Work and Revolution: Workers' Control in Barcelona in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-38

Michael Seidman

Work and Revolution: Workers' Control in Barcelona

in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-38

The enormous literature on the Spanish Revolution and civil war is dominated by a political, military or diplomatic perspective. Few historians, whether Communist, Republican,franquista, anarchist, syndicalist, Trotskyist, or even those lacking a clear political perspective, have written a social history of the events leading to the Revolution and the Revolution itself. This article will attempt partially to fill the vacuum by analyzing the economic and social development of Barcelona, the capital of Spain's most economically advanced region, Catalonia, and its most important city. The social and economic development of Barcelona in Catalonia will be interwoven with the story of the two main actors in the drama of the Spanish Revolution - the bourgeoisie (the owners of the means of production) and the working class. The study of their relation- ship will aid our understanding of workers' control of the factories and workshops of Barcelona from July 1936 to the end of 1938.

The historiography on workers' control in Barcelona has largely ignored a fundamental problem in Spanish history: the weakness of the Spanish bourgeoisie. This weakness is twofold. Politically, the Spanish bourgeoisie never forced a lasting separation of the Church from the state and the military from the civilian government; and economically it created neither a viable agriculture nor productive industry in most of Spain. While the Catalan bourgeoisie had in- dustrialized to some extent and had produced a respectable textile industry in the nineteenth century, by the opening of the twentieth

Journal of Contemporary History (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Vol. 17 (1982), 409-433

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century this industry was in decline, and the Catalans had not forg- ed others to take its place. An exploration of the failure of the Catalan and Barcelona bourgeoisie to develop the means of production is essential to any critical understanding of what the unions and their militants desired and accomplished when they seized control of the Barcelona factories and shops.

The lack of industry and the weakness of the urban bourgeoisie in Castile, the centre of Spain, is well-known, and the Catalan success in fostering a bourgeois culture with its values of industry, thrift, and work is often contrasted with the Castilian case. By the end of the seventeenth century the Catalans had developed a pros- perous textile industry.' In the eighteenth century Barcelona pro- bably had the most powerful bourgeoisie of the Spanish Peninsula, engaging in overseas trade and textile manufacturing. It began a 'real economic and industrial colonization of Spain'.2 Yet, despite the relative economic power of Catalonia in Spain, the eighteenth- century Catalan cotton industry has been described as 'modest'.3 From 1834 to 1854 the Catalan cotton industry blossomed and expanded. The Catalan textile industry was 'mechanized' between 1835 and 1861, in an attempt to reach the same level of mechanization as that of foreign textile industries, a level it never reached.4 Thus, even at its peak in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Catalan cotton industry, the basis of Catalan industrialization, was weak in comparison with its foreign competitors. For example, in the Catalan cotton industry each worker transformed 660 kg of cotton per year in contrast to the United States where each worker transformed 1,500 kg of cotton per year.5 Hence the constant demand from Catalan industrialists in the nineteenth century for tariff protection by Madrid to preserve a relatively backward industry which was dispersed among small, often uneconomical, firms. The demand for protection by the Catalans resulted in a 'pact' at the end of the nineteenth century with conservative agrarian and traditionalist elements of Castile and Andalusia, sectors that also desired protection for their unproductive and backward agricultures. Thus the Catalan industrialists came to sell their high-priced textiles to a poor but protected market in which the level of consumption was very low.

Although the cotton and textile industries were certainly the most important of the Catalan enterprises, the regional economic growth in the nineteenth century was not limited to textiles. Railroads were constructed, but these were dominated by foreign, mainly French,

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capital and technology.6 Mines also began to be developed, but again the exploiters were often foreigners, not Spanish. It is estimated that 50 percent of Spanish mines belonged to foreigners who were responsible for much of the concentration and modernization of Spanish industry.7 Orders for agricultural, textile, and transportation machinery went mostly to foreign industries since the Catalans had failed to build a potent metallurgical or machine- tool industry. At the end of the nineteenth century there was a certain decline in the key Catalan cotton industry as its growth rate dropped from 5.54 percent per year between 1834 and 1880 to 2.28 percent between 1880 and 1913.8 This decline would have been greater if Spain had not retained its protected colonial markets in Cuba and Puerto Rico until 1898, the year of the Spanish defeat by the United States.

Thus by the end of the nineteenth century the Catalan bourgeoisie was losing some of its industrial dynamism. It had built a textile industry, which, while respectable, was nonetheless suffer- ing from low productivity and under-mechanization. These faults resulted in a 'pact' with large landowners in the centre of Spain, culminating in the tariffs of 1891. During this period, as the Catalan bourgeoisie both demanded and received protection from Madrid, it also moved closer to the values of the aristocratic and Catholic centre. Important sectors of the Catalan bourgeoisie mar- ried into the aristocracy or ennobled themselves.9 Catalan bourgeois society often returned to the faith of the Catholic Church.10 The bourgeois culture of work, thrift, and industry seemed to falter. Although there was limited growth in metallurgy, chemicals and electricity, these branches, like the railroads of an earlier period, were dominated by foreign capital and technology. The established industrial sectors such as shipbuilding, shipping, and the port of Barcelona, declined significantly. On the eve of the First World War Spain was dependent on foreign nations for many raw materials, finished products, and even foodstuffs. In 1914, for example, 98 percent of spindles for the cotton industry were English-made.

