William J. Richardson

Heidegger and the Problem of ThoughtIn: Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Troisième série, Tome 60, N°65, 1962. pp. 58-78.

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Richardson William J. Heidegger and the Problem of Thought. In: Revue Philosophique de Louvain. Troisième série, Tome 60,N°65, 1962. pp. 58-78.

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Heidegger

and the Problem of Thought

To most English-speaking readers, Martin Heidegger is known as an existentialist. Yet the term is one that he himself more than once has repudiated as a betrayal of his own proper intentions. His purpose, he insists, is and always has been « to think Being ». Yet what precisely does he understand by « the thinking of Being » (das Denizen des Seins) ? Surely the question is not a superfluous one, and the remarks which follow would like simply to sketch in very bold outline the general terms of the problem involved (1).

A. The Problem of Being

I. The Grounding of Metaphysics.

From the very beginning, Heidegger's exclusive preoccupation has been to lay a foundation for metaphysics. By his own account, it all began on a summer day in 1907 when, as an eighteen-year-old gymnasiast in Constance, he received from Dr. Conrad Grôber, later archbishop of Freiburg (1932-48) but at that time pastor of Trinity Church in Constance, a book that was only gathering dust on Dr. Grober's shelf. It was Franz Brentano's dissertation, On the Manifold Sense of Being according to Aristotle (1862), and it served not only to open Heidegger's eyes to the problem of Being but to introduce him into the philosophical world of the Greeks. In recalling the fact now, he likes to cite Hôlderlin's line from the Rhine Hymn : « As you began, so you will remain » (2).

(l> These pages form part of a longer study, now being readied for publication, next fall, which bears the title, Heidegger : From Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Copyright, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

(>) « Wie die anfiengst, wirst du bleiben », cited in Untenoeg* zur Sprache

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought 59

More precisely, the problem of Being arose as soon as Heidegger began to meditate with Brentano the meaning of the word « being » (5v) for Aristotle. Here he became fascinated by « is », the little word that applies to everything — that enjoys an inconceivable polyvalence (makes world to be world and man to be man), without detriment to the marvelous unity of itself <3>. Yet what of this unity ? This must be Being itself, that which renders possible all « is ». Well, then, what about Being ? What meaning does it have ? If it is true, as Aristotle says, that the function of metaphysics is to ask « what are beings ? » (xi xb 5v % 8v) then, on the supposition that Being gives beings their « is », should we not first ask about Being itself (4) ? Such was the beginning of the way.

Aristotle's question was, to be sure, a « metaphysical » question. Whatever the post-Aristotelian origin of this word in the libraries of Rhodes, clearly the question about beings as beings was a « passing beyond » beings to that which n\akes them be, their « being- ness » (oôa(a) (5). Hence even if Aristotle called such an interrogation « first philosophy », we see with what justice may be attributed to the word « metaphysics » itself an interpretation that has become common currency since Simplicius in the fifth century : a « going beyond » (jieià) the « physical » (ta çuaocdt). This « going beyond » the Latins would call transcender e, so that metaphysics always comports in one way or another the processs of transcendence "\ The (puaixà must be understood as ta cpuaei Svxa (beings

(Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), pp. 92-93. See Franz BRENTANO, Von der manigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1862).

<*> The fascination abides. As in 1929 (Kant und da» Problem der Metaphysik, 2nd ed. [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951], p. 205 [Hereafter: KM]), so in 1952 (Was heisst DenJfeen > [Tubingen: Nicmeyer, 1954], pp. 107, 137 [Hereafter: WD]), the author returns again and again to the strange magic. N. B. We translate Heidegger's Seiendes (that-which-is) as « being » and Sein (that by which it is) as « Being ».

(4) In 1935, Heidegger meditates the sense of the Greek word for Being (elvat). After examining first its grammar (pp. 42-54), then its etymology (pp. 54- 55), he finds the results meager enough, then resorts once more to meditating « is » (p. 68), concluding that the primal form of sTvai must be neither the substantive, nor the infinitive but the third person singular, sc. « is » itself (p. 70). (Ein- fUhrung in die Metaphysik [Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1953], pp. 40-70 [Hereafter: EM]).

<*> The question bi-furcates immediately into the question of what beings are and that they are, hence the question about essence and existence.

<*> See Zm Seinsfrage (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1956), pp. 18, 36-37 (Hereafter: SF).

60 William J. Richardson

which « are » by reason of 9«3atç), where çtîcnç must not be taken to mean what we would call « physical » nature but must be understood in the sense that this word had for the pre-Socratic thinkers, as that by which all things emerge into presence as what they are, sc. Being itself (7). Briefly : metaphysics means the transcendence of beings to their Being.

