World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · oVVe-l4 LVL sL sVriV LrlU11U.. Jul...

34
Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ReportNo: 24407 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-25570) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 14.2 MILLION (US$20.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF MALI FOR A NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT Rural Development 2 Country Department 15 Africa Region T This doculment has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

Transcript of World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · oVVe-l4 LVL sL sVriV LrlU11U.. Jul...

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Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ReportNo: 24407

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-25570)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 14.2 MILLION (US$20.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF MALI

FOR A

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT

Rural Development 2Country Department 15Africa Region

T This doculment has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange RateE ffective March 11, 2002)

Currency Unit = CFA Francr'P A V-rn, I nn = TT nnn1

US$ 1.00 = CFAF 748.67

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS CountryAs sistanceSt rategyCFA Franc Currency of the West African Monetary UnionCMDT Malian Cotton Development Company (CompagnieMal iennede

DIveloppement des Textiles)CNU National Agricultural Research User Committee (Commission Nationale des

Utilisateurs des Resultats de la Recherche)CNRA National Agricultural Research Council (ConseilN ationalde la Recherche

Agricole)CRRA Regional Center of Agricultural Research (Centre Regional dela Recherche

Agr.4 o.)

CRU Regional User Committee (Comite Regional des Utilisateurs)EPCST Etablissement Public d Cdractere Scien-afique et Th iogiqueIER Institute of Rural Economy (Institut d' Economie Rurale)ON Ojpfce du NigerPNRA National Agricultural Research project

(Projet National de la Recherche Agricole)PNVA National Agricultural Extension Program (Programme Nationalde

Vulgarisation Agricole)QAG Quality Assurance Group

ViceP resident: Callisto E. MadavoTl,.ont-r. A Tl.AA ('rain

Sector Manager: Joseph Baah-DwomohTask Team Leader: Agadiou Dama

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MALINATIONAL AGRICULTU-KAL RESEARCHl PROJECCT

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Hrunuipal aiiLoUui LacR n I

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 35. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 7

6. Sustainability 9?7 Rknkc snd Rnrrnwer Perfnrmnnice 0

8. Lessons Learned 119. Partner Comments ii10. Additional Information 12Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 13Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 15Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 17Ann-ex 4. Baok Tnptc 1Q

Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 20

Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 21Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 22Annex 8. Summary of Borrower's Project Completion Report 23

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only inine performance of tneir oiiiciai uuties. its content maylHUL no UbV Ur-W.se disclosedIwithout World Bank authorization.

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Project ID: P001751 proiect RESEARCHIu, Ta Leadr- . A noinu IL, rz"it: A.:'&Ž -

ICR Type: Core ICR |Report Date: J 2. ., 02

1. Project Data

Name: AG. RESEARCH L/C/TFNumber: IDA-25570CounrryiDepartment: IAl.LI Reg.on: .ca iona: Offi

Sector/subsector: AR - Research

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 27-02-90 Effective: 05-11-94 10-11-94Appraisal: 25-03-93 MTR: 31-12-97 28-11-97Approval: 16-12-93 Closing: 31-12-2001 31-12-2001

Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT/IER / CNRAOther Partners: USAID, Dutch Cooperation, French Cooperation, Swiss Cooperation and

Canadian Cooperation

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Callisto E. Madavo V. K. JaycoxCountryhManner.nO A. David Craig Katherine Marshall

Sector Manager: Joseph Baah-Dwomoh Salah DarghouthTeam- Leader at .tC Ag-a;-u n Jan w--- ei,enbergI C(Ufl .LJI44C .A £ t . n

5a_nJs - _ A-.- - ,

ICR Primary Author: Agadiou Dama

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory,U= Unsatisfactory,H L=HighlyLik ely, L=Likely,UN =Unlikely,H UN=HighlyUnlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: L

In.itutinnal Develnnment Imnact: M

Bank Performance: U

Borrower Performance: U

QAG (if available) ICRauanliti, nt Sn,r,* S

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

The QAG rating for Quality at Entry wasmargina lly satisfactory. The project document system doesno tallowforqualified ratings, hence a vatisfactory rating was used.

The ICR team would have preferred to rate the vroiect's outcome mareinallv satisfactory, but this rating is notavailable.

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3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:The objective of the project was to implement the first six-year phase of the Strategic Plan for NationalAgricultural Research. The principal objective of this Plan was to ensure that adequate technology willherAme availahle to farmers as a means to increase a¢Tcultural growth and to reverse the decline inproductive capacity of the natural resource base. The project aimed at improving the performance of theJAa,Jt,na. M-C h l Les.O-tfvh sn g ea, o..h.u ^An u..pntl rm e -^ .Prnne,… qwi…U repepuan…- antiaccountability for results through institutional reforms. In view of the persistent limitations in theavailability- of reso-urces, tue project was to help focus the national research effort. on the priorities set Ouin the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Research. It was therefore to emphasize the testing of technologieselsewhere, expanding farmer-participatory research and move faster towards on-farm testing, and seekregional collaboration in adapting promising technologies to local circumstances.

3.2 Revised Objective:The project's objectives were judged pertinent throughout project implementation.

3.3 Original Components:The project included the following four components:a. Institutional Development - (i) transform the National Agricultural Research Council (Conseil

National de la Recherche Agricole, CNRA) into an entity, which integrates user representatives andthrough which all official funding for agricultural research is coordinated and screened; (ii) support thetransfornation of National Agricultural Research Institute (Institut d'Economie Rurale, IER) into anautonomous institution with an independent Board of Directors, and reorganize and strengthen it; and(iii) regionali7e research to brina it closer to its users

b. Technology Transfer and User Participation - (i) develop interactive processes between farmers,-vte-;ion agents and rpas-crnh,r thrmiunh form. r nartipnr,atin iin se-ftincr rpesercp-h o,tha nand

evaluating its results, to ensure research relevance and to accelerate the dissemination of researchresulit; and (ii) create puiot UsVeL Reserch11 -VLLU UUU wUhL i W rIL e LUSrLc uLses klIulb adU

processors) will contract for specific research topics of interest to themc. Research Program Implementation and Management - (i) improve research quality and relevance

through improved research programning, monitoring and evaluation methods and procedures,characterized by users' participation; (ii) provide research operating funds and introduce researchcontracting for the implementation of the research programs; (iii) develop a scientific information,publication and documentation unit at IER; and (iv) strengthen external linkages and support theparticipation of Malian institutions and scientists in regional and international collaborative researchprograms

d. Reqniirce lDevelonment and Managrement - (i) imnr^ve and strengthen exeriment station devel^pmentand management; (ii) design and implement a management information, accounting and cost accountingsys+m; (i;i) stengthen h-.- eso .ws development and r.agement, provide inoun...,

and (iv) rehabilitate and renew research experiment station and equipment.

The project was in conformity with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and sought to addressrural poverty by providing farmers with new technologies that would help increase agricultural productionand revenues. Project design had several strong elements: it was in conformity with the National StrategicPlan for Agricultural Research, it placed the main emphasis on institutional development (strengtheningresearch management and coordination of all official funding for agricultural research), it supported theautonomy of EER through the introduction of an autonomous board and statutes defining career paths andsalary structure, and it introduced accountability both through the introduction of research contracting

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mechanisms and through increased user participation in defining and evaluating results. The projectAesig'I .o.lIajul mAUL CU.1.g was iLt .ItHIIu LU h:LL i LULULUtUAU L UdLlr. LU oVVe-l4 LVL sL sVriV LrlU11U.. Jul

hindsight, the design team may not have satisfactorily evaluated Government's commitment to theinsttutionai changes sougnt oy tne project.

3.4 AD.C..-.Ja. *V ALC VSOC .Uf&VlClO

The project was not redesigned during implementation.

3.5 Quality atEntry:*M -s 11 - - 1_,:I_ - A _ -._1A _\ -Tlihe q-uauLy at e-utry wa Juudge marginyaly vugaJactquy by a QualityssurdnUIe uroup twtiu) panel sdraft report (October 1, 1999). The design of the project was considered satisfactory overall. The QAGpanel wrote that the project was presented to the Board because Bank management had become impatientwith the delays - four years of project preparation - and decided to move ahead when an opportunity to doso presented itself, despite the consequent need for conditions of effectiveness for the Credit. Some of theissues that afterwards delayed project implementation (adoption of the revised statutes, funding forincreased salaries, transfer of land titles to IER) would have emerged earlier if the Bank had insisted onbasic organizational and administrative arrangements being in place at the time of Credit approval. TheICR team concurs with this evaluation.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:Tne project achieved its global oDjective of improving the performance of the nationai agricuiturai researchsystem. The project achieved fundamental changes in the structure and management of research, increaseduser participation and external reviews of the quality of ongoing and proposed research activities. Therewere, however, some serious delays in project implementation that negatively impacted on the strengtheningof human resource management, financial management and monitoring and evaluation remain weak.Proiect outcomei st hereforer ated marginally satisfactory.