The First World War provided Catalan capitalism with,its great opportunity. Neutral Spain could now sell to all the warring nations and to the markets which the combatants had previously controlled. Spanish exports quickly expanded, and Spain unex- pectedly had a favourable balance of trade for the first time in many years. The Barcelona textile industry profited greatly. Yet, despite the windfall profits, Barcelonian industry was not

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significantly changed. Its major defects - smallness, atomization, technical backwardness, and lack of organization - persisted. The poor infrastructure of deficient railroads and ports hindered commerce and industry. Profits which could have been used to modernize antiquated machinery, concentrate atomized firms, develop new industries, and free Barcelona and Catalonia from foreign economic domination were spent elsewhere. The Barcelona bourgeoisie preferred to buy new foreign cars, to speculate in Ger- man marks or Berlin real estate, or to build luxurious houses.'2 Even Catalan banks speculated with war profits by investing in cotton commodities, the collapse of which contributed to the failure of the Bank of Barcelona.'3

An enormous opportunity was therefore lost, and a predictable post-war crisis hit Catalan industry. Many small chemical and drug firms, initiated during the war to provide substitutes for German exports, were quickly eliminated when peacetime commerce was resumed.14 The great industrial powers rapidly recovered the markets which had been lost to Spain. In 1922 the post-war crisis meant a forty-five percent reduction in the production of Catalan textiles.15 The government under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera was forced to establish one of the highest tariffs in Europe to protect both Catalan and the rest of Spanish industry. Employers often ignored even the minimal social legislation passed to protect the workers. In 1929 cereals, oil, wine, and oranges were twenty percent of the Spanish GNP, while iron and steel production were only two percent.'6

The Second Republic (1931-39) merely raised the protective bar- riers which had continued to exist under Primo de Rivera, and it failed to solve the country's essential social and economic problems. The standard of living for Spanish workers remained low. The level of illiteracy and the number of priests per capita were among the highest in Western Europe.17 As Spanish workers returned from the Depression-wracked nations of Northern Europe and emigration, an escape valve for the unemployed in Spain, was cut off, unemployment in Barcelona and other parts of Spain increased.'8 Neither the government nor private industry offered ef- fective solutions. For example, the directors of Spain's principal savings banks refused a government proposal in 1933 to finance dam construction to irrigate land and sell electric power: 'This proposal, so similar to the actual investment pattern of many large American insurance companies, was much too bold for the

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assembled bankers'.19 Spain's percentage of exports in world trade dropped steadily from 1.38 in 1880, 1.11 in 1913, 0.98 in 1925 to finally 0.84 in 1935.20

Spanish workers were most seriously affected by the failure of their bourgeoisie to develop the means of production. Salaries, health, education, housing, and social legislation were all below Western European norms. In 1900 the death rate was 30 per 1,000 in Spain, compared with 18 per 1,000 in Western Europe.2' The few exporting industries competed with those of the more technologically advanced nations by cutting the salaries of their workers. Just before the First World War Spain had the lowest salaries in Europe (Portugal excepted).22 Many factories lacked light, space, fresh air, and heat. Social legislation was inef- fective, and before the First World War there were only eight work inspectors in the entire country.23

Conditions improved slightly after the First World War, but the basic problems remained for Spanish workers and peasants. Although some industrial progress was made in the 1920s, by 1930 Spain remained basically an agrarian country with almost one-half the active population engaged in agrarian activities. The percen- tages of population in 1930 in the industrial and agrarian sectors were roughly equivalent to the distribution of the French population between 1880 and 1890.24 The influx of the rural poor kept salaries low for many urban workers. In Catalonia, where the average number of workers in an industrial firm was forty-six,25 owners did not or could not improve working conditions. Educa- tion was either lacking or controlled by the Catholic Church. The level of illiteracy in Spain was only matched by Portugal or Latin America.26 Technical education was insufficient, with only 1,527 students in both state and Church technical schools in 1935.27 Housing for many workers in cities was overcrowded and unhealthy with a high incidence of tuberculosis.28 In the period of economic crisis and higher unemployment, 1931-36, protection for the unemployed was inadequate.

Working-class misery entwined with the political and economic failures of the Catalan bourgeoisie created a revolutionary Ideology among the workers of Barcelona. Before the First World War the influence of French anarcho-syndicalism, based on the union or sindicato, was strong in the Barcelona anarcho-syndicalist union, the CNT (Confederaci6n Nacional de Trabajo). Anarcho- syndicalism called on workers in their unions to take over the

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means of production, and, just as importantly, to develop them. It emphasized the virtues of work and sacrifice. Georges Sorel, the French anarcho-syndicalist philosopher who was influential in Italy and Spain, rejected what he considered the bourgeois notion of progress; nevertheless, he believed that true progress existed in the workshop and in production:

Revolutionary syndicalism is the greatest educational force that contemporary society has in order to prepare the work of the future.

The free producer in a highly progressive workshop... desires to surpass everything that has been done before... The idea of continual progress is realized in a workshop of this kind.29

Unlike France, where anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism died out during and after the First World War and where the bourgeoisie effectively developed the means of production and separated the Church from the state, in Spain anarcho-syndicalism as a doctrine and a practice grew even stronger after the First World War. Those anarchists who believed that the union would be the basis of the future society of libertarian communism gained over other anarchists who held a more 'individualist' position or who considered that the building blocks of the new society would be the municipalities or the communes of the countryside. Diego Abad de Santillan, an anarchist leader who was later to represent the CNT in the Catalan regional government (Generalitat) during the Revolution, exemplified the changes in anarchist ideology. Abad de Santillan, who had opposed the domination of the union in the anarchist movement, became one of the most ardent defenders of the sindicato as the basis of revolution.30 He also shifted from being a zealous critic of 'capitalist' techology to an enthusiastic supporter. In 1931 he wrote that modern industrialism, such as Fordism, was 'pure fascism' which annihilated the 'per- sonality and dignity of man'.31 Yet two years later, in 1933, San- tillan wrote that modern industry was a source of pride for man since it had led him to dominate nature. He praised 'Taylorization' for eliminating 'the unproductive movements of the individual and raising his productivity'.32 He underlined the necessity to eliminate 'parasitism' and to provide work for all. Work would be both a right and a duty in revolutionary society.33

Santillan, a member of the radical FAI (Federacion Anarquista

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Iberica) which often controlled important positions within the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, was not alone in his support of work, modern technology, and the union as the seeds of the new society. More moderate members of the CNT also advocated many of San- tillan's objectives. Angel Pestania, leader of the less revolutionary elements of the CNT in the 1930s, called for a reorganization by the union to improve both production and consumption.34 For Juan L6pez, another CNT moderate, the union should take control of production from the bosses and impose 'order and moral discipline' on the shop floor.35 'Technical commissions' would run each industry, in accordance with the popular will, and L6pez' unions would intensify and elevate production.36 Other CNT members who downgraded the importance of the union in favour of the municipality or the commune, nevertheless stressed their faith in technological progress and production. For these more rural anarchists, everyone had the obligation to produce, and the 'identity card of the producer' was a prerequisite to any rights at all.37