If metaphysics be understood thus, however, is Aristotle, in finding the formula, thereby its genuine founder ? No, metaphysics as we understand it here emerged initially, Heidegger claims, with Plato, when he made the distinction between the beings of experience as a world of shadows and the Being of these beings as a world of Ideas. In the metaphor of the cave (Politeia VII, 514a, 2 to 517a, 7), for example, he speaks of a « going beyond » the shadows and « over to » the Ideas (516c, 3) (8). For all practical purposes, then, the sense of metaphysics, if not the formula, is here clearly disengaged.

Yet with this all is not said. For if it is clear that metaphysics thinks beings as beings, it must be equally clear that they appear as what they are only by reason of some strange light that renders them un-concealed (unverborgen) before, to and in the metaphysical gaze. Furthermore, this light as such, in rendering beings un-concealed, remains itself concealed (verborgen) within them, for it is itself not a being but merely the light by which they shine forth (9>. What is this light, the concealed source of non-concealment ? This is the question that metaphysics has never posed. But it is a question that must be posed, and, indeed, for the sake of metaphysics itself, since it is only by reason of this light that metaphysics can go about its task. The lighting-process by which beings are illumined as beings — this is what Heidegger understands by Being.

Let us pause for a moment and savor this, « Being, indeed —

(r) Heidegger claims that this sense of CpUCJtÇ may still be found even in Aristotle (Metaphysics Gamma I, 1003 a 27). Moreover, he maintains that, given this sense of tpVQIC, all metaphysics, whether it conceives Being as Pure Act, Absolute Concept or Will-unto-Power, remains essentially a « physics ».

• (•) |i£T' èxeîVa... etç taOta. [Platon* Lehre von der Wahrheit, 2nd ed. Ueberlieferung und Auftrag, Band 5 [Bern: Francke, 1954], p. 48 [Hereafter: PW]).

<•» Was ist Metaphysik ? 7th ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1955), p. 7. (Hereafter: WM). See also Ueber den « Humanismus » (in PW, pp. 53-119), pp. 76-77 (Hereafter: HB).

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought 61

what is Being ? » writes the author in the famous formula of 1947. «... [It] is not God, nor [some] ground of the world. Being is broader than all beings, whether they be rocks, animals, works- of-art, machines, angels or God. Being is what is nearest [to man] . Yet [this] near-ness remains farthest removed from him... » <10). Being is not a being, because it is that which enables beings to be (present) to man and to each other. It is nearest to man, because it makes him to be what he is and enables him to enter into comportment with other beings. Yet it is farthest removed from him because it is not a being with which he, structured as he is to deal with beings as beings, can comport himself. From the point of view of beings, Being encompasses them all, the way a domain of open-ness encompasses what is found within it. This domain is not, of course, « space » but rather that dimension out of which even space and time themselves come-to-presence. Being is the domain of openness, because it is the lighting-process by which beings are lighted- up <u>. If these beings be « subjects » or « objects », then the light itself is neither one nor the other but « between » them both, enabling the encounter to come about (12). It is from Being, then, that metaphysics derives all its vigor as from its proper element (13).

(It) « Doch das Sein — was ist das Sein ? ... Das 'Sein' — das ist nicht Gott und nicht ein Weltgrund. Das Sein ist weiter denn ailes Seiende und ist gleichwohl den Menschen naher als jedes Seiende, sei dies ein Fels, ein Tier, ein Kunstwerk, eine Maschine, sei es ein Engel oder Gott. Das Sein ist das Nachste. Doch die Nahe bleibt dem Menschen am weitesten... » (HB, p. 76).

(U) This process-character of Being accounts (or the fact that the important word Weaen has for Heidegger a verbal sense. See: Votn Wesen der Wahrheit, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1954), pp. 25, 26. (Hereafter: WW) ; Vortrage und Aufsatze (Pfullingen: Neske. 1954), p. 38 (Hereafter: VA); WD, p. 143. To underline the process-character, we have been tempted to translate Sein by the infinitive: To be. We have opted for the more normal form, however: because Heidegger himself usually uses the definite article da», when by omitting it he would have drawn attention to the verbal character of Sein; because Being is more accomodating to the exigencies of readable English than To-be; because the ambiguity that inevitably results may not be altogether a bad thing.

<12) HB, pp. 77 (Lichtung), 101 (Zwischen). May we say that Being thus conceived « is » ? If so, then only Being « is » ; beings, properly speaking, « are » not. The essential is to recognize the difference. (See HB, p. 80). In 1957, Heidegger will accept the formula « being is », provided that « is » be understood transitively. See Identiffl und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 62. (Hereafter: ID).

<u> WM. p. 8.

