World Bank Document · 2016. 7. 8. · Supervision IX December/19O 1 RUB Po 2 6 63 Supervision X...

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIL USE ONLY

RePwt No. 8803

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

BANGLADESH

MAND TUBEWELL PROJECT(CREDIT 1140-BD)

JUNE 27, 1990

Agriculture Operations DivisionCountry Department IAsia Regional Office

Thi document has a restried ditrbution and may be uand by recipies oly In Oe perfomans of heir offic dutis Its conatet may not othrwie be dsosed without Wodd Dank authoriadon.

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PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED

ADP - Annual Development PlanBADC - Bangladesh Agricultural Development CorporationBRDB - Bangladesh Rural Development BoardDTW - Deep TubevellDPHE - Department of Public Health EngineeringGI - Galvanized IronGOB - Government of BangladeshHTW - Hand TubewellICB - International CompetetiveBiddingKSS - Krishi (Farmers) Samabay (Coopertive) Samity (Society)LGRDC - Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and

CooperativeLG - Local GovernmentLLP - Low Lift PumpMOSTI - Manually Operated Shallow Tubewell for IrrigationMTFPP - Mediur &m Food Production PlanPP - Proje(. . oformaRD - Rural DevelopmentSTW - Shallow TubewellUCCA - Upazila Central Cooperative Association

Fiscal Year s July 1 - June 30

FORIVIC!AL u ONLYTHE V. RLD BANK

Washmgt;un. D.C. 20433U.S.A.

opmab" tvahaswn

June 27, 1990

HEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on BangladeshHand Tubewell Project (Credit 1140-BD)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "ProjectCompletion Report on Bangladesh - Hand Tubewell Project (Credit 1140-BD)"prepared by the Asia Regional Office. No audit of this project has beenmade by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time.

Attachment

Thi document ha a rstrictd distrbutin and may be u.d by repiens on Inte Peformaceof ther offW duties Its contents may not oterwe be dissed without Wodd ank aufhuimaon.

FOR OMCUIL USE ONLY

BANGLADESHHANDTUBEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT 1140-BD)


Table of Contents

PREVACE*.......................... i

BASIC DATA SHEET*......................................................ii

S Y AR............................

IT. INTRODUCTION.. *9....* . .* **.*. *** ** *** ****** ** *.*..*.....**1

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND APPRAISAL .............................. 2

A. Project Origin ..... .......................................... .2B. Project Preparation and Appraisal . ............. # ............. 2C. Project Description ................ ..... 3

1Y1. I MPLEMENTATION ........................ ......#.... * .................4

A. Implementation Experience ............. .. ... 4- Handtubewell Production ... ........ ......... ... ........... 4. . 4- Handtubewell Pricing ............. . ............. .. .6- Handtubewell Sale ...........to....*.............................. -6- Mechanics Training ................ . 8- Procurement and Distribution of Toolkits ..... 8- Sale of Spare Parts. ..... ............................... .. ... . 8- Research and Testing ........ ..... *....................... 83 civil WorKL ....................... ..#*..... 0....... ... 9

B. Project Costs .......................................... 9C. Financing and Disbursements. .. ........ .... . . .... ..... 9D. Consulting Services ............. ....to.................... 10

IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE .. ................. ............... .... 10

- Implementing agencies and Coordination .................. 10- Project Monitoring. .................................... 11- Compliance with Covenants .... .............. ...... . 11

V. PROJECT IMPACT .. ... . ...... .................. ............ ........ 1l1

- Findings of the Socio-Economic Surveys . ...l1- Project Sustainability.... .......... ... ......... ... . 13

VI. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION . .............. ........... 13

/t This PCR largely follows Bank's earlier guidelines (see page 1, para 4)

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

VII . IDA PERFORMANCE. ....................... . 14

- Project Design and Appraisal ............................ 14- Supervision..............4 ......... . ............. .14

VIII. LESSONS LEARNED .......................................... ...... .14

TABLES

1. Su.mmary of Physical Achievements............... -... .. 172. Arnual Sale of Hand Tubewells ................ .9

3. Changes in the Price of HT Sets.... .. 204. Project Expenditures....... ......... 215. Appraisal Cost Estimates and Actual Costs - Comparison ...........226. Project Financing ...... o.3 ... *.e .............. 27. Cultivable Land Holdings of Sample HTW Users by Division .........248. Principle Occupation of Sample HTW User by Division .............259. Affiliation of Sample HTW Users to Organizations ................2610. Land Cultivated by Sample Households .............. sees.......... 2711. Use of Irrigation Equipment by the Sample Households ............. 2812. Irrigated Land Size Owned by HTW Purchasers.................... .2913. Use of HTWs by the Sample Households ...... 30.... .3014. Percentage of Houteholds Producing Different Crops Using HTW.....3115. Mode of Financing the Purchase the HRTW .......... 3216. Impact on Women .... . . .9...o.**.33

ANNEX 1 - Related IDA Credits ....................................... 34

ANNEX 2 - Statuts of Covenants. ...................... 35

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BAiGLADESH

HAND TUBEVELL PROJECT (CREDIT 1140-BD)


PREFACE

This Project Completion Report (PCR) reviews the implementation of theHand Tubevall Project in Bangladesh for which Credit 1140-BD in the amount ofSDR 14.8 million was approved on May 17, 1981. The Credit was closed on March31, 1988 and the undisbursed balance of about SDR 955,061 was cancelled. Anamount of SDR 2.5 million was previously cancelled.

The PCR was prepared by the Agriculture Operations Division of theAsia Regional Office and is based, inter alia, on the Stuff AppraisalReport; the Credit, Guarantee, and Project Agreements; supervision reports;correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; internal Bank memoranda;and discussion with government officials.

This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). Thedraft PCR was sent to the Borrower on May 3, 1990, for comments by Jur.e 14,1990, but none were received.

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BANGLADESH

HAND TUJEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT 1140-BD)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT - BASIC DATA SHEET

KEY PROJECT DATAAppraisal Actual as 2 ofEstimate Actual Appraisal Estimate

Pro.4ect Cost (USS Million) 34.92 27.01 77Credit Amount (US$ Million) 18.0 14.74 82Date Physical Components Sept. 1985 June 1989CompletedEconomic Rate of Return 44 Not done

CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENT

IDA Fiscal Year FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 F788Appraisal Estimate 1.2 6.4 13.0 17.8 18.0(US$ Million)Actual (US$ Million) - .01 2.92 4.64 5.34 7.88 13.65 14.74Actual as 2 of Estimate 12 22 26 30

Date of Final Disbursement April 2S, 1988

PROJECT DATAOriginal Act'ial

Negotiations 03/16/81 03/16/81Board Approval 05/07/81 05/07181Credit Signing 07/08/81 07/08/81Credit Effectiveness 11 10/06/81 02/11/82Credit Closing 2/ 03/31/85 03/31/88

OTHER DATES

Name of currency : Taka (Tk)Exchange rate :

Appraisal year average (FY8O-81) s 16.0Implementation year average (FY81-87) : 26.0Completion year average (FY87-88) : 31.5

----------------------------------------------------------------------

1/ Credit effectiveness was delayed because GOB took time to meet theconditionalities. Project implementation was consequently delayed.

2/ Credit closing date was extended thrice; first to expand the scope of theproject; second to make up for the delay in IDA processing of the first requestfor extension and the delay in obtaining GOB's counter-signature and the thirdtime to complete the field testing of different types of manual pumps.

