 2.9 4.7 8.5 2.5 667 1,902 22 67102 Italy 2 3 -0.2 8.1 0.8 1,003 2,558 18 41103 New Zealand 4 0 5.1 5.2 2 0 2,083 3,673 7 20104 United Kingdom -0.9 10.8 2.2 -0.8 3,295 3,541 14 14105 Austria 1.4 1.5 5.5 1.9 1,685 3,398 12 25106 Japan -1.4 5 9 11 3 1.5 880 3.087 18 48107 Belgium -7.2 2.8 5.1 0.3 2.790 4,636 11 23108 Finland 3.3 20 6 9.4 5 7 1,304 5,793 11 40109 Netnerlands 16 9 -1.4 9.8 0.1 2,114 4,908 15 25110 Australia 12 1 4.6 6.5 2.8 2,576 4,908 12 15ill Canada 8.7 1.8 5.9 2.6 5,151 9,208 9 11112 France -1 4 5.3 5.7 1.7 1,964 3,619 16 33113 Germany, Fed Rep. -0.6 0.8 4.4 1 4 2,645 4,342 7 23114 Denmark -21.6 36.1 5.9 1.0 1,914 3,616 15 26115 U nited States 3.3 1.2 4.0 0 7 5,863 7,540 8 36116 Sweden 3.6 8.5 5.2 1 9 3,122 6,138 16 25117 Norway 6.8 19.4 6.0 3.9 3,400 8,305 15 13

-118 Switzerland 4.2 5.3 6.2 1.7 1,841 3,755 10 14

East Europeannonmarket economies 5 2. 3 6'. 3. 3 5. 1 983., 4.442

119 Hulngary 1.6 1.7 3.8 3.6 1,354 2,863 13 17120 Romania 5.9 1.9 7.8 4.7 1,056 3,289121 Albania 9.7 5.7 7.9 6.4 362 899122 Bulgaria 3.3 4.8 9.7 4.6 935 4,164 7 19123 Czechoslovakia 1.1 09 3.2 2.4 2,765 4,773 124 German Dem. Rep. 0.6 1.6 2.2 2.5 3,173 5,398125 Poland 40 1.0 4.4 3.7 1.756 3.198 .. 20126 USSR 5.8 4.2 5 5 3.5 2.029 4,736 4

a. Figures in itai)cs are for 1961-74. not 1960-74. b F gures in italics are for 1961, not 1960. c. Figures ~n italics are for 1980, not 1981.

233

Table 9. Growthi of merchandise tradeMerchandise trade Average annual growth ratea(millions of dollars) (percent) Terms of tradeExports Imports Exports Imports (1980=100)

19 8 2 b 1 9 8 2 b 1960-70 1970-82c 1960-70 1970-82c 1979 1982bLow-income economies 42.6i9 t 56.205 1 5- 4m 0 3 . 5 4 'ii 1 2 i108 f 87,i

China and India 30,321 i 33 097 iOther low-income 12.298 1 23.108i 5 7 w 0 2 5 8'1 0 7 P 108 87'.81 Chad 101 132 6.0 -8.6 5.1 -3.6 100 992 Bangiadesh 769 2,300 8.1 -0.8 7.0 5.5 96 983 Ethiopia 404 787 3.7 1.3 6 2 0.2 139 744 Nepal 46 252.5 Mali 146 332 2.9 6.6 -0.4 6.6 107 1026 Burma 380 408 -11.6 1.9 -5.6 -2.3 99 867 Zaire 569 480 -1.7 -5.6 5.4 -12.4 113 818 Malawi 262 314 11.7 5.1 7.6 1.2 ill 1069 Upper Volta 56 346 14.5 9.1 8.1 6.7 113 97

10 Uganda 371 339 6.9 -9.2 6.2 -7.9 103 741 1 India 8,446 14,088 4.7 4 7 -0.9 2.6 118 961 2 Rwanda 90 286 16.0 2.4 8.2 11.5 88 631 3 Burundi 88 214 . ..

1 4 Tanzania 480 1,046 3.8 -5.8 6.0 -1 5 105 8615 Somalia 317 378 2.5 9.1 2.7 3.8 116 11116 Haiti 380 525 .

17 Benin 34 889 5.2 -4.4 7.5 5.2 115 7518 Central African Rep 106 91 9.6 2.6 4 5 -0.2 99 901 9 China 21,875 19,009 .

20 Guinea 411 296 .

21 Niger 333 442 5.9 20.8 12.1 11.0 112 8922 Madagascar 433 522 5.4 -3.6 4.1 -3.4 103 8023 Sri Lanka 1.015 1,771 4.6 0.1 -0.2 1.8 126 8524 Togo 213 526 10.5 0.3 8.6 8.6 108 11225 Ghana 873 705 0.1 -4.7 -1 5 -4.8 136 61

26 Pakistan 2,403 5,396 9.9 4.7 5.4 3.9 119 9327 Kenya 979 1,683 7.5 -3.3 6.5 -2.7 108 8728 Sierra Leone 111 298 2.5 -6.6 1.9 -2 6 121 8429 Afghanistan 373 776 2.7 7.1 0.7 8.1 99 9630 Bhutan . .. ..

31 Kampuchea, Dem. 40 6232 Lao PDR 24 83 .

33 Mozambique 303 792 6.0 -13.3 7 9 -14.5 1 04 8434 Viet Nam 188 637.. .

Middle-income economies 329.5581t 380 2091i 5.4 "i 2.6 5 9 3 9 ,i99 ., 91Oil exporters 149.540 i 144.301 1 .44 -?I -1I 3'ii 3 6 'n 8 7",, 71 1043Oil importers 180.01 8, 235.908 1 6 7 m 4 0 P~ 7 4 ,, 1 5 -i 102 .. 85

Lower middle-income 97.855 1 I119 668 t 5 3 P' 1 6 "i 6.9 3 3 a, 96 ', 935 Sudan 499 1,285 2.1 -5 1 0.5 3.5 98 8536 Mauritania 232 273 53.8 -0.1 4.6 3 0 101 9737 Yemnen, PDR 580 1,193 .

38 Liberia 531 477 18.5 0.5 2.9 -2.4 121 9239 Senegal 477 974 1.4 -1.8 2.3 1.3 110 8940 Yemen Arab Rep. 44 1,98741 Lesotho"42 Bolivia 832 496 9 7 -3.9 8.1 3.8 77 7643 Indonesia 22,294 16,859 3.5 4.4 1 9 12.3 73 10844 Zambia 1,059 831 2.3 -0.5 9.7 -6.8 116 7245 Honduras 654 712 10.9 3.4 11.7 0 8 100 8146 Egypt, Arab Rep. 3,120 9,078 3.9 -0.3 -0.9 9.6 95 10547 El Salvador 704 883 6.2 2.6 6.4 1.2 99 6948 Thailand 6.945 8,548 5.2 9.1 11.3 4.3 121 7849 Papua New Guinea 799 1,029.. .

50 Philippines 5,010 8.229 2.3 7.9 7 2 2.1 112 8351 Zimbabwe 663 704 . ... 81 10552 Nigeria 19,484 20,821 6 6 -1.6 1 5 17 2 67 10353 Morocco 2,059 4,315 2.7 -0.3 3.3 4 7 98 9854 Cameroon 998 1,205 7.1 4.0 9.2 5.2 119 7155 Nicaragua 406 776 9.9 1.6 10.4 -1.3 103 6456 Ivory Coast 2,235 2,090 8.9 2.6 10.0 4.6 119 9157 Guatemala 1,120 1,362 9.3 5.4 7 2 3.3 92 7158 Congo, People's Rep. 923 970 6.4 1 4 -1 0 9 1 74 11059 Costa Rica 872 887 9.6 4.5 10.1 0.1 97 8860 Peru 3,230 3,787 2.1 4.8 3 6 1 6 99 8961 Dominican Rep 768 1,256 -2.1 4.0 9.9 1 3 83 8262 Jamaica 726 1.372 4.8 -3.3 8.2 -6.1 107 8563 Ecuador 2.341 2,189 2.8 -1.3 11.6 8.6 70 9864 Turkey 5,685 8,812 . 4.0 .. 2.0 125 89

Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes.

234

Merchandise trade Average annual growth rate'(millions of dollars) (percent) Terms of tradeExports Imports Exports imports (1 980=1 00)1 9 8 2b 1 9 8 2 b 1960-70 1 970-82c 1960-70 1 970-82c 1979 19820

65 Tunisia 1,960 3,294 4.4 -0.1 2.3 87 79 9966 Colombia 3,095 5,478 2.6 2.2 2.4 7.3 90 9267 Paraguay 330 581 5.4 5.8 7.4 6.7 133 8768 Angola 1,730 1,001 9.7 -15.8 11.5 00 74 10469 Cuba 1,328 1,415 3.9 2.9 5.5 1.4 90 6870 Korea, Dem. Rep. 843 89971 Lebanon 923 3,567 15.2 1.0 5.2 3.9 96 9272 Mongolia 37 29Upper middle-income 231.703 i 260.541', 5 4, 7 1' 5 5, 74' 100' 96.73 Syrian Arab Rep. 2,026 4,015 3.5 -4.0 4.1 11.3 73 10774 Jordan 753 3,241 10.8 17.7 36 13.5 102 10175 Malaysia 11,789 12,543 6.1 3.8 2.4 7.3 97 8376 Korea, Rep, of 21,853 24,251 34.7 20.2 19.7 9.8 127 95

* 77 Panama 309 1,569 10.4 -7.3 10.5 -3 9 94 8478 Cnile 3,822 3,529 0.7 9.5 4.8 1.5 120 7479 Brazil 18,627 19,936 5.3 8.8 5.0 1 4 114 8480 Mexico 21,006 15,042 3.4 8.6 6.4 8 7 77 106

* 81 Algeria 12,533 10,937 3.7 -0.3 -1.2 10.8 64 10682 Portugal 4,111 9,313 9.6 14.283 Argentina 7,798 5,337 3.8 8.3 0.4 1.6 102 9084 Uruguay 1,023 1,042 2.8 5.9 -3.0 1.9 119 8085 Soutn Africad 17,597 18,956 5.4 .8.2 .101

86 Yugoslavia 10,265 13,346 7.7 8.8 .101

87 Venezuela 16,443 11,670 1.1 -7.2 4.4 9.2 67 11288 Greece 4,297 10,023 10.8 9.4 1 0.8 4.5 98 10389 Israel 5,017 7,960 13.6 8.8 8.7 1 7 118 9390 Hong Kong 20,985 23,554 12.7 9.4 9.2 11.9 100 9591 S ngapore 20,788 28,167 4.2 5.9 .102

92 Trinidad and Tobago 3,072 3,697 4.9 -6.4 3.2 -5.3 95 9793 Iran, Islamic Rep. 16,379 11,231 12.5 -13.8 11.5 7 5 60 9894 Iraq 11,210 21.182 5.4 -4.8 1.7 24.1 69 118High-income

oillexporters 133 379 r 76.2'11t 33 5'u -2 9 P, 10 9 .I, 19 3~ (,8

95 Oman 4,421 2.68296 Libya 16,391 15,414 66.9 -8.1 15.6 12 9 67 10597 Saudi Arabia 79,123 40.654 10.8 2.3 11.0 32 3 67 12598 KLwait 16,561 8,042 5.2 -11.2 10.8 15.2 68 11599 United Arab Emirates 16,883 9,419 56.1 2.4 5.2 23.3 73 113Industrial market

economies 1. 148 808 i 1 212 975 i 8 5'n 5" 9 5. 4 3 , 106'i 99.100 Ireland 7,982 9.618 7.1 8.1 8.3 5.9 92 86101 Spain 20,522 31.535 11.5 9 4 18.5 4 4 117 92102 Italy 73,490 86,213 13.6 5.8 9.7 3.1 107 95103 New Zealand 5,539 5,825 4.6 3.9 2.9 1 8 112 98104 United Kingdom 97,028 99,723 4.8 6.0 5.0 3.5 102 97105 Austria 15,685 19,557 9.6 7.0 9.6 6.1 104 99106 Japan 138,911 131.932 17.2 8.5 13.7 3.5 125 106107 Belgium' 52,381 58,037 10.9 4.6 10.3 4.5 104 94108 Finland 13,132 13.387 6.8 4.7 7.0 2 4 112 100109 Netherlands 66,322 62.583 9.9 4.5 9.5 3 1 102 103110 Australia 22,022 24.187 6.5 3.8 7.2 5.2 103 100111 Canada 68,499 55,091 10.0 4.0 9.1 4.3 99 94112 France 92,629 115,645 8.2 6.1 11.0 6.2 107 98113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 176,428 155,856 101 5 6 10.0 5.1 106 100114 Denmark 15,527 17,162 7.1 4.8 8.2 2.1 107 99

.115 United States 212,275 254,884 6.0 5.6 9.8 3.8 111 107116 Sweden 26,817 27,591 7 7 3.2 7.2 2.3 100 99117 Norway 17,595 15,479 91 6.7 9.7 4.3 86 115118 Switzeriand 26,024 28,670 8 5 3 9 9.0 4.3 109 112East European

nonmarket economies 160 258.' 150i004, 94,. 67 8 6 ~ 6 0.119 Hungary 8.767 8,814 9.7 7.4 91 5.0 99 97120 Romania 11.714 9,836 9 4 .. 8.8121 Albania 267 246 . .

122 Bulgania 1.969 2,281 14.4 11.4 12.9 7.8123 Czechoslovakia 15,637 15,403 6.7 6.1 7.0 4.3124 German Dem Rep. 21,743 20,196 8.3 .. 8.6125 Poland 13.249 15,476 -0.3 6.7 -0.4 6.0 99126 USSR 86.912 77,752 9.7 5.6 7.1 8.3

a. See the technical notes. b. Figures in italics are for 1 981, not 1982. c. Figures in italics are for 1 970-81, not 1970-82. d Figures are for theSouth African Customs Union comnprising South Africa, Nam bia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. Trade between the component terr tor es isexcluded e. Includes Luxembourg.

235

Table 10. Structure of merchandise exportsPercentage share of merchandise exports

MachineryFuels, Other and

minerals, primary Textiles transport Otherand metals commodities and clothing equipment manufactures

1960a 19 8-1 b 1960a 1981b 1960a 1981b 1960a 19 8 1 b 1960, 1 9 8 1 b

L.wincome economies 9 1 9, 70 ;. 31 15.. 21, ,. 8. 2China and India 20., 26 ?2: 6 .2

i Chad 3 .. 94 0 0 32 Bangladesh ()32 56 . 1 . 13 Ethiopia 0 8 100 91 0 .)0 1)0 14 Nepal .. (). 69 24 .. 0 75 Mali 0 .96 I 1I 26 Burma 4 . 95 0 0 17 Zaire 42 57 0 0 .1

8 Malawi . )93 . . ( 29 Upper Volta 0 (. 100 85 0 2 0 6 () 7

lO0Uganda 8 .. 92 .0 0 (1 1 India 1 0 8 45 33 35 23 1 8 9 281 2 Rwanda1 3 Burundi4 Tanzan a () 10 87 76 0 .9 0 ()13 51 5 Somai,a 0 5 88 94 0 a)8 ( 4 11 6 Haiti 0 100 0 0 01 7Benin 1 0 80 7 II31 8 Central African Rep. 1 2 ()86 74 ( )1 ()1 26I 9Ch na . 24 . 23 21 .. 5 2720 Guinea 42 58 C 0 021 Niger 81 100 1 7 0 1 0 II0 122 Madagascar 4 13 90 79 1 4 1 1 4 323 Sri Lanka (1 14 99 65 0 16 0 0 524 logo 3 52 89 33 3 1 0 1 5 I 325 Ghana 7 83 0 0 . 1 0

26 Pak.stan 0 7 73 40 23 41 1 1 3 127 Kenya 1 36 87 52 0 .)0 1 12 1 128 Sierra Leone 15 20 .0 0 .65

29 Afghanisran ()82 .14 3 .1

30 Bhutan . .... ...

31 Kampuchea, Dern. 0 100 . 0 032 Lao PDR33 Mozambique 0 . 100 .0 0 .0

34 Viet Nam., ... . . .. ..

Middle-income economies 30; 33.. 59. 4. 3.. 10., 1 I 1IOil exporters 48. 80. -18 13,. 1, 2.. I 3. Oillimporters iS, 13. 6. 28... 1, 14 . 10. 3

Lower middle-income 20). 43; 76. 3-9. 1, C. i 2.. 2 10.

35 Sudan 0 5 100 94 0 1 0a . 0 (

36 Mauritania 4 69 1 20 637 Yemen, PDR38 Liber a 45 67 55 3 1 0 1)0 1 0 139 Senegal 3 52 94 29 1 4 1 4 1 1 140 Yemen Arab Rep (). 49 6 25 204 1 Lesotho'42 Bolivia ...

43 Indonesia 33 83 67 1 3 .) 1 I. 1( 244 Zamba .

45r-Honduras 5 6 93 83 2 0 (12 946 Egypt, Arab Rep 4 69 84 23 9 7 () G) 3 147 El Salvador 0 7 94 56 3 1 4 .) 3 3 2048 Thailand 7 8 91 65 1) 1 0 0 5 2 1 249 Papua New Guinea 0 . 92 .0 . 0 850 Pholippines 1 0 1 6 86 39 1 7 0 3 3 3551 Z mbabwe 71 . 25 I . 352 Nigeria 8 .89 .0 .0 353 Morocco 38 44 54 28 1 1 0 1 1 6 1 754 Cameroon 1 9 33 77 64 0 1 2 ()2 255 Nicaragua 3 2 95 88 0 1 0 ()2 956 Ivory Coast 1 8 98 82 0 3 () 2 1 557 Guatemaia 2 2 95 69 1 5 0 2 2 2258 Congo, People's Rep. 7 90 84 4 1) ()5 (4 659 Costa Rica 0 1 95 67 0 4 0 4 5 2460 Pertu 49 64 50 1 9 0 8 0 2 1 761 Dominican Rep 6 2 92 79 0 1)0 1 2 1862 Jamaica 50 81 45 13 2 1 0 1 3 463 Ecuador 0 .99 .. 0 .0 164 Turkey 8 7 89 56 0 19 0 4 3 14

Note For data cornparabi ty ano coverage see the tech n cal notes

236

Percentage share of merchandise exportsMachinery

Fuels, Other andminerals, primary Textiles transport Other

and metals commodities and clothing equipment manufactures196Oa 1981 b 1960a 1 9 8 1 b 1960a 19810b 1960a 19810 1960' 1981b

65lTunis a 24 57 66 1 0 1 1 5 1 2 8 1 666 Colomboa 1 9 2 79 70 0 8 (1 3 2 1 767 Paraguay 0 100 0 0 068 Angola69 Cuba 2 5 93 90 1 0 () 0 4 570 Korea. Dern. Rep.71 Lebanon. .

72 Mon golia. .

Upper middle-income 38 29 w 46,, 18. 4 12 ' 2. 14 ,, 10

73 Syrian Arab Rep. 0 .81 . 2 0 1774 Jordan 0 33 96 24 0 6 0 2 4 3575 Malaysia 20 36 74 44 .) 3 (.) 12 6 576 Korea,Rep of 30 2 56 8 8 30 (. 22 6 3877 Panama . 24 67 3 (). 6

78 Chile 92 65 4 25 0 ()0 2 4 879 Brazi 8 14 89 45 0 4 () 18 3 1980 Mexico 24 64 . .4 .1 781 Algeria 12 99 81 1 0 ()1 ()6 (<82 Portugal 8 9 37 20 18 27 3 13 34 3183 Argentina 1 8 95 72 0 1 .) 5 4 1484 Uruguay (.) 1 71 69 21 13 .) 2 8 1585 South Africa' 29 14 42 13 2 1 4 2 23 7086 Yugos avia 18 6 45 15 4 11 15 29 18 3987 Venezuela 74 97 26 .)0 .)0 1 (1 288 Greece 9 18 81 28 1 20 1 5 8 2989 Israe 4 2 35 17 8 6 2 19 51 5690 Hong Kong 5 1 15 2 45 42 4 18 31 3791 Singapore 1 29 73 15 5 4 7 26 14 2692 Trinidad and Tobago 82 90 14 2 0 1)0 3 4 593 Iran, Islamic Rep 88 .9 0 . 0 .3

94/Iraq 97 .3 0 00

High-incomeoillexporters 98. i i ,1

95 Oman . 94 . 1 . 4 .. 196 Libya 100 100 0 ()0 ()0 (/0 .

97 Saud Arabia 95 99 5 (10 (t0 (0 198 Kuwait 84 1 1 . 5 . 999 UJn ted Arab EmiratesIndustrial market

economies 11 12: 23; 13.. 7. 4 ~ 29. 37., 30., 32u100 Irelana 5 3 67 35 6 8 4 22 18 32101 Span 21 9 57 20 7 5 2 26 13 40102 Itsly 8 8 19 9 17 11 29 32 27 40103 New Zealand () 5 97 74 0 3 () 4 3 14104 United Kingdom 7 23 9 9 8 4 44 33 32 31105 Austr a 26 5 22 11 10 10 16 27 26 47106 Japan 11 1 10 2 28 4 23 57 28 36107 Belgium' 15 14 9 12 12 7 13 22 51 45108 Finland 3 8 50 20 1 7 13 2 1 33 44109 Netherlands 15 27 34 24 8 4 18 16 25 29110 Austral a 13 33 79 42 .) 1 3 6 5 18I11 Canaoa 33 26 37 22 1 1 8 28 21 23112 France 9 8 18 19 10 5 25 34 38 34113 Germany Fed.Rep. 9 7 4 7 4 5 44 45 39 36114 Denmark 2 5 63 39 3 5 19 25 13 26115 U nited States 10 7 27 23 3 2 35 44 25 24116 Sweden 10 9 29 12 1 2 31 42 29 35

~117 Norway 22 60 34 9 2 1 10 13 32 17118 Switzerland 2 3 8 4 12 7 30 34 48 52

East Europeannonmarkel economies 1 8.. 33 3. 34 ;.21

119 Hungary 6 8 28 27 7 7 38 31 21 27120 Romania ... ...

121 Albania . ..

122 Bulgaria 3 .75 .. 12 .6 .4

123 Czechoslovakia 20 5 11 8 () 6 45 52 25 29124 German Dem. Rep. . .. .

125 Po/and .. 17 .. 8 7 47 21126 USSR 24 .28 .. 1 .21 26

a F gures n ta ics are for 1961. not 1960. b. Figures in talics aretfor 1 980. not 1 981 a FiguresaretortheSouth Afroan Customs Union com-prising South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland Trade between the component countries is excluded. a. Includes Luxembourg

237

Table 11. Structure of merchandise importsPercentage share of merchandise imports

MachineryOther and

primary transport OtherFood Fuels commodities equipment manufactures

1960a 198 1b 1960a 1981b 1960a 1 9 8 1 b 1960a 1981b 1960a 1981b

Low-income economies 22 14;z, 7 21 z, 18, 12. 26 22 217. 31China andlIndia I3;i 21; I; 21. 3 1Other low-income 24-. 1

6; 8, 21; 4. 6; 21. 26. 43 31.

iChad 19 .. 12 .4 .. 19 . 462Bangladesh . 20 .. 8 . 11. 21 .. 403 Ethiopa 9 . 23 . 4 . 35 . 294Nepal . 4 18 .. 2 32 445Mali 20 5 .. 4 18 .. 53

6Burma 14 .. 4 .. 9 .17 567 Zaire .. ..

8 Malawi 8 . 15 . 2 . 34 . 419 Upper Volta 21 25 4 16 1 3 24 24 50 32

lobUganda 6 .. 8 .. 8 . 25 53

I lIndia 21 9 6 45 28 8 30 13 15 2512 Rwanda.13 Burundi14 Tanzania .. 13 .. 21 3 . 35 28l5 Somalia 27 33 4 1 0 4 18 35 51 27

17 Benin 17 .. 10 .. 18 .54

18 Central African Rep. 15 21 9 2 2 3 26 34 48 4019 Cnina .. 16 .. ( . 20 . 27 3720 Guinea . ..

21 Niger 24 23 5 15 4 4 18 26 49 3222 Madagascar 17 14 6 1 1 3 3 23 40 51 3223 Sri Lanka 39 19 7 25 5 3 15 23 34 3024 Togo 16 26 6 8 3 3 32 21 43 4225 Ghana 19 .. 5 .4 - 26 .. 4626 Pakistan 22 14 10 28 2 8 27 23 39 2727 Kenya 12 8 11 34 8 2 27 28 42 2828 Sierra Leone 23 . 12 5 15 4529 Afghanistan 14 7 4 .. 14 . 6130 Bhutan31 Kampuchea, Dem.32 Lao PDR33 Mozambique34 Viet NamMiddle-income economies 15 i 2,, 9., 21 13 6 , 28 , 29. 3S.. 32.

Oil exporters 19;, 17;, 7; 9, P.-. 5 27~ 37, 39 32

Lower middle-income i6 , 14 . 7, 21; 9. 5. 28. 29. 40; 31.

35 Sudan 17 19 8 19 3 3 14 22 58 3736 Mauritania 5 3 .. 3 39 5037 Yemen, PDR .

38 Liberia 16 22 4 27 7 2 34 25 39 2439 Senegal 30 28 5 30 2 1 19 18 44 2340 Yemen Arab Rep . 28 .. 7 I. 1 28 3641 Lesothoc 42 Bolivia ... ..

43 Indonesia 23 11 5 13 10 6 17 36 45 3444 Zambia . .. . .

45 Honduras 13 10 9 16 3 2 24 27 51 4546 Egypt, Arab Rep 23 34 11 3 16 6 25 28 25 2947 El Salvador 17 17 6 21 6 4 26 12 45 4648 Thailand 10 4 11 30 11 8 25 26 43 3249 Papua New Guinea 30 .. 5 .4 .23 .38

50 Phil pp nes 15 8 10 30 5 4 36 23 34 3551 Zimbaowe . . .. . . .

52 Nigeria 14 .. 5 .. 6 24 . 5153 Morocco 27 23 8 27 7 9 19 19 39 2254 Cameroon 20 9 8 12 3 2 17 34 52 4355 Nicaragua 9 18 10 20 5 1 22 21 54 4056 Ivory Coast 18 20 6 22 2 2 27 22 47 3457 Guatemala 12 6 10 38 7 3 26 16 45 3758 Congo, Peopie's Rep. 16 19 6 14 1 2 31 23 44 4259 Costa Rica 13 9 6 16 6 4 26 22 49 4960 Peru 16 19 5 1 5 4 37 49 37 2761 Dominican Rep . 18 . 33 3 . . 20 2662 Jamaica 22 19 8 33 9 3 24 15 37 3063 Ecuador 13 9 3 1 9 4 33 49 42 3764 Turkey 7 3 11 44 16 6 42 22 24 25

Note For data comparability and coverage see the technicalinotes.

238

Percentage share of merchandise importsMachinery

Other andprimary transport Other

Food Fuels commodities equipment manufactures196Oa 1 9 8 1 b 1960a 19810 196Oa 1 9 8 1b 1960a 1981b 19600 198101

65lun sia 20 14 9 21 4 8 23 27 44 3066 Colombia 8 10 3 14 15 6 43 37 31 3367 Paraguay68 Angola. . .

69 Cuba ..

70 Korea, Demn. Rep.71 Lebanon72 MongoliaUpper middle-income IS., 11 9, 22.. I5 7. .. 29, 33 373 Syrian Arab Rep. 24 .. 8 .5 . 15 .48

74 Jordan .. 17 17 .. 3 . I 33 .. 3075 Malaysia 29 13 16 17 13 5 14 37 28 2876 Korea, Rep. of 10 12 7 30 25 15 12 23 46 2077 Panama 15 10 10 31 1 1 22 21 52 37

78 Chile 15 .. 18 .. 4 33 . 3079 Brazl1 14 9 19 51 13 4 36 18 18 1880 Mexico 4 .2 10 52 .. 3281 Algeria 26 21 4 2 2 5 14 38 54 3482 Portugal 15 16 10 24 28 9 26 27 2 1 24

83 Argentina 3 5 13 11 11 6 44 43 29 3584 Uruguay 5 7 24 32 46 5 17 32 8 2485 South Africa' 6 4 7 (.) 9 4 37 42 41 5086 Yugoslavia 11 6 5 24 25 12 37 28 22 3087 Venezuela 18 17 1 1 10 4 36 43 35 35

88 Greece 11 11 8 22 16 7 44 28 21 3289 Israel 20 12 7 26 18 7 28 24 27 3190 Hong Kong 27 12 3 8 16 5 10 23 44 5291 Singapore 21 7 15 34 38 5 7 28 19 2692 Trinidad and Tobago 16 13 34 37 7 3 18 22 25 2593 Iran, Islamic Rep 14 .. 1 ,1 .. 23 .61

94 IraqHigh-income

o,ilexporters 1 5- 2 39.1 43

95 Oman . 13 .. 13 . 2 . 39 .. 3396 Libya 13 18 5 1 10 2 40 38 32 4197 Saudi Arabia . 14 . 1 . 2 . 40 . 4398 Kuwait .. 14 . 1 .. 2 . 41 , 4299 United Arab Emirates - 11 .. 11 2 . 36 . 40

Industrial marketeconomies 22. 11 . 11- 28. 24 . 9 6. 2 . 31.