Coherence of national research activities was greatlv imnroved thmirh the strengthening of MNRA_ whichis now responsible for the preparation, implementation and monitoring of all national agricultural research"ro. w , snA thnirnuh tA_avnniial PvtP.rn!l r-,tAws of t+1k -rear progrs. Tn 2)nnl ts- - of TPD

was changed from an ill-suited administrative statute to that of a public research and technologyebsL4LJUbUU ent (EtablJi.ssemert XUUCllc U CaraUcteFre 0E3Le1nYujquV CA 1TUr1r15wolgique, Er, I). i lm pruviude

IER with management autonomy and enabled it to start strengthening financial and administrative, andhuman resource management. Prior to the change in statute, !ER had already translated the prioritiesestablished in the national agricultural research master plan into better focussed research programs withemphasis on regional priorities and increased involvement of beneficiaries in the formulation of researchprograms and their monitoring. Collaboration between research and its natural partners (extension,producer organizations, NGOs) was strengthened through the creation of research user committees, regularregional technical review meetings, and the establishment of a research fund managed by the research usercommittees which permit ted these to contract out research activities with LER that were a priority to them.In addition, a new program that gave emnhasis to gender issues in agricultural develonment was added.Regional collaboration was substantially strengthened through the project. Twelve out of the sixteenresearch ,progrms are now ,v exec1ted in collahnvatrwm w,ith regional an.d in.ternati-onal agulua researchorganizations in adapting promising technologies to local circumstances. These regional partnerships haveaiso euillhue he Lu quiuLy of reseach i[ ugli uiipiuveu inUOIiiiauun excualuges.

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4.2 Outputs by components:I. The Institutional Development ComDonent is rated satisfactorv. All nlanned reformq wereimplemented as planned, but with long delays. CNRA acquired the status in 2001 of an agency that isrlirpr'tlu rp,v,rtina tn tie Milnkctru nf P,l,rva flvYeupinmPint anAd, hQcQ ,nainty,-aint o*i,^"^rsm-, TIv q-rA iscomposed of representatives of the ministries for rural development, finance, education, and environment,as weh'L as rMeppesentati-Yes r.om 'KTaLun& Aic'r' D-----Wh TT--Cn- u.e Cmoso raYnl03 W~ 03 ~jJi~~I1LLLV~ILWIJII 11a0LUCJLL r'LAl%U1LLLI4a1 X%V049ML. LJIJV l.-AJfLLULUCL IkUUFFUfniasurs ivaiunLCaUe

des Utilisateurs des Resultats de la Recherche, CNU), the private sector, NGOs, and the donorcomimumi-y. Through its Executive Secreiariat and its tmree committees (scientific, finance and users),CNRA has become the focal point for all publicly funded agricultural research planning, preparation,implementation (financing) and follow-up. Under this setup, the needs of end-users have been better takeninto account. This was further strengthened with the creation of a user fund that gave beneficiary groupsthe financial means to steer research into directions that were a priority to farmers. In 1997, a system ofresearch contracts for all donor funded agricultural research was introduced, which improved the technicalcontent of research proposal and the allocation of scarce resources over the different research activities.Research programming was further improved through the periodic review of the research nroramms byCNRA's technical committee, assisted by external research experts. The monitoring and evaluation ofrecearch however remains relativelv weak aq thic tnnl iC nnt ni,ffir.intlv APvAlnnfrl tn avaIlute tlhe imr,.A

of new technologies at the farm level.

The statute of LER was changed in 2001 to that of EPST, which better fits the needs of a research institute.Tlhs change allowed uhe insttutUon to have inc1rasedd autonomy in financial and numan resourcemanagement. It also allowed IER to pay salaries that were higher than regular civil service salaries underthe old -statute. Tne management structure of IER was reviewed and changed. A Board of Directors wascreated, whose members include representatives of user organizations, as well as three new departments(research, technical support and finance). The Director General's office was strengthened with the creationof three new services: human resources management, internal audit, and documentation, information andpublication. As planned, an evaluation of all research and technical support staff was carried out. Thisenabled LER to devise a targeted training program and assign staff to appropriate pay grades. The changein statute was not immediately financially supported by the Government and led to problems in salarypavments and the departure of few researchers

Research management w as decentralized tn the aeonal level: 8iA Regol Agr-cu.ii- Re--eh Centers(Centres Regionaux de Recherche Agricole, CRRA) were created. As at the central level, representativesof uer Urganizations, NGs and Go-v-ermeni agencies were represented in the regionai research panei.This allowed for improved coordination, management and monitoring of research programs at the regionallevel. As a result, 12 research projects were added to the research planning (including research on riceblight, sugar peas, dah and water melons). In addition, it forced researchers to improve the quality of theirresearch proposals in order to obtain funding. The trend towards improvements in quality of researchproposals was confirmed by the ti-annual extemal reviews and the decline in the rejection rate of researchproposals (from 80 percent in 1995 to 30 percent in 2001).

II. The Technology Transfer and User Participation Component is rated satisfactory. As part ofthi inctitu tininal eirpngrt1hrnin of T1'n121nhnrn,tnin wiuth tlh, Adiffe+t "-a-.- wasSix Regional User Comitees (Commision.Regionale des Utilisateurs, CRU) and the CNU were establishedas planned, and supported by te project. Members of these comittees recei-ved trig, and a researchfund was created to enable the CRUs to define priority research activities based on the expressed needs oftheir constituents. Thne- functioning of these committees was adjusted after the mid-term review to improve

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their representativeness and increase their impact on research programming. Their roles in research prioritysetting were clarified, turnover of membership of the CRUs was encouraged to allow for fresh ideas andimproved training was provided. Moreover, introduction of regional research panels and the training ofresearch staff in participatory research have helped improve the relevance of research executed at theregional level.

The activities foreseen under the pilot user research fund were only partially implemented. The fund was-- a:mda prw+;A aei&.ev.,.+I, the --e s_ to c-,A u . h'p+. -eea-c a+: ,+:e- +U__ el-vs ora" i~ LUJ.V & JW 1U&r wlil I4l'. I11"aj4 IAJ %.a&y %JULL DUALL1Q kJILVLL3F AWVa41L' a%A1 V1L&V0 ULJ.LVII L L LV

under contract for them. The main weaknesses were (i) the difficulty for research staff to translate theneeus ol users inw touaubu proposals; andu (i) ute lacK oI toois W assist beneflciaries m planning,

implementing and monitoring research activities. Eventually, this led to a much lower than plannedutilization of the user fund. Even so, 12 research projects for a total of CFA Franc 49.7 million wereexecuted. This represents only about twenty percent of the original fund (US$550,000). The impact on therating of the overall component is minor, because this was a pilot activity.

Collaboration with other development partners (extension services, other donor funded projects and NGOs)was strengthened. The emphasis was placed on trials in farmers' fields. Joint missions were carried outwith extension services (the National Agricultural Extension Program, PNVA, the Malian CottonDevelonment Comnanv. CMDT; the Office du Niger- 0N_ etC-) to follow-up on issue of mutual interestLER also carried out applied research on a contractual basis with the extension services (cotton, researchdevaIniemmpnt et" ) nA TandIp2 m nrnuuliA wPmi rwegmilar r..on t r8e io for extni .T'hcs

collaboration opened channels of communication that enabled IER to respond more effectively to problemsencountered uy fa-,n,ers anu otheu user Us0 ofL LLULUIJ reseachW. A U *OWI o1 l20 UnW LULUUV1Ug1oV Were

introduced by EER, of which 110 were disseminated by the extension services and were adopted to differentdegrees by farmers (see Annex 3 for some illustrative adoption rates). Thne tecinologies were mainlyfocussed on reducing the risks from climatic change, improving production (rice, fruits and vegetables, andpoultry) and quality of crops intended for transformation (cotton, corn, honey). Adoption rates wereclosely linked to potential income increases, input requirements (labor and non-labor inputs) andavailability, access to credit, and risk of crop failure. The inadequate funding by Government of the stateextension service, after the closing of the credit supporting the PNVA, was also a limiting factor in makingfarmers aware of new technologies.