62 WÛliam l Richardson

The author makes much of the metaphor suggested by Descartes in his letter to Picot, according to which all philosophy is as a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics and whose branches are all the other sciences (14). But what, Heidegger asks, is the ground in which metaphysics is rooted ? The unequivocal answer : Being. Being can be called, then, the ground in which metaphysics as the root of the philosophy tree, is held fast and nourished. To interrogate the ground of metaphysics, we must pose the « ground «-question, the question about the sense of Being (15). Now the « sense » (Sinn) of anything for Heidegger is the non-concealment by which it appears as itself. Non-concealment, however, i$ the literal meaning of d-X^sta, sc. « truth ». «... 'Sense of Being* and 'truth of Being' [are] but one » <l6). So it happens, then, that the ground-question of metaphysics becomes the interrogation of Being in the light of itself, Being in its truth.

The Being-question must, indeed, be posed, but it is not the task of metaphysics as such to pose it. To be sure, metaphysics talks about Being, but only in the sense of the total ensemble of beings, or of being-ness, with all of the ambiguity which, as we shall see, this implies. The fact is, however, that metaphysics cannot pose such a question. As long as its gaze is fixed upon beings, it profits from the light by meditating these beings-as-they-appear, (« ... metaphysics always presents being (5v) in that [dimension] which as beings (^ 5v) they themselves have manifested... » (17>, but cannot meditate the light itself, simply because the light does not appear by itself as a being but only in the beings it enlightens (« ...metaphysics, however, never pays heed to precisely that [dimension] of ÎV which, to the -extent that 5v becomes un-concealed, was by that very fact concealed » <18). There is no way, then, that meta-

CM> WM, p. 7 and paasim. (1*> The c ground «-question (Grandi rage) is to be distinguished from the

c guide «-question (Leitfrage), the question about beings as beings. See EM, p. 15. (16) « ... 'Sinn von Sein* und 'Wahrheit des Seins' sagen das Selbe » (WM,

p. 18). See: HB, p. 84; WM, p. 44; Holzwege, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1952), p. 245 (Hereafter: HW). Cf. Sein und Zeit, 6th ed. (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1949), p. 151. (Hereafter: SZ).

(17) «... denn sie stellt das Seiende (ov) stets nur in den vor, was sich als Seiendes (o Ov schon von diesem her gezeigt hat... » (WM, p. 20). Cf. p. 8.

<u> c ... Die Metaphysik achtet jedoch dessen nie, was sich in eben diesem oV, insofern es unverborgen wurde, auch schon verborgen hat ». (WM, p. 20). Note that in speaking here of two « dimensions » in beings, we have all that is neces-

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought 63

physics can get being, the lighting-process as such, in focus. That is why « ... metaphysics as such is excluded from the experience of Being by reason of its very essence... » <M).

As Heidegger goes about meditating the process of à-XVj&eia, this strange paradox, hidden from the metaphysician, that Being contracts into the beings it makes manifest and hides by the very fact that it reveals, never loses its fascination for him. He interrogates Being precisely inasmuch as it is hidden always in 6v (yet different from 5v), for it is « upon the hidden [dimension] of oV that metaphysics remains grounded... » (20>. We find striking confirmation of this in the inaugural lecture at Freiburg (1929), when, in posing the question that gives the lecture its title, « What is Metaphysics ? », he meditates the sense of Non-being (NichU). The hiddenness of Being (in beings) is, then, for Heidegger as essential a part of his experience as Being itself.

What we call here the « hiddenness » of Being (in beings) may be understood in terms of a « not » that contracts iBeing in beings and at the same time differentiates it from them. Since the function of Being is simply to en-light-en beings, then this contracting « not » is intrinsic to its very nature. For want of a better word, let us call the « not «-character of Being « negativity ». Then the manifestive power that shines forth in beings as beings we may call « positivity » <21). Once we comprehend this fusion of positivity and negativity into the unity of a single process, we begin to grasp what Heidegger understands by Being as the process of truth. For truth, understood in the radical sense of à-Xifjfreia, is literally non- (à-) concealment (Xifjd"!rj) <22). Being as the process of non-concealment is that which permits beings to become non-concealed (positivity), although

sary to kelp us understand the distinction between « ontk > and c ontological > as it appears in SZ.

(19> «... Als Metaphysik ist sie von der Erfahrung des Seins durch ihr eigenes Wesen ausgeschlossen... » (WM, p. 20).

(*°> c Auf dieses Verborgene im ÔV bleibt die Metaphysik gegriindet... » (WM. p. 20).

(«) The terminology as such is not Heidegger's, although we find a certain warrant for it in SZ. We are inclined to think of positivity and negativity here (if images of this kind do not do more harm than good) as two complementary components in a single movement, as in the composition of forces. In any case, the words must not be taken in any dialectical sense.