100 Ireland 18 13 12 15 11 4 2 1 27 38 4 1101 Spain 16 12 22 43 25 9 22 17 15 19102 Italy 20 12 14 35 31 11 13 20 22 22103 New Zealand 8 6 8 20 16 5 29 32 39 37104 United Kingdom 36 14 11 14 27 10 8 26 18 36105 Austria 16 7 10 19 20 9 29 27 25 38106 Japan 17 13 17 51 49 16 9 7 8 13107 Belg UMd 15 12 10 20 26 10 21 22 28 36108 Finland 13 7 10 31 20 7 33 27 24 28109 Netnerlands 18 15 13 26 14 6 22 19 33 34

110 Australia 6 5 10 14 16 4 31 39 37 38111 Canada 12 7 9 12 12 6 36 47 31 28112 France 25 10 17 29 25 8 14 22 19 31.113 Germany Fed. Rep. 26 12 8 24 28 9 10 20 28 35114 Denmark 18 12 12 24 11 7 23 21 36 36

115 United States 24 8 10 31 25 7 10 26 31 28116 Sweden 13 7 14 25 13 6 26 27 34 35

_117 Norway 12 7 9 15 13 7 36 34 30 37118 Sw tzerland 18 9 8 12 13 6 21 26 40 47East European

nonmarket economies i 0, 22. 16 , 3119 Hungary 8 9 12 17 28 11 28 28 24 35120 Romania 3 . 28 . 27 . 28 . 14121 Albania1 22 Bulgaria123 Czechoslovakia 10 23 14 . 35 .. 18

124 German Dem Rep.125 Poland 18 20 . 10 . 31 . 21126 USSR 12 .4 .18 .30 .. 36

a. Figuresen talicseare for 1 961, not 1 960 b Figures in italicsare for 1980, not 1 981. c. Figures are for tneSouth African Custom s Union com-pris ng South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho. Botswana, and Swaz land. Trade between the component territories s excluoed. a. Includes Luxembourg

239

Table 12. Origin and destination of merchandise exportsDestination of merchandise exports (percentage of total)

Industrial East Europeanmarket nonmarket High-income Developing

economies economies oil exporters economiesOrigin 1960 1982, 1960 1 982a 1960 1982a 1960 1982aLow-income economies 51 .- 52 a-21 :. 5,I 1 4 .2?1 39.

China and India 39;.' 48;, 36;. 6;, I 4' 25; 4?2Other low-income 66. 60w 3;, J.. 2 6. 29~ 30.

i Chad 73 44 0 0 0 7 27 492 Bangladesh .. 38 10 1 .. 513 Ethiopia 69 66 1 3 6 7 24 244 Nepal . 50 .. 0 C). 505 Mali 93 62 0 1 () . 7 37

6 Burma 23 35 3 2 () 3 74 607 Zaire 89 92 (. . )1 1 88 Malawi . 74 . 0 0 . 269 UJpper Volta 4 64 0 0 0 0 96 36

1 0 Uganda 62 88 0 0 0 2 38 101 1lndia 66 61 7 1 1 2 8 25 2012 Rwanda .. 61 . 0 . 3913 Burundi . 76 .. 0 0 2414 Tanzania 74 57 1 4 0 1 25 3815 Somalia 85 16 .. ( ) 68 15 1616 Haiti 98 97 (. )0 0 2 317 Benin 90 82 2 ()0 0 8 1818 Central African Rep 83 83 0 (10 .)17 1719 China 14 43 61 4 () 2 25 5120 GuLnea 63 87 8 ((1 .)1 9 1 321 Niger 74 76 0 0 0 0 26 2422 Madagascar 79 57 1 6 0 .)20 3723 Sri Lanka 75 46 3 4 0 4 22 4624 Togo 74 63 0 1 0 ()26 3625 Ghana 88 77 7 10 () .)5 1326 Pakistan 56 40 4 4 2 19 38 3727 Kenya 77 53 0 1 (4 4 23 4228 Sierra Leone 99 80 0 0 0 ()1 2029 Afghanistan 48 30 28 50 0 1 24 1 930 Bhutan .

31 Kampuchea, Dem. .32 Lao PDR . 1 5 .0 . ( , 8533 Mozambique 29 54 () 0 () 3 71 4334 Viet Nam 28 .7 . ()65

Middle-income economies 68 65 7; 4 I. 3.. 25 . 28Oillexporters 68. 70- 4 1, i 2 .28.. 27Oil importers 68.. 61; 9 ~ 6~ 5.. 23.. 28

Lower middle-income 73; 69., . 2;, 1 ;. 2.. 19:1 2735 Sudan 59 38 8 7 4 22 29 3336 Mauritania 89 95 0 0 0 I) 1 537 Yemen, PDR 42 53 () .)2 27 56 2038 Liberia 100 64 0 1 0 (. 1 3539 Senegal 89 65 0 (. 0 ()1 1 3540 Yemen Arab Rep 46 27 1 8 ().) 23 36 50

42 Bolivia 88 34 0 4 0 0 1 2 6243 Indonesia 54 75 1 1 (. . )42 2544 Zambia 74. 1 . 0 . 2545 Honduras 77 87 0 0 0 .)23 1 346 Egypt, Arab Rep 26 53 33 13 2 3 39 3147 El Salvador 88 74 0 ()0 0 12 2648 Tha land 47 55 2 3 3 4 48 3849 Papua New Guinea . 89 . .)(. . i50 Philippines 94 73 0 2 () 1 6 2451 Zimbabwe 49 I 1 4952 Nigeria 95 89 1 2 0 ()4 953 Morocco 74 68 3 7 () 2 23 2354 Cameroon 93 89 1 (.0. . 6 1 155 Nicaragua 91 68 () 6 0 .)9 2656 IVory Coast 84 71 0 3 0 ()1 6 2657 Guatemala 94 55 0 ()0 3 6 4258 Congo, People's Rep. 93 81 0 ()0 (17 1959 Costa Rica 93 68 () 2 ( ()7 3060 Peru 84 72 () 2 0 )1 6 2661 Dominican Rep 92 70 0 1 1 1 ()7 1 962 Jamaica 96 75 0 5 0 ()4 2063 Ecuador 91 50 1 1 0 ()8 4964 Turkey 71 42 12 5 .) 12 17 41

Note. For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes.

240

Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total)Industrial East European

market nonmarket High-income Developingeconomies economies oil exporters economies

Origin 1960 19828 1960 19828 1960 19828 1960 1982a65 Tunisia 76 73 3 2 2 4 1 9 2166 Colombia 94 73 1 4 0 ()5 2367 Paraguay 61 41 0 0 0 0 39 5968 Angola 64 67 2 (.) 0 0 34 3369 Cuba 72 43 19 10 .) 3 9 44

70 Korea, Dem. Rep.. .. 71 Lebanon 21 14 8 1 32 55 39 3072 MongoliaUpper middle-income 67 ., 63 a 6 ,,' 4.. I I; 4 ;.28 . 29.,73 Syrian Arab Rep. 39 55 19 18 11 9 3 1 1874 Jordan 1 5 11 11 26 23 62 6 175 Malaysia 58 5 1 7 3 0 1 35 4576 Korea, Rep. of 89 65 0 ()0 10 11 2577 Panama 99 76 0 (. 0 1 1 2378 Cnile 91 72 () 1 () 1 9 2679 Brazil 81 60 6 6 .) 1 13 3380 Mexico 93 91 () .)0 .)7 981 Algeria 93 93 0 1 (. 0. 7 682 Portugal 56 81 2 2 () 1 42 1683 Argentina 75 43 5 22 () .)20 3584 Uruguay 82 39 7 8 0 2 11 5185 South Africab 71 82 1 ()() 0 28 1886 Yugoslavia 48 27 31 50 1 3 20 2087 Venezuela 62 56 0 ()0 ()38 4488 Greece 65 60 21 8 1 11 13 2189 Israel 76 66 1 1 0 0 23 3390 Hong Kong 54 77 (.0. 1 3 45 2091 Singapore 38 40 4 1 1 5 57 5492 Trinidad and Tobago 80 69 0 (. ) ()20 3193 Iran, Islamic Rep 62 55 3 ()I 10 34 2994 Iraq 85 47 1 (. ) ()14 53High-income

oil exporlers 83.. 56 1 0, 1 i.1 17. 35,95 Omanr) 11 .. 0 .. 70 1996 Libya 67 80 7 4 0 0 26 1697 Saudi Arabia 74 66 0 ()0 ()26 3498 Kuwait . 44 .. I. 5 .. 5599 United Arab Emirates 91 12 0 ()0 45 9 43Industrial market

economies 67,. 66 a3 3.. 4 ~, 30 a 27100 Ireland 96 87 (. 1 () 2 4 10101 Spain 80 58 2 2 () 5 18 35102 Italy 65 64 4 3 2 8 29 25103 New Zealand 95 65 1 6 () 2 4 27104 United Kingdom 57 70 3 2 2 5 38 23105 Austria 69 69 13 11 () 3 18 17106 Japan 45 47 2 3 2 8 51 42107 Belgium0 79 83 2 2 1 2 18 13108 Finland 69 60 19 29 () 1 12 10109 Netherlands 78 83 1 2 1 2 20 13

110 Australia 75 49 3 4 1 3 21 44111 Canada 90 84 1 3 () 1 9 12112 France 53 66 3 3 (1 4 44 27113 Germany Fed Rep 70 73 4 4 1 4 25 19

.114 Denmark 83 79 4 1 .) 3 13 17115 Un ited States 61 54 1 2 1 5 37 39116 Sweden 79 79 4 3 () 3 17 15117 Norway 80 88 4 1 () 1 16 10118 Switzerland 72 69 3 3 1 5 24 23

East Europeannonmarket economies 19 a59* 22

119 Hungary 22 24 6 1 52 (. 2 17 22120 Romana 20 .66 (.0 14121 Albania 1 .93 0 .. 6122 Bulgaria 13 .80 .() .7123 Czechoslovakia 16 19 67 64 () 2 17 34124 German Dam. Rep. 19 .68 (. .13125 Poland 29 27 54 49 (. 2 17 22126 USSR 18 51 .() .. 3 1

a. Figures in italics are for 1981, not 1982. b. Figures are tor the South Afr[can Customs Union comprising South Africa. Narmibia, Lesotho, Bot-swana, and Swaziland Trade between the component territories is excluded. c. Incluces Luxembourg.

241

Table 13. Origin and destination of manufactured exports

Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total) VaualturedIndustrial East European exports

market nonmarket High-income Developing (millionseconomies economies oil exporters economies of dollars)

Origin 19620 1981b 1962a 19810b 19621 19810 1962a 198 1b 19620 1 9 8 1b

Low-income economies 5? 50 14 , 8 .28.

China and IndiaOther low-income 61 4. 1 5 . 1 8: 37 3.

IlChad 19 0 .. 6 75 12 Bangladesh 36 B 1 55 . 4483 Ethiopia 47 37 2 12 1 7 50 44 2 14 Nepal 73 0 . )27 295 Ma,. 33 I 0 .66 (.

6 Burma 5B .8 0 42 .. 37 Zaire 93 0 .. 0 7 .12

6 Malawi 33 ().. .). 67 .16

9 Upper Volta 19 19 0 0 0 0 81 81 1 1110 Uganda 15 0 0 8 5 0 .

11 India 56 51 5 18 2 7 37 24 630 4, 424_2 Rwanda 90 0 .. 0 tO 0.

1 3 Burundi1 4 Tanzania 93 60 0 (10 1 7 39 1 6 751 5 Somalia 6 1 56 0 3 4 1 1 35 28 I.

1 6 Haiti7 Ben n 16 . 0 0 62(.

168 Central Atrican Rep. 76 69 2 0 0 0 20 31 3 291 9 Cn na . . .12 29620 Guinea 21 Niger 7 30 0 (j0 0 93 70 1 1 022 Madagascar 67 73 0 1 0 ()13 26 5 2523 Sri Lanka 63 83 2 (.t ( 1 35 16 6 21824 Togo 44 9 0 1 0 0 56 90 1 3225 Ghana 39 .1 1 .(. 50 . 12

26 Pakastan 46 51 8~ 1 1 3 53 26 97 1,43927 Kenya 22 12 0 ~) 2 7 76 81 11 21026 Sierra Leone 96 0 .0 .2 .21

29 Afghanistan 96 1 .0 .3 930 Bhutan. .. . .

31 Kamnpuchea, Dam 30 1 . I .. 70 32 Lao PDR 35 0 .0 .. 65 .C

33 Mozambique 31 .0 .0 .69 .3

34 Viet Nam 10a . 0 .0 .90 .. 1

Middle-income economies 50. 5-. 7 1 I , 5; 43 31Oil exporters 61- 57 5, 2; I 3; 27. 3'Oil importers A8,. 5 55- 7,. 5; 48. 31,

Lower middle-income 53., 52. 8.. 3. 1 6 38; 39,35 Sudan 37 50 1 16 3 22 59 12 1) 436 Vaurtania 98 .0 0 2 .2

37 Yemen, PDR36 Liberia 94 47 1) ()0 0 6 53 3 1339 Senegal 76 24 0 1 0 ()24 75 5 11040 YemenArab Rep 59 . 0 7 . 34 1241 Lesotno-42 Bolvia 82 .0 0 .16 443 Indonesa 52 33 1 .11 5 46 62 2 73344 Zamora...

45 Honduras 1 33 0 0 0 0 99 67 2 6346 Egypt. Arab Rep 23 37 35 42 3 6 39 15 69 27647EFSa,vador 1 7 0 0 0 0 99 93 11 181,46 Thailand 51 59 () (G() 7 49 34 21 1,86949 Papus New Guinea 97 .0 0 .3 450 Pn: ppines 91 76 0 (. () 1 9 21 26 2,55251lZmbabmve 44 .0 0 .56 3152 Nigeria 91 . 0.(t . 9 34.-53 Morocco 52 45 2 9 (j 9 46 37 26 65.554 Cameroon 25 77 0 0 0 0 75 23 4 5055 Nicaragua 55 2 0 .)0 0 45 96 2 4756 Ivory Coast 61 34 0 .)0 ()39 66 2 26257 Guatemasa 46 4 0 0 0 () 54 96 6 32556 Conigo, People's Rep 66 88 0 0 0 0 12 12 14 6459 Costa R ca 78 11 0 (. 0 () 22 89 9 32260OPeru 53 45 0 2 0 () 47 53 5 38_661 Dominican Rep 98 80 0 0 0 0 2 20 4 186662 Jamaica 73 74 0 6 0 1 27 17 20 61163 Ecuador 46 .0 .. 0 .54 .2

64 Turkey 73 40 17 3 (. 21 10 36 4 1 748

Note For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes

242

Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total) mauacturedIndustrial East European exportsmarket nonmarket High-income Developing (millions

economies economies oil exporters economies of dollars)Origin 1962a 198 1b 1962a 1981b 1962a 19810 1962a 19 8 1b 19620 19810

65 Tunisia 64 68 0 2 7 7 29 23 10 83566 Colombia 57 33 0 1 0 (. 43 66 16 83867 Paraguay 84 0 .0 16 .. 468 Angola 34 4 .. 0 62 .21

69 Cuba 1 83 .. 0 .16 .. 6 319

70 Korea, Dern. Rep.71 Lebanon 22 4 .. 14 .. 60 .. 172 Mongolia

Upper middle-income Sc' 58. 5 a.. 1 5 414 31.

73 Syrian Arab Rep I .. I74 J.ordan 12 13 10 O. 32 36 46 51 1 20175 Maiaysia 11 62 0 (. () 2 89 36 58 2,35976 Korea, Rep of 83 62 0 0 0 10 17 28 10 19,18877 Panama 24 11 0 O. 0 1 76 88 1 3178 Cnile 45 29 0 ()0 2 55 69 20 73779 Brazil 60 43 3 1 0 1 37 55 39 9,46580 Mexico 71 .0 0 .. 29 .. 12281 Algeria 50 58 0 36 0 .)50 6 23 4982 Portugal 56 79 O. 2 .) 1 44 18 205 2,96183 Argentina 62 45 3 5 0 1 35 49 39 1.80084 Uruguay 75 45 13 6 0 (. 12 49 7 36385 Souith Africa' 54 O . . () 46 .317 15,31786 Yugoslavia 31 25 30 53 1 4 38 18 344 8,57487 Venezuela 94 59 0 (.) 0 (. 6 41 158 41788 Greece 52 53 6 4 3 15 39 28 27 2,26689 Israel 66 66 3 ()0 0 31 34 184 4,59090 Hong Kong 63 77 0 ()1 3 36 20 642 20,07691 Singapore 4 49 0 12 4 94 46 328 11,71292 Trnodad and Tobago 39 72 0 (O 0 ()61 28 13 31593 Iran, Islamlc Rep. 45 .. 1 . 3 . 51 .. 4494 Iraq 26 ~. .8 .66 .. 2

High-incomeoillexporters 13. 25.' O., H 30 23; 57' 52.

95SOmar,. 1:96 Libya 68 68 0 ()0 ()32 32 (. 5897 Saudi Arabia 64 12 0 ()12 18 24 70 3 72198 Kuwat (1 28 0 (. 35 21 65 51 11 2,45399 Uniteo Arab Emirates 76 G 3 .. 21 33

Industrial marketeconomies 63. 63. 3., 3. 1. 5. 33.. 29.

1 Cc W-1i,d ir ; t. 134 4,820101 Spain 57 53 1 2 () 6 42 39 205 14,320102 Italy 65 61 5 3 2 10 28 26 3,490 62,769103 New Zealand 90 72 0 .)0 1 10 27 23 1,096104 United Kingdom 58 62 3 2 2 7 37 29 8,947 70,115105 Austria 67 67 18 12 O. 3 15 18 931 13,255106 Japan 45 47 4 3 1 7 50 43 4,340 146,635107 Belgiumd 83 83 2 2 1 2 14 13 3,257 40,574108 Finland 56 57 31 31 O. 1 13 11 608 10,052109 Netherlands 78 79 2 2 1 4 19 15 2,443 33,738110 Australia 62 30 O. ) . 1 38 69 263 5,268111 Canada 89 88 0. O. O. 1 11 11 1,959 35,573112 France 63 63 4 3 O. 4 33 30 5,31 7 73,675

'113 Germany. Fed. Rep. 74 70 4 4 1 4 21 22 11,623 151,043114 Denmnark 76 74 8 2 O. 2 16 22 627 8,888115 U nted States 48 54 O. O. 1 6 51 40 13,957 157,21 7116 Sweden 76 74 6 3 (f 4 18 19 1,958 22,694

-117 Norway 81 73 2 3 () 1 17 23 442 5,533118 Switzerland 74 69 3 3 1 4 22 24 2,005 24,697

East Europeannonmarket economies

119 Hungary .. 23 . 56 .. 1 . 20 5,591120 Romnania121 Albania122 Bulgaria . ..

123 Czechoslovakia 14 .. 68 2 .. 16 . 12.971124 German Demn. Rep.125 Poland . 17 . 56 .. 2 . 25 9,983126 USSRP.

a Figures in italics are for 1963, not 1962. b. Figures in italics are for 1980, not 1981. c. F gures are for tne Soutn African Customs Union corn-prisng South Africa, Nam b.a, uesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. Traoe between the component territories is excluded. d. Includes Luxembourg._

243

Table 14. Balance of payments and reservesReceipts Gross international reserves

Current account of workers' Net direct In monthsbalance remittances private investment Millions of of import

(millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) dollars coverage1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1982a

Low-income economies 7 'China and India 61,IOther low-income 30O.-lChad 2 19 . . 1 ()2 18 2.02 Bangladesh .. -632 . 329 . .. 207 0.93 Etniopia -32 -196 .. .4 72 277 3.64 Nepal -. 86 . .. 94 268 6.55Mali -2 -113 6 39 .. 2 1 25 0.7

6 Burma -63 -317 . .98 328 3 97 Zaire -64 -375 2 .42 .189 312 1.68 Malaw. -35 -78 .. 9 .. 29 29 0.99 Upper Volta 9 .. 18 . () .36 67

lO Uganda 20 -256 . .4 . 57 73 01

11 India -394 -2,696 113 2,293 6 . 1,023 8,109 5.412 Rwanaa 7 - 90 1 1 O. 21 8 128 4.313 Burund ... . .15 3714 Tanzania -36 -268 .. 9 .. 65 19 0.215 Somalia -6 -177 . 20 5 -1 21 15 0.3

16 Haiti 2 -93 17 95 3 13 4 12 0.317 Benin -1 2 .. 7 16 1018 Central African Rep. -12 -39 () .1 9 1 52 2 319 Cnina .. 5,608 . . 17,142 9 420 GLinea .. .

21 Niger () . 1 .19 3522 Madagascar 10 -369 . 10 .37 20 0 323 Sr Lanka -59 -574 3 290 () 64 43 380 1 924 Togo 3 -152 1 - 35 173 5.625 Ghana -68 83 1 68 21 58 318 4.026 Pakistan -667 -811 .. 2.580 31 65 194 1,813 3.027 Kenya -49 -509 . 14 60 220 248 1.428 Sierra Leone -16 -158 . 8 6 39 8 0429 Afghanistan 49 69930 Bhutan31 Kampuchea, Dem.32 Lao PDR .6

33 Mozainbique34 Vijet Nam . 243

Middle-income economies 4 7.Oil exporters 416Oil importers 4 a

Lower middle-income 3 9.35 Sudan -42 -248 . 131 . 22 21 0 236 Mauritania -5 -252 1 2 1 15 3 144 2.737 Yemen, PDR -4 -221 60 411 .. .59 271 3438 Liberia .. - 79 . 8 0239 Senegal -16 . 3 .. 5 .22 2540 Yem'en Arab Rep, -610 .. 1,118 24 .. 558 2.941 Lesotho .. -50 .4 .. 48 1.242 Bolivia 4 -92 O. 1 -76 37 46 563 6.443 Indonesia -310 -737 . 83 133 160 6,248 3 044 Zambia 108 -252 . -297 . 515 157 1 545 Honduras -64 -228 . 8 14 20 120 1 446 Egypt. Arab Rep -148 -2.216 29 2,074 650 165 1 809 1 947 El Salvador 9 -250 . .4 . 64 277 2.648 Thaiiand -250 -1.144 .. 616 43 185 912 2.674 3 049 Papua New Guinea . -487 -.. 84 . 374 2 9

50 Philppines -48 -3,356 .. 240 -29 253 255 2,573 2 751 Zimbabwe . - 706 . 2 . 7 59 320 I 752 Nigeria -368 -7,324 . 205 358 223 1,927 1.153 Morocco -124 -1,876 63 849 20 79 141 540 1 154 Carmeroon -30 -525 () 21 16 1 81 81 0 555 Nicaragua -40 is 5 49 17156 Ivory Coast -38 15 31 . 119 23 0.157 Guatemala -8 -379 .29 76 79 351 2.458 Congo, People's Rep -320 . .. 31 9 42 0.359 Costa Rica - 74 -200 . 26 33 16 250 2.360 Peru 202 -1,644 . 70 59 339 1,987 4.061 Dominican Rep -102 -442 25 190 72 -1 32 171 1 62 Jamnaica -153 -403 29 75 161 -16 139 109 0.763 Ecuaoor -113 -1,002 .. .89 60 76 797 2464 Turkey -44 -849 273 2,187 58 150 440 2,645 3.1

Note For data comparabnlity and coverage see the technncal notes.

244

Receipts Gross international reservesCurrent account of workers' Net direct In months

balance remittances private investment Millions of of import(millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) dollars coverage

1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1982a65 Tunisia -53 -657 29 372 16 339 60 692 2.166 Colombia -293 -2,265 6 39 268 207 5,605 9.067 Paraguay -16 -388 1 4 44 18 699 7.268 Angola69 Cuba70 Korea, Dem. Rep.71 Lebanon 405 6,82272 Mon golhaUpper middle-income I73 Syrian Arab Rep -69 -493 7 140 .. - 57 579 1 574 Jordan -20 -336 - 1,084 .. 56 258 1,378 3 875 Malaysia 8 -3,445 .. 5 94 1.230 667 4,833 3 376 Korea, Rep. oi -623 -2,679 33 126 66 -77 610 2,946 1.177 Panama -64 -454 67 13 33 37 16 101 0.278 Chile -91 - 2,382 . . -79 365 392 2,597 3.979 Brazil -837 -16.332 . 6 407 2,551 1,190 3,997 1 280 Mexico -1,068 -2,778 123 216 323 868 756 1,777 0.681 Algeria -125 85 211 447 45 -1 352 5,915 4.682 Portugal -3,227 . 2,607 .. 136 1.565 10,540 10 783 Argentina -163 -2,505 6 41 11 266 682 4,504 4 584 Uruguay -45 -235 ..- -14 186 1,422 8.885 Soutn Artica -1,215 - 2,855 .318 - 573 1,057 3,944 2.086 Yugoslavia -372 -465 441 4,350 . 143 1,625 1 087 Venezuela -104 -3,456 . () -23 254 1,047 11,815 6.188 Greece -402 -1,891 333 1,019 50 437 318 2,630 2 889 Israel -562 -2,103 . 40 10 452 4,335 3 590 Hong Kong . 21 21591 Singapore -572 -1,278 93 2,093 1.012 8,480 3.392 Trinidad andoTobago -109 283 3 1 83 258 43 3 369 13.393 Iran, Islamic Rep -507 .. .25 . 21794/Iraq 105 .. .24 . 472

High-inco1me1oil exporter 6

95 Oman 358 .- 43 . 134 129 1,532 4 896 Libya 645 -2,977 139 - 765 1.596 10,425 6.997 Saudi Arabia 71 45,125 . 320 3,376 670 34,051 5 998 Kuwait - 5,786 . 3.- -222 209 7,073 7.599 United Arab Emirates . . . ... . 2,589Industrial market

economies100 Ireland -198 -2.147 . 32 204 698 2,794 2.7101 Spain 111 -4,150 469 1,124 179 1,280 1,851 14.328 4 3102 Italy 902 -5,635 446 1,187 498 -318 5,547 44.552 5 1103 New Zea and -29 -1,499 209 22 233 258 646 0 9104 United K.ngdom 1,975 9,391 . -439 -2,576 2,919 21,083 1 9

105 Austria -75 386 13 201 104 93 1,806 14,949 6.5106 Japan 1,980 6,977 - 189 -260 -4,085 4,877 34.404 2.4107 Beig um 717 -2,912 154 389 140 1,652 2,947 19,544 2.8106 Finland -239 -943 . -41 -230 455 2.098 1 5109 N'etnerlancos -483 3,460 . -15 -1,696 3,362 30,208 4 4110 Australia -837 -8,447 . 785 1,979 1,709 9,995 3.611I Canada 821 2,470 566 - 1,658 4,733 12,258 1 8112 France 50 -12,152 130 322 248 -1,248 5,199 53,928 3 9113 Germany, Fed Rep. 850 3,544 350 2,323 -290 -2,429 13,879 88,251 5.1114 Denmark -544 -2 255 - 75 55 488 3,010 1.5

115 United States 2,320 -11,504 .. 283 -6,130 13,491 15,237 143,445 4 9116 Sweden -265 -3,547 . -104 -718 775 6.286 2 0117 Norway -242 798 11 32 -22 813 7.414 3 4118 Switzerland 72 3,623 23 84 . 5,317 53,511 18 0

East Europeannonmarket economies

119 H-ungary -25 -397 . 2 1,449 1._6_120 Romania 1,040 .2,073 2.2121 Albania122 Bu/garia 123 Czechoslovakia

124 German Dem Pep125 Po/and126 USSR

a Figuresin italicsareforl1981, not 1982.