For many anarcho-syndicalist theorists, worker-elected democratic councils would be the decision-making bodies of the Revolu- tion. Power would be exercised by the workers who could revoke the council at all times. According to Santillan, regional and local councils would be coordinated by the Federal Council of the Economy, which would plan and direct industry and agriculture in accordance with directives from below.38 The goal of the ultimate council was 'to produce more and distribute better', and the Revolution would create 'a vast community of producers and consumers'.39 However, Santillan and other anarcho-syndicalist theorists never explored in depth the problem of a possible conflict between the democratic form of the councils and the content of the programme for economic modernization and industrialization. In other words, what if the workers themselves resisted the anarcho- syndicalist desire for modernization? Before exploring this question through an examination of what the Barcelona unions actually did when they controlled the factories during the Revolution, the failure of the Spanish and Catalan bourgeoisies to develop the means of production must be kept in mind. This failure deeply affected the actions of the revolutionaries and led them to undertake the tasks which the bourgeoisie had neglected. The revolutionaries wanted to free the Spanish economy from foreign control and to create an economically independent nation, and they adopted

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aspects of both the Soviet and Western (specifically American) economic models, which had rapidly developed the productive forces of the nation.

The working-class militants got the chance to take over the means of production on 19 July 1936 with the pronunciamiento of the Spanish generals, eventually headed by Generalisimo Francisco Franco. The military revolt was defeated in Barcelona because of the combined actions of the anarcho-syndicalist, Socialist, Com- munist, and Republican forces. CNT militants played a major role in the defeat of the pronunciamiento. The rebellious general who led the revolt in Barcelona was quickly shot, and a large part of the bourgeoisie fled the city in fear. Factory-owners and businessmen literally abandoned their firms which, working-class militants claimed, had often been neglected and undeveloped. One anarcho- syndicalist source estimated that fifty percent of the bourgeoisie fled, forty percent were 'eliminated from the social sphere', and only ten percent remained and worked.40 Militants from the CNT, quite often with the collaboration of members of the Communist- oriented UGT (Uni6n General de Trabajadores), took charge of the abandoned factories. Many firms, especially those with over a hundred workers, were collectivized. The collectives, as they were called, were ruled by a factory council, usually composed of both CNT and UGT militants elected by the workers of the firm. Many other factories and workshops, particularly those which had less than fifty workers and whose owners remained in Barcelona to work during the Revolution, were managed jointly by the owner and a control committee of CNT and UGT militants. It should also be noted that almost all workers were, in effect, forced to join one or the other union since life without a union card was often dif- ficult in revolutionary Barcelona.

Immediately after the failure of the military uprising in Barcelona, the CNT occupied the most important political, police, and, of course, economic positions in the city. As other forces Communist, Socialist, and Catalan nationalist - reorganized and gained strength, the CNT began to lose its political and police powers in Barcelona. Many historians - Burnett Bolloten in The Spanish Revolution, the Left, and the Struggle for Power during the Civil War, Noam Chomsky in American Power and the New Mandarins, John Brademas in Anarcosindicalismo y revoluci6n en Espana (1930-1937), Carlos Semprun-Maura in Revolucion y Contrarrevolucion en Cataluha (1936-1937) - have focused on the

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decline of the CNT's political and police powers and have wedded the CNT's loss of political power to a collapse of its economic power in those factories which had been collectivized or controlled by its militants. In other words, the periodization of the collectives has become subordinated to the periodization of the CNT's political vicissitudes in and out of government. Thus the end of the CNT's participation in the Republican government after the street fighting in Barcelona in May 1937 has been identified with the suc- cessful counter-revolution against the CNT's economic power in the factories which it controlled.

The identification of political and economic periodizations has some, but only limited, value. It was highly probable that when the forces opposed to the CNT, whether Communist or Republican, controlled the government, CNT factories were denied foreign cur- rencies and financial assistance necessary to procure raw materials and machinery. It has also been shown that the political withdrawal of the CNT a few weeks after the fighting in Barcelona in May 1937 increased Communist strength and led to important attacks on collectives in certain regions, notably Aragon. Nevertheless, in Barcelona, the most important bastion of the CNT, where it was undoubtedly the most important union, its economic control of industry did not collapse when its enemies gained political power. In fact, by its own and its enemies' admissions, the CNT, often with the participation of the UGT, retained control of many of the most essential industries in Barcelona virtually until the end of the war. The final part of this article will examine how the CNT and UGT rationalized the industries which they controlled and consequent problems which the unions and their militants encountered.

One of the first major tasks which the militants undertook was the concentration of the tiny and dispersed firms which composed most of Barcelona industry. With perhaps over 50,000 workers in the textile industry, the city of Barcelona was the most important textile centre in Spain. Although there were several large factories, in general the textile industry was dispersed in 'industrial crumbs', small firms lacking modern machinery. Often when these uneconomical units closed, their old machinery was bought at bargain prices by another industrialist who employed it again.41 Most of the Barcelona metallurgical industries' 35,000 workers were also scattered among small firms and shops which averaged less than fifty workers per unit. The statistics available on sixty- nine chemical companies in Barcelona indicate that nineteen firms

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had between one and ten workers; thirty-five firms between eleven and fifty workers; eight between fifty and a hundred workers; six between a hundred and five hundred workers, and only one over five hundred workers.42 The most important exception, the com- pany Cros with about two thousand workers in branches in many Spanish cities, was linked to English capital. With over 610 firms, the Catalan electrical industry remained a hodgepodge of small, often obsolete, power plants and distribution centres.

