Workshop on “Rethinking EU’s in the Asia Paciﬁc” · 2019. 12. 23. · the words of the new...

Workshop on “Rethinking EU’s Engagement in the Asia‐Pacific”

20‐21 April 2015 Singapore

Jointly organised by

Workshop on “Rethinking EU’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific”

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Workshop on “Rethinking EU’s

Engagement in the Asia-Pacific”

Workshop Report

20-21 April 2015 Singapore

Jointly organised by


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Contents Report 3 Conference programme 33 List of Participants 35


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Background and Overview of Workshop

Above: Group photo of workshop participants On 20-21 April 2015, the EU Centre in Singapore and Centre d'excellence sur l'Union européenne: CEUE/EUCE Montreal co-organised the workshop “Rethinking EU’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific - Challenges to EU’s Foreign Policy and Diplomacy”. Over the past two decades, the economic relationship between the European Union and the Asia-Pacific region has intensified because of the region’s economic dynamism. In 2011-2012, the EU also tried to boost its security engagement with its own “pivot” to Asia. With the Lisbon Treaty coming into force in 2009, it was hoped that the EU would have a much more coherent and cohesive foreign policy not only towards its immediate neighbourhood, but also in all its relations with the outside world. The Asia-Pacific is an important theatre for both economic and security reasons. The presence of the US as a pacific power in this region, and the rise of China meant that this region will be the core in determining the future world order. US relations with China, and the competition for influence in the Asia Pacific region has also intensified. The EU

to be taken seriously as an actor in the Asia Pacific needs to be more effective, in the words of the new Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, “in bringing the tools of external action together”. This workshop was an attempt to rethink the EU’s engagement with Asia-Pacific in the light of the political crisis in Ukraine, and its diminished stature and image as a successful regional entity and economic power as a result of the sovereign debt crisis. The workshop was divided into three sessions. The first session surveyed the EU’s current engagement with the Asia-Pacific by taking a comprehensive look into the EU’s trade policy and pursuit of bilateral FTAs, its public diplomacy foray into the region through its various outreach, research and education programmes and attempts to strengthen cooperation with Asia-Pacific partners in the areas of soft security. The aim of this session is to evaluate and debate how coherent and effective the EU has been in its engagement with the Asia-Pacific thus far, and what are some of the policies that have been successful in serving the EU’s interest and foreign policy objectives. The perceptions of and responses from Asia-Pacific partners to the EU presence would be analysed in order to gauge the strength and success of EU’s engagement. The second session examined the strategic partnerships that the EU has developed with major players and if and how they may have translated to common policies that have mattered for the Asia-Pacific region. The questions that were dealt with include how far do the EU’s priorities and interests coincide or conflict with the other key players in the Asia-Pacific such

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as China, Japan, and the US? How should the EU position itself vis-à-vis these powers. What about the middle powers in the region – Australia, Canada and South Korea? Should and how can the EU work with like-minded partners in providing regional public goods and promote good regional governance? Or should the EU focus only on the pursuit of its own material interests in the Asia-Pacific? The last session aimed to reflect upon the discussions of the first two sessions and debate, survey the global trends, the changing external environment that the EU faces in its own backyard, the internal discord within the EU and also the changes taking place in the Asia-Pacific in order to answer the key question of this workshop – does the EU need to rethink its strategy towards the Asia-Pacific. What should be the EU’s new priorities and interests, and what kind of new instruments and capabilities does the EU need in order to be a key player in the region and what should the EU do to pursue its growing interests in the region? Session 1: Surveying the EU’s Current Engagement with Asia-Pacific Dr Frédéric Mérand (Director, Centre for International Studies, University of Montreal) Dr Mérand’s presentation gave the audience an overview of the development of EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Dr Mérand highlighted the main elements that are worth watching in the future trajectory of EU’s foreign policy. He suggested that a refocus on security matters on the part of the EU is inevitable after living in a relatively benign geostrategic environment for some twenty

years. Fortunately, Dr Mérand noted that the EU has devised new tools to cope with security problems better in the past decades. Nevertheless, the EU faces new, different security challenges in its immediate neighbourhood where the EU struggles to speak in one voice and to translate the CFSP into action. The EU’s main challenge is that its security footprint is negligible vis-a-vis those of other global actors. Dr Mérand then explained that this conundrum is due to the peculiar institutional setup and the politics of EU member states. According to Dr Mérand, the EU’s external policy is in a double bind. Internally, the EU is split between the well-functioning centralised trade policy that strengthens the perception that the EU is increasingly a unitary actor and a less centralised foreign policy that, despite the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), remains under the tight control of EU member states. Externally, the EU’s economic interdependence with Asia is not matched by its security engagement in the region, while the exact opposite is true in Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. For these two reasons, the EU finds it difficult to foster coherent smart power strategy that combines economic, diplomatic and military resources to exert global influence.

Above: Participants at the workshop


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Dr Mérand further described the EU to be a “strange animal” on the ground that that there is more literature on what the EU is than on what the EU does for a long time. Dr Mérand traced the history of strategic narratives that preceded the “smart power” ideology in Europe. In the 1970s, inter-regionalism was a “big thing” and the EU encouraged the rest of the world to emulate their approach of integration. In the 1980s, the concept of “civilian power” was evoked more frequently and focused on the EU’s economic affluence. In the 1990s and 2000s, the “normative power narrative” suggested that the EU could wield influence by being who it was and by respecting, among other things, human rights. Dr Mérand then elaborated on what constitutes smart power. The smart power concept was developed by Joseph Nye to describe an effective combination of soft and hard power. The EU officials like to use the notion of “smart power”. In a speech delivered in Oxford University, then EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn used smart power explicitly in the title of his presentation in appreciation of its unique attractiveness as, in the EU context, smart power represents a composite of trade policy, development planning, enlargement policy, CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, the EU fails to live up to this ambition of being a smart power. Dr Mérand asserted that the EU is good at dealing with “quiet”, friendly middle powers (e.g., Canada), international organisations (e.g., the UN) and challenges such as climate change and terrorism, but inept in dealing with two categories of actors – emerging powers and traditional powers like Russia. In other words, it is not easy for the EU to live in a Westphalian world not least because the EU is not a

traditional Westphalian actor in the first place. In that regard, the CFSP is quite unique given some criticism that it is difficult to speak of common foreign and security policy. However, on the one hand, the regional concentration of power is probably essential if Europe wants to keep some of its influence as in the next decades EU’s share of the world’s economic and military resources will go down from 25 per cent to 5 per cent. On the other hand, the EU is not entirely recognised as a legitimate interlocutor by the outside world. According to Rebecca Adler-Nissen, a professor at University of Copenhagen, the paramount feature of CFSP, despite its symbolic contribution to the world, is that the EU unsettles nation-state diplomacy and changes the ways in which European countries perceive themselves. The reason why Dr Mérand reiterated this point was that he recognises that there is a tendency to judge the EU’s action against the yardstick of nation states, especially former imperial nations such as France and United Kingdom (UK) in the colonial era. To truly comprehend what the EU is doing, one must get rid of such notion that the EU should behave like France or the UK. But at the same time it is hard not to think in those terms precisely because in many aspects the world is still make up of nation-states working in that way. With respect to the future of the CFSP, Dr Mérand raised two points. The first point is that while geography leads the EU to focus more on its immediate neighbour-hood, economic inter-dependence leads it to somewhere else in the world. The EU has passed through three geostrategic configurations since 1945. The first was the Cold War which to some degree helped the creation of the EU. The second was the relatively peaceful period after


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the Cold War when the EU enlarged to cover almost the entire European continent. Now, over the past few years, the EU is strikingly surrounded by hotspots and a circle of real violence, Islamic style conflicts and civil wars for instance. At this point in time, EU’s hard power is deployed mainly in Africa, the Middle East and regions bordering Russia where economic interdependence is largely absent and where the EU model is rejected. The exact opposite can be found in the economically interdependent Asia, which is the destination of 21 per cent of EU’s exports and the source of 28 per cent of EU’s imports. In addition, unlike African countries, many Asian countries have either initiated free trade talks or concluded agreements with the EU. Clearly, there is a noticeable imbalance between EU’s hard power in its immediate neighbourhood and soft power engage-ment with the rest of the world. Admittedly, geography does force the EU to focus on regions with limited economic opportunities. The second point Dr Mérand highlighted was that politics remains a great challenge for the EU. Since the 1990s, it was believed by many that the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the double-hatted Vice President of the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy position served as an appropriate institutional fix. However, former imperial powers and smaller countries alike have drastically different world outlooks and do not think about the rest of the world in identical terms. One case in point is the military operation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Given the unanimity requirement of CFSP and diverging strategic priorities of EU member states in the region, the EU ended up agreeing on human rights issues only. Bearing this case

in mind, Dr Mérand found it remarkable that EU member states, going beyond the mere lowest common denominator, managed to reach consensus to sanction Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis despite widespread criticism of EU’s decision-making inflexibility. However, the declining military budget in Europe remains an impediment for the EU to play a greater security role. Accordingly, some have argued that the EU should focus on civilian power, where the EU has comparative advantage, and leave security issues to others. But the Russia case shows the limits of soft power without hard power. Nevertheless, in the security sphere, some member states want take the lead and that is why the EU cannot always come across as a coherent, unitary actor. Dr Mérand concluded his presentation by listing a few questions, such as whether the EU is an important actor and what the levers of the EU’s influence are in the Asia Pacific and what do the EU’s competitors do in the region. Dr Michael Reiterer (Principal Advisor, Asia and Pacific Department, EEAS) Dr Reiterer’s presentation was entitled “China rising, US pivot to Asia, ASEAN 2015, and East Asia Summit: Does the EU matter in the Asian century? In response to Dr Mérand’s observation that the EU foreign policy is tightly controlled by nation states, Dr Reiterer first reminded the audience that it is the European countries that form the EU and thus it is hardly surprising if they do dominate the EU foreign policy agenda. EU foreign policy has to be conducted on the principle of unanimity, unlike most other policy fields. Dr Reiterer then questioned the narrative of “pivot”. Some may argue that the pivot is just symbolic while others