245

Table 15. Flow of public and publicly guaranteed external capitalPublic and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans

(millions of dollars)

RepaymentGross inflow of principal Net inflow'

1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982Low-Income Economies

China and IndiaOther low-income

1 Chad 6 (.) 2 () 3 (.)2 Bangladesh 656 63 5933 Ethiop a 27 122 15 33 13 894 Nepal 1 71 2 3 -2 685 Mali 21 127 () 3 21 1246 Burma 16 402 18 68 -2 3347 Zaire 31 175 28 65 3 1108 Malawf 38 72 3 33 36 399 Upper Volta 2 78 2 13 (.) 65

10 Uganda 26 96 4 57 22 3911 India 890 2,405 307 675 583 1.73012 Rwanda () 28 () 3 () 2513 Burund 1 52 ( ) 3 1 4914 Tanzania 50 241 10 20 40 22115 Somalia 4 124 () 9 4 11416 Haiti 4 58 4 11 1 4817 Benin 2 92 1 19 1 7318 Central African Rep 2 21 2 2 -1 1919 Chna20 Guinea 90 88 10 55 79 3321 Niger 12 116 1 66 10 5022 Madagascar 10 278 5 70 5 20823 Sr Lanka 61 484 27 68 34 41624 Togo 5 50 2 11 3 3925 Ghana 40 94 12 38 28 5626 Pakistan 484 893 114 326 370 56727 Kenya 30 390 16 178 15 21228 S erra Leone 8 57 10 8 -2 4929 Afghanistan 34 15 . 1930 Bhutan31 Kampuchea, Dem.32 Lao PDR33 Mozambique34 Viet NamMiddle-income economres

Oil exportersOil importers

Lower middle-income35 Sudan 60 419 22 68 39 35136 Mauritania 4 215 3 16 1 19937 Yemen, PDR 1 172 () 40 1 13238 Liberia 7 59 12 19 -4 4139 Senegal 15 212 5 38 10 17440 Yemen Arab Rep 261 45 .. 21641 Lesotho () 42 () 4 () 3842 Bolivia 54 162 17 95 37 6843 Indonesa 441 4,250 59 1,148 382 3,10244 Zambia 351 311 33 97 318 21445 Honduras 29 202 3 51 26 15146 Egypt. Arab Rep 302 2,702 247 1,487 55 1,21547 El Salvador 8 156 6 24 2 13248 Thailand 51 1,420 23 306 27 1,11449 Papua New Guinea 25 171 () 31 25 139-50 Phnl ppines 128 1,880 72 494 56 1.38751 Zimbabwe I.) 517 5 51 -5 46652 Nigeria 62 1,864 36 618 26 1,24653 Morocco 163 2.178 36 779 127 1,399-54 Cameroon 28 181 4 143 24 3855 Nicaragua 44 302 17 168 28 13456 IvoryCoast 77 1,309 27 499 50 81057 Guatemala 37 344 20 34 17 31058 Congo, People's Rep 35 523 6 181 29 34259 Costa Rica 30 184 21 54 9 12960 Peru 148 2,105 101 982 47 1.12361 Dominican Rep. 38 395 7 141 31 25462 Jamaica 15 259 6 115 9 14463 Ecuador 42 273 16 539 26 -26764 Turkey 328 2,196 128 886 200 1,310

Note: For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes

246

Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans(millions of dollars)

RepaymentGross inflow of principal Net infIowa

1970 1982 1970 1982 1970 1982nisia 87 620 45 290 42 330

66 Colombia 252 1,218 78 305 174 91367 Paraguay 15 276 7 39 7 23768 Angola69 Cvba70 Korea, Dem. Rep.71 Lebanon 12 15 2 45 9 -3072 Mongolia

Upper middle-income

73 SyrianArabRep. 59 410 30 281 30 12974 Jordan 14 374 3 132 12 24275 Malaysia 43 2,883 45 241 -1 2,64276 Korea, Rep. of 441 3,982 198 1,829 242 2,15377 Panama 67 731 24 282 44 449

78 Chile 397 1,296 163 482 234 81479 Brazil 886 7,915 255 4,007 631 3,90880 Mexico 772 11,163 476 3,073 297 8,09081 Algeria 292 2,238 33 2,893 259 -65482 Portugal 18 3,112 63 798 -45 2,314

83 Argentina 487 2,422 342 1,070 146 1,35384 Uruguay 38 574 47 71 -9 50385 South Africa . .. ..

86 Yugoslavia 180 826 168 380 12 44587 Venezuela 224 1,924 42 1,593 183 33188 Greece 164 1.695 61 596 102 1,10089 Israel 410 2,108 25 1,118 385 99090 Hong Kong (.) 19 () 27 () -791 Singapore 58 267 6 121 52 14692 Tr nidad and Tobago 8 39 10 37 -2 1

93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 940 .. 235 70594 Iraq 63 18 46

High-incomeoil exporters

95 Oman . 231 . . 78 . . 15396 Libya97 Saudi Arab a98 Kuwait99 United Arab Emirates

Industrial markeleconomies

100 Ireland101 Spain102 Italy103 New Zealand104 Unted Kingdom

105 Austria106 Japan107 Belgium108 Finland109 Netherlands

110 Australia111 Canada112 France113 Germany Fed Rep,1i 14 Denmark

115 United States116 Sweden117 Norway

-118 Switzerland

East Europeannonmarket economies

119 Hungary . 1,203 . 978 225120 Romania121 Albania122 Bulgaria123 Czechoslovakia

124 German Dem. Rep125 Poland126 USSR

a Gross nflow less repayment of principal may not equal net inflow because of rounding

247

Table 16. External public debt and debt ser-vice ratiosExternal public debt Interest payments Detsrceaprengeo

outstanding and disbursed on external Debt__service_as_percentage_of

Millions of As percentage public debt Exports ofdollars of GNP (millions of dollars) GNP goods and services

1970 1982 1970 1982a 1970 1982 1970 1982a 1970 19821Low-income economies 1'0. 6l.a 1, 13 8

China and IndiaOther low-income 20)9, W6 i5., 1 6 57,, -4

1IChad 32 189 11.9 59 0 (. )1.0 0.1 3.9 042 Bangladesh .. 4,353 38.6 .. 48 1.0 . 833 Ethiopia 169 875 9.5 19.8 6 22 1.2 1 2 11 4 954 Nepal 3 297 0.3 11 6 (1 3 0.3 0.2 2.35 Mali 238 822 88.1 79.4 () 5 02 0.8 1.2 3.56 Burma 101 1,960 4.7 33.5 3 52 09 2.1 15 8 22.07 Zaire 311 4,087 17.6 78.4 9 72 21 26 448 Malawi 122 692 43.2 48.8 3 32 2 1 4.5 7.1 22 89 Upper Voilta 21 335 6.3 29.3 () 7 0.6 1 7 40

10 Uganda 138 587 10.6 8.0 4 10 0.6 0.9 2.7 22.311 India 7.940 19,487 14.9 11.4 189 476 0.9 0.7 20.9 7112 Rwanda 2 189 0.9 13.5 (.) 2 0.2 02 1 3 3.213 Burundi 7 201 3.1 17.0 () 2 0.3 0414 Tanzan,a 248 1,659 19.4 32.7 6 33 1.2 1 1 4.9 5 115 Somalia 77 944 24.4 78.4 (3 10 03 1 6 2.1 7216 Haiti 40 405 10.3 25.0 (1 8 1.0 1 2 5.8 5117 Benin 41 556 16.0 57.5 () 28 0.7 4.8 2.218 Central African Rep. 24 222 13.7 34.6 1 2 1.7 0.7 4 8 2.91 9 China .. .. . .

20 Gu nea 314 1.230 47 4 76.8 4 24 2 2 4.921 Niger 32 603 8.7 40 2 1 44 0 6 7 3 3 822 Madagascar 93 1,565 10.8 56.8 2 42 0.8 4 1 3.523 Sri Lanka 317 1,969 16.1 41 8 1 2 68 2.0 2.9 10.3 8 324 Togo 40 819 16.0 104.5 1 22 0 9 4.3 2.925 Ghana 489 1.116 22.6 3.6 12 27 1.1 0 2 5 0 6 8

26 Pakiatan 3,059 9,178 30.5 31.~5 76 213 1 9 1 8 . 9.227 Kenya 316 2,359 20 5 39 2 1 2 147 1.8 5 4 5 4 20.328 Sierra Leone 59 370 14.3 29.8 2 2 2.9 0.9 9 9 20.829 Afghanistan 547 . 58.1 . 9 .. 2.5 .

30 Bhutan . . .

31 Kampuchea, Dem.. . . ..

32 Lao PDR .

33 Mozambique . . .

34 Viet Nam . . .

Middle-income economies 12 3;, 24 5 1 5. 4 2 101I 16 9Oil exporters 27 259.. I?,. 4 6 I'2 6., 19.7,.O.ilimporters 12 1 23 7 I15. 3 8 . 159,

Lower middle-income I154, 2 7 2. 1 6 ; 7 ;. 93. I1 E;,

35 Sudan 319 5,093 15.8 47.7 1 3 1 1 1.7 0.8 10.7 7 536 Mauritan a 27 1,001 13 9 146.5 () 24 1.7 5.8 3.1 11 837 Yemen, PDR 1 761 . 80.2 (. 8 . 5.0 () 6.238 Liberia 158 641 49.6 68.1 6 14 5.5 3.5 . 139 Senegal 98 1,329 11.6 55.0 2 64 0 8 4.2 2 740 Yemen Arab Rep . 1,312 .. 36.1 . 10 .. 1.5 . 3 841 Lesotho 8 123 7.8 20.4(. 3 0.4 1.2 .. 2 042 Bolivia 479 2,556 47 1 39 1 6 165 2.3 4 0 11.3 28.243 Indonesia 2,443 18,421 27.1 21.1 24 1,160 0.9 2.6 6.9 8.344 Zambia 623 2.381 37.0 66.3 26 88 3.5 5.1 5.9 17.4

45 Honduras 90 1,385 12.9 53.2 3 97 0 8 5.7 2 8 16.846 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1,644 15,468 23.8 52.8 38 391 4.1 6 4 28 7 20.247 El Salvador 88 801 6.6 22 2 4 27 0 9 1 4 3.6 4.648 Tna land 324 6,206 4 9 17.4 1 6 483 0.6 2 2 3.4 8 449 Papua New Guinea 36 746 5.8 32 8 1 63 0.1 4 1 10 250 Philippines 572 8.836 6.1 22.5 23 535 1 4 2.6 7.2 12.851 Zimbabwe 233 1,221 15.7 19.1 5 95 0 6 2.3 . 9.252 N.gera 480 6,085 4 8 8 7 20 722 0 6 1.9 4 2 9.553 Morocco 711 9,030 18.0 60 8 23 615 % 9 4 7 7 36 8 -

54 Cameroon 131 1,912 12.1 26.8 4 121 068 3.7 3 1 15.6

55 Nicaragua 155 2,810 20.7 100.1 7 120 3.2 10.2 11.056 Ivory Coast 256 4.861 18.3 74.3 1 1 476 2.8 14.9 6.8 36 957 Guatemala 106 1,119 5.7 13.0 6 54 1.4 1 0 7 4 6.656 Congo, People's Rep. 135 1,370 50.4 67 5 3 92 3 3 13.4 .. 22.659 Costa Rica 134 2,475 13.8 111 7 7 82 2 9 6 2 10 0 12.560 Peru 856 6,900 12.6 33 5 44 548 2.1 7.4 11.6 36.761 Dominican Rep. 212 1,620 14 5 21.2 4 109 0.6 3 3 4.1 18 762 Jamaica 154 1.511 11.5 49.9 6 128 1.1 8.0 2.5 16 863 Ecuador 217 3.912 13.2 34.3 7 561 1.4 9 7 9.1 30.864 Turkey 1,854 15,933 14.4 29.7 42 932 1.3 3.4 16.3 19 6

Note For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes.

248

External public debt Interest paymentsoutstanding and disbursed on external Debt service as percentage of:

Millions of As percentage public debt Exports ofdollars of GNP (millions of dollars) GNP goods and services

1970 1982 1970 1982a 1970 1982 1970 1982a 1970 1982a

65 Tunisa 541 3,472 38.2 42.2 18 196 4.5 5.9 17.5 15.166 Colombia 1,293 6,004 18.8 15.4 44 569 1.8 2.2 11.9 17.567 Paraguay 112 940 19.2 16.1 4 41 1 8 1.4 11 9 10368 Angola .. ..69 Cuba .. . .. .. ..

70 Korea, Dem. Rep. . .. . . .. ..71 Lebanon 64 213 4 2 . 1 19 0.2 .

72 Mongolia .- - --Uppermiddle-income 108, -23 1 5 . 44 10, 169.73 Syrian Arab Rep. 232 2,616 12.8 15.1 6 92 2.0 22 10.8 14.274 Jordan 118 1,686 22.8 42.9 2 61 0.9 4.9 3.6 6175 Malaysia 390 7,671 10 0 30 5 21 479 1 7 2.9 3.6 5.176 Korea, Rep Of 1,797 20,061 20.4 28.3 70 1,887 3 0 5.2 19 4 13 177 Panama 194 2,820 195 70.6 7 332 3.1 15.4 7.7 13.878 Chile 2,066 5,239 25.8 23.7 78 551 3 0 4.7 18.9 18.879 Brazil 3,236 47,589 7.1 16.9 133 5,896 0.9 3.5 12.5 42.180 Mexico 3,206 50.412 9.1 31.1 216 5,892 2.0 55 23.6 29 581 Algeria 937 13,897 19.3 31.9 10 1,368 0.9 9 8 3.2 24.682 Portugal 485 9,598 7.8 43.9 29 904 1.5 7.8 .. 20.083 Argentina 1.878 15,780 8 2 29 5 121 1.272 2 0 4.4 21.5 24 584 Uruguay 269 1,829 111 20.2 16 156 2.6 2.5 21.6 13.485 South Afrca86 Yugoslavia 1,198 5,626 8.8 9.4 72 519 1.8 1.5 8 4 4 687 Venezuela 728 12,122 6.6 17.8 40 1,557 0.7 4.6 2.9 15.688 Greece 905 6.783 8.9 17.3 41 588 1.0 3.0 7.1 13389 Israel 2,274 14,900 41.3 64 6 13 1,001 0.7 9.2 2.7 20.890 Hong Kong 2 267 01 1.0 (.) 22 () 0.2 () ()91 Singapore 152 1,423 7.9 10.0 6 114 06 1.7 06 0892 Trinidad and Tobago 101 651 12 2 8.9 6 63 19 1.4 4 4 2993 Iran, Islamic Rep 2,193 . 20.8 85 3 0 12.294 Iraq 274 8.8 . 9 . 0.9 .. 2.2High-income

oil exporters95 Oman . 677 11.5 .. 30 . 1 8 .. 2296 Libya97 Saudi Arabia98 Kuwait99 United Arab EmiratesIndustrial market

economies100 Ireland101 Spain102 Italy103 New Zealand104 Un ted Kingdom105 Austria106 Japan107 Belgium108 Finlano109 Netherlands110 Australia111 Canada112 France113 Germany Fed. Rep.114 Denmark115 United States116 Sweden117 Norway118 Switzerland

East Europeannonmaiket economies

119 Hungary . 6,739 . . 30.0 . . 808 . 8.0 170120 Romania121 Albania122 Bulgaria123 Czechoslovakia124 German Dem. Rep.125 Poland126 USSR

a Figures .n talics are for 1981, not 1982

249

Table 17. Terms of public borrowingAverage interest Average Average

Commitments rate maturity grace period(millions of dollars) (percent) (years) (years)1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1970 19823 1970 1982a

Lwncome economies 308i lC.4 8 4. 31 . 30;. 9 7China and IndiaOther low-income 207-1, e6 362t 3 0 37. 29 32;. 9 d

I Chad 4 21 4.8 0~8 7 49 2 92 Bangladesn 1.036 . 1.5 . 39 93 Ethiopia 21 107 4 3 3.8 32 26 7 54 Nepal 17 107 2.8 1.4 27 40 6 105 Mali 30 234 0.3 2.0 27 40 11 96 Burma 57 662 4.3 3.3 16 30 4 87 Zaire 257 268 6.5 2.3 13 39 4 88 Malawi 13 51 3 8 3.5 30 34 6 79 Upper Volta 9 168 2.3 1.8 37 36 8 8

10 Uganda 12 251 3 7 3 6 28 33 7 711 India 933 3,684 2.4 7 0 35 27 8 712 Rwanda 9 80 0.8 1.2 50 45 11 913 Burundi 1 90 2.9 5 4 5 23 2 614 Tanzania 283 234 1 2 2.5 40 32 11 815 Somalia 2 84 () 1.7 4 22 4 516 Hait 5 64 6.7 2.4 9 43 1 917lBenin 7 140 1 8 7 2 32 21 7 418 Central African Rep 7 75 2.0 3 5 36 32 8 719 Cnina20 Guinea 158 86 2.6 3.4 15 27 6 721 Niger 18 164 1 2 5.9 40 22 8 522 Madagascar 23 218 2.3 5.0 39 23 9 623 SniLanka 79 642 3 0 7 0 27 26 5 624 Togo 3 12 4 6 4 7 17 30 4 825 Gnana 41 48 2.4 3.2 39 29 10 8

26 Pak sran 935 965 2.8 4.2 32 33 12 827 Kenya 41 524 3 0 5.9 36 30 8 728 Sierra Leone 24 50 3 5 2.4 27 25 6 529 Afghanistan 19 1 7 .33 .8

30 Bhutan

31 Kampuchea, Derm32 Lao PDR33 Mozambrque34 Vietnam

Middle-income economies iCi 565i1 7F 551 6 0.. 11 7 1 74.Oil exporlers .11' 3- 197- 6 0.. 22. 16.. Ii. .1 * Oil importers 65 472' 42 558 i 6 0. 1~ Ii. 14 A.

Lower middle-income 3 (lii 32g745. I6 , '3 4.

35 Sudan 118 701 1 9 3.6 16 21 7 636 Mauritania 7 204 6 5 2 6 11 20 3 437 Yemen, PDR 62 100 () 1 8 21 28 11 638 Liberia 11 126 5 4 4 4 19 32 5 739 Senegal 8 441 4.4 4 3 28 32 8 8

40 Yemen Arab Rep. 9 313 5.2 3.4 5 18 3 441 Lesotho .j10 51 8.3 25 23 2 542 Bolivia 13 145 3 7 8 9 26 18 6 743 Indonesa 518 5.777 2 7 94 34 15 9 544 Zarriba 555 420 4 2 6 8 23 21 6 6

45 Honduras 23 147 4.1 6 4 30 29 7 746 Egypt. Arab Rep 246 2,869 5.6 8 1 14 24 3 347 El Salvador 12 325 4 7 5.3 23 19 6 548 Thaiand 106 2,094 68 9 4 19 19 4 649 Papua New Guinea 58 166 6 0 13 5 24 14 8 650 Phil[pprnes 158 2,118 7.4 113 11 16 2 5 -

51 Zimbabwe . 715 . 8 9 . 16 552 Niger a 79 2,753 5.8 13 9 17 9 6 453 Morocco 182 1,794 4 6 10.2 20 11 4 354 Cameroon 41 347 4 7 9.2 29 18 8 5

55 Nicaragua 23 334 7.1 5 9 18 14 4 356 Ivory Coast 71 1.253 5 8 127 19 12 5 457 Guatemala 50 194 5 2 6 4 26 13 6 458 Congo, Peope's Rep. 43 497 3.0 10.4 17 8 6 259 Costa R ca 58 265 5.6 4.9 28 20 6 760 Peru 125 2,746 74 11.9 13 10 4 361 Dom nican Rep 20 406 25 5.5 28 17 5 462 Jamaica 24 317 6 0 88 16 17 3 563 Ecuador 78 407 6.1 8 8 20 18 4 764 Turkey 487 1,577 3 6 11.3 19 13 5 4

NVore For oats comparabritiy and coverage see tne technical notes

250

Average interest Average AverageCommitments rate maturity grace period

(millions of dollars) (percent) (years) (years)1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1970 1982a 1970 1982a

65 Tunisia 141 566 3.4 7.7 27 18 6 466 Colombia 362 2.371 5.9 10.7 21 14 5 567 Paraguay 14 383 5.6 9.1 25 16 6 468 Angola .. . . . .69 Cuba70 Korea, Dem. Rep .. .. . ..71 Lebanon 7 13 2.7 11.1 21 13 1 472 Mongolia .. . .

Upper middle-income 6 875, t 43.868 i 6 9.. 13 2 13, 10;. 4..' 4

73 SyrianArabRep. 14 218 4.4 6.4 9 17 2 474 Jordan 33 245 3 9 60 12 20 5 575 Malaysia 83 2,863 6.1 11.9 19 12 5 676 Korea, Rep. ot 677 3,759 6.0 11.5 19 13 5 477 Panama 111 552 6.9 13.1 15 11 4 478 Chile 343 1.432 6.9 14.4 12 8 3 479 Brazil 1,362 10,712 7.1 13.0 14 11 3 380 Mexico 826 10,799 8.0 14 8 12 6 3 381 Algeria 288 1,964 6 5 8.9 10 8 2 282 Portugal 59 2,446 4.3 11.3 17 8 4 383 Argentina 488 1,010 7.4 11.9 12 11 3 384 Uruguay 72 450 7.9 14.1 12 8 3 285 South Afr ca86 Yugoslavia 198 490 7.1 14.5 17 10 6 487 Venezuela 198 2,591 8 2 17 6 8 8 2 288 Greece 242 1,442 7.2 12 6 9 10 4 489 Israel 439 2,316 73 13.6 13 20 5 590 Hong Kong (.) 1 (.) 7.9 (.) 12 (.) 491 Singapore 69 432 6.8 10.9 17 11 4 392 Trinidad and Tobago 3 148 7.5 13.1 10 9 1 693 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1,342 6.2 .. 12 . 394 Iraq 28 3.3 . 11 .. 2High-income

oil exporters95 Oman96 Libya97 Saudi Arabia98 Kuwait99 United Arab Emirates

Industrial marketeconomies

100 Ireland101 Spa n102 Italy103 New Zealand104 United Kingdom105 Austria106 Japan107 Belgium108 Finland109 Netherlands110 Australia111 Canada112 France113 Germany, Fed. Rep.114 Denmark115 United States116 Sweden117 Norway118 Switzerland

East Europeannonmarkel economies

119 Hungaryb . 1,117 11.7 4.1 1.8120 Romania121 Albania122 Bulgaria123 Czechoslovakia124 German Dem. Rep.125 Poland126 USSR

a. Figures in talics are for 1981, not 1982 b Includes only debt in convertible currencies

2511

Table 18. Official development assistance from OECD & OPEC membersAmount

1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983,OECD ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Millions oI US dollars

102 Italy 77 60 147 182 376 273 683 666 814 827103 New Zealand 1 4 66 55 68 72 68 65 61104 United Kingdom 407 472 500 904 1,465 2.156 1,852 2,191 1,792 1,601105 Austira 10 1 1 79 154 131 178 314 354 157106 Japan 105 244 458 1,146 2,215 2,685 3,353 3,171 3,023 3,761107 Belgium 101 102 120 378 536 643 595 575 501 477108 Finland . 2 7 48 55 90 111l 135 144 153109 Netherlands 35 70 196 608 1,074 1.472 1,630 1,510 1,474 1,195110 Australia 59 119 212 552 588 629 667 650 882 754111 Canada 75 96 337 880 1,060 1,056 1,075 1,189 1.197 1,424112 France 823 752 971 2.093 2,705 3,449 4,162 4,177 4,028 3,915113 Germany, Fed. Rep. 223 456 599 1,689 2.347 3 393 3 567 3,181 3,163 3 181114 Denmark 5 13 59 205 388 461 481 403 415 394115 U nitedoStates 2,702 4,023 3,153 4,161 5,663 4,684 7,138 5,782 8,202 7,950116 Sweden 7 38 117 566 783 988 962 919 980 779117 Norway 5 1 1 37 184 355 429 486 467 559 584118 Switzerland 4 12 30 104 173 213 253 237 252 318

Total 4,628 6,480 6,968 13,847 19,992 22,820 27,265 25.635 27,845 27,531OECD As percentage of donor GNP

102 Italy 22 10 1 6 .11 .14 .08 .17 1 9 24 .24103 New Zealand .. . 23 52 .34 .33 33 29 28 .28104 United Kingdom 56 47 41 39 .46 .52 .35 43 37 36105 Austria I . 1 .07 21 27 1 9 23 48 .53 .23106 Japan .24 .27 .23 .23 23 .27 32 28 .29 .33107 Belgium 88 .60 46 59 .55 .57 50 59 60 .59108 Finland .. .02 .06 .18 16 .22 .22 .28 .30 33109 Netherlands .31 36 .61 .75 82 .98 1.03 1.08 1 08 91110 Australia .37 .53 .59 .65 55 .53 48 .41 57 49111 Canaoa 1 9 .19 .41 .54 .52 48 .43 .43 42 .47112 France 1.35 .76 .66 .62 .57 .60 .64 73 75 76113 Germany, Fed. Rep. .31 .40 .32 40 37 45 .44 .47 .48 48114 Denmark .09 .13 .38 .58 .75 77 74 .73 .77 73115 United States .53 58 32 .27 .27 20 27 .20 .27 .24116 Sweden .05 .19 38 .82 .90 .97 79 83 1 02 88117 Norway .11 .16 .32 66 90 .93 .85 .82 99 1 10118 Switzerland .04 09 .15 .19 .20 .21 .24 .24 .25 .31OECD National currencies

101 Italy (billions of lire) 48 38 92 119 319 227 585 757 1,101 1,255103 New Zealand (mil[ions of dollars) .. . 1 3 54 53 66 74 78 86 92104 United Kingdomlmrillions of pounds) 145 169 208 407 763 1,016 796 1,080 1.024 1,055105 Austria (millions of scnillings) . . 260 286 1,376 2.236 1,751 2,303 5,001 6,039 2.813106 Japan (billions of yen) 38 88 165 341 466 588 760 699 753 893107 Belgium (millions of francs) 5.050 5,100 6,000 13.902 16,880 18,852 17,400 21 350 22.891 24,364108 Finland (mnillions of markK<aa) 6 29 177 226 351 414 583 694 854109 Netherlands (millions of guilders) 133 253 710 1.538 2,324 2,953 3,241 3,768 3,936 3,412110 Australia (millions of collars) 53 106 189 421 514 563 585 566 867 844111 Canada (millions of dollars) 73 104 353 895 1,209 1.237 1.257 1.425 1,477 1,755112 France (millions of francs) 4.063 3,713 5.393 8,971 12,207 14,674 17,589 22,700 26.474 29,837113 Germany, Fed Rep (millions

of deutsche marks) 937 1.824 2,192 4.155 4.714 6.219 6,484 7,189 7,675 8.123114 Denmark (m~ll.ons of kroner) 35 90 443 1,178 2,140 2 425 2 711 2 871 3,458 3,'599115 United States (millons of dollars) 2.702 4,023 3,153 4,161 5,663 4,684 7. 138 5 782 8,202 7,950116 Sweden (millions of kronor) 36 197 605 2.350 3,538 4,236 4,069 4,653 6,201 5,975117 Norway (mnllions of kroner) 36 79 264 962 1,861 2,172 2,400 2,680 3,608 4,258116 Switzerland (millions of francs) 1 7 52 131 268 309 354 424 466 512 667OECD Summary

ODA (billions of US dollars, nominal prices) 4.63 6 48 6.97 13.85 19 99 22.82 27 27 25.64 27.85 27 53ODA as percentage of GNP .51 .49 .34 .36 .35 .35 .38 35 .38 37ODA (billions of US dollars,

constant1980 prces) 16.41 20.19 18.15 21.~60 24.09 24.89 27 27 25 82 28 31 27 37GNP (tirllions of US dollars, nominal prices) 90 1 30 2 00 3 90 5.70 6 50 7.20 7 30 7 24 7 52GDP deflatorb .28 .32 .38 .64 83 92 1.00 .99 .98 1 01

Note. For data comparability and coveragje see the technical nots

252

Amount

1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 19820

ObPEC MilinsolSdll54 N geria 14 83 50 26 29 33 141 5881 Algeria 41 54 42 41 281 103 97 12887 Venezuela 31 108 24 87 107 125 67 21693 Iran, Islamic Rep. 593 753 169 240 -19 -90 -157 -17894 Iraq 215 231 62 172 847 876 148

96 Libya 259 94 101 139 105 382 293 4397 Saudi Arabia 2,756 3,028 3,086 5,464 4,238 5.943 5,664 4,42898 Kuwait 946 531 1,292 978 971 1,140 1,154 1,29599 United Arab Emirates 1,046 1,021 1,052 885 970 909 811 563

Qatar 338 195 189 98 287 269 248 251Total OAPECd 5,601 5,154 5,824 7,777 7.699 9,622 8,415 6,708Total OPEC 6,239 6,098 6,067 8,130 7.816 9,690 8,466 6,804

OPEC As percentage of donor GNP54 Nigeria .04 19 .10 .05 .04 .04 .20 0881 Algeria .28 .33 .21 .16 .92 .26 .24 2987 Venezuela .11 34 .07 .22 22 21 10 3293 Iran), Islamic Rep. 1.12 1 16 .22 .33.94 I raq 1.62 1 44 .33 .76 2 53 2.39 A40

-96 Libya 2.29 63 57 79 .43 1 18 1 11 1897 Saudi Arabia 7.76 6.46 5 24 8.39 5.55 5.09 3.58 2.8298 Kuwait 7.40 3.63 8.1 0 5.46 3.50 3 40 3.55 4.8699 United Arab Emirates 11 68 8.88 7.23 6 35 5.09 3 30 2.88 2 06

Qatar 15 58 7.95 7.56 3 38 6.18 4.03 3.75 3.80

Total OAPECdJ 5.73 4.23 3.95 4 69 3.54 3.44 2 87 2.42Total OPEC 2 92 2.32 1.96 2.47 1.86 2.21 1 93 1.65

Net Bilateral flow to low-income countries1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

OECD ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__P_e_r'cen_tag'e 0o1 d-ono-r _G_NP__ '101 Italy .03 .04 06 01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .04102 New Zealand . . .14 .03 .01 .01 .01, 00104 United K ngdom .22 23 15 .11 .15 .15 .12 .13 07105 Austria . 06 05 .02 .01 .02 .0 .0 .01106 Japan .12 .13 .11 .08 .07 .08 07 06 1 1

107 Belg urn 27 .56 .30 .31 .23 .27 .24 .25 21108 Finland . .06 04 06 08 09 08109 Netnerlands 19 08 .24 .24 .34 .26 32 37 29110 Australia . .08 .09 .10 .08 .06 .04 06 08111 Canada .11 .10 .22 .24 17 13 11 12 13

112 France .01 .12 .09 .10 08 07 .08 .11 10113 Germany Fed. Rep 13 .14 10 .12 07 .09 .09 11 .13j14 Denmark . .02 10 20 21 28 28 20 .22

115 U nted States .22 .26 .14 08 .04 03 03 03 .0116 Sweden 01 07 12 .41 37 41 34 31 .36117 Norway .02 .04 12 25 .39 .33 .28 .25 .331t8 Switzerland 02 05 .10 .08 .06 .08 .07 .09

Total .18 20 13 11 .09 .08 07 08 08

a Preliminary est mates. b See the tecnnical notes c. Provisional. d. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

253

Table 19. Population growth and projections _________

Average annual growth Hypothetical Assumedsize of year ofof population Population stationary reaching net Population

(percent) (millions) population reproduction momentum1960-70 1970-82 1980-2000 1982 1990oa 2000a (millions) rate ofl1 1980

Low-income economies 2 3.. 19. 1 7 2 269r 621,t 309r7China andlIndia 2 3. 1 7 I3 1 725 i 1 938,i' 190,IOther low-income 2 5.. 2 6 2 9 544 i 683 ' 907'

1 Cnad 1.9 2 0 2.5 5 6 7 22 2040 1 82 Bangladesn 2.5 2.6 2 9 93 119 157 454 2035 1 93 Ethiopia 2 4 2.0 3 1 33 42 57 231 2045 1.94 Nepal 1.9 2.6 2.6 1 5 19 24 71 2040 1 95 Mai. 2 5 2.7 2.8 7 9 1 2 42 2040 1.8

6 Burma 2 2 2.2 2.4 35 43 53 115 2025 1.87 Zaire 2.0 3.0 3.3 31 40 55 1 72 2030 1.98 Malawi 2.8 3.0 3.4 7 8 12 48 2040 1.99 Upper Volta 2.0 2.0 2.4 7 8 1 0 35 2040 1 7

1 0 Uganda 3.0 2.7 3.4 1 4 1 7 25 89 2035 2.0

1 1 India 2.3 2.3 1 9 717 844 994 1,707 2010 1 71 2 Rwanda 2 6 3.4 3 6 6 7 1 1 47 2040 1 913 Burundi 1 4 2 2 3.0 4 5 7 27 2040 1 914 Tanzania 2 7 3.4 3.5 20 26 36 117 2030 2.01 5 Somalia 2.8 2.8 2 4 5 5 .7 23 2045 1.8

16 Haiti 1 6 1.7 1.8 5 6 7 1 4 2025 1.81 7 Benin 2.6 2.7 3.3 4 5 7 23 2035 2 01 8 Central African Rep. 1.6 2.1 2.8 2 3 4 1 3 2040 1.91 9 China 2.3 1.4 1 0 1,008 1,094 1,196 1,461 2000 1 720 Guinea 1.5 2 0 2.4 6 7 9 28 2045 1.8

21 Niger 3.4 3 3 3.3 6 8 1 1 40 2040 1 922 Madagascar 2 2 2.6 3 2 9 1 2 1 6 54 2035 1 923 Sri Lanka 2.4 1.7 1 8 1 5 1 8 21 32 2005 1 824 Togo 3 0 2.6 3.3 3 4 5 1 7 2035 2.025 Gnana 2 3 3.0 3.9 1 2 1 7 24 83 2030 2.0

26 Pakistan 2.8 3.0 2.7 87 107 140 377 2035 1 927 K(enya 3.2 4.0 4.4 1 8 26 40 153 2030 2 128 Sierra Leone 1.7 2 0 2 4 3 4 5 1 6 2045 1 929 Afghanistan 2 2 2 5 2 3 1 7 20 25 76 2045 1.930 Bhutan 1.3 2 0 2.2 1 1 2 4 2035 I.8

31 Kampuchea, Demn. 2 5 ..

32 Lao PDP 1 9 2.0 2.6 4 4 6 19 2040 1.833 Mozambique 2.1 4.3 3.4 13 17 24 82 2035 2.034 Viet Nam 3.1 2.8 2.5 57 70 88 171 2015 1.9

Middle-income economies 2 6 2 4 22, 1.163. 1 404r 1 41Oil exporters 26t.. 27; 25. S2lr 6-1 '819:Oil importers 25. 23. 20 642; 76).' 922:

Lower middle-income 2 5 25 4 . 673, 816, 1 02335 Sudan 2.2 3.2 2 9 20 25 34 112 2035 1 836 Mauritania 2.3 2 3 2 6 2 2 3 8 2035 1.837 Yemen, PUP 2 2 2.2 3.1 2 2 3 12 2040 1 938 Liber a 3.2 3 5 3.5 2 3 4 1 2 2030 1 839 Senegal 2 3 2 7 3 1 6 8 1 0 36 2040 1.9

40 Yemen Arab Rep 2.3 3.0 2.9 8 9 1 2 43 2040 1.941 Lesotho 2 0 2.4 2.8 1 2 2 7 2030 1.842 Bolvia 2 4 2.6 2.4 6 7 9 22 2030 1 843 Indonesia 2.1 2.3 1.9 153 1 79 212 370 2010 1 944 Zambia. 2.6 3.1 3 6 6 8 1 1 37 2030 2 0

45 Honduras 3.1 3.4 3 1 4 5 7 1 7 2025 2.046 Egypt, Arab Rep 2.5 2.5 2 0 44 52 63 114 2015 1. 847 El Salvador 3 4 3 0 2.6 5 6 8 1 7 2015 1 948 Tha land 3 1 2 4 1.9 49 57 68 il1 2010 1.849 Papua New Guinea 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 4 5 1 0 2030 1.8

50 Pn l;ppines 3 0 2.7 2.1 51 61 73 127 2010 1.851 Zimbabwe 3 6 3.2 4.4 8 1 1 16 62 2030 2 152 N ger a 2.5 2.6 3.5 91 119 169 618 2035 2.053 Morocco 2.6 2.6 2.5 20 25 31 70 2025 1.954 Cameroon 2.0 3.0 3 5 9 12 17 65 2035 1 9

55 Nicaragua 2.6 3 9 3 0 3 4 5 1 2 2025 2 056 Ivory Coast 3 7 4.9 3 7 9 1 2 1 7 58 2035 2 057 Guatemaia 3 0 3 1 2 6 8 1 0 1 2 25 2020 1 958 Congo, People's Rep 2.4 3 0 3 8 2 2 3 1 0 2025 1.959 Costa R ca 3 3 2 5 2.2 2 3 3 5 2005 1.9

60 Peru 2 9 2.8 2.2 1 7 21 26 49 2020 1.961 Dominican Rep 2 9 3.0 2.2 6 7 8 15 2010 1 962 J~amaica 1.4 1.5 1.4 2 3 3 4 2005 1.663 Ecuador 2.9 2.6 2 6 8 10 13 27 2020 1 964 Turkey 2.5 2.3 2.0 47 55 65 11l 2010 18

Note- For data comparability and coverage see the tecnnical notes.