Both CNT and UGT militants wanted concentration of enterprises for several reasons. First, the 'industrial crumbs' were held responsible for the low wages and poor working conditions of Barcelona workers. Second, the tiny firms were unable to compete in the world market, and their weaknesses permitted the domination of foreign capital in certain sectors. Third, mergers would reduce the number of 'parasitic' middlemen, create economies of scale, and thus lower costs to consumers. Therefore, the militants quickly attempted to merge the industries. In textiles, work done at home (trabajo a domicilio) disappeared after 19 July 1936.43 In

May 1937 the CNT Garment Workers Union:

succeeded in erecting a workshop in order quickly to end work which was being done in the home so that this work could be accomplished by profes- sionals... The premises where this workshop was installed have natural light and ventilation. Therefore production will gain in quality because these (women) workers will be under the direction of an expert.44

In construction, the CNT Building Union affirmed:

that changing the structure of the shop for the factory and counting on a rational and technical base, production will increase and physical effort will decrease.45

At the beginning of September 1937, the CNT Building Union had eliminated 'parasitic' middlemen and had concentrated 3,000 shops into 120 'great producing centres' which supposedly mass- produced.46 The CNT and UGT construction unions created one of the most important amalgamations with more than 30,000 workers.47

Standardization of parts and equipment often accompanied the fusion of the 'industrial crumbs'. CNT metallurgical militants wrote that standardization had three advantages: interchangeable parts, speed of repairs, and economy, and they concluded:

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The degree of Standardization is the scale that serves to determine industrial progress. Proof of this is that nations that have the best industry are those which have the greatest quantity of standardized parts.48

The Industria Metalgrafica, a collective of 220 workers, 91 of whom were men and 129 women, offered an excellent example of standardization and rationalization in what was, for Barcelona, a relatively large factory.49 206 of the collective's workers belonged to the CNT and fourteen to the UGT. The eight technicians of the firm were in the CNT; whereas the fourteen administrative personnel were in the UGT. With machinery that was approximately twenty-nine years old, it had produced metal boxes, metal cases, and lithographic equipment, but after the Revolution the factory was converted to war production. In November 1936 the collective's ruling council acknowledged that it intended to 'reduce labour as much as possible' by eliminating certain processes. In April 1937 the Council of Industria Metalgrafica declared: 'The ideal would be...to increase production and uncustomarily to lower labour costs, general costs, and consequently the price of the article.' The Council argued that it was: 'absolutely necessary to modify totally the manufacturing process, and we consider that "standard" manufacturing is the most advisable'. The collective's ruling body wanted a 'rational division' of machinery so that each factory could specialize in one type of production, for example, rectangular boxes, round containers, or lithography.

The desire to rationalize and standardize resulted in the adoption of the techniques of F.W. Taylor, an American engineer who was a founder of the 'scientific organization of work'. Taylorism involved a breaking down of the worker's task into its component parts, thus deepening the division of labour and terminating artisan-like production. The American engineer advocated increas- ing the speed of production, and his 'scientific organization' led to a kind of standardization of the workers themselves, who perform- ed extremely simplified tasks which required little thought or train- ing.50 His system encouraged increased production through the 'rational' use of incentives and piecework. It enlarged that division between those who thought or planned and those who only exe- cuted orders. Both the CNT and the UGT promoted Taylorism. On 19 November 1938 a CNT technician called Taylor 'the greatest organizer known'.51 The technician thanked the workers and the director of the factory Labora for their cooperation. He regretted

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his departure but was confident that if Labora continued on its present path, it would become one of the most important metallurgical firms in Spain. A letter of 23 November 1938 to the Administrative Junta of the CNT Metallurgical Union confirmed that 'during my stay at Labora I explained to the management of the factory the road to follow for the best output'.

Articles in CNT and UGT reviews endorsed Taylorism. In September 1937, an article entitled 'Professional Selection' in the CNT journal, Sidero-Metalurgia, praised the research done at Bethlehem Steel, Taylor's factory, where the optimum-sized shovel for coal stokers was developed and employed. This shovel permitted the most efficient use of the worker's strength. The article also lauded a disciple of Taylor, H. Gantt, who had eliminated the workers' unnecessary movements and therefore increased productivity. In addition, it argued for a careful selection of apprentices since the metallurgical industry had some jobs demanding only brute strength and others which needed intelligence. In May 1937, Horizontes, the review of the CNT-UGT Collective Marathon, formerly General Motors of Barcelona, concluded that the American engineer had achieved 'scientific organization of work' and had developed a system which chose the best workers for each job in the factory. The militants of Marathon argued that the careful selection of appropriate workers could prevent accidents and that Taylorism should be adopted in railroads, trams, buses, and machine shops.

CNT and UGT militants built new industries as they rationalized the old. CNT members of the Catalan Federation of Metallurgy sharply criticized the lack of 'progress' in the factory and underlined,

the misery, the lack of light, of hygiene, the same outdated tools, poor work organization and imperfection of work because of the ineptness and poverty of the Spanish metallurgical bourgeoisie which was always lagging behind the bourgeoisie of other nations.52

Even in the 1930s the most important metallurgical factories in Barcelona were still producing railroad supplies and equipment. By 1936 Spain had not yet developed a substantial motor-vehicle industry. Many Spanish car manufacturers, for example Hispano- Suiza, left Spain for the more favourable climate of France. In 1935 Spain imported over ninety-five percent of its automobiles.53

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Militants were, of course, aware of this failure and dreamed of the 'hot' Spanish car of the revolutionary future:

The cute little car (cochecito) will be constructed... to shelter two lovebirds. Its construction will take into account the most modern advances... we will endow it with lightning rods, aviation equipment, swimming equipment, radio, fire alarms, and extinguishers.54

When the CNT and UGT militants took control of General Motors in Barcelona, they embarked upon an ambitious programme to mass-produce the national truck. The Marathon Collective celebrated the first anniversary of the 19 July victory by displaying the first mass-produced Marathon truck motor. Ninety different councils and control committees which had cooperated in the construction participated in the festivities. A Marathon director praised the labour of the 12,000 workers [sic] in the Catalan automobile industry, and stated that the production of a mass- produced vehicle was part of 'our war for independence'.55 In February 1937 Horizontes declared that the economic potential of a nation could be measured by the number of motor vehicles per inhabitant, and it hoped that the automobile would soon become an accepted part of everyday life in Spain.

In addition to building new industries, the CNT and UGT improved working conditions in many factories. CNT factory councils recognized the importance of hygiene on production and wanted to imitate modern American factories which had industrial physicians.56 In general, lighting and safety were improved in numerous factories. Showers and WCs were built, and clinics and libraries were set up under both UGT and CNT auspices. Workers received accident and health insurance with expanded coverage, and older comrades' retirement benefits were improved. In the textile firm of Espafia Industrial, which with 1,800 workers was one of the largest factories in Barcelona, a day-care centre was established. Even some swimming-pools were constructed for the workers' use.

