R E ST R i cTrE D

FILE COPY Report No. AW- 14a

This report was prepared for use within the Bank and its aiffiliated organizations.They do not accept responsibility for its accuracy or completeness. The report rnot be published nor may it be quoted as representing their views.

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVE1

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPME.NT ASSOCIATION

ECONOMIC DEVELOPM:ENT IN MALI

EVOLUTION, PROBLEMS AtND PROSPECTS

(in five volumes)

VOLUME 1I

NOTES ON AGRICIJLTURE,LIVESTOCK AND FTISHERIES

May 20, 1970

Western Africa Department

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EXCHANGE RATES

Prior to May 4, 1967MF 246.853 = U.S. $1.00

MFl = aFAF

May 4, 1967 to August 11, 1969tD? 493.706 = U.S. $1.00

NT 1 = C:FAF 0.50

After August 11, 1969MF 555.419 = U.S. $1.00

ME 1 = CFAF 0.50

iNote: Cost and investment figures given in thiJs report inMali francs have not been adjusted for the partialdevaluation which took place on August I1, 1969, Anydollar equivalents cited are at the previous rate ofexchange unless otherwise noted.

AALI

NOTES ON AGRICULTURE, LTVESTOCK ANrD FISHERIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

THE COTTON PRODUCTION PROGRAM . .............................

I. Introduction ........ .................... .. . 1

II. FaLetors of Production ....................... 2

Improved Seed ............ 2Plows and Animal-Traction.... ........ , 3Insecticides and Sprayers . 3Fertilizer ... 4Manlure Pits and Carts . ............ 5Grouping of Fields , . . I*.. 6Early Sowing... 6Sowing Density and Sowing in Line . . . 7Extension, Credit and urchasing. .. 7SulDsidies ....................................... 9

III. Export Proceeds in Relation to Costs ................. 11

C ottonseed ............................ ........... 12

IV. Prospects and Investment Needs ........................ 12

Existing Proposals .. . 13Some Alternatives . ................. , 14Financing ....................................... 15

GROUNDNUTS . ...... ............ 17

I. Development of Production, Marketing and Prices...... 17

The Aarket Situation ..................... . 18

II. Efforts to Increase Production ........................ 19

The Marketing Progran . . .......................... 21Inproved Seeds , , . . ....... 21TIproved Crop Husbandry... .......... . 22Farm Decortication of Groundnuts . ............ 24Appraisal of the Operation ........ ..... , 25

Page No.

III. Prospects. ....... ............ . 26

Groundnuts and Cotton.. 27

RICE .. . ..... .. ... . ... 29

DIVERSIFICATION NTO OTHEROCRSP..... ............. 33

Sugar cane .................... .... 33"European' Vegetables . . .................. . 34Mangoes and Cashews . ...................... 35Tea .. .. .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . ......... 36DahL ,........ 37Tobacco .. . .. .. *.* ...... .... . 38Essential Oil of Orange ......................... 38

PRODUCTS DF WILD TREES AND PLANTS ......... ............ ... . 40

AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND THE PURCHASE AND DISTRIBUTIOU OFAGRICULTURAL INPUTS . . . ..... .. ......... 41

Agricultural equipment.L. .Fertiiizer .............. 42Reorganization of Credit and Procurementt . 43

HMNAN DISEASE PND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ........... 45

THE SPECI]AL PROBLEM OF THE OFFICE DU NIGER . ...... 47

Output and Yieds ................................ 147Financial Position of the Office ...... ........ t48Principal Problems. .... . I ........ , 48Proposals for a Study ... 49

LIVESTOCIK .... ..... 51

Beef Cattle ................... 51Avrailable Statistics ................. 52Cattle Marketing and Governmenl; Policy 52Approaches to Development of the Cattle Industry 55Genetic Improvement ......................... 56Pasture Improvement ............................. 56Ranches .. 57Disease Control . .57Watering Points in GrazIng Areas . .58

Page No.

LIVESTOCK con,t 'd

Livestock Routes ........................... . 58Policies and Administration ...................... 59Other Animal Resources. . ......... 59Animal By-Products . . ... ... 60

FISHING ........................ 61

VOLUME I1

iNOTES ON AGRICULTURE, LIVESTOWX ( A FISHERIES

THE COTTON PRODUCTION PROGRAM

I. Introduction

1. Table 1 gives figures on the development of cotton cultivationin Mali. The total amount of seed cotton mnarketed rose from 4,452 tonsin 1954/55 to 44,939 tons in 1968/69.1/ Although a low-yielding, short-staple type of n;ative cotton has been grown in Mali since the Middle Ages,the cultivation of higher-yielding varieties suitable for industrial pro-cessing ha's developed only in recent decades. Modern cotton culture wasfirst introduced in the irrigated area of the Office du Niger. The pro-duction of irrigated cotton reached a peak of 9,373 tons in 1963/64, butthe area umder cultivation has since dropped steadily and output has beendisappointing largely due to poor drainage conditions. Mealwhile, however,the output of rain-fed cotton has gone up markedly, under a program directedsince 1952 by the CFDT (Compagnie Francaise pour 1le Developpement des FibresTextiles) under contracts with successive governments.

2. This program has shown continuous progress in terns not only ofthe area under cultivation but also of yields, despite an economic situa-tion unfavorable to the expansion of market agriculture, which causedMalian farmers l:o reduce their involvement in market agriculture in generaland which undoubtedly slowed the growth of cotton culture too. Progresswas only briefly interrupted in 1965/66 and 1966/67 when the Government'sconcern about food crop production led to a temporary de-emphasis of cottoncultivation. In the last two years - 1967/6G and 1968/69 - non-irrigatedcotton accounted for over 90 percent of total output. It is with the CFDTprogram that this memorandum is concerned.

3. Under this program, the CFDT has had a variety of responsibilitiesincluding the organization of the extensicn work, the supply of improvedseed, the distribution of implements, fertilizers and insecLicides, thecollection and purchase and, finally, the ginning of cotton. It has sharedthe marketing of cotton fiber abroad with SOMIEX (Societef Malienne d'Impor-tation et d'Exportation), the state trading corporation. SCAER (Service duCredit Agricole et de l'Equipement AgricoJe, an autonomous agriculturalcredit organization operating within the E,anque de Developpement du Mali)has handlead the foreign procurement of implements and other supplies whichare sold against cash or seasonal credits reimbursed by deductions fromamounts paid by CFDT for the farmers' cotton.

1/ The figures in Table 1 refer to seed cotton processed by establishedginneries. Some seed cotton, variouslyr estimated at between 1,000 and4,500 tons per year, is manually ginnedl and spun by artisans.

Table 1: COTTON PRODUCTION

Tableau 1: PRODUCTION DU COTON

Non-Irrigated Culture Irrigated Culture Total Mali ProductionYear Marketed &inned by CFDT Area Yield Production Area Yield Production of &ins Irrigated as 7 of Total(r1 of seed cotton) (MT 0o 110cr) (HecUares) (kg/ha) (MT of seed cotton) (Nectares) (kg/na) (iT cf fiber)

Culture non-irriguee Culture irrigue_dunCe Cormerotalisea Egrend par CFDT Superficie Rendement Production Superficie Rendemaent Production des Bgren. Irrigue'% du Total

(Tm de coton graine) (TM de fibre) (Hectares) (kg/ha) (TN de coton graine) (Hectares) (kg/ha) (TM de fibre)

1949-50 1402 1 934 725

1950-51 1 365 2 122 643

1951-52 2 570 2 616 982

1952-53 2 391 2 831 845

1953-54 3 459 3 532 979

1954-55 1 127 3325 4 109 809 1 600 751955-56 1 538 3323 4 836 687 1 750 69

1956-57 2 603 3100 4 529 684 2 100 551957-58 2 884 3296 5 281 624 2 250 53

1958-59 3 825 3105 5 172 600 2 500 451959-60 2 653 4304 6 589 653 2 550 62

1960-61 6 393 5075 5 679 894 4 250 451961-62 5 894 1 376 42 503 138 6 990 6 817 1 025 3 900 541962-63 12 282 ) j30 5o 706 235 7 706 7 996 964 6 100 39

1963-64 15 763 4 545 57 049 268 9373 7 372 1 271 7 200 38

1964-65 21 772 7 700 67 633 314 6 411 5 481 1 170 10 000 23

1965-66 16 184 5 846 56 228 282 2 275 5 404 421 6 650 13

1966-67 21 731 8 074 44 540 45o 6 235 4 191 1 1488 10 300 23

1967-68 29 888 11 307 58 832 496 2 730 3 926 695 12 300 8

1968-69 40 889 15 300 eat. 71 500 est. 572 est. 4 050 est. 3 208 1 260 est. 16 800 9

1969-70 2 680 exp.

4. liThe CMD7t s ownm cotton purcIhases are financed 1by seasonal creditsextended by the i3anoue de DeveloppeTie-nt cLi hall (mLE). Contributions tothe cost of the pro&arwa have been made by various orfanizationls. FAC hasfinanced the costL of part of 0D CZDT ' ez-patriate stafjf and the constructionof some ginneries and storage faciliti-es. :ED has pard for t:ae operation'svehicles. Furthermore, the prograaa benefite indirectly from "'TC subsidiesto the prico, of' ag:ricultural impl1ements and froim PE) suLbsidies to the pricesof fertilizers and1 insecticides (to be extended to :Lmple:aents in 1969/70).

of After `innirE;, in.wl-hichl is fiaancially se12-b> e;,-oorting, CFDT sellspart of the cinned cotton to ndfor eprt to both cleari:q,-zone andhard curreniZyr counitries, maprkets solme abroad itself, and sells a srll31amount tco COJAn-STE- (Conrbinat `%alienne de ?eictiles) to cov7-er the differencebetwreen its needs and 7That the Office duli 1'iEer can deli-ver.

IT. Factors of Froc.uction

6. G-.:rowth of non-irrigated cotto prodict on is obviously closelyrelated to the effectiveness of the CThDP 4-n introducing new- cultural tech-nLicues. ,Thile production has increased duLe to an e,nansion of the culti-vated area as wTelrl as to higher yields, the latter accounts for most oftlhie gro.th. Mields have risen fourfold since independence, as more and.nore famners began to use improved seeds, iisectici des, m.aure and ferti-lizer and adopted culturalr techniques in accordance w.ith CFD? recormnxenda-tions. The area sown to co-1tot increased ablou-t 70 percent duringE the saxaeperiod. The dependabilitiy of the niarket uro- ided l- CFDT 2and the wi deruse of plovws aznd anima-l traction are lard ely respa 2sibole .for increase inthe cultivated area. The use o-f addit- onal inputs and i eplem.rents hasincreased the farner' s returns per unit of h]is llabcr.

7. iarmers. have been highly selective in adopting C.TDT-advocatued-practices. T'ablea2 show.rs ado-)tion rates for some cf the :ore -pooular ones.

Improved Seed

8. i'irballv al^11 farwers in the 02D,10 zonLe mase ii-auarmved seed. CFD1'distribute;s enough for -tieir needs and more for farmers out,side its zone.Traitio-m aJ haliaan varieties do not yield fliber of industrial quality. ThevarietT; now7 ir use, llle;n 333-52, an Imerican -_land tse weith medium-lonefibers, haa a yield 25-30 percent hi-her Uhma the improved variety u.sed 10years aL,o. .his year, CD'' will start replacing it; wTith BJA 592, ^thich iseppected to increase -,ields another 5-10 perc cnt, ceteris paribns.

9. ,'borL oL, the tcstPLnc, and- a-,^-iDtaticn of new- varieties is carriedou-t loy MI:C" (Ins-titute for CotVon-Te?-tile Yesearch) at ogoni in the Office

Table 2: COTTON: AL)O"T1iON OU' fRODLICTION INPUTS AND FARM EQUIPMENT IN CFDT ZONETableau 2: COTON: Uh.LTISATI )1 DFS !PROLU_T3 GHIMIQUES ET DU M4TERTkL AG0.COL EN ZONE CFDT

1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69

Improved Seed/Semences Selectionnees

Tons distributed/Distributions en tonnes 1 204 1 714 2 158 2 307 2 574 2 462 2 382

Percent of non-irrigated cotton area covered/Partie des surfaces emblavees couvertes 105 125 140 126 169 204 150

Insecticides

Hectares treated at least 3 times/Hectares traites au moins 3 fois 1 187 2 708 6 429 10 440 10 178 18 793 28 895

Percent of total area/ 2.3 4.7 9.6 18.6 22.8 31.9 40.5Pourcentage de superficie totale 2,3 4,7 9,6 18,6 22,8 31,9 40,5

Hectares treated at least 4 times/Hectares traites au moins 4 fois 4 802 4 564 7 881

Fertilizer/Engrais

Hectares receiving recommended dose/ /Hectares ayant recus le, dosage recommande 228 893 1 824 4 119 6 42 10 229 15 373 21 739

Percent of total area/ 0.5 1.7 3.2 6.1 11.4 23 26 30.4P5

'srcentage de aiperficto totale 0,5 1,7 3,2 6,1 11,4 23 26 30,4

Manure

Hectares receiving significant application/Nectares ayant recus des quantites appreciables 5 420 9 921 11 594

Percent of total area 8 22.2 19.7Pourcentage de superficte totale 8 22,2 19,7

Farm Equipment/Mate'riel Agricole Number bought in year X and still in use No. bought Total no. in Percent of familiesin 1968 use in 1967 in CFDT zone now

plus those owning usablesold in 1968 equipment

Quantite achete'e pendant -'annee et encore utilisable Achats en Tot .. 1 +f;.. Pour,er+ , ai f-

1968 sable en 1967 milles en zoneen plus les possedant duventes en materiel en bon1968 e'tat

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

Insecticide sprayers/Pulverisateurs 540 1 810 1 012 924 1 000 2 196 6 710 7

Plows and Multicultivators/Charrues et multiculteurs 2 907 1 505 1 577 1 655 750 1 366 17 934 19

Carts and cart axles/Charettes et essieuxr 130 104 36 630 1 061 5 710 6

du l,ir,er, and at Ki1farla, nor-thwest of lHoutviala. FJCL has financed theforeign cost of thi s operation. In vi e-l of t:o e obvio-us pay-ofi' for thesamall suns spent oi rese.rch, it is surprising that t,he Kosoni center mayhave to be closed in 1970 for lack of woney to pay three foreign researchsuecialists.

PloiTs and Animal.-Tr action

10. Tab1:e 2 shows t1he rate at whicL C?PT-zone fari.mers have beenacquiriL-c plows des-pite cer-tain supp y problems. it present, one faniJily-irn five owns a -lowr (and -presumably the oxen to pull it), but -he CFDTreports that two-thirds used plows for cotton tilling. Plow t:Lllage ismore wides-read for C-cotton than for othier crcds, and a fa-iliy ,ithout aplolo often borro-ws one to cultivate -its cot,,ton, paying, in hand la-bor onthe ouner1 s f.ar>,i. On an Thimou-n but much sy.leler portion of th.ae cottonland, plows are used to cultivate betwTeen the rows and redce hand-weecingneeded.

11. ',dortion of ani-_oi-traction cultiva.tion defirite7-,)- enablesfa=rmners to cultirsate more land. Preparatoryr tillage, lonig the priincipallabor bottlen.eck., talkes one-fourth ttlhe tiuic by -lo'½ that iJt1 does by hoe.TTeedfin- is -the ne--t bottleneck-,; weedin- tazae car boe red-uced I r y usinL aplow or nml'ic ti-vator bu-t os- far_-ers hav e not Tot learned to do this.

12. Fo:r L.ali as a -cThole, the s-era- e cY can apwarently eosotendthe area under cultivation pllro:d -e - 5 ectares - by about 20 to 30p*ercent with the help of a poT.'r If" the adCditional lanid is all devotedto cott-on and accotnt i s taken of the fact that the wiowmay also be lentto other farr,ers, it ca--n be estin.,ated that plo--wT-in- can macIl:e possible thecaltivat-i oni of .L.5 hec-tares of cotton w-hni`ch at ayerare wields would produceabout 750 kg o!f co-tuton worth albout ME34,00O. The de.Ll>.d for ploi-s indi-cates that fariaurs consider that inest_elstnt an a plow (a 7Bajac polow, coststhem IlF18,>-30), o fr-eLn and harness yields a r-ood return.

Insecticides and E,prayeri,

13. TTcarIl2 half of the cotton area in thie CF71T zone is rbow spray-edat leas-t three times with insecZicides (DDT rnd endrine). Sev-en percentof far;s oun sp:r2yers, 7-hich t1n- also rent, to thneir neighlbors. apr yingis rmiade ever :aio:e ixmfortexlt ob:7 the increasi;.i. size cf the cotton crow and2.the faz=.aer1 s need to ;protect h1is cash in,est,.lent in farm ri:ple,: ents andinputs. lL;tostu al1 fran-zers io p urchase fertilizer or laboriously trails-port and spread largoe qc,arLi aies of riadn-Ure protect these inve,stydents byapr ayinc,.. The nu_-w> er ofc treatri,ents rcouired (and hence -the profitatbilityvof sprry nn variies wi,,th thie s 4 ation:, -iLnsect attacl.s axe _ore serious -nthe hAigher-rcinfl a7 ereas of tne south.

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14. The CFDT egtimates that the average increase in yield per hectareresulting from three insecticide sprayiags is 250 kg. In 1967/68, theCFDT made aL survey of farms growing cotton in the Sikasso sector, theKoutiala sub-zont and the Fana zone. The survey found that, on average, fourinsecticide, treat:ments had increased yield by 320 kg/ha in Sikasso, 370 kg/hain Koutiala and 550 kg/ha in Fana when neither fertilizer nor manure wereapplied. When fLour sprayinga of insecticide were aLccompaniedt by use of manure,fertilizer or both, the increased production resulting from the insecticidetreatment (i.a., net of effects attributed to manure and fert:ilizer) rangedfrom 400 to 770 kg/ha.

15. Tvhese and other data are summarized in Table 3 in an attempt tocalculate what the farer's return would be to the labor he used in applyinginsecticides, manure and fertilizer (and to his investment in implementsand his management) if all purchased items were sold at cost.,

16. ILnsect:Lcide treatment requires a sprayer, which can cover 4-1/2ha/year, 10 liters of insecticide per hectare and 83 days for labor per hectare.Returns, based on results in the actual farm survey, range from MF755 toMF3,300 per day of labor spent making four applications for insecticide;returns based on the conservative theoretical resuLts of applying insecticidethree timeis were MF760/day. Both are several time,; the usual rate for hiredfarm labor, Ilorleover, the farmer can, in fact, buy an insecticide sprayerat about half the actual cost.

17. Table 3 also indicates that spraying insecticides nn cotton intendedfor export has favorable repercussions on the balamce of payments.

18. In vriew of the obvious importance of the insect problem, it seemssurprising that:Mali has no entomological 3.aboratory. It has been estimatedthat a small one at N'Tarla would cost MF 35 million ($71,000).

Fertilizer

19. The portion of the cotton area oni which fertilizer is used hasalso grown steadily and rapidly as Table 2 shows. Thirty percent of thearea is now fertilized. The popularity of fertilizer with farmers reflectsthe high cash return to a small amount of work. As indicated in Table 3,returns would be high even if the true cost of fertilizer were taken intoaccount. Last year the sale price of fertilizer was subsidized 13 percentby the FED.

20. The results of applying fertilizer are large enough to beclearly apparent. The labor involved in carrying 70 kg (the current re-commended doses) to the field and applying it is nct great. The downsiderisks are slight for it would take exceptional insect attacks, excep-tionally poor cultural practices or extreme drought to cause a loss

Table P RFThllS TO USE 0- INSECTICIDE, FERTILIER AND MANURE :1N COTTON CULTUtE

I. Output with Associated Inputs

Type of Cultural Practice Fern Rsults Theo retical Result,__-k7g 7ccseed cotton per17:tsre

None of inputs mentionedbelcw 220- 340 350

Insecticide 3/ crly 540- 86E 600Insecticide with manure 4/ 1,080-1,380 700Insecticide with fertilizer_/ 870-1,030 800All three 1,240-1,700 1,000

II. Output Associated with Use of Each Input

Input Fare Results Theoretical Result:

Insecticide:When used alone 320- 550 250Whea used with manure 560- 770 n.e.Wheds used with fertilizer 400-U7575 n.a.

Manure:When cued alone 300 n.a.When aced with insecticides 520- 540 100

i When used with insecticidesa:od fertilizer 370- 670 200

Ferti:izer:Wheos used alone 250- 275 n.a.When used with insecticides 170- 330 200When coed with insecticides

a-d centre 160- 320 300

III. Range of Value Added per Hectare by Use of Each Input

cnput Farn Results Thecretical Results(in MF/7ha; comnt of increase x )te4g of seed cottcn)

nsec1ticide 14,400-34,600 11 ,300Manure 13,500-30,200 1,500- 9,C00Fertiliser 7,200-184,900 5,000-13, 500

IV. Unsubsidized Cost o: Using Input per RectareCash Labor{MF7 (N an aays

insecticide:Cost of insecticide @ 5,425 (10 L.)

4'582.53 per liter 7,050 (13 L,00 5 t; of sp:ayer

1f226, OCxwyrs. :ife x 4.5 ha 1,300

Application 8 (4 applications)6 (3 applications)

Manure:Cost of ga-hering &

preparing manure ?Cost; of ca:^t fcr hauling

& spreadingMF 30 COO

Io yrs. life x 5 hra 60oLabor of spreading -anure 10

Fertilizer:Cost of fertili::er dose @

MF82ikg 5,230Applicatioins 2

V. Returns to Labor Dev,oted to Rach Input

Inut Fa Reesclts Theoretical Results(Ms/day) -

tnsocticide:4 treatments 755-3, 3003 treatmentc 760

Manurc 6/ 1,290-2,960 390- 840Fertilizer 735-4,585 1,635- 3,885

VI. Foreign E-change Result of Using Each Input

Inout Farm Results Theoretical Results(MF9/ha) - _ _ _

Insecticidc: 7/Foreign cohanga' earred. 19,000-46,000 15,000Foreign exchange cost:

Sprayer E8/ Soo 800I.,oeoticide jl 4,300 3,300

Net Gain 13,900-40,900 10,900-anure:Foreign exchange! earned 18,000-40,200 6 000-12, 000Foreign exchange! cost:

Cart 800 400Net Gain 17,600-39,800 5,600-11,600

Fertilizer:Foreign exchange earned 9,600-19, 80c 12 000-18,000Foreign exchange cost:

Fertilizer 3,500 3.500Net Gain 6,100-16,300 8 500-14,500

Results accordir.g to survey made by CFDT in 1967-68 of cotton outputs on a large number of farmsin Sikasso, Xoutiala and Faen districts representing the gamut of input ace.

_/ CFDT's conservative estimates of results that could be achieved by genernlizing use of inputs underpresent conditicons (probably assacing that farmers who now ace norn of the new itpets are the w-trsfarmers and would not therefore derive maximum benefit from the inputs.Four sprayings per year using 13 1. of insecticide mix per hectare for 'fanm results" and threeusing 10 1. for "thecretical results".

_/ Applicstion of a significant qasutity of manure and household wastes, approaching 10 T/ha.5/ Application of 70 kg of 18 N - 47 P205 per hectare.6/ Manure figures are not comoarable since the cost of preparing and gathering (or buying) manure is

excluded.27 B.a-d on foreign emchange value of MF60/kg of used cotton, derived by as:igning various taxes

included in price FOE Mali border to seed cotton, milling, transport and other costs.Baesd on the coot of lhose items at Mali border as follows:

18-37 fsrtilicer MF49, 779/NTSprayer MF20,000 each (estimate)Wheels and axle fCr cart >Fo20,0o0 each (estimate)Inse-ticide tF 330/liter (estimate)

in fertiizzcr .- p'mica-vion to cotton. -o-eoeer, the fertilizer has aconsiderablc resid:oal effect on thle yield of sorg,.hu3i, grown on the sameland -the folloin year, pa_rticul r½ iin d i- years 71inalLy, if thecotton produced is exoorted, the forei<m exchan-e g,ained easily paysfor t'Le fertil-Lzer iarnoort,s. Continu.edfL rapid e,pansion in ferti i zeruse can accordingly be ex pected.

21. C7O'DT currentl-T recormnends the aDnolicat-'on of 70 I:g of mixedfertilizer, containLnr 18 percent nitrogen and L. perce:n'- 0 perhectare. I'p,uOlication is noi: recomnlended only on fields ta i are treatedtLth insecticides. Table 3 shows that the net additional yi eltds of seedcot-ton thus- prouced rangi-e fro: n 160 -o 30 kGl.

22. CT'DrT reco-nmends a rathler Žaiodest dosa-ge of fertilIzer in oneffort to get fmiiers to use it. UIXT tests ,ctu a constantrelationshlip 1-betueen fertilizer a>pplicat, on and cotton vields upr to 250 kgof urea (L6 p7ze:rcenr-t ,) and 200 kg of super trin:Lephosnhate per hectareduring, the first - ear ai-d tuhe sane dose of urea the second.

23. Starting in 1069, CFD` 7ill rcco-a,-~riend a new and strongerformula: 75 kg- of a,,moniua,l rhosohaten 1IG, !c) of urea aznd i0 kg ofauoniiWnl sul-rphate per hect,ape. T:-is is e-eected to raise cotton -ieldsbY 720 L, f/a. Ti ield results co;^,firma erpectia-tions, thl:e njew formulzshould. produLce returns as hic,h as the old. one, and :auch more cotton,even -,.atho-u,.t sEulbsidl7-r. Tnhe unsubsidizedt umnrce of the new dose shouldIle ;a7Dout >P1 ,000Aa jand value of resul-tinL output7t about 132,400,ecuivaleint to a return of o7ver 3'8,000 /day of lI bor spent-- aprlys7incgthe dose. ITaPorts wortha around W6,000 wougld g,,enerate exeorts inorthover IE'0,000. Ko-eove, to heIT speed the ado-otion of the new!forrraula, PD has a,reed to increase sulbs-Ldies to fertilizer used oncotton during the -oresent frogram,'s fifth tr.-anche in 1969/70, reducingthe farnars cost by hal.

i-anure Fits and Carts

2L!. use o" ima:.ure o-n cotton has long, been a .,ajor thez,ie of theCFD". &tLccess has 'beern m.ore mitodest than in the cases mentioned aoove.One-fL,L' th o:, t1he cotton, area receaves imrmre, but the craalilzy- and quan-'tity- a:plied leave nur.Uch to be desired.