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Staff Weeks

FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY06 FY88 FY87 FY68 TOTAL

Preappralseal 5.6 10.6 .4 16.6Appraisal .1 56.3 S8.4Negotiation 4.0 4.0Supervision 4.2 22.7 12.7 20.8 20.1 26.8 20.2 19.0 145.7Other 1.3 .0 1.S

TOTAL .1 5.6 76.4 23.2 12.7 20.6 20.1 26.8 20.2 19.0 224.1

*Excludes time spent by Young Professionals.

Mlission Dat.

Vontb/ Nuaber of Day In Specializati'. Porformance Trend ProblemItem Year Persons Fl-ld11 Rsreosented 21 Stat.usi 41 Typ

Preparation * August/1980 S 21 E,J FApraial e Jun-Feb/1982 2 12 ASLE S FSuperv Won I August/1982 1 RiB PO 2 1 -Supervision I2 March/18 U 1 6 A 1 1 FSupervision III August/198S 1 RUB PO 1 1 FSupervision IV March/1984 1 6 A 2 1 -Supervision V Septsmber/1984 1 RUB PO 2 1 -Supervision VI July/1886 1 RUB PO 2 2 VSupervision VII Novembr/lOSS 1 4 A 8 a VSupDrvision VIII June/18S 1 6 A 8 S 0Supervision IX December/19O 1 RUB Po 2 6 63Supervision X April/1987 1 2 A 2 6; 6]Supervision XI November/19S 1 RU PO 2 ] 6

1] When the supervision was carried out by a st.ff member of Resident Mission, It Is Indicatedas RU In Form 590 .

2] Koy tO S"cT1itatilon:A a Aricultuis; PO Program Officer at the Resident MissionLO = Loan Officer; E Economist; I = Irripgtion Engineer;F a Financial Analyst

a] Key to Performance Statue1 = Problem free miner problem; 2 = moderate problem; 8 m ajor problem.

4] Koy tO Trend:I = improving; 2 a stationary; 8 a debtrorating.

63 Ko v eO Of ProbloF Financl; I nogerial

8] Now form 590 does not inclueo tae date

* Preparation and appraisal was combined.

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BANGLADESH

HAND TUBEWELL PPROJECT (CREDIT 1140-BD)


Evaluation Summary

Objectives

1. The main objectives were: (i) to increase the income of very small farmersby providing them with an access to affordable irrigation technology; and (ii) toprovide safer water supply to the rural population.

Implementation Experience

2. During the initial period, there were production difficulties due toinadequate funding for import of essential materials. Also, the controlled pricesof project HTW were below market costs, thus undercutting private sector production.This was corrected following IDA intervention. However, during the last projectyears the situation reversed and project HTW had to compete with lower priced HTWoffered b; the private market.

3. The pace of sale of HTW was slower than anticipated at appraisal. The mainreasons were: (i) sales were confined to cooperative members only; (ii) thecooperatives were often short of resources to provide the necessary credit tofarmers; (iii) inefficient HTW allocation procedures by BRDB; and (iv) inabilityof the Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE) to supply complete HTW setsduring the peak selling season.

Project Results

4. Socio-economic surveys indicate that although significant numbers of HTWwere purchased by larger farmers, small farmers have also gained significant access.Also, project HTW were used mostly (952) for drinking water supply. However, HTWs,when used for irrigation, were mostly for irrigation of high-value crops.

Sustainability and Lessons Learned

5. With more than 400,000 HTW installed throughout the country, thistechnology is now well established in Bangladesh. However, the proceduresintroduced under the project for distribution of HTW are clearly unsustainable.These were intended for a transition period, in which the technology was consideredto still be in its "infant" stages. However, as the review of projectimplementation indicates, public sector interventions resulted in inefficiencies inboth production and distribution.

6. With the technology now well known throughout the country, there is no moreplace for public sector involvement in production/distribution of HTW. Specialassistance with HTW to the poor would be better provided by the NGOs andinstitutions like the Grameen Bank.

BANGLADESHMAND TUBEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT 1140-BD)


I. INTRODUCTION

1. Agriculture is the dominant sector in the Bangladesh eiconomyaccounting for nearly 502 of the Gross Domestic Product. Agriculturalproduction is severely constrained by the scarcity of cultivable land andnatural hazsrds. The heavy pressure of population on land poses a majordevelopment constraint. It is estimated that more than 502 of farm householdscultivate less than 2.5 acres, the minimum holding necessary to providesubsistence income at the existing production levels. Farm holdings aresegmented into as many as 10 parcels. This constitutes an obstacle toefficient farm management. Rural institutions are weak and a firmly entrenchedrural power structure tends to monopolize limited services such asagricultural credit. Rural infrastructure is poorly developed and safe watersupplies are the exception rather than the rule.

2. The main thrust of the Government of Bangladesh's (GOB) agriculturaldevelopment strategy has been, and continues to be, to increase foodproduction, to give all farmers equal access to crop production inputs and toprovide employment opportunities to landless families. - was recognized that,to achieve these objectives, a major effort would be req-ired to overcome theshortage of minor irrigation equipment, spares, fertilizer &nd other inputs..he irrigation technology prevalent at the time of project formulation - DeepTubewell (DTW), 'hallow Tubewell (STW), and Low Lift Pump (LLP) - is moresuited for use by individuals or groups of larger laneholde-s because of the(relatively) large irrigation coverage (DTW 80ac; STW l2ac; T 3 50ac). On theother hand, hand operated tubewells (HTW), discharging 8-10 gpm and capable ofirrigating about 1/3 ac of paddy using family labor, are ideally suited forcatering to the needs of the farmers with small holdings. Moreover, HTWs areinexpensive, easy to install and maintain and can be manufactured within thecountry.

3. GOB, with IDA's assistance, formulated and implemented a Medium-TermFood Production Plan (MTFPP) for the period 1980-85. The Plan focussed onincreasing minor irrigation facilities such as DTN, STW, LLP and HTW and onincreasing the sup-ly of production inputs including availability and accessto agricultural credit. The Bank assisted the government in these effortsthrough the following projects: North Vest Deep Tubewell (Cr. 321-BD), ShallowTubewell (Cr. 724-BD), Low Lift Pump (Cr. 990-BD) and Rural Development IIProject (Cr. 1384-BD) and the subject project. (Annex I)

4. GOB had constituted a committee with representatives from theproject's implementing agencies and the executing Ministry to prepare aProject Completion Report (PCR). The Committee prepared the report andsubmitted it to IDA in April 1988. Since GOB had prepared the report on thebasis of the previous guidelines, this report has been prepared by the TaskManager, as an 'old style' PCR. This report iL also based on a review of theStaff Appraisal Report (No. 3280 BD, dated April 17, 1981), the Development

Credit Ag.eement (dated July 8, .981), IDA supervision mission reports,project files and discussion with government officials.

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION AND APPRAISAL

Proiect Origin

5. The basis of IDA's consideration in 1978, of a HTW project originatedfrom the rapid sale of 7000 HTWs financed under the IDA assisted RuralDevelopment I Project. However, at that time Bangladesh AgriculturalDevelopment Corporation (BADC) and the Integrated Rural Development Board(subsequently renamed Bangladesh Rural Development Board), each had one largeongoing Manually Operated Hand Tubewells for Irrigation (MOSTI) programs tosell 90,000 and 150,000 HTWs respectively. Since UNICEF w&s committed tofollow-up with their successful MOSTI project, an IDA project was not pursued.Subsequenitl.y when UNICEF was not able to proceed with a follow-on project, IDAwas requested by GOB to finance a HTW project.