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perceive it as containment policy. EU’s engagement is based on economics and trade as the EU is the largest trading and investment partner for almost each and every country in the Asia Pacific. Any uncontrolled crisis or conflict in Asia would have systemic global effect and profound repercussions on the EU. Therefore it is in the interest of the EU to ensure that the Asia Pacific proceed firmly on the path of economic development and democratisation. The EU thus also has a stake in the security of Asia, and that’s why four out of EU’s ten strategic partners are found in the region. Contrary to popular perception that the EU is largely irrelevant in Asia, Dr Reiterer noted that in fact there have been calls from Asian countries for a more active EU in Asian affairs, especially in areas like rule of law in the context of maritime disputes. The EU has neither major power agenda nor territorial claims in Asia, thus no one suspect that the EU seeks dominance in the region. In addition, Dr Reiterer reminded that European powers had been historically very active in Asia for centuries. Therefore, adjusting the EU’s policies rather than reinventing the wheel is warranted. Although the EU is challenged in its neighbourhood, Dr Reiterer defended the EU’s management of the Ukraine crisis. The EU even succeeded in incentivising Asian states such as Japan to be on board its sanctions against Russia. Japan accepted to pay a price as Japan is trying very hard to improve their relations with Russia in view of a possible settlement of the Northern Territories/Kurile Islands. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe was one of the few leaders who attended the Sochi Winter Olympic opening ceremony. Many other Asian countries were also supportive of EU’s sanctions (though

perhaps in a disguised manner), as they are fully aware that the behaviour of Russia in Ukraine should not be the norm of international relations in Asia. Rule of law and respect for international law is the message that many if not all Asian countries would like to see. Dr Reiterer then touched on EU’s free trade agreements (FTAs) in Asia. The EU has finalised agreements with Korea and Singapore and is negotiating with Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan and India. Given the multitude of bilateral, regional and inter-regional trade accords or negotiations there is the challenge for the EU, as a champion of multilateralism, to help ensure that the “spaghetti bowl” problem will not evolve into something too difficult to digest. The parallel negotiations of trade and political framework agreements signal that the EU is not satisfied to play just an economic role but wants to incorporate political and security dimensions into its relationships with Asian countries. Notably, Korea is the only country in the world that has concluded all three major agreements – Framework Agreement (2010), Free Trade Agreement (2011) and Agreement on Crisis Management Operations (2014) – with the EU. The promising progress in relations with Korea in all three areas has triggered much interest in the region and it is one of the reasons that Japan seeks to follow suit. China is also keen to conclude an investment agreement with the EU as soon as possible. The Agreement on Crisis Management Operations that the EU is negotiating with Japan is clearly a political, not an economic, deal. There has been strong interest not least because of the success of the Operation ATALANTA off the coast of Somalia. Piracy has been reduced drastically and many Asian countries also benefitted from increased security in this crucial shipping route. The success shows


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that the EU is able to combine soft and hard power into a “smart power” strategy if necessary. There is also a confidence- building element in the operation since the EU succeeds in getting the Chinese and Japanese navies to jointly participate in this operation. Another area that the EU is involved in Asia is development aid. The EU is the largest development aid donor in the world. Despite the decrease in overall expenditure and the austerity measures, the EU’s development aid to Asia increased by twenty per cent, reflecting the strong commitment of the EU to the region. Dr Reiterer mentioned that in order to achieve coherence in its foreign policy, EU member states meet weekly in Brussels to discuss outstanding issues of the Asia Pacific under the chairmanship of the EEAS. This included common discussion with member states on security and maritime issues in Asia. This work contributes to the goal of a more coherent and cohesive EU policy towards Asia. These issues are also discussed at the ambassadorial level at the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Contrary to the public perception that the EU is just a paper tiger there are many examples of EU engagement and those of its member states especially in the area of non-traditional security. The often indirect working method of the EU through international or UN organisations contributes to this misperception. The successful operations in Aceh with ASEAN and more recently in Mindanao were some examples of EU engagement beyond trade. The EU also took up the invitation by Korea to engage in Northeast Asia. President Park invited the EU with other regional players to participate in the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation

Initiative (NAPCI), thanks to EU’s experiences and know-how in overcoming the legacy of the past. Looking ahead, Dr Reiterer asserted that it is necessary to reinvigorate the usual summits that link the EU with its strategic partners. Non-proliferation is not only a major concern for Asia, but also for the international community. If the EU manages to strike a deal with Iran, this expertise could prove helpful in negotiating with North Korea. The upcoming summits with Japan, China and Korea can facilitate the engagement and familiarisation of the new leaderships in both Asia and the EU. With respect to South China Sea issues, the EU insists on upholding the rule of law and has organised seminars in Indonesia and Malaysia. Dr Reiterer also reminded the audience that the EU is a signatory of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), accession to which is the prerequisite of the participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS). The EU’s membership in the TAC grants the EU the required rights and legitimacy to offer assistance in the South China Sea disputes. With respect to boosting inter-regional cooperation, the EU is in the midst of preparing a Communication on ASEAN which will be published soon. It actively supports ASEAN’s efforts in building the ASEAN Economic Community 2015 through a legal approach, and is the biggest financial contributor to the ASEAN Secretariat. In particular, the EU wants to work closely with ASEAN on connectivity because it will facilitate people-to-people exchange on the one hand and open up new markets for entrepreneurs on the other hand. Besides participating in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Europe Meeting


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(ASEM), boosting inter-regional ties with ASEAN, the EU is interested in joining the EAS. The reason is not that all the others are at the table but the idea that the EAS should complement the ARF on the level of head of government – a natural move for an active ARF member. It is one of the tasks of the EU to safeguard the multilateral trading system and the WTO and to work towards mitigating the damage that inter-, intra-regional and bilateral trade agreements could have on the multilateral rules based system. Along these lines it would be worthwhile to explore how mega trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) such can be multi-lateralised. On EU-US cooperation, Dr Reiterer mentioned the US-EU Joint Statement on the Asia-Pacific Region in 2012, which is an open invitation to Asian countries to strengthen cooperation with the EU and US. The value-added aspect of the EU-US cooperation in Asia is its complementarity: the EU is engaged in non-traditional security and governance issues and not trying to put more boots on the ground; instead it strives to engage Asia through soft/smart power strategy in non-traditional security areas. Dr Reiterer also pointed out the challenge to the international liberal order, international law and Bretton Woods system (not least in the launch of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [AIIB]) that the EU has to take up. In order to increase influence and visibility the EU needs to leverage better both the EU’s and its member states’ internal trade and development aid polices. The EU’s economic strength remains the foundation

for foreign policy. Public diplomacy campaign in Asia is under preparation and it will be the tasks of the EU Delegations in the countries to adapt the messages for the respective audiences. He ended his presentation by underlining that the EU does have soft power as exemplified in its social, cultural and cultural attractiveness which gives strength to the EU’s presence in Asia which is strong, multi-dimensional and multi-layered. During the discussion, Prof Park asked if the perceived mega-FTA’s threat to multilateralism is the intended con-sequence or a by-product of EU’s (and US’s) trade policy. Dr Reiterer responded by first recalling that for a long time the EU did not pursue bilateral trade agreements in Asia but concentrated fully on the multilateral track of the WTO. But with the stalling of the WTO Doha Development Agenda the EU had no choice but to change its policy to embrace bilateral FTAs like everyone else. Touching on the factors that hindered the ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations, Dr Reiterer mentioned the diversities in economic development among ASEAN states and the different levels of institutionalisation. But Dr Reiterer reassured the audience that the region-to-region FTA remains on EU’s agenda as agreed with ASEAN in the Joint Action Plan. Dr Lai suggested that the EU should have a differentiated public and cultural diplomacy towards different Asian countries in light of the fact that Asia is not a homogenous entity. Dr Reiterer agreed and, added that messaging has to be targeted to individual countries. Dr Duke followed up and noted that, apart from the more tailored, country specific public diplomacy activities; the EU is also going to have more general themed,


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character building public diplomacy engagement as the rearrangement in the European Commission to form the Europe and the World Group will attempt to devise a common message to be communicated around the world. Dr Fitriani asked about the EU’s interests in Southeast Asia beyond trade and economics. Dr Reiterer suggested that EU’s interests in ASEAN is broad based as evidenced by the strengthened engagement in ARF and includes policy areas like human rights, democracy, institution building, intra-regional mobility, connectivity, green economy and climate change. ASEAN reacts positively to the EU’s comprehensive approach and there is genuine demand from the region for greater EU engagement, not least to offer an alternative to China and the US. Dr Mérand added that he believed it may be inappropriate to ask what the EU’s interest in a certain region is as the EU’s interests in the meantime is the collection of the national interests of 28 member states. Dr Hungdah Su (Jean Monnet Chair, National Taiwan University & Director-General, European Union Centre in Taiwan) In his presentation, Dr Su assessed the role that the European Union Centre in Taiwan (EUTW) has played in supporting EU public diplomacy in Taiwan since its establishment in 2009. Dr Su’s presentation was divided into two parts: (1) the history of EUTW through academic perspective and the linkage between soft power and public diplomacy, and (2) a balance sheet of EUTW in term of EU’s public diplomacy. Dr Su presented an academic framework to try and understand the notion of “soft

power”. Dr Su pointed out that, like other concepts in international relations, there is no unified definition of soft power. Dr Su adopted Joseph Nye’s definition that soft power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes you want via attraction instead of coercion or payment. In international politics, the resources that produce soft power are the actor's values, culture, policies and institutions. Therefore, public diplomacy is only feasible when the subject is equipped with a bundle of core values, internal governance and international behaviours that are attractive to the elites and the public in third countries. Hence, he believed that soft power is a kind of innate ability and cannot be cultivated. He affirmed EU’s possession of soft power, not least because the EU is built as a community of values, and hence perceived as a normative power and a leader in promoting universal values. Dr Su then argued that, apart from the possession of soft power (necessary condition), to have a successful public diplomacy requires a solid institution with mandate in the third country in question as partner (sufficient condition). The mandate is contractual and based on mutual respect. By combining the two conditions, a new subject will be created to implement public diplomacy. The new institution must be equipped with regulatory capacity, strong values and, perhaps more importantly, its own cognitive pillar. Dr Su believed that the institution should be able to leverage its soft power to mobilise resources and be a cooperative partner of the polity. At the same time, the institution must be perceived as an independent actor; otherwise, public diplomacy risks being relegated to propaganda.