25. Jis indicated in :7able , wrheln Droperly applied mr-anure has adrama^-tic Linr nct on yields. i-rtheror,e, lt involves -miniril2 iriportcosts - onlv those of the caGt needed to ransncc2t it. -owever,,P;aatheri ng and producng proper m-aanure and the-n spreading it islaborio,s. The CPDT recomrmends putting 10 tons on an hect,are ofcottonz oba:OlSly tIy s involves far more wyork thanL soreadf-ng; 0.07tons of fertibLizer. The fayil-: that uses :.c-lanre properly,- must haveaccess to a c.-rt. 1urrtheamore, t.e procuction of -roper nanure invoes

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chnEnes i.n n2n-J hal ardit aad, if oric :y-oiertr, much. ore -;york. Forover a decade, C7DT has been try½nr to -erns-ade f^-ar;ers in its zone tokeen animzals ir s ables anid to di- -:nanuroe pits to k;eep the manure fromiomdizin;. In 1967, the CFD? reportec b3aut 5,00c nranure pi-ts in i't,szone, 3,000 of the7a in use, anid 7,300 comz,ost hear-s, 6,000 of them in use.

26. The anount of timiie required to nrep are a ton of manTure variesTidely d.th local condtions anAd has not even been esti.ated. Certainly,it lo.e-rs tIhe attractiveness of intensive use o-^ m,anrnxe to the farmer,particularly of' the heavr' ap-l-Ications -dhlch uould do the most good bu-tu-hlich also involve the riost prep aratory 7.er . Also, there iS no vay toi.nQrove the attractiveness of usin manure tlrouLh a 3iD suLb s di. 'ever-

theless, the practice is evidently anreadinW since 20 pelceit of cottonfar-;ers norT coisider iGt to their advantage t-c use at least some miianunre.Gradualy others -.may see t1he results and be a,ble to jluge T!hehe. theeffort recuired tGo nroduce and spread .manure is -ortn--hile

Grouping of Fields

27. Particularly in thie early 19160's, `the CFD atteIiX ted to chancetraditional village land teimre natt-erns andnd to have villages ErorT allof their cot,ton in oie continuous field. Tn, the -9il4 1fafers ixinds, thiseffort often beca-e confused teith Government e^for-s to establish agri-cultu-re on a vi: _ age-col lectiv-e 'basis. In any case, much im-iore resistancrto thie changle -l..as enco-c-Intered thcn had beme- nticinated.

28. ThLe -ulrose of iroedingfi Ids is to facilitate sunpervirsioneand e:_tension efflorts anc, raost ospeciiallv, to impLi,rove pest cont^rol.PLegrDoupin efforts haVe, in fca, beer sUC.cessfu.L only in -th-e southerrnp-eartG of- the zone ihere .r -L! is hec-rie-r aaad insect attack more seriouts.Else-uhere, gromAing e.ffo-us lIa^ve been abUandoned.

Early Soning

^S. Soring cotton earl-y n the rain- season p-rod.ces m-uch bettervi elds thaan scming -;t la er. One of the CTDQ Is :,a ora themes has beenearly sovig. Althoug,h Varimtions in the advent of the rains from yearto year --ake it difficul t to estim,ate the success of° t-his -theime, resultsdo not appear to have been enco nraging. In fact, the aveUr-e soningdate for cotton in 1966 and 1)67 vas latDr tlhan it hlad been in 1964. In1961l, two oz CFDT' s soix regions hnad so-r over half their cotto:n by theend of June and three m-ore L mid-July:. .in 1960 and 1967, none of theahad somr. half by mid-July. In cont-rast, 70-85 -percent of the sorghnm-aand all.et `ad een sc b n b the e:Cd of J7Lne.

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30. Resistance to early plantins of cotton stems fromi the f armiers' con-cern to insure soT7inL of vitial f4ood crops before w..orkinE on cash crops.There are a feow farmrcrs who plarnt cotton bafore sorghum, but they in-variably eare relati-7ely w-Tell off and have .`ull granaries. I:n zones likeKlouLtiala i:Phere cotton culture is more .advaaced and. where more farmers usefertilizer and have pliows, the date of sowing tencis to be sanewhat earlierthan in others. A farmer's -.willingness to sow cotton early depends on hisconfidence in a reliable sunply of food. This corfidence ma-y gcradua,llydevelop as the result of the beneficial effect of cotton fertilizer onsorghuam, the use of the plowT in expending the aree. under cuAtivation andthe building- up of some cash reserves bI, farmers. Thus earl-y planting ofcotton, -hich can undoubtedly produce significant ircreases in yields, islikely to cone about very slowly.

Sow.aing -ensity and Sowing in Line

31. 7'The C-IDT has tried to persuade f-armers to sow in :Line to increasethe num-rber ofl" seed pock:ets per unit of area and subseoUently:- to do properthinning. Cotton is now al-aost alwTays sovn in line, w.:hich .,ialkes inter-rowplowin: possible to help wYeeding, and the lines are the prower distianceaopart. However,, farmers still do not achieve the proper deensity of seed-pockets and proper thinning is not alT.-awys carried out. That little pro-gress has been made in achieving optirasm density nay be due to traditionsof extensive agricullture in an env_ronm,,eent where :and is plentiful a-ndfarmers have dificulty, in apprecia.tinrg the need 1;o use land more inten-sively when fert-ilizer is a-wlied.

Extension, Crecidt a-nd Purchasing

32. The degree of success achieved in g'aining acceptance of the a'bovethemes is large:el- attributalble to the C_-DT's extension systtem-i. -.t present,there are 320 extension -Torkars, each resroonsibole for a base sector ofaoult 2,500 inhabitants living in one large o-r several smlaller villagesand working about 250 farms. These .wForkers are recruited by the CFDT amonglow,er pr.Lary school loeava-rs w-h-Io have no chance to continL-,e in school. Theyare -iven a pu_rely -ractical traininL, paid less th.n rov ernment ex.tensionwor0ers (]wr192,oOo to _..T22,000 per year)., and di-aaissed if they are not

effecti-e. Their traini`n: leaves the& ineligibDle for office jobs orforeign scholarshi-os; there are thus few-el desertions.

33. The extension wJorkers are direcned by, 70 supervrisors, oine perZETiD (Rural E3rarsion Zone), wlho earn lf'r 276,C0C t,o iiF336,000 er year, and9 sector chiefs. -ri felw of the sector chiefs mnd the regional personnelare still foreigners. The n<i3ers of extensionists, rAlhiat they cost, a-ndwho paVys themi are indicated in Talble )4. .,n addition, the CFDT emrploysabcut 90 unskilled ijorkers and non-nrofessional office w-orkers.

T he area covered by, the CIDT extension effort now includesnea.rly one-fourth of hali's popu,lation. :[ts e7qpansion can be seen in

Table 4: CFDT EXTENSION OPERATIOI' 1969

Tableau 4: LIENCADRENENT DE LA CFDT 1969

Number Of Which Foreigners Of Which Paid byMalian

ExtensionFund FAC CFDT

Effectif Dont Etrangers Dont Payes ParI'articipa-

tion a2'Encadre-

ment FAC CFDT

Personnel - Function!/Personnel - Capacite

Regional Chief/Chef de Region 1 1 1

Accountants/Experts Comptables 2 2 2

In-service TrainingExpejts/

Charges du Recyclage 2 2 2

Technical Deputies/Adjoints Techniques 2 2 2

Sector Chiefs/Chefs de Secteur 9 5 4 5

Deputy Sector Chiefs/Adjoints aux Chefs

de Secteur 7 7

ZER Chiefs (Super-.visors)/

Chefs de ZER 70 70

Base Sector Chiefs(ExtensionWorkers)/

Chefs des Secteursde Base 320 320

Cost (millions of NE)!Coat (millions defra-ncs

maliens)

Personnel expensesfor Malian em-

,ployees/Depenses au titre dupersonnel malien 110

Personnel expensesfor foreignerspaid by FAC/

Depenses au titre dupersonnel etrangerpay4 s par 'le FAC 95

Current cost, trarns-port/

Depenses courantes 27

Seed operation!Operation semences 18

General administra-tive exp7d:itures

Frais gtenerauxd'administration 5

75

-8 .

the number of ER's co'vered; there are 243 ZER's in Mali (this excludesthe Office and the Gao Region).

Number of ZER's covered by CFDT Zone

9611962-63 19634 1964-65 1965-66 196 1967-68

2 23 34 41 5'S 63 62

Present plans do not call for expansion of the area covered, though thenumber of extension workers may increase.

35, Ia 1970, salaries of CFDT extensionists are to be raised tothat of their Government counterparts. CFDT extension workers are tobe considered equal to those in Government service though their level offormal education is well below that of the latter. This step should addKo37 million to the cost of CFDT extension.

36. In addition to dispensing advice, CFDT agents handle distribu-tion of seed, farm inputs and materiel for the SCAER, the purchasing ofcotton and thet collection of debts. Purchasing teams move from villageto village. The credit payments due are collected by the teams. At pre-sent, the only items sold on credit are insecticide sprayers and currentinputs - seed, insecticide and fertilizer - all of which are repayableat the first harvest. Plows, carts, etc., are row sold orly for r.ash.Because CFDT eontrols ginning, it has a monopoly, of cotton purchasing,and the collection rate on loans is very high - 97 percent.

s3. Nost of the harvest is transported to the ginneries in CFDTtrucks, partly financed by FED. Where possible,, a 5-MT truck with a54MT trailer :ls used. However, many secondary roads are iLn such poorcondition that the trailer cannot be used or that CFDT conitracts witha local trucker to do the hauling. In the latter case, the price perton-kilometer is ME50-55/TKm ($0.10-11) compared to about MF35/TKm($0.07) on a naormal Malian back road.

38. After ginning, the cotton fiber is either sold lto SOMIIEX fordelivery to C03MATEX, sale to clearing-zone counitries or saQle for hardcurrency; or is exported by the CFDT itself for hard currency. Sincequantities and prices of clearing-zone t:ransact:Lons are not available,information on exports is incomplete. Presumably, all cotton processedby modern ginneries except that sold to COMATEX has been exported. How-ever, only a portion of the cotton seed not needed for sowing has beenexported. A substantial part has gone 1:o waste, not even serving asanimal feeAl If present plans for expanding SEPOM facilities at Koulikoromaterialize, it will be able to treat 15-20,000 MT of cotton seed, raisingits value at the ginnery from 0 to aboul: 1NF15/kg. The economics of theexport operations will be discussed below.

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Subsidies

39. The success of the CFDT operation would not have been possiblewithout foreign assistance which has (a) paid part. of the cost of theoperation" both current and capital, and (lb) reduced the price of newinputs to farmers and made it more profitable to adopt them. Cottonproduction has grown and, since devaluation}, cotton etxport is economic.Therefore, a part o,f any effort to expand production can now be financedby cotton itself, However, it is important to isolate the subsidy ele-ment in present cotton operations in order to determine to w7hat extentexpansion of the! cotton operation can be auto-financed and to what extentoutside assistance is still needed.

40. As will be aeen below, subsidies are now considerably less thanthe tax the Government recovers from cotton fiber exports. In 1968/69,all recurrent subsidies amounted to 6.1 percent of the value of Maliancotton fiber FOB Abidjan or Dakar; while Government taxes arnounted to28 percent, apart from the 7 percent collected to support thie extensionservice.

41. Subsidies to cotton production nay be broken down into invest-ments in t:he infrastructure for purchasing, moving and ginnLng the cottonand current subsidies to the sale of farm inputs and materiel, and tooperating expenses of the extension systenl.

42. Investment subsidies consist of FED donrtions of tLrucks andother means of itransport for the CFDT operation, FAC financing of CFDTginneries and FAC donation of storage facilities.

43. FAC has already financed seven ginneries with a capacity of75,000 MT. At the charge presently made for ginning - MF30,2OO/MT offiber - operation of the ginneries is profitable at reasonable levels ofutilization. The Fana ginnery, which was recently completed, cost MF410million ($830,000), including the cost of the necessary electric genera-tors; one-third of the cost was financed by CFDT and Energie du Mali,the rest by French loans carrying a certain subsidy element. CFDT hasfinanced the ginnery in Bamako.

44. It seems likely that production will exceed the capacity ofexisting imills lby 1971 or 1972 so that another ginnery costing aboutMF400 million will be needed. Some external financing will be necessary.

45. In 1968/69 and 1969/70, FAC will donate 13 storehouses costingMF260 million to the cotton operation. Thie CFDT estimates that in 1970/71and 1971/72 it will need l0000n 3 of additional storage space for seed

cotton and fiLber. Construction cost is estimated at MF350 million ($700,000).

46. FEI) donations of vehicles to the cotton operation have been asfollows (in MF million):

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5 - 6 6 1~~-2.lCn

l96:-66 12:? ;.3 7 (Lver.)126 6-o7 12.3 (1)67-68 24.01968-6c) (rro-r.)1°969-70 (proj.) ca 50.0

pepsirs a:il cu-rrnt operating e,penses of t,he vehicles are pai.d forthrough a charEe on ex,orts.

L7. 5Cuzrrent su0bsidies are: FiA)C paymne; t of personnel costs of mostof the Prenchmen rorhinC -i the CFP-DT eltemnion of r"ort; FED suosidies tosale nrices of` insecticides and fert-- 1,ers used o:a cottoin; _T!C, Riussianend (soon).>-ED d6nations of agricultural bquipment,, some of which is usedon cottlon; and 7ED support ofL a pilotV -cDro-ect to T,od.ernize agriculturein the :Tana zone.

L18. Est:,iat.Ina the eftafect of s'uc, ezcl or cot on - r6ouctLion i S diiffi-cult for twTo reasons: (a) twhe total value of the aid, if lmmom3, was notaIrcv-s passed Jon- to the feri_er, and (t) several of tlhe oierat Ions bene-fit both Cotton aned other crops. 'or nstance ustil recen-l only peartof' F'AC faexm-nc;ba.eriel donations ser-ved to r-educe -t-he :rice -Jto the farmer,the rest b-Ienef,ited the Pooerraient. Flows :'d carts sold to a cotton± oxemer scrv"e oartly to hove his co-,-ton -o,artly to i r-,ro veother crops and Žrobabl poart>- to irncrease hdis lels-cnre. r'he aLdcd-t' Ona-' cot'tCn production which results-- fro:.r sUich aid, or Et' sL aries ofex,patriates in the C0FD stef'2 (w.ho co.st, on averare, over `.o tim-.es theaverage :calrian in the systei) is dCf3ficulc- to EueSs.

49. Table 5 estimates the .5=.-ounts of suchl aid chaTheb e to cottonproduction. 1-eedless to say, tnese calculations only rep,resent orderso' raagnitude. `"heyf, iandicate t-hat the to-Cl suabsilies to farmers cer tonof fiber am,ounterd t'o 2arouid Ii-ff8,100 thI-I '1lle last GrI-e-de-t-al:x.atJion year anldabout f-?ll,_0 aCC'nd K7L5 00 in thie t-O -oost-de-,-aLac' on --ears, ecinv-Lamerntto between 5 anc.7 10 aercent of the v-Tcue cf the cotton fiber.- delivered toA'bid`ijan ol Der. 'The incr-ease in -he total axaount of' su'bs:id'ies since1966S/67 wa.s, of^ coarse, attribUutble rt t o the haigher cost of var-ious

ira-orted iniputs follow--n c devala-,-cation in 1.967.

50. oIec:ase of the obovlious crofitabc t oD usin,g 'ertilizer andinsect-icides o-v-en at unsubsizd prces se aboe) i-t old-o-iI probablybe possibs:le t.o oblire farm;.ers2s to -_bsorb the current sbsioy to theseprobhcts 'rihout r2 sing; the curr,cent- producers' price of `245Ag. InLriei7 of t:he cf.e_and -for a-ricel:tural eca-im ent' 'th smi,e is oroba'l1,- trueof that a-d. Sich actions -.o-ld, of course, -.reuce the ar otadil ofcotton gro'A c'r, to an unhmLoun eCtent, would slow. dovc the speed withw-hich farr;ers are Decainnrdn or eo:acandinr their cotton -produc-tion.

Table 5: DECURRENT SUBSIDIES TO COTTON PROGIOAM

(MF million except where noted)

1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 Status of Future Financing

FAG SunDort for ExtensionTotal donation 95.0(?) 95.O(?) 95.0(?) 95.0 95.0 Assured through 1970/71Part attributable to cotton in CFDT zone /1 85.5(?) 85.5(?) 85.5(?) 85.5 85.5

FED subsidies for1. F'ertilizers

Total 22.4 /3 22.4 /3 21.2 47.9 139.0(proj.) Subsequent financing notPart chargeable to cotton in CFDT -one /2 16.3 16.3 15.5 35.0 /4 101.0 assured

2. InsecticidesTotal 39.9 39.9 42.0 61.7 61.6 Subsequent financing notPart chargeable to cotton in CFDT zone 34.3 34.3 36.2 53.1 53.0 assured

FAC Donations of Agricultural Equipment /5Total 0 30.6 /6 61.3 /6 180.0(?) ca 150.0 Further assistance improb-Part applied to reduction in prices /7 0 0 34.3 180.0(?) 150.0(?) able in view of establish-Of which chargeable to cotton /8 0 0 13.7 72.0 60.0 ment of FAC-financed agri-

cultural implements fac-tory under negotiation.

FED Subsidies for Agricultural EquipmentTotal 0 0 0 0 ca 150.0 Subsequent financing notPart attributable to cotton 19 0 0 0 0 100.0 assured

FED Aid to Fans Development Zone

Part chargeable to cotton (90%) 419. 19.4 33.9 19.6 83.4 assured

Total Subsidies to CottonFAC - Extension service 86.0(?) 86.0(?) 86.0(?) 86.o 86.oFED - Fertilizer 16.0 16.o 16.0 35.0 101.0FED - Insecticides 34.0 34.0 36.0 53.0 53.0FAC - Agricultural equipment 0 0 14.0 72.0 60.0FED - Agricultural equipment O 0 0 0 100.0FFD - Fana zone 19.0 19.0 34.0 20.0 83.0

Total 155.0 155.0 186.0 266.0 483.0

Tons of Cotton Fiber Produced in CFDT Zone 5,846 8,074 11,307 15,300 (est.)Subsidy per ton (MF) 26,500 19,000 16,500 17,500

/1 Assuming that 10% can be charged to sorghum crop./2 Deducting 9% for fertilizer subsidies accruing to Office du Niger and charging 20% of balance to sorghum crop following cotton. It is assumed that aid for subventIons was

entirely passed on to farmers in the form of price reductions./3 Average for years 1965/66 and 1966/67.7 Of this amount, only MF18.9 million was actually used to reduce prices to farmers.75 Data available only for calendar years. Aid for 1967 has been attributed to 1967/68 etc.7 Figures somewhat uncertain. SCAER, the source of these data, also cites different figures: MF43 million for 1966 and MF74.3 million for 1967./7 On assumption entire subsidy passed on to farmers.7 On assumption that 60% of equipment was used in CFDT zone and that two-thirds of this was chargeable to cotton culture.7 On assumption two-thirds of entire amount chargeable to cotton culture.

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51. The charge on cotton fiber exports to corer the costs of extensionwork is now suff:icient to cover all such cc'sts in the CFDT zone, includingthose now paid by the FAC, but excluding thLe cost of FED's slpecial programin the Famn zone,,

III. Exprt Proceeds in Relation to Costs

52. Since devaluation, it has been possible Eor Mali to collect a sub-stantial export tax on its cotton without pricing itself out of markets. Withdevaluation, unit value of cotton exports in terms of Mali francs doubled.Most of the costs of producing cotton, processing it, and getting a ton ofcotton fiber to Abidjan or Dakar are local and therefore did not double. Theproducers' price nf MF34/kg for first choice seed cotton was raised to NF40for the 1968/69 agricultural year and to M45 (i.e.., 32 percent in all) for1969/70. Eveni at the MF34 and MF40 prices., farmers have been expanding produc-tion. This is partly because the prices of imported inputs - fertilizer, in-secticides awl materiel - have been subsidized to keep them from doubling.

53. For 1968/69, when the producers' price was mF40/kg, for first-classseed cotton (94 percent of the total), the MF288,000 ($585) which a metric tonof fiber fetclhed delivered to Abidjan or Dakar paid for the following (in MF):

106,400 37% to the producer31,535 11% for all transporti.30,200 10% for ginning18,940 6.77L for other conmercial cysts_20,300 77. for extensiorL service-

207,375 4/70,100 24.4% to Government: Treasury-10,300 3.6%/o net: to Office of Price Support5/

1/ Average for the 60% exiting via Abidjan; for Diakar the amount was MF30,938.2/ Average cost: of purchase, sale, insurance, storage, handling and interest

for delivenr to Abidjan; for Dakar the amount was MF19,953 due to higherstorage charges.

3/ This levy will probably yield MF292 million on the 1968/69 crop on theassumption that the ginning outturn of 37.5% on an output of 40,900 tonsof seed cotton will be 14,400 tons of fiber oi which 900 tons may be re-quired to meet the needs of the COMATEX textile plant wlich the Office duNiger cannot cover. This sum could be. well in excess of the MF160 millionthe C?DT expects to spend on extensior. net of the FAC subsidy and somewhatlarger than the NF255 million that is likely Ito be spent on extension in-clusive cf the FAC subsidy. The difference is to be used to retire a MaliGoverniment debt to CFDT. The estimated total cost of extension for 1969-70amounts to about NF19,000 per ton of estimated exports in 1968-69, anamount well below the charge of MF24,760 per ton which Lwas stated to benecessary in the report "Elements d'un progranme de l'operation coton enculture seche pour les annees 1969-197'2."

4/ of the export tax collected by the Govrernment, MF6,000 per ton is supposedto be allocated to SCAER to finance it:s operations, but SCAER has in factnever received its share.

5/ The tax iLs :MF12,000/MT, but ca MFl,70() is needed to align the price., grossof taxes,, with world prices FOB West ifrican port.

54. T'he hiIher producers wnice azmnolm ced on Ila.7-- 28, 1969 raises theproducers, share b- Ib13,300 3 to F119,28OO'oJo ;_i,er o: L2,.6 percent of thetotal. DThen if this aCditiorinal -,ont, ere decluct,ed from -the total oLI7 8 0,.30 that has g,one to t'he alni freasra and tC.e Price Stacbilization

mund, the res:i6iual calount o' 267,100 per ton -ould still bc substentiallyrcr,eater than the aggreg^ate subsic: o-f about .'715,3,00 per tonI of cottonlfiber riade available in 1068/69.

Cott,onseed

55. CPDT cotton-opurchases in 1968/69 -ill i--ld about 2i!,500 l 'T ocottonseed a12 cfter g arg. At presentu, cottot--noaiseed is either 7 asted or e-ported as it is. There is a m-,arlket for cok-tonseed in developed countries,.here it is crashed to yriel d o. 1 and prote&l -r.h cahe -or animal feed.Houever, the .o^rrld p:rice - about -I_170,0300/0 ;,60) c.i.f. ports in cons.umngcountries - is b0 axely suificient to cove-r -uaz-sport ard related costs plus.e1i an taxes o 0 3, 091/il.

56. G'o-tonseed is ml,> cons-idered a v- ess aby--.rod-uct at the girnery.Plans to Ew:Manld S1E30'9 s IKoulikoro oil m.ill to treat cottonseed could chl-Lmvgethris, givring thGe:! cottonseed a value of couit iTl5Ag at the, heier, Thecaho ethat TTould "De urod,ucec' ars a by-product of oil extraction could be usedto fatten lallils catt'le be-fore e, oport.

IV. Prospects and Investment cecds

57. Under -thle oresent cost st-arctuare, nai Is cotton prodnuct onL isqutGe co-)etitive _' nonr_ teu:is. Eoor-ts m -oud still be able 'lo -py av.) b stantilt ta-- -to tlhe state and/or to finance in-estm-.ient in f-uLrther ex-pa nsion, even id the subsidies from forei,n aid we-are deducted znd the'vU11 cost o_ th-e ex-tension service ,.ere charL:;ed to cotton. -If the expected15 percent; decline in -.-orld cot 'ton ;rices over the nex:t five ,;-ears mrzater-ializes, I .liez Coo-ton exports - wil1 not be so lucrative, b.t the Govern-Ilenlt pro)ahlo,cy -Tould eren th-en be aob-e -o realize Ea smlall tax on emoports ifattentiion is paid to kee-in- costs do-In.

58. 1he possiil 'I es for eon -a ic linL cott-on uDroduction are rrecat.£lheir rea] izatJi on de-oends orn (a) irduc ¾rue.rs !'o have recently takenno th'e cl-ivat.l on of cotton to ,,ro-, it on the same scale as the more ex-perienced f-armers; (1b) e:1ccunra.i-n -,der acceptance of t'he nelT inpu-tsessential for a Con'uir neo J-ncrease n y-4elds, arcd (c) expandlin the presentCOttOnl zone inRto Cco) eColj-fiC,alidentonical ar<eas macre Ii Ltle cotton is nlon-groiun. The increase i-n oat'rut LthClt m,ay: be exp,ected from each of thesedevelopm,lents -is ii dcllted '00el.