Project Preparation and Appraisal

6. the project concept and scope were simple, based upon ts- experienceof the two HTW projects already implemented by GOB. However, the appraisalmission did raise some policy issues. These were:

(a) making pig iron and coke eligible for import by individual andgroups of industrial finms rather than solely by GOB;

(b) increasing the sale price of HTWs sold to farmers under the GOBprojects to a level that would allow full cost recovery and leavea margin for profitability to any private firms and marketingagents interested in producing and supplying this equipment tofarmers in competition with GOB projects; and

(c) prcviding medium-term credit through the banking system andthrough the UCCAs for the purchase of the HTWs.

7. In response, GOB argued that the existing foundries did not have theexperience to import the raw materials required for fabricating pumpheads.The bank therefore agreed that the pig iron and hard coke (required to producecomplete pumpsets) and galvanized iron (- I.) pipes and brass wire mesh (forstrainers) were to be procured by DPHE following ICB procedures. The localsuppliers would be given a preference limited to 15X of the c.i.f. value ofimported material or the import duty whichever is less. Contracts far

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fabricatl;ai wear to be let following local competitive bidding proceduressatisfactory to IDA. Under this arrangement DPHE was to provide foundries withthe required amount of pip iron and coke for a specified number of pumpheads,on the basis of fixed coefficients (80 pounds of pig iron and 20 pounds ofnard coke per pumWhead). The foundriea would then supply the pumpsets to DPHEat the price specified in the contract. It was agreed that strict qualitycontrol woald be ensured so that the foundries would supply the hand tubewellsaccording to the standard specification agreed under the project.

8. GOB reluctantly agrfed to slightly increase the price of theequipment to be so80 under the project and to maintain parity with HTWs soldunder other GOB projects. The price that was agreed on, was not a "full cost"price since indirect taxes were excluded. An adequate dealer margin wasincluded in the sales price. A national Hand Tubewell Coordination Committeewas set up to review the prices of both the private sector and the projecthand tubewell prices with a view to ensuring parity in hand tubewell prices.The provision of medium-term credit (for the members of the farmerscooperatives) was also agreed to by GOB.

Project Description

9. The major objective of the project was to increase the productionand incomes of very small farmers by giving them access to appropriateirrigation technology. Secondary objectives were to provide safer domesticwater supplies and to encourage the domestic manufacture of irrigationequipment.

10. The project was to be implemented nationwide in areas having suitableground water conditions, i.e., (a) sweet-water bearing sand within sixty feetof ground surface; and (b) a static water table within 20 feet of the surfaceduring the period of peak irrigation requirements (AprillMay). It was toproduce and distribute 180,000 (later increased to 270,000) hand tubewellsover a three year- FY1981 to FY1984 (later extended to FY1988) period,Pumpheads and strainers were to be fabricated by qualified foundries andmachine shops in Bangladesh under contracts with Department of Public HealthEngineering (DPHE), and the complete pumpsets were to be distributed by DPiEto the Upazila Central Cooperative Association (UCCAs) from which they were tobe sold to the farmers. The project was to provide major and minor tool kitsfor private mechanics to install and service hand tubewells. There wasprovision for simple training for village mechanics. Medium-term credit. was tobe provided to purchase the hand tubewells and the tool kits. The projectprovided for an internationally recruited quality control consultant to workwith a Quality Control unit in DPHE to be set up under the project. Theproject also included a program of research and testing of appropriate handtubewell equipment with the objective of finding and developing design

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improvements to increase the efficiency of minor irrigation and then promotingthe improved design(s) towards privatization in a follow-up HTW project.

11. The IDA Credit of US$18.0 M was to finance about 80Z of the projectcost excluding duties and taxes. It was to cover the full foreign exchangecost (US$16.2M) and about US$I.8M equivalent of the local costs. Farmerspurchosing hand tubewells and tool kits on medium-term credit were toc'ontribute a downpayment equal to 102 of the hand tubewell price, net of taxesand duties. The balance would be the medium-term loan repayable in equalannual installments over a three-year period. About 15? of the farmers wereexpected to purchase hand tubewells on a cash basis. GOB was to finance thebalance of the project costs including taxes and duties. Funds were to be madeavailable to the implementing agencies in the form of budgetary allocations inthe Annual Development Plan (ADP).

III. IMPLEMENTATION

A. Implementation Experience

12. Table 1 gives a summary of physical achievements under the project.Several events determined the need to make some changes from the SAR estimatesduring project implementation. During 1982, in the face ofexceptionally severe economic constraints and the necessity to reduce theoverall size of the ADP, the government appointed a Martial Law Committee toreview all projects and programs. This review resulted in a scaling down of anumber of projects. In the course of this pruning, several components of theHTW project, e.g., vehicles, laboratory testing, and consultants for themid-term review and for the management information system, were cut ordeleted. The research and testing component was reduced from $200,000 to only$10,000.

Production of HTWs

13. According to the appraisal estimate, the 180,000 HTW sets (50? ofwhich were 2-pipe sets and 502 3-pipe sets) were to be produced anddistributed as follows: 1981-82 - 40,000; 1982-83 - 60,000; 1983-84 - 80,000.Production and distribution were delayed for several reasons. During the firstyear none were produced because the major raw materials (pig iron aud hardcoke) could not be imported due to lack ox adequate funds in the ADP (aproblem common to many projects at that time)- Once this budgetary allocationproblem was resolved, GOB banned the international procurement of 1 1/2 inchdiameter G.I. pipe. Procurement of G.I. pipe was held in abeyance while IDAinsisted that in order for the procurement to be eligible for IDA financing,

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10B procedures would have to be followed. The ban was walved temporarily inthe early part of 1983 and then for the duration of the project in June 1985.The waiver of the ban was made a condition by IDA for the expansion of theproject scope and extension of the Credit closing date proposed by GOB in 1985(para 16).

14. The fabricatio-n & * pumpheads was also initially slow to startbecause of the delay in ,.iunting the quality control consultant. The delaywas due to DPHE's initial _.eluctance to adh.re to IDA's guidelines forappointment of consulting *ervices. To expedite the fabrication work, theResident Mission of the Bank appointed a local consultant for a month (June1983). From July 1983 DPHE hired the same local consultant for the entireproject period.

15. As part of its austerity program, Government banned for a short timeinternational travel of officials. This prevented travel for pre-shipmentinspection and led, in some cases, to shipment of inferior quality materialand to short shipment. Due to tL. relatively small quantity of materials (lessthan one shipload) procured by DPHE. only one or two offers were received inresponse to calls for ICB tender and this led to retendering and delays inprocurement.

16. In mid-1984, the Government requested IDA to finance additional90,000 HTWs and 180,000 sets of spare parts out of the credit savings, as wellas extend the Credit closing date from March 31, 1985 to March 31, 1985. Themid-term review had estimated the demand for HTWs at full-cost pricing to bearound 400,000 additional units during the Third Five-Year Plan period(1985-1990). The review also identified a need to provide for di3tribution ofspares under this project since spare parts were apparently being stolen fromUNICEF/DPHE stores and sold in the market to meet the demands for spare parts.