III. The Research Program Implementation and Management Component is rated satisfactory.The creation nf a Riptntifip DepvPrtmPnt at ER allowed the rnodernFm,tin of frasx-rlh rsa sgement Th,jc,

were developed and adopted, which allowed for better programming and implementation of researchda1Vl1I1s as weVIl ad U1yiuv-u YUA1jJU1LLjVU 01 1-vVal4il JULpUW. 1rn-vil'ivU ilbU mudlil4v IllUL0 lrb1UUlblVV IU

the needs of users through the integration of the CRU/CNUs into the planning process. The adoption of theresearch master plan and its subsequent revision to regional conditions have also increased theresponsiveness of research to local needs. The training provided by the project strengthened the technicalcapacities of researchers and support staff in several areas: station management, research proposalformulation, participatory research, research programming, inclusion of gender issues in research, writingup and publishing of research results, and technical expertise in several research areas. Putting research ona contractual basis also improved the quality of research proposals and publication of results. All 16research programs of IER were evaluated both internally by committees including users and externally by ananel of indenendent experts. These evaluations were instrimental in focussing research activities on thepriorities identified in the master plan (both national and revised regional plans). Most research staff was.ranefo A .L fr tflfnlt>o te% *lsL absL.aan n s A tAta (ale*fl rs fo:lk t% T of - I.e 0Z-4t*e pMl o 1 a ). Ah1ese

regional based reseachers have been able to produce significant adaptive research results (adaption ofprorising ne-w vIeuies, uie-uy guiueliues for UivCsLoCK, new - uuoer varieties, etc.). Research resuits were

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systematically published in EER's annual reports (six during the project), research bulletins (over 400) and4r-, sc; -

44 'M-none ~, -rnn f a .1-n, e ollnna F.- mn'-A.mA+- o fLive sientif pu.vnlca1t.na. -U c-.ation of a da'abase has alo a'low- ed fo. L-.fl0L a v aUiUuy o

research results and programs under implementation, and constitute an important tool for the disseminationof research. Thvie project also created a national research network through the fornalization of parnershipsbetween IER and other research institutes in the country.

IV. The Resource Development and Management Component is rated unsatisfactory, despiteimpressive progress obtained in several areas. The poor implementation of the component is mainly theresult ofd elays ino btaining the land titles, less than expected support from other donors, lack of adequatelytrained financial personnel, weak internal financial management capacity and lack of a staff careerdevelopment plan.

IV.a. Management of Research Tnfrastructure and Fciuinment. The new organi7ational setup of LFRseparates the roles of research and support to research (infrastructure management). The six directors ofthe regional ,'ntnrs eno onger dectly involved in research, but are instead solely responsible 1.-t

management of the infrastructure used by researchers, financial and administrative management. IER alsoobtained tuu Lu he land of .41 a U rUVdLeaU1 ldAAciliuVs 4u UaVnUd dve U U a eLr. pInii foI LUUJ UrVr1UPUVlnL IMs

master plan was only partially carried out because of (i) lengthy delays in obtaining the land titles, whichwere a condition of disbursement for these investments; and (ii) much less than expected donor support,which led to inadequate funds being available to carry out the planned activities (rehabilitation oflaboratories and replacement of old equipment were thus not done). Also, not all station managers areproperly trained to adequately manage the land under their responsibility (rotation, homogenouspreparation, etc.). Funding for infrastructure maintenance was also inadequate, in part because not alldonors supported this activity. Several donors only provided funding for research itself and not for theassociated maintenance costs. The lack of donor support for maintenance required a reallocation of theIDA credit to increase funding for maintenance.

.b. Financial Mancr-ment. Financial mnnnagmpent was PnhAnce w ith the intrduction of a nawsystem that allowed for improved analysis of expenditures through greater coding flexibility. In addition,_^e"see AAs6AV _A-1A wereAAI -. A-A -_1-4 on +1kA AX.- A;A -- _AAAAAAUAAL_--1 AAAAA_1 _ v UIL'. VLVsw AAL[ &A%V UVCAI VJ_LlU 1~rU1U113 Ult1 uaQw;J VL %JA *u1ULwL.WL. w Ua'alal tLal Iii i1UVlVIL

was decentralized to the regional level and the process of work programming and budgeting greatlystrengtened. Tne rumaining weaknesses are uae lack of adequately trained personnei and the poor internalaudit capacity. The 2000 audit of IER's statement of expenditures underscored this by raising questionsregarding the appropriateness of recorded transactions.

IV.c. Human Resource Management. Much progress has been achieved. Descriptions of aUl positions atLER have been done. AU research personnel was tested and assigned to appropriate grades, and a stafftraining plan was designed and implemented. A database was created with information on all staff. Thestatus of all personnel was changed from civil servant to that of employee of a nublic entemnrise- whichallowed for greater flexibility in remuneration and increased incentives for qualified research and supportstaff to stay at TR.R S-rini^us .wpr-Anepm were the Ian-rk of Aplovpl.rmwpnt of a career pln a" and 1.

non-compliance by EER management of the newly adopted staff manual.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:iThLe Staff Apprai . RyepoJw 1SAPt%i) n4;nt iitWIXAE U ME11111 ELC01 111 Ja JIe Moo iav of .L1ui wI LUfo the pUeJVL4.

It merely quoted a Bank report from 1981 and stated that similar projects in other countries had anestunmateU rate oi retum exceewng '40 percent. EiR. nas cameu out several studies to measure the impact ofnew technologies on farm household income and overall production. The studies are based on smallsamples, which make it very difficult to extrapolate the results. It is also difficult to measure to what

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extent improved productivity is due to research or extension.

4.4 Financial rate of return:ThL SAPR didl nnt etimatp. a fi1nqnci1 r2tp nf rmtnrn either No infnrmatinn ie avai1ah1 tn stirate onne nr

altematives measures, such as improved cost efficiency. As was common at the time of projectn rnn.n w. n-r -Aq-A lk., -A '4l.flnIr +1-.~.An.n+a

p±9 9

a.Laun, uo p&a. ne.ters we eva% bdefined by which toJ aLta U.LUO LflLflUABtS.

4. .a ........raldvcivp ...p.at:..

The project's institutional development impact is rated modest. IER and CNRA have been greatlysUtrgtUheneU UUt ghI Uthe poUJecL. TUh change satut Ul o uER w lr,the V1WaUUJ 1-- V--'- inLcUrseu

user input in the formulation of research programs and the start of research on a contractual basis withoutput indicators, are significant and in many ways irreversible improvements. Researcn has becomeincreasingly demand driven and relevant to the ultimate users. Several weaknesses remain, such asfinancial management and monitoring and evaluation. The overall rating is therefore conservative.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5J.S 1 Factors 0 the cotro.l Of U*U5*LII* or ,,-.plemett;, .g age.c,3

Two main factors that were outside Govemment's control, affected project implementation. The first wasUlUV UreVUuduUn oi Uis -XI1 CP r1A Prc inI 1 77-t. IL OISXUiI%iUan Ly iLncreVdVU tI L%,VL VI ofLtL pIUJV^L LU 1LCa C'LU1r.Ii4y

terms and put increased pressure on Govemment to increase its counterpart contribution at a time whenGovemment revenues were under severe pressure due to extremely iow prices for cotton, which is thecountry's main foreign exchange earner. The second, was the lower than expected contribution by otherdonors: out of the US$68.1 million expected, only US$19.2 million were eventually received. Thesignificant reduction in finincial support led to the decision to: (i) not rehabilitate laboratories and replaceequipment, and even with the delays in obtaining title to land, insufficient funds were available to executethe infrastructure rehabilitation program (US$34.4 million less); and (ii) cut the funding for researchactivities (including four programs in their entirety; US$21.0 million less). The impact on the institutionalreforms nlanned under the proiect was limited; these cuts will, however, have an irnpact on future researchactivities, as the infrastructure will be in increasing need of rehabilitation. An important cause for theredrlAceA Ann-r finAinc wn: n nrnfemin. anA iinndnninAd rhantp in thpir en.intru aceietani -ftratiou

5.2 Factors genera a 1y subjiect to government cont.ro:Key factors include frequent turnover of decisionmakers, insufficient budget allocations (especially forextenLIon)11, UlIay s inI Moutluf"lW ILLSJLIlWs and .IL unila-f r' iSuLI.IUJLn si of wu

Sotuba Regional Research Center.