<") WM. p. II.

64 William J. Richardson

the process is so permeated by « not » that (Being itself remains concealed (negativity). To think Being in its truth, then, is to think it in terms of both positivity and negativity a once.

In the simplest terms : Heidegger's whole effort is to interrogate the positive-negative process of à-X^eia., insofar as it gives rise to metaphysics. The full import of this can be appreciated, however, only when we watch him at work. He meditates, for example, the formula xl to oV % oV and endeavors thereby to disengage the interior structure of metaphysics. Now the formula, he insists, is essentially ambiguous. To be sure, « beings as beings » means the whole ensemble (xafrdXov) of beings, considered in terms of that which makes them « be », sc. their being-ness (obola). The being-ness of the ensemble of beings, however, may be understood in at least two ways : it may mean the common denominator of all beings (8v xafrdXov, xoivdv), hence iBeing, as we say, « in general » ; or it may mean some ultimate « ground » which lets the ensemble of beings be, where this is understood in the sense of some being, supreme among the rest (8v xafrdXou, axpdtatov), and, because supreme, often called « divine » (fretov). Insofar as the task of metaphysics is to make affirmations (Xdyoç) about beings (ô'vxoç) meditated in this way, it is of its very nature onto-logy. When this word emerges in the seventeenth century, however, it is usually reserved for metaphysics in the first sense, sc. the interrogation of Being in general, whereas metaphysics in the second sense, the interrogation of a supreme Being (however this be conceived), is properly speaking a theo-logy, or, as we might better say, a theio-logy. The term « transcendence » shares the same ambiguity. It can mean the passage from beings to Being-in-general, from beings to the Supreme Being, or even the Supreme Being itself (23). What is capital, however, is to note that, since the formula oV % ôv itself is ambiguous, metaphysics necessarily encompasses both these modalities, its innermost structure is onto-theo-logical (24>.

<3S) SF, p. 18. Thus in Kantian terms one would speak of metaphysics in the first sense as a reflection upon the « transcendental », and in the second sense upon « transcendent Transcendence ». See HW, p. 318.

<") WM, pp. 19-20. In ID, p. 51, the author recalls the formula of WM (1929), p. 38, which says that metaphysics meditates beings-as-such (therefore Being-in- general) and in their totality (Being as Supreme Being). We follow here the prologue added to fifth edition of WM (1949). The sense is the same. Cf. KM, p. 17.

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought 65

■ 2. The Ontological Difference.

But the problem lies deeper still. Why is it, after all, that 8v % oV gives rise to the confusion in the first place ? The reason, we are told, lies in the nature of oV itself. Grammatically, it is a participle and as such may be used either as a noun (v. g. can a human being live on the moon ?) or as an adjective with a verbal sense (v. g. being curious, we want to know). More precisely : oV, when taken as a noun, means that which is, se. a being (Sciendes) ; taken as a verbal adjective {seiend), it designates that process by which a being (as noun) « is », se. its Being (Sein) (25). The word itself, then, comporting both senses, is intrinsically ambivalent, and it is because 5v itself can mean either Being, or beings, or both, that the interrogation of ô'v \ ÔV can evolve as a meditation on either Being-in- general (onto-logy) or on the ultimate ground (theo-logy) (26). In other words, the onto-theo-logical structure of metaphysics is rooted ultimately in the intrinsic ambivalence of oV.

It would be a grave mistake, however, to think that this ambivalence of oV is something peculiar to Aristotle. The fact is it characterizes the entire history of Greek thought. The primitive form of oV, Heidegger claims, is most probably èdv, as the word is found, for example, in Homer (v. g. Iliad I, 70), or even in Parmenides and Heraclitus. The I- would indicate the stem àa- (hence êaxtv, est, i&t, is), in whose dynamic power the participle shares in double fashion. What is mare, in Parmenides and Heraclitus, lav can mean, in addition to the ambivalence we have mentioned already, the ultimate and unique process that we know as one-in-many ("Ev- ndtvxa) (27). That is why the author, in a much later expose (1957) of the onto-theo-logical structure of metaphysics, feels free to meditate the ambivalence of ô'v under the guise of Heraclitus'

e/Ev, which in turn is identified with Ad^oç, conceived as the process of grounding beings (28). "Ev, the grounding process, is correlative with nàvxoc, the ensemble of beings that are grounded, and the correlation is so intimate that one correlate cannot « be » without the other :

<"> HW, pp. 161-162, 317. <"> Heidegger claims that the word participium meant precisely « taking part »

in two senses, sc. of noun and verb, at once. The point, however, is less cogent in English than in German, for we reserve the word « participle » to the verbal adjective, calling the verbal noun a < gerund ». See WD, p. 133.