The desire to improve working conditions and to rationalize and modernize a backward industrial structure created a need for, even a dependence on, technicians, and both the CNT and UGT built schools to train them. In the Spanish Revolution traditional anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist desires for a non-hierarchical levelling of salaries conflicted with their wish to develop the means

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of production with the aid of scientists and technicians. The CNT's glorification of science and technology had attracted some technicians and managers into its ranks. However, others were frightened away from the CNT by its levelling tendency, by the dominance of blue-collar workers in its membership, and by its relative indifference to Catalan nationalism. Many technicians, managers, and particularly white-collar workers joined the UGT, which was closely aligned with the Catalan Communist Party, the PSUC, which supported many demands of the Catalan nationalists and accepted large wage differentials without question.

Yet throughout the Revolution the CNT continually fought for the support of the technicians. Juan Fabregas, one of the most important CNT representatives in the Department of Economy of the Generalitat, frequently paid homage to the 'technocracy as the factor which must rule Human Society in the new evolutionary state that we are beginning to experience'.58 Available statistics con- firm that although there was some levelling of salaries, the militants in charge of the factories conserved appreciable differences. In general, while the highest salaries of the directors may have been reduced or limited, the CNT, with or without UGT participation, significantly increased the salaries of the technicians and skilled workers in, for instance, the dyeing and finishing branch of the Barcelonian textile industry.59 Even in cases where salaries were levelled, pay differentials still widened as the worker took on more responsibility or as his technical skill increased.

In August 1937 the Technical-Administrative Council of the CNT Building Union proposed a revision of the anarcho- syndicalist theories on wages.60 The Council posed the following dilemma: either restore work discipline and abolish the unified salary or encounter disaster. The Council called for the re- establishment of incentives for the technician and the professional. Within many construction collectives the technicians had con- siderable power since they not only received substantially more pay than other workers, but they also established production quotas. In October 1937 in its review, Luz y Fuerza, the CNT National Federation of Water, Gas, and Electricity asserted that the Russian Revolution had taught Spanish workers that without technicians the Revolution was impossible. In light of the CNT's courtship of technicians, claims by the Communist historian, Ramon Tamames, in his La Republica: La era de Franco, that the CNT-inspired con- traction of salaries led to a great decrease in production must be

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qualified. The reasons for the decline must be sought elsewhere. At the beginning of the Revolution the CNT union of the textile

and garment industry responded to a demand which it had been making for years: the abolition of production incentives, especially piecework, 'the principal cause of the miserable conditions' of the workers, according to the union.61 Yet the abolition of piecework soon came under attack by the union itself. On 9 April 1937 the CNT Boletin de Informacion stated that in the industrial branches where piecework had been dominant before the Revolution and where it was now abolished, productivity had seriously declined. The Casa Girona was one of the most significant and spectacular examples of the problems of workers' control in the Spanish Revolution. The Casa Girona, also known as Material para Ferro- carriles, employed 1,800 workers and was one of the most important metallurgical factories in Barcelona. It had made railroad equipment before the Revolution, and after July 1936 it produced for the war effort.62 A report by the CNT-controlled factory council of the Casa Girona to the CNT Metallurgical Union of Barcelona declared that costs before 19 July 1936 had been 31,500 pesetas and since then had increased to 105,000 pesetas. Charges for retired personnel rose from 688 pesetas before 19 July to 7,915 pesetas; for accidents, from 950 pesetas to 5,719; for the sick, from 0 to 3,349 pesetas. Weekly payroll costs jumped from 90,000 to 210,000. With all these cost increases a 'rather intense production' was expected and needed. However, the factory council stated that production had actually diminished despite the greatly improved benefits and an increase of workers from the pre-revolutionary 1,300 to 1,800.

Girona's factory council did not believe that lengthening the working day would solve the problem since it had already added eight hours per week to the schedule, and the additional time had not only failed to increase production but had not even succeeded in stopping its decline. Thus, despite a 38 percent increase in personnel, a 233 percent increase in benefits, a 133 percent rise in weekly paychecks, production declined by 31 percent. The council suggested certain 'practical' measures to correct the situation: 'To establish a war bonus which will be adjusted to completed production' [italics in original]. According to the management of Girona, no other solution was possible since pay increases and the establishment of minimum production levels had failed. The council asked the Metallurgical Union for authorization to establish the bonus

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and to initiate 'rigorous control' by its production committee and engineer. The council denied that its proposals meant a return to the 'old days of exploitation' since 'the prices of all work will be agreed upon by those who manage and those who execute'. Workers whose work was superior must be rewarded. If not, the council would be discouraging initiative.

A letter written by the commission which was delegated by the Administrative Board of the CNT Metallurgical Union to investi- gate the 'abnormalities' at the Casa Girona confirmed the Girona factory council's difficulties. The investigating commission reported that a worker who received eighteen pesetas produced thirty pieces; whereas an apprentice who received only five pesetas produced eighty pieces in the same amount of time. According to the commission, the workers themselves had agreed with the factory council to establish a system of piecework. The investigating commission wrote that the new system of production incentives was in contradiction 'fundamentally... with our most intimate convic- tions' because the CNT had always fought against piecework. However, the workers were carried away by their 'egoistic instincts' and egged on by the Communist Party and the UGT. The investigating commission declared despondently that the Casa Girona would not be the last case where production necessities would con- tradict 'our ideas of equality and liberty'. It attacked the 'uncons- cious and irresponsible' workers who refused to produce without a monetary incentive. The commission concluded that the Girona council was justified in establishing piecework since 'cons- cious workers' were a minority in the factory.