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Dr Su then traced the history of the EUTW as a tool of EU’s public diplomacy. The EU Centre initiative was launched in the mid-1990s to strengthen the transatlantic relations. In 1995, the US and the EU adopted a New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) which not only consolidated the democracy in Europe but also helped reconstruct the new world order based on their shared core values. Under such circumstances, leaders from the US and the EU decided to build “bridges across the Atlantic. Together, [they] will work with [their] business people, scientists, educators and others to improve communication and to ensure that future generations remain as committed as we are to developing a full and equal partnership.” The EU Centre was presented by the European Commission as a flagship project with the aim of enhancing American universities’ under-standing of the EU. In 1998, 15 EU Centres, 12 in the US and three in Canada were created. After a satisfactory review by the European Commission in 2001, the EU decided to reproduce the EU Centre approach in Asia and Oceania. In 2004, the inaugural EU Centre in Asia, the EUIJ, was established in Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo. After another promising review in 2006, the EU Council adopted regulation No. 1934 and selected seventeen countries and regions, including Taiwan, as partners in building a network of EU Centres. The National Taiwan University (NTU) organised a consortium to respond to the call in 2008 for the establishment of an EU Centre in Taiwan. Dr Su explained the rationale for having a consortium of five universities in that the NTU preferred a national EU Centre over a university Centre given the fact that the EU would create only one EU Centre in

Taiwan. The consortium later enlarged by accepting two more universities’ into its consortium. The EUTW was inaugurated in 2009, and built on the aspiration that it should be independent from the EU, the EU Delegation in Taiwan and even host universities. In terms of regulatory capacity, within a month after the signature of the agreement, the EUTW adopted the statute and convened the steering committee composing seven university presidents, one representative from the EU delegation, one representative from the country of EU's rotating presidency and the Director General of the EUTW. An advisory board was introduced to encourage the participation of scholars, businessmen and diplomats alike. Before the inception of the EUTW, there were already in Taiwan three graduate schools of European studies, two research institutes of European policies, two think tanks with EU focus, one national contact point, the EU-Taiwan Forum and two EU info-centres. Since May 2009, the EUTW has become a solid institution both physically and digitally – webpages, Facebook page, apps were developed to attract the younger generation. The EUTW also served as a coordinator centre for two associations. One is the European Community Studies Association Taiwan (ECSA Taiwan) that is now applying to join the EUSA-AP (European Union Studies Association Asia Pacific) and serves as the bridge between the Taiwanese EU study community and the broader international community. The other one is the Friends of Europe that was launched in mid-April 2015 to bring in other interests such as the business and connect them to the academia.


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Dr Su then highlighted some key events, for example, the EUTW Forum on EU Policies which is organised every two months with the help of the national library. However, realising that not everyone is interested in policy debates, the Centre established a second national forum, the Taiwan European Culture Forum. Due to the cultural richness of Europe, the Culture Forum has wider coverage including cuisine, fashion, and film-making. Soon the EUTW also stepped up to engage the scientists and engineers, who predominately graduated from American universities and work with international outlook. The EUTW was able to find a niche and jointly organised the national forum on science with national contact point. A national forum on environment and science was inaugurated in mid-April 2015 to attract scientists and engineers and induce them to participate in EU-related activities such as Horizon 2020. The event was successful as natural scientists are keen to establishing contacts with the EU officials who are tasked with scientific cooperation. At the same time, industrialists are willing to sponsor the EU-Taiwan scientific cooperation in areas such as electronics, biology and pharmaceuticals. With respect to teaching, Dr Su suggested that, due to a host of factors including the cohort size, availability of teachers, Taiwan has EU studies programmes in only four universities. The strategic planning for the EUTW is to introduce double-master degree in collaboration with European universities. Agreements with Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II) have been signed and negotiations with Humboldt University and Charles University are underway. To build up research on the EU in Taiwan, the EUTW has launched a book series called the Taiwanese Book Series of European Studies. In addition, the EUTW

organises annual student workshops in May and experts/scholar panels in October/November. Dr Su then moved to EUTW’s international engagement. It was worth noting that a cross-strait EU studies forum in Chinese language, with the host being alternating between mainland China and Taiwan, has been established six years ago. Nevertheless, Dr Su acknowledged that it is difficult and time consuming to coordinate seven universities not least because the EUTW faces challenge in recruiting qualified administrators that are proficient in English in non-English speaking regions like Taiwan. Dr Su concluded his presentation by citing remarks from the EU Ambassador in Taiwan “we, the diplomats, are here to tell you the EU policies and how good the EU is in the world, but EUTW is there to inform the public what the EU really is.” In the discussion, Dr Mérand pointed out that although the Asia-Pacific region is rightly more interested in European culture, but culture is largely national or local and is not something the EU as an institution stands for. Dr Duke wanted to know if there is any case that the public diplomacy efforts of EU member states complicate or compromise those of the EU. Dr Su agreed with Dr Mérand’s observation and further noted that, in Taiwan, the “medium powers” and smaller member states are eager to cooperate with the EUTW to promote their visibility but the “big powers” prefer to practice public diplomacy through their own institutions such as the British Council. Dr Jora commented on the EU’s outreach activities. In the second phase of grants for the EU Centres, the European Commission wanted to see more value for its money and mandated the EU centres to


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dedicate at least forty percent of activities to outreach activities and public diplomacy, to the disappointment of the academics who want to focus more on teaching and research. It was not the case in the third phase and therefore there is a slowdown in organising public diplomacy events. Dr Jora called for more ownership on the side of the EEAS to reverse the trend. Dr Evi Fitriani (Head, International Relations Department, University of Indonesia) Dr Fitriani began her presentation with an overview of EU-ASEAN relations. The EU-ASEAN informal relations dated back to 1972 and the two sides established formal relations in 1977. In 1980 although the EU, then the European Community (EC), signed the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agree-ment, differences in political philosophy, values and practices hindered the progress in real cooperation. It was not until 1990s did the EU renewed its interests in ASEAN, with the adoption of the New Asia Strategy in 1994 and the inauguration of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. However, the 1997 Asian financial crisis dented the EU’s interest in ASEAN and it was only a decade ago when Southeast Asia enjoyed rapid economic development, that the EU again refocused its attention on ASEAN. In 2007, the EU and ASEAN signed the Nuremberg Declaration on an Enhanced EU-ASEAN partnership and this was followed by a two-year negotiation of EU-ASEAN region-to-region free trade agreement (FTA). The negotiations proved difficult and were suspended in 2009. Dr Fitriani suggested that there are two reasons for this failure. The first is because of the great diversities in terms of economic development among ASEAN

member states. Dr Fitriani was also informed by concerned economists that the EU-ASEAN FTA incorporated competition policy, investment and government procurement, trade facilitation and other sensitive items that have plagued the WTO negotiations. ASEAN member states, therefore, found it politically difficult to accept. The second reason is ASEAN’s attention on its own community-building efforts. The goals of building an ASEAN Community and EU-ASEAN FTA were perceived to be incompatible by some Southeast Asian states as the former prioritised regional community building while the latter led the region to somewhere else, thus causing confusion. The abortion of the EU-ASEAN FTA did not invite too much discussion despite the fact that the EU was the third largest trading partner of ASEAN (after China and Japan) and the largest source of investment. Then came the European debt crisis which not only reduced the share of the EU in ASEAN’s international trading portfolio but also convinced Southeast Asian countries that they should focus more on regional issues and regional trading partners. Dr Fitriani highlighted the shift in EU’s FTA strategy as the EU started to negotiate bilateral FTAs with four Southeast Asian countries. The first that the EU invited was Singapore, the most prosperous country in the region with the highest GDP per capita. Despite being the smallest state in ASEAN in terms of territory and population, Singapore is the top trading partner of the EU in the region in both goods and services and many European companies use Singapore as the hub to serve the ASEAN region. The second invited country was Malaysia, the EU’s second largest trading partner in the region. Vietnam and Thailand were also invited by the EU in 2012 and 2013,


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respectively. Indonesia, as the largest economy and the most populous country in the region, was not invited. Nonetheless, the EU-Indonesia relations were strengthened in 2009 after the signature of the EU-Indonesia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Intense contacts have taken place since 2011 to explore the possibility of negotiating a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). The potential FTA was named CEPA to comfort the Indonesians who are sceptical of free trade agreements. However, the negotiation process has been slow and frustrating as EU’s negotiating positions are extremely inflexible without taking the development of Indonesian economy into careful consideration. As a whole, Dr Fitriani suggested that the impact of the shift in EU’s FTA strategy is rather minimal for Indonesia. When it comes to the Indonesian perspective regarding the FTA, Dr Fitriani identified three factors that coloured the perspective. The first is the colonial memory, which reminded the Indonesians of the exploitation of the Europeans and their persistence in pursuing their material gains at the expense of Indonesians. The second factor that shaped the Indonesian view of the EU is Indonesia’s position in the region. Indonesia as the biggest state felt it has a moral obligation to strengthen the ASEAN centrality and unity. Engagement in bilateral FTAs divides ASEAN countries and distracts them from regional community building. The last factor is the economic interests of Indonesia. Dr Fitriani then presented her under-standing of the EU’s motivation to negotiate a FTA with ASEAN. Firstly, ASEAN is a big and lucrative market that has a positive trade balance with the EU.