Turnover. During the six years of project implementation, there was a tremendous turnover of keydecision makers: three different ministers, three different secretary generals and three different directorsgeneral of IER. This rapid turnover of decisionmakers had a seriously negative impact on projectimplementation as decisions were frequently deferred and decisionmakers operated in a survival mode andrefused to make politically inexpedient decisions (e.g. land titles for research centers and stations).

Budget Allocations. Following the closure of the PNVA in 1998, Government failed to provide sufficientoperating funds to continue extension activities. This had a negative impact on the timely introduction ofnewi tp4-hnnlnriv to f2rmeum In MdAitinin rYnvPrnmrnnt fni]PA tn provM_e in a tinmlu m,nnpr the rI.P,raA

budget for the increased salaries following the adoption of the change in statute of IER and its researchSuI. gLis WU LU Ue'. UG1- aLUL Ul over. V1auLIr.

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Adoption of Institutional Reforms. As a result of the turnover of decisionmakers, the adoption of keyinstitutional reforms was delayed by almost four years. This was an issue repeatedly brought up by Banksupervision missions but did not lead to a suspension because it was felt that it would endanger thesubstantial progress made in other areas, such as research programming and implementation.

Sotuba Repional Research Center. The Government expropriated 800 ha (out of a total of 1,050) fromthe Sotuba Regional Research Center to be used for urban development. This caused the displacement ofseveral research nrorarms (livestock- sorghum- camr) and the need tn enrclAe the remrsinina land qt hicrhcost (FCFA 400 million or US$0.55 million equivalent) to prevent further urban encroachment. TheAprnirwiAotnti Of the land haA noit been Adi,...c A v.tl a-ny, of . Aonor -M- -- o to +1e So..-b

Regional Research Center.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:P1 fIUaruw J,ir.uag,ement. J r ea rLa1I4UsU a 1i4iU ar-a of WVeaLues dL I1. ULUULIUL ULU pLrject

implementation period and caused the Bank to threaten to suspend disbursements. Financial managementreceived attention only late in the project, foliowing repeated weaknesses identified in audit reports. Anew computerized financial management system was installed and 1ER staff received training from anoutside accounting firm, which also temporarily took over bookkeeping activities at IER. At the end of oneyear of training, only few staff could use the software.

Procurement. A routine ex-post review of the compliance with the Bank's procurement proceduresidentified several weaknesses related to proper filing of documentation evidence, which makes it difficult toascertain whether procedures were properly complied with. A review of Statements of Expendituresshowed that irregularities may have taken place in some instances. Staff subsequently received training indr2uino un nprerement'nIpnRp nrnner dnmirni-nt filincr _nd in rPsnPrtina Raninr ,,rn mrpm.ept nrmpAimcp in

particular as they relate to local shopping. The 2001 audit report is to focus on this issue, but the resultsW,vere noit a-vaau. il U-A-AJU, tlfltt ii.- tflL.t.Iwere ot vble Wwm to beinlued in'e ICAR_

numan Resource Management. iER's failure to implement the career development pian for its staf,despite the testing of all research staff and the elaboration and implementation of a training manual, and itsnon observance of its personnel manual, have contributed to some turnover, as has Government's delayedfunding for the salaries. Staffing is only slightly higher than the appraisal targets and substantialreductions have been achieved: e.g. LER employed 265 researchers at appraisal and 158 at present (129researchers are opertional and 29 are enrolled atdi fferent universities) versus a target of 140.

Monitoring and Evaluation. Indicators were identified at appraisal. but were never qnantified afterproject start-up. Instead, new indicators were proposed and adopted after the project's mid-term review.lie Lawlt fnr i-negfirolmionce ^f mnitrifino ar%A aah- fl_t N0 xLyiti t1A 1 ns., 1- ma a1-1. _;--,.o --AL

IER, neither paying much attention to it. Also, no methodology was developed during projectimplemenUaiUon. Sotwar,e wab installed towardU ,te end of the project which allOWeu for tie tracking ofresearch activities. It was, however, too late to properly evaluate project outputs.

5.4 Costs andfinancing:At appmisai project costs were estimatea at U i i 1.7 miiiion; at project compietion actuai project costsare estimated at US$56.6 million. IDA's actual contribution to the project's costs was US$19.5 millionversus US$20.0 million estimated at appraisal; Government's actual contribution was US$17.7 millionversus US$17.9 million estimated. Government's contribution expressed in local currency was, however,significantly higher. As mentioned above, donor contributions were substantially lower than estimated at

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appraisal. Of the planned contribution of US$68.1 million, only US$19.2 million was actually provided.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Ratnonale for st<stainabiiiy rating:The SAR lacked a definition of sustainability and also did not define a timeframe in which it would have tobe achieved. For purposes of the ICR, sustainabiity is defined from an institutionai perspective and tneoutcome is rated likely. Financial sustainability was not expected to be achieved after this first six-yearphase.

The project contributed significantly to the institutional strengthening of EER and CNRA. IER is now amuch stronger institute, where research and management are separated, research staff is almost allregionalized, as are programs and decisionmaking; the other development partners (producer organizations,NGOs, other government agencies, and development Droiects) are included in the setting of researchpriorities; and increased professionalism of research staff through training and assistance in reviewingresedrrh nrnnnqqls All this has led to an increqqe in the n,inlitv of the research nromXm- and in the ninmherof technologies adopted by producers. In the case of CNRA, this has become an autonomous agency whichha a = dram-r cafa;ty to ..- 5v rfsmlh n lihy and nnnlrnn.

T_ .t _ 1___ ._ I_-1_____LLs ___ .1_ _-_ __ _L__r__ ___In the luog-Lerm, finncalQu sustalbililLy Wml U bought by havig beneca USZe o1 research pay forprograms that interest them directly, while the government would continue to provide funding for strategicresearch with a public interest purpose (e.g. for increased food security). Overhead costs of iE R would beincluded in the cost of the specific research, which would avoid that insufficient funds are available forinfrastructure maintenance. EER has already made significant progress in securing an increasing share ofrevenue from domestic sources through contractual research arrangements with large companies, such asCMDT, sale of research related production and Government budgetary contributions. The share of thesetypes of revenues as percent of IER's overall budget increased from 25 percent in 1994 to 49. percent in2001.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:A follow-un oneration had always been nlanned. Such an operation couild however, not he nut in place intime for an orderly transition because of delays in reaching agreement with the Government on the timinganAd scope of the restructuring of the Ministry for Rfra Development, anA AosrA on t1ae part of the Bank'sdesign team to have a truly sectoral operation rather than a series of stand alone projects. The Agricultural0erv.ces -an r.dcr1%___4;_ ng o- Suppor __je, TTpr'dbya A crdi-Ul ,he amo-un of SDRaVLVUVVb dULU J1?ILUUU.V1 %.J1r.U14ULAVUUb O3UFJULL rijL4J,;, bUjJj)U1LrU V U~ dIi J-t %~VAU.L LU UIUC WIIUUAU UI alJD.~34.2 mnillion (Cr. 35830-ML), was approved by the Board on December 11, 2001 and is expected to beeffective by October 2002. Tims project wil contnue to strengtnen me reforms introduced under theNational Agricultural Research Project.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7 1 I.ondi.ia:

The Bank's performance at the lending stage is judged marginally satisfactory. Project design was in=P-#- *-; U ke *U'T.+;oSrc ! --- : A EI 9 . M .- ~>h f- r;A D--U MU +e Ulpsw"flltlfhf

7V w&Lf Lfld I VCI%'5- int '- f A ll4U U U f0 Ifl' At *UitUL~UL fVhI, niia

on institutional development (strengthening research management and coordination of all official fundingfor agricultural -rsearch) and supported the autonomny of IER through the introduction of a separate statuteand by defining appropriate career paths and salary structure. It also tried to address failures fromprevious operations by introducing accountability through research contracting and user participation indefining and evaluating results. Its major weakness was that it was an ambitious project, trying to do too

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much (major institutional reform and major research impact). As noted before, under pressure to move theproject forward, too many important reforms were left for implementation with no up-front conditionality.In addition, the design team failed to quantify impact and progress indicators. The latter was however, notuncommon for nroiects designed during this neriod.