17. IDA agreed to the request based on the assessment that a proposedfollow-on HTW project would not be approved by the time of the closing of thisproject (March 31, 1985); hence the need to fill the gap by increasing thenumber of HTWs and to extend the closing date. However, with the inordinatedelays (about 6 months) by both IDA, in processing the request for extension,and by GOB in counter-signing the draft amendment letter on the expansion ofthe project scope and consequent delay in the procurement of raw materials andGI pipes, sufficient HTW sets could not be supplied by DPHE to meet demand.The Government requested a further 15-month extension to June 30, 1987; RMBalso agreed that a 15-month extension was warranted in light of the GOB fiscalyear ending on June 30, the expiration of the PP and inadvisability ofterminating the project in the middle of the sale season. However, in keepingwith the current guidelines, IDA approved only a one-year extension (to March31, 1987) with the proviso that a limited additional extension could be

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considered upon review of the progress of project implementation. In order tocomplete the field testing and the sale of the total 270,000 HTWs, the Creditwas again extended to March 31, 1988.

Pricing of HTWs

18. In early 1984, a mid-term project review by a World Bank consultantfound that, though the Taka price of most local products using imported rawmaterials had increased as a result of the substantial devaluation of the Takasince appraisal, the price of project HTWs had not been increased accordingly.In effect, there had been a real reduction in the net-of-taxes prices that hadbeen agreed to by GOB. The project HTWs were undercutting the market forprivate sector production. Subsequently the Bank recommended that theGovernment increase the price of project HTWs (Table 2). After initial stiffresistance GOB eventually agreed to an increase. It should be noted though,that the project HTWs are of a much a higher quality than those traditionallyoffered by the private sector, and could have been expected to command apremium.

Sale of HTWs

19. The pace of sale of HTWs was much slower than anticipated atappraisal (Table 3). This was due to a number of factorst (a) HTW sales wereconfined by a directive of Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB), to onlymembers of KSS (Farmers Cooperative Society) when the SAR clearly stipulatedthat HTWs would be sold to all farmers for cash, while only members of the KSSwould be eligible to receive credit; (b) most UCCAs did not have the requiredliquid funds to pay for the HTWs from the DPHE stores (the procedure was thatthe farmers paid 15Z of the price as downpayment and the balance had to bepre-financed by the UCCAs from its own resources); (c) the procedure ofcentral allocations of the HTWs by BRDB head office, based on ProjectDirectors' reports on demand, did not allow any reallocation between UCCAs inthe event that any UCCA failed to lift its allocation within the specifiedtime, or if the demand in some UCCAs exceeded the allocation; and (d) theinability of DPHE to supply complete HTS sets during the peak selling season(November to May) due to delay in procurement of raw material.

20. Based on the recommendations of the July 1985 supervision mission,BRDB liberalized the sale of HTWs to include non-members of the KSS and alsodecentralized the system of allocation of HTWs so that it was more responsiveto the demand situation. To solve the problems of inadequate funds, severalUCCA's an arranged overdrafts against the shares and savings of thecooperative society's members with a commercial bank and took delivery of HTWsets from DPHE stores. This arrangement is not permissible under cooperativerules. As a result of the above changes, as well as the publicity campaigncarried out by BRDB at the suggestion of the supervision missions, the salesperformance improved somewhat.

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21. Demand for 3-pipe HTWs exceeded appraisal estimates. In part, thismay have been due to a price differential with the private market. The ban onthe importation of GI pipe had allowed the price of locally produced GI pipesto be increased. Since the project obtained a waiver from the import ban, GIpipes were procured through ICB at least 25 to 302 cheaper than the prevailingmarket price. The demand for the extra set of pipes may have been influencedby this price differential, and possibly, the extra pipes were resold by thefarmers at the higher market price. Alternatively, it may have been due to thefalling water table due to groundwater irrigation development in several partsof the country. This was not anticipated at appraisal. Since the actual reasonfor the increased demand for 3-pipe HTW sets could not be ascertained, theApril 1986 supervision mission recommended that BRDB should allow UCCAs tosatisfy the customers demanding a HTW set with 3 pipes first, rather thanconstraining sales momentum by limiting sales to 50S for 2-pipe sets and 502for 3-pipe sets. This flexibility also boosted sales. As a result of the saleof more 3-pipe set than estimated, several thousand pumpheads without pipeswere left. The supervision mission recommended that these pumpheads be offeredto the foundries on the basis of the buy-back option (para 26).

22. Contrary to appraisal estimates, HTWs were largely sold for cash(about 95Z). This was because of a combination of factors: (a) inability offarmers to use credit because they could not give collateral or could not gethold of a guarantor to recommend them for a loan; (b) reticence of UCCAs toprocess credit purchases because of the paperwork needed for a small size loanand the substantial effort necessary to recover the loans; and (c) high demandamong those willing and able to pay cash.

23. Sale of HTWs in the second extension year was impeded by an increasein price, 18X for 2-pipe set and 212 for 3-pipe sets, necessitated byincreased prices of raw materials and GI pipe. Furthermore, project HTWs hadto compete with lower-priced pumpsets (with PVC pipes and wells) sold by theprivate sector, and also with the low-price indigenous Rower and the Treadlepumps sold under various NGO programs.

24. The project provided for a buy-back option where interested foundriesand machine shops could buy back 202 of the pumpheads fabricated and pipesholed by them (Section 3.11 of the DCA). Initially, the foundries andworkshops were not interested in this option: the workshops, because the holedpipes were of little use alone; the foundries, because the pumpheads producedunder the project were significantly more expensive than the ones producedoutside the project (although the latter were of inferior quality). In theinterest of expeditious disposal and preventing the physical deterioration ofstocks, the November 1987 supervision mission recommended that the foundriesand the workshops should be offered the unlimited buyback of whole pumpsets.IDA modified the relevant section of the DCA to accommodate this. A number of

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the foundries then became interested - the below-market cost of the project GIpipes possibly provided the inducement. A total of 65,093 complete handtubewell sets (242 of the total) were sold back to the foundries andworkshops.

Trainins of Mechanics

25. About 2030 persons had been trained on the installation repair andmaintenance of HTWs. The project target was 2000. According to the findingsof a survey carried out by BRDB, mechanics training program has created acadre of professional mechanics.

Procurement and Distribution of Toolkits

26. Of the targeted 25000 sets of toolkits, 250 major and 1100 minortoolkits had been procured. These kits were to be sold on credit to trainedmechanics and farmers. Due to delay in the procurement of toolkits andinability of BRDB to establish link with the participating commercial bankprovided in the project provide credit, the distribution of tool-kits wasdelayed. However, with the increase in the price of toolkits in the market,sales picked up and almost all the toolkits were sold by FY88.

Sale of Spare Parts

27. None of the HTW project (UNICEF MOSTI, USAID SSIP) including this,included spare parts for the pumpsets. Each assumed that local foundries andmachine shops would supply parts as demanded. The mid-term review of theproject found that there were a scarcity of spare parts and recommended itsinclusion in the extended project. Subsequently, 180,000 sets of spare partswere provided in the project. Of which the UCCAs sold only 38,000; andanother 38,000 were sold through the buy-back option. Sale was difficultbecause the spare parts procured under the project cost more than the inferiorquality available in the market. At the time of proj*jct completion, the spareparts sets were being sold in open auction.

Research and Testin8

28. As mentioned earlier, the research and testing component wasinitially dropped from the project. It was later re-incorporated in therevised PP in 1985, but implementation was delayed because the LocalGovernment Division did not agree to the consulting firm recommended by theResearch and Testing Committee set up by the RD Division. The research andtesting confirmed that a follow-up project should cover a range of pump types,including TARA for areas where the depth of water table is more than 6.5meter.