Union militants fought against absenteeism as they fought against low productivity. Many comrades in construction were often 'ill'. The CNT Technical Commission of Masons noted: 'the irresponsibility of certain workers. We refer to those who fake illness and do not work, thus causing heavy economic damage to our collectives'.63 The commission was astonished at the 'astuteness and wickedness of the unscrupulous workers' who invented all kinds of strategies to get sick-pay. These and other abuses 'seriously threatened' the commission's social policies, and it demanded a 'crusade' by union delegates 'radically to stamp out the abuses'.64 Another technical commission, that of the CNT woodworkers, established a Committee on the Sick which required a worker to visit one of its physicians before obtaining sick-pay.65 In November 1937 militants of the UGT Masons' Union charged that, in addition

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to the excess of personnel, lack of credits, and transportation difficulties, an important reason for the 'failure' of the Construction Amalgamation was the 'excessive sum of pesetas paid to the ill'.66

Along with absenteeism, sabotage and theft were also serious problems. In March 1938 the CNT delegate of the Collective MEYDO reported to the machinery section of the CNT Metallurgical Union that sabotage was endangering the life of the collective.67 Over a long period of time, a great number of parts and tools, valued at 50,000-60,000 pesetas, had disappeared. The Col- lective attempted to convince the workers that these thefts were equivalent to stealing from themselves. Persuasion failed since the thefts continued and even increased. As a result, the Collective laid off its workers until the stolen equipment reappeared. After two days without work (and seemingly without pay), several workers on their own initiative went to the home of a certain Juan Sendera where much of the stolen equipment was found. The accused Sendera was dismissed from the Collective MEYDO. Other collectives established strict sets of rules which created guards to inspect all packages leaving the factory and which forbade all unauthorized movements.

The unions and factory councils were troubled by constant wage demands from the rank and file. The CNT and UGT members of the Control Committee of gas and electricity encountered a serious problem early on in the Revolution. On 3 December 1936 workers of the industry began collecting signatures demanding a joint CNT- UGT assembly to solicit the year-end bonus.68 The reaction of the Control Committee was one of anger. One member called the petition 'counter-revolutionary and fascist' and asked that those who had signed it be locked up and detained. Both UGT and CNT members of the Committee feared that the proposed assembly would not only claim the annual bonus but might also raise the question of salary differences among workers, technicians, and administrators. One Control Committee member declared that the 'unions exist to direct and channel the aspirations of the masses'. Others concluded that an assembly must be avoided at all costs. Some feared that in an assembly 300 signatories of a petition demanding more money could easily be joined by another 2,000 or even 4,000 workers. A certain Garcia stated, 'Either we have no authority over the masses or we impose it upon them'. The meeting finally agreed to pay the bonus to avoid the assembly being formed. Members were requested not to discuss the meeting with outsiders

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since the Committee wished to learn who had initiated and agitated for the petition in order to take possible punitive measures against them.

The chemical firm Cros, one of the largest in Spain, was collectivized shortly after the pronunciamiento and had a factory council composed of three members from the CNT and three from the UGT. Its review, Sintesis, frequently told workers to postpone demands for salary increases and vacations. Yet a full meeting of the collective and its unions showed that not all workers followed Sintesis' advice. On 30 June 1937 representatives of the collective's offices and factories in Alicante, Lerida, Valencia, and Barcelona and delegates from fourteen different UGT and CNT unions met in Barcelona to discuss a petition from sailors and ships' technicians in the CNT and UGT maritime unions.69 The maritime unions asked for back-pay for overtime and work on Sundays from November 1935 to 19 July 1936. In other words, the sailors demanded back pay for work done before Cros had been collectivized. Both the CNT and the UGT National Federations of Chemical Industries opposed the sailors' claim, but they hoped for a compromise since many other sailors had received back-pay. Other representatives opposed a compromise because of the demands of the war and those of the collective itself. There was an incident during the meeting when a sailors' representative, frustrated by the long discussion, stated that if the assembly was not in a hurry to achieve a solution, the sailors were, since a ship was scheduled to sail shortly. Delegates interpreted the statement as a threat, and the president of the assembly warned that the meeting could not be coerced. Other delegates criticized the sailors for threatening to strike and for their 'indiscipline'. A representative from Alicante noted that the workers in his factory had gone hungry but had still made sacrifices for the good of the collective. The Badalona delegate protested the sailors' claims and said that the collective could not be considered 'bourgeois' since all agreements had been adopted by majority vote. He insisted that no agreement could be reached until the sailors' envoys ceased threatening to strike. The UGT maritime delegate replied that he was not aware of any strike threat. The CNT maritime representative declared that all the sailors wanted for risking their lives at sea was fair and equal treatment. Another delegate answered that the collective had always given the highest consideration to its sailors but that on occasion the sailors had refused to sail if their

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demands were not accepted, and the factory council had often been forced to accede. The meeting finally accepted a proposal which delayed a solution to the problem of back-pay until economic conditions permitted. Workers of other collectives often sought salary increases to keep up with wartime inflation.

Both the CNT and the UGT engaged in an intensive propaganda campaign to counteract wage demands, absenteeism, sabotage, and indiscipline. In February 1937 in its Boletin, the CNT Textile Union of Badalona, an industrial suburb of Barcelona, called on workers to imitate stakhanovism, a movement to increase production which had aroused 'keen enthusiasm' among Soviet workers. The CNT review even published a photograph of the Soviet work hero. According to Sintesis, the magazine of the Collective Cros, the USSR was an example of 'successes obtained by rationalization and efficient work organization'.70 In December 1937 the magazine attacked laziness and vice and warned workers who considered 'work as a punishment' that they had better change their attitude quickly. Sintesis praised stakhanovism and wanted to make work a 'sporting game, a noble competition' in which the victor could achieve a great prize: 'the title of distinguished worker of production'. In February 1937 the journal of the Marathon Collective, Horizontes, contained an article by La Pasionaria herself which was entitled 'Our cry: WORKER, WORK'.

Sailors were the object of special criticism. Near the end of the war and the Revolution, the CNT Maritime Union became extremely blunt:

The majority of workers are an inert mass who, carried by circumstances, came to the unions because life was impossible without a union card.71

You must guess what the sailors are thinking because they are not able to express themselves in assemblies and meetings.72

Construction workers were also condemned. In March 1938 the CNT Building Union charged that the collectives, which had been constructed at such a high cost, were endangered by the 'passivity, indifference, and sabotage' of certain workers. To solve the problem:

Workers must act with energy in all cases. A person who discovers a saboteur, an opportunist, or a slacker cannot be considered an informer or a betrayer.