7.2 Supervision:The Bank's performance at the supervision stage is judged unsatisfactory. Though the project wasvi,pPrvIe. rPoIll2rlv uwith qaticfqrttnrv Pk-ill miy P'Yrn-nt initiqllv in tlh fnqnriRl rnnaoPment nrP.,

important decisions that would have reinforced the institutional reforms were not made in a timely manner.iLje laaskTet, LU^C2r (backedA by setzr . oubbsted inL 1996 "M&t &L&e B^r k L Id reconsmidethe statutes for EER through advancing the Mid-Tern Review, but regional management did not supportihns. with hindsight, it would have been be'ter to nave foiiowed tue Task Tearn Leader's advice or,alternatively, to have threatened suspension. Continued inaction in irnplementing the revised statuteseventually led to a threat of suspension in connection with the Mid-Term Review (late 1997). The statuteswere subsequently revised by the Government, but funds for salaries were not provided in a timely manner.The land title issue was not resolved until staff requested the intervention of the Regional Vice Presidentwith the President of Mali. Following discontinuity in the assignment of financial-management specialiststaff assigned to Mali, and difficulties in coordinating their visits with supervision missions, the CountryOffice was strengthened in this area and the situation improved. The ambitious design of the proiect, withfocus on both institutional strengthening and improved research results, made the project difficult tosunervise= Sunervision became almost exclusvively focused on imnlementation and problem solving. As aresult, the deficiencies in the functioning of project monitoring and evaluation were never satisfactorilyoAArncnA AoAnita a nArA DrPx rpn, nonal I QIl

4 mnIff~C a, ws.%voy.-Pw i<Afl*-.V jJlf.' 0Xt8b0.tJfl

73 2vera lBank-pe. - o.e:Overall Bank performance is rated unsatisfactory. This rating is based on the weaknesses noted at theubigu i.uu supvisio sMLUagvo.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:LL U peLjX llIUIAV of LUe Bo.Luwer anU Lue iU1FpIVL.LVULULPC agenUies UUrIUg pEUJ p1e parUaUUUU lb ri<lU

unsatisfactory. Following the 1991 meeting in Abidjan between member countries of the Special Programfor Action in Agricultural Research, the Government and LER took a lead role. Tne new agriculturaimaster plan and a national agricultural research strategy were designed with the help of USAID and theIntemational Service for National Agricultural Research, and officially adopted by Govermnent. Therewas, however, little progress on the key issue of institutional reforms during the four years of projectpreparation.

7.S Government implementation performance:Boffower performance during proJect implementation was unsatisfactory. Govemment was slow inreleasing counterpart contributions and took many years before adopting the revised statutes for LER.Delays in releasing funds for the amreed unon hiaher salaries for IER research staff led to the departure ofqualified staff. In addition, the activities planned to upgrade the capabilities of research laboratories,rcnters anA cdtatinns .n,il,A innt hp c-n,IintPA hranlip rynupmrnmipnt AijA innt irwirAil T;PT ,xxthl arr-ptaol%I lo.A

Inn * is -'-- … SSSJS … ._. ^. - * .,w. s aw_ wS-j nSy

titles until late in the project. In addition, Government significantly reduced the size of the Sotuba RegionalL-research el w b,,LU y amlULs 80 per Ln for LuVal ba V.IdVeLLop LLL eLL LLD Vit llphrLY, reqling, laurge iL-YVbsuslabin fencing. This not only led to the relocation of research programs to other centers, but also to delays andto increased investments at this site to the detriment of others.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

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The implementation performance of both CNRA and IER has been satisfactory. Both agencies wereinstrumental in preparing their staff for the proposed institutional reforTns, especially those related to staffgrading, the separation of staff into research and technical support staff, staff training, sub-regionalcollaboration with other research institutions, and improved research planning and execution. IER alsosuccessfully moved research staff from its headquarters in Bamako to the regional centers. IER was,however, less successful in implementing the required changes in financial management, which hasremained weak. CNRA satisfactorily performed its role of coordinating and ensuring qualitv control ofnational agricultural research activities, and introducing contractual research.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:Thp Rnrrnwprc nversill nprfarmanrep ic rntpd1 inca17ifiefptnr, h'rtiic nf thp imnart nf thp A1pInwe in

implementing key institutional actions (adoption of the revised statute of IER, inadequate budget provisionsfor salaries, lad titles). These delays m-ade it iff.cult to implement the envisaged in_stitutioa activities,despite good efforts on behalf of IER and CNRA. It is likely that the project could have achieved all of itsinstitutional and researcn strengtnening objectives nad there been iess deiays, as the attention of theimplementing agencies and Bank supervision missions could have been focussed on technical issues.

8. Lessons Learned

Several lessons are evident from the implementation of this project. These are:

a) Institutional reform is a long-term and difficult process that often requires difficult policy decisions. Inthe case of this project, the proposed reforns meant that (i) the Ministry for Rurai Development was toreduce its control over IER and CNRA, (ii) transfer ownership from Ministry of Finance of vast plots ofproductive land to IER in a country where land pressures are increasing, and (iii) loss of control fromdifferent Ministries on IER as a large employer. In such an environment, the time needed to implementthese institutional changes needs to be carefully evaluated. This project was too optimistic in this regard.Dated covenants and conditions of disbursements are not effective means of convincing waiy and newpolicy makers to implement profound changes.

b) A project which tries to achieve profound institutional changes should have a detailed road mapo 4-s i -a., otono anA vnar.fnA raJ.l*c 'TlIo -a neve A far t-.,.- fln;a n -A l.k- n A- ;+ more

ho, '- vj -6 *-p so-n mtd ..a ted Wt- *-V - Sh0 F F Jt. OUt t"o e It

complex to supervise.

c) A properly functioning monitoring and evaluation system is a prerequisite to assess the impact of aproject. in the case of this project, the well selected indicators that were in the Development CreditAgreement were never used to monitor project progress and impact. Likewise, farm level impact of newtechnologies was not adequately followed to form the basis of guidelines for selecting and prioritizingfuture research efforts. As a result, the success of a new technology is based on proxy indicators, such asadoption rates, only little is known about actual constraints to adopting promising new technologies at thefarm level.

d) A demand-driven national system for technology generation, transfer and training, needs to 1rnitp allinterested parties in one platform, and take into account all related activities that are carried out in thecountr.It is therefore in-poatnt as part of the pr.ojec+ +_ -A , a

W~".Y A. - - - ---Lfl-J- F- -Ib -J L Fl'.WyJJ%.L &% t UUL.i Jt.L4 .LJ.LLlI2 attt

organizations of NGOs and private sector service providers, at both the regional and national level.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:

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No formal comments were submitted to the Bank by the due date. The Borrower did, however, prepare a_e- com- ..lc .n .4 A - -a f -f+1a -,4 ca" lke ftinA in A ixiiv 8

FJ9LJJt4.fl .JLLIJULIF%UULIU%jfL LW t. f I. AlU .* LWay. UL1*JU .ama

(b) Cofinanciers:The cofinanciers of the project had reviewed their own activities separately at an earlier stage. Theydi dnot providec riticism on the aide-memoire of the mission but instead chose to formulate severalobservations on what they felt were areas in need for strengthening during a possible follow-up operation.The cofinanciers felt that:* fixedc osts at the center/station level should be prefinanced so that research activities could be carried

out; retnbihrSe.nent nf these eypntlrpe wniltd hp AhtaiinPA thmniuah an nvPrhaA r1hnrop aidded tn narth

research contract;a nluergoaiaino eec udn o,i a-c'r resea.-hdvlp,n ad,:nsr c

V Lucucuvr, 1~1irVi4dLaijL&uUJJ VUI LVDVMILJU JLLIULU, £LJ1 U.! JAUML LVUICU, aL%,U.%&VV ,U~1.41SJLLL%J avS.& v1Jo J1

the researcher too independent vis-a-vis the CRU;* funding of NGO executed researcn activities should be tesiea,a s successes were obtained ini the

Sikasso region;* the CRU is a committee of the CNRA and has no legal standing to directly receive public funds; and* only one audit should be carried out covering all sources of funding, instead of independent audits

carried out on behalf of each donor./-I tnLerparm,e-s ^T/2/1va.>-:-#- o(1. LAdd iincal rtion