2.54

Hypothetical AssumedAverage annual growth size of year of

of population Population stationary reaching net Population(percent) (millions) _ population reproduction momentum

1960-70 1970-82 1980-2000 1982 1990, 20001 (millions) rate ofl1 198065 unisia 2.0 2.3 2.3 7 8 10 19 2015 1.866 Colombia 3.0 1.9 1 9 27 32 38 62 2010 1 867 Paraguay 2.6 2.6 2.3 3 4 5 8 2010 1.968 Angola 2.1 2.5 2.8 8 10 13 44 2040 1.969 Cuba 2.1 1 1 1.0 10 11 12 15 2010 1.670 Korea, Dem. Rep. 2.8 2.5 2.1 19 22 27 46 2010 1.871 Lebanon 2.9 0.5 1.3 3 3 3 6 2005 1.672 Mongolia 3 0 2.9 2.4 2 2 3 5 2015 1 9Upper middle-income 2 6. 2 3; 2 1, .190 r 588i 7i8t73 Syrian Arab Rep. 3 2 3.5 3.5 10 13 17 42 2020 2.074 Jordan 3 1 2.5 3.9 3 4 6 16 2020 2.075 Malaysia 2 8 2 5 2 0 15 17 21 33 2005 1.876 Korea, Rep, of 2.6 1 7 1.4 39 45 51 70 2000 1.777 Panama 2.9 2.3 1.9 2 2 3 4 2005 1.878 ChIle 2.1 1.7 1.4 12 13 15 21 2005 1.779 Brazil 2 8 2 4 2 0 127 152 181 304 2010 1.880 Mexico 3.3 3 0 2 3 73 89 109 199 2010 1 981 Algeria 2.4 3.1 3.7 20 27 39 119 2025 1.982 Portugal 0.3 0.8 0.6 10 10 11 14 2000 1 483 Argentna 1.5 1.4 1 3 28 32 36 54 2010 1.584 Uruguay 1.0 0.4 0.7 3 3 3 4 2005 1.385 South Africa 2 4 2.8 3.1 30 39 52 123 2020 1.886 Yugoslavia 1.0 0.9 0.6 23 24 25 29 2010 1 487 Venezuela 3.8 3.6 2.6 17 21 26 46 2010 2 0

88 Greece 0.6 1 0 0.4 10 10 11 12 2000 1.389 Israel 3 5 2 5 1 6 4 5 5 8 2005 1.790 Hong Kong 2 5 2 4 1 4 5 6 7 8 2000 1.691 Singapore 2.3 1.5 1.0 3 3 3 3 2000 1.692 Trinidad and Tobago 2.1 0.5 1 7 1 1 2 2 2010 1.793 Iran, Islamic Rep. 3.4 3.1 3 1 41 53 70 159 2020 1.994 Iraq 3.2 3.5 3.4 14 19 26 68 2025 2 0

High-incomeoil exporters 42. a,0 38 1f> 24, 33,

95 Oman 2 6 4.3 2.9 1 1 2 4 2020 1.996 Libya 3.9 4.1 4.3 3 5 7 21 2025 2 197 Saud Arabia 3.5 4.8 3.7 10 14 19 62 2030 1 998 Kuwait 9 9 6.3 3.5 2 2 3 5 2010 2.199 United Arab Emirates 9 3 15.5 3.7 1 2 2 4 2015 1 6Industrial market

economies 1 1 . 0 7 0-1; 723,; 749,t 780;iiCO Ireland 0 4 1.5 1 1 4 4 4 6 2000 1 5101 Spain 1 0 1 0 0 7 38 40 43 51 2000 1.3102 Italy 0.7 0.4 0 1 56 57 58 57 2010 1.2103 New Zealand 1.8 1.0 0.6 3 3 4 4 2010 1.4104 United Kingdom 0.6 0.1 0.1 56 56 57 59 2010 1.2105 Austria 0 5 0.1 01 8 8 8 8 2010 1 2106 Japan 1.0 1.1 0.4 118 123 128 128 2010 1 2107 Belg urn 0.6 0.2 0.1 10 10 10 10 2010 1.2108 Finland 0 4 0.4 0.1 5 5 5 5 2010 1.3109 Netheriands 1.3 0.7 0.4 14 15 15 15 2010 1.3

110 Australia 2 0 1.5 1.0 15 16 18 21 2010 1.5111 Canada 1 8 1.2 1.0 25 27 29 33 2010 1.5112 France 1.1 0.5 0.4 54 56 58 62 2010 1.3113 Germany, Fed. Rep 0.9 01 -0. 1 62 61 60 54 2010 1.1114 Denmark 0.8 0.3 0.1 5 5 5 5 2010 1.2

115 United States 1.3 1 0 0 7 232 245 259 292 2010 1.4116 Sweden 0.7 0 3 01 8 6 9 8 2010 1.1117 Norway 0.8 0 5 0 2 4 4 4 4 2010 1.2118 Switzeriand 1.5 0.1 0.1 6 6 6 6 2010 1.0

East Europeannonmarket economies 1 1 . C 8 0 6 384, -407, 13

119 Hungary 0.3 0.3 0.1 11 11 11 12 2010 1 2120 Romania 0.9 0.9 0.7 23 24 25 31 2000 1.3121 Albania 2.8 2.5 1 8 3 3 4 6 2000 1.8122 Bulgaria 0 8 0.4 0.3 9 9 10 10 2010 1.2123 Czechoslovakia 0 5 0.6 0.4 15 16 17 20 2000 1 3

124 German Dem Rep -0 1 -0.2 0.2 17 17 17 18 2010 1.2125 Poland 1.0 0 9 0.7 36 39 41 49 2000 1.4126 USSR 1.2 0.9 0.7 270 288 306 377 2000 1 4Total' 4.556 5,205 6,082

a For the assumptions uised ini tne projections see toe technical notes. b. Excludes countries with populations of less than 1 million.

255

Table 20. Demographic and fertility-related indicatorsCrude Crude Percentage Percentage ofbirth death change in: married women

rate per rate per Crude Crude Total of childbearingthousand thousand birth death fertility age usingpopulation population rate rate rate- contraception,

1960 1982 1960 1982 1960-82 1960-82 1982 2000 1970 1981Low-income economies 44 c 30 * 24; II ; -34 2, -54 7: 4 1 32.

China andlIndia 43' 25; 24~ 9 -42.6 : - 615 3 4 2 -Other low-income 47., -14. 24. 16;. - 7 .. - 32 8;, 6 1;. 2'

1 Chad 45 42 29 21 -6.6 -27.7 5.5 5.62 Bangladesh 47 47 22 17 0.2 -24.7 6.3 5.1 . 193 Ethiopia 51 47 28 18 -7.0 -35.9 6.5 6.14 Nepal 46 43 26 19 -6.5 -27.3 6.3 5.3 7S Mali 50 48 27 21 -3.2 -23.0 6.5 6.06 Burma 43 38 21 13 -11.3 -37.9 5.3 3.67 Zaire 48 46 24 16 -4.1 -34 2 6.3 5 88 Malawi 56 56 27 23 0.2 -15.7 7.8 7.19 Upper Volta 49 48 27 21 -1.5 -20.1 6.5 6.0

10 Uganda 49 50 21 19 1.4 -11.6 7.0 6.411 India 48 34 24 13 -28.3 -46.8 4.8 2.9 12 2812 Rwanda 53 54 27 20 0.9 -27.4 8.3 7.613 Burundi 45 47 25 19 2.9 -23.7 6.5 6014 Tanzania 47 47 22 15 08 -33.4 6.5 5.815 Somalia 48 48 29 25 02 -12.3 65 6116 Haiti 39 32 19 13 -17.4 -35.7 4.6 3.7 1917 Benin 51 49 27 18 -2.5 -32.2 6.5 5.9 . 1718 Central African Rep 43 41 26 17 -3.9 -35.4 5 5 5.6 19 China 39 19 24 7 -52.8 -71.9 2.3 2.0 .. 6920 Guinea 48 49 35 27 1.8 -22.6 6.5 6.121 Niger 52 52 27 20 0.7 -24.5 7.0 6.422 Madagascar 47 47 27 18 -0.1 -33.0 6.5 5.923 Sri Lanka 36 27 9 6 -25.7 -34 8 3.4 2 3 .. 5524 Togo 51 49 23 19 -2.7 -17 6 6.5 5.925 Ghana 50 49 20 13 -1 8 -35.7 7.0 6.3 .. 1026 Pakistan 49 42 23 15 -13.6 -34.3 5.8 4.8 627 Kenya 55 55 24 12 0.2 -47.9 8.0 7.1 6 728 Sierra Leone 49 49 34 27 -0.2 -20.6 65 6.129 Afghanistan 50 54 31 29 7.4 -6.5 8.0 5.6 230 Bhutan 43 43 25 21 -0.2 -15.3 6.2 5.131 Kampuchea, Dem 45 .. 21 ...

32 Lao PDR 44 42 23 20 -4 7 -12.0 6.4 5.933 Mozambique .. 49 .. 16 .6.5 5.934 Viet Nam 47 35 21 8 -24.9 -62.3 50 3.1Middle-income economies 43., 35. 17;. 10: -220 - 396 , 4 7, 36',

Oil exporters 47. 38 21;,' 12. -191, -42 9; 53 40.Oil importers 40+ 31;, 15. 9.' -24 5, -37 0:, 42 3 3

Lower middle-income 46;, 37 20 12, -2i 2;, -420O... 5,0. 3 935 Sudan 47 45 25 18 -3.4 -29.9 6.6 6.0 . 536 Mauritania 51 43 27 19 -14.3 -28.3 6.0 5.9 .. 137 Yemen, PDR 50 48 29 19 -5.6 -33.9 6.9 6.338 Liberia 50 50 21 14 -0.3 -30.6 6.9 6.239 Senegal 48 48 26 21 () -22 5 6.5 60 . 440 Yemen Arab Rep. 50 48 29 22 -2.8 -25.1 6.8 6.2 . 141 Lesotho 42 42 23 15 .) -35.8 5.8 5.2 . 542 Bolivia 46 43 22 16 - 7.2 -28.7 63 4.243 Indonesia 44 34 23 13 -23.9 -43.2 4.3 2.8 .. 5344 Zamnbia 51 50 24 16 -2.2 -36.5 68 6.145 Honduras 51 44 19 10 -14.2 -45.1 6.5 4.1 .. 2746 Egypt, Arab Rep. 44 35 20 11 -22.1 -44.6 4.6 3.0 . 2447 El Salvador 48 40 17 8 -17.4 -52.1 5.6 3.3 .. 3448 Thailand 44 28 15 8 -36.2 -48.1 3.6 2.6 15 5949 Papua New Guinea 44 34 23 13 -22.3 -43 1 5.0 3 650 Philippines 47 31 15 7 -34 0 -5.3.4 4.2 2 7 15 3651 Zimbabwe 55 54 17 12 -1.8 -25 0 80 71 1552 Niger[a 52 50 25 16 -4 7 -35.6 6.9 6.3 .. 653 Morocco 50 40 21 15 -19.8 -30.7 58 3.8 . 1954 Cameroon 38 46 21 15 21.2 -30.7 65 6.4 . 255 N caragua 51 45 18 11 -11.3 -39 8 6.3 4.056 Ivory Coast 49 48 24 17 -2.7 -28.2 7.0 6.4 .. 357 Guatemala 48 38 18 9 -21 0 -49 1 5.2 3.4 1858 Congo, People's Rep. 40 43 18 10 6 8 -46.0 6.0 5759 Costa Rica 48 30 8 4 -36.8 -51 3 3.5 2.3 6560 Peru 47 34 19 11 -27.4 -42.1 4.5 3 2 . 4161 Dominican Rep. 49 34 17 8 -31.1 -54.0 4 2 2 7 .. 4262 Jamnaica 42 27 9 6 -35.0 -36.4 3.4 2.3 .. 5563 Ecuiador 47 37 17 8 -20.5 -49.3 5.4 3.5 .. 3464 Turkey 43 31 16 9 -28.0 -43.4 4 1 2.7 32 36

Note' For data comparability and coverage see the tecnnical notes.

256

Crude Crude Percentage Percentage ofbirth death change in: married women

rate per rate per Crude Crude Total of childbearingthousand thousand birth death fertility age usingpopulation population rate rate rate contraceptiona

1960 1982 1960 1982 1960-82 1960-82 1982 2000 1970 198165 Tunisia 47 34 1 9 9 -27.0 -51 9 4.9 3.1 .. 4166 Colombia 47 29 17 7 -38.8 -57.5 3.6 2.6 4967 Paraguay 43 31 13 7 -27.2 -44.6 4.2 2,7 3668 Angola 50 49 31 22 -1.8 -28.6 6.5 6069 Cuba 31 1 6 9 6 -46.7 -36.7 2.0 2.070 Korea, Dem. Pep, 41 30 13 7 -25.9 -42.0 4.0 2.671 Lebanon 43 29 14 9 -33.2 -40.2 3.8 2.4 5372 Mongolia 41 34 15 7 -17.0 -52.7 4.8 3.1

Upper middle-income -30;, 31 13, 8;, -23 2 -36 4. .42.. 3 173 Syrian Arab Rep 47 46 18 7 -1.5 -62 1 7.2 4.0 . 2074 Joraan 47 45 20 8 -5.5 -59.3 7.4 5.2 22 2575 Malaysia 44 29 15 6 -34.1 -57.0 3.7 2.4 3376 Korea, Rep. of 43 23 14 6 -46.7 -53 3 2.7 2.1 25 5477 Panama 41 28 10 5 -31.9 -47.6 3.5 2.3 .. 6178 Chile 34 23 13 7 -32.8 -46.8 2.7 2.279 Brazil 43 31 13 8 -26.9 -37.4 3.9 2.680 Mexico 45 34 12 7 -25.3 -41.5 4 6 2.8 3981 Algeria 51 47 20 13 - 7.8 -36 7 7.0 6.1 82 Portugal 24 18 11 10 -26 4 - 8.3 2.3 2.1 .. 6663 Argentina 23 25 9 9 6.5 3.4 3.4 2.584 Uruguay 22 18 10 9 -17.4 - 5.2 2.6 2.285 South Afr ca 39 40 15 9 1 3 -43.2 5.1 4.4 86 Yugoslavia 24 15 10 9 -36.6 -10 1 2.0 2.1 59 5587 Venezuela 46 35 11 6 -24.4 -50.9 4 3 2.7 . 4988 Greece 19 14 7 9 -24.3 19.2 2.3 2.189 Israel 27 24 6 7 -12.3 19.3 31 2 390 Hong Kong 35 18 7 5 -47 2 -20.9 21 21 42 7291 Singapore 39 17 6 5 -55.3 -16.1 1.7 2.1 60 7192 Trinidad and Tobago 38 29 8 7 -22.1 -17 2 3 3 2.4 44 5293 Iran, Islamic Rep. 53 41 19 10 -23 8 -48.7 5 6 4 294 Iraq 49 45 20 11 -9.2 -46 2 6.7 4 9 14High-income

oil exporters 49..' 42.. 22.. 11 i -2 9. -498, 6 9 5 8.195 Oman 51 47 28 15 -7.0 -47.1 7.1 4.096 Libya 49 45 19 11 -7.1 -42.9 7 2 6.397 Saudi Arabia 49 43 23 12 -11.2 -45.8 7.1 6.398 Kuwait 44 35 10 3 -21.4 -65.2 5 7 3.099 United Arab Emirates 46 28 19 3 -39.1 -82.1 8 0 4 8Industrial market

economies 20- 14 10i. 9. 31 4. -5- 17. 0u

100 Ireland 21 20 12 9 -5.1 -18.3 3.2 2.1101 Spain 22 15 9 9 -29.5 1 1 2.2 2.1 . 51102 Italy 18 11 10 11 -37.0 9 4 1 6 1.9 .. 78103 New Zealand 27 16 9 8 -40.4 -8.0 1 9 2.0104 Unitea Kingdom 18 13 12 12 -27.4 3.5 1.8 2.0 69 77105 Austria 18 13 13 12 -30.2 -5.5 1 6 1 9106 Japan 17 13 8 7 -25.4 -13.2 1 7 1 9 56107 Belgium 17 12 12 12 -28.4 -4.8 1 6 1 9108 F nland 19 14 9 9 -25.9 . 1 6 1 9 77 80109 Netherlands 21 12 8 8 -42.3 6.5 1 4 1 8

110 Australia 22 16 9 8 -28.1 -9.3 2.0 2.0111 Canada 27 15 8 7 -43.4 -11.5 1.8 2.0112 France 18 14 11 11 -23.5 -3.5 1.8 2.0 64 79

J 13 Germnany Fed. Rep. 18 10 12 12 -42.3 () 1.4 1.8 114 Denmark 17 10 10 11 -38.0 13 7 1.5 1 9 67

115 U nited States 24 16 10 9 -32.5 -9.5 1.8 2 0 65 68116 Sweden 14 11 10 11 -19.0 9 0 1 7 1.9.117 Norway 17 12 9 10 -28 3 9 9 1 7 1 9 .. 711h18 Switzerland 18 11 10 9 -35.2 -3.1 1 9 2.0

East Europeannonmarket economies 23. 18., 8.. 10. IO - 5 314. 2 3 2 1

119 Hungary 15 13 10 14 -15 0 32.4 2.0 2 0 67 74120 Romania 19 17 9 10 -9 4 11.5 2.4 21 . 58121 Albania 43 28 10 6 -35.9 -47.1 3.6 2.2122 Bulgaria 18 15 8 10 -18 0 28 4 2.1 21 . 76123 Czechoslovakia 16 15 9 12 -4.4 27 2 2.2 2.1 124 German Dem. Rep. 17 15 14 13 -14.7 -6.6 1.9 2.0125 Poland 23 19 8 9 -14.2 21 1 2.3 2.1 60 75126 USSR 25 19 7 10 -23.7 42 3 2.4 2.1

a. Figures include women whose husbands practice confraception. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the tecnnicalnotes

257

Table 21. Labor forcePercentage ofpopulation of Average-annual growthworking age Percentage of labor force in: of labor force(1 5-64 years) Agriculture Industry Services (percent)1960- 1982 1960 1980 1960 1980 19~60 1980~ 1960-70 1970-82 1980-2000

Low-income economies 5.5 59 77;, 13.. 143 is 17.,China and India 56. 61 ; 69. 17 14, 1 7 Other low-income 54~ 53; 82 73. 7 1 1 II E, '8 2 3.. C'.

i Chad 57 54 95 85 2 7 3 8 1 5 1 8 2.62 Bangladesh 53 55 87 74 3 1 1 10 15 21 29 3.03 Ethiopia 53 52 88 80 5 7 7 ~320 1 7 3.04 Nepal 57 55 95 93 2 2 3 5 1.3 24 2 75 Mali 54 51 94 73 3 12 3 15 21 2.1 29

6 Burma 59 55 67 10 . 23 1 1 1 5 237 Zaire 53 52 83 75 9 13 8 12 1 4 23 328 Malaw 52 50 92 86 3 5 5 9 2,4 25 329 Upper Volta 54 52 92 82 5 13 3 5 1 6 16 2 5

10OUganda 54 52 89 83 4 6 7 11 26 21 3.5

1 1 India 54 57 74 71 1 1 13 15 1 6 1 7 21 2.112 Rwanda 53 52 95 91 1 2 4 7 2.2 32 3 513 Burund 55 53 90 84 3 5 7 1 1 0.9 1 6 2814 Tanzania 54 51 89 83 4 6 7 1 1 21 2.6 34ls Soma ia 54 54 88 82 4 8 8 10 21 2.9 20

16 Haiti 55 53 80 74 6 7 1 4 19 06 13 2017 Ben n 53 51 54 46 9 16 37 38 21 21 2818 Central AfricanPRep 58 55 94 88 2 4 4 8 11 15 2.419 China 56 63 69 . 19 ! 2 17 18 1 620 Gu nea 55 53 88 82 6 ~1 6 7 1.1 13 23

21lNiger 53 51 95 91 1 3 4 6 30 3.0 3422 Madagascar 55 53 93 87 2 4 5 9 1 7 21 3023 Sri anka 54 60 56 54 14 14 30 32 21 21 2124 Togo 53 51 80 67 8 15 12 18 25 18 3 225 Ghana 53 51 64 53 14 20 22 27 1 6 23 39

26 Pakistan 52 51 61 57 18 20 21 23 19 27 3.127 Kenya 50 47 86 78 5 10 9 12 2 7 33 4.228 Sierra Leone 55 53 78 65 12 ~9 10 16 1.0 1 6 2429 Afghanistan 55 52 85 79 6 8 9 13 1 9 2.1 2630 Bhutan 56 56 95 93 2 2 3 5 03 2.1 23

31 Kampuchea, Dem 53 . 82 4 14 2032 LaoPDR 56 51 83 75 4 6 13 19 11 08 2733 Mozambique 56 53 81 66 8 18 11 16 18 34 3.134 Viet Nam 54 8 1 7 1 5 10 14 19 .2.7

Middle-income economies 55. 55 6?2 46. is. 21 I 23. 34 21 . 7Oil exporters 51 54. 6 _. 4 1 7 23 3 't, Ž.

Oillimporlers 55. 57* 6 0 4426 I 24. 32. 2 221 34

35 Sudan 53 53 86 78 6 10 8 12 21 2.8 3.036 Mauritania 53 51 91 69 3 8 6 23 19 20 2.437 Yemen. PDR 52 52 70 45 15 15 15 40 17 1 7 3.638 Liber.a 52 51 80 70 10 14 10 1I6 2.4 30 3 539 Senegal 54 52 84 77 5 10 1 1 13 1.7 2.0 2 7

40 Yemen Arab Rep 54 52 83 75 7 1 1 10 14 1.6 2 0 3441lLesotho 57 55 93 87 2 4 5 9 1 6 1 9 2 742 Bol va 55 53 61 50 18 24 21, 26 1 7 23 2943 Indonesia 56 57 75 58 6 12 17 30 1 / 2 5 1 944 Zambia 53 50 79 67 7 1 1 14 22 21 2 3 32

45 Hionduras 52 50 70 63 1 1 20 i9 17 2.5 32 3.546 Egypt, Arab Rep 55 57 58 50 12 30 30 20 22 25 2.447 ESalvador 52 52 62 50 17 22 21 28 30 2.8 3548 Thailand 53 56 84 76 4 9 12 15 2.1 2.8 2249 Papua New Gu nea 57 55 89 82 4 8 7 10 1 7 1.7 20

50 Phil pQnes 52 53 61, 46 15 17 24 37 2.1 2.5 2 751 Zimbabwe 52 50 69 60 1' 15 20 25 31 23 4 552 N ger a 52 50 71 54 10 19 19 27 1 8 1 8 3553 Morocco 53 51 62 52 14 21 24 27 1 5 28 3.554 Cameroon 57 54 87 83 5 7 8 10 1 5 22 3.2

55 Nicaragua 50 50 62 39 16 14 22 47 2.3 38 3.956 Ivory Coast 54 53 89 79 2 4 9 17 3.6 4.1 3357 Guatemala 51 54 67 55 14 21 19 24 2.8 32 2958 Congo, People's Rep. 56 52 52 34 17 26 31 40 1 8 2.2 3 959 Costa Rca 50 59 51 29 19 23 30 48 3.3 38 28

60 Peru 52 54 53 40 20 19 27 41 2 1 28 2.96' Dom~n.can Rep 49 53 67 49 12 18 21 33 22 36 3062 Jama~ca 54 54 39 35 25 18 36 47 04 23 2863 Ecuador 52 52 57 52 19 17 24 31 2 7 2 8 3.464 Turkey 55 59 79 54 11 13 10 33 1.4 20 2.3

Note For data comparability and coverage see the tech n cai notes

258

Percentage ofpopulation of Average annual growthworking age Percentage of labor force in: of labor force

(15-64 years) Agriculture Industry Services(pret1960 1982 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960-70 1970-82 1980-2000

65 Tunisia 52 56 56 35 18 32 26 33 07 3.1 3.166 Colombia 50 60 51 26 19 21 30 53 3.0 3.3 2.467 Paraguay 51 53 56 49 19 19 25 32 2.3 2.9 3 068 Angola 55 53 69 59 12 16 19 25 1.6 2.0 2 969 Cuba 61 61 39 23 22 31 39 46 0 8 1 8 1.8

70 Korea, Demn. Rep. 53 56 62 49 23 33 15 18 2.3 2 9 2.871 Lebanon 53 56 38 11 23 27 39 62 2.1 1 1 2.272 Mongolia 54 54 70 55 13 22 17 23 2.1 2.5 3.1

Upper riddle-income 55, 57. 419 30. 2 0. 28 :3 i 412. 23 Ž13. 2 5:73 Syrian Arab Rep. 52 49 54 33 19 31 27 36 2 1 3.3 4.474 Jordan 52 51 44 20 26 20 30 60 2 8 2 5 4.475 Malaysia 51 56 63 50 12 16 25 34 2 7 2 9 3.076 Korea, Rep. of 54 62 66 34 9 29 25 37 3.1 2 6 2177 Panama 52 56 51 33 14 18 35 49 3 4 2.4 2.5

78 Chile 57 62 30 19 20 19 50 62 1 4 2.1 2.179 Brazil 54 55 52 30 15 24 33 46 2.7 2.3 2.680 Mex co 51 52 55 36 20 26 25 38 2.8 3.2 3 381 Algeria 52 49 67 25 12 25 21 50 0.5 3.5 4 882 Portugal 63 63 44 28 29 35 27 37 0.4 06 0.883 Argentna 64 63 20 13 36 28 44 59 1.3 1.3 1 384 Uruguay 64 63 21 11 30 32 49 57 0.8 0.3 0 985 Soutn Africa 55 55 32 30 30 29 38 41 3.0 2 9 3.386 Yugoslavia 63 67 63 29 18 35 19 36 0 6 0.6 0 687 Venezuela 51 55 35 18 22 27 43 55 3.1 4.1 3 388 Greece 65 64 56 37 20 28 24 35 0.0 0.8 0 589 lsrae 59 58 14 7 35 36 51 57 3 6 2.4 2 190 Hong Kong 56 66 8 3 52 57 40 40 3 3 3.5 1 491 Singapore 55 66 8 2 23 39 69 59 2.7 2 6 1 292 Trinobad and Tobago 53 63 22 10 34 39 44 52 2 5 1 8 2.293 Iran, Islamic Rep 51 52 54 39 23 34 23 27 3.1 2.9 3.894 Iraq 51 51 53 42 18 26 29 32 2.9 3.1 3 9High-income

oil exporters 54. 5. 62., 426,, 13 19, 5. 35, 38.. 4 5.. 3895 Oman 54 52 96 Libya 53 51 53 19 17 28 30 53 3 6 36 4 497 Saudi Arabia 54 52 71 61 10 14 19 25 3.3 4 7 3 798 Kuwat 63 52 1 2 34 34 65 64 7.0 4 8 3 499 United Arab Emirates . .