-9.

Civil Work

29. The project provided for one regional store, in addition to DPUE'sthree, to overcome the storage problem of HTWs. Due to the slow pace of sales,UTW sets remained at DPHE stores for a long time without proper maintenance,such as regular greasing. Due to shortage of space, some HTW material, such asbrass strainers, were kept in the open and consequently corroded. Afterrepeated requests by supervision missions, DPHE began a maintenance program,but only in the last year of the project.

B. Project Costs

30. Total project cost over a period of four years was estimated at Tk.482M (US$ 3514). Project completion however was extended to six years andTables 4 and 5 present the actual project expenditures and a comparisonbetween the appraisal and the actual project costs. Though the credit becameeffective in the FY82, there was no allocation in the ADP for the project.Actual expenditures under the project exceeded appraisal and PP estimates.This has occurred due to increases in: (a) operating costs, (b) HTW productionin the revised project (para 15, and (c) cost of civil works and inclusion ofspare parts in the revised project. (para 15) Expenses for incremental staffincreased due to upward revision of salaries. With the increased number ofHiWs produced, the local cost of HTW production was higher than originalestimate. The construction cost of a storage godown at Natore was also morethan appraisal estimates. Finally, the inclusion of 180,000 sets of spareparts also increased the cost of the project.

31. There was also savings of about $400,000 in the credit becauseseveral components were cut or deleted. As a result of these reductions, aswell as favorable bids on purchase of raw materials, exchange rate changes andthe appointment of a local instead of an expatriate consultant for qualitycontrol, there were overall savings of about SDR 7.2M.

C. Financing and Disbursements

32. Total financing from IDA was USS 14.74M or 82? of the tvtal Creditamount. Contribution from GOB was US$ 5.57M or 65? of the appraisal estimate(Table 6). Since the bulk of the HTWs was sold on cash, farmers contributionwas significantly more than the appraisal estimate of 152 of the farmersbuying with cash.

33. Disbursement of IDA Credit was slow throughout the project period. Atthe end of FY85 (the original project completion year) only 30? of the Creditamount was disbursed against 100? of the appraisal target. Major reasons forslow disbursement were the delay in the procurement of raw materials for MTW

-10-

fabrication and G.I. pipes. The bulk (about 652) of the Credit was to financethese items.

D. Consulting Services

34. The quality control consultant did an excellent job of checking thequality of all raw materials and finished goods and advising the foundries onproduction matters as well as advising the Research and Testing Committee.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

Implementing Agencies and Coordination

35. The project was to be implemented by BRDB which is an agency underthe Rural Development and Cooperative (RD) Division under the Ministry ofLocal Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (LGRDC). The Director(Field Services) of BRDB served as the project manager, and a full-time DeputyDirector was assigned to assist in carrying out the day-to-day projectadministration. A sub-project management unit was established in DPHE, anagency under the Local Government (LG) Division under the Ministry of LGRDC inthe office of the Superintending Engineer for Planning, who became themanager. A full time Executive Engineer was assigned to assist him.

36. Project implementation was affected because the participatingagencies of the government did not act expeditiously. In the initial years ofthe project, implementation was delayed due to inadequate funding provided bythe Planning Commission. The initial rigid attitude of the Ministry ofCommerce about the waiver of the ban on the import of GI pipes procured underthe project also considerably delayed project implementation. The inordinatedelay by ERD to countersign the amendment letter to the DCA also affectedimplementation because awards for procurement of raw materials had to be keptin abeyance till signature.

37. Project management was negatively affected by inadequate cooperationbetween the two Divisions - RE and LG. This resulted, inter alia, in the delayin the appointment of the consulting firm to carry out the field testing ofthe different pump types.

38. Project management within BRDB was initially slow to monitor theperformance of the sales program. Centralized allocation procedure for HTWsadversely affected sales. BRDB could not advise UCCAs to resolve theirliquidity problem to purchase HTWs from DPHE stores. However in the lateryears of project life, management in both DPHE and BRDB has been quick intaking decisions such as in the case of the unlimited buy back option andauctioning to expedite sales. BRDB, being a non-technical agency, has to be

-11-

complemented for the efficient handling of the field testing of the handpumpsthrough the Research and Testing Committee.

39. DPHE management always considered the project as BRDB's and thattheir responsibility was the supply of complete pumpsets. DPHE failed tocoordinate the distribution of the pumpsets with the peak selling season(November-May) of the HTWa9. This was one of the causes of the delay in sales.

Project Monitoring

40. The project had made provisions for technical assistance fordevelopment of reporting procedures and information feedback. BRDB did notuse the technical assistance but, on their own, prepared reporting forms formonitoring performance. The format was reviewed by the Resident Mission ofthe Bank and was found adequate. The main problem was delay in the submissionof the reports which supervision of HTW sales very difficult.

Compliance with Covenants

41. The status of compliance with covenants was satisfactory. All thecovenants have been complied with albeit some with slight delay. Annex IIgives the status.

V. PROJECT IMPACT

Findings of the Socio-Economic Surveys

42. Two socio-economic surveys of the project were carried out. The firstsurvey was done in 1984 and the final one in 1987. The 1987 study Wasconducted in 12 upazilas in four divisions with a sample size of 2344households. The major findings are:

(a) Landholding Pattern (Table 7)- HTWs distributed during the early years of project period mostly

benefitted the larger farmers owning 2.5-5 ac ofcultivable land, while about 45Z of the subsequent batches ofHTWe went to the small farmers owning 1.5 ac or less;

- in the Rajshahi division, 44Z of the beneficiaries were smallfarmers;

(b) Occupation of HTW Purchasers (Table 8)- self-employed farmers were the dominant group (66Z) to purchaseBTWe; 18Z went to traders and businessmen;

- among the HTW users, the share of landless and sharecroppers was6Z, most of whom were in Rajshahi division;

-12-

(c) Organisational Affiliations (Table 9)- The KSS farmers bought most of the early consignments of HTWs;in subsequent years however the women's cooperatives and therural poor groups were allowed to purchase project HTWs;

td) Land Under Cultivation (Table 10)- HTW users cultivating 0.5 - 1.5 ac and 2.5 - 5.0 ac both V-remodal households with 482 and 34Z share of HTW respec. y;

- the modal group of HTW users cultivating 0.5 - 1.5 ac wasfollowed by group cultivating 1.5 -2.5 for about 19? of thecases;

te) Irrigation (Tables 11,12 and 13)- though HTW buyers had access to other irrigation equipment,small farmers used less of other irrigation technology;

- for 49Z of the cases, HTW purchasers did not irrigate any landwhich implies that these HTW were used for drinking water.

- only 4.5? of the project HTWs were used for irrigation; 21? forboth irrigation and drinking water, and 10? for drinkingwater and kitchen garden;

(f) Crops Cultivated (Table 14)- in irrigation, HTWs were primarily used for vegetablecultivation (51?) followed by water melon, chilies, pulses andpaddy;

(g) Sources of Finance (Table 15)- About 86? of the households purchased HTWs from their ownsavings;

- among the sample households, no farmer bought HTW with creditfrom comercial banks.

(h) Impact on Women (Table 16)- women from 32Z of the household owning HTW increased productionof kitchen gardens.