Secondly, the EU’s competitors such as China have already signed FTAs with Southeast Asian countries. Thirdly, the failure of multilateral trade negotiation induces the EU to initiate FTA with ASEAN. Dr Fitriani went on to elaborate on the pros and cons of the suspension of the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations. On the positive side, Dr Fitriani noted that the suspension of region-to-region FTA eases the EU’s pressure on Indonesia. In its FTA negotiations, the EU has vigorously pursued market penetration through trade liberalisation and intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. They were seen as attempts by the EU to impose its regulatory power on ASEAN countries. The negotiation process, therefore, created immense pressure on Indonesia that was not ready to open its market to the extent that the EU demanded. The Indonesia’s economic development and com-petitiveness cannot match the EU’s in the short term. What complicated the matter further were the stringent parliamentary scrutiny of foreign agreement and the democratic processes that constrained the Indonesian government’s negotiation position. Dr Fitriani then argued that the termination of EU-ASEAN region-to-region FTA was a blessing in disguise for Indonesia. On the negative side, the termination of EU-ASEAN FTA negotiation also challenges the ASEAN Economic Community and Indonesia’s own national interests for two reasons. Indonesia views the EU’s approach in choosing individual FTA partners as resembling the “divide-and-rule” strategy that was used to conquer the region in the colonial era, and deepened the economic development gap across ASEAN countries and in turn cause problems for the AEC project and regional integration in general. Indonesia also


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feared that the bilateral EU FTAs with its neighbours strengthened its regional competitors at the expense of Indonesia. In conclusion, Dr Fitriani noted that EU-ASEAN economic relations are bound to be difficult. Indonesian perspectives regarding the shift in the EU’s FTA strategy are by and large ambiguous as it has both positive and negative consequences for Indonesia. During the discussion, Prof Chen argued that the EU faces a choice in Southeast Asia – either to promote ASEAN regional integration or to push for a high standard FTA which ASEAN might not be ready for. Dr He Baogang questioned why region-to-region FTA is more prone to failure than bilateral FTAs with individual countries. Dr Duke invited Dr Fitriani to confirm that, from the Indonesian perspective, the EU is nothing more than trade. Dr Fitriani reiterated that trade is indeed of paramount importance and it is EU’s responsibility to convince the region that the EU has other interests beyond economics. Mr Ji commented that the proposed EU-ASEAN FTA would benefit ASEAN in two ways. On the one hand, it helps ASEAN to make up the missing stage of regional integration, the custom union. On the other hand, the region-to-region FTA would strengthen ASEAN cohesiveness in the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) negotiations. Dr Fitriani said it may not necessarily be the case. For her, not every step of integration including custom union has to be accomplished in a fixed order. In addition, RCEP is conceptualised not to preserve ASEAN centrality but to balance against the TPP.

Dr Annmarie Elijah (Associate Director, ANU Centre for European Studies) Dr Elijah postulated that the EU-Australia relations come with historical baggage, predominately due to the historical relationship between Australia and the United Kingdom (UK). The close historical relations were perceived to be threatened by the UK’s likely accession to the EU. Unsurprisingly, the Australian attitudes towards European integration were mixed. On the one hand, the Australian policymakers had no problem in appreciating the merits of European integration – everyone thought it was a good idea and peace and stability in Europe had been secured to everyone’s benefit. On the other hand, the immediate economic and trade impact of the UK’s EU membership on Australia had largely been negative, especially where the common agricultural policy (CAP) was concerned. Therefore, Dr Elijah noted that a “twin approach” to European integration from Australia was adopted. Essentially, Australia’s problems associated with the UK’s EU membership were in time transformed to the broader issues related to the EU itself. Australian policymakers learned it early and in the hard way that Australia will always be outside Europe’s internal dynamics, particularly when it comes to issues such as securing long-term peace and stability between France and Germany, and this lesson stays with the Australian government all the time. After addressing the historical tone of the beginning of the EU/UK-Australia relationship, Dr Elijah showed some figures on the real impact of the UK’s EU membership on Australia. Australian exports to the UK dropped from 40 per cent in total in 1950 to less than five per


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cent by the end of the 1970s. This was a nasty period for the Australian economy and as a result this was translated into a rather negative impression of European integration in Australia. At that time, however, Dr Elijah also noted that the Australian diplomats were fairly inept and grudging about shifting focus from London to Brussels. Dr Elijah then argued that, historically speaking, the nature of European integration and the division of policy authority dictated that the EU’s and Australia’s interests kept conflicting. To Australia’s detriment, the areas where the EU was the most coherent and united, including trade, agriculture and environment, were precisely where the EU and Australia did not see eye to eye. If we could reimagine for a moment about Australia’s relationship with the EU where the EU coming into being in a completely different way focusing on security and foreign policy from the onset, we might see a rather different bilateral relationship between the EU and Australia. As the EU’s external character broadens, so does the bilateral relationship. Australia started off in a fairly direct obsession with the UK’s EU membership and trade policy implications and over time the bilateral relationship has been broadened and achieved interesting development in multiple areas rather other than just focusing on agriculture and trade. Throughout the 1990s, the EU and Australia signed a series of bilateral agreements in areas ranging from industrial cooperation, to science and technology, and to wine and education. Once the relationship broke down into different specific areas of policy coordination, the EU-Australia relationship became much more harmonious. There

had been more frequent meetings and dialogues, and the agenda were no longer confined to agriculture and trade. In addition, annual formal consultations were held between the EU Presidency, the European Commission and the Australian government. In the late 1990s, there was also an attempt to negotiate a treaty level Frame-work Agreement. Dr Elijah described it to be an interesting episode. The initial negotiations went on well but failed in the end because the EU insisted to include the human rights clauses in the treaty while the Australian government believed that human rights clauses and trade should not be connected in international agreements. The treaty-level agreement was therefore downgraded significantly to a narrower and more general Joint Declaration. By the end of 2000s, the EU and Australia announced plans to negotiate a Partnership Framework, focusing on five common practical objectives: foreign policy and security, bilateral and multilateral trade, cooperation in the Asia Pacific, cooperation on environment, energy, fisheries and forestry and cooperation on science, technology, education and the movement of people. The 2008 Partnership Framework was deemed successful. In the words of the former EU Ambassador to Australia, Bruno Julien, with concrete measures “we should be able to get more done; it will be not only more flexible, but more efficient, to have not only ‘blah-blah’, words in a declaration, but common action”. With the continuously improving bilateral relationship, in 2010 a new footing for Australia and the EU – the Treaty Framework Agreement – was announced. The negotiations, commenced one year later, still stalled on the same issue of “linkage” to include human rights clauses


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in all agreements. The problem has now been overcome and the Framework Agreement is initialled and expected to be formally concluded soon. The Framework Agreement also forms the backdrop for the possibility of an EU-Australia free trade agreement which is under active consideration in both Canberra and Brussels. This potential FTA presents both opportunities and challenges. For Australia, Dr Elijah suspected that the danger is that the whole matter of agriculture trade will be back on the table. But at the same time, there is some serious common ground between Australia and the EU to generate really exciting policies. The other aspect both sides will need to discuss is the so-called regulatory coherence issue, which means matching up regulations so that they no longer impede bilateral trade. In the final part of her presentation, Dr Elijah elaborated on the Australian perceptions of the EU. First and foremost, because of the intrinsic peripheral position, Australia persistently fails to grab the attention of policymakers in Brussels. The strategic priorities the EU attaches to the US and China and the sheer complexity of EU internal politics exacerbate Canberra’s concerns. Another disadvantage of Australia is the asymmetry problem – one versus 28. The vexed history now is on a more positive footing. An interesting problem for Australia is that if the EU is a global power, what kind of power is it? Dr Elijah concluded her presentation with cautious optimism by suggesting that although there are clear opportunities for creative policy-making if Australia puts history aside; the “institutional gap” – Australia prefers informal institutions while the EU prefers formal, legalistic ones – may be a stumbling block in the way forward.

In the discussion, Dr Duke asked if the European financial crisis affected the Australian public opinion about the EU. Dr Elijah confirmed that the European crisis did damage EU’s image, from one of an admirable successful bloc to a questionable economic template. Mr Loke asked if the potential UK’s exit from the EU in the near future would affect the Australian attitudes towards the EU given the close relationship between the UK and Australia. Dr Elijah said yes and further argued that it won’t do anything good to Australia if the UK leaves the EU. For example, when the UK joined the EU, a series of bilateral agreements between Australia and the UK were dissolved over time. But the prospect of re-establishing these bilateral ties is uncertain. Session 2: Competition or Collaboration? The EU’s Relations with Other Major Powers in the Asia-Pacific Dr Simon Duke (Professor, European Institute for Public Administration) In his presentation, “EU-US Relations and the Asia-Pacific”, Dr Simon Duke highlighted the EU’s key challenges in the years to come – of which one of the most important issues is balancing its partnership with the US and China, especially in Asia-Pacific. He said that while relations with Asia-Pacific are a key component of the EU’s ongoing strategic discussions, it is still absent from a few major Asian fora, and is not a member of East Asia summit. Competing with China and the US for influence in Asia-Pacific is difficult for the EU, especially in security issues, as the other two have major interests in the


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region, but even aligning preferences with the US is easier said than done. Dr Duke said that while EU-US relations are “irreplaceable” and despite the US being one of the EU’s 10 Strategic Partners, it all means nothing in practical terms because the EU is viewed with decreasing relevance by the US and is rarely mentioned in Washington’s diplomatic circles, aside from discussions about the ongoing TTIP negotiations. Furthermore, the importance of mutual dialogue between the two sides will be severely diminished if TTIP negotiations fail. He added that there is also a lack of understanding on the European side as to what the so-called US pivot to Asia means. Dr Duke argued that historically, the US has for a long time been a Pacific power and has, at least since the end of World War II, been looking toward Asia in policy terms. In security terms, US interest in Asia-Pacific can be seen in its bilateral security agreements with Japan and South Korea, and the deals made with the Philippines, and other countries in Southeast Asia. He said that the US should not be viewed as an impartial actor, especially in issues surrounding security and on territorial disputes – which has led to rise in temperature in the Asia-Pacific today.