<"> HW, pp. 317-318. <»> ID, p. 67. Cf. VA, pp. 222, 224.

66 William J. Richardson

"Ev can no more serve as ground unless Ilavxa be grounded than n<fcvta can be grounded without *'Ev. This intimate correlation between e'Ev and Ildcvta, intrinsic to the Heraclitean Adyoç, corresponds precisely to the duality of Being and beings that we call the a ambivalence » of oV (29). What is more, out of the ambivalence in A.ô-foç arises even for Heraclitus the same ambiguity that we find later in the structure of metaphysics : e'Ev is unifying one in the sense of the absolutely primary and universal ; 'TEv is the unifying one in the sense of the being, supreme among the Hdcvia (for Heraclitus : Zeus), which grounds the rest, because it is in some way or other the « fullness » of rfEv in the first sense (30).

Coming again to Plato, we can see that the distinction between sensible and supra-sensible, sc. between physical and meta-phy- sical worlds, derives from the same ambivalence. In this respect, it is instructive to recall that this ambivalence is expressed when we call oV a participium. For the old grammarians, this meant that the word « participates » in two meanings at once, that of a noun and that of a verb. The conception of « participation », however, is not a grammatical but a philosophical one. The Latin grammarians took it from the Greek grammarians (jteTO)(V)) who took it, Heidegger claims, from Plato. For Plato, the word describes the relationship between beings and Being, sc. the Ideas. A table, for example, is what it is because it offers its visage to us as a table. To the extent that an individual being offers the visage of a table, Plato maintains that it « participates » (jii&eÇiç) in the Idea of table. In other words, between Being (Idea), the participat-ed, and beings, the participating, there is a )((i)piaji(5ç, se. Being and beings abide in different « places » (x&pa) in the process of participation. For Heidegger, however, what accounts for the conception of Being and beings as abiding in two different places is precisely the ambivalence of ov. It is this that gives rise to ytopiopôç. Participation presupposes ambivalence (31).

Clearly, then, metaphysics is rooted not merely in the ambiguity of the formula oV ^ oV but more profoundly still in the ambivalence of Sv itself. It follows that the process of d-X^eta must be conceived somehow as the coming-to-pass of oV in this peculiar duality.

<"> ID, pp. 59. 62. 66-69. Cf. VA. pp. 218-221. <"> ID. p. 67. Cf. VA, pp. 222. 224. ("> WD, pp. 134-135. 174-175 taken a* a unit. Heidegger italicizes the voratu-

getetzt (p. 135).

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought 67

and therefore if we are to ground metaphysics, we have no other choice but to think Being as the process through which this ambivalence takes place.

But we must go one step further. What is this ambivalence, after all ? Nothing else but the correlation in a single word of « being » as noun and « being » as verbal adjective, hence of that which is (manifest) and the process by which it is (manifest), of beings and Being. Now we could not speak of « ambivalence », of « duality », or, for that matter, of « correlation » at all, unless we experienced some difference between the correlates. The ambivalence in oV, then, names a difference between Being and beings, and from the very beginning Heidegger has called it the « ontological » difference (32>. It follows, then, that whenever we have spoken of the duality of ov, we could have used the term « ontological difference » just as well. The Being, then, whose sense, sc. whose truth, Heidegger seeks in order to ground metaphysics, is nothing else than the emergence of the ontological difference, and conversely, the forgottenness of one is equivalent to the forgottenness of the other. «... The forgottenness of Being is the forgottenness of the difference between Being and beings » (33>.

Out of this forgottenness, metaphysics is born. Nor need the forgottenness be conceived as a deficiency in the metaphysician. Rather it is inherent to metaphysics as such : « because metaphysics interrogates beings as beings, it remains with beings and never returns to Being as Being... » <34). As the word us used in the context of this citation, metaphysics is still conceived as arising with Plato, and, thus understood, it is in the strictest sense a going jiexà xà çuawtà. That is why it emerges first with Plato's distinction between sensible and supra-sensible. When we recall, however, that metaphysics in this sense is no more than one manner in which the ambivalence of oV comes to pass, we realize that its roots go deeper than

<"> Vom Weten de» Grandes, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Klottermann, 1949), p. 15. (Hereafter: WG).

<"' «... Die Seinsvergessenheit iat die Vergessenheit des Unterschiedes des Seins zum Seienden ». (HW, p. 336). (Writer italicizes here; Heidegger italicizes whole). The same point was made in 1929 (KM, p. 212), but it comes into sharp focus only in retrospect.