- most of the women with access to HTW saved enormous time infetching water;

4S. The above findings indicate that while the smaller farmers havegained access to HTWs in large numbers, a significant number of HTWs have goneto the larger farmers, businessmen and traders. One plausible explanation isthat access to credit was inadequate and only those with ready cash had accessto project RTWa. Irrigation by HTWs was a relatively new concept and thisproject was to demonstrate that HTWs are well suited for winter vegetablecultivation.

44. The project has been successful in facilitating private sectordevelopment in the manufacture and sale of No.6 handpumps. Local foundrieshave been established or expanded to manufacture all pumpheads for theproject. After attaining capability to manufacture handpumps, the big

-13-

foundries are now capable of selling as many as 1500 pumpheads on average permonth through their own dealer networks. Furthermore, about 227 UCCAs earnedmore than Tk 24 M in comissions from the sale of project HTUs.

Project Sustainability

45. The benefits of the NTWs sold under the project are likely to besustained throughout the lifetime of the equipment. The project HTWs are ofsuperior quality and therefore more durable than other HTWs available in themarket. There are more than 400,000 HTWs installed throughout the country andusers generally are able carry out minor repairs. The mechanics trained underthe project, as well as the toolkits supplied, will be useful to carry outmajor repairs and maintenance of the project pumps. There are a large numberof mechanics operating at the village level. The forty foundries whichparticipated in the fabrication work have benefitted from the guidance of Shequality control consultant and this will have a lasting effect.

46. Although no major risk was identified during appraisal, the risk hadbeen mentioned that, in some areas, the installation of DTW and STW may dry upHTWs. In some areas this has happened and more cases can be expected. However,this is not a major problem since farmers can lift HMes and sink themwherever groundwater is available, or the equipment can be sold to farmers inother areas.

VI. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION

47. At appraisal, economic rates of return (EU) was estimated to be 442.When costs and benefits of drinking wacer HTWs were excluded, ERR wasestimated at 47Z. Sensitivity tests indicated that the project was moresensitive with respect to changes in yield and price changes but for allexpected extreme changes in the variables, the project would maintain a rateof return well above the estimated opportunity cost of capital of 122.

48. Since project HTWs were mostly (951) used for drinking water and lessfor irrigation, there could be lower economic returns. On the other hand, whenused for irrigating high-value crops, such as vegetables, fruits and chilies,project HTWs achieved high returns. Although a re-estimation of the projecteconomic impact was not done due to lack of data, a conservative assessmentmay be made based on the above observation and the fact that there is a heavycash demand for HTWs. While overall returns may be somewhat lower than thoseestimated at the time of appraisal, the investment in BTWs remainseconomically viable. Furthermore, the availability of pure drinking water hada positive impact on the health of the rural population.

-14-

VII. IDA PERFORMANCE

Prolect Desin and Appraisal

49. The Bank's preparation and appraisal missions were combined becausethe government's project preparation was believed to be satisfactory. The Bankprocessed the project documentation expeditiously.

50. Though the procurement arrangements were cumbersome, they werenecessary to ensure the availability of raw materials to the foundries at theworld market prices in the face of GOB's restrictive policies on imports.There was no evidence that the project in any way disrupted the flow oiimports by the private sector. The import of coke and pig iron has sincebecome considerably freer than when the project began.

Supervision

51. In addition to the formal b4-annual supervision carried out by bothheadquarters and resident mission staff, the project has been subjected tocontinuous supervision by RMB. The supervision missions identified keyproblems which impeded project performance and provided solutions. On numerousoccasions, the RMB bad to perform the task of a mediator between the twodivisions within the Ministry responsible for project implementation. RMB alsohad to intercede on behalf of the implementing agencies, first with thePlanning Commission to provide adequate budgetary allocation, and then withthe Ministry of Commerce, on behalf of ERD, to allow ICB procedures to oefollowed for the import of the GI pipes under the project which was acondition for the extension of the Credit closing date. Furthermore, the Bank(particularly RMB) played an advisory role. A case in point is the suggestionto GOB to modify the buy-back procedures so that the unsold stocks of projectUTWe can be sold.

VIII. LESSONS LEARNED

52. The main lessons from project implementation are as follows;

(a) The appraisal mission assumed that credit was essential to influencedemand for HTW and to make them accessible to smaller farmers. Theexperience of the project has been that credit was not necessary tocreate demand and was not sufficient to direct HTWs to sma'a3rfarmers. The fact that more than 801 of the HTWs have been sold forcash demonstrates that larger aumbers of buyers exist who are willingto pay cash for the relatively small numbers of HTW available. Untilthis demand is filled, there will not be much effective demand forHTW credit.

(b) Provision of credit will not direct limited supplies of HTWs totarget population. Increased supply of RTWs combined with provision

-15-

of credit are practical ways to reach larger numbers of smallfarmers.

(c) Government's objective to provide cheap HTWs to poor farmers cannotbe achieved until it addresses immediately the perverse policies ofhigh levels of nominal protection on both inputs and outputs of theGI pipe sub-sector. In addition, the duties on raw materials for thefoundry sub-sector exceed the weighted average duty rate of allimports for the country as a whole. When these issues are addressed,HTWs can be made available at much lower prices.

(d) Due to groundwater changes since 1980, deep set manual alternativesshould be promoted in areas with falling water table.

(e) Any future HTW project should emphasize private supply anddistribution of HTW equipment.

-17-

Table 1BANGLADESH

HAND TUBEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT 1140-BD'

PROJECT COMPI.ETION REPORT

Summary of Physical Achievements

…___________________- ______________________-.____________________________.._

Indicators Unit Appraisal ActualEstimate

1. Civil Work(a) DPHE godown 1 1 1

2. Procurement(a) Raw materials

- Coke M Ton 2570 2570- Pig iron M Ton 10082 10082- G.I. pipe '000 ft 15300 10200

(b) Brass-wire mesh Rolls 2275 2275

(c) Perforated brass sheet M Ton 74 74

(d) Tool-kits No.- major 275 275- minor 1100 1100

(e) Spare parts No. 180000 ±80000

(f) Vehicles No. 13 1

3. Fabrication No. of sets(a) Brass Strainer 120000 [11 225000

(b) Pumphead 180000 [2] 180000

4. Sale of Pumpset No. of sets(a) DPHE to UCCAs 180000 [2] 204907

(b) Buy-back Option 36000 t3] 65093

5. Sale of Spare Parts 4] No. 144000 38290.(a) DPHE to UCCA 36000 36000

6. Sale of Tool-Kits 51 No.- major 275 270- minor 1100 1090

7. Mechanics Training No. 2000 2030

-18-

Couments

[1) Later revised to 225.000[2] Later revised to 270.000(3] The project p ovided for buy back option of 202 of the fabricated pumpheads to participating foundries and holed pipes to participatingfound-ies and holed pipes to participating machine shops. Since thefoitLjries were initially not interested in the pumpset only, toexpedite sales, it was agreed by IDA and GOB to allow unlimited sale ofwhole pumpset to interested foundries and workshops.[4] GOB sold the balance through auction.[5] GOB has auctioned off the unsold stock.

I-, mUO)t-(

I*� w.tt- I:00

OES.S.

0. g� 3U.0@ I,

* � iiii [ii00 �§ I�

*0

@0 *0U'*� I� if'

m* IW0.4- I"-d I*

&

*4.'11

0.'

o 1!0.'

I-,

'.4

0.4

0 Ii H4.

-20-

Table 3BANGLADESH

HAND TUBEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT 1140-BD)


Changes in the Price of NW Sets(1)

Year Type of HTW set Price to 2 ChangeFarmers (in Tk.)