Above: Participants at the workshop Thus, in his view the EU can play a more prominent role in the region if it can take

on the role of interlocutor between the US and Asia-Pacific countries and stress normative principles without getting caught between them or damaging relations with its other strategic partners like China. The EU can use its soft power to emphasize rule of law, especially regarding the resolution of territorial disputes. He said that after all, some Asian countries want another choice or alternative to aligning with China or the US in the region. For the EU to succeed it needs to raise its profile by differentiating itself from other major powers in the region. But at the same time it also collaborates with the US in Asia in many respects, and has to decide between adopting a country-targeted strategy or taking a regional approach to engaging the region. The EU is particularly important for the smaller EU member states, and in particular the new member states, which lack “natural approaches” to Asia in their foreign policy. In summary, the main challenge for the EU in the Asia-Pacific is balancing interests of the US, China and its Asia-Pacific partners. Intensified cooperation with ASEAN might also lead the EU to a place at the East Asia Summit. With 2015 being the 40th anniversary of EU-China relations, Dr Duke concluded by saying that it is an occasion to “polish EU foreign policy credentials, including in Washington, via a deeper engagement with China on security and defence, and not just in trade and investment.” During the discussion, Professor Frederic Merand questioned the EU’s “relaxed” attitude towards the US and China in the Asia-Pacific. Dr Duke said that this is because the EU is still re-engaging with China and that both sides are building


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mutual trust, though there are some concerns on the part of the US, with regards to issues such as China’s role on cyber security, and in maritime security and the implications this could have for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Dr Stefan Hell pointed out that the EU’s cookie-cutter approach to the Asia-Pacific countries might be annoying to some. The point was also raised that there is a growing realization that security has to be addressed on the part of the EU if it wants to be seen as a credible partner in global dialogue. Dr Michael Reiterer spoke about “normative baggage” the EU carries, saying it is part of the deal, and comes from Article 21 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which says that the EU has to pursue foreign policy in a certain manner. Using the death penalty as an example, he said this issue has put the EU into conflict with US, China, Indonesia, Japan and Singapore, but as it is one of the EU’s principles, all sides must recognize where the differences are. Dr Duke said in response that the EU does not have a problem with normative representation on paper. The problem, he said, is that the EU often turns a blind eye, citing its relations with Russia and Central Asia, which are not the same as how it deals with ACP countries, lending it being accused of double standards. Professor Chen Zhimin (Jean Monnet Chair and Dean, School of International Studies and Public Affairs, Fudan University) The presentation on “China’s Eurasian Pivot and China-EU Relations” by Professor Chen Zhimin began with a look at China’s pivot to its neighbourhood, in the form of the “One Belt One Road” initiative. This is a framework for

organizing its multinational economic development, comprising the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt, and the Maritime Silk Road on the South China Sea, South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. China’s renewed focus on its neighbours that has taken place since the government came to power in late 2012 is a big shift in the country’s priorities. For example, China organized a major neighbourhood diplomacy conference in October 2013 – the first in its history. Prof Chen called this evidence that China sees its neighbours as crucial to the country’s security, development and prosperity. He then explained the driving forces for the shift in China’s priorities, saying that while the country’s priorities shifted in response to the United States’ pivot to Asia it also reflects the new development agenda in China. A large number of projects under the One Belt One Road initiative include financing connectivity and infrastructure development to encourage growth in the rural and landlocked western parts of the country and to upgrade its coastal economy. Prof Chen sees this as China exercising its comparative advantage – building of infrastructure – the country has the manpower and technical ability to construct ports, high-speed railway lines and airports efficiently and cheaply, and the money to undertake extensive development projects. The latter is reflected in the announcement of the creation of a $40 billion development fund (Silk Road Fund) in November 2014. Prof Chen also discussed the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It is an attempt by China to reform global governance from the regional level. He explained that the Chinese decided to create the AIIB as achieving reform in existing mechanisms


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like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank, known as the “reordering from within” strategy, has been blocked. This forced China to follow a “reordering from outside” strategy, which includes other institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), other plurilateral embedded orders like the Chiang Mai Initiative Multi-lateralization (CMIM) and plurilateral parallel institutions like the New Development Bank (NDB) and the aforementioned AIIB. Prof Chen pointed out that the founding members of AIIB includes 14 of the EU’s 28 members, and despite being announced in October 2014, is already seen by many as a potential rival to the IMF and World Bank, adding that there were complaints from Brussels that, in competing to join the AIIB, western countries had failed to unite against it. However, he said now there is a potential for Europe to use the AIIB to force the US to “change its stubborn policy on maintaining its dominant role in existing international organizations”, as the AIIB is already a world bank, with the participation of African states, Brazil, and others. He added that the UK is also trying to benefit from the establishment of the AIIB as it tries to maintain London’s position as a global financial centre. Prof Chen pointed out that China “is coming to Europe now” and not like in the past when it was the other way around. He highlighted how China is now “pivoting” to the EU as reflected in the various infrastructure development that China is investing in - on land with the trans-Eurasia railroad connecting the city of Chongqing in China and Duisburg in Germany, and at sea, with the building of ports in Greece and Italy and even a rail project to connect Greece and Hungary. The EU’s importance to China is clear with Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s visit to

Brussels in 2014, the first by a Chinese leader. Foreign direct investment by China into Europe has also grown substantially, from $1 billion in 2004-2008, to $3 billion in 2009 and 2010 and to $11 billion in 2011, to $18 billion in 2014. These investments while still small will continue to grow. Prof Chen pointed out that there are fears from the EU that the new transport infrastructure being constructed by China in Central Asia will weaken Europe’s role as a hub with regards to the Middle East and Africa. China’s focus on Eurasia has also raised worries “that the Chinese government has an increased ability to influence what route trade flows between China and the EU”, just as there are concerns that the 16+1 dialogue is dragging the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states to look east. However, he believed that this is an initiative that is helping Eastern European economies shift from its peripheral role in the EU. Geopolitically, he feels that China can do more with the EU than just anti-piracy cooperation and engaging in military dialogue, saying that there more areas for security partnership that can be explored. China’s pivot also means a growing relationship with Russia, though Prof Chen pointed out that this would also help economic development in Europe’s neighbourhood and as a result, providing stability and facilitating the economic development of CEE countries like Greece. In summary, China is shifting from being an order-taker into an order-shaper, which has implications on the development of EU-China relations, chiefly that the Eurasian pivot is bringing Europe and China closer together physically. He said that trilateral US-EU-China relations are “a complicated game”, with the US having a new urgency to speed up its economic


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engagement with China, citing Congress’ recent passing of the TPA. Prof Chen said that One Belt One Road is a long-term project that would transform the geography of the Eurasian continent if it takes off, and is of the opinion that the relationship between China and Europe will be only strengthened because of the growing investment dimension between the two sides. In the discussion that followed, Dr Michael Reiterer pointed out that China was the only country “that has bothered” to publish a policy paper on the EU in time for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Brussels in March 2014, and said that the “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” will transform the relation-ship between the two sides. Prof Reuben Wong said that the idea of China as a norm shaper is rather new and wondered what the absence or weakening of the western-led normative order says about what is left of the EU’s normative power. For Prof He Baogang, China has taken the initiative in its imagining of a new region and said that it is fascinating to him because no one had done so before it, and wondered how Europe would respond to China. Prof Chen said that developing both “belt” and “road” are challenging – on the land route, there is Islamic extremism and instability and the large areas it covers presents infrastructural challenges, while on the water, China is embroiled in numerous maritime disputes and territorial claims. However, he said that China sees itself as addressing needs of international partners and will probably beat the United States in this respect and clarified that One Belt One Road is not about institutions and regulations, but about investment promotion, and as such is compatible with regional institutions.

In response to Dr Farizal Mohd Razalli’s question about how the China-Russia relationship may affect the China-Europe relationship, Prof Chen said that China is in a delicate position in balancing its relations with Russia and the EU, but said that closer China-Russia ties are inevitable because of the sanctions the EU has placed on Russia. He said being close to Russia is a “necessity” for Chinese foreign policy, as both countries are neighbours and share many economic and geopolitical interests. Prof Toshiya Nakamura (Director, Global Media Research Centre, Nagoya University) In the presentation “The EU and Japan – Why Relations Between the Two Never Quite Took Off”, Prof Nakamura outlined the recent advance of security relations between the two. He noted that EU-Japan cooperation is mostly characterized in terms of trade and investment, and cooperation in security is still a work in progress. He called EU-Japan security relations “the missing link” in the US-EU-Japan partnership, especially since the proposed lifting of EU arms embargo on China raised concerns from the US and Japan as it has a direct impact on security in Asia. Prof Nakamura said that EU-Japan cooperation was weak until the 1990’s because of the frequent trade frictions in the 1970s – 1980s. After the end of the Cold War, both parties began to discuss security cooperation, but they had different security concerns – the core of Japan’s security policy was its alliance with the US (with whom it also has a trilateral dialogue with Australia and another with India). He explained that the Europe’s lack of engagement with Japan during the Cold War was probably because of the US


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presence. However, with the end of the Cold War, Prof Nakamura pointed out that Japan, though far from Europe, was very much involved in European security issues, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s, pointing out that Ms Sadako Ogata, who led the UNHCR, played an active role in solving humanitarian issues in the Balkans during Bosnian war and in the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. He also brought up the former UN special representative in the Balkans, Mr Yasushi Akashi, who was stationed in Zagreb to lead UN missions in the region. Prof Nakamura then outlined the development of security relations between the two sides since the 1991 EC-Japan joint declaration in The Hague. He said that in Japan’s view, the EU is both an economic power and a civilian power, so there is a common base and much room for cooperation, but there is a lack of interest on both sides to be security partners. In his opinion, both sides are underestimating each other, precisely because they lack knowledge of each other. He did point out that the statement made at the most recent annual EU-Japan summit, which said that both sides would continue to explore the scope for collaboration in the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions, including the possibility of Japan’s future participation in them, as a positive sign for stronger security cooperation. For Prof Nakamura, he sees the attraction for Japan to cooperate more closely with the EU because of similar values, the economic weight of the EU and its civilian approach to security operations. He pointed out that EU’s share of the global economy stands at 23 per cent, and that it has 28 members and two Security Council members. But he conceded that the EU and the US are more interested in China

because of the latter’s rapid economic growth. He cited a 2007 public opinion survey conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, in which only 3 per cent of European intellectuals felt than Japan was the most important partner for the EU (as opposed to 51 per cent for the US) and that 39 per cent felt that China was the most important future partner. He said that Japan regards Germany as an important partner, though in the last decade, Germany’s actions did not show its closeness as compared to the years before. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Tokyo in March 2015 was her first in seven years. In contrast, she visited China seven times during her time in office. Prof Nakamura said that if Tokyo considers relations with Brussels vital, it must step up its engagement with the EU and attract its interest and balance economic and other policy needs, including security interests. He ended his presentation by highlighting the three challenges brought up by former Japanese Ambassador to the EU Takayuki Kimura. These three challenges that need to be overcome by Japan and EU to improve mutual cooperation are: (1) reconciling the different positions, (2) unpicking the complexity of decision making in the EU, and (3) closing the perceptions gap regarding the importance of each other as partners. Prof Park Sung Hoon (Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University) Prof Park gave an overview of the past 20 years of South Korea’s relations with the EU in his presentation “EU-South Korea Relations Pre and Post-EUSFTA”, beginning with the EU’s Korea Strategic Paper adopted in 1993, and the two concept