Industrial marketeconomies 63. 6-. 6 18 E. 38. 33 4 56 I 20 6

100 Ireland 58 59 36 18 25 37 39 45 0.0 1 3 1.5101 Spain 64 63 42 14 31 40 27 46 0.2 1.2 0 8102 Italy 66 65 31 11 40 45 29 44 -0.1 0.6 0 3103 New Zealand 58 64 15 10 37 35 48 55 2.2 1.7 1 0104 United K ngdom 65 64 4 2 48 42 48 56 0 6 0.4 0 2105 Austria 66 65 24 9 46 37 30 54 -0 7 0 9 0 3106 Japan 64 68 33 12 30 39 37 49 1 9 1.3 0 7107 Belg un 65 66 8 3 48 41 44 56 0 3 0 7 0 2108 Finland 62 68 36 11 31 35 33 54 0 4 0 9 03109 Netnerlands 61 67 11 6 43 45 46 49 1 6 1 3 0 5110 Australia 61 65 11 6 40 33 49 61 2 6 1 8 1.1111 Canada 59 67 13 5 34 29 52 66 2.5 20 1.1112 France 62 64 22 8 39 39 39 53 0.7 1.0 0 6113 Germany, Fed Rep 68 67 14 4 48 46 38 50 0.2 0.8 (-114 Denmark 64 65 18 7 37 35 45 58 1.1 0.6 04

'15 United States 60 66 7 2 36 32 57 66 1.8 1.7 0 9116 Sweben 66 64 14 5 45 34 41 61 1 0 0 3 0 4117 Norway 63 63 20 7 37 37 44 56 0 5 0.7 0 6418 Swvitzerland 66 67 11 5 50 46 38 49 2.0 0 4 0 2

East Europeannonmarket economies 63. i:n 42. 16. 31) 1 4 78 3. 8. 1 10.

119 Hungary 66 65 39 21 34 43 27 36 05 03 0.1120 Romania 64 64 65 29 15 36 20 35 0.9 0 6 0.7121 Albania 54 58 71 61 18 25 11 14 2.3 2.7 2.4122 Bulgaria 66 66 57 37 25 39 18 24 0.7 02 02123 Czechoslovakia 64 64 26 11 46 48 28 41 0 8 0 7 0.6

124 German Demn Rep. 65 64 18 10 48 50 34 40 -0 2 0.5 0.3125 Poland 61 66 48 31 29 39 23 30 1.7 1 4 0.8126 USSR 63 66 42 14 29 45 29 41 0.7 1.2 06

259

Table 22. UrbanizationUrban population Percentage of urban population Number of

As percentage Average annual In cities of cities ofof total growth rate In largest over 500,000 over 500,000

population (percent) city persons persons_____ ~~~~~~1960a 1982a 1960-70 1970-82 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980

Low income economies 17. 21 4 1 -14, 10 16 31. 55. ~China andlIndia 18. 22. 6 3 3 5, 49, 114rOther low-income 12. 20. 52. 52Ž 8, 1, 40, 31'

1IChad 7 1 9 6.8 6.4 3 9 0 0 0 02 Banglacoesh 5 1 2 6.2 6.0 20 3 0 2 0 5 1 1 33 Ethiopia 6 1 5 6 5 5.6 3 0 3 7 0 3 7 0 14 Nepal 3 6 4.2 6.7 4 1 2 7 0 0 0 05Mali 1 1 1 9 5 4 4.7 3 2 24 0) 0 0 06Burma 1 9 298 3.9 3 9 2 3 2 3 23 2 3 1 27Zaire 1 6 3 8 5 2 7.6 1 4 2 8 1 4 3 8 1 28 Malawi 4 1 0 6.6 6.4 1 9 0 0 0 09 Upper Volta 5 1 1 5.7 6.0 .. 41 0 0 0 0

lo Uganda 5 9 7.1 3.4 38 52 0 52 0 11 1 ndia 1 8 24 3.3 3.9 7 6 26 39 1 1 36l 2Rwanda 2 5 5 4 6 4 .. 0 0 0 0 013 Burundi 2 2 1.3 2.5 .0 0 0 014 Tanzania 5 13 6 3 8 5 34 50 0 50 0 1 -

lS Somala 1 7 32 5.7 5.4 . 34 0 0 0 01 6Haiti 16 26 3.9 4.0 42 56 0 56 0 17Ben n 1 0 1 5 5 4 4.4 . 63 0 63 0 1

1 8Central Afroan Rep. 23 37 4 7 3.5 40 36 0 0 0 01 9China 18 21 ... 6 6 42 45 38 7820 Guinea 1 0 20 4.9 5 2 37 80 0 80 0 121 Niger 6 1 4 7.0 7.2 31 0 0 0 022 Madagascar I11 20 5.0 5.2 44 36 0 36 0 123 Sri Lanka 18 24 4 3 2.5 28 16 0 16 0 124 Togo 10 21 5 8 6.6 60 0 0 0 025 Ghana 23 371 4.6 5 0 25 35 0 48 0 226 Pakistan 22 29 4.0 4 3 20 21 33 51 2 727 Kenya 7 15 6.4 7 3 40 57 0 57 0 128 Sierra Leone 13 23 4.9 3 9 37 47 0 0 0 a29 Afghanistan 8 1 7 5.4 5.8 33 1 7 0 1 7 0 130 Bhutan 3 4 3.3 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 031 Kampuchea, Dern. 10 3 7 ..

32 Lao PDR 8 1 4 3.8 4.7 69 48 0 0 0 033 Mozambique 4 9 6.5 8 1 75 83 0 83 0 134 Viet Nam 1 5 1 9 5.3 3 2 32 21 32 50 1 4Middle-income 33. .16, * .14 4 2., 28. 29.. 35 48. 541 t 28'

Oil exporters 27 0 2 427 '30 3. 48 IS 42,

Lower middle-income 24;. 34 . 4 , 4 .1 2. ?2 . 28 .4 `2 -.335 Sudan 10 23 6.8 5 8 30 31 0 31 0 136 Mauritania 3 26 15.5 8 1 .. 39 0 0 0 037 Yemen. PDR 28 38 3.5 3 7 61 49 0 0 0 038 Liberia 21 34 5.6 5.7 .. .0 0 0 039 Senegal 23 34 4.9 3.7 53 65 0 65 0 140 Yemen Arab Rep. 3 14 10 2 8.3 .. 25 0 0 0 041lLesotho 2 13 7 5 15.4 . .0 0 0 042 Bolivia 34 45 4.1 3 3 47 44 0 44 0 143 Indonesia 15 22 3.6 4.5 20 23 34 50 3 944 Zamb a 23 45 5 2 6.5 .. 35 0 35 0 145 Honduras 23 37 5.5 5 5 31 33 0 0 0 046 Egypt, Arab Rep 38 45 3.5 2.9 38 39 53 53 2 247 El Salvador 38 42 3 6 3.4 26 22 0 0 0 048 Tha land 1 3 1 7 3.6 4.3 65 69 65 69 1 149 Papua New Guinea 3 1 7 15.2 6 6 .. 25 0 0 0 050 Pnilippines 30 38 3.8 3 8 27 30 27 34 1 251 Zimbabwe 1 3 24 6.7 6 0 40 50 0 50 0 152 Niger a 1 3 2 1 4.7 4.9 1 3 1 7 22 58 2 953 Morocco 29 42 4.2 4.1 1 6 26 1 6 50 1 4-54 Cameroon 1 4 37 5.8 8.0 26 21 0 21 0 155 Nicaragua 4 1 55 4.0 5 0 4 1 47 0 47 0 156 ivory Coast 1 9 42 7 3 8 2 27 34 0 34 0 157 Guatemala 33 40 3 8 4 0 4 1 36 4 1 36 1 158 Congo, Peoples Rep 30 46 5.0 4 4 77 56 0 0 0 059 Costa Rica 37 43 4.0 3 2 67 64 0 64 0 160 Peru 46 66 5 0 3.7 38 39 38 44 1 261 Dominican Rep. 30 53 5.6 5.3 50 54 0 54 0 162 Jamaica 34 48 3.5 2.6 77 66 0 66 0 163 Ecuador 34 46 4.2 3 8 31 29 0 51 0 264 Turkey 30 44 3.5 4 7 18 24 32 42 3 4

Note: For data comnparability and coverage see the technical notes.

260

Urban population Percentage of urban population Number ofAs percentage Average annual In cities of cities of

of total growth rate In largest over 500,000 over 500.000population (percent) city persons persons

19601 1982a 1960-70 1970-82 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 198065 Tunisia 36 54 3.8 4.0 40 30 40 30 1 166 Colombia 48 65 5.2 2.7 17 26 28 51 3 467 Paraguay 36 40 2.9 3.3 44 44 0 44 0 68 Angola 10 22 5.7 5.6 44 64 0 64 0 169 Cuba 55 68 2.9 2.1 32 38 32 38 1 1

70 Korea, Dem Rep. 40 63 5.0 4.2 15 12 15 19 1 271 Lebanon 40 77 6.9 2 8 64 79 64 79 1 172 Mongolia 36 53 5.3 4 2 53 52 0 0 0 0

Upper middle-income 4i.. 6 4. . 3 9, 28 , 29 38.- 51 32, 70,173 Syrian Arab Rep. 37 49 4.8 4.4 35 33 35 55 1 274 Jordan 43 60 4.7 4.0 31 37 0 37 0 175 Malaysa 25 30 3.5 3.4 19 27 0 27 0 176 Korea, Rep. of 28 61 6.5 5.0 35 41 61 77 3 777 Panama 21 53 11.1 3.2 61 66 0 66 0 178 Chile 68 82 3.1 2 4 38 44 38 44 1 179 Brazil 45 69 5.0 41 14 15 35 52 6 1480 Mexico 51 68 4.7 4.2 28 32 36 48 3 781 Algera 30 45 3.5 5 4 27 12 27 12 1 182 Portugal 23 32 1 8 2.5 47 44 47 44 1 183 Argentina 74 83 2 1 1.9 46 45 54 60 3 584 Uruguay 80 84 1.3 0.6 56 52 56 52 1 165 South Africa 47 50 2.6 3.2 16 13 44 53 4 786 Yugoslavia 28 44 3.2 2.8 11 10 11 23 1 387 Venezuela 67 84 5.1 4 3 26 26 26 44 1 488 Greece 43 64 2.6 2 5 51 57 51 70 1 289 Israel 77 90 4.3 3 1 46 35 46 35 1 190 Hong Kong 89 91 2 6 2.4 100 100 100 100 1 191 Singapore 100 100 2.3 1.5 100 100 100 100 1 192 Tr ndad and Tobago 22 22 1.8 0.7 . 0 0 0 0

93 Iran, Islamic Rep. 34 52 5.3 5.1 26 28 26 47 1 694 Iraq 43 70 5.8 5.3 35 55 35 70 1 3High-income

oil exporters 20 6 85.. e3. '9'. 28. 0. 3-1 u) 3,95 Oman 4 20 6.3 15.6 .

96Libya 23 58 8 4 8.0 57 64 0 64 0 197 Saudi Arabia 30 69 8 4 76 15 18 0 33 0 298 Kuwait 72 91 10.1 7.4 75 30 0 0 0 099 United Arab Emnirates 40 79 14.9 14.4 . ..

Industrial marketeconomies 6.3; 78, 1 9 1 3 i6 13,9 Is3 955 10-4,1 152t

100 Ireland 46 59 1.6 2.5 51 48 51 48 1 1101 Spain 57 76 2 6 21 13 17 37 44 5 6102 Italy 59 70 1.5 1 1 13 17 46 52 7 9103 New Zealand 76 85 2.3 1 5 25 30 0 30 0 1104 United Kingdom 86 91 0.9 0 3 24 20 61 55 15 17105 Austria 50 55 0.9 0.7 51 39 51 39 1 1106 Japan 63 78 2.4 1.8 18 22 35 42 5 9107 Belgium 66 73 1.2 0.4 17 14 28 24 2 2108 Finland 38 64 3.2 2 4 28 27 0 27 0 1109 Netnerlands 80 76 1.0 0 6 9 9 27 24 a 3

110 Australia 81 89 2.5 2.0 26 24 62 68 4 5111 Canada 69 76 2.7 1 2 14 18 31 62 2 9112 France 62 79 2 4 1 4 25 23 34 34 4 6113 Germany, Fed Rep 77 85 1.4 0 5 20 18 48 45 11 11114 Denmark 74 85 1 6 0.8 40 32 40 32 1 1

115 United States 70 78 1 8 1.5 13 12 61 77 40 65116 Sweden 73 88 1.8 1.0 15 15 15 35 1 3117 Norway 32 54 3 5 2.6 50 32 50 32 1 1118 Switzerland 51 59 2.2 0.8 19 22 19 22 1 1

East Europeannonmarket economies 48 . 6 2 . 1P, 9 7. 23; 32. 36.' 65,

119 Hungary 40 55 2.1 1.4 45 37 45 37 1 1120 Rumania 32 5 1 3.4 2 7 22 17 22 17 1 1121 Albania 31 38 3.8 3.4 27 25 0 0 0 0122 Bulgaria 39 66 3.8 2.3 23 18 23 18 1 1123 Czechoslovakia 47 64 21 1.8 17 12 17 12 1 1

124 German Dem. Rep. 72 77 0 1 0 2 9 9 14 17 2 3125 Poland 48 58 1.8 1.7 17 15 41 47 5 8126 USSR 49 63 2 7 1.8 6 4 21 33 25 50

a Figures in italics are for years otner tnan those specified.

261

Table 23. Indicators related to life expectancyLife expectancy

at birth Infant(years) mortality rate Child death rate

Male Female (aged under 1) (aged 1-4)1960 1982 1960 1982 1960 1982 1960 1982

'Low--in-c,o,m,e-e-con,o,mie-s- 4-2 . __58 ;.4 61 165 2'.. 211 IChina andlIndia 42., 61' 41. 62. 165.- 78, 26. 9 Other low-income 42., 50;. 43., 52 163;. 114 31, 1 94

1 Chad 33 42 36 45 210 161 60 372 Bangladesh 45 48 42 49 159 133 25 193 Ethiopia 35 45 38 49 172 122 42 254 Nepa. 39 46 38 45 195 145 33 225 Mali 36 43 39 47 179 132 45 276 Burma 42 53 45 56 158 96 25 127 Zaire 38 49 42 52 150 106 32 208 Malawi 36 43 37 46 206 137 58 299 Upper Volta 36 43 39 46 234 1 57 71 3610 Uganda 41 46 45 48 139 120 28 22 -

1 1 India 43 55 42 54 165 94 26 1 112 Rwanda 38 45 41 48 167 126 40 2513 Birund; 37 45 40 48 143 123 31 2414 Tanzania 40 51 43 54 144 98 31 18-15 Somalia 32 38 36 40 213 184 61 47

16 Haiti 44 53 45 56 182 110 47 1717 Benin 38 46 41 50 173 117 42 231 8 Central African Rep. 37 46 40 49 170 119 41 239 Chna 41 65 41 69 165 67 26 7

20 Gu.inea 31 37 34 38 222 190 65 50

21 Niger 36 43 39 47 178 132 45 2722 Madagascar 36 46 39 50 177 116 45 2323 Sri Lanka 62 67 62 71 71 32 7 324 Togo 41 45 41 49 201 122 55 2525 Ghana 43 53 46 57 132 86 27 15

26 Pakistan 44 51 42 49 162 121 25 1727 Kenya 45 55 48 59 112 77 21 1328 Sierra Leone 29 37 32 38 235 190 72 5029 Afghanistan 33 35 34 37 233 205 41 3530 Bhutan 33 43 31 42 243 163 43 26

31 Kampuchea, Dem. 41 42 44 45 146 .22

32 Lao PDR 39 42 42 45 180 159 29 2533 Mozamnbiquje 40 49 43 52 154 105 34 2034 Viet Nam 42 62 45 66 163 53 26 4Middle-income economies 49; 58 52.. 62 .126. 76. 3 10;,,

Oillexporters 45, ES A7. 59. 16. 90.2Oil importers 5? 6i11 56 65 I IC, 6_4. '9 8..'

Lower middle-income 441 55. 47. 58. 144. 59, :) 13.?

35 Sudan 38 46 40 49 168 119 40 2336 Mauritania 36 43 39 47 178 132 45 2737 Yemen), PDR 35 45 37 48 210 140 59 2838 Lber.a 43 52 45 56 173 91 42 1639 Senegal 36 44 39 46 178 155 45 34

40 Yemen Arah Rep 35 43 36 45 212 163 60 3841 Lesotno 41 51 44 55 137 94 29 1742 Bolivia 41 49 45 53 167 126 40 2243 Indonesia 40 52 42 55 150 102 23 1344 Zambia 38 49 41 52 164 105 38 2045 Honduras 45 58 48 62 145 83 30 846 Egypt. Arab Rep 46 56 47 59 128 104 23 1447 El Saivador 49 62 52 66 136 72 26 748 Thailano 50 61 55 65 103 51 13 449 Papua New Guinea 41 53 40 53 165 99 26 13-50 Philippines 51 62 54 66 106 51 14 451 Zimbabwe 47 54 51 58 100 83 19 1452 Nigeria 37 48 40 52 190 109 50 2053 Morocco 46 51 48 54 161 125 37 22-54 Cameroon 41, 52 45 55 134 92 28 16

55 Nicaragu.a 46 56 48 60 144 86 30 956 ~vory Coast 37 46 40 49 167 119 40 2357 Guatemrala 46 58 48 62 92 66 10 558 Congo. People's Rep. 47 59 49 62 118 68 23 1059 Costa Rca 60 72 63 76 74 18 8 160 Peru 47 57 49 60 163 83 38 861 Dominican Rep. 49 61 53 65 120 65 20 562 Jamaca 61 71 65 75 52 10 4(.63 Ecuaclor 49 61 52 65 140 78 28 764 Turkey 49 61 52 66 184 83 47 9

Note. For data comparabil y and coverage see the technical notes

262

Life expectancyat birth Infant(years) mortality rate Child death rate

Male Female (aged under 1) (aged 1-4)1960 1982 1960 1982 1960 1982 1960 1982

65 Tunisia 48 60 49 63 159 65 36 666 Colombia 49 62 57 66 93 54 1 1 467 Paraguay 54 63 58 67 86 45 9 368 Angola 32 42 35 44 216 165 63 3969 Cuba 62 73 65 77 35 17 2 170 Korea, Bern. Rep. 52 63 56 67 78 32 9 271 Lebanon 58 63 62 67 68 39 6 372 Mongolia 51 63 54 67 109 51 14 4

Upper middle-income 655; 63, 58; 637 '101 ,, 58 1 5., '3

73 Syrian Arab Rep. 49 65 51 69 132 58 25 574 Jordan 46 62 48 65 136 65 26 675 Malaysia 52 65 56 69 72 29 8 276 Korea, Rep. of 52 64 56 71 78 32 9 277 Panama 61 69 63 73 68 33 6 278 Chile 54 68 59 72 119 27 20 279 Brazil 53 62 57 66 118 73 19 880 Mexco 55 64 59 68 91 53 10 481 Algeria 46 55 48 59 165 ill 39 1782 Portugal 61 68 66 74 78 26 9 183 Argentina 62 66 68 73 61 44 5 284 Uruguay 65 71 71 75 51 34 4 285 South Africa 51 60 55 65 92 55 16 586 Yugoslavia 61 69 64 74 88 34 10 287 Venezuela 55 65 60 71 85 39 9 288 Greece 67 72 70 76 40 14 3 189 Israel 70 72 73 76 31 16 2 190 Hong Kong 61 74 69 78 37 10 2(.91 Singapore 62 70 66 75 35 11 2 (92 Trinidad and Tobago 62 66 66 70 45 26 3 193 Iran, Islamic Rep. 50 60 50 60 163 102 26 1394 Iraq 47 57 50 61 139 73 28 8High-income

oil exporlers 43 56 45, 60.. 175 913 4.1 13,

95 Oman 38 51 39 54 193 123 52 2196 Libya 46 56 48 59 158 95 36 1197 Saudi Arabia 42 54 45 58 185 108 46 1698 Kuwait 58 69 61 74 89 32 10 199 United Arab Emirates 51 69 54 73 135 50 26 3Industrial market

economies 68; 71. '3 78.. 29 1it)100 Ireland 68 70 71 76 29 11 2 .101 Spain) 67 71 71 78 44 10 3 (102 Italy 67 71 72 76 44 14 3 1103 New Zealand 68 70 74 77 23 12 1 (104 United Kingdom 68 71 74 77 23 11 1I.105 Austria 66 69 72 77 38 13 3 1106 Japan 65 74 70 79 30 7 2(.107 Belgium 67 70 73 77 .31 12 2 (108 Finland 65 69 72 78 22 7 1 )109 Netherlands 71 73 75 79 18 8 1 (110 ALustral a 68 71 74 78 20 10 1(.I11 Canada 68 71 74 79 27 10 2(.112 France 67 71 74 79 27 10 2(.

.113 Germany Fed. Rep. 67 70 72 77 34 12 2 (114 Denmark 70 72 74 78 22 8 1 (115 U n ted States 67 71 73 78 26 11 1(1116 Sweden 71 75 75 80 17 7 1 1117 Norway 71 73 76 79 19 8 1 (

-118 Switzerland 69 77 74 81 21 8 1()East European

nonmarket economies 65 151. '2. 74. 38.. 21 3, 119 HLungary 66 68 70 75 48 20 4 1120 Romania 64 68 67 74 76 29 8 2121 Albania 61 69 63 73 83 44 9 3122 Bulgaria 67 70 70 75 45 20 3 1123 Czechoslovakia 67 68 73 75 24 16 1 1124 German Dem. Rep. 67 70 72 76 39 12 3(.125 Poland 65 68 70 76 56 20 5 1126 USSR 65 65 72 74 33 2

263

Table 24. Health-related indicatorsDaily calorie supply

Population per: per capitaAs percentagePhysician Nursing person Total of requirement

1960a 1980a 1960a 1980a 1981a 1981a

Low-income economies i 2. 08; 5 772 7.226 48 41 2. 2.319 97China and India 7.019; 2591; 6.734 ;, 3 315 2 262.. 98Other low-income 37.092;. 15.931 .r9 759 9 716 2,082 91

1 Chad 72,190 47,530 5,780 3,850 1.818 762 Bangladesh 10,940 24,450 1,952 843 Ethiopia 100,470 58,490 14,920 5,440 1,758 764 Nepal 73,470 30,060 .. 33,420 1,929 86S Mali 64,130 22,130 4,710 2,380 1,621 726 Burma 15,560 4,660 8,520 4,750 2,303 1137 Zaire 79,620 14,780 3,510 1,920 2,135 948 Malawi 35,250 40,950 12,940 3,830 2 138 949 Upper Voita 81,650 48,510 3,980 4,950 2,008 95

10 Uganda 15.050 26,810 10,030 4,180 1,778 80I1I India 4,850 3,690 10,980 5,460 1,906 8612 Rwanda 143,290 31,510 11,620 9,840 2,194 8813 Burundi 98,900 45,020 4,640 6,180 2,152 9514 Tanzania 18,220 17,560 11,890 2,980 1,985 8315 Somalia 36,570 14.290 4,810 2,330 2,119 10016 Haiti 9,230 8,200 4,020 2,490 1.879 9617 Benin 23,030 16,980 2,700 1,660 2,284 10118 Central African Rep. 51,170 26,430 3,410 1,720 2,164 9619 China 8,390 1,810 4,050 1,790 2,526 10720 Guinea 33,770 17,110 4,040 2,570 1,877 7521 Niger 82,170 38,790 8,460 4,650 2,489 10222 Madagascar 8,900 10,170 3,110C 3,660 2,474 10923 Sri Lanka 4,490 7,170 4,170 1,340 2.250 10224 Togo 47,060 18,100 5,340 1,430 1,889 8325 Ghana 21,600 7,630 5,430 780 1,995 8826 Pakistan 5,400 3,480 16.960 5,820 2,313 10627 Kenya 10.690 7,890 2,270 550 2,056 8828 Sierra Leone 20,070 16,220 2,880 1,890 2,053 10129 Afghanistan 28,700 16,730 19,590 26,000 1,758 7230 Bhutan .. 18,160 .. 7,960 .. 10331 Kampuchea, Dein, 35,280 .. 3,980 .. 1,998 9532 Lao PDR 53,520 20,060 4,950 3. 040 1,986 9733 Mozambique 20,390 39.110 4,720 5,600 1,881 7034 Viet Nam 4,190 . 2,930 1,961 90

Middle-income economies 17 257 5 411 , 3.838 ;, 886 260D 71Oil exporters 30 075 A 6997 ,4 1388; 1.96E. 508 I 08;Oil importers 7 161 4.083 .3 56Ci1 1.12,686 113Lower middle-income 28,478 . 7 765 . 4.697., 2 482 , 2 454.1 '1 J

35 Sudan 33,230 8,930 3,010 1,430 2,406 9936 Mauritania 40,420 14,350 5,430 2,080 2.082 9 737 Yemen, PDR 13,270 7,200 .. 830 2,067 8638 Liberia 12,600 9,610 1,410 1,420 2,510 11439 Senegal 24,990 13,800 3,150 1,400 2,434 10140 Yemen Arab Rep. 130,090 11,670 .. 4,580 2,239 7641 Lesotho 23,490 18,640 6,540 4,330 2,535 i1142 Bolivia 3,830 .4,170 .,2,179 9143 Indonesia 46,780 11,530 4,510 2,300 2,342 11044 Zamnbia 9,540 7,670 9,920 1,730 2,094 9345 Honduras 12,620 3,120 3,110 700 2,171 9646 Egypt,Arab Rep. 2,550 970 1,930 1,500 2,941 11647 El Salvador 5,330 3,220 . 910 2,146 9448 Tnailand 7,900 7,100 4,830 2,4100 2,303 10549 Papua New Guinea 19,320 13,590 .960 2,323 9250 Phiiippines 6,940 7,970 1,440 6,000 2,318 11651 Zimbabwe 4,790 6,580 1,000 1,1 90 2,025 9052 Nigeria 73,710 12,550 4,040 3,010 2,361 9153 Morocco 9,410 10,750 1,830 2,643 11554 Cameroon 45,230 13,990 3,080 1,950 2,439 10255 Nicaragua 2,690 1,800 1,250 550 2,184 9956 Ivory Coast 29,190 21,040 2,920 1,590 2,670 11257 Guatemala 4,640 8,610 9,040 1,620 2,045 9358 Congo, Peopie's Rep. 16,100 5,510 1,300 790 2,199 9459 Costa Rica 2,740 1,460 720 450 2,686 11860 Peru 1.910 1,390 3,530 970 2,183 9861 Dominican Rep. 8,220 2,320 .. 2,150 2,192 10662 Jamaica 2,590 2,830 420 630 2,643 11963 Ecuador 2,670 760 2,360 570 2,100 9764 Turkey 2,800 1,630 16,300 1.130 3,019 122

Note' For data comparability and coverage see the tecnnical notes.

264

Daily calorie supplyPopulation per: ~~~~~~per capitaPopulation per: ~~~~~As percentage

Physician Nursing person Total of requirement1960, 19808 19608 19808 19818 1981a

65 Tunisia 10,030 3,690 890 2,782 11666 Colombia 2,640 1,710 4,220 800 2,521 10867 Paraguay 1,810 1,710 1,380 1,100 3,005 13968 Angola 14,910 6,650 2,096 8369 Cuba 1,060 710 950 360 2,766 12170 Korea, Dem. Rep. 430 3,009 12971 Lebanon 1,210 540 2,080 730 2,476 9972 Mongolia 1,070 450 300 240 2,691 ill

Upper middle-income 27.532; 2'. 021 .2 752 1 024 , 2816. I1

73 Syrian Arab Rep. 4,630 2,270 10,850 1,410 2,908 12074 Jordan 5,800 1,700 1,930 1,180 2,260 10275 Malaysia 7,060 7,910 1,800 940 2,662 12176 Korea, Rep. of 3,540 1,440 3,240 350 2,931 12677 Panama 2.730 980 760 420 2,271 103

78 Chile 1,780 1,930 640 450 2,790 11479 Brazil 2,210 .. 2,810 2,529 10780 Mexico 1,830 .. 3,650 .. 2,805 12181 Algeria 5,530 2,630 .740 2,433 8982 Portugal 1,250 540 1,420 650 2,675 11083 Argentina 740 430 760 .3,405 12584 Uruguay 960 540 800 190 2,912 11085 South Africa 2,180 480 .2,825 11886 Yugoslavia 1,620 550 630 280 3,662 14487 Venezuela 1,500 990 2,830 380 2,642 107

88 Greece 800 420 800 600 3,748 15089 Israel 400 370 360 130 2,946 11590 Hong Kong 3,060 1,210 2,910 790 2. 920 12991 Singapore 2,380 1,150 650 320 3,078 13392 Trinidad and Tobago 2,370 1,360 670 380 2,694 12193 Iran, Islamic Rep. 3,860 6,090 7,690 2,520 2,795 11494 Iraq 5,280 1,800 3,040 2,160 3,086 127High-income

oil exporters 14I 735 i.355 4.996, 836. 2969: 12495 Oman 31,180 1,900 50096 Libya 6,580 730 1320 400 3,459 14797 Saudi Arabia 16,370 1,670 5,850 1,170 2,895 11698 Kuwait 1,210 570 270 18099 United Arab Emirates .. 900 .. 340

Industrial marketeconomies 816,, 554 4170 I81:,, 3 396.. 132

100 Ireland 950 780 190 120 3,495 135101 Spain 850 460 1,300 330 3,142 127102 Italy 640 340 1,330 . 3,716 150103 New Zealand 850 650 120 3,480 129104 United Kingdom 940 650 210 140 3,322 132105 Austria 550 400 440 230 3,539 134106 Japan 930 780 310 240 2,740 117107 Belgium 780 400 520 120 3.916 160108 Finland 1,570 530 170 100 2,799 103109 Netherlands 900 540 .. 130 3,588 133110 Australia 750 560 . 120 3,210 119111 Canada 910 550 170 90 3,321 126112 France 930 580 530 120 3,360 133

j113 Germany, Fed Rep. 670 450 370 170 3,538 133114 Denmark 810 480 220 210 3,567 133115 United States 750 520 340 140 3,647 138116 Sweoen 1,050 490 100 60 3,196 119_117 Norway 900 520 330 90 3,173 118'118 Switzerland 740 410 350 160 3,561 133

East Europeannonmarket economies 6-83. 349 ,35)8 131 ,3 351 , 131

119 Hungary 720 400 330 150 3,509 134120 Romania 790 680 420 270 3,337 126121 Albania 3,620 960 530 310 2.701 112122 Bulgaria 710 410 550 190 3,644 146123 Czechoslovakia 620 360 230 130 3,472 141124 German Dem, Rep. 1,180 520 .3,780 144125 Poland 1,070 570 460 240 3,210 123126 USSR 560 270 340 100 3,328 130

a Figures in italics are for years other than those specif.ed. See the technical notes.