(a) In the loutti.K'a sector, Chrte cottonL culture first ca-.ght

on and inhere the C070T has bDeen morhin< longes-t, 0.1 3 ha of cott'Con aregroanl -er personi. 2he C7DT2 regards t'-is about the :practical_ m 111im underoresent 'tecmnica- r estrai nts. As a resu1lt of' the -oreseint e-tension ,-stem,

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other parts of the CFDT zone, notably the Segou and Dioila siectors, arerapidly ex?anding the area under cotton. If all existing sectors attainedthe KoutiaLa average, the area under cottorL would be 109,500 ha instead ofthe 71,500 ha now planted. CFDT has scaled its goal down to 93,500 ha,but even this increase would be equivalent to another ll,O0O MT of seedcotton at present yields, a 30 percent increase over present levels.

(b) The most advanced farmers are now obtaining yields of 3 to 4MT/ha; the average yield is 1/2 MT/ha. The latter is now rising rapidlywith growinag use of insecticides, fertilizetr and even manure, which havenow caught on and are becoming rapidly generalized, New seed now beingdistributed shouLd raise yields 5-10 percent alone. Application of CFDT'snew fertilizer dose is expected to raise yields by the present averagetotal yield. Therefore, it seems likely that increase in yield willaccelerate, and that Malian farmers might Esoon average 1 to 1-1/4 MT/ha.On the basis of the more conservative estimate of the cultivated areasuggested above, that is equivalent to 94,000 to 1L7j000 MT of seed cotton.

(c) The present division of MalL into cotton and groundnut zonesis merely a matter of tradition. Groundnul: cultureB first developed in the

West with the opening of the railroad; cotton culture spread first in theSoutheast next to the CPDT's traditional center of Bobo-Dioulasso. Actuallyclimate and soil conditions in the two zones are similar. Cotton is ex-panding into the traditional groundnut zonet along the Niger River. Therefore,it should be ieasible to expand the cotton extension operation into a zoneat least as biLg as the one it now covers, with the ultimate possibility ofproducing as much cotton in the new area a; in the old. The agronomy,economics and extension techniques are already worked out and the responseof farmers has been tested. Altogether, onie could expect an expansion ofMali's seed cotton production to 200,000 to 300,000 MT eventually.

Existing Proposals

59. The Government and CFDT envisage a program with more modest objec-tives for the immediate future. This program aims at increasing cotton pro-duction essent-ially by continuing or increasing subsidies to the price offertilizer and agricultural equipment. It provides for no expansion of thezone of action, no major increase in the extension effort and no investmentin secondary roads to open up new areas.

60. On lthe basis of present subsidy Levels, the program expects thatexpansion in ithe area treated with insecticides, fertilizer and manureand the introduction of new seed will raise the amount of seed cottonmarketed as follows:

1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73

Actual Estimated Projected Projected Projected4OJ900T 42,OOOT 60,OOOT 68,000T 74 ,000T

As indicated below, a larger volume is expected if, with the help of highersubsidies a heavier dose of fertilizer can be applied to 50,000 ua by 1972.

i968-69 1 969 70 IS)0.-71 1 _71-72 1972-73

Actual Projected Projected Proj, ected Projected03900T 55,oooT 68,oooT 80,IDOOT 90,0007'

The higher ubsidy -for the henakvier fertiLizer d'ose has been agreed uponby 'E3 -or 060/70.

61. The Goveriimenxt and C-PDT assess .he investnent needs associatedi-th the proposed program frm 1569-70 tO 1972/73 as follot-s (;in 'S nillions):

Present 1ertili -er Dose lHeavier Fertilizer Dose_~~~~~~~lL _ 1. _ 0.

i?-nmeel drive vehicles (7) 10.5i2--ton tr-ucks ,0 ,iT.IeaTy truc'hs mnd trailers 232 31 8Stora e: CheimicC.- jprouct-bs 360 360

Cot-ton azd seed 270 lendling nz,hine Ž,0 1,0e ginn eryT 0 i:CO

-nore recenlt CFDT estimate places desir-d in,neIst:;Ient in stora-e iacilitiesat 700 mill-ion in adtion to tlhe 12260 .illion the FA'QC has already pro_-ised s for 13 s-toraEe sheds in 1269,/71. -7he re-vised esti Iate ernrisarges con-struc,ticon of 75 storage sheds for- che;--iical prodacts _G n tK?.s covered by theCFDT at a cost of ,.50 rmillion end additional storare space for cotton.(10 000 m-) at a cost of I.3.0 million.

Soae Alternatives

62. Xs S'g£g£;eStVed abDo--ve, the-r e are o`CThe2 'S of stip,r.uI;at-in, cottonporoduction tlmn thIie ones no-,- envisagred'btt t',-e Covemanenz, (elnd the CDT.These i ,rt, srle:nent em1stin.- effLorts oy, to so:-e e.-ten-, ivolve a re-directio.n of e-Lstint aia into dilfere`t chanmire s. The latter ndiht mar-ticulal-e r L n -roe to ac-.nounts nour used for s-'esLd_LZing, fern_lizer and far?;.-machine s, hich farx.ers erentu,a I7- shou:ld be able 'o do vithout.

63. tIrst, -te e.-tension ca 2o_t coabd be ezxancled' bo ne.T zones orinmtensified in areas inhere it is not yet sufficient. Since most ezra an-SiOn -told be 7TestTard inrto the peenus zolne, thils raises organizctionaluoroblems. For-tuntely, cultivation Of cotton and Lrolu-dn-dts are notmu.t-.allyjr e-clusive. In fract, as Pierre Wlguier shoated long ago at 1) Pesoba,cultivatio,n o the o croI)s in rotat-ion could be benefical!. Therefore,ew:pasi'on of Oneration Cotton :nig,nht `he acConr:10MILed by ,r rec;cling CFD§T agentsto improv,e thei,'r kno-Trledlge of other crops ancd lci? traxinin e7ltens§,.on per-sonnel oultside the -resent cotton zone in cot-'-o:.l cult,ure. U'he levy of

12° 8¾ ' 4° 0¾ " 4°REPUBLIC OF MALI

ZONES SUITABLE FOR A L G E R I A

COTTON PRODUCTION K ER

20¾ ExTsting CFDT cotton z20I/ Area potenficity suitblwe fOr -otto thua jI¾

now primarily devoted to groundnuts\\\\\\\~\ IrrigaitgaIed a r eaG o 'f Office Au N.i.ger (riceI cotton) ;

* Cotton ainneries . I

Main roads-* iS Railways

Rainfall

o 100 200 300 400

Kilometers

M A U R I T A N I A / j

2 <'- ~ ,i X N I G E R

Nio

lr~ ~~~~'

U P P E R V O L T ACA

12¾~~~~~~~~ *4/~~~~~~~~~J~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ N .~~~~~~~~~. rt 12'

ITS¾ANIA I|ENPOAL JM iT|ALI N

G U I N E A~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~GIE 0 INNAm, XVI

si BBRA ~~~~NIGERIA

*.J, ~~~~~~~\ 0 ~~~H A N A CAMEROON-

8¾ )%1*4 0¾ 41IBRD-2667

- 15 -

MF20,300 per ton now imposed on exports of cotton to support extensionwork and the amnount now devoted to subsidiea could be used to financesuch an operat:Lon.

64. Seconid, improvement of seconldary roads could make it possiblefor remote vil:lages to enter cotton production and cheaper for CFDT tomove the cotton and other goods in areas now producing. The CFDT fur-nished the Bank !i ssion with the outline of a program for improving 1,165km of roads which are of the greatest importance to cotton operations inits present zone of action. This tentative program provides an estimateof the projected traffic on the roads and a rough indication of the costsof improveuent (IvF1,000 million or $2 million) (see Table 6). While adetailed study of the cost8 and benefits would be rneeded, there are pre-liminary indications that a feeder-road project woutld be wort:hwhile.Table 6 shcs road-user savings only to transporters of cotton in 1972.A program of this nature could also be expected to elicit more cottonproduction and to affect production and marketing of other crops - sorghum,groundnuts} oniors, mangoes, et al. Similar opport:unities extist outsidethe present: cotton zone.

65. Current FED support for the cotton operation is assured througlt1969/70; thtat of FAC through 1970/71. Ilali clearly would lilce to seeboth the iztvestment aid and the subsidies continuecl after those dates;since the cotton operation is a successful one, there seems lto be a goodchance thai: Mali will be able to continue to receive support for the pro-gram from present: sources or others. For 1969/70, the subsidy to agricul-tural equipment, which FAC seems anxious to end, will be coq?lemented by FED.

66. In view of the early termination of the present arrangements forfinancing, steps should be taken soon to arrive at an agreermnnt betweenthe Mali Government and the financing agencies actually or potentiallyinterested in the dimensions, content and cost of the future cotton pro-gram and tlheir respective roles in financirtg it.

67. In dletermining the content of such a program, the future role ofsubsidies should be carefully reviewed. In the pa.st, subsidies have un-doubtedly 1beern an important factor in stimtilating the use of inputs thathave greatly increased yields. It could be argued that subsidies arejustified when it can be demonstrated that the inputs are clearly economicard that this condition is in fact met when the Government can collect inthe form of export levies as much as is paiLd out in subsidies. The presentcombination of export levies and subsidies can be said to operate as anincentive to the good farmer and as a penaiLty to the farmer who does notenjoy the benefit of subsidies. On the otlher hand, indefinite continuationof subsidies appears unjustified, particularly after the stage is reachedwhen a considerable number of farmers have become convinced that the use offertilizer, inisecticides and farm machinery is so profitable that they arewilling to continue to employ them even when the full cost is charged. Theissue is really not whether to abandon subsidies, but at what stage and in

Table 6 : OUTLINE OF ROAD IMPROVE1MENT PROGRAM FOR THE CFDT ZONE

Tableau 6 : APERQU DU PROGRAMME D'AMELIORATION ROUTIERE INTERESSANT LA ZONE DE LA CFDT

Highest Priority/ Second/ Third/Premiere priorite Deuxiieme priorite" Troisieme priorito

Kilometers of road suggested for improvementby CFDT/

Longueur des routes dont la CFDT a pr6conisdl'ame'lioration (en kn) 620 313 242

Tons of cotton CFDT expects to move overthese roads by 1972-73/

Tonnage de coton que la CFDT compte trans-porter sur ces routes en 1972-73 29 700 9 800 8 430

Ton-kilometers assuming that average unittravels half length of road - in million TKm/ 9.2 1.5 1.0

Tonnes kilom'etres dans l'hypothese qu'une unitd'moyenne parcourt la moitie de la longueur d'uneroute - en million de T-Km 9,2 1,5 1,0

Saving to cotton transporters it improvementreduces cost by MF20/TKm (e.g. from MF55 toMF35) - in MF millions/

Economies pour les transporteurs de coton sil'ameiloration re'duit !es couts de 2uFM/T-Km(soit de 55FM a 35FM) - en millions de FM 184 31 20

Estimated cost of improvement/Cout estimatif de 1l'amelioration 527 266 206

Number of years to cover cost from user savingsto cotton transporters alone/ 2.86 8.6 10.3

Nombre d'annees neocessaires our couvrir le coutresultant des economies realisees par usagerspour les seuls transporteurs de coton 2,86 8,6 10,3

Source: Based on data provided by CFDT.

Basl sur les donnees fournies par la CFDT.

-M W

.... ... ....

... .... ... ... . .

o 15

w 0CD -6 - - - - - -

097

Ar

>

.............................

V�, >1

711- 7777� 777 77- ':77N

- 016

wh-at s',teps t1hey Ss to be abol shed. lesoluti'-:on of" *his isste u-ill dependin psart on lu hether or not thle current cottn-r ogra is t,,o be extended tone7- ar eas uhere ziany neX T f f2i ers .11 have to be persuaded to adopt therecora,iended in4 uts.

68. I: anly event, the financinc,g byo=% F.( and FED of investvients incotton maxhketing and processing truL,,cks, storage facilities -have clearly been crl-c_ al to -tothe opei-ation and must conti'nue to be assuredei'lther -fro:n existinrg or other sources. Since the cotlon oneration as alhole is prof table, i t ould be possible ro secare e: terna :financin

for thiese iw -est,.nent nleeds ii necessary.

69. Some investne-nts, inlving entirely O' pro- -local costs,also req'oire -" nancin. -o.r instance, the efficierncr of SC E;s I oerations.oou'.d be enhanced b better storace facilities ad. a suall amxiouLnt of orkinLg

canital. If SC.AER actually recei&-ed the 76,O0/0: of f-iber: exnorts h! chthe lax urovides, it v.oulci be c,7ble to fainace much of this needeCd inLv-estn.entit self.

70. E::2ansion of thel area of 'the cot-tGon opDeration, as su,ggested, trouldrecuire suppleplEientax.r inrvestnents in ex,,tensior servic es, roa. c;s and, -lntipm.atelJr,g,inn-in faciliies. Prof i'ili'- of such in-estments -ould rec-uire ca-refulstudy, bu,t tie experience 7rth siilar elfforts acic are obviously urofitablesho-Lld, f acilitat,e such stud-r

- 17 -

GROID1N1JTS

L, .o Producron MarkcetiM.RdPces

71. Information on groundnuts producliion is not very reliable.In the years for which sampie agricultural census data are availableoutput does appear to have stagnated apart from changes due to climaticfactors; and if other available estimates of output are to be believed,there may have been some decline in producition. In any event,it isclear that tluh volume of groundnuts marketed has fallen considerably inrecent years. An increasing proportion of the crop has apparently beenconsumed on the farm or marketed outside auithorized channels. Moreover,of the declining; portion sold to the Goverwment, an increasing share hasgone for processing into oil at SEpOm'S Kouilikoro oil mill which sellsprimarily in the domestic market, thus leaving less to be exported asshelled nuLts (see Tables 7 and 8).

72. The drop in the volume marketed is parti.cularly serious forMali. Before inLdependence, shelled groundauts were the country'ssecond expiort, a,fter cattle; by 1966 they 'had fallen to fourth placeand were worth less than 40 percent of what they h,ad been irt 1959.The Goverrment has found it increasingly difficult: to live up to theterms of t:he clearing agreements under which virtually all groundnutswere exported, and the SEPOM oil mill, rebuilt by German aid., has hadto operate far below capacity. Such problems were aggravated duringpoor crop years like 1967/63. Thanks to the clearing agreements, however,M4ali was insulated from drops in the world-marker price; Mali's purchaserspaid the siame price as the protected French market:.

73. The drop in groundnut marketings was not: marked unitil 1965.In that year, farmers were becoming acutely aware of the shrinkingpurchasing power of the Mali franc, and were further discouraged by acut in the prodilcers' price from MF14 to IEF13/kg. As markeitingsdeclined, farmers probably both ate a larger portiLon of theLr cropand planted less. Subsequent increases in. the farm price to MFl6/kgin 1966/6' and lto tB24 in 1967/68 apparently failed to increase output,partly, perhaps, owing to the limited supply of consumers' poods tofarmers, and partly because climatic conditions considerably reducedthe 1967/68 crop. Apart from the factors mentioned above, the virtualunavailability of improved seeds and delays in the purchase of groundnutsby SOMIEX, the Government's trading comparny, discouraged output. Inone year SOMNEX was so late in its purchasing thait part of the harvestwas not mirketed until fully a year later, with adverse effects on bothquality aind price.

74. The SEPOM mill now takes a larger portion of the crop andin 1969/71) expects to process a greater tonnage tlhan has been marketedin some recent years. Until 1967/68, the groundniuts processed bySEPOM were consumed locally as oil; only in 1968 4id MIali begin toexport oil. Oil produced and consumed locally presumably replacedimports, but it was also at the expense of exports of shelled nuts.The net foreiLgn exchange gain in exporting oil rather than nuts issmall, largely because the tariff structure of important countries

Table 7: GROUNDNUTS: DISPOSITION BY QUANTITIES

Tableau 7 ARACHIDES: DESTINATION PAR QUANTITES

(in metric tons)(en tornes)

1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69

Productionl/(in shell)/Production&/(coques) 122 500 148 000 153 200 159 200 119 000

Estimated amount used for seed (in shell)/Quantiteestimative utilisee pour lessemences (coques) 14 100 10 500 9 530 8 960

Farm consumption (in seed)/Consommation au stade de ltexploitation(semences) 22 400 93 750 116 470 110 140

Amount marketed through official chamnels(in shell)/Quantite commercialisee parles circuits officiels (coques) 85 900 50 900 83 4oo 66 400 70 700 75 000 48 800 27 200 39 809 29 252 28 OOO(est.)

Equivalent decorticated/Equivalent enarachides decortiquees 56 760 33 600 55 000 43 800 46 600 49 500 32 200 18 000 26 300 19 300Of which/dont:

- Exported/Exportation 25 360_2/ 13 580 19 500 10 500- Bought by oil mill/Achat par

!es '-fuileries 071 6 84o hIh20 6 800 8 797 21 500

Oil equivalent/Equivalent en huile 284 2 420 2380 3 440 2 738 6 500Used for soap/Fabrication du savon ? ? 50 50 14? n.a.Sold locally/Vente sur le marche national 284 2 420 2330 3 390 2 386 n.a.Seld for. _ or±Veyt"e a l'exnortation 0 0 0 338 n.a.

Oil cake equivalent/Equivalent en tourteaux n.a. n.a. n.a. 4 076 n.a.

1/ As indicated by sample agricultural censuses. / Tellequ'elle ressort des recensements agricoles par sondages.

2/ From that year's crop. Actual amount exported was higher~ due to drawdown of stocks. / Provenant de la recolte de la campagne en question. La quantiteeffectivement exportee etait supe'rieure en raison du prelevement sur les stocks.

Table 8: DISPOSITION OF GROUNDNUT CROP

TabLeau 8: DESTINATION DE LA RECOLTE AiACHIDIERE

(in Percentages)(en pourcentages)

1958-59 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68

Used for seed, etc./ 11.5 7 6 5.5 )Utilisation pour l,es semences, etc. 11,5 7 6 5,5 ) 75.5

Consumed on farms/ 18 63.5 76 69 ) 75,5Consommation alL stade de )1'exploitation 18 63,5 76 69 )

Marketed! 70 33 18 25 24.5Commercialisati.on 70 33 18 25 24,5Of which/dont:Exported as shelled nuts/ 69 26 13.5 18.5 13.5Exportation sous formedecortiquee 69 26 13,5 18,5 13,5

Crushed at oil mill/ 1 7 4.5 6.5 11Broyage "a 1lhuilerie 1 7 4,5 6.5 11Of which/dont:Oil for local sale/ 1 7 4.5 6.5 10.5Huile <destine4 e aumarche' national 1 7 4,5 6,5 10,5

Oil for export/s 0 0 0 0 1Huile destinee a

1'exportation 0 0 0 0 1

Made into soap/ neg. neg. neg. neg. neg.Fabrication le

savon neg. neg. neg. neg. neg.

~% CHART I- Disposition of Groundnuts CCAT

20,0ooo - (in metric tons) ._-_:

150,000L

- - :- - -. - - - , - . -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~, ~

y, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~77,

Shelled and exported

Marketed

50,000 ?

Use on farm

10,000 ~~~~~~Seed, etc.

1958-9 1959-60 1960-1 1961-2 1962-3 1963-4 1964-5 1965-6 1966-7 1967-8

IBRD - 4573

- 18 -

generallgy discriminates against oil import<s.

The Market Situation

75. At recently prevailing producers' prices, groundnut growinghas not been very lucrative for MOfalian farmners. The price increase toMIF30/kg annouinced at the end of May 1969 should provide a greaterincentive, bu-t the limit has now probably been reached in view of theprospective world marlet situation and 1,ali's distance from markets.The cost cf transporting a ton of agricultural prcduce from Barnako toDakar, including handling, storage and insurance, is about .FT20,000($40). This represents almost 25 percent of the selling price ofgroundnuts in Dakar, but only 7 percent of the price of cotton fiber.Miali can therefore never pay its groundnut producers as much as Senegalcan, and is thus at a competitive disadvantage.

76. The various prices the Mali Government has paid its peanutfarmers since independence have been fixed so as to permit exports andleave a simall margin for the Governnent or SOrEX, which handlespeanut marketing, shelling and exporting. Before devaluation, theprice was variously 11;174, 13 and 16/k<g of' unshelled nuts. At F13,for instance, unshelled peanuts would cost, IT15.50/kg at the sheller,equivalent, in terms of shelled nuts, to ?F23.50. After adding 1&2/kgfor shelling anld sacking and I1,ll/kg for shipment to Dakar, handling,etc., the cost of a ton of shelled peanuts at Dakar wTas about WS36,500,compared to an f.o.b. selling price in the range Df rFh44,000 to 1 m 7,000.The difference was available to the Goverinment or to SOMIEX.

77. Devaluation in 1967 created a nore favorable situation, forthe export price in Mali francs doubled wiile the cost of transportdid not rise by as much. The Government passed part of the benefit onto the farmers by raising the farm price by 50 percent - arl increasegreater than that for other agricultural products. 1>Thile the farmgate price in 1968/69 was thus HF2Vj/1g; the price delivered to SOMIIEXwas I1T25.6, yielding a margin that in most cases was too small to coverthe cost of transport. To this price, equivalent to s739 in terms ofshelled rnuts, iSOMIEX had to add iF2 for shelling and sacking and PfE20for transport wnd handling. This brought the cos,t at Dakar to Tn,61,000per ton compared to a sales .rice of HF85$,000 The difference enabledthe Government to levy an exoort tax of 1724,900.,

78. Although Maii has in the past bleen able to sell in "clearingagreement" countries at -prices to some extent insulated from worldmarket fluctuations, it is unlikely to remain iniTune fro;m the prospectivewrTeakening of groundnut prices in the future. -lo-rld mark-et prices whichrose to a high of $167/NT (IMF82,000) in 1968, a:re expected to declineto $153 (hF75,000) in 1970 and at a slightly lowefr rate thereafter.Thle farm prLce of M'P30/kg fixed in `May 1L969 is now more than doublethat prior to devaluation. This price, after the addition of all chargesexcept for the export tax will raise the cost of shelled nuts ex-Dakarto IF70,500. It is therefore clear that exports will still be profitable,but only if the Government contents itself with a smaller export tax.

- 19 -

However, if the 'hi;,her farii ;rice succeeds in bringing larger suppliesto the .lar'.et., T:he loss in revenue du)e to a low.-er tax per ton may beoffset in considerable measure by a higher volumLme of exports.

.ore of the ex-oors in the future is excected to be in theforrmi of oil. Groundnut oil production at tbhe IXoulikoro m,ill. exceededlocal demand for the first time in 1968. In 1969/70 it will. probablybe able to work at ca-oacitr, processin.7 21,500 tons of shelled nuts(equal to 33,000 tons unshelled) and zroducing nearly 10,000 tons ofoil, of which 7C00 tons should be available for export. In view ofthis increase in. output and the oros)ect tLat the mill will be furtherexpanded, it is im,poortant to appreciate what benef'it Miali will derivefrom exDortiny riore of its croo as oil.

80. A ton of shelled groundnuts should yield about 400 kg ofoil and55 'rg of cake, although in 'ali the oil yield fal's at timesto as low as 30 -oercent due to th-e harvesting of im,iiature nuts. Peanutoil now sells for M'16 6/k<g in Miali and calCe {or 1'119.7/kg. The smallquantities ex-oorted in 1968 fetched 1T139/kg (for oil) and MF24-5/7sg(for cake'. The world price for groundnut oil (3-5 percent acid content)c.i.f. Euroepan port is now about $270/1',T ('7J134,000) and is expectedto fall about 7 percent over the next five years. The price of groundnutcake is about $L12/ITf (FB55,000) on the same basis and is expected tohold steady or -to rise by 5 ?ercent over the same period. Tn 1968,MIali realized more thain the going world )rice for its groundnut oil,but had difficulty selling its cak-,e.

81. At the l966 orice obtained by Piali a to:, of shelled nutsexported in the form of oil and cakre yielded >`399100 at DakCar, or~Ff0,100 after deducting MF19,000 for transoort and handling. This

is approximatiely what a ton of shelled groundnuts now costs at themill on the basis of the fari, price of M 30/kg without ma'ing anyallowance for processing or for exp ort taxes which axiount to I112,000per ton for oil and TT2690 per ton of cak.e. This unfavorable situationis due tc the fact that the ;rice of oil aake at Dakar barely coversthe cost of trans--ort and handling. It would clearly be to Mali'sadvantage if it, could find a mark.et for the cak:e at haome for the fatteningof cattle. If cak)e could be sold at home for `.19.7/kg and the oilexported at a price of iYl39/`kg ex-Dakar, the factory value of shelledgroundnuts would be -IS58,000 or enough to meet processing costs andleave a m,argin of about -T5000 for taxes.

TI. Efforts to Increase Oroduction

82. The cultivation of groundnuts first developed during the

colonial neriod along the T(oulLcoro-BaxaRo-Dakar railtay line. Cultiva-tion was extensive, using as little labor )er unit of land as possibleand virtually no ca;)ital. Yields were low - about 500 kg. to 600 kg.of unshelled groundnuts per hectare. Groundnuts were not planted untilthe major food cro3 - sorghum, or millet - had been planted and weeded

- 20 -

the first time. This shortened thae periocd for maturation, especiallysince groundznuts had to be harvested befoie the soils became too hard.The high proportion of immature nuts yielded a relatively low oilcontent.

83. Allthough the groundnuts were -roduced at a cost low enoughto malke them competitive despite ialits distamoce from worldc mt-ckets,for farmers groundnLut cultivation was onlyr marginally ;profitable eventhough they (lid not have many alternative ways of earning cash. 11henthe Government cut -prices to keep them in line with the world marketat independence, many farmers in western ?Iali chcse to get their cashby migrating to wage jobs in toTwms insteall.

84. From independence to 1964, efforts to increase groundnutproduction imre largely hortatory. Thereafter, an attempt was madeto introduce improved seed, but this was not effective until "OperationGroundnut"t was started in 1967 with technical asSistance from the BDPF.(Agricultural rTroduction Develop)ment Bureau). To support this OperationFAC is -providing -!"340 million ($700,000) per yeaLr through 1971. Thisamount pays for French technical assistance, some trucks used forcollecting the groundnuts, bicycles for Mlalian extension workers,fungicides for treating the seed, some farm tools and a radiio netwforklinking the technicians. Over two-thirds of the cost is for exo?atriatepersonne-l. FAC gave the Operation twTentyr truclks during its first twoyears and lIali contributed seven. Tali bears most of the local costsof the Operation, including the salaries of 140 Halian extensionsupervisors and a considerable number of farrm-level extension wor'kers(Itencadreurs"). FED is making available subsidies for fertilizer usedon groundnuts through 1969/70. Table 9 gives an indication of thetotal foreign assistance for the grounidnut ca,mpaign.