1982-84 2 pipe 11733 pipe 1339

1985-86 2 pipe 1497 +283 pipe 1781 +33

1986-88 2 pipe 1717 +153 pipe 2080 +17

[1] Prices are stated for HTW sets with brass strainers.

-21-

Table 4BANGLADESH

HAND TUBEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT 1140-BD


Project imeadi.tures

(Tk in Million)

Project Performa Revised Revised ActualFiscal Year Estimate Estimate (1) Estimate (2)

81-82 89.95 0.47 - [1]82-83 124.33 1.14 .60 119.2783-84 162.33 178.86 161.99 67.6484-85 105.60. 291.79 72.94 43.8985-86 1.48 108.21 110.1986-87 122.33 124.60Total 482.21 473.74 466.07 465.59

Cl] There was no financial allocation for the project in FY 81-82.

-22-

Table 6BANOAESH

HAND TUSEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT-1140-BO

PROJECT CWLETION REPORT

AosleesO Cot Estimates an As!"l Cost - CaMnrtona

(in million)

ITEM APPRAISAL COST ESTIMATES ACTUAL COSTS ACTUAL as X of SARFo=rign Flrign ForeignExchange Exchange Exchange

Total Costa Cost Local Coats Cost Local Costs Cost

(Tk.) (USS) (USS) (Tk.) (USS) (USI) (Tk.) (USS) (USS)

Operating [11 2.68 .16 - 8.22 .13 - 127 81 eCost

Vehicles and 4.15 0.25 .16 .91 .03 .01 22 12 ?Equipmnt

Bul ldi ngs 0.6 0.4 - .98 .04 - 16S 10

Cost of HlW. 329.8 20.6 11.14 390.21 16.61 10.40 118 76 92

Reserch and 8.90 0.24 .12 2.44 0.09 62 37Testing

Technical 6.16 0.39 .89 1.26 .05 20 13Assistnce

Training and 3.B8 .21 .64 0.02 16 10Publ icity

Tool Kits 1.40 0.87 .96 0.04 69 6

Spare Parts 14.4 .56

Godown Rent .16 .01

Total 851.94 28.12 11.6 416.08 16.6 10.41 118 72 88

E1] Includee Incremental stff costs and other operating costs.

-23-

Table 6BANGLADESH

HAND TUBEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT 1140-BD


Proiect Financing

(in US $ Million)

Source Planned FinalCredit Agreement

IDA Expenditure 12.0 14.74Categories

Domestic 8.6 5.35

-24-

Table 7

BANGLADESH



Cultivable Land Holding. of Samole BTU Users by Division

Land holdings Dhaka Chittagong Xhulna Rajshahi Total(acres)------------------------------------------------ __---------------_------------

0 53 17 - 55 125(9) (4) (5) (5)

01-0.5 116 61 7 126 310(19) (16) (3) (11) (13)

0.5-1.5 126 138 62 304 630(20) (36) (25i) (28) (27)

1.5-2.5 148 62 30 254 494(24) (16) (12) (23) (21)

2.5-5.0 138 56 93 248 536(25) (14) (37) (23) (23)

5.0-7.5 11 24 32 65 132(1) (6) (13) (6) (6)

7.5-10.00 6 22 14 29 71(1) (6) (5) (3) (3)

10.0-15.0 1 6 9 11 27(<I) (1) (3) (1) (1)

15.0-25.0 5 2 2 3 12(1) (1) (1) (<1) (1)

25.0+ 2 5 7(1) (1) (<1)

…------------------------------------------------------ --- …------------------

Total 605 388 251 1100 2344(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)

----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------_

Sources: Tables 7-16 are taken from 'Socio-Economic Survey of theBeneficiaries of IDA on Assisted Hand Tubevells Proii_ct' by Muzaffar Ahmadwith Iqbal Ahmad, 1987.

-25-Table 8

BANGLADESH



Principle OccuPation of Sample HTM User by Division

Dhaka Chittagong Khulna Rajehahi Total

Landless labor 2 - 41 43(<l) (4) (2)

Share-Cropper - - - 96 96(9) (4)

Self employed 360 282 193 704 1539peasants (60) (73) (77) (64) (66)

Employee 93 32 19 54 198(15) (8) (8) (5) (8)

Traders and 132 58 39 189 418Businessman (22) (15) (16) (17) (18)

Others 18 16 - 16 50(3) (4) (1) (2)

--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------_

Total 605 388 251 1100 2344(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)

----------------------------------------------------------- __----------------_

-26-

Table 9BANGLADESH



Afffiliation of Sal.e RW Users to Orsaniwations

…*----------------------------------_--------------------_--------_--_--___--

Organizations Dhaka Chittagong Xhulra Rajshahi Total

-------------------------------------------------------------- __-------------_

Farmers 411 259 211 897 1778Cooperatives (68) (67) (84) (82) (76)(ESS)

Women's 32 11 2 49 94Cooperatives (5) (3) (1) (4) (4)(MSS)

Rural Poor 141 49 19 154 363Cooperatives (23) (13) (8) (14) (15)(BSS)

Other types of 3 - - - 3Cooperatives (1) (cl)

Self-Reliant - - - - 1(Swanirvar) Group (<c)

Upazila Parishad - 2 2 - 4& Political Party (.80) (.80) (<1)

Does not belong to 18 69 14 - 101any Organization (3) (19) (6) (4)

--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------_

Total 605 388 251 1100 2344(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)

----------------------------------------------------------- __----------------_

-27-

Table 10BANGLADESH

HAND TUBEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT 1140-ED)


Land Cultivated b! Sa_le Households

---- _---------------------------------------------------.---__---------------_

Land size Dhaka Chittagong Khulna Rajshahi Total(acres)______________________________________________________________________________

01-0.5 15 75 17 91 198(2) (18) (7) (8) (8)

0.5-1.5 106 133 50 278 567(18) (33) (20) (25) (24)

1.5-2.5 148 45 29 223 445(24) (11) (12) (20) (19)

2.5-5.0 154 20 84 302 560(25) (5) (33) (27) (24)

5.0-7.5 35 26 27 85 173(6) (6) (11) (8) (7)

7.5-10.00 25 20 16 27 88(4) (5) (6) (2) (4)

10.0-15.0 7 25 6 8 46(1) (6) (3) (1) (2)

15.0-25.0 4 5 3 3 15(1)' (1) (1) (1) (1)

25.0+ -4 2 2 3 11(1) ()(}()(1

Not cultivated 107 57 17 80 261(18) (14) (7) (71 (11)

----------------------------- _-_-----___------------------_---------__-------_

Total 605 408 251 1100 2364(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)

--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------_

-28-

Table 11BANGLADESH



Use of Irrigation EquipMent by the Sample Households

------------------------------------------------------------------------- __--_

Types of Dhaka Chittagong Xhulna Rajshahi TotalEquipment n=605 n=388 n-251 n100 n'=2344--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------_

HTW 92 74 101 245 512

STW 172 31 55 244 502

DTW 49 9 29 7 94

LLP 69 48 28 10 155

others 71 101 10 28 210

Total 453 263 223 534 1473------.------------------------------------------ __-----------------__-------_

-29-

Table 12BANGLADESH

HAND TUBEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT 1140-BO)


Irr&ated Land Size Owned by HTY Purchasers

Land size Dhaka Chittagong Khulna Rajshahi Total(acres)--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------_

Nil 225 177 166 596 1164(37) (46) (66) (53) (49)