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The Union will take charge of all denunciations wherever they come from and whomever they concern.73

The unions made it clear that the workers had to build a new society based on work. The Revolution must create a 'New Dawn' where 'work was essential'.74 While true art and science had been destroyed by capitalism, work was 'the only value that remains unblemished'.75 With or without the bourgeoisie, work was the only source of wealth.76 In January 1938 the journal of the UGT petroleum workers, Petroleo, admonished: 'We want to make a new society in which work and the worker will be everything.' Petroleo bluntly stated, 'the Revolution is not a good time (juerga)', and included a poetic homage to oil, that 'divine essence'. For the CNT, the unions, which were based on work and consumption, were 'diametrically opposed' to capitalism: 'The union is the form par excellence that permits the extraction of the maximum of efficiency and output from its members'.77

In their quest for 'maximum efficiency and output', both the CNT and the UGT were forced to confront the problems of absenteeism, sabotage, low productivity, and indiscipline, and both unions reacted in analogous ways to 'solve' these conflicts. However, although the similarity of the difficulties which con- fronted the CNT and the UGT has been emphasized, our examination of workers' control in Barcelona cannot be completed without discussing the tensions between the two great unions. The historical literature has largely stressed the political and ideological differences which separated the UGT from the CNT. Some historians have focused on the UGT and the Catalan Communist Party programme for nationalization or government control of industry in

opposition to the CNT's policy of collectivization or union control. Others have pointed to the CNT and anarcho-syndicalist ambi- valence toward political action and governmental responsibility as opposed to the UGT and the Catalan Communist Party's will- ingness to participate in elections and to control government. However, as significant as these ideological and political tensions were, the day-to-day conflicts over economic and industrial control were equally important. The two unions constantly competed for new members, each adherent representing new dues and increased power. In addition, competition for available jobs was fierce, and only those holding a union card could get them. In certain branches where the CNT dominated, it could place its members in positions,

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and the UGT acted similarly in firms which it controlled.78 The rank and file would occasionally take advantage of the divisions between the CNT and the UGT to advance its own demands. The unions sometimes feared that the cancellation of vacations or the establishment of an intensive working week would weaken their position in the factory, permitting the minority union, whether CNT or UGT, to profit from the unpopularity of the dominant union and to attract new members.

The Spanish Revolution ended in Barcelona when Franco's troops took Catalonia early in 1939, but workers' control was not forgotten. When owners and managers, who had left Barcelona during the Revolution, returned, they expressed surprise that their businesses were in such good condition.79 The working-class militants had even improved the backward industries which they had inherited from a bourgeoisie which was weak both politically and economically. The unions and factory councils had often rationalized, standardized, and modernized production under try- ing circumstances. They bought new machinery, improved working conditions, built schools, and tried to eliminate a number of the most glaring inequalities. Nevertheless, the militants' vision of a modern Barcelona, where a nationally independent and rationalized industrial system was to be promoted by democratic workers' councils, often ran into the resistance of the workers themselves who continued to demand more pay, fake illness, sabotage production, and reject the control and the discipline of the factory system. The Barcelona militants were forced to confront the same problems that both the Western bourgeoisies and the Communist parties, which have rapidly developed the productive forces, have also experienced.

The idea of class consciousness held by the union militants conflicted with that of the rank and file. For the militants, class consciousness meant active and enthusiastic participation in the unions or parties which were building 'socialism' or 'libertarian communism' by rapidly developing the productive forces. However, many workers expressed their class consciousness by continuing to avoid the space and time of the rationalized workplace and of work itself. This resistance to industrial work should not be attributed to the peasant or 'pre-industrial' nature of the Barcelonian working class since over two-thirds of the workers were Barcelonian natives or veteran industrial labourers.80 The phenomena of low productivity, indiscipline, sabotage, and indifference among workers are

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present in even the most advanced industrial societies, and these phenomena indicate that resistance to work space and work time is not confined only to 'developing' countries but occurs throughout many stages of industrialization.

Historians of the Spanish Revolution have focused on the political and ideological divisions among Communists, Socialists, and anarcho-syndicalists and have thereby neglected the central problem of the divorce between militants committed to a certain vision of the future and workers who were reluctant to sacrifice to fulfil this ideal. Therefore, the militants used coercion to force the workers to work harder both to win the war and to build the new society. The war merely reinforced, but did not create, the need for coercive methods. Thus, the war was not the cause of the coercion and repression of the rank and file but was, like the militants' vision of the future, the result of a deeply-rooted historical process which was characterized by the economic and political failures of the Spanish and the Catalan bourgeoisies.

Ironically, after the defeat of the Left, Franco's governments adopted many aspects of the militants' vision of the future. Under Franco's rule the means of production were rationalized and modernized. Spain strengthened its agriculture, improved its infrastructure, and developed its industrial base. Cars began to be mass- produced, and the anarcho-syndicalist vision of cities of large apartment complexes and massive automobile circulation was partially realized. The ability of post-war Spain to achieve what CNT and UGT militants once dreamed of can help explain the decline of anarcho-syndicalist and other large-scale working-class revolutionary movements in present-day Spain.

Notes

I wish to thank Prof. Stanley Payne for directing me to the archives of Salamanca and Prof. J. Amelang of the University of Florida for his suggestions.

1. Jamie Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain, with the collaboration of Jorge Nadal Oiler, trans. Frances M. L6pez Morillas (Princeton, NJ 1969), 466-467.

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Seidman: Workers' Control in Barcelona, 1936-38 431

2. Jaime Vicens Vives, Cataluna en el siglo XIX (Madrid 1961), 126. 3. Jordi Nadal, El fracaso de la revoluci6n industrial en Espana, 1814-1913

(Barcelona 1975), 192. 4. Ibid., 195. 5. Pau Romeva Ferrer, Hist6ria de la indtstria catalana, 2 vols. (Barcelona

1952), 2: 370. 6. Nadal, op. cit., 30-34. 7. Ibid., 93-104. 8. Ibid., 210. 9. Antoni Jutglar, Hist6ria critica de la burgesia a Catalunya (Barcelona 1972),

297. 10. Vicens Vives, Cataluna en el Siglo XIX, 174. 11. Nadal, op. cit., 158. 12. See Pedro Gual Villabi, Memorias de un industrial de nuestro tiempo

(Barcelona 1922), for valuable insights into the Barcelona bourgeoise during the First World War. See also Pau Vila Dinares and Lluis Casassas Sim6, Barcelona i seva rodalia al llarg del temps (Barcelona 1974), 394.

13. Joan Sarda and Lluc Beltran, Els problemes de la banca catalana (Barcelona 1933), 22.

14. Santiago Roldan and Jose Luis Garcia Delgado, Laformaci6n de la sociedad capitalista en Espaha, with the collaboration of Juan Mufioz, 2 vols (Madrid 1973), 1:39.