85. The ODerationls zone of act-on has bee, gradually extended.It started in the Circles of Koulikoro, 3anamba, Xolokani and part ofBaiaako Circu.e and was extended to cover imost of Kita Circle in 1968/69.'This is the area of most concentrated groundnut cultivaticn, accountingfor about 53,000 hectares or about 25 percent of the national total andfor around :L7,000 i'Tr or circa 60 percent of the total marketed in 1968/69.In the next two years, the Operation is to be extended into Bafoulabeand Kita Circles, whence most of the remaining marketed groundnutsoriginate.

86. Oceration Groundnut has met with numerous difficulties. Itbegan too late to have much effect in 1957/68 wahich was also adisastrous year climatically5 in 1963/69, w>,hen clinatic conditionswere also poor, the sale of part of the crop to private traders tendedto obscure the effect of the operation and reduce the profitability ofits investments in marketing operations.

87. It will be some tine before the effect-iveness ow OerationGroundnut can be assessed. Groundnut marketing; seem bound to recoverto some extent from past low levels in response to tne higher pricefixed byr the Governm-^ent and the improve,ent in the abnormTlly p- oor

Table 9 : FOREIGN SUBSIDIES TO GIDUNDNUT GROWERS

Tableau 9: SUBVENTIONS ETRANGERES AUX CULTIVATEURS DIARACHIDES

(MF million)(millions de FM)

Description l965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71

FACTotal support to Operation Groundnuts/Appui total 'a l'Opration arachides

293 258 385 304

Of which/dont'Extension service/

? ? 328.5 30h

Services de vulgarisation ? ? 328,5 30h

Trucks for marketing/Camions destine's 'a la commercialisation

34 34 51 0

Farm equipment/ ? ? 5.5 0

Materiel agricole ? ? 5,5 0

Subsidy to farm equipment/,Subvention au t"…e .- ^

FEDTotal support to Operation Groundnuts/ 186 186 55.5 38 23

Appu' t-4al a1OpKration arachides 186 186 55,5 38 23

0O which/dont:Extension service/ 91.5 91.5 - - -

Services de vulgarisation

Fertilizers/Engrais 59 59 33 38 23

Trucks for marketing/ 111.5 11.5 21 - -eN

Camions destines a la commercialisation 11,5 11,5 21 - -

Improved seed/ 24.5 24.5 1.5

Semences amelidnrees 24,5 24,5 1,5

I/ Impossible to determine since equipment was distributed through SCAER directly and not through Operation Groundnuts.

\ ~~~~~~~~~~ " eA

Impossible a determiner du fait que le materiel a ete distribue directement par l'entremise de SCAER et non grace a

l'intervention de l'Operation arachides.

12' 8' ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'To Taodeni 0 *'

"OPERATION GROUNDNUT" /KA L GE R AGOUNGAO~~~~4..

NIAFOUNKE') 0

Priority roads: A-, B ------ *1i'Tesoolit ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~Mnak

… F~~~~or tracks * o~~iotoDIGAA~

~ Internatinal airpor

* AirfieldsBA A

- MA U RI TAN I ~~~~~~~~~~~IAS /i r

)j 'K ~~~~~~~-~~--l'i Klo-) .. .4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~AB

I 4~~~~~~~L

JANUARY 1970 IBRD 2668R~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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weather conditions of the recent past. In that event, however, itwill still. be difficult to determine how mach of the improvement willhave been due tc) the Operation's program.

88. Basically this program focuses oa (a) irprovement in marketing,(b) distribution of better seed and (c) adoption of better crophusbandry.

The Market,ing Program

89. Before Operation Groundnut began, marketing in the zone wasthe monopoly of SOMIEX, which worked through the SJHDRs (CooperativeRural Deverlovoment Societies) and local cooperatives. Under this systemfarmers often e_xperienced delays in the mar'!eting of their crop. TheBDPA, as manager of Operation Groundnut, is now in charge o0 the collectionof the crop and its delivery to SO14TEX. In 1967/66 it operated 250buying stations,. EThile this undoubtedly helped the farmers, collectionand transport proved extremely costly in view of the small amount ofgroundnuts marketed per station. In 1968/69, the number of buyingstations was redluced to 1hO; the Operation's 27 trucks were 7Meot busyfor three months but were unused the rest of the time. Due to thesmall amoumt purchased, the cost was again prohib-itively high. lWhileBD?A considers that it can cut costs to NTT4/1kg, this is still farabove the IIF..6,/kg which SOiEX now allowus for collection and transport.

90. Obviously, it is crucial to find. a way of providing thegroundnut farmer with good marketing services at 'Less cost. The useof trucks just for marketing groundnuts dur.ing three months of theyear does not appear to be economic. Contracts wrLth private truckersmight be .uch cheaper. However, it is possible that in any eventmarkceting losses mayj have to be sustained until farmers can be persuadedto produce a larger volume for the mar'ket. Nlevertheless, the economicsof Operation Groun=dnutts markceting system raight well be reexamined.

91. One factor producing high costs is the extremely poor conditionof all roads in the area. The Operation has eren undertaken some minorroad repoairs itself in an attempt to save money, but is not equipped toperform this function. A map showing the roads rl^ihich the BDPA. considersit most lnportant to improve is attached. The necessary improvementsmig't cost as much as H3800 million ($1.6 million).

Improved veecis

92. During the early years of I-ali's independence, the qualityof the grouncdnut seeds N-lalian farmers were planting degenerated con-siderably. In collaboration with LMHO (0Ll and Oil-seed ResearchInstitute), Operation Groundnut has ident:ified and is multiplying twoimproved varieties which are considerably superior to those now used.Uhere rainfaLl is over 1100 imm/year, 48-337 is being used, but is aboutto be replaced by 56-2335 for the ;-rincipal area with 700 rn to 1100 .zmof rainfall annually, the best variety is still 28-206. Using thesevarieties should considerably improve yie:lds and limit -oroblems withrosette disease.

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93. The seed multiplication program is working satisfactorily, butit is too ear:Ly to demonstrate results. Ia 1968/69, 815 MT of improvedseed were grown through contracts with farners. Of this amount, BDPAsold 447 iNT, enough for about 4470 hectares or eight and one-half percentof the area under groundnuts in the zone. It plans to replace seed everyfour years. ]Farmers are expected to pay fDr the seed with ].5 percent oftheir harvest, which covers a little more than half the cost: of the program.The small net cost of the program ought to produce major benefits.

Improved Crop Husbandry

94. Effcrts iri this field are concentrated on raising yields. Extensionworkers are using four main themes: (a) earlier planting, (b) higherplant density, (c) disinfection of seed and (d) use of fertilizer. As aresult of using this formula, BDPA and IRHO experts hope that adoption ofthese practices will raise average yields from the present low level of0.5 MT/hectare (unshelled) to 1.7 MT/hectare. A few of the best farmersare now getting 2 MT/hectare.

95. It is noteXworthy that the improvement possible with this formula,though considerable, does not compare with that from the CFDT cotton formula.The best yields now being achieved by cotton farmers are 16 times thoseachieved with traditional methods and 8 times the present national average;the best groundnlut farm yields are 4 times the national ave:rage obtainedwith traditional techniques.

(a) Earlier planting has important and obvious advantages. Itwould inc:rease yields and permit the nuts to be left in the ground untilmaturity, thus increasing oil content. HIowever, earlier sowing bringsgroundaut labor requirements into conflict with those for growing sorghumand millet. Experience has shown that farmers will not prejudice theirstaple crop for groundnuts; Operation Groundnut has recognized and acceptedthis.

96. The Operation's answer to the labor-bottleneck problem is to persuadefarmers to plant their sorghum before the rains start. normally, thereare several reasons why this is not done. Though the soil is hard beforethe rains, one can skip preparatory tillage - rudimentary in most of thezone in any case - and insert the sorghum seed in holes made with a stick.However, whiLe the seeds are lying ungerm:Lnated in the dry soil, they aresubject to biLrd and rodent attack, and wii:h the first light rains they mayrot. Efforts are being made to deal with these hazards by treating seeds witha preparation which is both a fungicide and pesticide. However, the seedtends to sprout following the first rains, and failure of subsequent rains,which is not infrequent early in the rainy season, will cause seedlings towither and necessitate replanting. While this may not be a major task andfarmers have to do it at times under present conditions, it negates theeffect of early planting and increases the uncertainty of getting a goodyield. In any event, few farmers have as yet adopted the practice ofsowing their scrghum and millet before the rains in order to be able tosaw their groundnuts earlier.

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(b) The increase in the density of sowing has also proveddifficult; to achieve. Farmers have a tendency to economize the useof seed and still do not appreciate the need for more intensive useof land. Higher sowing density does, however, somewhat reduce theburden of weeding and its advantage may w;ell become more apparent whenmore fertilizer is used.

(c) Dis:infection of seed calls for the application of 200 gof fungicide.to the quantity of seed (100 kg) recommended for sowingone hectare of groundnuts. The cost of this is i4P150. The effect onyields apparently varies considerably. It may be as high as 30 percentin a very wet year and may be negligible in othe,, years. BDPA/Parishas estim,lated the average yield increase from use of fungicides at6 percent.

97. In 1968/69, the 0Oeration sold 10,418 packages of fungicide,each suf.ficient to treat seed for one hec:tare. If properly used, thisshould have been enough to cover 20 percent of the area slanted togroundnuts in the zone.

98. I' o:n the a-verage yields do increase by 6 percent, theadditional output would be 30 kg per hectare worth ̂1t1720 at the oldprice and ZT900 at the new price. Since most families appear to growabout half an hectare of groundnuts, the:Lr net increase in. income,after deducting the cost of fungicide and without allowing for therather negligible amount of labor involved in treating the seed, wouldbe T1F375. It is doubtful that farmers will be able to attribute tothe treatm ent of seed such modest inc'ea1 t1 in yield and income whichraL 'cell within the range of yield fluctuations caused by weather

conditions. EHoever, if it turns out that disinfection really offersprotection against a 25 percent drop in producti.on in wet years,farmers might recognize and appreciate th.ze results.

99. As already indicated, fungicides were also distributed forapplicat,ion to sorghum and millet in efforts to persuade the farmersto plant; these cro-ps earlier. The thirty grams of fungicide requiredto treat; the 12 kg of seed necessary for one hectare of s,orghum ormillet cost the farmer MF5o. In 1968-69 11,400 30-gram packages weredistribuited. The effect on yields does not seem to have been conclusivelyestablished. -?hen farmers sow before the rains, the cost of fungicideis likely to be well over I-750/hectare since he will almost certainlyhave to resow at least once. Most of the farmers now using fungicidea-.parently do not plant before the rains.

(d) operation Groundnut recommends application of 1.00 kg ofmixed fertilizer (6N-20P-10S) per hectare. The resulting increase inproducti.on varies widely with conditions, but BEPA estiimates the averageat 300 kg of unshelled groundnuts per hectare. At the old farm priceof F24/'kg, this additional output was worth ~T$7200; at the new priceof 'MF30, it is worth '1F°000. For the fertilizer' the farmer Days a

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subsidized price of NF3200, leaving him a net theoretical gain ofMiP40O0 at the old groundnut price and A1'75800 at the new groumdnutprice. However, if he were required to pay the fuLll cost of fertilizer,or MF6lO0, his net gain would be reduced to HllO() and MF2900 perhectare respectively. Assuming that the farmer spends three man-daysin spreading the fertilizer, the returns to his ltbor per day wouldbe as fol:Lows oIn the basis of alternative assumpt-'ions about the costof fertilizer and the price of groundnuts:

Fertilizer Cost At .iF24/kg for At T-3OA/g forgroundnuts groundnuts

At M1432/kg (subsidized) 1,333 1,933

At I761/1/kg (umsubsidized) 367 967

Even the lowest of these returns are well in excess of prevailingagricultural wages, and particularly at the new price for groundnuts,they seem very attractive. Moreover, the potential increase in yieldsof groundnuts together with the residual effects on sorghuni or milletgrown the fo'Llowing year appear striking enough to be noted. by farmers.

100. Although the use of fertilizer on groun.dnuts is not asprofitable as in the case of cotton, it seems to be definitely worth-while. This may account for the fact that considerable success hasbeen achi.eved in a relatively short time in convincing farners to usefertilizer. In 1968/69, sales of fertilizer amouinted to 485 MT,enough to treat 4850 hectares or 9 percent of the groundnut area inthe zone.

101. In practice, however, results have not measured up to expecta-tions, largely because variations in rainfall affect the increases inyield which theoretically can be obtained, and higher yields are alsoconditioned on the adoption of better cultural practices. In 1968,when rainfall was erratic, many farmers did not obtain the expectedincrease of 300 kg in additional yields and accordingly suffered losses.irWithout dense sowing fertilizer also tend.s to encourage excessive weedgrowth iistead of raising yields. Directors of the Operation admitthat many farmers are disillusioned with the results of using fertilizer.They now plan -to concentrate on the other, low-capital cost themes,and to recommenad fertilizer only when they are convinced that the otherthemes are followed.

Farm Decortication of Groundnuts

102. Aoart from the practices outlined above, Operation Groundnutsought initially to encourage farm decor.ication of groundnuts. In1967 and early 1968 SCAER sold 200 shellers, the totalrnu..-wri.b.r it had

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originally purchased. However, SOMIEX intervened to stop this programbecause It was jeopardizing the profitability of SOMIEX's own shellingoperations.

103. BDPA considers shelling of groundauts on the farm t:o beadvantageous. If this opinion should prove to be correct upcin re-examination,SOMIEX should lbe required to curtail its own shelling operation.

104. At prices prevailing in 1968/69 shelling of groundruts on thefarm appeared to yield a modest return to the labor involved provided thegroundnuts wer,e of good quality. A kilogran of good groundnuts, thenworth I1F24, couldL yield 0.66 kg of nuts worth, at VF42/kg, M1E27.8. However,if the groumdnuts; contain many empty grains or wornay nuts, the yield ismuch lower. Insistence on farm shelling might indeed oblige farmers toraise the quality of their output, an objective which is important for theexpansion of exports and the improvement of the economies of SEPOM's pro-cessing operation. Buyers now pay farmers the same! price for unshelledgroundauts regardlless of quality; with farm shellinig, farmeris would bepaid according to the actual yield in terms of nuts.

Appraisal of the Operation

105. It is clearly too early to judge the prof.itability of OperationGroundnut. The Operation has been going for only two full seasons. Thefirst season was largely devoted to organization and other preparatorywork. Climatic conditions in both years were unfavorable. In 1968/69the volume of groundnuts marketed through both official and unofficialchannels maty have increased, but it is difficult to determine how muchthis is duei to Operation Groundnut and how much to higher farm pricesand greater availability of consumers goods. On the whole, the benefitsof the program are not yet clearly discernible, but: it must be concededthat a simiLlar conclusion would probably have been reached about theCFDT cottotn program had it been appraised a few years after ithe beginningof its operation.

106. The program has been successful in mobilizing assistance bothby FAC and FED anid has produced a considerable expansion of Niali's ownextension efforts; in the groundnut zone. EED fert:ilizer subisidiesand FAC's agenera:L farm-equipment subsidies have undoubtedly benefittedfarmers, both in their groundnut and other crops.

107. The limited effect of the Operation is revealed by thedifficulty encountered in securing repaymenLt of credits expended inconnection with the program. Of the MF8 million in credits granted togroundnuts farmers in the first two years, one-third has not been repaid.This record, poor by comparison with that for cotton credit, is pre-sumably due orLy in part to the disappointing effe,ct of inputs onfarmers' profits. In practice, it is undoulbtedly nmuch more difficultto recover credit extended for the cultivation of groundnuts because itis not easy to channel their marketing through a single agency which candeduct repayments from the sale proceeds.

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III. Prospects

108. At prices that wipll be paid to farmers beginning late in 1969,Hali will still be able to sell shelled groundnuts profitably on theworld market. Hiowever, if the world market price drops as expected,the tax the Government will be able to levy on these exports will becomenegligible.

109. If the SEP03 oil mill runs at caLpacity, as it may in 1969/70,it should produce nearly 10,000 PT of unrefined oil - 7000 to 7500 1Tmore than 1Mal-its home market consumes. IJ world p?rices hold at nearpresent levels, it will be profitable to export groundnut oil only ifsome return can be realized on the calke arid if oil yields are L-0 perentor higher. Many experts expect vegetable-oil prices to decline by themid-1970s.

110. Another factor - the spread of Aistrologis mold - may endangerexport of groundnut products. This mold, which attacks grcundnutsafter they are harvested, particularly under the poor storage conditionsprevailing in Mali, produces aflatoxin, whiich is fatal to poultry inextremely small doses, and to cattle and lumnan beings in slightlylarger ones. International buyers of groundnuts and groundnut-cake arenow better abDle to detect aflatoxin. The3-e is thus considerable riskof adverse effects on the prices of lali's groundnuts, particularlythose of oilcake which is most infected. The aflatoxin factor probablyaccounted for the fact that -ali's cak'e exotorted in 1967/68 and 1968/69fetched far 'less than the world price.

lIl. Other pests are also becoming a serious problem. Borers andother insects are destroying a significant part of the marketed cro?after harvest. TWhereas the processing of good-quality groundnuts cannormally be expected to yield about 40 percent oil, 55 percent cake and5 percent waste, the Koulikoro oil mill in 1967/68 realizecl 31 percent oil,46 -l/2 percent cake and 22-1/2 percent waste. The low oil content waspartly due to early harvesting, but the excessive w-Taste wams due not tofaulty crushing, but to insect damage and impurit,ies in the groundnutsit bought. Groundnuts which are bought for !F30/fkg at the farn cannotbe exported profitably if they are of such poor quality and suffer fromsuch insect dlaage before processing. Research on ways of dealing withthis problem is essential and urgent.

112. Provided that these marketing problems can be overcome, theprospects of at least restoring outout and sales to former levelsappear to be reasonably good. As recently as 1963/64, iJalian farmersmarketed 75,00() INT of unshelled groundnuts at prices lower than thoseto be paid next year. The volume marketed fell only when the goodsfarmers could buy became really scarce. In the :Late 1950s, at pricesno higher than the 1969/70 price in real terms, they marketed nearly100,000 tons. Their returns, however, were alwaays marginal, and manyfarraers reduced or abandoned their output when the terms of trade madegroundnuts cultivation less attractive, particularly in re:lation to

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wfages that could be obtained through labor migration. Now that consumergoods are again in good supply and the grolindnut price is relativelyattractive, a higher output should in princiiple be obtainable evenwith the use of traditional methods and quite independent of' the adop-tion of the practices that have been promoted by OCperation Groundnut.

113. In establishing buying stations ^wJhere farmers can sell atfixed prices, Operation Groundnut is proviling a valuable service.However, it h,as already been pointed out tnat collection and transportcosts are much too high and that means must be devised to reduce theseto a level that can be supported without subsidies. The need to usemarketing as a means of recouping credit extended for grouncdnut cultiva-tion should not be irreconcilable with a system under which transportof groundniuts is entrusted to private trucking contractors. The latterhave much greater possibilities to use their trucks profitably throughoutthe year than the Government.

1146 While the use of improved seed is cheap and comparativelyeffective, the efforts of Operation Groundnut to get farmers to shiftfrom extensive to intensive cultivation of groundnuts are still atthe experimental stage and ought to be so regarded. Some of the practicesnow urged by BD79A may need to be abandoned or deermphasized, as in thecase of the CF3T program after some years of tria:L. Thus socio-economicobstacles make it unlikely that farmers will sow their stapLe foodcrop before the rains. There is a wgelcome tendency now to concentrateon innovations that involve little cost ard do not demand much extralabor. The use of fertilizer is likely tc, spread only wihen improvedseeds are used, when plants are sown as early as the farmer can manage,and when denser -planting is accepted.

15. Sirnce early planting is one of the keys to the problem ofhigher yields, and since it seems unlikely (perha:;s even not desirable)that farmers will change the way they plarnt their sorghum and millet,the possibility of speeding up the planting and weeding of sorghum-millet and the planting of groundnuts would seem to be the answer.Senegalese farmers have improved the efficiency of their labor at thecrucial bottleneck time - the early rains - by using seed-drills andplows. Although past efforts to sell seecl-drills in 4Tali have not beenvery successful, the potential benefits of this inmDlement are such as towarrant renewied attempts to promote its adoDtion as a means of achie'vingearlier planting of groundnuts.

Groundnuts and Cotton

116. In the preceding discussion of cotton, it was suggested thatcotton should also be grown in the present groundnut zone. WAhile thismight to some3 extent diminish the attraction of groundnuts and theaippeal of the practices promoted by Operation Groundnut, there areagronomic advantages in growing the two crops in rotation. Theseadvantages are enhanced by the fact that groundcnuts have become a moreattractive crop than formerly, now that the farm -price has been raisedto I230/kg. Moreover, the expanded use of plows and other aniraal-drawn

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equipment may enable farmers to till more land and increase theirproduction of both crops, particularly if at the same time otheryield-ra-Lsing inputs are adopted. Successful promotion of both cottonand grouldnuts may produce significant economies in the costs of extensionwork, marketing and the supply of production requisites andi may make itmore profitable to improve rural roads.

117. Nevertheless, it must not be focrgotten that cotton, boughtat Itj42/kg and exported, is more profitable for Iali than groundnuts,bought at I9'30%kg and exported, at least under present mark-et conditions.For some years to come, cotton will probably be able to support ahigrher export tax than groundnuts, which is a considerable advantageto a Government wvhich is so beset by budget problems as that of Nali.Thus even if farmers should be disposed to shift in some measure fromgroundnuts to cotton, it would clearly be in M4al:i's interest to letthem do so.

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RICE

118. HItali is a substantial producer of rice. Reliable figures onoutput are lacking. Although some estimates of anrual production go upas high as 180,000 to 200,000 tons of paddy, data cLerived from the sampleagricultural census for a number of years and adjusted for areas not coveredindicate that 160,000 tons is likely to be a more accurate figure. Produc-tion seems to havre stagnated at this level ever sirnce the early 'fifties.Heanwhile, rice consumption in the urban areas has increased at the expenseof sorghum largely owing to government price controls, so that Nali, for-merly an exporter of rice, now has difficulty in meeting its own needs. In1965/66, rice had to be imported for the first time-, and in 1969/70,following at particularly bad harvest, arrangements were made to import asmuch as 20,000 tons at a total cost of MF1.67 billion ($3.4 million).

119. About three-quarters of the rice output is consumed on the farm,almost entirely in the form of parboiled rice which is produced by womenwho sell suall surpluses over family consumption im. local markets. Thebulk of the rice marketed in the urban areas is milled white rice. Pricesare officially fixed for all types and at a:ll levels, ranging from thefarm to the retail price; and the official mnarketing organization, OPAM,is charged witlh the purchase and sale of rice. Until recently, officialprices offe.red little or no incentives and eancouraged "black-marketing" ofsubstantial quantities of rice. Following dissolution of the customs unionwith Senegal, where Mali's surplus rice had been sold, the price of whitepaddy was reduced 25 percent for the ostensible purpose of keeping Malirice competitive in the export market. Ove;r the next five years, the farmprice was then progressively raised from 1F03 per kg to NF12.50 in 1964/65and MF16 in.1966/67. Following a 50 percent devaluation of the Mali francin 1967, the price was increased by only 1F2 to NF18. With the stimulus ofrising consumption and stagnating output, a lively black market developed.In 1968, for example, the black-market price for paddy at Segou was aroundNF30-35 per kg. Higher paddy prices in neighboring countries - ranging,in 1968, from around L1F33 in Gambia to NF42 in Senegal - also encouragedsmuggling, limited only by the distance of ithe markets in these countriesfrom the producing areas in Mali. In an ef:Eort to provide better incentivesand discourage black-marketing, the Governmnt finally raised the farm priceof white paddy to NF24 at the end of M4ay 19169.

120. Rice is grown under a variety of conditions. Comparatively smallquantities of pluvial rice are cultivated in the high-rainfall (1,000 nm.and over) areas of the Upper Niger Valley and Sikasso region and on wet,unflooded bottom lands and stream beds. Over half is grown in the inlandDelta areas amnually flooded up to two meters by the Niger ard Bani Riversand consists of '"semi-floating" and "floating" types of rice, which on theaverage yield 600 kg of paddy per hectare w:Lth occasional peaks up to 800-900kgs. The balanlce is produced on (a) some 65',000 hectares where polders havebeen established to provide at least partial control of water and where therice cultivated ranges from ordinary irrigat:ed to semi-floating and floatingvarieties yielding on the average 1 ton per hectare, and (b) the irrigatedarea of the Office du Niger where about 45,000 tons are produced on 30,000hectares at yields which have progressively declined from around 2 tons perhectare to 1.5 tons.

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121. In the flood plains of the inland Delta., indigenouas varieties ofrice, of wrhich the principal type is Oryza glaberimma, are grown, and the"red" pad1y which they produce is still favored by many consumers despitecomparatively lcow yields. Asian varieties (Oryza sativa) ,which are higheryielding and more responsive to varietal improvement are cultivated in theOffice du Nliger and the polders. These areas, however, are constantlythreatenedl by the invasion of perennial indigenous or "wild rice" varietieswhich, owing to their rhizomatcas roots, are diffi.cult to eradicate. Per-iodic deep plowing by tractor, followed by the exposure of roots to the sun,still appears tC) be the only effective means of combating such invasions butcosts about MF2C),000 ($40) per hectare.