10. Additional Information

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

As was common at the time, but shouldh ave been retrofitted. Both the SAR andt heDC A defined a set ofimp, mntation prugriss aiu oULPULtui inUdios. 1 IIusu miicalorS arU Shown bOCIW

Progress Indicators Defined at Appraisal End of1994 Project

outcome4 l 1 2001 1

dissemiination

Progress madei nt he implementation ofre search4 1I rnntrictina nrngeP entI

|aiue percentageo f researchact ivities(i n 0% 100%Ivaiut erms)i mpiementeu unuerco nuracua

arrangementsnumber of research proposals accepted I 20% (1995) 70%

-as aproportion of those proposed |

Training received and delivered compared to |45 Doctorats/PhD | 62initial program 6U Msc/DEA 94

l12se ssionsforCR Umember I

42 seed

trained9 trainingsessionso nForestryUpanirnes

Impact assessments 012

and external reviews 0 16programsevaluated

Impactas sessments carried out jointlywi th the |LWVextension services and research users

Number of research contracts funded from the

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| pilot User Research FundI- number 12- vqhiee q-, nercentqvre of totAl Fllund

Number of local working group meetings 66 249

and numbero f monthly meetings with extensionstaff (subject matter specialists) attended 80 311Publication of the annual renort (timeliness) l5Number of scientific publications |400

I NumDer of puDlications for extension services iiuProgress with the rehabilitation of research 100%infrastructure (valuecom pletedas percentof 30%value scheduled)Equipment procurement(va lue purchasedas 1 100% | 28%perceniuage 1 originally scLheduiied)Progress with the consolidation of donor IDA,Gvtfunding (percent of total funds coordinated and Dutchthrough CNRA)Percent of research programs submitted to 33%

IVteru al re-view each year.

Evaluation of all IER scientific staff DoneEvaluation of all JER technicians by their peers | |_DoneIEvaluation of accounting staff hy accounting Done

Paroicgpamon M collaorduIvere gionaires earch j6 i2 out or 10

programsIIRationalization andreg roupingo fcen tral 1998service laboratories in four laboratoriesCost recovery of all contractsr elated to the Throughout project Yesproaucutonofseedproducti ondiaoratoryservices n arrCap thenu mberof scientistst o14 0 by 140 158December 31, 2000 I scientists- of

which 29

training |Cap the number of technicians 130 for research I 186

programs and 40 forexperiments tation

I_ __14_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I I

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) l

Expenditure Category ICB PrR-cuement MethoC 2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 4.60 0.00 4.90 | 9.50(0.00) (4.60) (0.00) (0.00) 1 (4.60)

2. Goods 4.70 0.00 1.30 8.00 14.00'I7A (1A0 in A (1 .30)A (0.A0 (60AA)

13. Services 1 0.00 0.00 2.00 12.40 14.40Consultants and audits (0.00) I (0.00) 1 (2.00) j (0.00) 1 (2.00)

14. Mlscellaneous | 0.00 I 0.00 I 1.00 1 7.10 1 8.10

|Training j (0.00) I (0.00) I (1.00) I (0.00) I (1.00)1 Mierllanniu I n n0. n n00 I A nn I sQon I s

IRecurrent costs and (0.00) (0.00) | (6.00) | (0.00) | (6.00)research contracts6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.40iler r@Alreseh fund (.0 ( 0.)A AA I (A AAN (A. AA0 (A0AA0

Total 4.70 j 4.60 10.70 1 91.60 111.60 I(4.70) j (4.60) j (10.70) (0.00) l (20.00)

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Procurement Method'lExpenditure Category ICB -NC - O N.B.F. Total Cost

,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C . %h~ I -

1. Works 0.00 1 1.05 0.00 T 0.93 f 1.98

(0.00) J (1.05) j (0.00) I (0.00) j (1.05)2. Goods | 2.00 | 0.22 | 0.41 | 3.18 | 5.81

(2.00) (0.22) (0.41) (0.00) (2.63)

Consultants and audits (0.00) | (0.00) | (3.22) (000) (3.22)

4. Misceiianeous 0.00 0.00 i2

Tralning (0.00) (0.00) (1.23) (0.00) (1.23)

5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 11.08 | 30.33 41.41iRecurrent costs and (0.00) (0.00) (11.08) | (0.00) | (11.08)|research contracts £ t l ll16. Miscellaneous 0.0 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.51|User research fund (0.00) (0.00) | (0.51) (0.00) | (0.51)I Total I 2 An 1 1 27 I 16 .45 36. R8 56C 7

[ _ _._____(2_00) (1.27) 16j45 (0.00) (19.72)

"Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies.2 Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff

of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i)

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managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Project Financing by expenditure account (in US$ million equivalent)

Iex6enditure account Appraisal Estimate I Actual/Latest Estimate P

D r;o IDAA |1 GG -ovt CoF. | IDA |Govt. CoF.CIN--wr- In 4.6 0.80 4.10 I . 1.0?7 0.93 22.8 133.8 22.7 Vehicles and equipment 6.00 0.00 8.10 2.60 1.56 3.18 43.3 0.0 39.3

Ue-sAA A- A-un A-'A' 'A' 00 01 0.00 127.c A A 0.0

Consultant services 2.00 0.00 12.40 3.10 1 .16 155.0 0.0 9.4"'C"", v-ann an aa v I aaI 'I . ant ala a a~ a~ a_., VIraining i.0U 0.00 /.iV 1.;0 ;.25 I ;0.0 0.0 ;7.6

Operating costs of NARC, 3.00 17.10 38.10 | 5.97 15.05 30.33 199.0 88.0 79.6JLiER and ingREResearch conventions 3.00 0.00 0.00 2.94 0.00 98.0 0.0 0.0

The distribution of theGo vemment counterpart contribution overt he different categories is not availableseperately, it is included under the cofmancing column. The actual Government contribution was US$17.7million versus US$17.9 million planned (or about 99 percent).

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Beneflts

The Staff Appraisal Report did not attempt to estimate economic or financial benefits for the project.AUs&teaU, it L4IJLVtee to zn n I,stnLUIQJ 3t,fLt,LI ' Pt,sIUI S Polc,y A azpe;, T.' ml nau6, Je 19, vUvI h ih ad.

concluded that investments in agricultumal research in both developed and developing countries hadgeneratea hign ecounomiic raws vo return, excuming 0 percent m many ciases.

IER conducted some studies to estimate the financial and economic impact of technologies develoned andextended during the implementation phase of PNRA. The studies were conducted in 2001 on the main crops

rraM r.,-ce anti lnw rrnnnd r.Pe non m;7p m,illpt/cnrolhiim rnttnri ornntininitt anni infnrnn2tinn was

obtained on the adoption rates of the different technologies and the estimated returns. Table 1 below gives a

Table 1: Adoption and profitability of innovations (source [ER. 2001)

Programs | Intenal Rate Adoption 1I I___________________ _ of Return Rate

Rice l62% O155% |Maize | 120% o 45-78%

1Millet 1660/n 1 1I8°/n 1Sorghum l 50% |22%COLouo 28%-/ 1 2n/

Artificial insemination 1 _ _26%_l

Fodder crops 8%Groundnut 1 22% 1 10-15% |

The results of thee stuAdie or. inAXit;x7A nnlu na thP samnlP size was tnn smnil

N'4o sLiudie Ws1u weUrLu l en .U rLUUa4Mur *I Iost effec.VLUVVUVe- Ves of 4IL,1i UtULVbo ardU a4IL.e LLL piUCVL,. llllS

weakness will be addressed during the follow-on project.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:I steop nf Proect Cc1o eranaI SeciI, . Perfnrnance Rating

. . e&onol.e I &onists1 FMS, etc.) s ImplementationI Development 1Identiffcafon/Preparation

07/91-01i91 2 i Agr. Researcn Speciaiist, S I Economist

06/91 5 1 Agr. Research Specialist,1E conorist,Agr. ServicesSpecialsst,lR esewarch infrfastructreSpeciahstr

1[Pnrocu c.reen Speialist,

IADDraisal/egotiation03-04/93 8 1 Agr. Research Specialist, SS

1 Economist,0 I Agr. Services Specialist,

1R esearch InfrastructureSpecialist,1 InfRastruchure Specialist,

12/21/1994 2 1 A.ServicesSpecia,ISMS, Procurement Speciaist,

nr9 I lSociologist R e

08/28/1994 4 1 Agr. Services Specialist, S HSI Agzriculturalist.I ISociologist,1 Research Specialist