265

Table 25. EducationNumber Number

enrolled in enrolled inNumber enrolled in primary school secondary higher education

as percentage of age group school as as percentagepercentage of of population

Total Male Female age group aged 20-241960 1981a 1960 1981a 1960 1981a 1960 1ge1a 1g60 1981P

Lw-income economies 80 a94 . 69. 107; 341, 81 ;, 18 34 ,2.

China and India 90; 102; it. 40~ 89. 21. 38;4.Other low-income 38. 72; 5 1, 84; 25, 58; 7 19 1

1Chad 17 35 29 51 4 19 3 . .2 Bangladesh 47 62 66 76 26 47 8 15 1 33Ethiopia 7 46 1 1 60 3 33 .. 12 () 14Nepal 10 91 19 126 1 53 6 21 1 35Mali 10 27 14 35 6 20 1 9 1

6Burma 56 84 61 87 52 81 10 20 1 47Zaire 60 90 88 104 32 75 3 23 (1 8 Malawi I. 62 . 73 . 51 1 4()9 Upper Volta 8 20 12 26 5 15 1 3 . I

10 Uganda 49 54 65 62 32 46 3 5 . I

IlIInd a 61 79 80 93 40 64 20 30 3 82 Rwanda 49 72 68 75 30 69 2 2 (3 Burundi 1 8 32 27 40 9 25 1 3 () 1

1 4 Tanzania 25 102 33 107 1 8 98 2 3 . (1 5 Somalia 9 30 1 3 38 5 21 1 1 1 () 11 6 r-fa3t 46 69 50 74 42 64 4 1 3 11 7Benin 27 65 36 88 1 5 42 2 168 118 Central African Rep 32 68 53 89 1 2 49 1 1 3 11 9 Cnina 109 118 130 . 106 21 44 12OGuLnea 30 33 44 44 16 22 2 1 6 521 Niger 5 23 7 29 3 17 . 6(122 Madagascar 52 100 58 45 4 14 323 Sri Lanka 95 103 100 106 90 100 27 51 1 324 Togo 44 111 63 135 24 87 2 31 225 Ghana 38 69 52 77 25 60 5 36 () 1

26 Pakistan 30 56 46 78 13 31 1 1 1 7 1 227 Kenya 47 109 64 114 30 101 2 19 (. 128 Sierra Leone 23 39 30 45 1 5 30 2 12 (.29 Afghanistan 9 34 1 5 54 2 13 1 1 1 1) 230OBhutan 3 21 25 1 7 3 3(.31 Kamnpuchea, Demn 64 82 46 .3

32 Lao PDR 25 97 34 105 1 6 89 1 18() )33 Mozambique 48 90 60 102 36 78 2 6 (34 Viet Nam . 113 120 . 105 48 3Middle-income economies 75. 10?, 83., 106;, 68. 95; 14., -1 11

Oil exporters 64. 106. 75.. Ill. 52, 95, 3., j32 8.Oillimporters 84, 99, 90;. I02.. 15C'. 95. 18 . 44 4. 13.

Lower middle-income 66;.- 101, 76, ICj6 56. 91, 10; a4 *j, 9.

35 Sudan 25 52 35 61 14 43 3 18 () 236 Mauritania 6 33 13 43 3 23 . 1037 Yemen, PDR 13 64 20 94 5 34 5 18 238 Liberia 31 66 45 82 18 50 2 20 () 239 Senegal 27 48 36 58 17 38 3 12 1 340 Yemen Arab Rep. 6 47 14 82 . 12 5 141 Lesotho 83 104 63 84 102 123 3 17 (1 242 Boiivia 64 86 78 93 50 78 12 34 4 1243 Indonesia 71 100 86 106 58 94 6 30 1 344 Zamb a 42 96 51 102 34 90 2 16 .2

45 Hondu~ras 67 95 68 96 67 95 8 30 1 846 Egypt, ArabD Rep. 66 76 80 89 52 63 16 52 5 1547 El Salvador 80 61 82 61 77 61 13 20 1 448 Thailand 83 96 88 95 79 93 13 29 2 2049 Papua New Guinea 32 65 59 73 7 58 1 13 250 Philppines 95 110 96 Ill 93 108 26 83 13 2651 Zimbaowe 96 126 107 130 86 121 6 15 ( .52Nigera 36 98 46 94 27 70 4 16 () 353 Morocco 47 76 67 97 27 60 5 26 1 654 Cameroon 65 107 87 117 43 97 2 19 2

55 Nicaragua 66 104 65 101 66 107 7 41 1 1256 Ivory Coast 46 76 68 92 24 60 2 17 () 357 Guatemala 45 69 50 74 39 63 7 16 2 758 Congo. People's Rep 78 156 103 163 53 148 4 69 1 659 Costa Rica 96 108 97 109 95 107 21 48 5 2660 Peru 83 112 95 116 71 108 15 57 4 1961 Domrinican Rep 98 109 99 . 98 7 4t 1 1062 Jamaica 92 99 92 99 93 100 45 58 2 663 Ecuador 83 107 87 109 79 105 12 40 3 3564 Turkey 75 102 90 110 58 95 14 42 3 5

Note For oata comparabil ty and coverage see the techn cal notes.

266

Number Numberenrolled in enrolled in

Number enrolled in primary school secondary higher educationas percentage of age group school as as percentage

percentage of of populationTotal Male Female age group aged 20-24

1960 1981. 1960 19811 1960 19811 1960 1981, 1960 1981,65 Tunsia ~~~~~~~ ~~66 106 88 119 43 92 1 2 30 1 5

66 Colombia 77 130 77 129 77 132 1 2 48 2 1 267 Paraguay 98 102 105 106 90 98 1 1 26 2 768 Angola 21 .. 28 . 1 3 .. 2 .( ()69 Cuba 109 107 109 110 109 104 1 4 75 3 2070 Korea, Dem. Rep. 116 ..I 118 . I 1147 1 Lebanon 102 118 105 123 99 114 19 58 6 2872 Mongolia 79 105 79 107 78 102 51 89 8 9

Upper middle-income 88 104 93, 107; 83. 101l 20; 51 ,4 ., 14.

73 Syrian Arab Rep. 65 101 89 112 39 89 16 48 4 1874 Jordan 77 103 94 105 59 100 25 77 1 2775 Malaysia 96 92 108 94 83 91 19 53 1 576 Korea, Rep of 94 107 99 108 89 105 27 85 5 1877 Panama 96 111 98 113 94 108 29 65 5 2778 Chile 109 115 111 115 107 114 24 57 4 1379 Brazil 95 93 97 93 93 93 11 32 2 1280 Mexico 80 121 82 122 77 120 11 51 3 1581 Algeria 46 94 55 106 37 81 8 36 (. 582 Portugal . 103 . . .. 56 4 1183 Argentina 98 119 98 120 99 119 23 59 11 2584 Uruguay Ill 122 111 124 111 120 37 70 8 2085 South Africa 89 . 94 85 .15 .386 Yugoslavia 1l1 99 113 100 108 98 58 83 9 2287 Venezuela 100 105 100 105 100 104 21 40 4 2088 Greece 102 103 104 103 101 102 37 81 4 1789 Israel 98 95 99 94 97 96 48 74 10 2690 Hong Kong 87 106 93 108 79 104 20 65 4 1091 Singapore 111 104 121 106 101 103 32 65 6 892 Trinidad and Tobago 88 94 89 93 87 95 24 61 1 593 Iran, Islamic Rep. 41 95 56 111 27 78 12 45 1 594 Iraq 65 113 94 117 36 109 19 59 2 9High-income

o.ilexporters 29; 83. 44; 93; 12. 73 ;, 3, 1. ,.-

95 Oman 74 .. 90 .. 57 .. 2296 Libya 59 123 92 128 24 119 9 67 1 697 Saudi Arabia 12 64 22 77 2 51 2 30 1) 898 Kuwait 117 94 131 96 102 93 37 76 1499 United Arab Ernirates .. 127 127 .. 127 .. 61 () 4

Industrial marketeconomies 114 101 ;. 107., 103 , 112 ,103; 64 ,, 90; 16.. 37

100 Ireland 110 102 107 101 112 102 35 93 9 21101 Spain 110 110 106 110 116 109 23 88 4 23102 Italy 111 101 112 102 109 102 34 73 7 27103 New Zealand 108 102 110 103 106 101 73 81 13 26104 United K:ngdorr 92 103 92 103 92 103 66 83 9 20105 Austria 105 99 106 99 104 98 50 73 8 24106 Japan 103 100 103 100 102 100 74 92 10 30107 Belgium 109 100 Ill 100 108 101 69 90 9 26108 Finlano 97 96 100 96 95 96 74 98 7 31109 Netnerlanos 105 100 105 99 104 101 58 95 13 31110 Australia 103 110 103 110 103 110 51 86 13 26111 Canada 107 106 108 106 105 104 46 93 16 37

-112 France 144 110 98 112 143 111 46 86 10 26113 Germany, Fed. Rep 133 100 132 100 134 100 53 94 6 28114 Denmark 103 97 103 97 103 98 65 105 10 29115 United States 118 100 . . 100 . 100 86 97 32 58

.116 Sweden 96 98 95 98 96 98 55 85 9 37117 Norway 100 100 100 100 100 100 57 97 7 26118 Switzerland 118 .. 118 .. 118 .. 26 .7 18

East Europeannionmarket economies 101 ;,105 101 ,99; 101 ,, 99, 45 . 88 .i 11 *, 20,

119 Hungary 101 99 103 99 100 99 23 42 7 14120 Romnania 98 103 101 104 95 103 24 68 5 11121 Albania 94 106 102 109 86 103 20 65 5 5122 Bulgaria 93 99 94 100 92 99 55 83 11 15123 Czechoslovakia 93 90 93 90 93 91 25 46 11 18124 German Dem. Rep, 112 95 ill 95 113 97 39 89 16 30125 Poland 109 100 110 100 107 99 50 77 9 17126 USSR 100 107 100 . 100 .49 96 11 21

a. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes.

267

Table 26. Central goverrnment expenditurePercentage of total expenditure

Housing and Overallcommunity Total surplus/amenities; expenditure deficit

social security Economic (percent of (percent ofDefense Education Health and welfare services Other, GNP) GNP)

1972 1981V 1972 19891, 1-972 1981 1972 1981r 1972 i98i 1g972 198 11h 1972 198 1 1 1972 19811

Low,--inc-ame~canomwie-s 11.13 6 % 6.29 4, 5.18~ 4 2 2. 1>14 4, 5China and IndiaOther low-income I14,,. 15 4, 14, 11 5 6 2. 4 4 47 6r. 26.20 4 2.21.1h, 4.5.

IChad 24 6 . 1 4 .. 4.4 .. 17 .. 218 32.7 . 18 1 -3.22 Bangladesh . . .

3Ethiopia 14.3 .. 14.4 .. 57 4 4 22 9 38 3 .. 13 8 . -144 Nepal 7 2 6 5 7 2 97 4.7 4.1 0.7 15 572 57 1 23 0 21 0 8.5 13.4 -12 -2255Mali. 11.1 .. 15.7 . 3,1 . 3 0 .114 .. 55.6 25.9 ..- 5.6

6 Burma .. 21.7 .. 10 1 6 1 9.2 35.5 . 1 7 3 16.5 1.77 Zaire .. . .. . .. . . .38 6 33.8 -7 5 -5.98 Malawi 3.1 8.4 15 8 11.1 5.5 5 2 5 8 2 9 33.1 38 2 36 8 34.3 22 1 35 3 -6 2 -12 09 Upper Volta ... 14.6

10 Uganda 23.1 34.5 15.3 109 53 4.0 73 2 8 12 4 13.7 36.6 34.1 21.6 3 2 -8.1 -2 51 1India 20 4 . 1 9 1 8 42 . 23.3 48 4 1 40 -6 012 Rwanda 13.1 18.8 4.5 . 4.1 . 41 4 .. 18.0 14.4 . - 1.813 Burundi .. 21 2 -3 014 Tanzania 11.9 11.2 17 3 12.1 7.2 5 5 2 1 2.4 39.0 37 4 22.6 31.5 19 7 33 3 -5 015 Somal a 23.3 5.5 7 2 .. 1.9 . 21.6 . 40 5 13 5 0 6

1 6 HaI ti . .. .. . .. 14 5 19 4 -5 01 7 Benin... ....

1 8Central African Rep. 9 3 16 9 . 4 9 6 1 . 18.8 43 9 23 5 -4 51 9China20 Guinea.21 Niger 3.8 .. lO . 41 . 3 8 32.4 38.0 . 25 9 -06622 Madagascar 3 6 9 1 4.2 .. 9 9 40.5 32.7 20 8 -2 523 SriLanka 1.7 .. 7.2 .. 3 5 13.7 .. 13 6 . 60.3 .. 33.9 - 12.824 Togao. .. . . .. 35 3 -2 225 Ghana 8.0 3.7 20.1 22.0 6 2 7.0 41 6.8 15 0 20 7 46.6 39.8 19.5 10 1 -5 8 -6 226 Pakistan 28 5 3 1 1 6 7.2 .. 32.4 27 2 17.7 ..- 5 427 Kenya 6.0 10.7 21.9 20 6 7 9 7.8 3.9 0.8 30.1 30 0 30 2 30 0 21.0 28.4 -3 9 -6 828 Sierra Leone . . . . .27.2 . -9.229 Afghanistan30 Bhutan

31 Kampuchea, Dem....32 Lao PRO33 Mozambique34 Viet Nam

MidoIe-income economies 15 2., 96.V 124 1 43. 66. 53. 203. 138, F 245. 270 21I0 30 ') 16.), 24, jj-j1

Oillexporters 163. 62. 154,I 1.56.. 5 7 5 6.. I 1i, 37 23.3. 30 7. 225 a 32Ž-, I 13 2i78 - P. -9,Oillimporters 1 4-. 158. 710, 101). 6 9. -3 6., 245 13Ž 7224, 2027. Ž20. 2%. 2 0% 28, -1. - ,.

LoweFrmiadle-income 1 74, 14lI, 188 142 48,B 42 51, 49 :'0Ž 26,3.- `3 7.I36. ' .0S 4i- 23-I.36

35 Sudan 241 13.2 9.3 9.8 5 4 1 4 14 0.9 1568 19.8 44.1 54 9 19 2 19.1 -0.8 -3.236 Mau itan a . .

37 Yemen, POP38 Liberia .. 11.3 .16 0 7.6 3.3 33.0 .. 28 8 33.7 . .11.5

39 Senegal 15.6 21.3 .. 4 3 . 9 9 20.6 28.1 1 74 29.3 -0 8 -3.3

40 Yemen Arab Rep .. 32.6 .. 14.0 . 3.6 .. 13 6 36.2 .. 41 8 -19.74t Lesotno .19 5 8.0 .. 6 5 . 24 5 41.5 1 66 -0.042 Bolivia 1 62 22.7 30.6 24 4 8 6 7 2 2 9 2 7 12 4 17T2 29.3 25.8 9 2 12 7 -1.4 -4.143 Indonesia . 12.7 .. 7 9 . 2 5 1 2 .. 29.4 . 46 2 18 2 27 3 -2 6 -2 244 Zamb a ..- 19 0 11 9 7.4 6.1 1.3 0.6 26.7 21.9 45 7 59 6 35.4 39.8 -14A4 -14 0

45 Honouras 12.4 22.3 .. 10.2 8.7 28.3 . 18 1 . 15.4 -2 746 Egypt, Arab Rep47 El!Salvaoor 6 6 16.8 21,4 17.9 10 9 8.4 7.6 5 4 14.4 24 7 39 0 26 9 12 8 18 5 -1 0 -,7448 Tha land 20.2 20.6 19.9 19.3 3 7 4 3 7 0 5 6 25.7 23 3 23 5 27.0 17 2 18.5 -4 3 -3.549 Papua New Guinea . 4.0 . . 17.7 . 9.1 . 3 2 19 6 46.5 39 8 -5.5

50 Pnil ppines 10 9 14 2 16.3 14.2 3.2 5 0 4 3 5 8 17 6 55 3 47.7 5 5 13 5 12 8 -2.0 -4 051 Zimbabwe .. 19 9 19 5 .. 6 9 7 5 . 19.5 26 6 31 3 -7.352 N geria 40 2 .. 4 5 .. 3.6 0.8 19 6 31 4 .. 9.9 -0 9 53 Morocco 12 3 16 2 19 2 16 5 4.8 3.0 8.4 5.6 25 6 28 0 29 7 30 7 22.4 39 8 -3 8 -i3 654 Cameroon . 5 1 7 5 2.7 5.1 10 0 .69 6 21 6 .- 3 455 Nicaragua 12.3 11.0 16 6 11 6 4.0 14 6 16 4 7 4 27.1 20 6 23 6 34.9 15.5 30 2 -40 -5.856 Ivory Coast 3.9 . . 16 3 . 3 9 . 4 3 13.4 5871 32 2 -17057 Guatemala 11 0 . 19.4 9.5 . 10 4 .. 23.8 25 8 9 9 16.2 -2 2 -6 258 Congo, People's Rep .. . . . .. 54 6 -5 859 Costa Rica 2 8 2 6 26 3 23 7 3 8 29 7 26 7 12 6 21 8 15.2 16.7 16 2 i8 9 23 7 -4.5 -3 2

60 Peru 14.8 13 8 22 7 11 3 6 2 5 3 2.9 1 1 30 3 . 23 1 68 5 17T1 20 2 -11 -3 561 Domin can Rep. lag13. 9.7 13 5 37.3 16 8 18 5 17 0 -0 2 -2 762 Jamaica . .44.9 .- 16 663 Ecuador 11.6 30.1 7 9 .. 1.3 1 94 -. 29 5 17.1 . -5 164 Turkey 15 4 15.2 18 2 16.8 3 3 2 1 3 3 8.9 41.9 25 7 1 79 31 3 21 8 23.3 -2 1 -1 8

Note- For data comparahi[ity and co)verage see tne techn cal notes

268

Percentage of total expenditureHousing and Overallcommunity Total surplus/amenities; expenditure deficit

social security Economic (percent of (percent ofDefense Education Health and welfare services Other, GNP) GNP)

1972 1981b 1972 1 901b 1972 1981 19-72 9g81 19-72 19810 1972 1 981b~ 1972 1981" 1972 19810b65 Tun sia 4 9 8.3 30.5 1 5.3 7 4 7.7 8.5 13.6 23.3 34 0 25 1 21 1 22.5 32.4 -0 9 -2.566 Colombia . .13.3 -2 667 Paraguay 13 8 13.2 12.1 1 16 3.5 4.5 18 3 22.8 19 6 19.0 32 7 28 8 13.1 10 7 -1.7 -1 568 Angola69 Cuba....

70 Korea, Dem Rep71 Lebanon72 Mongolia

Upper middle-income 146. 8 '. 1 0 A 1413, 70 C % ?4Ž 154 230. ~ 0 Ž8 9 IE 20~.-4 -3.I

73 Syrian Arab Rep. 37.2 37 7 11 3 71 14 1 1 3.6 11 4 39 9 30.9 6 7 11.8 26 1 41.3 -3.4 -6.874-Jordan 25 3 . 7 6 .. 368 14 5 28.3 20.6 .35.8 -7.675 Malaysia 18 5 15 1 23 4 15.9 6 8 4 4 4 4 10.5 14.2 29 0 32.7 25.2 27 7 4068 -9 8 -15 876 Korea,Rep.of 25.8 35 2 15 9 17.9 1 2 1 3 568 6 7 25.8 14 4 25.7 24.5 18 6 19.0 -4 0 -3 777 Panama . . 12 8 .. 13.2 .. 12 8 18 4 .. 42 8 -. 36.1 -9 1

78TChi e 6 1 12.0 1 43 14.4 8 2 6 4 39 8 42.6 15.3 11 4 16.3 13 3 42.3 31.0 -13 0 2.779 Brazil 8 3 3 4 668 3.8 6.4 7 4 36 0 34 8 24 6 24 1 17 9 26 5 16 6 19.5 -0 4 -2 480 Mexico 4 2 2 5 16 6 18.2 5.1 1 9 24 9 18.6 34 3 36 4 15 0 22 3 12.1 20 8 -3 1 -8 981 Alger a82 Portu.gal

83 Argentina 8 8 11.4 8 8 7.3 2.9 1.4 23 5 34.2 14.7 17.9 41 2 27.8 16 5 23 6 -3.4 -8 584 Uruguay 5 6 12.9 9.5 7 7 1.6 3.8 52.3 51.7 9 8 13 3 212 10 7 25 0 24 4 -2 5 -1.585 South Afr ca .... 21 9 22 7 -4.2 -2,486 Yugoslavia 20.5 50.4 24.8 . 35 6 7.2 120 16 6 7 0 25 8 21.1 8 5 -0 4 -0 187 Venezuela 10.3 3 9 18.3 18 3 11.7 7.3 8.2 6 8 2568 32.8 25.7 30 9 21 3 26.9 -1.0 -2 6

68 Greece 14 9 9.0 .. 7 3 30.7 .. 27 9 10.3 27 5 34 4 -1.7 -4 869 srael 39.8 39 8 9.0 9.4 3.5 3 5 7.8 19.2 16 3 3.9 23.5 24 1 44 1 78 4 -16.3 - 18 690 Hong Kong91 Singapore 35.3 21.7 15.7 19 1 7.8 7 2 3.9 8 4 9 9 15 2 27 3 28.5 1668 25.2 1 3 0.192 Trinidad and Tobago 2 0 112 5 9 1 73 31 1 32.4 .. 31.0 3 3

93 Iran, Islamic Pep 24)1 11 7 10.4 15 9 3.6 5.4 6 1 11 5 30.6 22 9 25.2 32 6 30.8 -4 694 Iraq . .

High-incomeoil exporlers 12. 28 0. 1135 9Ž 55 5 '2. i 7 7.i, 7:l,,1, 36 i: .. 83. 4 17 7

95 Oman 39 3 S0 8 3 7 5.3 5 9 3 0 3 0 1.6 24.4 23 8 23 6 15.4 62 1 51 9 -15 3 2 496 L bya97 Saud. Arabia98 Kuwait 8 4 9.8 15 0 9.0 5.5 4 9 14 2 15.2 16.6 19 3 401 41 9 34.4 28 9 1 74 34 099 UnnteboAraboEm[rates 24 5 47 5 16 2 11.7 4.5 7 9 6 4 3 9 18 2 6 1 30 2 22. 9 181 . 2 3

Industrial marketeconomies .. 13 6 . 43 51. 99 114. 24, 417, 116 3 . ?` 144, 1 A2.. 117, -A-.. -0 9 - 2

100 Irelanod 33 0 51.7 -5 5 -14.5101 Spain 6 5 4 4 8.3 7.9 0 9 0 7 49.8 58.5 1 75 13 7 17.0 14 9 1968 27 3 -0.5 -4 3102 Italy 3.4 9 2 11.0 32.0 -. 7 5 36.9 .. 47 3 -12 9103 New Zealand 5 8 5.4 16.9 13 5 14.9 14 4 25.5 28 9 16 4 15 7 20.4 22 2 28 5 39 6 -3.8 -7 6104 United Kingdom 16.7 . 2.6 . . 12.2 26.5 11 1 30.8 32 7 40 8 -2.7 -4.7105 Austria 2.9 9 5 12 9 48 4 12 7 13.6 -. 39 4 -2.9106 Japan . .12 7 10.0107 Belgium 6.7 5 5 15 5 14.8 1 5 1.7 41 0 45.0 18 9 18.4 -6 4 14.6 39 2 55.8 -4 3 -11 7108 FPnland 6.1 5 1 15.3 14.5 10 6 11 2 28 4 28 8 27.9 26 9 '1 6 13 5 24 8 29.9 1 3 -1 0109 Netnerlands 5 6 12.6 .. 1168 40 2 11 2 18 6 I 55.5 -6 6110 Au.stralia 14 1 9 6 4.4 8 2 6 2 10 1 21 0 29 4 13.1 8 1 392 34.6 19 5 24 6 -0 3 -0 7Ill Canada 7 8 3.5 . 6 2 . 34 1 1 84 29 9 23 3 . -2 6112 france 75 8 7 15 0 4. 475 6 9 14.3 32.5 42 1 0 7 -2 7113 Germany, Fed. Rep 1 24 9.2 1 5 0.8 17.5 18 5 46 9 51.8 11 3 6 6 '0 4 13 1 24 2 31 0 0 7 -2 3114 Denmark 7 2 15 9 10 0 41 3 11 8 -. '38 32 9 43 8 2 7 -6 3

115 United States 32 2 21 8 3 2 2.5 8 6 10 7 35 3 36.9 10 6 9 8 '01 1 83 19.4 23 4 -1 6 -2 7116 Sweden 12 5 7 3 14 8 10.5 3.6 2 0 44 3 49.6 10 6 10 5 14 3 20 2 28 0 43 7 -1 2 -9 2117 Norway 9 7 . 9 9 12.3 39 9 20 2 8 0 .35 0 38 9 -1.5 2 1118 Switzerlando 15.1 10.6 4 2 3 3 10.0 12.7 39 5 49.0 18 4 13 3 12 8 11 1 13 3 18 3 0.9 (

East Europeanno,-mailkell economies

119 Hungary120 Romana121 Albania122 Bulgaria123 Czechoslovakia

124 Germnan Dem Rep.125 Poland126 USSR

See the technical notes. b Figures in italics are for 1 980, not 1 981.

269

Table 27. Central government current revenuePercentage of total current revenue

Tax revenue TotalTaxes on Domestic Taxes on currentincome, Social taxes international Current revenue

profit, and security on goods trade and nontax (percent ofcapital gain contributions and services transactions Other taxesa revenue GNP)

1972 198 1b 1 972 _19 W1 ig~72 1987 1~972 19g~W 19721 1 9 81 1972 l9 8 11 1972 1981aLow-income economies 21 6.. 19 8., 24 1 .38 6 35 2 - 5 3.. 7 4 . 39 1 ii 7 , 41 . le T.. 14 3

China and IndiaOther low-income 21 6. 20)4 241. 34 8 35? 30 3 - I 1 4. 17. 131. 1 4, . ,

1 Cnad 16.7 12.3 .. 45 2 20.5 5 3 13.12 Bangladesh3 Ethiopia 23 0 27.8 32.5 . 5 6 .. 111 10 54 Nepa 4 1 6 1 . .. 26.5 36.8 36 7 34 4 19 0 8 7 13 7 14.0 5 2 8 15 Mal 18 8 . 39 7 20 7 1 32 . 7.6 . 14 4

6 Burma 2.7 .. 39 0 16.7 . 41 7 . 17 17lZaire 22.2 34.9 2 2 10 12 7 15.3 57.9 30 1 1 4 3 7 3 7 15 0 27 9 21 56 Malaw 31 4 28 5 24 2 30.3 20.0 23 1 0 5 0 4 23 8 17 8 16 0 19 59 Upper Volta

10 Uganda 22.1 19 7 32 9 36 6 36.2 37 8 0 3 0.3 8.5 5.7 13.7 0 711 India 19 4 41 0 .. 22.1 . 0.6 16 9 12 812 Rwanda .17 8 4 1 19.3 .. 42 4 2 4 14 0 12 913 Burundi .. 22 4 2.9 28 7 . 24 0 .112 10 8 11 914 Tanzan a 29 9 31 1 . 29 1 50 6 21 7 10.2 0 5 0 9 18 8 7.2 15.8 190615 Somalia 10 7 .. 24 7 45 3 5 2 . 14 0 13 7

16 Hait 13.9 . 15.5 48 4 9 6 12 6 11 317 Beon r.18 Centrar African Rep 16.1 . 6 4 20 8 39 8 7 8 9 1 16.919 Ch na20 Guinea

21 N ger 23 8 . 4 0 . 18 0 36.4 2 6 15 3 20 322 Madagascar 13 0 7 2 29 8 33 6 5 4 10 9 18 423 Sri..Lanka 13 3 . 32 5 . 47 0 1.8 5 3 18 324 Togo .. 34 4 5 8 15.3 . 31 8 _. 17 14 4 34 825 Ghana 18 2 24 8 29 1 391 40 8 27.9 0 4 0 1 11.4 8 2 15.1 4 2

26 Pakistan . 156 332 34.0 0 3 17.0 15 127 Kenya 35 6 29 1 19.9 38 2 24 3 22 0 1 4 0 6 18 8 10.0 18 0 23. 128 Sierra,..eone 23 9 . .. 204 . 44 4 15 9 8 16.829 Afgnanistan30 Bhutan

31 Kampuchea, Dem32 Lao PDR33 Mozambique34 Viet Nam

Middle-income economies 2-49, 4 34. 14. 8> 27 6 2i 14' I 1 ,. 33. 1. 15.. 4> 19S. 263.IOillex porlers 33 2 62 .- 8. 5. _3 4 IO 5 '2.-4. 3 (.i . g 1I rOil imporiers 2(,6 2(6. 15 1 , 9 3. 245 138. uS. I . 4. 13I.r I' :? 26.