122. Since independence, the Government has sought to eqpand rice out-put principally through the creation of polders provided wilth embankmentsand canals to control the flood and regulate the water leveL in the areas.Such schemes have required considerably less investment than irrigationprojects with complete control over water. The area that has been or isin the process of being developed as polders amounts to about 100,000hectares. However, a considerable part of alreaty existing polders hasnever been brought under cultivation. Thus out of 57,700 hectares in theSegou-I4opti region only 29,500 hectares were cultivated and 18,150 hectaresharvested in 1968. A variety of reasons are responsible for this poorrecord. Some polders were too hastily designed, without adequate topographicand hydrological data, so that wzater control proved highly dieficient. In atleast one,, continuing disputes over land rights prevented exploitation. Instill others, the area was only partly planted to rice because farmers wereunaccustomed to rice growing and were satisfied with the crops they werealready cultivating such as cotton, maize or vegetables. The lack of effec-tive extension services capable of advising farmers on probLems of watercontrol and improvements in cultural practices has also proved a seriousimpediment. Thus expectations that with a modest use of fertilizer averageyields of 1.8 tons per hectare might be achieved f'e-L far short of realiza-tion.

123. Since 1965 an FAO ueam, financed by UNIDP, has been working in theSegou-Mopti regLon on a program to improve existing and develop new polders,to elaborate effective methods for more intensive rice cultivation and totrain, at a newly established center at Dioro, extoension workers specializedin rice. Based largely on the team's work, the Government initiated in 1969a special extension effort known as Operation Rice and staffed with personneltrained alt Dioro. This is to provide one extension supervisor (moniteur)and two farm-levrel extension workers for every 1,000 hectares of rice culti-vated in the poLders. Among other things, this extension service will dis-tribute imprcved selected seed, encourage the use of fertilizer and fungi-cides, promote the expansion of animal traction and the adoiption of pedal-threshers and assist in the administratior. of credit and the improvement inmarketing. T'he plan provided that the area covered would gradually be ex-panded from an initial 21,500 hectares in 1969 to 69,000 hectares in 1972.Unfortunately, the Government's budget reEources wiere so lUnited that onlyM@15 million ($30,000), a completely inadequate smIn, was provided for thefirst year. Subseq'uently FAC a-reed to help meet the costs.

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124. The work of the FAO team, which is now scheduled to end mid-1970,has also provided the basis for identification of a rice project by stafffrom the IBRDts Permanent 11ission in Abidjan. This, as tentatively defined,would (a) develop four new polders with an area of' 23,000 hectares in theMopti area at an estimated cost of $3,000,1000, (b) provide tor an extensionservice for all the polders in the Mopti-Segou region (ca. 70,000 hectares)at a cost, for six years, of about $3.8 mi'llion, and (c) an agriculturalcredit in an amount of $1.0 - 1.5 million to finarnce purchases of fertilizers,draft animals, plows and threshers. The FAO team is to complete detailedtechnical plans for establishment of three polders in the first half of 1970,and FAC iEs expected to finance technical studies for the fourth as weIl as theeconomic feasibility investigation of the entire project. TChe total increasein output from this project has been tentatively put at 78,000 tons of paddyof which about 24,000 tons -would come from expansion of the cultivated area andincreases in yields in the four polders mentioned above, andi the balance fromsimilar developments promoted by the extension sexvice in tlhe polders previous-ly established writh financing by FED, FAC and the Mali Gover-nment.

125. The costs and benefits of this project are subject to detailed veri-fication. It is possible that the amount of credit required for oxen and plowsmay be less than anticipated since some sample surveys already carried out sug-gest that farmers who live in the immediate neighborhood of the polders and maybe expected to receive allotments of rice land already have a considerablenumber of oxen and plows. Considerable care will have to be exercised to in-sure that the amount of land allotted to each family in the expansion of thearea under cultivation does not exceed that which can be ti:Lled intensivelyOca. 3 hectares per active worker). The number of farm families available forsettlement on newly cultivated land will also have to be assessed. 'While exist-ing rice miills appear more than adequate to process the additional marketedoutput, their condition may need to be examined to determine requirements formaking good deferred maintenance and for replacement of part of the equipment.In any event, account will have to be taken of the fact that hitherto hand-milling and parboiling has in the past bee:n able to compete effectively withindustrial milling and has resulted in a Fproduct that is nutritionally superiorto industrially milled rice. For the futtLre careful consideration will have tobe given to detenrining the relative roles of (a) handmilli:ag and parboiling,(b) industrial mnilling, and (c) milling in small portable mills of the Chineseor Japanese type.

126. The Ylopti region is undoubtedly the most suitable for expansion ofrice production. Ecological conditions are most favorable and the lower floodlevels make the cost of embankments less than farther upstream. Farmers areaccustomed tco growing rice and have no otLer cash crop which can compete withrice.

127. In the first instance, any increase in output will have to be usedto satisf;y growing consumption in Mali which by 1975 may well be between200,000 and 225,000 tons of paddy. Whether the new farm price of MF24 forwhite paddy wvill be sufficient to bring about the additional output is stilla moot question, although it is conceivabLe that the price will prove an ade-quate incentive at least in the region where there are no alternative competing

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cash crops. It is doubtful that the farm price can be increased if Mali iseventually to compete with Far Eastern rice in the import markets of WestAfrica. The present farm price, after allowances for milling, transport andhandling would make it possible to deliver milled rice in Dakar at a pricearound $150 per ton. While this appears to be competitive iwith other imports,at the present t:ime, there is a strong probability that iworld market priceswill decline significantly. Thus, although M1ali has the potential for de-veloping ain ouLtput in excess of its otn requirements, its ability to marketan eventual surp'lus may wvell depend on the realization of additional improve-ments in yielcls capable of reducing costs of production.

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DIVSIFCATIDN fIEO OU2HER CROPS

128. A certain number of new crops have been developed or are in theprocess of development and are contributing in a modest measure to the di-versificat-Lon of agriculture. Among these are sugar cane, ";3uropean" vege-tables, nmaigoes and cashews, tea, dah, tobacco and essential oil of orange.

Sugar Cane

129. The most significant development has beein the produlction of sugarcane under irrigation at the Office du Niger. The Office hais developed forthis purpose a new area comprising 1,800 hectares, of which 1,200 are undercane at any time and 600 are fallow. Production began in 1966-67 Trith2,650 MT of sugar and rose to 6,200 iC in 1968-69. The Office hopes toraise outpuit to 8,ooo MT in 1969-70, which would enitail a consiAernble ex-pansion of the grinding season since the mill can grind only 400 MT per day.

130. Mainland China has provided both financing and technical assis-tance for the operation. Although IRAT (Tropical Agricultural ResearchInstitute) was doing research on cane varieties and agronomy until 1968,Chinese technicians generally used their own varieties and techniques.Heavy fertilizati.on (330 kg of urea and 50 kg of s-Lperphosphatie/ha) isrequired. Mlany operations are mechanized, but cutting is manual. Thecane is now burned to facilitate cutting and handling. On the average,one worker cuts 800 to 1,000 kg of cane per day. Early problems were ratdamage and inability to drain the cane properly in the three weeks priorto cutting. Both problems are "contained T", but probably still affect yields.

131. Iuring the first two years, yields were 5.5 MT of sugar per hectare(a ton of c:ane yields 10.2-10.5 percent sugar); in 1968 fert-ilizer arrivedon time for the first time, making possible an increase in yiLeld to 6.5 M.However, these yields are still low¢, barely half those achieved at RichardToll in Senegal, for instance.

132. lThe Office estimates the current cost of producing refined sugarat MF95/kg ($190/1i4T) at the factory, including depreciation but not theturnover tex from which the mill is exempt. If the! mill can achieve in 1969-70the larger output indicated above, costs may be cut to NF80-83/kg ($160-166/YTT).These costs; are low enough to permit SOE'DM to transport and retail loose sugarat MF120/kg; without loss. They are, of course, far above the cost of a tonof sugar from the residual world "free market1 i delivered to EBamako ($40 plus$40 transport and handling from Dakar to Banako plus ocean freight). Neverthe-less, the degree of protection would be less than in neighboring countries.At the present price of ML120/kg (NF130/kg in cubes), Mali sugar is actuallysmuggled across the borders of OCAM neighbors who buy their sugar from CongoBrazzavillei and Madagascar at $132/MT and sell it dearer than in Mali.

133. The sugar mill also has facilities for producing 700,000 liters ofalcohol from the molasses. The Office expects to get production costs downto HF50-60/liter, but packaging and shipping to the border cost more than that.A small amount has been sold to the Ivory Coast at a loss3 it appears that this

by-product will continue to be too expensive to export or to campete normallywith imports. Storage is a problem too.

134. Mails annual sugar consumption is 25,0o0 to 30,000 MT. The pre-sent factory cEn produce at most 8,000 MT aELd the p:resent irrigated perimeterpossibly 10,00-12,000 MU. Self-sufficiency, therefore, would require furtherinvestment. The Government estimates that the expansion of annual productionto 30,000-4o,,oo0 oT could entail an investment of about IVF8,000 million ($16million). In principle, the cane plantatiorL and processing facilities atDougabougou could be enlarged and/or the production of cane could be developedon the flood plains of the Lotio at Loumana near Sti2asso. The Loumana pro-ject evidently requires further study.

135. So long as Mali's neighbors adhere to the OCAi sugar agreement,Mali can obviously raise the consumers' price of its sugar considerably.It is unlikely that high-cost sugar and lower consuqption would have adverseeffects on development. Thus, Mali could incerease prices so as to insure agood financial return on existing and possibly future investments in sugar,provided production costs are no higher than those now prevailing. However,the Government could presumably obtain even more revenue by buying sugar inthe cheapest world market and selling it at high prices in Mali. The costof producing domestic sugar is likely to reriin high and therefore cannotbe expected to support a tax as high as that. on imports from a cheap sourceof supply such as Cuba. The Government mus-. accordingly weigh the advantageof saving foreign exchange against the gove:;mment revenues it would sacrificeby expanding local production.

"European" Vegetables

136. Such vegetables have always been produced. in modest quantities forthe European population in Mali and foreign exchange restrict,ions in the1962-67 period stimulated output in replace,nent for imports. However, thislimited market is quickly satiated. The Goaeenment has accordingly tried tostimulate exports by entrusting marketing tD OPAM and has established acanning factory to process vegetables and fruit for both the domestic andforeign markets.

137e The carnery, located near Bamako, was comipleted in 1964, partly withYugoslav financing, and is being operated by SOCO?IAJ, a public enterprise towhich the Government has also tumned over the irrigated area of 3,3COhectares at Baguineda that was original1y developecd as a pilot scheme forthe Office du Niger. The factory was to process 7,500 142 of tomatoes,3,600 MT oli'nangoes and 140 MT of guavas and tamarind. Actually, it hasalways operated iar below capacity. In 1967-68 it produced only 414 MT oftomato paste and 227 tons of fruit juices; and its sales, amounting toIF35 nmillion ($70,000),were considerably less than its output. The enter-prise has suffered considerable losses, attributab:Le in large part to itsextremely costly and largely unproductive farm operation.

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138. Part of SOCOMA's difficulties are due to marketing problems.Apparently no market study was ever made. Its prices are too high toinsure significant sales in the domestic market or to meet competitionabroad. Supply problems have also been encountered. SOCOMA's own farm hasso far produced only a negligible quantity of tomatoes. It must, therefore,rely on tomatoes supplied by farmers in the surrounding area and in theNiger Valley above Bamako. Although. it bought 3,594 tons of tomatoes in1967/68 at; an average price of IE18.6/kg, the supply is rather irregularand unreliable. Moreover, the price it pays, though below that prevailingin the retail market at Bamako, is still above the level that would makeits own product competitive.

139. OPAM's success in selling fresh vegetables abroad has also beenextremely modest. Its total exports of vegetables, including potatoes,apparently reached a high of 47 tons in 1966-67. For the following year,no figures are available, but apparently it was able to sell only 1 ton perweek to the Ivory Coast during the dry season. Cooperatives of growerswith whom OPAM cdeals have been unable to assure regular supplies. OPAM'sown inefficiency and its failure to insure adequate packing and qualitycontrol have been other factors contributing to this rather poor record.It is doubtful, in fact, that OPAM's sales while it had a monopoly of exportwere actually greater than total exports previously. The Government's agree-ment in 1969 to allow the private sector once more to participate in thistrade may, therefore, actually stimulate exports t:o some exl:ent.

140, With proper quality control, packaging znd marketLng Mali mighteventually be able to compete for the winter vegetable market in Europe forit has a cdirect air service with Europe, natural conditions are favorablefor the cultivation of vegetables and production costs are :Low since devalua-tion of the Mali franc. However, the marlket is very limited. Adequatesupplies of good quality are also a key problem. The BDPA, which is direct-ing an agricultural extension service in the Upper Niger Valley for theGovernment, is seeking to encourage the production of onions, green beans,peppers and eggplants for this purpose and is now exporting these productson a pilot: scale with some success.

Mangoes and Cashews

141. Since independence, the government has strongly encouraged plantingof mangoes anLd cashews. A large number of small plantations, particularly ofgrafted mingcoes, have been established, above all by government employees.Mango trees require little or no care once they are established, and thequality oE MeLli mangoes is excellent. OPLM has been sellin.g an increasingquantity abroad - 315 tons in 1967/68, of which about 100 MI was exportedby plane to Europe, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, and the balance was sold toneighboring countries. The cost of air transport to Europe - tl130/kg - isseveral times the purchase price of mangoes in the local market, but can beborne in view7 of the high price which this luxury fruit fetches in Europe.However, the market is limited, as was dexaonstrated in 1969 when prices de-clined consicierably owing to the simultaneous arrival of shipments from

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Bamako and Bobo-Dioulasso (Upper Volta). C-onsiderable effort will be re-quired to develop a higher volume market but at somewhat lower prices.

142. Prospects for the exploitation of cashew, nuts are less favorable.Hand-crack.ing of nuts is too labor-intensive to be attractive and it isdoubtful that the volume of output can justify the installation of mechani-cal decort:icating plants similar to those recently, established in EastAfrica, which has a virtual monopoly on the supply of cashewi nuts and pre-viously shipped its output entirely to India for hand-decortication by cheaplabor.

Tea

143. Tea appears an unlikely crop for a low-aLltitude, hlot country witha long dry season. Nevertheless, this crop has be-en the subject of experi-mental development with Mainland Chinese technical. assistance in the Sikassoregion of southtern Mali where rainfall is the highest in thte country. Devel-opment has been influenced by the consideration that Mali imports between450 and 600 ton,s of tea annually.

144. At present, eight Malian agronomiists and two Chinese experts, whowill leave in 1971, are assigned to this project which was initiated in 1962.The Government has established two experirental, irrigated plantations atBanankoni and Finkolo near Sikasso. Most of the agronomic problems regardingvarieties, shading, pest control and fertilizer applications are said to havebeen satisfactorily resolved. It is claiamed that the tea bushes do not sufferseverely from the long, hot, dry season. Yields, however, are still low.The 4.4 hectares harvested in 1968-69 produced only 1.5 tons of green tea(equivalenit to 250 kg dried tea) per hectare. Much higher yields would benecessary to justify the cost of establishment, estimated, inclusive ofirrigationa, at le 450,000 to 500,000 ($900 to $1,000) per hectare, and theanaual cost of operation projected at DFl5O ,000 to 200,000 ($300 to $400).The Project Director believes that an output of 1 ton of dried tea perhectare can ultimately be obtained. Apart: from the question of cost, thesupply of picking labor may be a problem, for the flush season coincideswith the time when considerable labor is required in the Sikasso area forthe first weeding of sorghum.

145. Present plans call for the expansion of the area planted to teato 106 hectares in 1969-70 and 206 hectares in 1972-73. The primary irriga-tion works already built are said to be sufficient for this expansion. In1969 Communist China agreed to provide addlitional assistance for the expan-sion of tea cultivation and for the construction of a tea factory with acapacity of 500 tons.

146. As in the case of sugarcane, a careful review would be desirablebefore the Government commits itself to considerable investment. The pro-duction of high-cost tea for the domestic market would undcubtedly savesome foreign exchange but only at the expense of import duty revenues whichthe Government could ill afford to lose.

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Dah

147. Vah, a hard vegetable fiber similar to kenaf, has ].ong beenproduced in Mali for manufacture into rope by local. artisans. Output isprobably about 1,000 MT per year. It is now proposed to develop productionfor the mantufacture of bagging material, demand for which is growing rapidlyowing principally to the expansion of cotton output. It is possible thatMali will soon be spending 1Fl billion ($2 million) for imports of sackingand hessian.

148. In 1968,, FED agreed to provide $438,000 for further research workon dah by IRCT and for a pilot production and marketing schemne to be carriedout under the supervision of CFDT. IRCT has already established that dahgrown on good, well-manured or well-fertilized soil. can yield 10-15 MT perhectare. It has also identified varieties somewhat: superior to local onesnow in use (Pokeo, a Hibiscus sabdarifa, for the wetter zone,, and Soudanprecose, a Hibiscus cannibinus, for the drier). CEDT has been making effortsto encourage prodluction, concentrating on areas alc,ng the northern edge ofits cotton zone near San, where annual rainfall is about 700 Em, and alongthe southern edge, south of Sikasso and Bougouni, wtere rainlall is over1,300 mm.

149. 'So far,, CFDT has not been successful in buying much fiber. In1968-69, it: was able to buy only 23 XT. In large part, this is due to thefact that CFDT buys only the best long fiber which enjoys a good demand forlocal rope making. The price it pays - MF90,000 per MT - appears insuffi-ciently attractive to the Mali farmer, but at the same time is higher thancan be supported as long as the fiber must be sold in the export market.Transport costs to Abidjan, for example, add about MF20,000 per ton to theprice and iLn Abidjan the fiber has to compete with Class A and B Asianjute, which costs; between MF90,000 and 125,000 ($180-$250) per ton deliveredto West African ports. Apparently M4ali has taken it loss of 14F15,000-20,000on the small quanttities of fiber it has furnished I:o the Filitisac plant inAbidjan.

150. The intention, howiever, is to determine whether enough productioncan be developed to warrant the establishment of a sacking factory in Mali.Such a plant wrouLd apparently require a mirLimum supply of 3,000 tons of dahto operate economically. The principal obstacle to an increase in the out-put of dah is retting. For this, water ancL, above all, a lot of labor isnecessary. If only high-quality fiber were! used iin the manufacture ofsacking, it is doubtful that farmers would be willLng to produce the necessarysupplies at a price that would make the sacking produced in Mali competitivewith imports. On the other hand, there is evidence that lower-quality rawmaterials would suffice for the production of sacking of adequate quality.One consultant., for example, has suggested that experience in some othercountries indicates that the "batch" of rawi materials could include not onlycuttings but even unretted fiber up to about 30 percent. If further investi-gation should verify the feasibility of this suggestion, the production ofdah might well be much more attractive to farmers, thus enhancing the prospect

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that enough could be produced - around 25O0 tons of fibre annually - to war-rant the domestiJ manufacture of sacking without a significant increase in cost.

Tobacco

151, While Malian farmers have always grown some indigenous tobacco(perhaps 400-700 MT per year) of non-industrial qujality, efforts to en-courage the cultivation of tobacco suitable for manufacture of cigarettesbegan only followiag the establishment of a cigarette facboyy in. Kali.These efforts have been concentrated on the Upper Niger Valley and theOffice du Niger. The cigarette factory operated by SONATAM, a publicenterprise, requaires about 600 MT of tobacco per year. In 1968-69, itbought 50-60 MT of dried leaf from the Office du Niger and smaller quanti-ties in the Upper Valley, paying MF300 per kg. While it could use moreMali toba,co, some would inevitably have to be imported for admixture withnative tobacco.

152. Tobac,co can apparently grow well in both areas on good, well-manured or well-fertilized soils. Chinese broad-leaved and Virginiavarieties have presented problems, but Maryland varieties have shown goodresults. In the irrigated area of the Ofiice du Higer, tobacco is grownin the off-season, but in the Upper Valley it has so far been cultivatedin the rainy season, usually immediately following an early-maturingmaize crop. In accordance with recommendations oE IRAT, tobacco in theUpper Valley is also to be grown in the dry seasona, with planting inDecember and harvesting ia February. This is expected to have the addi-tional advantage of employing labor and land that would not otherwise beutilized.

153. The principal problems encountered are quality control and curing.In the Office, leaves are dried on the ground in accordance with Chinesemethods; in the Upper Valley, on racks in straw-mat shelters. The qualityis still poor.

154. Beginning in 1969-70, Mali will benefit from a FED grant of $470,000(IF235 million) for a program to promote tobacco production in the Upper Valley.This pilot program, which will be in charge of the BDPA, will provide closesupervision of tobacco growers and instituite improvements in the method ofcuring. The results achieved will determine the feasibility of a larger pro-gram aimed atl covering all of Mali's domestic requirements.

Essential Oil of Orange

155. FEI) has also provided a small sum - $47,000 - fox another diversi-fication project designed to encourage the production of essential oil oforange south of lKenieba in the remote southwestern part of Mali. The inhabi-tants there have virtually no source of cash income. Extensive orange plant-ings exist, but there is no market for the fresh fruit. Beginning in 1966,therefore, a small project was launched to extract from orange peels essentialoil of orange which can be sold abroad at a price of NF4,000 per liter. Ex-traction was to be both by hand (using a sharpened spoon) and by machine,with farmers receiving respectively MF900 and MIF700 per liter for the oil

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extracted by these methods. Although an ultimate goal of 4,000 liters wasset, output has :proved disappointing. In 1968/69, production amounted toonly 497 liters, of which all but 57 liters were eKtracted by machine.Apparently farm -families have not considered the price sufficient compen-sation for the labor involved in hand extraction even though the work canbe done in the I'dead" agricultural season. For 19659-70, more machines areto be made available in the hope of increasing the output.

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PRODUCTS OF WILD TREES AND PLAIITS

156. A smaJll,but significant, contribution to the Maliaa diet is madeby products collected from plants and trees that a:re wild or are encouragedin their natural state. Baobab, for its leaves ami fruit, and nere, are thetwo most common. Similarly, a number of products that grow wild are ex-ported before or after processing. Since the volume of these products thatcan be coLLected is rather elastic, the quantities marketed are a functionof market prices.

157. The moist important gathered produLct by far is the fruit of theshea tree (karit). The pulp is eaten and the nut cooked and treated toyield butter and oil (beurre et huile de k rit" ) for lamps and cosmetics.In 1967-68, the Kolikoro il mill began bnjing shea nuts and butter,paying a price of 14F22/kg for the nuts, whi.ch proved so attractive thatmarketings soared. SEPOM bought 6,097 NT of nuts and SOQIEX 1,501 MIT. Thetwo state corporations also bought 2,718 I' of shea butter. In 1966, whenthe price of rLuts was low - 1F6/kg, the volume markceted was only 275 MT.

158. The marketing of other gathered products has also responded to theprice increases following devaluation. Prior to devaluation, they had beeneither left on t:rees or smuggled. Kapock fiber ex?orts, which had nearlydisappeared since 1962, reached 60 NT in 15968; gum Arabic rebounded from arecord low of 32 MT in 1967 to 208 iiT in 19168, which, howiever, was stillonly a fracticon of pre-independence exports. The marketing of skins of wildanimals has probably shown a similar resportse,

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AGRICULT%RAL CRKD1IT A1D THEPURCHASE AID DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL INPUTS

159. The purchase and distribution of agricultural equipment, fertilizer,insecticide, etc., and the associated extension of credit have been theresponsibility of SCAER (Service du Credit Agricole et de l'Equipement Rural)which operates as a more or less autonomous department within the Government-owned Development Bank of Mali, the country's principal commetrcial bank.SCAER has suffered from a serious shortage of competent staff; it has beenserved by only onLe foreign technical consultant and its accounting staffis seriously deficient. It was unable, for instance, to provide the Missionwith a comprehensive statement of its transactions, particularly on thevolume of credit extended for various purposes and the rate of recovery.Moreover, the Government has never been abla to provide SCAER with adequatefinancial resources. Its storage facilities are, therefore, inadequate,and it has been fiorced progressively to restrict itself to the extensionof seasonal agricultural credit. Subsidies on the supplies end equipmentdistributed have been financed from foreign assistance.

Agricultural Equipment

160. Despite these difficulties, SCAER has been able to distribute animpressive amount of agricultural equipment, largely because there has beena strong de.mand on the part of farmers for -plows, carts and other implementseven in the! absence of credit. A sample agricultural census indicatedthat there were 90,300 ploxws in Nali in 1967-68. Virtually one farmer infour now hats a pl.ow, which means that the use of animal-drawn equipment isprobably more waidespread in M-ali than in any other West Afric:an country.Table 11 shows that SCAER distributed nearly 50,000 plows of various typesduring the five-year period, 1964-60. Not all of these proved equally suit-able. Amorg them were 10,000 Kreka plcws obtained from Yugoslavia, whichproved to be rather ill-suited to local conditions and were sold only overa long period of time, thanks in part to the fact t:hat 3,533 were madeavailable on credLit to young men who completed their training at the seasonalagriculturall schools and the civil service camps whLich later supplanted theseschools. The so-called "#multi-cultivator". a tool-frame on which varioustypes of implements can be mounted, also met with cnly limited acceptance,partly because the frame was not sturdy enough owing to poor welding; itsuse has been largely restricted to plowing.

161. Other items of equipment distributed during the fivre-year periodincluded oarer 8,000 manual sprayers for use in the cotton program and some13,000 carts and sole-aud-wheel sets for carts, Most of the insecticidesprayaxs have been YrenfTh models; Russian and Yugoslav models, though cheaper,have proved' less satisfactory. Carts and axle-and-wheel sets have been ingreat demanid by farmers who have shown a definite preference for carts withpneumatic tires, apparently because these require less tract:Lve effort,particularly in muddy conditions.