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papers on China and Japan published in 1995. He said that EU-Korea relations have been overshadowed by the activities of major regional powers— the US and Japan, and increasingly China. He asked if things have changed in the past 10 years, and if the Korea-FTA, signed in October 2009 and in force since July 2011, has been a trigger for wider changes in the Asia-Pacific? Prof Park said that much has changed in the time since the EU began relations with the Asia-Pacific in the early 90’s. In 1994, the EU published the paper “Towards a New Asia Strategy”, which provided a road map to engage countries in the region. A number of other papers about engaging Asia, in particular with ASEAN, China, etc, followed in subsequent years. In 2001 another policy paper was published that served as an update to the 1994 paper which included Australasia with the other 3 sub-regions (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia), widening the EU’s perspective on this part of the world. Prof Park also noted other papers, in particular the European Security Strategy (2003) and the Global Europe Strategy (2006). The latter in particular led to a shift in EU’s external trade policy. A major part of the Global Europe Strategy touched on Asia, where global economic activity was fast moving forward. The EU was keen thus to pursue a more growth-oriented strategy to the benefit of its member states by placing priority for concluding FTAs with countries in the region. In 2001, the first framework agreement between Korea and EU was signed, and this was replaced by a new one in 2010. The country subsequently became one of the EU’s 10 Strategic Partners (though in the discussion that followed, many

questioned this designation, asking if it actually meant anything in practice). Korea was a priority country for the EU to conclude Free trade agreement (FTA) in EU’s Global Europe Strategy. FTA negotiations with Korea was launched in 2007, concluded in 2009, and came into force in 2011. In 2014, both sides also signed an agreement on participating in crisis management operations. Korea is also actively collaborating with European partners in science and technology, and in international development. Education is also an important area of cooperation, and Prof Park cited the ASEM dual fellowship program headquartered in Seoul, which has been running for 10 years, and the country’s five EU centres. With all these agreements and cooperation spanning wide and varied fields, Prof Park is of the opinion that Korea is enjoying a “unique status” as a partner of the EU. He pointed out that Korea is the only country in the world with which the EU has signed three major cooperation agreements (framework agreement, free trade agreement, and an agreement on participation in crisis management operations), positing that it might be because Korea is an easier partner for the EU, with China too big and politically complex to deal with and Japan too economically complex. Further down the road, Prof Park sees stronger trilateral cooperation in international development, particularly as he believes Korea will be able to contribute its regional expertise in working with South and Southeast Asian countries, while the EU/European states have expertise in working with Latin American countries. He suggested a focus on green growth and technology, technical education and vocational training (a field Korea learned a lot from European


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countries, especially Germany), trade promotion and resource development. He added that Korea would like to play a more active regional security role as it is well positioned to be a mediator between China and Japan, as well as between the developed and less developed countries in the region. Prof Park said security-related cooperation between Korea and the EU should be explored further, given the latter’s renewed focus on security. However, he also cautioned that security matters are quite sensitive for Korea, especially with the country’s security alliance with the US. On North Korea, Prof Park felt that the EU could play a role in encouraging peaceful coexistence with South Korea. Lastly, Prof Park pointed out that, meaningful lessons for Northeast Asian reconciliation could be drawn from European integration and the leadership of Germany and France in this process, and from other reconciliation processes in Europe, such as the German–Polish reconciliation. During the discussion, Prof Michael Reiterer reiterated that the EU’s strategy of linking economic and political agreements, as was the case with Korea, has been successful. He said that the two agreements with Korea have provided a sound basis for enlarging cooperation between the two, giving examples of regular meetings and dialogues being held between both sides (about 50 covering political issues alone). He also suggested such an approach could have a similar effect with regards to Japan to “fill a void which has been created by the lapsing of the EU-Japan cooperation agreement”. He proposed that Japan could have pursued closer cooperation in security matters with the EU since the EU is not a military power and would have not contravened the Japanese Constitution on the role of

Self Defence forces. Mr Jason Ji questioned how symmetric Korea’s relationship with the EU has been, calling it a “sovereignty squeeze” because of the different bargaining powers of the EU and Korea in the negotiation of the FTA. He asked if Korea was more willing to accept less from the EU because of strategic considerations or if there was something specific out of the deal that was important for Korea. Prof Park did not quite agreed with the view and said the Korea-EU FTA has improved the relationship between the two sides and that it has not been an asymmetric relationship. He added that the political agreement was signal to policymakers on both sides to go further beyond trade relations, citing cyber security as an area where there has been much progress in cooperation, precisely because of increased confidence between the two partners. Responding to the remark that Korea has suffered a trade deficit with the EU in the past 3 years, after the EU-Korea FTA came into force, Prof Park said that this could be because of the Eurozone debt crisis that led to business cycle slowdown. Prof Park also responded to a question about the role of civil society with respect to Korea’s FTA negotiations because there were a lot of protests in Europe during TTIP negotiations, saying that the role of civil society was relatively muted because the energy of the protesters was used up in their protests against the Korea-U.S. FTA agreements, which predates the Korea-EU FTA.


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Session 3: Retreat, More of the Same, or Restrategise? Rethinking the EU’s Interests and Priorities in the Asia-Pacific Dr Antoine Rayroux (Coordinator, EU Centre of Excellence, University of Montreal-McGill University) Does the EU really have the soft power it believes it possesses? The EU might have a large presence in Asia-Pacific, but this does not always translate into real influence. If smart/soft power is important for the EU, then the EU must learn to manage its reputation. Dr Antoine Rayroux raised these issues in his presentation “A Theoretical Discussion on Perceptions and Reputation – What Can the EU Do to Enhance its Reputation in the Asia-Pacific?”, which took a closer look at the EU’s reputation in the world, and provided reasons for why it should care. Dr. Rayroux began by defining reputation, seeing it as a shared established/collective image/belief – essentially a social construction rather that a psychological construction. It is a relation as opposed to a property, based on a set of social signals and how they are collectively received. Thus, when it comes to EU diplomacy abroad, it is not about sending signals but also about how they are interpreted, which varies especially with context.

Above: Presentations on 2nd Day of Workshop

Dr Rayroux said if indeed the EU sees its reputation as something that matters, it has to address: (1) multiple audiences – He recounted a study he conducted among about 200 political insiders in the DC beltway, but also the general public, saying that the EU should not talk the same way to different audiences; (2) different issues – is the EU an economic or trade actor or is it something more? He gave the example that the EU is viewed as a development actor by Ethiopia, but not by North America; and (3) the confusion over EU/Europe and its member states – the EU is not the same as Europe, yet it is in the mind of the general public. The EU is seen as, and wants to be more than a collection of institutions, and as such must navigate this dichotomy in its public diplomacy, as both “big” and “small” EU member states use the EU to amplify or direct their interests, but not in the same way. He said that the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty has enabled the EU delegation to play a greater role not only through coordinating foreign policy and the projection of the EU abroad, but also by facilitating information sharing and contributing to socialization dynamics. However, Dr Rayroux pointed out that stereotyping of practices will remain a problem – even if the EU’s practices have changed, its reputation will stay the same, at least for a while. Whether it likes it or not, in many parts of the world, the EU has been perceived to be in decline over the past few years, which might create some discrepancy between the actual situation in Europe, and how it is interpreted abroad. He used the example of Canada, which is still widely regarded as a “good international citizen” because of positions on multilateralism, human rights, even though its foreign policy has changed radically in the past 10 years.


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In the discussion, Dr Hell concurred that there is an inherent ambiguity between the national and EU levels of diplomacy, but instead of seeing it as a problem, there is a potentially rich story that lies in this overlap. With the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS now comprises staff seconded from member states. How the diplomats from the Commission and from the national ministries interact and influence one another in the EEAS and whether this result in “uploading” national preferences or “downloading” of European pre-ferences would be interesting to observe. The reputation of the EU may lie in its ability to manage this grey area. Dr Silviu Jora (General Manager, EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation) Dr Silvia Jora’s presentation on “The Challenges of EU ‘Business Diplomacy’ in Asia” covered the EU’s soft power arsenal, focusing on business diplomacy, a concept that is still relatively new, and how this is being applied in the EU’s strategy to engage Asia. He said that the EU’s involvement in promoting business activities in the context of the Lisbon Treaty is justified, but at the moment, only a tiny fraction of EU industrial actors are involved in international activity beyond the single market, so there is a huge potential for growth in this area. The EU is currently engaged in a lot of business activity in Asia that goes beyond market access and trade diplomacy, such as external business support, business and FDI promotion, where member states had exclusive competency. In particular, Dr Jora highlighted the increasing number of pan-European corporate actors, like Airbus, which now functions more like a European company, rather than a French or German one. He also provided some examples of promotion of “European

interests” in the business arena, eg, Euro-chambers representing national chambers of commerce and responsible for driving European business support in Asia; Business Europe, a lobby group of 33 European countries, and the European Business Organizations (EBO) Worldwide Network, which is 80 per cent represented by Euro-chambers in the Asia-Pacific. However, EU-driven business diplomacy focuses on much smaller players – it is driven by the need to provide internationalization support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which he calls “the new mantra” of EU diplomacy. The EU is now looking at SMEs to drive growth because of the fact that while the EU is a major exporter and a large FDI provider, 90 per cent of its economy is made up of SMEs. However, only 30 per cent of SMEs are involved in international activities beyond the single market. One such initiative Dr Jora focused on is the EU’s Missions for Growth, led by industry players and the Commissioner for DG Industry and Entrepreneurship Antonio Tajani, several of which are operating in Asia, including in Thailand, Myanmar, China, Vietnam and South Korea. These missions comprise political meetings, but include a business dimension with business promotion activities in the form of groups of companies (60-100 at a time, representing about 20 member states, 35 to 40 per cent of which are SMEs), accompanying the Commissioner on visits. The missions also promote Europe as a destination for business. Though it has the support from the EEAS—then Foreign Policy High Representative Catherine Ashton accompanied the mission on its visit to Myanmar and China—support from member states still remains to be seen.