12/21/1994 | 2 | 1 Agr. Services Specialist, S HSI Agr. Research Specialist

06/23/1995 1 Agr. Research Speciaist HS

I iit2;/g99r. Services Specialist,07/11/19/17 2 | ResearchMgt. Specialist

| ~~~11/23/1996 |4 |1 Agr. Services Specialist, | U | U

l l | 1~~~~~~~~~~ NGO Specialist,I I I !~~~~~~~~~~ ConsulaintIII

1 ~~~02/25/1997 3 1 1FMS, u U U 1 Agr. Services Specialist,

I I I ~~~~~~~~~~~I Research Specialist

| ~~~07/11/19/1997 |2 |1 FMS, | U | UI Agr. Services Specialist

11/25/1998 4 4 1 Farmers Organization U U

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Specialist,1 FMS,2 Agr. Services Specialist

02/26/1999 1 1 Agr. Services Specialist U| UU

05i28ii999 3 ; z P 2 gr. Sbervices -SpeciaiList, f

1 FMS

02/10/2000 7 2 Agr. Services Specialist, S S1 T ;i,etn^rle npp,ral'ct,

1 FMS,1 A. Research SPepGia1iSt

1 Soil Fertility Specialist,1 Farmerq Organi7ation

| | Specialist02!10/2000 I 3 1 Aar 1.Servinpq Ierinisdist

1 FMS,1 Procurement Specialist

02/26/200 1 | 3 |1 Agr. Services Specialist, SI Agr. Research Specialist,1 Livestock Specialist

03/11-22/2002 ! 1 Agr- Research Specialist; S S

1 Economist,2 Agr. Services Snecialists.1 M&E Specialist,IR esearch InfrastructureSpecialist,1 Infrastructure Specialist,I FMS,1 Procurement Specialist,1 Project Assistant,I Technical Asistant

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Ac.a -ts E

Identification/Preparation 22.5. . ....... _, . _~~ Ar fl , ~ ^ . --AppralsallNegotiation 45.0U 3Y97,071.37

Supervision 114.3 471,313.49ICR 22.0 45,400.00Total 203.8 1 914,584.86

Detailed budgets do not allow for a distinction between preparation and appraisal. All preparation costsare put under Appraisal.

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)Ratinf

L Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NAOl Netnr Pnliries n H ) SU n M C N 0 NAM Physical OH OSUOM ON ONAn F.in,neia! OnH Os UOM O N *vN.A

3 Institutional Development 0 H 0 SU 0 M 0 N 0 NAFn rr e O H OTr SU O M A, * AMAL__.J LJS& J$,CIq4 ... A thL W314 ~ . I 1S

LO Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N * NAO Gender O H 0 SU 0 M ON A NA

O Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NAOJ Private sector developiment C) H (-iO SU O(D M ON O IVAOi Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NAOi Other (Please specify) O H O SUO M ON * NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bankperformance Rating

Z Lending OHS*S OU OHU15 Nunprvivion O z n! O5 *aU O .HU

F Overall O HS O s * U O HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

F Preparation OHS OS *U O HU? Government implementation performance 0 HS 0 S 0 U 0 HU

F Implementation agency performance 0 HS 0 S 0 U 0 HUF Overall OHS OS * U O HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

StaffApp naisal Report, National A g cut'hral 1L2pagort1 Prnnpoet. Datea M,vnwm.br 0 1 O99 andA Reor no12190- MLI.

Development Credit Agreement, National Agricultural Research Project, Republic of Mali, Credit Number2557- fiLi, date

Aide-memoires of the supervision missions

Bilan du projet national de recherche agricole (PNRA), Comite national de recherche agricole, f6vrier 2002(rapport provisoire)

Rapports Annuels de Recherche (Anual Research Publications). IER

Rannorts d'a iLitq financierS

D1d. Dsn..oA- ID-U-- A ^AI KTD A -. 4-;1 A.4- -- A -- A, A-4-* . ...I.,e>ssvS \|9 X\_swV - APVWS J _I LNX, VJLUa I at.R WJLL I VI V1U UaL

Rapport d' evaluation du Projet National de la Recnerche Agricole ( PN.KA) par le Gouvernement.

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Additional Annex 8.S ummary of Borrower's Project Completion Report

Afin de doter le secteur du developpement nAral d'un Systeme National de Recherche Agricole perfornantet repondant aux exigences d'une production agricole croissante, diversifiee et durable, le Gouvemement duMali a elabore en 1992 un Plan Strategique A long terme de la Recherche agricole. La premiere phase de ceplan, prevue pour une periode de 6 ans, a ete traduite en actions dans le cadre du Projet National de laRecherche Agricole (PNRA).

Soutenu et finance nar le Gouvemement du Mali et la Banque Mondiale avec la participation de nombreuxpartenaires au developpement (Pays-Bas, USAID, Novartis, Cooperation Suisse, France, FED etc.) lePNRA,A a dA6ff"avrr en 1 QQA At a pr.s -gin l- 3! AAP.Amhra 2)001

Les objectifs vises par le PNRA etaient les suivants:- le reUforUemtenit InsiutUonnel;

- une meilleure gestion des programmes de recherche;- le transfert de technologies et la participation des utilisateurs (producteurs et transformateurs) au

processus de fonctionnement de la recherche;- la mise en valeur et la gestion des ressources.

Conformement aux dispositions de l'accord de credit, la mission gouvemementale a effectue une evaluationfinale du programme dont les r6suitats et les conclusions sont resumAs ci-apres.

All. t.tra d- renforein en iQttlAir

T - I'-TfT A J.L....Li

Le 1'41'.ft a el' U4LtrILOVlLl eUn -une WititA alutonow chamge de Ur c dLUUIUnUUU et UC lit supervisiUn Uds

activites du systeme national de la recherche agricole avec une bonne integration des representants desUtilisateurs de la recnerche agricole. ii a ete a partir de 1997, maitre d;ceuvre (financement BanqueMondiale) ou fortement associ6 (financement Pays-Bas, Cooperation Fran,aise) au financement de larecherche agricole A travers une strat6gie de contractualisation de la recherche.

L'IER a ete erige en Etablissement Public A caractere Administratif (1992) puis en Etablissement Public Acaractere Scientifique et Technologique (2001); il est dot6 de l'autonomie administrative et financiere etdispose d'un patrimoine s6curise et d'un personnel sous contrat regi par un accord d'etablissement. Lepersonnel de recherche est hir&archis6 dcans les princinaux corms de la recherche. LTER a ete forternentregionalis6 (centres regionaux et stations de recherche) et restructur6 avec une s6paration entre les fonctionsde raecherhe et d'appui alx ser ices Ae raphae_he.'

Ces acq-uisL UVsb UiLpVLLdUs Mir le pl:an inbd-LU 60nnel,on,Iz:aC, ont ee ccopa44gfe5s de queques fabilesses,

notamment, le retard accus6 dans la mise en place de certaines reformes, 'imnplication encore insuffisantedu ClNAKA et des Utilisateurs dans le financement de la recherche et iimpilication encore insuffisante desautres acteurs du SNRA dans l'execution des projets de recherche.

Au titre de la gestion des programmes de recherche

La mise en couvre du PNRA a beaucoup contribue A ameliorer la gestion scientifique de la rechercheagricole au Mali. La pertinence et la qualite scientifique des recherches ont et6 fortement d6velopp6es Atravers une meilleure organisation structurelle (Direction scientifique; coordinations et colleAesscientifiques) et la mise en place de mecanismes appropri6s de programmation et d'evaluation de larecherche ag.cole a-c la plei;"e partcipation des ut--isa-eM (cor^.ssions Ap t A--.l A-M Ar' T A .1

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strategique revis6, cycle de programmation, evaluations externes des programmes etc.). Les chercheurs ontMAnAfi6iA de nomnhreuses fnrmntions et participent al ux activxtes des reseatx region_a ux e-t intt-rnstionan txiderecherche.

Dans la realisation de cet objectif, n1 a e note comme principales faiblesses, l'insuffisance des ressourceshumllainies au niveau de certains programilules et centres de -recherhe, i'ins-ulfisance de 'Iexploitauions desautres ressources du SNRA.