(") « Weil die Metaphysik das Seiende als das Seiende befragt, bleibt sie beim Seienden und kehrt sich nicht an das Sein als Sein... » (WM, p. 6). Yet metaphysics profits from the difference constantly, and the transcendence proper to it must pass through the difference as such (WD, p. 175).

68 William J. Richardson

Plato, reach down, as we have seen already, to the very origins of Greek thought. Hence « if we think... the essence of metaphysics in terms of the duality of [beings and Being], which derives from the self-concealing ambivalence of ô'v, then the beginning of metaphysics and the beginning of Western thought occur together ». If, on the other hand, we take the essence of metaphysics as the distinction between a supra-sensible and a sensible world, « ... then metaphysics begins with Socrates and Plato... » <35). In probing the gound of metaphysics, Heidegger meditates its « essence », sc. that which lets it be what it is, in both these senses, and since in each case, though in different ways, the ontological difference goes un-thought, he poses as well the question as to why it has been forgotten — forgotten, indeed, necessarily (38>.

This proposal to ground metaphysics by interrogating the sense of Being as the process of à-X^eta through which the ontological difference breaks out has been Heidegger's unique pre-occupation since the first pages of Being and Time (1927). One must admit, of course, that the focus on the difference as difference becomes sharper in the later years than we find it in the beginning, and the evolution in clarity warrants very special attention. But the fundamental position is made sufficiently clear as early as the inaugural address of 1929, when the author formulates the ground-question with Leibniz' formula : « why are there beings at all and not much rather Non-being ? » (37). For Leibniz, of course, the formula asks effectively about a Supreme Being that « grounds » all other beings and is therefore eminently a metaphysical question. For Heidegger, the question means : how is it possible that beings (independently of a where » they might have come from, a who » or « what » may have « caused » them, as metaphysics understands these terms) can be (mani-

(") c Denken wir ... im Hervorkommen des Zweifachen von Anwesendem und Anwesen aus der sich verbergenden Zweideutigkeit des ÔV das Wesen der Metaphysik, dann fallt der Beginn der Metaphysik mit dem Beginn des abend- lândischen Denkens zusammen. Nimmt man dagegen als das Wesen der Metaphysik die Trennung zwischen einer iibersinnlichen und einer sinnlichen Welt,... dann beginnt die Metaphysik mit Sokrates und Platon... » (HW, p. 162). Cf HW, p. 243, where pre-Platonic thought is conceived as a c preparation » (vorbereitet) for metaphysics in the strict sense. A case in point : the correlation of 'EV'IItXVTa in Heraclitus' Adyoç (ID, p. 67; VA, pp. 222. 224).

<••> ID, pp. 46-47. <"> «... Warum ist uberhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts ? » (WM,

P. 42).

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought 69

fest) as beings. In other words, it is a question about the coming-to- pass of the lighting-process of à-XV)freia, which we now understand as the emergence of the ontological difference. What is more, it is a question about this process as permeated by negativity. Heidegger himself expands the question thus : « ... How does it come about that everywhere [about us] beings have the primacy ... while that which is not a being, which is thought of as Non-being in the sense of Being itself, remains forgotten ?... » (38). The ground- question meditates not only Being but obliviousness to Being, the forgotten- ness of the ontological difference.

One last word ! Since metaphysics by reason of its nature cannot meditate the Being-process which is its ground, then to ground metaphysics we must pass beyond it. This is the sense of the « overcoming » of metaphysics. By overcoming it in this way, do we vitiate or destroy it ? Of course not. If we leave metaphysics, it is only to return to the ground from which it draws vitality. Heidegger explicitly does not wish to tear the roots of philosophy out ; he will simply dress the ground, till the soil wherein it finds its strength (89). This effort to lay bare the foundations of ontology was called in the early years « fundamental ontology » <40\ but after 1929 the word disappears completely. In 1949 we are told why : the word « ontology », -even with the epithet « fundamental » to explain it, makes it too easy to understand the grounding of metaphysics as simply an ontology of a higher sort, whereas ontology, which is but another name for metaphysics, must be left behind completely (41). The

'**' c ... Woher kommt es, class iiberall Seiendes den Vorrang hat und jeg- liches ' ist ' fur sich beansprucht, wâhrend das, was nicht ein Seiendes ist, das so verstandene Nichts als das Sein selbst, vergessen bleibt ?... » (WM, p. 23).