Lower middle-income 27 5. 384. 29 3 25 3 205 175. i05 ~6 1 I 12.,5~ 1 8.

35 Sudan 11 8 14.4 30.4 26.0 40 5 42 6 1 5 0.7 15 7 16 3 18 0 13 436 Maur tan:a37 Yemen PDR38 Liberia 32 4 . .24 2 36 3 33 3 8 22 739 Senega. 17 6 1 74 . 3 9 24 5 18.8 30.9 18 9 23.8 24 4 3 2 16 6 16 8 25 9

40 Yemen Arao8Rep 8.8 .10.0 49 2 12 5 19 5 22 041 Lesotho 14.3 2 0 62 9 95 11 3 . 11 742 Bolivia 14.5 15.2 28 4 37.8 46 0 29 4 5 3 3.7 5 7 1 39 7 8 8 543 Indonesia 45.5 72.5 22 7 7.8 17 5 4.8 3 6 1 0 10.6 13 9 14 4 26 444 Zambia 49.7 35.2 20 2 46.8 14 3 7.7 01 3 3 15.6 6 9 24.2 25 1

45 Honduras 19.2 24 2 3.0 33 8 25 9 28 2 42 4 23 1 9 13.5 5 7 12.6 14.846 Egypt, Arab Rep.. .

47 El Salvador 15 2 20 9 25 6 35 2 36 1 29.8 1 72 4 9 6 0 9 2 11.6 12 448 Tnaiand 12 1 19 6 46.3 45 5 28.7 22 8 1 8 1 8 11 2 10 2 12 9 14 449 Papua New Guinea 58 0 12 3 181 1 0 .. 10 6 . 23 5

50 Philippones 1 38 21 7 . .. 24.3 41.9 23 0 22 3 29 7 2 8 9 3 11 4 12 5 11 751 Zmbaowe 47 7 . .. 30.5 9 1 1 2 11 5 . 26 3-52 Nigeria 43 0 . . 26 3 17.5 .. 0.2 13 0 11 353 Morocco 16 4 18 5 5 9 5 4 45 7 31.6 13.2 20 9 6.1 7 0 1 26 1686 18 1 25 854 Cameroon) 28 2 . 6 2 16.0 34 1 4 4 11 2 18 3

55 Nocaragua 9.6 78 14 0 8 9 37 4 373 24.3 25.2 8 9 10 7 5 8 10.1 12 6 23.156 vory Coast 12 9 5 7 -. 25 0 42.8 6.0 7.5 23.457 Guatema[a 12 7 12.0 11 2 38 1 29.5 26 2 19 9 15.6 14.9 9 4 1 25 8 9 1 0458 Congo, People's Rep 19 3 48 7 4 4 40 3 7 6 26.5 13 0 6 4 2 7 7.4 23.5 18.4 39.059 Costa Rica 17 7 14 6 13 4 25 2 38.1 25 7 18 0 27 3 186 1 8 11.1 5 3 15.8 20 1

60 Peru 17 5 15 8 32 2 41 8 1 57 29.2 22 1 5 2 12.4 81 16.0 16 661 Domn canPRep 17 9 19 0 3 9 3 7 19 0 25 6 40 3 28.6 1 8 1 7 17 0 21 5 17.9 14 162 Jamaica63 Ecuador 43.7 . 19.3 26 8 1 4 8.9 12.064 Turkey 30 8 51.7 . .. 31.1 19.9 14 5 5 3 61 6 7 17.6 16.4 19 7 22.0

Note. For data comparability and coverage see the teconical notes

270

Percentage of total current revenueTax revenue Total

Taxes on Domestic Taxes on currentincome, Social taxes international Current revenue

profit, and security on goods trade and nontax (percent ofcapital gain contributions and services transactions Other taxes, revenue GNP)

1972 1 9 8 1 " 1972- 1 9 8 1 b _1972 1 9 8 b -1 972 1 9 ~8 1 " 1T972 1 9 8 1~b _1972 1 9 8~1 b 1972 19a1l,

65 Tunsia 15.9 15.3 7.1 8.8 31.6 23.4 21.8 25. 7.8 3.2 15.7 23.9 23.0 31.866 Colomnbia 37 2 13 9 16 0 . 20.3 .. 7.2 . 5.5 10.867 Paraguay 8.8 16.2 10.4 14.6 26.2 16.5 24.8 21.0 17.0 22.5 12.8 9.2 11.5 10.368 An go/a69 Cuba ... .

70 Korea, Dem. Rep... . . .. .. . . . .

71 Lebanon ..

72 Mon go/ia

Upper middle-income 23 8; 464. 20 4.i 03. 26 i. 210 115. 1 06.. 0 3. -28;. 171. 14 5. 20 7; 270;73 Syr an Arab Rep 6 8 12.5 . .. 10 4 6.2 173 14 6 12.1 6.1 53.4 60.7 24.5 24.274 Jordan .. 13.7 . .. . 7.5 ..I 42.2 .. 9.9 ..1 26.7 .. 19.275 Malaya a 25 2 36 9 0.1 05 24.2 15.4 27.9 28.3 1.4 1.8 21.2 17.0 21.2 29.176 Korea, Rep. of 29.2 23 0 0.8 1.0 41.7 44.7 10.7 13 9 5.2 3.7 12.3 13.7 13.6 20.177 Panama 24.9 - 18 9 . 16.7 . 10.7 .. 9.2 .. 19.7 28.1

78 Cnile 12 9 16.9 27 1 15.3 28.6 40.9 10.0 5.5 4.3 4.7 171 16.8 30.2 31.879 Brazil 18 3 13 2 27 4 25 7 37.6 27.5 7.0 3.0 3 7 4.8 6.0 25.8 17 7 23 580 Mesico 36 5 37.1 19.4 14.4 32.4 31.8 13.1 29.1 -9 9 -18.6 8.4 6.2 10.4 15.7

82 Portugal .. . .

83 Argentina 7 4 5.4 25.9 15 8 14 8 44.0 18.5 10.7 -3.7 5 3 37 0 18.9 13.1 17.784 Uruguay 4.7 7.3 30.0 24.6 24 5 43.9 6.1 11.7 22.0 5.7 12 6 6.7 22.7 23.285 SouthnAfr ca 54 8 55.8 1.2 1.1 21 5 23.8 4 6 3.3 5 0 3.2 12.9 12 8 21.3 24 186 Yugoslavia . .. 52 3 .. 24.5 68.2 19.5 30 1 . .. 3.7 1.7 20 7 8.487 Venezuela 53 8 75.0 5.9 3.6 6.7 2.9 6.1 5.7 1.1 0.8 26.4 12.0 21.9 33.3

88 Greece 12 0 . 23.5 34.9 .. 6.7 .. 11.9 . 11 0 . 26.989 Iarael 36.2 41 4 10.3 23 0 25.0 21 6 3.6 6.8 7.3 12 4 12 3 32 0 55.190 Hong Kong .. . .. .. .

91 Srngapore 24 4 35 6 . .. 17 6 14.1 11 1 5 6 15 5 15.5 31 4 29.2 21 6 28 092 TrriodadandoTobago .. 70.0 2 0 . 4 1 . 6 5 . 0.6 . 16.8 .. 44.1

93 fran, Is/amic Rep 7.9 11 7 2.7 7.3 6 4 3 0 14.6 8 2 4.9 3 9 63.6 65.9 26.294 fraq .. . .. . .

High,-incomeoil exporlies

95 Oman 71 1 28.9 .. . 0.3 3.0 1 1 2 3 0.2 23.6 69 4 47.4 54.296 Libya97 Saudi Arabia .. . . . . .

98 Kuwait 68.8 2 4 .. 19.7 0 5 1 5 1.1 0 2 0.1 9 9 95.9 55,2 71.199 United Arab Emirates .. .. . . .. . .. . 0 2

Industrial marketeconomies 45,2.. 41 I 268. 308. 17. i5 8.. 2 0 15, 26. 2 0 53. 8 7..- 246 301I..

100 Irelano 28.1 34.7 8.9 13 6 32.6 25.1 16 6 13 5 3.2 2.1 10.5 11 1 30 6 39.8101 Spain 15.9 23 9 38.9 47 1 23 4 16.8 10 0 6.0 0.7 -0.8 11.1 7.0 20 0 24 8

102 Italy . 34.2 . 32 9 a. 23.2 .. 0.2 2 7 . 69 . 35.3103 New Zealano 61 4 66 8 . . 20.0 18.4 4.1 3.6 4 5 1 4 10.0 9.7 27 3 34 9104 United Kngdom 39 4 39 7 15.1 15.6 27.1 26 4 1.7 () 5 6 5.9 11.2 12.4 33 5 36 3

105 Auatr a 20 6 35.3 .. 25 1 . 1.4 . 8.7 .. 8.9 36.8106 Japan ... .

107 Belgium 31 3 37.4 32.4 30.6 28.9 25.0 1.0 () 3.3 2 2 3 1 4.9 35.0 44 8108 Finland 30 0 30 5 10.~7 9 7 47 7 48.0 31 1 5 2.9 2 9 5.5 7.3 27 1 29 7109 Netnerlarida - 28 3 37 4 191 (. . 2 3 a. 12.8 50 8

110 Australia 58.3 62 4 .21.9 23 1 5.2 5 2 2.1 0.2 12.5 9 0 21.4 24.4111 Canada 47 5 11.1 . 1 20 .. 6.1 10.0 . 13 4 22.1112 France 16.9 18.0 37 1 42.5 37.9 30.1 0 3 ) 2 9 3.5 4 9 5 9 33 6 40.5113 Germany, Fed. Rep 19.7 17 6 46.6 55 2 28 1 22 7 0 8 () 0.8 01 4 0 4 4 25 2 29.0114 Denmnark 40 0 35 5 51 2 7 42 0 46.6 3.1 0.8 3.0 2 7 6.8 11 8 35.5 36 2

115 United Slates 59.4 54 2 23.6 28 0 7.1 6.4 1.6 1 3 2.5 1 1 5.7 9.1 18 0 21 7'116 Sweden 27 0 16 0 21.6 38 7 34.0 29.7 1.5 1 2 4.6 1.2 11.3 13 2 32 5 37 9117 Norway 22 5 28 7 20.5 22.0 47 9 38 2 1 6 0 7 1.0 I11 6.6 9 3 37.0 44.1118 Switzerlano 13.9 14.3 37.3 48.2 21.5 19 4 16.7 9.1 2.6 2.3 8.0 6.7 14.5 18.4

East EuFopeannonmarkel economies

119 Hungary120 Romania121 Albania122 Bulgaria123 Czechos/ovakia

124 German? Dem Rep125 Po/and126 USSP .

a See the technical notes. b Figures in italics are for 1980, not 1981

271

Table 28. In-come distributionPercentage share of household income, by percentile groups of households'

Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest HighestYear 20_percent quintile quintile quintile 20 percent 1 0 percent

La w---i"n' c o-m e -ec on om ie sChina and IndiaOther low-income

1 Chad_2 Bangladesh 1973-74 6.9 11.3 16.1 23 5 42.2 27 43 Ethiopia4 Nepal 1976-77 4.6 8.0 11.7 16.5 59.2 46.5S Mali6 Burmna7 Zaire8 Malawi 1967-68 10.4 11.1 13.1 14.8 50 6 40 19 Upper Volta

10 Uganda11 India 1975-76 7.0 9.2 13.9 20.5 49 4 33.612 Rwanda13 Burundi14 Tanzania 1969 5.B 10.2 13 9 19.7 50.4 35.615 Somalia16 Haiti17 Benin18 Central African Rep.19 Cnina20 Gujinea21 Niger22 Madagascar .

23 Sri Lanka 1969-70 75 11.7 15.7 21.7 43.4 28.224 Togo25 Ghana26 Pakistan27 Kenya 1976 2.6 6.3 11.5 19.2 60.4 45.828 Sierra Leone 1967-69 5.6 9.5 12 8 19.6 52 5 37 829 Afghanistan30 Bhutan31 Kampuchea, Dem.32 Lao PDR33 Mozambique34 Viet NamMiddle-income economies

Oil exportersOil importers

Lower middle-income35 Sudan 1967-68 4.0 8.9 16.6 20.7 49 8 34 636 Mauritania37 Yemen, PDR38 Liberia39 Senegal40 Yemen Arab Rep.41 Lesotho42 Bolivia43 Indonesia 1976 66 7 8 12.6 23.6 49 4 34 044 Zambia45 Honduras46 Egypt, Arab Rep.47 El Salvador .

48 Thailand 1975-76 56 9.6 13 9 21 1 49 8 34 149 Papua New Guinea .

50 Philippines 1970-71 52 9.0 12.8 19.0 54.0 38 551 Zimnbabwe52 Nigeria53 Morocco54 Cameroon55 Nicaragua56 Ivory Coast57 Guatemala58 Congo, People's Rep.59 Costa Rica 1971 3.3 8.7 13.3 19 9 54.8 39.560 Peru 1972 1.9 5.1 11.0 21.0 61.0 42.961 Dominican Rep. .

62 Jamnaica63 Ecuador64 Turkey 1973 3.5 6.0 12.5 19.5 56 5 40.7

Note. For data comparability and coverage see the technical notes.

272

Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of householdsaLowest Second Third Fourth Highest Highest

Year 20 percent quintile quintile quintile 20 percent 10 percent65 Tunisia66 Colombia67 Paraguay68 Angola69 Cuba70 Korea, Dem. Rep.71 Lebanon72 Mongolia

Upper middle-income

73 Syrian Arab Rep.74 Jordan75 Malaysia 1973 3.5 7.7 12.4 20 3 56.1 39.876 Korea, Rep. of 1976 5.7 11.2 15.4 22.4 45.3 27577 Panama 1970 2.0 5.2 11.0 20 0 61.8 44 278 Chile 1968 4 4 9.0 13.8 214 51.4 34.879 Brazil 1972 2 0 5.0 9.4 17.0 66.6 50 680 Mexico 1977 2.9 7.0 12.0 204 57.7 40.681 Algeria82 Portugal83 Argentina 1970 4.4 9.7 14.1 21 5 50.3 35.284 Uruguay85 South Africa86 Yugoslavia 1978 6.6 12 1 187 239 38.7 22.987 Venezuela 1970 3.0 7.3 12.9 22.8 54.0 35.788 Greece89 Israel 1979-80 6.0 12.0 17.7 24.4 39.9 22.690 Hong Kong 1980 5.4 10.8 15.2 21 6 47.0 31.391 Singapore92 TrinidadandTobago 1975-76 4.2 9.1 13.9 22.8 50.0 31.893 Iran, Islamic Rep.94 Iraq

High-incomeoil exporters

95 Oman96 Libya97 Saudi Arabia98 Kuwait99 United Arab Emirates

Industrial marketeconomies

100 Ireland 1973 7.2 13.1 16.6 23.7 39.4 25.1101 Spain 1974 6.0 11 8 16.9 23.1 42.2 26.7102 Italy 1977 6.2 11.3 15 9 22.7 43.9 28.1103 New Zealand104 United Kingdom 1979 7.0 11 5 17.0 24.8 39.7 23.4105 Austria106 Japan 1979 8.7 13.2 17.5 23.1 36.8 21.2107 Belg um 1974-75 7.7 12 4 17.0 23 1 39 8 24.3108 Finland 1977 6.8 12.8 18 7 24.9 36.8 21.2109 Netherlands 1977 8.1 13 7 17.9 23.3 37.0 22.1110 Australia 1975-76 5.4 10.0 15 0 22.5 4/.1 30.5111 Canada 1977 3 8 10.7 17.9 25 6 42.0 26 9112 France 1975 53 11.1 160 21.8 45.8 30.5113 Germany Fed. Rep. 1978 7.9 12.5 17.0 23 1 395 240114 Denmark 1976 7.4 12.6 18.3 242 375 224115 United States 1978 4.6 8.9 14 1 22.1 503 33.4116 Sweden 1979 7.2 128 17.4 254 37.2 21.2117 Norway 1970 6 3 12.9 18 8 24.7 37.3 22 2118 Switzerland . .

East Europeannonmarket economies

119 Hungary120 Romania121 Albania122 Bulgaria123 Czechoslovakia124 German Dem. Rep.125 Poland126 USSR

a. These estimates should be treated with caution. See the technical notes.

273

Technical notes

This edition of the World Development Indicators which the conversion of GNP proceeds in the fol-provides economic indicators for periods of years lowing manner. The first step is to convert theand social indicators for selected years in a form GNP series in constant market prices and nationalsuitable for comparing economies and groups of currency units to one measured in constant aver-economies. The statistics and measures have been age 1980-82 prices. This is done by multiplying thecarefully chosen to give a comprehensive picture original constant price series by the weighted-of development. Considerable effort has been average domestic GNP deflator for the base periodmade to standardize the data; nevertheless, statis- (that is, by the ratio of total GNP in current pricestical methods, coverage, practices, and definitions to total GNP in constant prices for the 1980-82differ widely. In addition, the statistical systems in period). The second step is to convert the seriesmany developing economies still are weak, and measured in constant average 1980-82 prices inthis affects the availability and reliability of the national currency to one in US dollars by dividingdata. Readers are urged to take these limitations that series by the weighted-average exchange rateinto account in interpreting the indicators, particu- for the base period. The weighted-averagelarly when making comparisons across economies. exchange rate is the ratio of the sum of GNP in

All growth rates shown are in constant prices current prices to the sum of the GNP divided byand, unless otherwise noted, have been computed the annual average exchange rate in national cur-by using the least-squares method. The least- rency per US dollar for 1980, 1981, and 1982. Thesquares growth rate, r, is estimated by fitting a third step is to convert the series measured in con-least-squares linear trend line to the logarithmic stant average 1980-82 US dollars to one measuredannual values of the variable in the relevant period in current US dollars by multiplying that series byusing the logarithmic form: Log X, = a + bt + e,, the implicit US GNP deflator for 1980-82. This pro-where X, is the variable, a is the intercept, b is the cedure was followed for most economies.slope coefficient, t is time, and e, is the error term. The GNP per capita figures were obtained byThen r is equal to lantilog b] - 1, the least-squares dividing GNP at market prices in US dollars by theestimate of the growth rate. population in mid-1982. The use of the three-year

base period is intended to smooth the impact of

Table 1. Basic indicators fluctuations in prices and exchange rates. As thebase period is changed every year, the per capita

The estimates of population for mid-1982 are pri- estimates presented in the various editions of themarily based on data from the UN Population Divi- World Development Indicators are not compara-sion. In many cases the data take into account the ble.results of recent population censuses. The data on Because of problems associated with the avail-area are from the computer tape for the FAO Pro- ability of data and the determination of exchange.duction Yearbook 1982. rates, information on GNP per capita is shown

Gross national product (GNP) measures the total only for East European nonmarket economies thatdomestic and foreign output claimed by residents. are members of the World Bank. The World BankIt comprises gross domestic product (see the note has a research project under way to estimate GNPfor Table 2) and factor incomes (such as investment per capita for nonmarket economies that are notincome, labor income, and workers' remittances) members. But until a broadly acceptable method isaccruing to residents from abroad, less the income prepared, figures will not be shown for the GNPearned in the domestic economy accruing to per- per capita of such economies.sons abroad. It is calculated without making For Romania the GNP per capita figure has beendeductions for depreciation. derived, following the World Bank Atlas method, by

The GNP per capita figures were calculated using adjusted official Romanian national accountsaccording to the World Bank Atlas method, under data and converting them into US dollars at the

274

effective exchange rate for foreign trade transac- tions, in particular for the oil-producing countriestions in convertible currencies. during the period of sharp increases in oil prices. It

The World Bank, for its own operational pur- is used as an indicator of inflation because it is theposes, attempts to estimate internationally compa- most broadly based deflator, showing annual pricerable and consistent GNP per capita figures. This movements for all goods and services produced intask is made difficult, however, by conceptual and an economy.coverage as well as quality differences in the basic Life expectancy at birth indicates the number ofdata and by the fact that prevailing exchange rates years newborn children would live if subject to thedo not fully reflect the rate at which transactions mortality risks prevailing for the cross-section oftake place. Recognizing that these shortcomings population at the time of their birth. Data are fromaffect the comparability of the GNP per capita esti- the UN Population Division, supplemented bymates, the World Bank recently initiated a process World Bank estimates.aimed at revision of the World Bank Atlas methodol- The table on this page shows basic indicators forogy described above. It is systematically evaluating 34 countries that have a population of less than athe GNP estimates of its member countries, focus- million and are members of the United Nations,ing on the coverage and concepts employed, and the World Bank, or both. For most of these coun-where appropriate will make adjustments to tries, comprehensive data are not available.increase comparability. This evaluation of national The averages in this table are weighted by popu-accounts data will be based on documentation on lation.the sources and methods underlying the compila-tions, obtained either directly from national gov-ernments or from other international agencies Tables 2 and 3. Growth and structure ofsuch as the UN Statistical Office, OECD, and the productionStatistical Office of the European Communities.

The World Bank is also undertaking a systematic Most of the definitions used are those of the UNreview to improve the conversion factors. For 1983 System of National Accounts.on, GNP per capita for a specified year in US dol- Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the totallars will be estimated by converting GNP in final output of goods and services produced by annational currencies using a mean of the official economy-that is, by residents and nonresidents,exchange rate for that year and the two preceding regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreignyears, adjusted for relative price changes between claims. It is calculated without making deductionsthe economy in question and the United States. for depreciation. For many countries, GDP byAn alternative conversion factor will be used when industrial origin is measured at factor cost; forthe official exchange rate is judged to be egre- other countries without complete nationalgiously different from the rate effectively applied accounts series at factor cost, market price seriesto foreign transactions. were used. GDP at factor cost is equal to GDP at

GNP per capita estimates calculated using the market prices, less indirect taxes net of subsidies.new methodology will be published in the next The figures for GDP are dollar values convertededitions of the World Bank Atlas and the World from domestic currency by using the averageDevelopment Indicators, together with detailed annual official exchange rate for the year in ques-technical notes. tion: that is, they were not calculated by using the

Given the data and conversion factor consider- World Bank Atlas method described in the note forations discussed above, this year's GNP per capita Table 1. Because of these differences in conceptfigures must be interpreted with great caution. and in method of conversion, the figures in these

The average annual rate of inflation is the least- tables are not comparable with the GNP-basedsquares growth rate of the implicit gross domestic numbers in Table 1.product (GDP) deflator for each of the periods As in Table 1, data are shown only for East Euro-shown. The GDP deflator is first calculated by pean nonmarket economies that are members ofdividing, for each year of the period, the value of the World Bank.GDP in current market prices by the value of GDP The agricultural sector comprises agriculture, for-in constant market prices, both in national cur- estry, hunting, and fishing. In developing coun-rency. The least-squares method is then used to tries with high levels of subsistence farming, muchcalculate the growth rate of the GDP deflator for of the agricultural production is either notthe period. This measure of inflation has limita- exchanged or not exchanged for money. Due to

275

difficulties in assigning subsistence farming its 1970 dollars. The average sectoral shares in Table 3proper value, the share of agriculture in GDP may are weighted by GDP in current dollars for thebe underestimated. The industrial sector comprises years in question.mining, manufacturing, construction, and electric-ity, water, and gas. All other branches of economicactivity are categorized as services. Tables 4 and 5. Growth of consumption and

National accounts series in domestic currency investment; Structure of demandunits were used to compute the indicators in thesetables. The growth rates in Table 2 were calculated GDP is defined in the note for Table 2.from constant price series; the sectoral shares of Public consumption (or general government con-GDP in Table 3, from current price series. sumption) includes all current expenditure for pur-

The average growth rates for the summary mea- chases of goods and services by all levels ofsures in Table 2 are weighted by country GDP in government. Capital expenditure on national

Basic indicators for UN/World Bank members with a population of less than 1 million

GNP per capita

Alrage AzLiftArea Aeagealerp annual fPryidahaval Area Vre7zgE~~~awml rt Avea,am, iia e7ycchtal/

PopIulation (thusan,ds groazthi rate rate ofrnflatiozz at bart!,O(milfion) .f square Dollars (percent) (perwcit) f,toars)

UNIWorld Bantk menier azid-1982 k,o,seters) 1982 l960-82" 1960-70 1970-82 1i982'

Guinea-Bissau 0.8 36 170 -1.7 .. 7.1 38

Comoros 0.4 2 340 0.9 3.4 11.7 48

Cape Verde 0.3 4 350 . 11.9 61

Gambia, The 0.7 11 360 2.5 2.2 9.7 36

Sao Tome and Principe 0.1 1 370 1.2 . 7.5 62

St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.1 (.) 620 0.6 4.0 12.9

Solomon Islands 0.2 28 660 1.3 3.0 8.3

Guyana 0.8 215 670 1.7 2.4 9.9 68

Dominica 0.1 1 710 -0.8 3.8 16.5 58

St. Lucia 0.1 1 720 3.4 3.6 11.0

St. Kitts-Nevis 0.1 (.) 750 1.1 5.5 9.8

Grenada 0.1 (.) 760 1.6 3.4 15.0 69

Botswana 0.9 600 900 6.8 2.4 11.5 60

Swaziland 0.7 17 940 4.2 2.4 12.8 54

Belize 0.2 23 1,080 3.4 3.4 9.5

Mauritius 0.9 2 1,240 2.1 2.2 15.0 66

Antigua and Barbuda 0.1 (.) 1,740 -0.2 3.1 14.0

Fiji 0.7 18 1,950 3.2 2.5 11.7 68

Barbados 0.3 (.) 2,900 4.5 2.3 13.8 72

Malta 0.4 (.) 3,800 8.0 1.5 4.9 72

Bahamas 0.2 14 3,830 -0.4 3.4 7.4 69

Cyprus 0.6 9 3,840 5.9 1.3 7.3 74

Gabon 0.7 268 4,000 4.4 5.4 19.5 49

Bahrain 0.4 1 9,280 .. .. .. 68

Iceland 0.2 103 12,150 3.2 12.2 38.2 77

Luxembourg 0.4 3 14,340 4.0 3.7 6.8 73

Qatar 0.3 11 21,880 .. 2.6 29.4 71

Djibouti 0.4 22 .. .. .. .. 50

Equatorial Guitiea 0.4 28 .. .. 3.4 .. 43

Maldives 0.2 (.) .. .. 1.0 .. 47

Seychelles 0.1 ( ) 66

Suiritianie 0.4 163 .. .. .. .. 65

Vaniuatu 0.1 15 .. .. .. .

Westeni Samoa 0.2 3 .. .. .. .. 65

a. Because data for the early 1960s are not available, figures in italics are for periods other than that specified. b. Figures in italics are for 1970-81,not 1970-82. c. Figures in italics are for years other than 1982. See the technical notes.

276

defense and security is regarded as consumption arable land, defined as comprising arable land andexpenditure. land under permanent crops. This includes land

Private consumption is the market value of all under temporary crops (double-cropped areas aregoods and services purchased or received as counted once), temporary meadows for mowing orincome in kind by households and nonprofit pastures, land under market and kitchen gardens,institutions. It includes imputed rent for owner- land temporarily fallow or lying idle, as well asoccupied dwellings, land under permanent crops.

Gross domestic investment consists of the outlays The figures on food and fertilizer are from thefor additions to the fixed assets of the economy, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): fromplus changes in the net value of inventories. computer tapes for Production Yearbook 1982, Trade

Gross domestic saving shows the amount of gross Yearbook 1982, and Fertilizer Yearbook 1982; and fromdomestic investment financed from domestic out- Food Aid Bulletin, October 1980 and July 1983. Input. Comprising public and private saving, it is some instances data are for 1974 because they pro-gross domestic investment plus the net exports of vide the earliest available information.goods and nonfactor services. The index of food production per capita shows the

Exports of goods and nonfactor services represent the average annual quantity of food produced per cap-value of all goods and nonfactor services sold to ita in 1980-82 in relation to that in 1969-71. Thethe rest of the world; they include merchandise, estimates were derived from those of the FAO,freight, insurance, travel, and other nonfactor which are calculated by dividing indices of theservices. The value of factor services, such as quantity of food production by indices of total pop-investment income, labor income, and workers' ulation. For this index, food is defined as compris-remittances from abroad, is excluded. ing cereals, starchy roots, sugar cane, sugar beet,

The resource balance is the difference between pulses, edible oils, nuts, fruits, vegetables, live-exports and imports of goods and nonfactor serv- stock, and livestock products. Quantities of foodices. production are measured net of animal feed, seeds

National accounts series in domestic currency for use in agriculture, and food lost in processsingunits were used to compute the indicators in these and distribution. Given the weaknesses in agricul-tables. The growth rates in Table 4 were calculated tural production statistics, caution should be exer-from constant price series; the shares of GDP in cised in interpreting them.Table 5, from current price series.