Au titre du transfert de technologie et de la participation des utilisateurs au processus de la recherche

Durant la p6riode d'execution du PNRA, de nombreuses innovations ont e developpees dans l'objectifd'accroatre et de diversifier la production et le revenu agricole et d'instaurer les mecanismes d'une gestiondurable des ressources naturelles. Le transfert de ces technologie s'est trouv6 fortement favoris6 par lesmecanismes de cooperation mis en place dans le cadre du PNRA et du PNVA entre chercheurs,vulgarisateurs et Utilisateurs des resultats de la recherche (test en milieu reel- AMRn-

La parmdri Iatin tdes T t tlie2t lre au processl cIPnroaramtli2In de la rA c l pha s,'est c cIAt e A

la cr6ation des CRU et CNU, leur participation aux comit6s preparatoires et aux journ6es portes ouvertesu~ .iiU u~ ~AEILJ-1 1%,V,Ll av2IluJJ UVIZ %lAul1ulMubbun UV UilVi11 UU %-P4I%J, 1r, Iv.VU ~1LIux Ldes Centres ue recece e esin e o=isin euvi:d lru,l recoLirs a-u angues8

nationales lors de certaines sessions. Un fonds des Utilisateurs a ete mis en place pour le fmancement deprojets de rechercne a la demande directe des Utiiisateurs; iis ont par ailleurs benefici6 de nombreusess6ances de formation et d'appui conseil lors de la preparation de leur plate-forme.

Malgre ces points tr6s positifs, il est not6 des insuffisances dans le systeme de diffusion de certainesinnovations techniques qui en limitent l'adoption, le faible niveau de mobilisation du fonds des Utilisateurspour le financement de projets de recherche a la demande directe des Utilisateurs, la d6finition insuffisantedes procedures et modalites d'implication des utilisateurs au mecanisme de financement et desuivi-evaluation de la recherche agricole. L'insuffisance des credits. surtout anres l'arret du PNVA et avecla crise de la fliere coton, a quelque peu limite la diffusion et I'adoption de certaines technologies.

Au titre de la valorisation et de la gestion des ressources

Sur le plan des infrastructures, des realisations importantes ont e realisees en matiere de constructions etde r6habilitauion des locaux ainsi que sur ie plan de i'acquisition de mateiei et dequipements. Des manueisde procedures pour le bon fonctionnement de lIER ont et6 elabores et mis en cuvre ( Accordd'etablissement, gestion financi6re, gestion du personnel, passation des marches, gestion decentralisee duparc auto etc.). Le systeme comptable et financier mis en place est effectivement decentralise et donne plusde cr6dibilit A l'IER.Ces efforts sont cependant juges encore insuffisants, en particulier en ce qui conceme l'equipementinformatique des centres, leur dotation en personnel comptable qualifie et en personnel de recherche de hautniveau.A !'isue, de sonA cn Vuloion Ia rMission rnn0,.ernerpMen,nfl a formnnlA n t..n r.or,b: de . t4n.

dontc elles relatives:

- au renforcement du CNRA dans son role de pilotage des activites du SNRA;- au renforcement des capacites manageriaies et scientifiques des structures de recherche;- au renforcement des liens de collaboration entre les principaux acteurs du SNRA;- a la mise en place des Conseils regionaux de recherche et A l'op6rationalisation du cycle r6gional de

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programmation de la recherche;- a la mise en place de sttnices apprpripres de financernent de la recherche narimne (re(rhercheqstrategiques ou appliqu6es, recherches a la demande directe des utilisateurs);- au it-muiA.t.iiirt.t du dino tif deU V s iii-evU at.itn met d'eudte d'irpact Ide sn .esl.rnot.a Ina tcecin

S'agissant de 1'6vaiation de la 1p e.r.o..ance du Gou-rne.w..nt et de la --nque Mor.dia, Ia missiongouvemementale note les observations et appreciationsc i-apres:

Performance du projet et durabilite du projet

Le PNRA a contribue a la mise en place d'une ebauche de systeme national de recherche agricole autour del'IER qu'il reste a renforcer. II a dote le dispositif national de recherche d'un organe de coordination et desupervision, le CNRA, et assur6 la pleine participation des utilisateurs au processus de la rechercheagricole. Le PNRA a contribue a l'am6lioration de l'environnement scientifique et de gestion de lIER. II acontribue a l'exp6rimentation d'approche nouvelle en matiere de fmancement de la recherche agricole. Bonnombre de ces resultats peuvent etre jug6s de durables et sont susceptibles d'exploitation dans la mise eneuvre de la Comnosante Apnui au svsteme national de la recherche aaricole du PASAOP.

Pprfwm,niinrp Au gniviv.rnPmt-.nt

En A-'-:t des --------- s notees dns A rsee 1vl dea. -*erAes Aci ..e upogz=.,e atc1f u vutJp. Ut.al %IAJUCU U& a,l..ouItt m 0 la *tlOt. . tt u wt UL .d a.toa.,VitOUtFU~aLW& ~U*it. F.ii -at

I'acquisition des titres fonciers des domaines de recherche, la performance aussi bien du gouvernement quedes agences d'execuuon peut -re jugge satusfaisante. L mm et le CNRA se sonat acquittces ae manieresatisfaisante des missions qui leurs etaient confiees.

Performance de la Bangue

La performance de la Banque peut 8tre jugee satisfaisante en depit de quelques insuffisances de lapr6paration du projet, apparues plus tard dans la mise en oeuvre et l'evaluation finale; il s'agit surtout duprobleme des indicateurs d'imDact et des methodes de leur evaluation obiective.Les missions de supervision ont ete regulieres et de bon niveau, m8me si lors de ces missions les problemesdep ,IveApplPnnptit insitutionnen1 ont niilunuie npeu mnrrinnflic4 !'anpreniati-^n desm rAultot- tpphniniieq et tip

leur impact.

Relationse ntrel 'emprunteure tl aBa nque

En d&pit des difficultes rencontrees dans la mise en ceuvre, les relations entre l'emprunteur et la Banquesont restees fianches et cordiales.

Lecons a tirer

L'elaboration de proc6dures claires au d6part constitue un el6ment de succes dans l'ex6cution du projet.Par ailleurs l'identification des indicateurs contribue enorm6ment a assurer une bonne supervision, ainsique des evaluations performiantes.

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IBRD 24964

NATIONAL AGRICULTURALF p ALEA| M ~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A L G E R I A.\

RESEARCH PROJECT l ;/1IiI

REGIONAL CENTERS =lSAHARAN/CENTRES REGIONAUX DE RECHERCHE SAHAR;ENNf

STATIONS DE RECHERCHE = SAHELLAN/SAHELIENNE F : I I F I II!

* SUBSTATIONS ZIIISUDANIAN/SOUDANIENNE I I I ; 1 !| r I |II Fj II l

SOUS-STATIONS | GUINEAN/GUINEENNE ! I IFlFI ti |I

_ Paved Roads ® Region Capitals ! Ii IiRoutes Rev6tues Chef -Leu-de-R6gion

Paved Roads Under Construction -_ Region BoundariesRoutes Revetues en Construction Limite de RegionRailroad e * National Capital

Chemin de Fer ~~~~~~Copitole D Etot

Navigabole Rivers (July-Decem6er) 2W Isohyets in MilrimetersRivi6re Navigable (juillet-decermbre) Isohy6tes en Millimetres J

t> Flood Areas -- _ International BoundariesZone D'inondation Fronti6res lnternationales

;, Dam and Reservoir \\.\N*jt J \1\ X\\ \ X X \\ \ \\\Barrage et Reservoir > \gt\&\\\\\\\\\

B /_ eAVM A U R I T A N I A ;_

4 ' J \ 'a, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~N I G E R

|' - i > S ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~B uF R K5 I N < vAA~~~ BURKIN

w t N f 7 , | |SFASO NSH!, / N ~~~~~Torl d.|i ALGERIA

0 50 150 200 250 300

G UIN E A Kebila _ ikasso KILOMETERS ALGERIA

G U I N E A ,C r $ Kebilo ilo 2 MALI r IFir,61. NKAK~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~( _ -

T h r s a o sb e e c p , mor e y e W o d u sn M , Ba A re c G H ABN A / I I" i IJ EU R K I N A 7 ,

| r rwpSOOfl& ttgyrs I COTE D'IVOIRE L. | GUINEEA NIGEN A

NOVEMBER 1993

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IMAGING

Report No.: 24407I ype: 'CR