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Dr Jora also mentioned the EU Gateway Programme and executive training programmes in Japan and Korea, and the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Coo-peration (“the epitome of EU business diplomacy”), as one of the long-running EU business diplomacy projects, having been established 28 years ago. Other business diplomacy initiatives include the SME Centre in China, Europe-Asean Business Centre in Thailand, and others. He also called the Integrated Asia Platform initiative, a platform for cooperation and coordination for the scattered business support activities in the region “the most relevant for the projection of EU actorness in Asia, and proof that Asia is being taken seriously by the EU”. In conclusion, Dr Jora said that because growth is the EU’s primary obsession, it is taking Asia and its economic potential seriously. He suggests that in trying to attract inward FDI promotion into Europe, because many EU member states do not have the capability to market themselves, particularly in distant markets like in Asia, Europe should therefore be promoted as a single FDI destination. This is possible in small, gradual steps – procedures must first be made simpler and the positions of member states must be streamlined, saying that Europe has a bigger chance of attracting FDI from Asia if it is seen as a single and cohesive destination. Mr Xavier Nuttin (EU Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS) Mr Xavier Nuttin spoke about the strength of parliaments, their role and their importance for democratic systems in his speech “Making Parliamentary Diplomacy Work”. He began by extoling the virtues of parliamentary diplomacy, reiterating that the European parliament is the only institution that is democratically elected

by the citizens. While not being involved in direct negotiations and taking decisions in the area of international relations, parliaments have strong scrutiny and control powers when passing legislation and through their budget approval powers. The European Parliament has a “direct impact on foreign policy today”, through its debates and resolutions, which add legitimacy to policies, and also its ratification of international agreements and treaties, including free trade agreements. He reiterated that public support is crucial for the success of policies and legitimacy of international agreements. Mr Nuttin pointed out that promotion of democracy is one of the EU’s key commitments, enshrined in Article 21 of the EU Treaty, and the European Parliament would like to engage more with parliaments in Asia. Unfortunately, in several parts of Asia, the role of parliaments is weak. It is the executive branches of governments that maintain control over foreign relations. Regional parliaments are few in Asia and also remain weak, ASEAN being an illustration. He noted that the idea to establish an ASEAN Parliament was first brought up in the 1970s, and again in the early 2000s, but only as a “long term goal”. The ASEAN Charter also does not make any mention of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA), “a consultative body with no legislative or oversight power that has made no significant contribution to policies”. Even in the drafting of the text of the ASEAN Charter the national parliaments were not consulted. Nothing has been done in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which does not have a forum to bring together parliaments of its member states. It approved in 2011 a Charter of


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Democracy, which puts democracy and fair, credible elections at the centre of the system. However the idea to set up a conclave of parliamentarians has all but been forgotten. While parliaments remained weak in the scrutiny of international relations, he noted that the visibility of civil society has increased in recent years and that the clamour for public participation is becoming a general trend, including in Asia. Mr Nuttin pointed out that the European Parliament is active in all regions of the world and is part of several regional joint parliamentary assemblies, for example, Eurolat with Latin America, and with the ACP countries, there is the EU–ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly and Euromed with Mediterranean countries. However, there are no inter-regional or joint regional parliamentary meetings with Asia. He therefore sees the potential for the intensification of relations between EU and Asia in this area. He noted that there is some region-to-region relations, through the Asia Europe Parliamentary Partnership, but it is only a one-day meeting usually held back-to-back with the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit every two years, and has had extremely poor results for various reasons, including the lack of a secretariat, the short duration of the meeting, and the lack of commitment of members of parliaments to attend the meeting. Concluding, Mr Nuttin said he believes that more exchange between parliaments in Europe and Asia will increase their role and visibility in each country and contribute to the spread of democracy and democratic values. He acknowledged that “EU commitment does not always result in concrete measures, saying that

parliamentary support and diplomacy exists, but needs to be stronger to promote legitimacy of different policies. More parliamentary support and commit-ment on the part of EU is needed. On the part of Asia, the governments must show democratic maturity and be more prepared to accept control and oversight power by parliaments. In the discussion, Mr Jason Ji wonder if the EU would be considered an unreliable partner should the Commission conclude trade deals which are then rejected by the Parliament, referring to the EP’s rejection of ACTA in 2012. Dr Farizal also questioned the competency level of parliamentarians, especially in issues on trade relations and foreign policy, where they are often poorly informed and base their knowledge on speculation and unreliable sources, referring to his native Malaysia. He said that the more advanced parliaments could contribute to the development of ASEAN parliaments by sharing best practices. Mr Nuttin responded saying that if there is a lack of competency, this would be precisely an area the EP could support, adding that instead of a focus on local or national issues, joint parliaments could also focus on transnational and global issues, such as climate change, human trafficking. Dr Hell said that internal tensions in the EP must be addressed before it can fully realize its potential to engage Asia-Pacific and other regions. He pointed out that the EP is in a legitimacy crisis itself because of the low electoral turnout. In fact the most recent elections in 2014 saw its lowest turnout in history. He also noted that a number of member states reacted negatively to the declaration of political accountability and against the EU’s Foreign Affairs High Representative Federica Mogherini’s closer association


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with the Commission and the EP when their preference is for the Council, the natural interlocutor for them in CFSP, to be primus inter pares. To address the EP’s legitimacy crisis and to increase its relevance, Mr Nuttin suggested this might be addressed by voting from a European list, as opposed to a list of national candidates. Dr Cher Lai Suetyi (Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University) In the presentation, “Rethinking EU’s Public Diplomacy and Soft Power Instrument”, Dr Lai gave an overview of the “EU in the Eyes of Asia-Pacific” research project that looked at how the EU’s smart power projection was received in Asia in 2004-2012. She presented the data from China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, India, Singapore, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand, chosen because the EU is either the top or among the top three trade partners in these countries (the first four countries listed are also among the EU’s 10 Strategic Partners). The study included media analysis of key words (EU, Europe, European Parliament, European Council, European Commission) in print and television news, as well as public opinion polls and interviews with decision makers and newsmakers (editors, producers).

Above: Dr Lai (middle) responding to questions during a Q&A session

Dr Lai said that in general, the EU’s visibility in the media has grown since the Eurozone debt crisis, though at varying levels. For example the EU’s visibility is low in India, despite it being a key trading partner of the EU. In terms of actorness, and despite its efforts to change public views of it, the EU is still predominantly seen as an economic or trade actor in the Asia-Pacific; its social and cultural dimensions were poorly reported. Dr Lai then gave a quick overview of the various perceptions, pointing that in China, the EU is recognized for its economy, but is seen as a second-class power globally; in Korea, media coverage mostly focused on the EU’s FTA negotiations with the country and on its effects on the Korean economy. After the negotiations, the EU’s visibility in the media fell considerably. Similarly, in Singapore media, the EU was mostly mentioned in business and economic stories. Certainly, political interests influence the media’s coverage – Dr Lai said that Chinese reporting on the EU in the People’s Daily newspaper (owned by the Chinese Communist Party) grew more positive after the Eurozone debt crisis, because China was a major purchaser of Eurobonds. She also pointed out that among newsmakers interviewed in all nine countries in the study (except for India), the EU was viewed as less important than the United States and China. Perhaps geographical proximity also plays a factor in perceptions of importance – in Australia and New Zealand, the EU ranked even lower in importance compared to other countries in Southeast Asia. News makers in Australia and New Zealand ranked it sixth in importance. Dr Lai concluded by saying the EU’s perceived importance in the Asia-Pacific is weaker than in reality, and there is a lot of


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room for it to improve its public diplomacy. She said that “big powers” appear to be more interested in the EU, citing China, Japan and Singapore. The eurozone debt crisis also had a negative impact on how Asia-Pacific viewed the EU. In fact, the higher the EU’s visibility in a country, the poorer it was viewed. The EU was most positively seen in India and South Korea, countries in which coincidentally, the EU was the least visible. The EU was viewed the most positively in China and New Zealand, and in general most countries viewed the EU as a peaceful actor, and more of an economic or development actor. She stressed the importance of targeting news editors and TV producers, explaining that their views reflected what is sellable to the target audience, and that how they think affects what goes into the news. Dr Stefan Hell (Team Leader, Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument) In “Rethinking EU’s Strategy Toward ASEAN”, Dr Stefan Hell gave an assessment of EU’s regional policy toward ASEAN by looking at how this manifests itself in the three ASEAN communities: the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), concluding that the EU could do far more to engage ASEAN. He believed that there a need for new kind diplomacy in an increasingly complex and challenging environment and said the EU needs to move from info politics to real dialogue, and seek to better understand how its partners view it and manage these perceptions.

Above: Dr Hell (L) delivering his presentation Dr Hell began by summarizing ASEAN’s external relations, which have evolved to a complex network of overlapping layers and concentric circles. With Europe, interregional relations date back more than 40 years, and EU and ASEAN have enjoyed smooth diplomatic relations, with the exception of the Myanmar issue, since they were formally established in 1977. The EU is third among ASEAN’s largest trade partners after China and Japan. It is also the biggest source of FDI in ASEAN, while ASEAN is the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner. In other areas of cooperation, the EU works with ASEAN in areas such as counterterrorism, crisis response, dis-armament and non-proliferation, fighting transnational crime and promotion of human rights. As such, it is seen as a soft or “easy” partner as it does not inconvenience the organization, as some other dialogue partners do, over individual policy issues and does not forcefully set a political agenda in its terms of cooperation. ASEAN does not view the EU as a military power in Asia, and hence there is little cooperation in hard security and military cooperation is primarily related to a supply of arms from its member states. However, Dr Hell pointed out that the EU being a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is very interested in engaging