15. Ibid., 106. 16. Manuel Tui6n de Lara, La Espaha del siglo XX, 1914-1939 (Paris 1973),

137-138. 17. Ram6n Tamames, La Repablica: La era de Franco (Madrid 1975), 142-150. 18. See Alberto Balcells, Crisis econ6mica y agitaci6n social en Cataluia de 1930

a 1936 (Barcelona 1971), for statistics on the growing unemployment in Barcelona during the Depression.

19. Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939 (Princeton, NJ 1967), 94.

20. Paul Combe, Niveau de vie et progres technique en France (1860-1939) (Paris 1956), 320.

21. Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain, 621. 22. Stanley G. Payne, Falange (Stanford, Ca. 1967), 2. 23. Angel Marvaud, La question sociale en Espagne (Paris 1910), 289. 24. Miguel Martinez Cuadrado, La burguesia conservadora (1874-1931) (Madrid

1978), 111. 25. E. Pinilla de la Heras, Los empresarios y el desarrollo capitalista (Barcelona

1968), 156. 26. Tamames, op. cit., 143. 27. Estadisticas bdsicas de Espana, 1900-1970 (Madrid 1975), 430-431. 28. Jaume Aiguader i Mir6, El problema de l'habitaci6 obrera a Barcelona

(Barcelona 1932). 29. Georges Sorel, Reflexions sur la violence (Paris 1972), 320. 30. Diego Abad de Santillan, El anarquismo y la revoluci6n en Espaha: Escritos

1930-38, ed. Antonio Elorza (Madrid 1976), 280-296. 31. Ibid., 96. 32. Ibid., 125.


33. Ibid., 172. 34. Angel Pestafia, Normas orgdnicas (Barcelona 1930), 18. 35. Juan L6pez, C6mo organizard el sindicato a la sociedad (Barcelona n.d.), 5. 36. Ibid., 6-7. 37. Issac Puente, Finalidad de la CNT: el comunismo libertario (Barcelona 1936),

26. 38. Diego Abad de Santillan, El organismo econ6mico de la Revoluci6n: C6mo

vivimos y como podriamos vivir en Espana (Barcelona 1938), 169-180. 39. Ibid., 36, 180. 40. Agustin Souchy and Paul Folgare, Colectivizaciones: La obra constructiva de

la revolucion espaiola (Barcelona 1977), 75. 41. Enrique Diumar6 y Mim6, El problema industrial textil: el maquinismo y la

cuestidn social (Barcelona 1939), 26. 42. Statistics in carpeta 1426, Servicios Documentales, Salamanca [hereafter

known as SD]. 43. A. Perez, 'La concentraci6n industrial', CNTMaritima, 15 September 1938. 44. Boletin del Sindicato de la Industria Fabril y Textil de Badalona y su Radio,

May 1937. 45. Hoy, December 1937. 46. Solidaridad Obrera, 4 September 1937. 47. Josep Maria Bricall, Politica econ6mica de la Generalitat (1936-1939), 2 vols.

(Barcelona 1978), 1: 224. 48. Sidero-Metalurgia, September 1937. 49. This paragraph is based on c. 871, SD, and on information provided by Sr.

Raphael Pujol. 50. See Georges Friedmann, Le Travail en miettes (Paris 1964), and David F.

Noble, America by Design (New York 1977). 51. Letters in c. 887, SD. 52. Sidero-Metalurgia, July 1937. 53. L'industrie automobile, F128797, Archives Nationales, Paris. 54. Sidero-Metalurgia, August 1937. 55. Horizontes, June-July 1937. The 12,000 figure may have been too high since

Sidero-Metalurgia, October 1937, reported only 4,250 workers in the automobile industry.

56. Boletin del Sindicato de la Industria Fabril y Textil de Badalona y su Radio, June 1937.

57. Souchy and Folgare, op. cit., 102. 58. Juan Fabregas quoted in Boletin del Sindicato de la Industria Fabril y Textil

de Badalona y su Radio, June 1937. 59. C. 626, SD. 60. Boletin del Sindicato de la Industria de la Edificacidn, Madera y Decoraci6n,

10 August 1937. 61. C. 163, SD. 62. The following paragraphs concerning the Casa Girona closely follow letters in

c. 1186, SD. 63. Boletin del Sindicato de la Industria de la Edificacion, Madera y Decoracion,

10 November 1937. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid.

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Seidman: Workers' Control in Barcelona, 1936-38 433

66. Minutes of the UGT Masons' Union, c. 1051, SD. 67. This paragraph closely follows the letter in c. 854, SD. 68. This paragraph is based on the minutes of the Control Committee, c. 181-182,

SD. 69. This paragraph closely follows the minutes of the Cros assembly, c. 1421,

SD. 70. Sintesis, January 1937. 71. CNTMaritima, 11 June 1938. 72. Ibid., 15 August 1938. 73. Boletin del Sindicato de la Industria de la Edificacion, Madera y Decoracion,

15 March 1938. 74. Sidero-Metalurgia, September 1937. 75. Hoy, December 1937. 76. Ibid., January 1938. 77. Sidero-Metalurgia, October 1937. 78. C. 1051-1052, SD. 79. See La Espaha Industrial: Libro del centenario (Barcelona 1947), 69; Alberto

del Castillo, La Maquinista Terrestre y Maritima: Personaje hist6rico (1855-1955) (Barcelona 1955), 508.

80. Cf. Peter Stearns, Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor: A Cause without Rebels (New Brunswick, NJ 1971), 103: 'Syndicalism could be a roaring success where, as in Catalonia, ex-peasants, already aggrieved by rural hardship and

injustice, were newly exposed to industry and looked to an idealized past.' Other historians have characterized Spanish anarcho-syndicalism as 'primitive' or 'millenarian'.

Michael Seidman has recently completed his doctoral

dissertation for the University of Amsterdam. He is the author of 'The Birth

of the Weekend and the Revolts against Work: The Workers of the Paris Region

during the Popular Front (1936-38)', French Historical Studies, Fall 1981.

Work and Revolution: Workers' Control in Barcelona in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-38

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Transcript of Work and Revolution: Workers' Control in Barcelona in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-38