<"> WM, pp. 9-10 (grabt, pfiugt). Rnckgang appears in the title of the introduction to WM (1949) and passim throughout. Note a discrepancy between text (1929) and introduction (1949): in 1929, it seems possible to ground metaphysics while remaining interior to it, for the question of Non-being is a « metaphysical » question (WM, pp. 41, 24-27, 38). Similarly in KM, pp. 13-14, we are told that the foundation of metaphysics must not be conceived as a basis that supports it from the outside but as the projecting of a blueprint (Entwerfen des Bauplans) for metaphysics, as discernible in the nature of man. It is the c metaphysics of metaphysics » (v. g. KM, p. 208). In 1949, it is clearly necessary to quit metaphysics entirely in order to meditate its ground. Latent here is the entire transition from the early to the late Heidegger.

<40> SZ, p. 13; KM, p. 13. <**) WM, p. 21 . Thus the word « ontological » has become for Heidegger

70 William J.Richardson

essential is to realize that whether we speak of fundamental ontology or the ground of metaphysics, the sense is identical : we are talking about the ultimate process out of which metaphysics arises, the essence (Wesen) of metaphysics. Conversely, to meditate metaphysics in terms of its essence will mean always to leave it in order to return to its ground, sc. to think upon the truth of Being. It is the truth of Being — and this means Being as the process of truth in beings (à-XVj&eia) — that alone interests Heidegger. This is the « one star » — the only — that remains constant along the way (43).

B. The Problem of Thought

If anyone wishes to assess Heidegger's philosophical effort, one would think that the best way would be to measure the success or failure with which he has been able to answer his own question about the sense, sc. truth, of the Being-process. But such a project is unfeasible, not only because he has not yet said his last word about Being, but because it becomes increasingly clear that for him a last word probably cannot be said, insofar as the sense of Being lies in the fact that it is eminently question-able. If he has an importance for his contemporaries, then, this importance must be measured not by the question as answered but by the question as asked. It is in terms of the very posing of the question, therefore, that one might seek to assess the originality of his work.

The question about the sense of Being remains through Heidegger's entire work an indefatigable effort to think the Being-process. The question, then, about the sense of Heidegger ultimately may reduce itself to this : what does it mean to think. ? Such is the question that we are endeavoring to pose here : what does Heidegger mean by the thinking of Being ? It is a notion that becomes thematized only in the later work, and if we were to examine it in its fullness, we would have to trace the shift from the problem of fundamental ontology in the early period to the search for authentic thought later on as a metamorphosis that is as much controlled by

suspect. Cf. Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), p. 55. (Hereafter: G). In the later years, even the « ontological difference » becomes simply the difference (Di0erenz, Unter-Schied).

<42> « Auf einen Stern... » (Aus der Erfahrung de» DenJfeens [Pfullingen: Neske, 1954], p. 7 [Hereafter: ED]).

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought l 71

an internal unity as it is dictated by an intrinsic necessity. It would be a privileged opportunity to watch the interior dynamics of the so-called « reversal » in Heidegger's thought. For the present, however, let us be content with generalities.

To begin with, what shall we call this thought that thinks the Being^process ? The author himself speaks of it in many ways, but we settle on one of them for reasons of clarity and consistency. The thought which interrogates the foundations (Wesen) of metaphysics we call simply « foundational » thought (das wesentliche Denken) (43). How is it to be understood ?

1. Negatively.

We gain best access to the notion of foundational thought if we first determine what it is not. The thought that overcomes metaphysics is not a metaphysical thought. But what is metaphysical thought ? Only a Heidegger-eye of metaphysics in its history can give us an understanding of it (44).

However oblivious the pre-Socratics may have been to the onto- logical difference as Heidegger himself thematizes it, they had a profound sense of the Being-process, for they conceived Being as qrôaiç. Whatever it is that spontaneously emerges, or opens-up and unfolds, and, having unfolded, appears in abiding self-manifestation — this is çtSatç. It is not simply what we call « nature », which is a being like the rest, sc. only one form of emergence. Rather it embraces all manner and types of beings : heaven and earth, gods and men. By reason of this çtfaiç beings arise and stand forth as being what they are, sc. they become con-stant and observable, able-to- be-encountered. <£6aiç is emergent-abiding-Power. Whence does it emerge ? From concealment. Recent philological research finds a

<"> Denken is literally an infinitive. Used as a noun (more often in German than in English), it implies the activity or process of thinking. In English, this is more easily rendered by the participle than the infinitive. Hence we translate it usually as « thinking » occasionally as c thought », intending this always to mean c thought » in the active sense, sc. as in the process of accomplishing itself. Wesentliche comports the full verbal sense of Wesen, which oan be appreciated only as we proceed.

<"> In the résumé which follows, we seek only a simple statement of Heidegger's argument. To offer textual justification for every statement made would expand the present article into book-form. We reduce citations, therefore, to a minimum.

72 William /. Richardson

relation between the stem (pu- and 9a- of çaÉveoOm, suggesting that çtSaiç is an emerging-into-light, a shining-forth, an appearing. Hence by reason of <pi5atç, à-XV)freta, comes-to-pass (is).