The summary measures in Table 4 are weighted Table 7. Industryby country GDP in 1970 dollars; those in Table 5,by GDP in current dollars for the years in question. The percentage distribution of value added among

manufacturing industries was calculated from data

Table 6. Agriculture and food obtained from the UN Industrial DevelopmentOrganization (UNIDO), with the base values

The basic data for value added in agriculture are from expressed in 1975 dollars.the World Bank's national accounts series in The classification of manufacturing industries isnational currencies. The 1975 value added in cur- in accord with the UN International Standardrent prices in national currencies is converted to Industrial Classification of All Economic ActivitiesUS dollars by applying the official exchange rate (ISIC). Food and agriculture comprise ISIC Majorfor 1975. The growth rates of the constant price Groups 311, 313, and 314; textiles and clothing 321-series in national currencies are applied to the 1975 24; machinery and transport equipment 382-84; andvalue added in US dollars to derive the values, in chemicals 351 and 352. Other manufacturing gener-1975 US dollars, for 1970 and 1982. ally comprises ISIC Major Division 3, less all of the

Cereal imports and food aid in cereals are measured above; however, for some economies for whichin grain equivalents and defined as comprising all complete data are not available, other categoriescereals under the Revised Standard International are included as well.Trade Classification (SITC) Groups 041-046. The The basic data for value added in manufacturing arefigures are not directly comparable since cereal from the World Bank's national accounts series inimports are based on calendar-year and recipient- national currencies. The 1975 value added in cur-country data, whereas food aid in cereals is based rent prices in national currencies is converted toon crop-year and donor-country data. US dollars by applying the official exchange rate

Fertilizer consumption is measured in relation to for 1975. The growth rates of the constant price

277

series in national currencies are applied to the 1975 are in dollars at prevailing exchange rates. Notevalue added in US dollars to derive the values, in that they do not include trade in services.1975 US dollars, for 1970 and 1981. The growth rates of merchandise exports and imports

are in real terms and are calculated from quantum(volume) indices of exports and imports. Quantum

Table 8. Commercial energy indices are the ratios of the export or import valueindex to the corresponding unit value index. For

The data on energy generally are from UN sources. msdevelopneconoies these indesa FrThevrefr t comerialform ofpriaryenegy: most developing economies these indices are from

Theytrolef tod commercal forms ofquids, p ari ergy the UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade andpetroleum and natural gas liquids, natural gas, Deeomn Sttsisadspleetr.aao

soId ful (cal lint,ads'o) n rmr Development Statistics and supplementary data. Forsolidrfuels (nuceal, ignithe,man , and prim industrial economies the indices are from the UN

electricity (nuclear geothermal andhydroYearbook of International Trade Statistics and Monthlypower)-all converted into oil equivalents. Figures Bulletin of Statistics. The summary measures are

on liquid fuel consumption include petroleum median values. Note again that these values do notderivatives that have been consumed in non- include trade in .

energy uses. For converting primary electricity The terns of trade, or net barter terms of trade,into oil equivalents, a notional thermal efficiency of . ' '> , ' , ~~~~~~~~~~measure the relative level of export prices corn-34 percent has been assumed. The use of firewood pared to import prices. Calculated as the ratio of aand other traditional fuels, though substantial in country's export unit value index to the importsome developing countries, is not taken into unit value index, this indicator shows changes

account because reliable and comprehensive data over time in the level of export prices as a percent-are not available.

age of import prices. The terms-of-trade indexThe summary measures of growth rates of numbers are shown for 1979 and 1982, with 1980 =

production are weighted by volumes of production 100. The unit value indices are from the same

in 1974; those of growth rates of en'ergy consunp- sources cited above for the growth rates of exportstion, by volumes of consumption in 1974; those of and imports.energy consumttiptionz per capita, by population in 1974.

Enzergy imports refer to the dollar value of energyimports-Section 3 in the Revised Standard Inter- Tables 10 and 11. Structure of merchandisenational Trade Classification (SITC)-and are tradeexpressed as a percentage of earnings from mer- The shares in these tables are derived from trade

chandise exports. The summary measures are values in current dollars reported in UN tradeweighted bv merchandise exports in current dol-lars. tapes and the UN Yearbook of International Trade Sta-

Because data on energy imports do not permit a tistics, supplemented by other regular statistical

distinction between petroleum imports for fuel publications of the UN and the IMF.and for use in the petrochemicals industry, these Merchandise exports and imports are defined in the

note for Table 9. The categorization of exports andpercentages may overestimate the dependence onimported energy. ~~~~imports follows the Revised Standard Interna-

tional Trade Classification (SITC).In Table 10, fuels, mniicrals, anid metals are the com-

Table 9. Growth of merchandise trade modities in SITC Section 3, Divisions 27 and 28(minerals, crude fertilizers, and metalliferous

The statistics on merchandise trade are from UN ores), and Division 68 (nonferrous metals). Othlerpublications and the UN trade data system, sup- prima rl/ commiiiiodities comprise SITC Sections 0, 1, 2,plemented by statistics from the UN Conference and 4 (food and live animals, beverages andon Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Inter- tobacco, inedible crude materials, oils, fats, andnational Monetary Fund (IMF), and in a few cases waxes) less Divisions 27 and 28. Textiles and clothinlgWorld Bank country documentation. represent SITC Divisions 65 and 84 (textiles, yarns,

Merchandise exports and imnports cover, with some fabrics, and clothing). Machinerlv and transportexceptions, all international changes in ownership etlizipment are the commodities in SITC Section 7.of goods passing across customs borders. Exports Other miianiuifacturcs, calculated as the residual fromare valued f.o.b. (free on board), imports c.i.f. the total value of manufactured exports, represent(cost, insurance, and freight), unless otherwise SITC Sections 5 through 9 less Section 7 and Divi-specified in the foregoing sources. These values sions 65, 68, and 84.

278

In Table 11, food commodities are those in SITC quited transfers to the rest of the world. The cur-Sections 0, 1, and 4 and in Division 22 (food and rent account estimates are primarily from IMF datalive animals, beverages and tobacco, and oils and files.fats). Fuels are the commodities in SITC Section 3 Workers' remittances cover remittances of income(mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials). by migrants who are employed or expected to beOtiher primary commodities comprise SITC Section 2 employed for a year or more in their new econ-(crude materials excluding fuels) less Division 22 omy, where they are considered residents.(oilseeds and nuts) plus Division 68 (nonferrous Net direct private investment is the net amountmetals). Machinery and transport equipment are the invested or reinvested by nonresidents in enter-commodities in SITC Section 7. Other manufactures, prises in which they or other nonresidents exercisecalculated as the residual from the total value of significant managerial control. Including equitymanufactured imports, represent SITC Sections 5 capital, reinvested earnings, and other capital,through 9 less Section 7 and Division 68. these net figures also take into account the value of

The summary measures in Table 10 are weighted direct investment abroad by residents of theby merchandise exports in current dollars; those in reporting country. These estimates were compiled

- Table 11, by merchandise imports in current dol- primarily from IMF data files.lars. Gross international reserves comprise holdings of

gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), the reserve

Table 12. Origin and destination of position of IMF members in the Fund, and hold-merchandise exports ings of foreign exchange under the control of mon-

etary authorities. The data on holdings ofMerchandise exports are defined in the note for Table international reserves are from IMF data files. The9. Trade shares in this table are based on statistics gold component of these reserves is valuedon the value of trade in current dollars from the throughout at year-end London prices: that is,UN and the IMF. Unallocated exports are distrib- $37.37 an ounce in 1970 and $456.90 an ounce inuted among the economy groups in proportion to 1982. The reserve levels for 1970 and 1982 refer totheir respective shares of allocable trade. Industrial the end of the year indicated and are in currentmarket economies also include Gibraltar, Iceland, dollars at prevailing exchange rates. Due to differ-and Luxembourg; high-income oil exporters also ences in the definition of international reserves, ininclude Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, and Qatar. the valuation of gold, and in reserve managementThe summary measures are weighted by merchan- practices, the levels of reserve holdings publisheddise exports in current dollars. in national sources do not have strictly comparable

significance. Reserve holdings at the end of 1982

Table 13. Origin and destination of are also expressed in terms of the number ofmanufactured exports months of imports of goods and services they

could pay for, with imports at the average level forThe data in this table are from the UN and are 1981 or 1982. The summary measures are weightedamong those used to compute special Table B in by imports of goods and services in current dol-the UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. lars.Manufactured goods are the commodities in SITC(Revised) Sections 5 through 9 (chemicals and Table 15. Flow of public and publiclyrelated products, manufactured articles, andmachinery and transport equipment) excludingDivision 68 (nonferrous metals). The data on debt in this and successive tables are

The economy groups are the same as those in from the World Bank Debtor Reporting System.Table 12. The summary measures are weighted by That system is concerned solely with developingmanufactured exports in current dollars. economies and does not collect data on external

debt for other groups of borrowers. Nor are com-

Table 14. Balance of payments and reserves prehensive comparable data available from othersources.

The current account balance is the difference Data on the gross inflow and repayment of principalbetween (1) exports of goods and services plus (amortization) are for public and publicly guaran-inflows of unrequited official and private transfers teed medium- and long-term loans. The net inflowand (2) imports of goods and services plus unre- is the gross inflow less the repayment of principal.

279

Public loans are external obligations of public final repayment of principal. The grace period isdebtors, including the national government, its the interval between the agreement date and theagencies, and autonomous public bodies. Publicly date of the first repayment of principal.guaranteed loans are external obligations of pri- The summary measures in this table arevate debtors that are guaranteed for repayment by weighted by the amounts of loans.a public entity.

The data in this table and in successive tables on Table 18. Official development assistance fromdebt do not cover nonguaranteed private debt OECD and OPEC membersbecause comprehensive data are not available; forsome borrowers such debt is substantial. The debt Official development assistance (ODA) consists of netcontracted for purchases of military equipment is disbursements of loans and grants made at conces-also excluded because it usually is not reported. sional financial terms by official agencies of the

members of the Development Assistance Commit-

Table 16. External public debt and tee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-debt service ratio operation and Development (OECD) and of the

members of the Organization of Petroleum Export-External public debt outstanding and disbursed repre- ing Countries (OPEC) with the objective of pro-sents the amount of public and publicly guaran- moting economic development and welfare. Itteed loans that has been disbursed, net of includes the value of technical cooperation andrepayments of principal and write-offs at year-end. assistance. All data shown were supplied by theIn estimating external public debt as a percentage OECD.of GNP, GNP was converted from national curren- Amounts shown are net disbursements to devel-cies to dollars at the average official exchange rate oping countries and multilateral institutions. Thefor the year in question. The summary measures disbursements to multilateral institutions are noware weighted by GNP in current dollars. reported for all DAC members on the basis of the

Interest payments are those on the disbursed and date of issue of notes; some DAC members previ-outstanding public and publicly guaranteed debt ously reported on the basis of the date of encash-in foreign currencies, goods, or services; they ment. Net bilateral flows to low-income countriesinclude commitment charges on undisbursed debt exclude unallocated bilateral flows and all dis-if information on those charges was available. bursements to multilateral institutions.

Debt service is the sum of interest payments and The nominal values shown in the summary forrepayments of principal on external public and ODA from OECD countries were converted intopublicly guaranteed debt. The ratio of debt service 1980 prices using the dollar GNP deflator. Thisto exports of goods and services is one of several deflator is based on price increases in OECD coun-rules of thumb commonly used to assess the ability tries (excluding Greece, Portugal, and Turkey)to service debt. The average ratios of debt service measured in dollars. It takes into account the par-to GNP for the economy groups are weighted by ity changes between the dollar and national cur-GNP in current dollars. The average ratios of debt rencies. For example, when the dollar depreciates,service to exports of goods and services are price increases measured in national currenciesweighted by exports of goods and services in cur- have to be adjusted upward by the amount of therent dollars. depreciation to obtain price increases in dollars.

The table, in addition to showing totals forTable 17. Terms of public borrowing OPEC, shows totals for the Organization of Arab

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). TheCommitments refer to the public and publicly guar- donor members of OAPEC are Algeria, Iraq,anteed loans for which contracts were signed in Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Unitedthe year specified. Arab Emirates. ODA data for OPEC and OAPEC

Interest rates, maturities, and grace periods are aver- were also obtained from the OECD.ages weighted by the amounts of loans. Interest isthe major charge levied on a loan and is usually Table 19. Population growth andcomputed on the amount of principal drawn and projectionsoutstanding. The maturity of a loan is the intervalbetween the agreement date, when a loan agree- The growth rates of population are period averagesment is signed or bonds are issued, and the date of calculated from midyear populations. The sum-

280

mary measures are weighted by population in has declined to replacement level because past1970. high growth rates will have produced an age distri-

The estimates of population for mid-1982 are pri- bution with a relatively high proportion of womenmarily based on data from the UN Population Divi- in, or still to enter, the reproductive ages. Conse-sion. In many cases the data take into account the quently, the birth rate will remain higher than theresults of recent population censuses. death rate and the growth rate will remain positive

The projections of population for 1990 and 2000, for several decades. A population takes 50-75and to the year in which it will eventually become years, depending on the initial conditions, beforestationary, were made for each economy sepa- its age distribution fully adjusts to the changedrately. Starting with information on total popula- fertility rates.tion by age and sex, fertility rates, mortality rates, To make the projections, assumptions aboutand international migration rates in the base year future mortality rates were made in terms of1980, these parameters were projected at five-year female life expectancy at birth (that is, the numberintervals on the basis of generalized assumptions of years a newborn girl would live if subject to theuntil the population became stationary. The base- mortality risks prevailing for the cross-section ofyear estimates are from updated computer print- population at the time of her birth). Economiesouts of the UN World Population Prospects as Assessed were first divided according to whether their pri-in 1982, from the most recent issues of the UN mary-school enrollment ratio for females wasPopulation and Vital Statistics Report and International above or below 70 percent. In each group a set ofMigration: Levels and Trends, and from the World annual increments in female life expectancy wasBank, the Population Council, the US Bureau of assumed, depending on the female life expectancythe Census, and recent national censuses. in 1980-85. For a given life expectancy at birth, the

The net reproduction rate (NRR) indicates the annual increments during the projection period arenumber of daughters that a newborn girl will bear larger in economies having a higher primary-during her lifetime, assuming fixed age-specific school enrollment ratio and a life expectancy of upfertility rates and a fixed set of mortality rates. The to 62.5 years. At higher life expectancies, the incre-NRR thus measures the extent to which a cohort of ments are the same.newborn girls will reproduce themselves under To project the fertility rates, the first step was togiven schedules of fertility and mortality. An NRR estimate the year in which fertility would reachof 1 indicates that fertility is at replacement level: replacement level. These estimates are speculativeat this rate childbearing women, on the average, and are based on information on trends in crudebear only enough daughters to replace themselves birth rates (defined in the note for Table 20), totalin the population. fertility rates (also defined in the note for Table 20),

A stationary population is one in which age- and female life expectancy at birth, and the perform-sex-specific mortality rates have not changed over ance of family planning programs. For most econo-a long period, while age-specific fertility rates have mies it was assumed that the total fertility ratesimultaneously remained at replacement level would decline between 1980 and the year of reach-(NRR=1). In such a population, the birth rate is ing a net reproduction rate of 1, after which fertil-constant and equal to the death rate, the age struc- ity would remain at replacement level. For mostture also is constant, and the growth rate is zero. countries in sub-Saharan Africa, however, total

Population momentum is the tendency for popula- fertility rates were assumed to remain constanttion growth to continue beyond the time that until 1990-95 and then to decline until replacementreplacement-level fertility has been achieved; that level was reached; for a few they were assumed tois, even after NRR has reached unity. The momen- increase until 1990-95 and then to decline. Also fortum of a population in the year t is measured as a a few countries in Asia and the Middle East, theratio of the ultimate stationary population to the rates were assumed to remain constant for somepopulation in the year t, given the assumption that years before beginning to decline. In several indus-fertility remains at replacement level from the year trial economies, fertility is already below replace-t onward. In India, for example, in 1980 the popu- ment level. Because a population will not remainlation was 687 million, the ultimate stationary pop- stationary if its net reproduction rate is other thanulation assuming that NRR = 1 from 1980 onward 1, it was assumed that fertility rates in these econo-was 1,195 million, and the population momentum mies would regain replacement levels in order towas 1.74. make estimates of the stationary population for

A population tends to grow even after fertility them. For the sake of consistency with the other

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estimates, the total fertility rates in the industrial able, program statistics are used; these includeeconomies were assumed to remain constant until India, Indonesia, and Zimbabwe. Program statis-1985-90 and then to increase to replacement level tics may understate contraceptive prevalenceby 2010. because they do not measure use of methods such

International migration rates are based on past as rhythm, withdrawal, or abstinence, or of contra-and present trends in migration flow. The esti- ceptives not obtained through the official familymates of future net migration are speculative. For planning program. The data refer to a variety ofmost economies the net migration rates were years, generally not more than two years distantassumed to be zero by 2000, but for a few they from those specified.were assumed to be zero by 2025. All summary measures are weighted by popula-

The estimates of the hypothetical size of the sta- tion.tionary population and the assumed year of reach-ing replacement-level fertility are speculative. They Table 21. Labor forceshould not be regarded as predictions. They areincluded to provide a summary indication of the The population of working age refers to the popula-long-run implications of recent fertility and mortal- tion aged 15-64. The estimates are based on theity trends on the basis of highly stylized assump- population estimates of the World Bank for 1981tions. A fuller description of the methods and and previous years. The summary measures areassumptions used to calculate the estimates is weighted by population.available from the Population, Health, and Nutri- The laborforce comprises economically active per-tion Department of the World Bank. sons aged 10 years and over, including the armed

forces and the unemployed, but excluding house-

Table 20. Demographic and fertility-related wives, students, and other economically inactiveindicators groups. Agriculture, industry, and services are

defined in the same manner as in Table 2. TheThe crude birth and death rates indicate the number estimates of the sectoral distribution of the laborof live births and deaths per thousand population force are from International Labour Office (ILO),in a year. They are from the same sources men- Labour Force Estimates and Projections, 1950-2000,tioned in the note for Table 19. Percentage changes and from the World Bank. The summary measuresare computed from unrounded data. are weighted by labor force.

The total fertility rate represents the number of The labor force growth rates were derived from thechildren that would be born per woman, if she Bank's population projections and from ILO datawere to live to the end of her childbearing years on age-specific activity rates in the source citedand bear children at each age in accord with pre- above. The summary measures for 1960-70 andvailing age-specific fertility rates. The rates given 1970-82 are weighted by labor force in 1970; thoseare from the same sources mentioned in the note for 1980-2000, by estimates of labor force in 1980.for Table 19. The application of ILO activity rates to the

The percetntage of married womnen of childbearinig age Bank's latest population estimates may be inap-usinig contraception refers to women who are prac- propriate for some economies in which there haveticing, or whose husbands are practicing, any form been important changes in unemployment andof contraception. These generally comprise male underemployment, in international and internaland female sterilization, intrauterine device (IUD), migration, or in both. The labor force projectionscondom, injectable contraceptives, spermicides, for 1980-2000 should thus be treated with caution.diaphragm, rhythm, withdrawal, and abstinence.The figures for Bulgaria, Denmark, Poland, and Table 22. UrbanizationRomania, however, as well as the 1970 figures forthe United Kingdom, exclude sterilizationi. Women The data on urban population as a percentage of totalof childbearing age are generally women aged 15- populationi are from the UN Patterns of Urban and49, although for some countries contraceptive Rural PopulationT Growth, 1980, supplemented byusage is measured for other age groups. data from the World Bank and from various issues

Data are mainly derived from the UN Monitoring of the UN Demographic Yearbook.Report and publications of the World Fertility Sur- The growth rates of urban population were calcu-vey and the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey. For lated from the World Bank's population estimates;a few countries for which no survey data are avail- the estimates of urban population shares were cal-

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culated from the sources cited above. Data on The daily calorie supply per capita was calculated byurban agglomeration are also from the United dividing the calorie equivalent of the food suppliesNations. in an economy by the population. Food supplies

Because the estimates in this table are based on comprise domestic production, imports lessdifferent national definitions of what is "urban," exports, and changes in stocks; they exclude ani-cross-country comparisons should be interpreted mal feed, seeds for use in agriculture, and food lostwith caution. in processing and distribution. The daily calorie

The summary measures for urban population as requirement per capita refers to the calories neededa percentage of total population are weighted by to sustain a person at normal levels of activity andpopulation; the other summary measures in this health, taking into account age and sex distribu-table are weighted by urban population. tions, average body weights, and environmental

temperatures. Both sets of estimates are from the

Table 23. Indicators related to life expectancy Food and Agriculture Organization (FAG).The summary measures in this table are

Life expectancy at birth is defined in the note for weighted by population.Table 1.

The infant mortality rate is the number of infants Table 25. Educationwho die before reaching one year of age, per thou-sand live births in a given year. The data are from a The data in this table refer to a variety of years,variety of sources-including issues of the UN generally not more than two years distant fromDemographic Yearbook and Population and Vital Statis- those specified, and are mostly from UNESCO.tics Report; and UN, "lnfant Mortality: World Esti- The data on number enrolled in primary school refermates and Projections, 1950-2025," Population to estimates of total, male, and female enrollmentBulletin of the United Nations, 1982-and from the of students of all ages in primary school; they areWorld Bank. expressed as percentages of the total, male, or

The child death rate is the number of deaths of female populations of primary-school age to givechildren aged 1-4 per thousand children in the gross primary enrollment ratios. Although pri-same age group in a given year. Estimates were mary-school age is generally considered to be 6-11based on the data on infant mortality and on the years, the differences in country practices in therelation between the infant mortality rate and the ages and duration of schooling are reflected in thechild death rate implicit in the appropriate Coale- ratios given. For countries with universal primaryDemeny Model life tables; see Ansley J. Coale and education, the gross enrollment ratios may exceedPaul Demeny, Regional Model Life Tables and Stable 100 percent because some pupils are below orPopulations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University above the official primary-school age.Press, 1966). The data on number enrolled in secondary school

The summary measures in this table are were calculated in the same manner, with second-weighted by population. ary-school age generally considered to be 12-17

years.

Table 24. Health-related indicators The data on number enrolled in higher education arefrom UNESCO.

The estimates of population per physician and nursing The summary measures in this table areperson were derived from World Health Organiza- weighted by population.tion (WHO) data, some of which have beenrevised to reflect new information. They also take Table 26. Central government expenditure

-into account revised estimates of population.Nursing persons include graduate, practical, The data on central government finance in Tablesassistant, and auxiliary nurses; the inclusion of 26 and 27 are from the IMF Government Financeauxiliary nurses enables a better estimation of the Statistics Yearbook, IMF data files, and World Bankavailability of nursing care. Because definitions of country documentation. The accounts of eachnursing personnel vary-and because the data country are reported using the system of commonshown are for a variety of years, generally not definitions and classifications found in the IMFmore than two years distant from those specified- Draft Manual on Government Finance Statistics. Duethe data for these two indicators are not strictly to differences in coverage of available data, thecomparable across countries. individual components of central government

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expenditure and current revenue shown in these iture on the general administration and regulationtables may not be strictly comparable across all of relevant government departments, hospitalseconomies. The shares of total expenditure and and clinics, health and sanitation, and nationalrevenue by category are calculated from national health and medical insurance schemes.currencies. Housing and community amenities, and social secu-

The inadequate statistical coverage of state, pro- rity and welfare cover (1) public expenditure onvincial, and local governments has dictated the use housing, such as income-related schemes; on pro-of central government data only. This may seri- vision and support of housing and slum clearanceously understate or distort the statistical portrayal activities; on community development; and onof the allocation of resources for various purposes, sanitary services; and (2) public expenditure forespecially in large countries where lower levels of compensation to the sick and temporarily disabledgovernment have considerable autonomy and are for loss of income; for payments to the elderly, theresponsible for many social services. permanently disabled, and the unemployed; and

It must be emphasized that the data presented, for family, maternity, and child allowances. Theespecially those for education and health, are not second category also includes the cost of welfarecomparable for a number of reasons. In many services such as care of the aged, the disabled, andeconomies private health and education services children, as well as the cost of general administra-are substantial; in others public services represent tion, regulation, and research associated withthe major component of total expenditure but may social security and welfare services.be financed by lower levels of government. Great Economic services comprise public expenditurecaution should therefore be exercised in using the associated with the regulation, support, and moredata for cross-economy comparisons. efficient operation of business, economic develop-

Central government expenditure comprises the ment, redress of regional imbalances, and creationexpenditure by all government offices, depart- of employment opportunities. Research, trade pro-ments, establishments, and other bodies that are motion, geological surveys, and inspection andagencies or instruments of the central authority of regulation of particular industry groups are amonga country. It includes both current and capital the activities included. The five major categories of(development) expenditure. economic services are fuel and energy, agriculture,

Defense comprises all expenditure, whether by industry, transportation and communication, anddefense or other departments, for the maintenance other economic affairs and services.of military forces, including the purchase of mili- Other covers expenditure for the general admin-tary supplies and equipment, construction, istration of government not included elsewhere;recruiting, and training. Also falling under this cat- for a few economies it also includes amounts thategory is expenditure for strengthening the public could not be allocated to other components.services to meet wartime emergencies, for training Overall surplus/deficit is defined as current andcivil defense personnel, and for foreign military capital revenue and grants received less totalaid and contributions to military organizations and expenditure less lending minus repayments.alliances. The summary measures for the components of

Education comprises public expenditure for the central government expenditure are weighted byprovision, management, inspection, and support central government expenditure in current dollars;of preprimary, primary, and secondary schools; of those for total expenditure as a percentage of GNPuniversities and colleges; and of vocational, tech- and for overall surplus/deficit as a percentage of.nical, and other training institutions by central GNP are weighted by GNP in current dollars.governments. Also included is expenditure on thegeneral administration and regulation of the edu- Table 27. Central government current revenuecation system; on research into its objectives,organization, administration, and methods; and Information on data sources and comparability ison such subsidiary services as transport, school given in the note for Table 26. Current revenue bymeals, and medical and dental services in schools. source is expressed as a percentage of total cur-

Health covers public expenditure on hospitals, rent revenue, which is the sum of tax revenue andmedical and dental centers, and clinics with a current nontax revenue, and is calculated frommajor medical component; on national health and national currencies.medical insurance schemes; and on family plan- Tax revenue is defined as all government revenuening and preventive care. Also included is expend- from compulsory, unrequited, nonrepayable

284

receipts for public purposes, including interest col- from data gathered by the World Bank fromlected on tax arrears and penalties collected on national sources but not adjusted. The estimatesnonpayment or late payment of taxes. Tax revenue for Sri Lanka are from the results of a joint projectis shown net of refunds and other corrective trans- of the World Bank and the Economic and Socialactions. Taxes on income, profit, and capital gain are Commission for Asia and the Pacific. The esti-taxes levied on the actual or presumptive net mates for Latin American countries other thanincome of individuals, on the profits of enter- Mexico come from the results of two joint projectsprises, and on capital gains, whether realized on of the World Bank, one with the ILO, the otherland sales, securities, or other assets. Social Security with the Economic Commission for Latin America.contributions include employers' and employees' Those for Mexico are the results from the 1977social security contributions as well as those of Household Budget Survey.self-employed and unemployed persons. Domestic Data for Australia, Belgium, the Federal Repub-taxes on goods and services include general sales, lic of Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands,turnover, or value added taxes, selective excises on the United Kingdom, and the United States aregoods, selective taxes on services, taxes on the use from national sources. Data for industrial marketof goods or property, and profits of fiscal monopo- economies other than those listed are from Sawyerlies. Taxes on international trade and transactions 1976; the joint project of the ILO and the Worldinclude import duties, export duties, profits of Bank; and the UN Survey of National Sources ofexport or import marketing boards, transfers to Income Distribution Statistics, 1981.government, exchange profits, and exchange Because the collection of data on income distri-taxes. Other taxes include employers' payroll or bution has not been systematically organized andmanpower taxes, taxes on property, and other integrated with the official statistical system intaxes not allocable to other categories. many countries, estimates were typically derived

Current nontax revenue comprises all current gov- from surveys designed for other purposes, mosternment revenue that is not a compulsory nonre- often consumer expenditure surveys, which alsopayable payment for public purposes. Proceeds of collect some information on income. These sur-grants and borrowing, funds arising from the veys use a variety of income concepts and samplerepayment of previous lending by governments, designs. Furthermore, the coverage of many ofincurrence of liabilities, and proceeds from the sale these surveys is too limited to provide reliableof capital assets are not included. nationwide estimates of income distribution.

The summary measures for the components of Thus, although the estimates shown are consid-current revenue are weighted by total current reve- ered the best available, they do not avoid all thesenue in current dollars; those for current revenue as problems and should be interpreted with extremea percentage of GNP are weighted by GNP in cur- caution.rent dollars. The scope of the indicator is similarly limited.

Because households vary in size, a distribution in

Table 28. Income distribution which households are ranked according to per cap-ita household income rather than according to total

The data in this table refer to the distribution of household income is superior for many purposes.total disposable household income accruing to per- The distinction is important because householdscentile groups of households ranked by total with low per capita incomes frequently are largehousehold income. The distributions cover rural households whose total income may be relativelyand urban areas and refer to different years high. Information on the distribution of per capitabetween 1966 and 1981. household income exists, however, for only a few

The estimates for developing economies in Asia countries. The World Bank Living Standards Mea-and Africa are from the results of a joint project of surement Study is developing procedures andthe World Bank and the International Labour applications that can assist countries in improvingOrganisation (ILO). Those for Turkey, Hong Kong, their collection and analysis of data on income dis-Malaysia, Israel, and the Republic of Korea are tribution.

285

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The World Bank

World-Devefiment Report 1984 examines poptlation change in developing coutites and itslniks with development The Report shows why continuing rapid population growth on anever larger base is likely to mean a lower qualhty of life for millions of peoe. It concludesthat m some countries development may not be possible at all unless slower populationgrowth can be achieved soon, before higher real incomes would bnng fertility down sponta-neously The Report outlines public policies to reduce fertility that are humane and afford-able and that complement other development efforts, placing special emphasis on educationfor women and increased family planning services The successful experience of manycountries in implementmg population policy, particularly in the past decade, shows howmuch can be accomplished and how quickly

The Report also analyzes the underlymg causes of the 1980-83 world economic recession,concludmg that its roots go back beyond the oil pnce rise of 1979-80 to ngidities being builtinto economies from the mid-1960s onward In reviewing prospects for the next decade, theReport concludes that sustained recovery requires economic reforms in developed anddeveloping countries alike, as well as concerted international action to roll back protection-ism and increase capital flows-both commercial bank lending and, especially fox low-income countries, concessional flows

A Population Data Supplement and multicolor maps and graphics supplement the textThe final portion of the Report comprises "World Development Indicators," 28 two-pagetables containing economic and social profiles of 126 countries

World Development Report has been published annually by the World Bank since 1978 Eachedition examines the current world economic situation and prospects as they relate todevelopment and offers a detailed analysis of a particular topic or sector of importance ineconomic and social development

ISBN 0-19-520460-3

ISSN 0163-5085