Table 10: FQUIPMENT BOUGTiT AND SOLD BY SCAER BY YEAR AND ESTIMLATED IVENToRrTabei f10o: ACHAT ET VENTE DE MATERIEL PAR SCAER PAR ANNEE ET INVENTAIRE ESTIMATIF

Reported Inventory TotalEnd 1968 Distributed

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Inventaire Indiqu6 Distribu45

LIGHT PLOWS fin 1968 (1964-68)

r'u* pSTrwVs T 5-P55TS

Bajac TXN Bought/Achat 2 000 1 650 4 250 3 000 380

KvP-27 B ouat/Achat , 000 500 9 000 33

Kreka Bought/Achat 10 000 0

Other/Diverses 5

All light plows/Totalit6 des charrues l6gAres Sold/Vente 6 805 5 964 3 104 15 809 2 870 34 552

Inventory/Inventaire -4 805 -5 964 -954 -2 559 + 130

MULTICULTIVATORS Bought/Achat 1 000 2 500 4 600 2 500 1 185

MJLTICULTIVATEURS Sold/Vente 626 2058 5180 1 741 9 605

Inveutory/Inventaire -626 +442 - 580 + 759

HEAVY PLOWSCHAMUES LJURDES

Bajac No.2 Bought/Achat 5 000 315Sold/Vente --------- 4,422________ __ 4 422

INSECTICIDE SPRAYERS Bought/Achat 2 000 1,800 1 000 1 000 1 000 2 600 1 158

PULVERISATEURS D'INSECTICIDE Sold/Vente 1 826 1 739 1 095 1 120 2 540 8 320

Inventory/Inventaire -26 -739 -95 -120 + 60

CARTSCHARIETTES

Complete cart/Charrettes complates (1/2 T) Bought/Achat 1 500 0

Axle & metal wheels/Es3ieu et roues metalliques (1/2 T) Bought/Achat 1 750 1 118

Aga & pneum,tic wheels/Essieu & Roues pneumatiques(1/2 T) Bought/Achat 700 3 000 2 250 876

All 1/2 T carts & components Sold

Totalite des charrettes 1/2 6lements Vente 693 1493 3 143 1 836 7 165

Inventory/Inventaire -693 - 793 -143 +414

Complete cart (1 T), metal iheels Bought 500

Charrettes complgtes (1 T), roues metalliques Achat 0

Axle & metewiffheels/Essieu et roues m6tallio,ues (1 T) Bought/Achat O

Axle & pneumatic wheels/Essieu & roues sur pneu (1 T) Bought/Achat 700 3 000 1 950 312

All 1T carts & components SoldTotalit6 des charrettes 1T et 4le4ents Vente 3 -360 880 3 095 1 7h0 6 078

Inventory/Inventaire +997 -360 -180 -95 +210

Table 11: AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT: COSTS TO SCAER AND PRICES CHARGED TO FARMERSTableau 11: MATEXIEL AGRICOLE: COUT POUR SCAER ET PRIX COMPTES AUX AGRICULTEURS

(in Mali francs)(en francs maliens)

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969

LighL Plows/Charrues legeresBajac TM (French)/(fran,aise) Price (Prix) ---- 10 100----------------/--18 430---

Cost (Cou^t) 10 000 none/nul 9 200 12 300 22 600KVP-27 (Russian)/(russe) Price (Prix) -------- 6 500-----_---/ _ ________9 000- …----------

Cost (Cout) 10 800 ----none/nul--- 8 250 7 550 none/nulKreka (Yugoslav)/(yougoslave) Price (Prix) ------------------- 6 500------------------- all sold/vedes

Cost (Cou^t) 6 440 ------------none/nul----------------- integralement

Multicultivators (French)/Multicultivateurs (francais) Price (Prix) -----------13 000----------------/--20 000---Cost (CoGt) 13 000 nnff / 13 200 14 750 24,000

Heavy Plows/Charrues lourdesBajac No.2 (French)/(francaise) Price (Prix) ------------19 500----------------/--21 000---

Cost (Coiut) 19 400 ---none/nul------------------

Insecticide Sprayers/Pulverisateurs d'insecticideYugoslav or Russian models/Modeles yougoslaves ou russes Price (Prix) - ---- 6 500-.-______French models/Modeles francais Price (Prix) -------------------- 19 fCnnn___--- AArn t^ 16 9COAverage/Moyenne Cost (Cout) 7 240 12 100 11 200 10 560 17 400 26 000

Carts/Charrettes all sold/venduesComplete cart,l/2T,metal wheels/Charrettes completes,l/2T,roues metalliques Price (Prix) ------------13 500----------integralementComplete cart,1/2T,pneumatic/Charrettes completes,l/2T,sur pneus Price (Prix) ------------28 000---------- " tComplete cart,l/?T,average both/Charrettes completes,1/2T,moyenne des deux Cost (Cout) 16 000 ---none/nul------------------

Axle&metal wheels,l/2T/essieu et roues me/talliques,l/2T Price (Prix) -------------6 500---------------.------------cost (Coit? 6 950 ---none/nul…---------Axle&pneumatic wheels,l/2T/essieu et roues sur pneus,l/2T Price Prix ----14 000 --------…/--22 190--

Complete cart,lT,metal wheels/Charrettes completes,lT,roues metalliques Price cPri 11 700 18 600 25 700

/ Cost (Couit) 21 400 ---none/nuT--------l- grg IentAxle&metal wheels,lT/essieu et roues metalliques,lT Price (Prix) ------------10 000----------all sold/vendues

Cost (Co~i~t~ 100 -- nn/u - -:Axle&pneumatic wheels,lT/essieu et roues sur pneus,lT Price Prix3 11 000 --- 16u000---- i-----/ 55a5---cost (Coidt) -- 1 0-… …/5 55--14 800 21 400 33 300

Note: "None" means that no equipment was bought by SCAER in the year indicated. / Nota: "Nul" signifie que SCAER n'a acquis aucun mate'riel pendantl'annee indiquee.

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i62. The Mi.;sion found it impossible to obtain full information onthe prices paid by SCAER for various types of equipment and on the methodsof financing the purchases. Table 11 marshals such data as was availableon the total cost of getting this equipment to the farmer and the actualprices charged to the farmer. It is evident that the latter has notcovered the full cost, particularly after devaluation of the Mali franc in1967 when prices were not raised sufficiently to cover the inicreased costof procure-,iert. The difference represents the subsidy element which, par-ticularly since dlevaluation, has been financed priTarily with FAC assistance.

163. FAC :has undertaken to finance a small implement factory costingIJI150 million, which is to be completed in :1970 and. is to assemble imple-ments, workingr in close cooperation with another izrplement factory (SISCONA)in Senegal. FAkC hopes that the Government -will be prepared to discontinuesubsidizing; equipment when this plant starts operating.

16)4. Lack of financial resources and t:he poor repayment record on someequipment loans f'orced SCAER to curtail arnd virtually discontinue sales oncredit. Probalbly the largest amount of credit was extended in connectionwith the sale of plows and draft oxen to yoing men leaving the seasonalagricultural schools and civic service traiLing camps. Apparently lessthan 5 percent of' these loans has. been repaid, resulting in losses toSCAM of some ]\F1.67 million (see Table 12). Except for this type ofloan, SCAEB. has discontinued the sale on credit of almost all equipmentover recent, year<s. Only sprayers in the cotton zone are still sold oncredit; but even in this case the entire price must be paid out of theproceeds of the f'irst cotton harvest. As is indicated in Table 11,considerable quantities of equipment were s )ld even. on a cash basis.

Fert..lizer

165. SCA11 has also been responsible for the procurement and distribuWtion of suc.h annual seasonal inputs as fertilizers and insecticides. As isindicated in Table 13, the quantity of fertilizer distributed has remainedrather modest - fluctuating inL recent years between. 3,000 ancL 6,000 tons.The bulk of this is used on cotton in the CMDT zone and in the Office duNiger. Recently, small quantities have also been distributed through theagency of the IBDPA for the groundnut campaign and the Upper Niger Valleyextension program, of which that orgarnization is in. charge.

166. No diff'iculties have been encountared in selling whatever fertili-zer was available. The only exception was :3art of the superphosphate suppliedby the Soviet Uni.on, whi.ch could not be distributed. because it corroded thesacks in w¢hich it) cam.re. Probably considerably more fertilizer could have beensold had it not been for certain obstacles. High cost and irregular supplyhave probabl? 1been the principal impediments. Table lh showEs, for instance,that the cost of fertilizer delivered to farms in 1.968 was for the most partmore than twice aLs high as the ex-factory price oareng to high costs oftransport, handling and storage. SCAER's financial difficulti-es and cumber-some procurem.ent procedures for fertilizer obtained. under FEE) financingalso limited sapplies and frequently delayed their arrival.

Table 12; ESTIMATES OF SCAER'S FINANCIAL OPERATIONS EN CONNECTION WITH TIE SALE OF AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT

Tableaul2: ESTIMATIONS DES OPERATIDNS FINANCIERES DE SCAER DANS LE CADRE DE LA VENTE DE MATERIEL AGRICOLE

(in millions of Mali francs)(en millions de francs maliens)

1963 l96h 1 95 166 1967 1968

Estimate of proceeds due from, sale of agricultural equipmeit/ 81.0 104.0 117.0 3148.0 16L4.0Estimation des fonds provenant de la vente de materi6l agricole 81U0 101,0 117,0 348,0 164,0

Reported FAC subsidy/ 60.0 0 31.0 61.0 180.0Subvention FAC indiqu6e 60,0 0 31,0 61,0 180,0

Purchase of agricultural equipment during year at cost/ 122.0 281.5 11.2 81.5 357.0 359.0Achat de materigl agricole pendant llannd'e au prix coutant 122,0 281,5 11,2 81,5 357,0 359,0

Apparent change in inventory assuming proceeds due from sales + FAC subsidy cover costs/ +141.0 -93.0 -66.0 -52.0 +15.0Evolution apparente de l'inventaire en retenant lhypothese des fonds provenant desventes plus les couts destines a couvrir les subventions du FAC +141,0 -93,0 -66,0 -52,0 +15,0

Purchases of spare parts during year at cost/ 5.B 87.9 26.2 51.9 61.5 33.0Achats de pi'ces de rechange pendant l'annee a prix courant 5,8 87,9 26,2 51,9 61,5 33,0

Estimated amounts of equipment loans to/Montants estimatifs des prets au titre dumateriel consentic:Seasonal school leavers 8.7 Ih.-7

alXl^.-cs quittant 1'euule ,jur uie base saisonniere 8J7 14J,7

Civic service camp leavers L/ / 8.9 7.0aux individus liberes du service civique Y/ 8,9 7,0

R"'tim,ated loss or. the basis of 5% repayment/ 8.3 22.4 6.7Perte estimative sur la base dtun remboursement de 5% 8,3 22,4 6,7

Amount of draft-animal loans to/Montant des prgts au titre des animaux de trait consentis:Seasonal school leavers/ 15.5 23.1aux elhves quittant l1ecole sur une base saisonni6re 15,5 23,1

Civic service camp leavers/ 54.8 42.8aux individus liberes du service civique 54,8 42,8

Estimated loss on the basis of 5% repayment/ 14.7 74.0 40.7Perte estimative sur la base d'un remboursement de 5% 14,7 74,0 40,7

/ At usual prices; Kreka plows were sold on credit to civic service camp leavers at one-half the official price.

Aux prix habituels; les charrues Kreka ont ete vendues 'a credit et a la moitie' du prix officiel aux individus liberes du service civique.

Table 13: SALES OF FERTILIZERS

Tableau 13: VENTES D'ENGRAIS

(in MT)(en Tonnes)

Active Stock at

Ingredient/ End 1968/Ingr'i ent Stock'

Kind/Type Actif 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 fin 1968

Ammonium Phosphate/Phosphate d'Ammoniac 1 120 1 347 0

Peanut Mix/Melange d'Arachide 6N-20P-10S 1 513 736 920 197

Urea/Uree Since 1967

4 6N 376 494 649 56

Triple Superphosphate 45P205 531 50 134 211 128

Asmonium Sulphate/Sulphate d'Ammoniac 19-21N 736 1 697 647 313 99 32

Potassium Sulphate/Sulphate de potasse 50K20 64 28 117

Superphosphate 17-21P 2 0 5 9o 2 -(83 186 149 20 0

Phosphal 34P2 05 20 197 17 63

Potassium Chlorate/Chlorure de potasse 6o0"Po 26 239 26 52 7 2

Cotton Mix/Melange coton 18N-h7P 2 622 120 16

Total 1 383 4 719 5 450 3 379 3 298 611

Equivalent in MT of active ingredients/Equivalent en T dtingr6dients actifs 419 1C013 1 866 1521 1 598

Percentage distributed by/Pourcentage distribue' par:1) CFDT 45 31 48 33 39

2) Office du Niger 20 15 8 ? 24

3) BDPA - - - - 12

4) Other/Autres 35 54 44 ? 25

Table 14: COST AND PRICES OF DIFFERENT FERTILIZERS AT FARM IN 1968

Tableau 14: PRIX DE VENTE ET PRIX DE REVTENT DE DIVERS ENGHAIS CHIMIQUES LIVRES AUX PRODUCTEURS EN 1968

Components of Total CostKind Sale Price Total Cost (1) (2) (3)

Price ex-factory Transport Cost Handling, Storage, Insuranceto Bamako Bamako to Producer' and Selling

IT-A 9+Z 1r-- de vente P-.-;x de Composition du Prix de Revient

revient total (1) (2) (3)Prix ex fournlisseur _ Co-ut de trarsport Frais commerciaux

a Bamako Banako au Producteur

Cotton mix/ 71.5 81.9 44.9 4.6 25.4 6.0Melange coton 71,5 J 81,9 44,9 4,6 25,4 6,0

Peanut mix! 32.C 61.0 29.0 4.75 21.2 5.8Melange arachide 32,0 61,0 29,0 4,75 21,2 5,8

Urea/ 72.0 78.5-84.5 37.1 6.1-6.9 28.6-35.8 4.7-6.0Ure'e 72,0 78,5-84,5 37,1 6,1-6,9 28,6-35,8 4,7-6,o

Supertriple- 38.0 67.0 32.6 6.0 20.2 7.8phosphate 38,0 67,0 32,6 6,o 20,2 7,8

Potassiumsulphate/ 32.0 62.7 22.9 )!7 24-7 10.0

Sulphate depotasse 32,0 62,7 22,9 4,7 24,7 10,0

Others/ResteAmmeonium

sulphate/ 28.0Sulphate

d'ammoniaQ 28,0

Phosphal 22.022,0

Potassiumchlorate/ 20.0

Chlorure depotasse 20,0

l/ Sale price reported to FED for 4th Tranche of FED II was MF57.9/kg.

Le prix de vente donne au FED pour la 4eme Tranche du 2 Iem FED etait de FM57.9/kg.

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167. Imports of fertilizer have been heavily subsidized. under the pro-gram of "aid to production and structural iLmprovements", financed from thesecond FED. This program, extending over the five crop years from 1965-66to 1969-70, provided for a fixed subsidy oni fertilizer used on cotton,groundnuts and rice in designated areas . rhe subsidies varied for differ-ent crops and areas and were less for the Office du Niger than for otherareas. Originally, the rate of subsidy on fertilizer was eypected to de-cline from.40 percent in the first year to 7 percent in the final year.Actually the subsidy program developed quitpe differently. FPart of thiswas due to the fact that FED funds originaLly earmarked for subsidizing theprice of cotton were not needed for this puirpose because bef'ore devaluationMali managed to sell its cotton to "clearing countries" without a subsidyand after devaluation the price of cotton became competitive in the worldmarket. Larger sums thus became available for fertilizer subsidies. Atthe same time, Hali was so short of foreign exchange that it could procurevirtually no fertilizers with its own resources. Thus in 1566 and 1967,the FED subsidJies accounted for all of the fertilizer imported by Mali andwere paid directly to European suppliers. Finally, the 1967' devaluationgreatly increased the cost of fertilizer imports in terms of Maali francs,thus generating a demand for larger subsidies. Table 15 shows that the totalamount of subsidies disbursed by FED on both fertilizer and insecticideshas actually increased, particularly after devaluation. For the final year1969-70, FED has agreed to raise the subsidly on fertilizer used in the CFDTzone and also to subsidize implements sold in this area.

168. Fertilizer and other annual inptibs have been sold on the basisof seasonal crecits reimbursable after the harvest. The record of repay-ment has been fairly satisfactory. In the CFDT cotton zone about 97 percentof the crelditis are recovered, largely because the marketing of cotton pro-vides an almost evasion-proof method of coLlection. Of the small amount ofcredit extended in connection with BDPA's Upper Niger Valley operation,apparently about 90 percent is reimbursed. The record of repayments oncredits provided for the groundnut campaign - approximately 65 percent - isless satisfactory, primarily because groundnuts can be readily sold throughunofficial channels.

Reorganization of Credit and Procurement

169. The Mali Government has become increasingly aware of the defici-

encies of SCAER and has requested the IBRD for technical assistance in re-viewing the operations of this organization and in drawing iup plans for anew autonomous agricultural credit institution, inLcluding a proper accountingsystem.

170. In reorganizing the procurement and dist,ribution of agriculturalequipment and supplies and the associated extension of credit, particularattention will have to be paid to staffing, the installationi of an efficientup-to-date accouLnting system, and the possibilities of reducing the highcost of transport and distribution. It is doubtfua that any new, reorganizedinstitution can be adequately staffed without at least some foreign personnel

Tablel5: SIUBSIDIES TO FERTILIZER AND INSECTECIDE PRICES UNDER THE SECOND FED

Tableaul5: SUBVENTIONS DES PRIX DES ENGRALS GHIMIQUES ET DES INSECTICIDESDAN'S LE CADRE DU DEUXIEME FED

(millions of MF/en milLions de FM)

II III IV V1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70Average/ Average/ Proposed/Moyemne Moyernie Proposee

Fertilizers/Engrais

On cotton! 22.4 22.4 21.2 47.8 (139.0)Sur coton 22,4 22,4 22.2 47,8 (139,0)

On peanuts/ 14.5 14.5 33.34 24.96 ( 22.75)Sur arachides 14,5 14,5 33,34 24,96 C 22,75)

On rice/ 12.65 12.65 16.5 40.0 ( 36.0)Sur riz 12,65 12,65 16,5 40,0 ( 36,0)

Insecticides

On cotton/ 39.9 39.9 42.0 61.7 ( 61.6)Sur coton 39,9 39,9 42,0 61,7 ( 61,6)

to assist with procurement and accounting.

171. Tranasport, distribution and storage costs can probablyr be reducedin a variety of ways - by more careful estimates of' the equipment andsupplies needed at various distribution polats; by more efficient procure-ment to insure timely deliveries, thus obviating storage frorm one year tothe next; and by expanding and improving storage f,acilities at criticalpoints. The Government has recently requested IF70 rillion ($l40O,000) fromFAC to fiancme the construction of a storage shed on a railway siding inBamako; andI CFDT has indicated a need for NIF350-450) nillion ($720,000-$900,000) fJor additional storage facilities, largely for cotton, fertilizersand insect:icides, at the level of the "circles".

172. The coist of the whole operation c:ould probably be reduced alsoby taking great care to insure the procurement only of those types of equip-ment and supplies which are really well-suited to J.Iali's requirements. Inthe past, SCAER has been occasionally reqiLred to buy and distribute typesof equipment wThich did not really meet nee<ls and w2hich could finally be soldonly after costly delays and at some loss.

~73, Whether credit should be extended in the future for periods inexcess of a season is a moot question. Despite the fact that considerablesales have been made against cash payment, it is probable that the acquisi-tion of equipment and draft animals could be accelerated by credits extendedover a two or three year period.

174- ~ Padiexperience indicates that credit generally should be extendedonly for specific, well-directed campaigns which are calculated to raisethe output of particular crops and which cffer reasonably rialiable means,through organized marketing, for the recovery of the credits out of the in-crease in production generated.

175. The financing of any new organization w:ll pose problems. Ex-tremely limited financial resources will make it difficult for the Govern-ment to make any large financial contribution, but as a minimum it couldturn over to the institution the F6.C000 out of t:he export taxes levied oncotton per ton which under the prevailing law it is suppocc-d to pay, butactually does not pay, to SCAER. Foreign loans might be available to financethe procurement, during a specified period, of equLpment, fertilizers andinsecticides required for designated agricultural operations. In this way,a revolving furLd for the continued extension of credit could be created.The financing of aznual inputs could also be financed to some extent byrecourse to local bank credit.

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HEUJMA DISEASE AND AGRICULTJRAL PRODIJC.J`10

.176. The three diseases which pro'bably affect the productivity of Malianagriculture the most are malaria, schistosomTiasis (:Liver fluka) and onchocer-ciasis.

177. Malaria is endemic in rural 1Mali. It saps the strength and lowersthe produc :MTy of farmers and hezdmen and is sometimes fatal. Its impacton output is still, to be assessed. In any event, eradication of malariaby destroy1ag the anopheles mosquito carrier is beyond Mali's means andthe use of malaria suppressants (Nivaquine, Aralen, Quinine) is too expen-sive for rural people.

17.8. Schistosomiasis is apparently endemic in some, but not all, ofMalits irri,Rated areas and occurs elsewhere as well. The disease organism(Shistosoma mansoni) is carried by snails wILich thr:ive in still water. Thedisease has a debilitating effect on human beings, but thle variety endemicin Mali is apparently not as virulent as As-ian varieties. New and effec-tive methods for eradicating snails in lakes and streams and for curingpersons infected with the disease are available. An experiment carried outaround Bcuake in the Ivory Coast indicates that the direct costs involvedare quite low. The application of Moluscid (Molurame) cost about $2 perhectare and.the cost of the drug used in curing infected persons was $1.18to $1.68 per person. The overhead costs, however, are much higher. More-over, there. is as yet little agreement on the effect which the disease hason the productivity of farmers. At present, there are no shi.stosomiasiseradication programs under consideration in Mali.

2.79. COnchocerciasis is responsible for the abandonment cof many rivervalleys in Ma-li southof 140 11. Since thera is no land shortage in Mali,the people from these valleys have been able to move and farm uplands in-stead. Farmers generally realize, however, that the uplands are somewhatless fertile than the bottom lands and for this reaLson often risk contrac-tion of the disease in order to achieve the higher yields possible in thebottom lancds. Thle economic cost of the disease is the difference betweenthe productivity of farm labor on the uplands and on the bottcm lands. The.humat cost ol thc biiivrXss produced y- the discas; is obviously ,reat.

180. 'The onchocerciasis organism is carried by a biting fly which canbreed only in streams running at a specific speed and south of 140 1Y. Mostof the fly population spends the dry seasc2 farther south and returns toits Malian breeding grounds in the wet season. The organisnL breeds in thehuman being, producing millions of worms whliich form cysts and ultimatelyattack the eyes. Because of the unbearable itching, people generally leavethe river valleys where the fly and the disease become established. Whenthe French. conquered the region, they found the ornchocerciasis zones emptyand well wrooded and made them forest preserves. Since then,, the diseasehas spreadc, as population maps clearly show.

181. A reliable method of controlling the disease now is availableby treating the breeding sites of the fly with pesticide. This has beentried successfully in southeastern Mali and adjacent parts of Upper Volta

- 46 -

and Ivory Coast as part of a FED progran. The disease cannot, be eradicated,however, since the fly can fly up to 150 km to reinfect a cleared area froma non-cleared one. In the absence of contlmLng ccntrol measures, settlersin cleared land mray once more be infected b; the disease.

182. I'he onchocerciasis-cleared valleys around Sikasso have been spon-taneously resettled. The tea plantations mentioned previously are also inthis area. At present, plans are being elaborated for a concerted oncho-cerciasis eradication program in seven countries, including southeasternMali At present, the costs of this program can onily be app:,roximated, anddecisions on whether to proceed depend on studies that will attempt toassess the cost and benefits of a control campaign. Such a campaign willapparently require ten years, followed by further efforts during an addi-tional five years to insure permanent control. Thereafter, naational conser-vation measures would have to be maintained. A program for training nationalpersonnel could istart at the earliest late in 1969, and the actual controloperation not before 1971. The seven country program may cost $45 millionfor fifteen years, in addition to the cost of trairing. A strong regionalorganization would be required since failure to take measures in one coun-try could soon nullify efforts in others.

183. Southwestern M4ali is also a heavy onchocerciasis zone. Thouglthe same techniques would work there, there are no immediate prospectsfor a control campaign. However, the seven-state project could later beextended to southwestern Mali, Guinea and eastern Senegal if it provedeffective. A 1-JHO project now startingin Guinea could be extended to coverthese regions. Onchocerciasis eradication in southwestern I[ali would re-quire close cooperation with Guinea and Senegal.

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THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF TIlE OFFICE 'DU NIGER

184. Malit s only major irrigation sclheme, located in the MiddleNiger basin and managed by the Office du Niger, has continue!d to deteriorateover recent years. In the last four years, the output of seed cotton hasaveraged only a little over 3,800 tons as c-npared. with 8,7CO tons in thepeak yeares 1962-63 and 1963-64. The produ2tion of paddy has apparentlyremained stable at around 40,000 to 422,ooo tons, but the yields of 1.4-1.5tons per hectare compare unfavorably with those of 1.8-2.0 tons obtained adecade ago.(See Table 16). The relatively poor performance of these twocrops was hardly compensated by the development of' sugar production which,as alreacdy noted, is characterized by high cost, cr by the small quantityof tobacco - some 50 to 60 tons - grown in recent years Settlers in theirrigated perimeter of the Office continue for the most part to be dissatis-fied with the net income obtained which appears tc compare unfavorably withthat of most cotton and rice farmers outside the Office. The Office itselfcontinues to suffer serious though not readily ascertainable losses.