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ASEAN on broader political security issues. ASEAN engages wider stakeholders in regional security issues through the ARF processes. Even though the EU will have a designated ASEAN ambassador from 2015, Dr Hell says it is late to the party, pointing out that the US, China, India, South Korea, Japan Australia, New Zealand and Canada all have their own dedicated ambassadors to the region far ahead of the EU. There are also no regular EU-ASEAN summits, which put the EU at a disadvantage compared to other dialogue partners of ASEAN. Dr Hell said the gap between the EU’s and ASEAN’s institutional development is “enormous”, pointing out that the Commission has about 33,000 staff, while the ASEAN secretariat has about 300. The EU also provides in development cooperation—€200 million for the funding period 2014-2020, or about €30 per year—to the ASEAN secretariat for capacity building. This is double what ASEAN states themselves contribute. The funding is operationalized across all three ASEAN communities through two programmes – ARISE (ASEAN Regional Integration Support from the EU) and READI (Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument). As ASEAN is becoming more institutionally developed under the ASEAN charter, Dr Hell said there will certainly be more opportunities for it to work more closely with the EU, with the establishment of the Committee of Permanent Representatives of ASEAN member states, and with the likely strengthening of institutions to manage the single market of the 2016 ASEAN Economic Community. In Dr Hell’s opinion, the EU should take advantage of the convergence in interests to increase its support to ASEAN in fighting transnational crime and

corruption, having built strong capacities and has systems in place in this field. An area he pointed out the EU could also have a great potential for influence is in strengthening civil society and human rights. The latter could particularly be done through the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). AICHR which is only five years old and is still in the process of finding its footing, has the EU as its first dialogue partner, and with which it has agreed on a three-year work plan of activities from 2013. Dr Hell highlighted the fact that while the EU is viewed by ASEAN as a dialogue partner with certain unique expertise and skillset, he cautioned that the EU must be realistic about how it is perceived by ASEAN: it is not seen as a key political and security actor, though it is seen by ASEAN as a supporter of its own ambitions to integrate regionally. The EU provides strong hands-on support to ASEAN’s goal of closer integration among its member states and as such, it is in these technical areas and among senior officials and in meetings and working groups that the EU plays a very prominent role, Dr Hell said. In conclusion, Dr Hell said the EU is punching below its weight, as while it is by far the biggest donor to ASEAN, it is perceived as a bureaucracy-heavy partner that is more reactive than proactive with regards to policies. Furthermore, because of its complexity as a regional organization, it is not as good at focusing its policy and communication as compared to ASEAN’s other dialogue partners. The existence of EEAS that coordinates EU policy is an important step to improve this. As the post-Lisbon EU is honing its foreign policy tools, it should pay attention to align the strategic interests formulated by EEAS. He is sceptical about the EU’s


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added value to hard security issues in Southeast Asia, but in terms of trade and economic policy, the EU is well-positioned vis-à-vis ASEAN to add value to the single market project, and should contribute its experience to this process, which in turn will benefit the EU in the long run. In the discussion that followed, Dr Fitrani asked Dr Hell to elaborate on his suggestion for the EU to develop its dialogue with ASEAN on human rights. Dr Hell responded that the dialogue is not meant to be an expression of the EU’s normative power – the EU should not seek to teach, but rather to engage in a dialogue among equals, and there is a potential for it to play a strong role here. Prof Chen, wondering about the growing EP’s growing decision-making power following the Lisbon treaty, questioned if the EU is becoming a more complicated or problematic negotiation partner because of the requirement for parliamentary approval. He added that in his opinion, it would now be much harder for the EU to reach any deal with China. Responding to a presentations by Dr Rayroux and Dr Lai on EU’s reputation and visibility, Dr Hell said that the problem the EU is that it does not communicate directly with the public. Its messages are transmitted via the media, through the daily briefing at noon at a press conference in Brussels. As such, it cannot shape and control its reputation outside of Brussels, and thus suggested that public diplomacy through the EU Delegations might be more promising because information can be more targeted at the respective audiences.

Rapporteurs: Mr Timothy Misir Independent Researcher Mr Jason Ji Xianbai Associate, EU Centre Edited by: Dr Yeo Lay Hwee Director, EU Centre

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Workshop Programme

20 April 2015, Monday

09.00 – 09.15 Opening and Welcome Remarks

09.15 – 12.30 SESSION ONE – SURVEYING EU’S CURRENT ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ASIA-PACIFIC

This session will survey the EU’s current engagement with the Asia-Pacific by taking a comprehensive look into the EU’s trade policy and pursuit of bilateral FTAs, its public diplomacy foray into the region through its various outreach, research and education programmes and attempts to strengthen cooperation with Asia-Pacific partners in the areas of soft security. The aim of this session is to evaluate and debate how coherent and effective the EU has been in its engagement with the Asia-Pacific thus far, and what are some of the policies that have successful in serving the EU’s interest and foreign policy objectives. The perceptions of and responses from Asia-Pacific partners to the EU presence would be analysed in order to gauge the strength and success of EU’s engagement. 09.15 – 10.30 P 1 : An Overview of the development of EU’s Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP) by Prof Dr Frederic Merand (Director, Centre for International Studies, University of Montreal)

P 2 : An Overview of EU’s Current Strategy Towards Asia-Pacific by Dr Michael Reiterer (Senior Advisor, Asia and Pacific Dept, EEAS)

10.45 – 12.30 P 3: The EU’s Public Diplomacy in Asia: The Case of EU Centre in Taiwan By Prof Su Hungdah (Jean Monnet Chair at National Taiwan University and Director-General, EUTW)

P 4: The EU in Indonesia by Dr Evi Fitriani (Head, International Relations Dept, University of Indonesia)

P 5: EU-Australia Relations – How the EU is perceived in Australia by Dr Annemarie Elijah (Associate Director, ANU Centre for European Studies)

14.00 – 17.00 SESSION TWO – COMPETITION OR COLLABORATION? EU’S RELATIONS WITH

OTHER MAJOR POWERS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC How far do the EU’s priorities and interests coincide or conflict with the other key players in the Asia-Pacific such as China, Japan, Russia and the US? How should the EU position itself vis-à-vis these powers. What about the middle powers in the region – Australia, Canada and South Korea? Can and should the EU work with like-minded partners in providing regional public goods and promote good regional governance? Or should the EU focus only on the pursuit of its own material interests in the Asia-Pacific? This session will examine the strategic partnerships that the EU has developed with major players and if and how they may have translated to common policies that have mattered for the Asia-Pacific region.


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14.00 – 15.15 P 1 : The EU and US – Working Together or Drifting Apart? by Dr Simon Duke

(Professor, European Institute for Public Administration) P 2 : EU-China Relations and Competition in the Asia-Pacific? by Prof Chen Zhimin (Jean Monnet Chair & Dean of School of International Studies and Public Affairs, Fudan University)

15.45 – 17.00 P3 : The EU and Japan – Why Relations between the two never quite take

off? by Prof Toshiya Nakamura (Director, Global Media Research Centre, Nagoya University) P4 : EU-South Korea Relations – Pre and Post EUSFTA by Prof Park Sunghoon (Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University & Executive Director, KU-KIEP-SBS EU Centre)

21 April 2015, Tuesday

09.00 – 12.15 SESSION THREE – RETREAT, MORE OF THE SAME, OR RE-STRATEGISE? RETHINKING EU’S INTERESTS AND PRIORITIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

This session will reflect upon the discussions of the first two sessions and debate, survey the global trends, the changing external environment that the EU faces in its own backyard, the internal discord within the EU and also the changes taking place in the Asia-Pacific in order to answer the key question of this workshop – does the EU need to rethink its strategy towards the Asia-Pacific. What should be the EU’s new priorities and interests, and what kind of new instruments and capabilities does the EU need in order to remain a key player in the region or to protect its own interests? 09.00 – 10.45 : P 1: A Theoretical Discussion on Perceptions and Reputation – What can the

EU do to enhance its reputation in the Asia-Pacific? by Dr Antoine Rayroux (Coordinator, EU Centre of Excellence, University of Montreal – McGill University) P 2: Beyond Trade: The Challenges of EU Business Diplomacy in Asia by Dr Silviu Jora (General Manager, EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation) P 3: Making Parliamentary Diplomacy Work – Strengthening Dialogue Amongst Politicians? by Mr Xavier Nuttin (EU Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS)

11.00 – 12.15 : P 4: Rethinking EU’s Public Diplomacy and Soft Power Instrument? by Dr Cher Lai Suet Yi (Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University)

P 5: Rethinking EU’s Strategy Towards ASEAN? by Dr Stefan Hell (Team

Leader, Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument)


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List of Participants Dr Laura Allison Research Fellow, Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, NTU Email: [email protected] Prof Chen Zhimin Dean, School of International Relationsand Public Affairs, Fudan University Email: [email protected] Dr Simon Duke Professor, European Institute of Public Administration Email: [email protected] Dr Annmarie Elijah Associate Director, ANU Centre for European Studies Email: [email protected] Dr Evi Fitriani Head, Dept of International Relations, University of Indonesia Email: [email protected] Dr He Baogang Head, Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, Nanyang Technological University Email: [email protected] Dr Stefan Hell Team Leader, Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument Email: [email protected] Dr Wilhelm Hofmeister Director, Political Dialogue Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Email: [email protected] Mr Jason Ji Xianbai Phd Candidate, RSIS, NTU & Associate, EU Centre Email: [email protected] Dr Silviu Jora General Manager, EU-Japan Center for Industrial Cooperation Email: [email protected] Dr Lai Suet Yi, Cher Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, Email: [email protected]

Dr Le Thu Huong Visiting Researcher, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Email: [email protected] Mr Loke Hoe Yeong Researcher, HEAD Foundation & Associate, EU Centre Email: [email protected] Professor Frederic Merand Director, Centre for International Studies, University of Montreal Email: [email protected] Mr Timothy Misir Independent Researcher Email: [email protected] Professor Toshiya Nakamura Director, Global Media Research Centre, Nagoya University Email: [email protected] Mr Xavier Nuttin EU Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Email: [email protected] Professor Park Sunghoon Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University Executive Director, KU-KIEPS-SBS EU Centre Email: [email protected] Mr Antoine Rayroux Coordinator, EU Centre of Excellence, University of Montreal-McGill University Email: [email protected] Dr Farizal Mohd Razalli Senior Lecturer, School of History, Politics & Strategic Studies, UKM Email: [email protected] Dr Michael Reiterer Senior Advisor, Asia and the Pacific, European External Action Service Email: [email protected] Professor Su Hungdah EU Centre in Taiwan Email: [email protected] / [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]






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Professor Pascal Vennesson S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Email: [email protected] Dr Reuben Wong Jean Monnet Professor, Department of Political Science, NUS Email: [email protected] Dr Yeo Lay Hwee Director, EU Centre in Singapore Email: [email protected] EU Centre Staff Ms Jamika Jorge-Petit Intern, EU Centre Email: [email protected] Ms Teo Mei Yee Senior Executive Email: [email protected]


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Established in 2008, the EU Centre in Singapore is a joint project of the European Union, the National University of Singapore (NUS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), and is part of a worldwide network of EU centres and EU institutes. We aim to promote knowledge and understanding of the EU and its impact on Singapore and the region, through activities revolving around outreach, education and research.

As part of our public outreach activities, the Centre organises an ongoing series of talks, lectures and seminars. The Centre contributes to education and research on the EU through organising academic conferences and by publishing background briefs, working papers, and policy and research briefs.

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