0-0.5 35 46 22 233 336(6) (12) (9) (21) (14)

0.5-1.0 88 51 13 128 280(15) (13) (5) (11) (12)

1.0-1.5 69 19 16 27 131(11) (5) (6) (2) (6)

1.5-2.5 122 32 16 90 260(20) (8) (6) (8) (11)

2.5-5.0 58 49 7 23 137(9) (13) (3) (2) (6)

5.0-7.5 3 7 7 22 39(1) (2) (3) (2) (2)

7.5-10.5 5 7 4 1 17(1) (1) (2) (2) (2)

Total 605 388 251 1120 2344(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)

------------------ __- --------------------------------------------------------

-30-

Table 13BANGLADESH



Use of BRDB NTMS by the Sawle Households

Use Type Dhaka Chittagong Khulna Rajshahi Total

-------------------------------------------------------------- __-------------_

frrigation - - 6 76 82(2) (7) (4)

Drinking 404 313 140 626 1483(67) (80) (56) (57) (63)

both Irrigation 181 38 45 222 486and Drinking (30) (10) (18) (20) (21)

Kitchen - - 3 7 10Gardening (1) (1) (<1)

Irrigation and - - - 13 13Kitchen, Gardening (1) (1)

Drinking and 20 37 47 125 229Kitchen Garden (3) (10) (19) (11) (10)

Irrigation, Drinking - - 10 31 41and Kitchen (4) (3) (2)Gardening--------------------------------------------------------------- __------------_

Total 605 388 251 1100 2344(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)

----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------_

-31-

Table 14BANGLADESH



Percentage of Households Producing Different Crops Using HTW

Crops Dhaka Chittagong Khulna Rajshahi Total

___________________________________________________________.__________________-

Rice 7 11 18 2 8

Jute 7 10 - - .3

Wheat - 1 1 2 2

Tobacco 1 - - .1

Sugarcane - 1 - - .1

Chillie 10 21 - 3 8

Onion 10 1 .5 3 2

Garlic 7 - - - .3

Pulses - - 26 - 7

Water melon - 15 14 18 16

Mustard - .4 - .1

Vegetables 41 27 35 65 51

Betal leaf - - 1 - .4

Others 17 22 4 1 5

…------------------------------------------------------------------------__--_

Number of Sample 92 74 101 245 512Households---------------------------------------------------------------- __ ----------- _

-32-

Table 15BANGLADESH

HAND TUBEWELL PROJECT (CREDIT 114a0:D)


Nbde of PFiaecina the Purchase of the BTU

Source Dhaka Chittagong Ehulna Rajshahi Total

a. Own saving 589 325 195 905 2014(86)

b. Loan 1- 2 - 24 26(1)

c. Sale of - 2 - 2articles (<l)

d. Others 12 - 7 19(1)

e. (a+b) 9 47 24 164 244(10)

f. (a+c) - 27 _ 27(1)

g. (b+c) - - - -

h. (a+b+c) 7 - 5 12(1)

i. Others

Total: 605 388 251 1100 2344(100)

1]---Loa--s--obtained-----from---friends,-----el---ti--es,--moneyle_----ders-_

1] Loans obtained from friends, relatives, moneylenders.

-33-

Table 16BANGLADESH



Impact on Women

------------ _-------------------------------------------------------__-------_

Advantages Dhaka Chittagong Khulna Rajehahi Total(n-605) (n=388) (n=251) (n=1l00) (n=2344)

Saves time for 491 336 221 720 1768fetching water (81) (87) (89) (65) (75)

Pure waterresulting in 243 296 120 496 1155less illness and (40) (76) (45) (49) (49)better healthcare

Facilitate daily 518 302 96 369 1285Health care (86) (78) (38) (34) (55)

More production 201 42 95 410 748in kitchen garden (33) (11) (38) (37) (32)

Increased incomethrough use of 182 109 79 382 752HTW in crop (30) (28) (31) (35) (33)

------------------------------------------------------------------- __--------_

-34-

Annex 1BANGLADESH



Related IDA Credits

Credit Year ofTitle Purpose Approval Status Comments

1. 990-BD Procurement and sale 04104180 Credit closed PCR preparedof LLPs and spares, on 12131/84rehabilitation ofserviceable LLPs andtraining program ofBADC mechanics.

2. 1147-BD Provision of longterm 05/21181 Credit closed PCR preparedcredit to finance on 12/3186minor irrigation andother agriculturalinvestments and andtraining program fornationalised commercialbanks' staff.

3. 1384-BD Strengthening of the 06114/83 On-going Credit closingtwo-tier cooperative project date was Junesystem through, among 30, 1988 butother things, provision has now beenof training of the extended tocooperators and BRDB June 30, 1990.staff, medium termcredit to purchaseSTW and LLP and short-term credit for agri-cultural production.

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Annex 2BANGLADESH

HAND TUBEWELL PROJECT (CUDIT 1140-BD)


Status of Covenants

Deadline forSection Subject Compliance Status

3.03 Establish and maintain in January 1982 CompliedDPHE an office of QualityControl with at least threefull-time staff members.

3.06 Provide medium-term credit - Compliedin amounts and on terms andconditions agreed upon betweenthe Borrower and the Association.

3.07 Provide short term credit to Compliedfarmers who have purchasedor are purchasing hand tubewellsunder the Project.

3.08(a) (i) Establish a research and October 1, 1981 Complied butTesting Committee to supervise delayed

* . the research and testing program;

(ii) Submit a separate report to June 30, 1983 Complied butthe Association, evaluating the delayedresults of such testing of handtubewells models and offering arecommendation on whether anynew hand tubewell designs shouldbe adopted for future handtubewell projects.

3.08(b) DPHE to enter into a contract Nov 30, 1981 Complied butsatisfactory to the Association delayedwith Bangladesh University ofEngineering and Technology tocarry out research and testing.

3.09(a) Establish within BRDB January 1, 1989 Complied buta management information system. delayed

(b) The Borrower shall conduct a on or before Compliedreview, in conjunction with the the third yearAssociation, of project of the projectbeneficiaries, remaining handtubewell demand and theviability of such improveddesign pumpset as maybe

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recommended by the Researchingand Testing Committee.

3.10(a) The Borrower shall establish Compliedthe price for hand tubewellssold on a cash or credit basisto farmers under the project ata level sufficient to cover, atthe time of establishment, thesum of (i) the equivalent of 100percent of 100 percent of ex-DPUEcost (net of taxes and duties);(Ii) a dealer's margin of 1S2;(Iii) the average cost of trans-portation of such hand tubewellsfrom DPHE to points of purchase.

(b) The Borrower shall review suchprice annually thereafter, and ifnecessary make adjustments in theprice;

(C) The Borrower shall include a Complied butprovision in each contract for delayedpump head fabrication or pipeholding under the project whichwould permit the contractingfoundry or machine shop to buyback upto 20 percent of thepumpheads or strainers producedunder the contract.

3.12 Borrower shall prepare a January 1, 1982 Complied butJutailed plan for carrylug delayedout the training program.

4.01 Borrower ould submit CompliedAudit Accounts/Reportdne to ID not later than9 months after each fiscalyear.

World Bank Document · 2016. 7. 8. · Supervision IX December/19O 1 RUB Po 2 6 63 Supervision X...

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Transcript of World Bank Document · 2016. 7. 8. · Supervision IX December/19O 1 RUB Po 2 6 63 Supervision X...