Output and Yields

165. The: decline in cotton output is particularly striking in Vietu dfthe earlier hopes that intensification of cotton cultivation would bringabout a significant increase in productior../ The area planted to cottonhas dropped steadily from an average of around 7,'00 hectares in 1962-63and 1963-6h to about 4,000 in 1968/69 and is expected to be only 2,700hectares in 1.969-70. While a small part cf this decline may be attribut-able to the more labor-intensive methods of cultivation introduced, themajor cause was apparently the increasing discouragement of the farmerswith the inadequate drainage of their cotton fields. The deteriorationof drainage canals and the poor quality of' some of' the land levellingoperations have made it increasingly impossible to deal particularly withthe large rainfall with which the irrigated area is repeatedly afflicted.Thus in the heavy rainfall years 1965-66 and 1967-68, yields per hectarefell to the extremely unremunerative leveLs of only 420 and. 680 kgs, re-spectively. On the other hand., in the comnparatively dry years 1966-67 and1968-69, yieLds recovered to 1,490 and 1,230 kgs. The development ofcotton output in the Office is in sharp contrast to the maxked progressmade in dry-land cultivation of cotton.

186. In recent years, the total area under cultivation in the Officehas remained about the same - at a level somewhat over 33,000 hectares.It remains ia sharp contrast to the total of about 55,000 hectares developedfor irrigation. Only a very small part o.f this difference is accounted forby the fallowg requirements of cotton cultivation. M4uch of the land developedproved subsequently incapable of being effectively irrigated or drained. Some7,50O hectares have had to be abandoned owing to poor drainage, which led to

/ See "Hali: T'he Office du Niger - an Experience wYith Irrigated Agriculture"in Volume I]: of de Wilde et al, Expeiences with Agricu.Ltural Developmentin Tropical Africa, published for the IBRD in 1967 by The Johns HopkinsPress: ;77a137imore

Table 16: OFFICE DV NIGER: AREA, POPULATION AND PRODVCTIOGN/ - Tableau 16: OFFICE DU NIGER. SVPERFICIE, POPULATION ET PRODUCTION./

Area (hectares) Production of Processed ProductsProductio d dpraits trait6sAoreacie (htar) Area Rice/Riz paddy Yie1d,2/t Area - Seed Cotton/Coton grairae Miledled Rice Cotton fibre Cotton ol Soap Sugar5f Alcohol

Developedficie ( ated P ti nl Superficie Proiuctionr/ Hendementl/ Superficie ProduRoil ndement idz usine Fibre de Coton Exile de cstoo Savon Sucre / Alcool

Year,/Inn6e Arenagee Cultivfe (OOOXs)/iPlerts 000 ha) (000 PT)/(OOO T) ~ff/ha-T/ha (000 ha) (000 T)/(000 T) F/ha-T/ha (F)/(T) (M)/(T) (000 litres) ()/(T) (MT)/(TY (000 litre)

199/6o 83 427 36 608 34 7 30 0 55 8 18 6 6 4 3 0 7191(1/6l 44 499 35 673 38 3 30 0 54.7 18 5 7 5 1 0 9 1 365 10319(61/?,2 45 029 33 280 37 2 96 5 11 0 1 6 6 8 7 7 1 0 2 097 1671962/63 46 050 31550 37 3 23.6 38 1 15 8 0 7 8 1 0 2 101 2071963/64 48 936 36 589 32 9 29 2 42 9 18 7 4 9 6 1 3 14 365 3 305 95 991968/65 52 555 33 892 30 3 28.4 40 3 14 5 5 6 4 1 1 11438 1 976 88 751965/66 58 555 33 525 33 4 28.1 42 2 15 5 4 2 3 0 42 17 566 648 36 861966/67 54 748 33 527 31 2 28.8 41 4 184 4 2 6 2 1 5 10 914 2 198 65 53 2 649 3331967/68 54 744 33 787 30 9 29 0 n.d. n.d. 4 0 2 7 0 68 16 469 1 004 39 35 3 313 144196f/69 - 29,8 n.d. n.d. 3 2 4 prest.) 1.21969/70 - - - 30-38(est.) 2 7Cproj)

( prevu J

j/ Figures on the scall quantity of tobacco grown in remmt years in the area of the Office / On ne dispose pas de donnees sur la faible quantit6 de tabac cultiv6e ces dernieres ann&ee dana leare ot available. p6rimAtre de l'Office.

2/ Total number of members of families settled in the area as colonists. ,/ Nombre total de membres des famsilles fix6es dans la region en qualite de colons.e/ nota on total output and accordingly on yields are estimates only. The only accurate flgures L Lea onnees easur la potl"a i .le, 0901 ,e....T.ats O.- L 'soni

available are those for productlon achieved in the area (ca 12,000 hectares in recent years) ohiffres .exacts dont on dispose osoceroent la production obtenue dane la region (pras de 12.000 he-taresfarmed directly by the Office and those are the amounts collected by the Office from colonists. ces derni4res asn6es) et faisant lIobjet d'une exploitation directe par l'Office, et les chiffresThe latter retain a portion of their paddy (perhaps 16,000 to 18,000 tons) for their own con- afferents aux quantit6s ramassees par l'Office auprAs des colons. Ces derniers ont con8erve onesumption and fcr illicit marketing. The Office has not made estimates of total output for recent partie de leur paddy (peut-itre 16,000 A 18.000 tonnes) pour leur consommation pereonnelle et pouryears , list of figures for preceding years are approdmately errrect, production has probably la cosmmercialisation illicite. L-Office nla pas procede A des estioations de la production totaleremained in the neighborhood of 41,200 to 42,000 tons. pour les derniAres snnfes, mais les chiffres des ann6es prAc6dentes sont probablement exacta; laE/ Oxcluding small quantities of seed cotton retained by the colonists for hand ging and proau.tilur oat prvbablao-.sn1 rost.o aux n-vircns de 841.000 1 -2.O0 tcr-nessubsequent artisansl spinning and weaving. 8/ Non compris de faibles quantites de coton graine wonservges par les colons pour 116grenage manael

8/ The area planted to cane was 505 ha in 1966/67, 686 ha in 1967/68 and probably about 920 ha et le filage et tissage artisanaux.in 1968/69. 8 La saperficie plant6e en canne 6tait de 505 ha en 1966/67, 686 ha en 1967 /68 at probablenent 920 ha

environ en 1968/69.

- 48 -

heavy weed infestation and particularly to the inaision of wild rice. Upto 1965-66, the Office continued to develop newv land even though it wasevident that there was insufficient manpower to till intensively the landalready under cultivaticn.

Financial Position of the Office

167. T'he financial situation of the Office renmains parlous. While nobalance sheet has been published since 1964-65 and even that one was hardlyaccurate, considerable losses have apparently been incurred. According toone source,, losses in the five-year period 196o-61 to i964-615 amounted toabout MF2,7?50 million. The continuing deficits havre been due to a numberof factors. The long distance of the area from markets and sources ofsupply have raised the cost of inputs and depressed sales priLces. The pay-ments in kind which the Office charged the colonists for many of its services,including ridging, plowing and the supply cf fertilizers, apparently havenever covered costs, and part of the payments have not in fact been collected.The disappointing output of the colonists E everely limited not only the pay-ments which the Office could collect for its services but also the revenuesobtained from processing and selling the crops purchased from the colonists.Attempts byr the Office to undertake farming operations itself, through thecultivation in recent years of 12,000 to 13,000 hectares of :rice land, re-sulted in further losses. Government subventions h-ave provided only minorrelief. FinarLcially, the Office has barely been able to keep its head abovewater by postponing payments of accounts dl2Le and above all, by failing tomaintain the irr:igation and drainage network and to make good the deprecia-tion in its equijpment and installations. F'or instance, the Office reportedin 1969 that 1?47 of its 211 tractors and lC)9 of its 220 trucks were in badcondition. The deterioration of drainage and irrigation canals has ad-versely affected production and the poor state of equipment has at timesseriously delayed ridging and plowing.

UJ[ Some of the deficiencies of the scheme arise from original failuresof planning in the 'thirties. The irrigation and drainage canals were pamnnedwithout the adequate knowledge of micro-relief which was essential in an areawith very little natural slope. The drainage of one of the principal sectors -

Kolongotomo - was laid out in such a way that water cannot be evacuated whenthe Niger River is in spate. Rainfall was substantially underestimated sothat drains were not designed to cope with excess rainfall. Development wascarried out in widely scattered areas, thus compounding difficulties of trans-port and management.

Principal Problems

129. From the beginning, one of the critical difficulti.es has been theinability to attract a sufficient number of settlers or colonists to aclhdeve,through intensive cultivation, the high yields necessary to support the in-vestment and operating costs of the scheme. Since Mali and particularly thearea aroun.d the Office was underpopulated, a consi.derable part of the settlerswere originallIy recruited outside Mali, in Upper Volta. In the initial decadesthe increase attainable in the Office was attractive enough to permit the re-

- 49 -

cruitment c,f additiomal settlers. The settled population reached a peak ofabout 38,300 in 1960-61. By 1967-68, however, it had declined to 30,900.The deterioratirL of conditions, particularly drainage, in the Office, theheavy charges which colonists had to pay in relaticn to the rather low levelof agricultural prices set by the Government and the development of relativelyattractive far:mixng opportunities outside the Office all contributed to a netexodus. Moreover, from 1960-61 to 1967-68, the number of able-bodied maleworkers (15-55 years of age) among the settled popilation appears to havedeclined more rapidly than the total population - by 33 percent as comparedwith 20 percent. Many of the younger members of extended families who tookup land in the area of the Office have apparently found more attractive oppor-tunities elsewhere. This rapid sharp reduction in the available work forceprobably has been an important factor in the curtailment of the area devotedto cotton, which demands considerable labor, and th.e marked preference showmfor the cultivat-ion of rice, which is grown by much more extensive or lesslabor-intenisive raethods.

Proposals Jfor a ',tudy

190. The Government faces a formidable set of problems in determiningthe future of the Office du Niger. In principle it seems desirable to pre-vent as a mninimum further deterioration of an area in which so much hasalready been invested. The higher prices which the Government authorizedfor rice and cotton should increase farmers' incentxives, but unless drainageand irrigation are significantly improved and a more effective extensionservice made available, much progress probably cannot be made. Any assess-ment of tha cost and benefits of new efforts to rehabilitate and re-developthe Office du Niger should presumably consider the past investment as "sunkinvestment". In other words, the cost of such effoDrts must be appraisedin relation to tihe benefits of any increase in output generated, and thereturn on :new investments in the Offi-ce must be compared with that obtain-able wTith investments of similar magnitude possible outside the area of theOffice. There must be assurance also that all the elements essential foran increase in production are available. It may well be possible, for in-stance, to find land within the Office tha1; can be reclaimed at a rathermoderate cost, but unless people can be found to farm it the investmentwould obviousLy not be worthwhile.

121. What is needed at this juncture :is a thorough,objective study ofall the problems faced by the Office a-nd of the possible remLedies. Theorganization and financing of such an inquLry have been the subject of verypreliminary discussions between the Mali Government and FAC. If a positivedecision is t-aken, it would be desirable to reach agreement on the termsof reference of the study with agencies that might be approached for financingif worthwhile in-vestment opportunities shoild emerge. As a minimum, the teamundertaking the investigation should have the following personnel and functions.

(a) An irrigation and drainage expert and a public works engineerto determine the most economic and feasible way of overcominig the most seriousdeficiencies in the irrigation and drainage network and of reclaiming on aselective basis some of the abandoned land.

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(:b) A practi'cal agriculturnsst ard an agricultural econonist toreview and suggest possible changes in crop3ping patterns in the light ofpast experience, prospective prices of crop.s, the cost of production re-quisites and the availability and cost of manpower and equipment.

I'c) A specialist in agricultural training and extension work tosuggest wars and means of improving the training and effectiveness of theOffice' s present extension force which is admittedly inadequate.

i(d) An agricultural marketing specialist and an economist toexamine aLl the problems of thle Offices maLchinery and vehicle park inorder to determi:ne the cost of various medcanized agricultural operationsand to make recanmendations on the standardization of equipment and itsmaintenance ard management.

(e) An accountant and financial specialist to examine the presentfinancial pos.ition and accounting methods of the Office and to make recommen-dations on the installation of a system of accounting which would give arealistic and current picture of the'finances of the Office and enable thelatter to cost its various services as a guide to future planning.

(f) One or twfo sociologists to analyze the problems faced bythe colonists of the Office and the factors affecting the retention ofold,and recritmrent of new, colonists, and their responses cor reactionsto prevailing cropping patterns and the coaditions within the Office.

(g) A principal economist to guide and coordinate the cost-benefit analysis of proposals for rehabilitation or reorientation advancedby team members.,

2.92. Such a team, working under competent leadership, should in thefirst instance determine the feasibility of carrying out a rinLhmum rehabili-tation program which in relation to its cost has the prospect of a reasonablygood return. It; might suggest a program of several stages, with the executionof each stage contingent on the experience and degree of success with themeasures carried out in the preceding stage.

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LIVESTOC(

193. Next to agriculture, animal prodtuction is Mali's largest industry.Production of beef cattle, sheep, goats, fish, poultry and other domesti-cated animals, and of by-products like millc, butter, eggs, hides and skins,accounts for one-sixth of GDP. When related processing and marlketing acti-vities are added, animal production accounits for fully one-fifth of GDP.

Average per capita consumption of animal foods and protein in Mali is thehighest inL est Africa. Furthermore, anizml products make up over half ofMali's exports.

194. Despite the obvious importance of animal production, relativelylittle attention has been devoted to collecting ar,d analyzintg the relevantdata with a view to working out feasible approaches to the promotion ofthis industry. Government livestock and fish stat:istics are not on a parwith those generated by the agricultural censuses. Althouglh the Governmentattempts to collect heavy taxes from animal production, particularly fromthe beef cattle industry, it devotes a very small part of ilts services tothis part of the economy. The Livestockl Service (Service de VE'levage) andthe Fisheries Service (Section Peche, Service des Eaux et Forets) accountfor about 1 percent of the Government budget. The Livestock Service isseverely lhandicapped by insufficient funds for such things ,as vehicles andvehicle o'perating expenses.

Beef Cattle

195. Beef cattle are H4ali's largest export by far. Beef cattle produc-tion alone accounts for between 13 percent: and 14 percent of GDP.

196. There are about 4.5 million beef cattle in Mali - about the sameas the number of people. In the relatively small portion of the countrysouth of approximately 130N, which is infested by tsetse fly, the cattlekept are trypanosomiasis-resistant types of the N'Dama vaViety. They aresmall; only mature bulls ever reach weights over 100 kg.i. Probably about15 percernt of tiali's cattle are N'Damas. They are generall.y kept on farmsby people who are primarily agriculturalists and about 200,,000 are used topull plowrs. Thie bulk of mali's cattle - ca. 85 percent - are raised northof the trypanosomiasis zone and are Zebu types. The average Zebu is about I/50 percent heavier than the average N'Dana; adult: bulls weiLgh over 150 kg._The Zebu are kept primarily for their meat by about half a million pastor-alists who are nomadic or semi-nomadic and who sell their cattle to meettheir cash needs. The average family may have a herd of 50 beasts or moreof which, characteristically, about five or six animals would be sold peryear.

197. Transhumance -- migration between wet-season and dry-season pastures-- is a necessity for almost all of Mali's herdsanen. In the dry season,animals imust: be driven to reliable water points; for a great many this meansthe Central Delta of the Niger or that river's lower reaches in Mali. Inthe wet season, the pasture areas used in dry season are farmed and the

I/ Carcass wreight.

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cattle are driven out into the steppes to live on the grasslands. Substan-tial areas of grassland go unused for lack Df watering point<;. Around waterpoints there is f'requently severe overgraziag.

Available 'Statistics

198. T'he stzatistical service of the Livestock Service admits that itscensuses usually cover less than half of the cattle population. However,a consensus has been developed on the size and general characteristics ofthe Malian herd, largely as the result of an extensive study made by threeFrench consultants in 1965 (Lacrouts, Sarniguet andl Tyc, ExpLoitation ducheptel boirin au Mali) and of information gathered in the course of therinderpest eradication campaign. For the campaign, pastoralists broughtout cattle for vaccination which they had previously hidden to avoid taxes.

199. The size of the herd,gross increase and bhe dispozition of thatincrease are indicated in Table 17 . Earli.er figu:res were compiled fromadministrative estimates by Samir Ainin, whein he was the Government?s nationalaccounts adviser; later ones are from FAG studies. It is important to remem-ber that, relatively coherent as these estimates are, they are not based ona complete ancd fully reliable census.

200. if these figures are correct, the "fnatural"l rate of increase ofMali's herd used to be only 4 percent. DL sease control efforts by Frenchveterinarians and the provision of some watering points raised this to about10 percent by independence; and subsequent developments, principally therinderpest campaign, have raised it to the current level of around 12 percent.

201. Aboult 39 percent of the herd are probably cows, 6 percent bulls,22 percent hei.fers and 114 percent bullocks (1-3 years old) and 19 percentcalves. Considering the need to grow cattle big enough to stand the longtrek to market and the use of natural inseauination., this composition isnot unusual. The annual calving rate - 0.65 per cow - is low due to therather harsh natural conditions cattle must support. The principal explana-tion for the low rate of herd growth is the high mortality rate anong younganimals. Nearly one-third die in their first year.

Cattle Marketing and Government Policy

202.. The data on the number of cattle marketed given in Table 17 donot confirm the thesis that livestock are irrationally hoarded. Cattle,in the first instance, are a source of subsistence but they are also soldreguLarly to satisfy needs for cash. Once pastoralists became convincedthat disease control measures were effectively redJucing animal mortalityrates they evidently kept thLe annual growth of their herds bo about 1 per-cent or, at the most, 3 percent. The highLer natui^al rate of growth wasused to inacrease. local meat consumption and to step up exports to suchcoastal countries as Ivory Coast and Ghanat, which were developing rapidlyand short of protein foods.

Table 17: ANIMAL PRODUCTION: BEEF CATTLE, SIZE, GROWTH AND DISPOSITION OF HERD

Tableaul7: PRODUCTION ANIMALE: BOVINS, CHEPTEL TOTAL ET UTILISATION DU CROIT

(By head and percent)(Par tete et pourcentage)

Year Source Total Gross Total Of which Increase not

Number Increase Marketed Ma'i an Emxort Export MarketedConsumption on hoof as meat

Annee Source Cheptel Croit Commercialise' Dont

Total brut Consommation Export. Export Crolt nonlocale sur pied viande commercialise'

1928 Amin 1/ 1460 000 59 000 4% 44 000 3% 44 000 3% neg. 0 15 000 1%

1939 Amnin 1 830 000 128 000 7% 73 000 4% 63 000 3.5% 10 000 0.5% 0 55 000 3%3,5% 0,5%

1945 Amin 2185 000 153 000 7% 87 000 4% 67 000 3% 20 000 1% 0 66 000 3%

1959 Amin 3300 000 330 000 10% 230 000 7% 130 000 4% 100 000 3% 0 1 W000 3%

1964- 05 Lacrouts,Sarniguet,TycS e/ 4 300 000 521 000 12% 473 000 11% 312 000 7% 157 000 4% 4 000 48 000 I%

1966 Sarniguet,T ic,PeyredieuduCharlat 3/ 4 500,000 550 000 12% 480 000 10.5% 350 000 8% 128 000 3% 2 000 70 000 1.5%

10,5% 1,5%

V Samir Amin, Trois experiences africaines de developpement; le Mali, la Guinee et le Ghana.

Marcel Lacrouts, Jean Sarniguet, Jean Tyc, Exploitation du cheptel bovin au Mali.

3/ Sarniguet, Tyc, Francois Peyredieu du Charlat, L'Approvisionnement en viandes de l t Afrigue centre ouest.

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203. Prior to independence, exploitation of the beef-cattle herd wasalmost entirely in private hands. The private sector handled the transport,slaughter and marketing for local consumption and organized the trekkingof cattle on the hoof for marketing in the coastal countries. A Frenchprivate company - TREC - operated a slaughterhouse at Bamako and exportedsmall quantities of refrigerated meat (never more than 400 ITl per year) toAbidjan.

204. After independence, the Government developed ambitious plans tohave all cattVLe available for export slaughtered in Nali and. to export themeat by refrigerated trucks and by plane. A public enterprise - SONEA -was established with a monopoly of the export of cattle,meat, hides andskins and witi the function, also, of retailing meat and yoghurt locally.In the period 1964-67, a small sub-company - SEPAM - in which there was a40 percent Freanch participation, also operated, handling 60 percent of SONEA'smeat exports .V and investigating the prospects of marketing meat in Europe.Construction of modern slaughterhouses wit:a cold-storage facilities was

initiated at Bamako (capacity of 10,000 MT of carcass meat), Gao (3,000 MT),Kayes and Segou (2,500 MT each) and Mopti (2,000 NT). Financing was pro-vided by FED and. Yugoslavia. Of these, only two were actua:LJy completed -those at Bamako and Gao - and the rest were abandoned.

205. At the same time, the livestock industry was subjected to heavytaxation amd sevrere regulations, which while largely circumvented werenonetheless a serious liability. The prices of cattle were fixed at lowlevels with the ostensible objective of keeping down the cost of living.The pastoralists, who like farmers already had to pay a personal head tax,were also liable to an annual tax of NFhOCI on every head of cattle repre-senting roughly 20 percent of the incone c,f a herdsman who sold 10 percentof his herd per year, and by a number of government levies on the exportof cattle. While SOKEA itself was exempt from the turnover tax, localbutchers in Bamako who were legally required to have their cattle slaughteredin SONEA's abattoir were subjected to the turnover tax of MF45/kg which wasabolished only in mid-1969.

2o6a Under these circumstances, marketing was severely disrupted. Theprice controLs, although never really susceptible of enforcement, causedcattle dealers largely to abandon the off:Lcial markets except for animalsof inferior grade. The supply of cattle to SONEA.'s abattoirs was adverselyaffected. The abattoir at Gao has never operated. because it was never ableto buy cattle at the official prices and the one in Bamako has operated atonly a fraction of its capacity. Butchers preferred to slaughter much oftheir cattle illegallyin order to escape the tax and SONEA, even thoughitself forced to circumvent price controls, generally found it possible tobuy only young and inferior animals for its owvn accamt. Mhe volume ofslaughtering at the Bamako abattoir fell far below expectations, as is in-dicated by the followving statistics (in MT of carcass weight):

1/ SEPAI4's management was never really separate from that of SONEA.

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1965-66 1966--67 1967-68 1968-69(firsthalf)

Cattle a/For the acccunt of butchers 2,390 2,280 1,264 837For SONEt ac:couant

For local sale 1,505 1,3131 1,4.6 6 )For ex?ort 768 252 244 ) 809 ,

Other animals 93 _77 _119

Total 4,756 3,990 3,093 1,646

Capacity utilization (percent) 47.6 39.0 30.9 32.9

- Including, apparently, "Other animals".

Under these conditions, SONEA has incurred considerable losses. Its exportsof meat have also proved disappointing for a variety of reas,ons, includinginadequate, sqpplies of good quality cattle, poor marketing practices andthe tendency of importing countries to prefer imports of cattle on the hoofto imports of meat. Exports of meat, primarily tc the Ivory Coast, roseexceptionealy tc 770 tons in 1965-66 but in the fclloTring twro and a halfyears averaged only 274 tons annually. Even these exports have taken placeat a loss.,

207. Faced with disappointment in its meat sales to West, Africancountries., SOMEA has elaborated a project, with an investmexnt cost esti-mated at IT 189.6 million($379,000) for the pre-cooking and subsequentrapid freezing of meat in order to make it marketc&ble in Europe in com-pliance wiLth the sanitary regulations prevailing there. This proposedre-orientation of meat sales to Europe, which at best would be a difficultmarket to penetrate, appears dubious considering the fact thiat there ispotentially a. large and much less demandixig market closer at, hand in theIvory Coast and Ghana. Admittedly, difficulties have been encountered inselling to these countries, but these can be overcome if price regulationsin Mali are relaxed to insure a larger availability of the higher-qualitycattle suitable for export, if marketing i.s improved and if agreementsare reached with the importing countries regarding ccnditions of access totheir markcets.

20L. Goveimnent regulations and taxes have also encouraged the clan-destine e:xport oDf cattle. Traditionally, probably half of the cattle exportedon the hoof acrOss Mali's long frontiers have always escaped recording. In

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the mid-esUties, however, the proportion of unrecorded or clandestine exportsincreased 1ubstantially. In addition to the regular export toaxes, cattletraders had to pay a special fee of MF1,OOC per head to SONEA in recognitionof its "moinopolyl' of exports. The increasingly sevrere foreign exchange re-strictions led to the institution of a government requirement that the pro-ceeds of exports be fully repatriated. Since there was a severe shortageof consumer goo&; in Mali and the Government was generally hostile to mer-chants, there was every incentive to circuivent this requirement. Cattleexports, therefore, became a vehicle for capital f Light; and to the extentthat the proceeds of exports were repatriated it took the form of clandes-tine imports of goods sold at black-market prices In Mali. Beginning in1964, the Government tried to improve incentives by providing that cattleexporters who made a bank deposit as a guaranty of performance could repa-triate haLf of their proceeds in the form of goods which they could thensell at prices that enabled them to recoup their losses on t1le export ofanimals. However, this measure proved to be only a palliatire.

209. Devaluation of the Mali franc, followed by a considerable liberali-zation of :Lmpcrts, changed this situation in severa respects. In theory, itdiminished the incentive for clandestine imports and increased export incen-tives by greatly widening the disparity between controlled livestock pricesin Miali and thLe prices prevailing in nearby countries, thus enhancing SONEA'sdifficulties in getting an adequate number of cattle for slaughter. TheGovernment sought to capitalize on the increased price disparity by raisingthe tax on exports of cattle from 71,000 iper head to MF5C,00. This, however,again encouraged clandestine exports so that the Government felt obliged toreduce the tax to PIFIl,50O in January 1969, and, at a still later date, toMFl,000. This measure, in addition to a generally more tolerant officialattitude toward private trade, has imdotabtedly helped to restore more normalconditions, although it is likely that over half thle cattle exports are stilluncontrolled.

Approaches to Development of the Cattle Industry

210. The potential of Mali's cattle industry is certainly considerable.The country can :produce a substantial number of cattle for export on thehoof or as meat, and the prospective demandl for meat in the coastal areasof West Africa is likely to bring about price increases which should makecattle raising increasingly remunerative. A recent study of prospectivesupply and demnand sponsored by the Entente countries and covering, apartfrom these countries, also Nali, Nigeria and Ghana, forecasts a growingmeat deficit after allowing for supplies from the surplus savannah areas,including a considerable increase in Mali's exports. Thus, the estimateddeficit is exp>ected to rise to about 30,00() tons ia 1970 and 135,00O tons in1975 (See Table 18). An FAO projection made for the same area, enlarged toinclude also Senegal, Gambia, Miauritania, liberia and Sierra Leone, alsopoints to a subst7ntial though somewrhat smaller (75,000 to 125,000 tons)deficit in 1975..1' Both studies are based on real demand and not on theore-tical nutritional requirements.

2/FAO's lower estimate is apparently due primarily to the fact that it didnot take into account the effect of risiilg incomes on meat consumption.

Table 18: PROJECTED BALANCE OF BEEF PRODIfCTION AND CONSUMPrIONFOR CENTRAL WEST AFRICA 1/

Tableau 18: PREVISION DE L'EQUILIBRE PRODUCTION-CONSOMMA.TIONDE LA VIANDE DE BOVINS POUR L'AFRIQUE CENTRE-OUEST /

(MT of meat & offals)(T de viandes et abates)

1966 1970 1975 1980

Deficit of the Coastal Zone/Deficit de la C8te 1h2 300 177 000 255 000 349 100

Surplus of the Sairarn.ah Zone Availablefor Export/

Exc6dent disponible det la Savanne 1C8 500 112 600 115 900 113 600

Regional Deficit/Deficit r4gional 33 800 64 400 139 100 235 500

Possible Imports from Neighboring Countries/Importations possibles des pays voisins

Mauritania/MauritaiLe 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000Chad/Tchad 'a 000 31 000 31 000 31 000

Uncovered Deficit/ ca ca caDeficit non-couvert neg. 30 000 135 000 200 000

c.f. Available for Export from Mali/n .m. Excedent disponible du Mali 27 500 35 900 47 500 59 400

lf Entente countries plus Mali, Ghana and Nigeria. Figures are from Entente study carried outout by SEDES.

Pays de 1'Entente avec le Mali, le Ghana et le Nig6ria. ChiffreS de l' etude effectueepour le Consei:L de 1'Entente par SEDES.

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211. Up to the present, however, Nali has not done very much to developits cattle poitential. The most positive measure has been the rinderpesteradication campaign carried out in coacerit with other neighboring countries.A number of new veterinary posts and a vaccine producing laboratory werealso established. Another important activity has been the provision ofwatering poinits. Between 1960 and mid-1966l, expenditures fc,r this purposeamounted to IiDF895 million ($3,4 million at the rate of exchange then pre-vailing), of which two-thirds came from forreign sources. Nkcre recently, theFederal Republic of Germany has financed a drilling program in the grazingareas of the Gourma region, which has been conspicuously unsuccessful. Alto-gether, the well-drilling program has lacked coherence.

212. Admittedly, it has been difficult to work out an intelligent pro-gram for an industry which is predominantly traditional in character andabout which relevant data are still far from fully known. However, someindication, of possible lines of development can be given.

Genetic IzrProvement

213. Genetic improvement does not appear to be a fruitful line of attackand would, at best, have only a long-range impact. The preEsent Zebu strainsapgear well-adapted to the existing, difficult conditions. South of latitude13 N the t:rypancisomiasis-resistant N'Dama is the nost suitable breed. PureNvDamas are not very numerous and are becoming increasingly mixed wlith otherstrains. A modest project to breed these cattle on a ranch at Yanfolila,estimated to entail an investment of NF250-300 million ($500,000-$600,000)has been proposed, but the detailed costs and bene!fits are still to be workedout.

Pasture Irgrovement

214. This is a difficult objective where range lands are a free andcommon good and, of course, unfenced. Besides, the use of rangeland is notso intensi.ve that overgrazin- has become a general. problem. Ihere localizedovergrazitng exists, it can probably best be remedied througl a programproviding more and well-distributed watering points that would bring currentlyungrazed pastures into use. There does, however, appear to be some limitedscope for providing improved pasture or fallow or unutilized land in theOffice du Niger. On the research station at Kogotni, IRAT has achievedinteresting results with a legume (Phaseolus lateroides) whiLch can providegood grazing for animals and, when subsequently plowed under,e can have abeneficial effect on such a crop as cotton. Sowinig of this legume on landwhich is otherwziLse likely to be idle in any event may be worthwhile forcolonists of the Office who already have a considerable number of cattle.Trials which would also assess the carrying capaciity of this type of pasturemay well be worth undertaking. Measures would havre to be devised, however,to insure tha.t land sown to the legume would not he used for common pasturebut w¢ould be reserved for the livestock of the farmer sowing the legume.

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Ranches

215, While feed lots where cattle would be fattened on purchased grainand other feed may well be uneconomic under tile conditions prevailing in 1Mali,the establishment of ranches where cattle brought in from the open-rangelands can be "finished" or "fattened" hold:; out more promise. Such "finishing"ranches (ranclhes dlembouche), provided witlh adequate water and grass andsome facilities for supplementary feeding, could greatly accelerate the weightincrease of ciattle, permitting them to be imarketed two years earlier than ifthey stayed ol the open range. Cattle fin:ished on such ranches could not betrekked to the market and would, therefore, have to be trar.sported by truck.

216. It has long been proposed to establish a finishing, ranch near Nionoon the edge ofE the Office du Niger. Some 12,000 hectares, which could perhapssupport 5,000 cattle, are available for this puzpose not faar from a livestockresearch station operated by the Livestock Service. Supplenentary feed inthe form of rice, bran, cottonseed and cake, and perhaps molasses, could bemade available in principle from the Office du Niger, although it should benoted that present plans call for the closLng dotm of the Office's old cotton-seed oil mill and the processing of cotton seed at the newer oil mill muchfarther doinsitream in Koulikoro. It was originally estimatetd that the ranch,the investment cost of which was tentative:Ly put at NF320 million ($640,000),might be able tc market 5,000 animals per year after adding about 100 kg eachto their vreiglht. FAC has been making an agrostological studly of the projectand the M4ali Government has examined the problem of supplying the proposedranch with, water which would probably have to come from the office du Niger.The preliminary findings indicate that the ranch cannot support 5,000 cattle,and a compnlementary or alternative ranch farther to the nort:h is now beingconsidered., perhaps for supplying cattle fDr a more intensivre feeding opera-tion on the Niono ranch. In any event, further study is needed to determinethe econotmic fearsibility of this project or some modification thereof.

217. A single ranch like that at Niono would not by itself make a verysignificant contribution since the number of animals it could market wouldprobably amount to only about 2 percent of Mali's estimated exports. However,it could demonstrate the feasibility of the ranching approach and thus providethe basis for thte establishment of more ranches at: suitable locations.

Disease Ccntrol

218. The successful campaign against rinderpest has demaonstrated theimportance of disease control in improving the size and productivity ofM4ali's cattle herd. However, the campaign has not: been carried out in anentirely satisfactory manner, and the Livestock Service, whkLch has beenseverely handicapped by a shortage of funds, may need, according to oneestimate, additional annual funds of MF60 million to compleite and consoli-date the effort.,

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219. Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) is now the disease mostdamaging to adult: cattle. Its eradication has a high priority. However,there is st:ill a difference of opinion on the effectiveness of existingvaccines and the cost of the operation. The Livestock Service estimatesthat an effective campaign to eradicate CBPP w¢ould cost HFI,080 million(ca $2.1 mi.llion). The possibility of a regional campaign against thisdisease was recenttly discussed in Dakar by represerLtatives of: the govern-ments concerned and of the agencies - FED, FAC and USAID - which financedthe drive against rinderpest.

220. Zebu cattle south of latitude 13°N are subject to atttacks oftrypanosomiLasis and streptothricosis. Experience in East Africa indicatesthat the tsetse i'ly can be eradicated but at considerable cont. In viewof the availability of trypano-resistant cattle and the still ample rangeland in the tsetse-free areas, eradication of the t:setse fly does not appearto have high priority.

Watering Points-in Grazing Areas

221. The provision of more watering points in these areas would greatlyincrease the availability of rangeland and help to eliminate overgrazing nearexisting water supplies. However, the lack of any overall hydro-geologicalsurvey of Mali. anLd its underground water reisources has severealy handicappedvell-dri1l:lng. In some areas, notably the Gao Graben and the Gondo, well-drilling p;rograma have been successful, but: in other areas adiequate watersources have not been found. For instance, the German-sponsoDred programin the Gourma area has yielded rather disap,pointingy results.

222. ksidle from the Gourma region, the area north of Tornbouctou andGoundam, east of the I4auritanian border, artd the Nara-Nioro -area south ofthe border require prospecting. In 1963 a program, including experimentalwell-drilling, for exploring the water resc,urces of the Nara-Nioro regionand the Gondo was initiated with UNDP finarLcing, but as of mid-1969 it wasstill handicapiped by the lack of a drillingr rig. This program hopes alsoto be instrumental in coordinating the activities of three governmentalservices w1hich are concerned with well-drilling and now often work at cross-purposes. Investment and operating costs of wells will, of course, have tobe carefully (eamined in relation to expecl:ed benefits.

Livestock Routes

223. The proper equipment of traditionial livestock routes with waterand other faciLlities could greatly reduce weight losses which, togetherwith losses due to disease and emergency sLaughter, now often run up to20 percent. The Government has prepared a project for the improvement ofstock routes in t'estern Mali between Gogui, Nioro, Nara and Bamalo, andbetween Nioro and Kayes, which envisages the construction or improvementof 41 watering places at an estimated cost of 17E20 million ($240,000).If this project would really succeed in bringing about the expected reduc-tion in weight loss and mortality, it should be highly productive and

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qualify for external financing. However, its realization is dependent onmore detailed sttudies, including the completion of investigat:ions into theavailability of underground water resources.

Policies and Adad.nistration

224. Steps t:hat have recently been taken with respect to taxation and tothe reorganizatucin of SONEA should remove some of the impediv*nts to thedevelopment: of the cattle industry, The reduction of the export tax toNFl,O0O per head makes illegal exports less attract:ive althongh it is arguedby some in the Livestock Service that a further reduction to NF500 would reall!ymake it unworthwhtile to run the risk involved in clandestine exports and mighteven increase the, total revenue collected by the Gcovernment. The abolition ofthe turnover tax on livestock slaughtered for the aLccount of butchers by SONEAshould enccurage greater use of the Bamako abattoir provided the butchersdo not consider SONEA's slaughtering fees too high. The Government also decidedat the same, time (May 1969) to terminate SONEA's legal monopoly of cattlemarketing and export, thereby presumably eliminatirg the fee of XFl,000 perhead which cattle dealers were at least in theory required to pay on theirexports, and to reorganize SONEA. A l4alian Cattle and Meat Office (OMBEVI)was established to control and supervise the operations of three companiescharged resipectivrely with slaughtering, the marketing of meal:, hides and skins,and the matagement of a tannery and shoe factory which was fiLnished in 1970.

225. Livestock prices are now left to find their own levrel in the lightof supply and demand conditions. It remains to be seen whether the new statemarketing company will be prepared or able to compete in the livestock marketsso as to secure al supply of meat at prices that will permit it to sell remun-eratively, both in the controlled domestic market and in the foreign market.

226. Finally, it is highly desirable that a comprehensive study be under-taken with the objective of elaborating an integrated program for disease con-trol, watering points, finishing ranches and livestock routes. The approachto these problems in the past has been too much on a piecemeal basis.

Other Animail Resources

227. Trhe importance of other animals to the Mallian econoamy should be brief-ly mentioned. Donkeys (ca. 200,000-400,000), horses (130,00)) and camels(100,000) are used primarily for transport and traction. Pigs, which areprincipally raised for consumption by the foreign community, are of littleeconomic sLgnificance. Sheep and goats, however, are of great importance.Their number is ait least double that of the cattle herd. Although reliabledata are lacking, it is possible that the slaughter rate - about 20 percent -may be somiwhat higher than the rate of increase so that the size of the sheepand goat herd may be declining. Consumption of sheep and goat meat per head(10 kg.) is3 almost as high as that of beef (11 kg.). While sheep and goatsare still being exported, cattle can probably make more efficient use of Mali'sland and labor resources and are more readily exportable.

228. P?oultry (chicken and guinea fowl) flocks are believed to numberbetween 8 and 12 million. They are raised primarily for meat. Poultrygenerally forage for their own feed although they are fed table scraps and,occasionally, teirmites. The Sotuba Animal Husbandry Station distributes

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improved breeds at a fraction of the cost. Newcastle disease frequentlymakes seriDus inroads on village flocks. Ilthough poultry are raised pri-marily for subsistence, there is a small and rapidly growing t"co1mercial"poultry industry which produces both broilers and eggs for the urban market.This industry imports chicls from Israel anid France (recently at an annualrate of 40,000)), which are brought in by plane at a cost of w5F340 each,raises them with purchased sorghum and a special feed supplement of protein,minerals and vitamins supplied by the Government's Sotuba livestock farm,and sells the broilers, weighing on the average over 1 kg., in the urbanmarket at about 4F600 each. Although this price compares favorably, on aweight basis, with that of "regular" chickens, the market for poultry willremain extremely limited unless prices can be reduced.

229. A small, American-sponsored project, which is to start in thelatter part of 1969, is designed with this objective in mind. It is toproduce about 500,000 improved chicks for sale at a cost price of MF40 eachin Mali and part.ly also in neighboring couLtries. The project will providetechnical assistance to 1alians who want to become commercial poultry pro-ducers and. vaccine to control Newcastle disease. If sufficient producersare indeed found., a much broader market for broilers could be developed atlower prices.

Animal By-Products

230. The consumption of milk and milk products, except by pastoralists,is negligible. This year (1969) the Bamako Milk tUnion (ULB), is opening,with aid f.rom UIICEF, a small milk and dairy products plant wJhere the supplyof fresh nilk will be supplemented by powrdered milk provided by the WorldFood Program during the initial phase. The fresh milk is to come fromfarmers near Bamako and in the Upper Niger Valley. The ULB hopes to sell3,000 liters per day at a price of ME70 per liter, recouping its slight,loss at this price from the sale of luxury products such as yoghurt, cremefraiche anid ice cream. For the longer term, ULB also has plans for processingmilk collected iin the lacina area into dried milk protein for supplementarycattle feeding, but this plan seems rather unrealistic consiLdering the factthat at this time milk is a luxury product even for comparal:ively well-to-dopeople in the towns.

231. Hides and skins, while a significant export, are rather low inquality owing to the damage inflicted by fire wounids and brand marks, trekwJounds and streptothricosis and to poor slaughteriLng and treatment. SONEAwas never notably successful in improving quality;; it remainis to be seenwhether O14BEVI, one of whose autonomous divisions will be specially concernedwith hides and skins, will be able to achieve better results. The Governmentconsiders that :Lts immediate task is to inprove existing collection and curingfacilities anLd to educate Livestock Service personnel in the care and handlingof hides and skins.

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FISHING

232. VAli's rivers and lakes, centerin, in the unique inland delta,are rich in fish. Even after meeting an internal per capita consumptionequal to 9.3 klg. of fresh fish - nearly equal to the consumption of beef -the catch is large enough to make fish the country's third largest export.There is no ev:Ldence that fisheries resources are being depleted.

233. While virtually all rural families living; near water courses,lakes or ponds are engaged in fishing to some extent, fishing providesthe principal livrelihood for about 30,000 fishermern and their families,of whom over half are Bozo-speaking. These fisherxen live iu 400 to 500camps, mainily in the Central Niger Delta, fish With nets, harpoons and trapsand use lonig boats up to 6 meters long and capable of carrying 3 tons. Some500 outboard motors are in use. The commercial center of the fishing Industryis Mopti; others are of relatively minor sigaificance.

234. As in the case of livestock, statistics are deficient and notaltogether reliable. The most systematic survey of the industry was doneby Charbomnier and Cheminault and published in 19W6 under the title"Traitemenit et: commercialisation du poisson prche glans le Delta Centraldu Niger". Subsequent studies by the Hali Government and the French Organi-zation SCE'r - Cooperation are all based on this earlier survey. Customsstatistics on exports and estimates made by the Goviernment's Fisheries Sectionare all acknowledged to be incomplete.

235. 'rhe total fish catch is generally believed to be albout 100,000tons per year, ranging from 00,000 tons in a bad year to perhaps 130,000in an exceptionally good year. The bulk oi- the fish catch is converted intodried and smoked fish, since facilities fo£1 marketing fresh fish are inade-quate. Ttwo different estimates of the disposition of the catch may be cited:

Charbomnier- Estimate obtained byCheminault Mission in MoptiEstimate.-**. (1969)

(in MT)

Total catch (fresh) 95,0010 100,000

DispositionConsumed, fresh, 15,0010 40,00

Eaten by :fishermen 10,oo1Marketed 5,000

Consumed as dried and smoked fish a0,00o(fresh) 60,000(fresh)Processed fish

Eaten by fishermen 10,00O)processed 2,000)processedMarketed in Mali 3,000)weight 12,000)weightExported 12,000)

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Around 7,000 tces of dried and smoked fish eLre annually shippied from theMopti regiola to markets in Upper Volta, Gharna and IvJory Coast. A con-siderable volume apparently escapes control. With ithe shortage of consumergoods prevailing in Mali during the mid-sixt:ies, merchants fouund it pro-fitable to repatriate part of their export. proceeds in the form of clan-destine impDrts for sale in the black market:. Thus, recorded exports ofsmoked and dried fish fell to 6,197 tons in 1965 as compared with an averageof about 9,)000 tons in the previous four yeLrs and [13,454 tons in 1960.The export tax, raised to MF41,000 (f82) per ton following the 1967 devalu-ation, has provided an additional incentive to illegal exports.

236. The iish is smoked or dried in the fishing camps after a slightfermentation, which gives it a distinctive i'lavor different from that ofsea fish. It is then transported in bulk to centers, primarily Mopti, where itis sold and then packed and marketed by merchants. Most of it is solddirectly to merchants. The balance is sold through a cooperative with head-quarters at Mopti and basic primary societies in the fishing camps. The co-operative claims 15,000 members, or about half the total of professionalfishermen. The cooperative, whose members pay an entrance fee of MFl,000,charges 1T10 per kilogram for the fish it markets. In the three years,1966-68, its purchases averaged 2,393 MT, valued at MF302 million, and itssales MF323 million. Only a small quantity of fresh fish has been sold,all of it to SOMEA for marketing in Bamako. This year (1969) the Freedomfrom Hunger campa.ign is providing a small ice-making plant, a. refrigeratedtruck for fish transport to urban centers, jand a small van for marketing fishin nearby villages. It is hoped that this wjill greatly increase marketingof fresh fish.

237. Relations between the cooperative and the small groups of merchantswho handle fislh in Mopti have always been strained. The merchants havelooked uporL the cooperative as their rival, enjoying the patronage of theGovernment. The cooperative, on its part, was never able to put into practicethe monopoly which it legally had in 1967 and 1968. It has been obliged tosell its fish to the merchants who are the only ones possessing the facilitiesand knowtledge necessary to exploit the foreign market. Fishermen continue tosell the bulk of their catch to merchants who can siupply credit for the purchaseof outboard motors and nets, go more frequently int:o villages to buy and mayat times of.fer better prices. M1hile the cooperative has 10 taotorboats tofacilitate transport, fishermen have to rely principally on t:heir own trans-port for deliveries of fish to the cooperative.

238. The priLncipal problem of the fishing industry is the infestationof dried and smoked fish by the larvae of two species of butterfly - Dermestesmaculatus <and Necrobia rufibes. Infestaticn by these larvae begins at thefishing carps. According to an FAO fisheries expert statlgnead in Mopti,they probably account for a 25-40 percent loss in weight.- The loss in

1/ The degree of loss is indicated by the fact that: the ratio of conversionof fresh fish into dried or smoked fish which now obtains in Mali isestimated to be 4.3 to 1 whereas the normal rat:io should be about 3 to 1.

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quality is even greater. By the time the infested fish reach the consumer,they are often virtuaUly reduced to skin andl bones, fit for saaceseasoning(for which they are principally used) but for little else. The resultingloss in quality and weight may diminish the value of production by any-where from MF50 million ($1 miLlon) to pos;sibly as much as MF2,000 million($4 million.).

*9. lv[eans for combating this pest are now available but, have neverbeen effectively applied. Treatment rests on the fact that the larvae arequite susceptible to heat and emerge from the fish wihen exposed to heat. InMopti, for examFple, they emerge from the hot concrete warehollses early inthe morning and, can then be sprayed and killed with an insecticide dcn-toxicto human beings. Some spraying has in fact taken place with donated insec-ticides, but it is not organized on a regular basia.. In the camps, disin-sectizatiCol can be carried out with small solar ovens which have a capacityof 65 kg and can eliminate virtually all the larvae through"heat treatment"in two and a half.' hours. These ovens which can easily be built by localcraftsmen 1'rom wood, plastic sheets, screening and tin cost only NFl2,000each to build. lThe packing of fish at the camps irL disinfected straw mattingcould greatly assist in preventing reinfestation. In practice, how;ever,none of these measures has been applied.

240# T'here is no lack of plans for the development of f:isheries. Whatis lacking is a properly staffed organization which could assunme thenecessary responsibility for carrying out a. plan. Fishing is one of theresponsibilities of the Government's Water and Forestry Service which ischarged also with the protection of wild life and f'orest reserves and theoperation of the Bamako zoo. Apart from an annual personnel budget ofMFll5 million, it has only about NF20 million ($40.000) in operating funds.IWith respeet to fisheries, its principal activities consist of licensingfishing and fishing-boats and of settling disputes over fishing rights.In Mopti, iLt imintains a small Fisheries Section staffed by two Maliansassisted by an FAO expert and responsible, among o-bher things, for theoperation of a small fisheries biology laboratory. Its work is handicappednot only by lcack of staff and direction, buLt also by confusion over theownership of the building in Mopti wJhich houses the cooperative, a smallrepair installation for outboard motors ancd an inoperative cannery and isalso expected to house the new ice plant.

242. If HMali is to meet the increasingly stiff competition it is likelyto encounter as the result of the development of marine fishing in the coastalcountries, it will have to mount a sericus effort to inprove the qualityand lower the cost of smoked and dried fish. Such an effort will have toconcentrate on the following objectives:

(a) Disinsectization of fish - This involves organizing (i) theconstruction of•solar ovens and their dissemination to the fishing campsand (i;) the regular spraying of warehouses in Mopti. On the assumptionthat each oven c.an treat as a minimum two batches or 130 kgs of fish perday and that -breatment would take place 251) days per year, about 370 ovens

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would eventuially be needed at a total cost of i 4,44h0,00. The first stepwould be to initiate a testing progran in a number of fishing carmps. Shouldthe ovens prove a success, their installation could later be complementedby measures to encourage fishermen in the camps to pack their fishing withmaterial impregnated w7ith insecticide.

(b) Expansion and supervision of cooperatives - Experience withthe Mopti cooperative, which is reasonably well run, has a good accountingsystem and makes a small profit, shows that there is a promising fieldfor cooperative action. A fisheries plan wcrked out by the 'Bureau d'Etudesof the (theen) Ntnistry of Development envisaLged the organization of threeCooperative Unions at (i) Mopti, (ii) Gao and Dire, and (iii) Segou. TheseUnions were to do the marketing, keep accouLts and provide fishing suppliesfor the lower-level "coop4ratives de cerole" each of hi;ch would maintain apaid agent in the "bases primaires" located in the fishing canps. Thecooperatives could gradually assume the function of supplying fishermen withsolar ovens or the materials for their construction, fishing nets, outboardmotors and spares, etc. It would be necessary, of course, to train coopera-tive staff, to supervise their activities anid to supply them with credit.Any program to expand cooperatives would have to be carefully phased inaccordance witih cumulative experience. A f.irst step in this program mightbe to improve the organization and expand the scope of the eAistin cooperativein Mopti.

(c) Provision of a proper extens:ion service - A phased programto establish such. a service appears to be essential. The Plan alluded toabove sugge.sted that eventually 37 trained :V/extension workers be madeavailable fbr wo-rk in the fishing camps. Th.ey would advise fishermen onfish proceessing, supervise the disinsectization program and assist insupervising the activities of cooperatives.

(d) Provision of credit through cooperatives - A small revolvingcredit funL should suffice. Its administration might be entrusted to SCAERprovided the latter were properly reorganized and staffed. Credit could bemade available for the purchase of' outboard motors, materials for solarovens, nets, and other fishing equipment.

(e) Epansion of the market for fresh anid canned lish - The firststeps toward the development of a market for fresh fish have already beentaken and would result in the marketing of 210-260 PE! per year. A smallcanning facility capable of turning out 3 ,COO 200-gram cans of fish alreadyexists and requires only operating capital and a market to start functioning.The cost ol canning and transport has been estimated at 1NU60-70 per can, andit is believed that the product could be retailed .in Bamako at a price ofMF100-110. Thle possibility of producing a superior t3pe of smoked fish forthe luxury markcet should also be explored. The FAO expert in Mopti has

_ A fisherie's school (Ecole Artisanale de Peche) at Mopti has been proposedfor this purpose but methods of training cheaper than those entailed by aformal institution might be devised.

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produced a simulated "smoked salmon" of excellent quality which could bemarketed at M700 per kg. and perhaps be exaorted in limited quantities.

242. It iE; important that some organization within the Government begiven the definite responsibility for drawitng up and carrying out a projectalong the lines indicated above. The cost of such a project should be keptmodest for the fishing industry cannot support elaborate services. Theprincipal component of the cost would be thea recurring expenditures forthe governnent services to be provided and for a small revolving creditfund. Whil.e these expenditures would not be large, they may well be greaterthan the Government can afford in its straitened financial circumstances.Some external financing would probably be needed for 8OmSetirm until thebenefits of the piroject are realized and the Goverrment's oWmI revenues willaccordingly be favorably affected. Some foreign teicbnical assistance isalso likely to be needed in drawing up the project and carryiing it out.