With Plato, this early Greek conception of <pt5aiç-dfcX^9-eia ac. truth conceived as non-concealment, undergoes a transformation, for, although oh the one hand the Ideas re.tain the original sense of à-XYJO-euz, insofar as they are conceived fundamentally as a source of light by reason of which, through participation, the « beings » of experience shine forth, nevertheless the Ideas become at the same time something-to-be-seen (elSoç ; JSeîv), and truth comes gradually to mean the proper viewing of the Ideas, the conformity (ôp&dnqç) between the being that views and the Ideas (conceived as beings) that are viewed. Here the Ideas are transformed from a source of light into that-which-is-viewed. In other words, Being is reduced to a being. The confusion will mark the entire subsequent history of metaphysics. Token of the confusion will be the domination henceforth of the conception of truth as conformity and a disregard of the original sense of truth as non-concealment. Since truth-as-non-concealment is what Heidegger understands by Being, it is easy to see in what sense he understands metaphysics as the perennial forgetfulness of Being.

But if metaphysics begins with Plato, it reaches its term in the subject- ism of Descartes and the entire modern period. With the liberation of man unto himself that characterized the epoch, Descartes sought some fundamentwn inconcussum veritatis, by which man himself could become the arbiter of his own truth. Truth, then, becomes not only conformity but the verification of this conformity, sc. certitude. This fundamentum would a underlie » all truths, hence would be the « subject » of truth, which for Descartes himself was, of course, the cogito-swn. The fundamentum veritatis becomes the res (subjectum) co gitans, where cogitatio is to be understood as the present-ing, or pro-posing, of an object to a subject, in such a way that the present-ing or pro-posing subject itself can guarantee its conformity to the object in a manner analogous to the way in which the subject guarantees to itself its own existence (4*'. Since only that

<"> EM, pp. 11-12 (aufgehenden und verweUenden Walter*), 54, 77 (?U- çaÉvsa&at,), 47 (i-X^9-eia).

(4e) Present-ative thinking reaches its fulfillment in the subject-ism of Des- oares, but it is a type of thinking that is intrinsic to metaphysics as such. For in meditating beings as beings it (re)presents these beings in terms of their being-

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought 73

is true which is certifiable, beings are « true » only insofar as they enter into the subject-object polarity, sc. are either subjects, or objects. Hence the Being of beings becomes that by which they are subjects (subject-ivity) or objects (object-ivity) : their only presence is found not in their own non-concealment but in the order or (re)presentation by a subject. With Descartes, then, the transcendence which characterizes all metaphysics becomes not a passage unto something specifically non-human, whether an Idea or God, but rather unto a subjectum which in one way or another is related to human nature itself. It is, then, less a « going beyond » the human orbit than an exploring of it. Hence for the epoch of subject-ism Heidegger suggests that we speak not of « transcendence » but of « rescendence » (47).

However this may be, the subject for Descartes is an individual human ego, but Leibniz extends the notion so that it could apply to every being. For every monad is endowed with the power of present-ation, se. perceptio et appetitus. Kant's transcendental philosophy was an attempt to discern the conditions necessary to render possible the present-ing of objects to the subject. But the culmination of subject-ism (hence of all metaphysics) arrives with Hegel, for it was he who explored the absolute character of the certitude in which Descartes' quest for the fundamentum inconcussum terminated, sc. the certitude of self -awareness.

Culminated in Hegel, subject-ist metaphysics reached its ultimate consummation in Nietzschean nihilism. On the one hand, Nietzsche saw that the old supra-sensible (meta-physical) values had lost their meaning for nineteenth century Europe, and, to the extent that he took God to be the symbol of these values, God was certainly dead. On the other hand, his own effort at revaluation remained itself a metaphysics, for the Will-unto-Power, posing as it did new values (truth and art), was eminently a subject-ism. The only change was in the way in which the presentative subject was conceived : now it was Universal Will. Nietzsche failed, then, to overcome metaphysical nihilism. In fact, he added to its momentum, for to the extent that his super-man responds to the exigencies of Being con-

ness, hence present-ative thought simply transposes onto the level of thought the process of transcendence. It has its origin in Plato to the extent that, in transforming Being into a being (Idea), Plato conceived the being-ness of beings as see-able (eîSoç : fôsTv), hence present-able through some type of vision.

<"> SF. p. 18 (Reszendenz).

74 , • ' William J. Richardvon. ■ .

oeived as Will-unto-Power, he seeks (and must seek) domination over the earth. This he achieves principally through scientific progress. Such is the meaning of the « technicity » which crystallizes for contemporary society the forgetfulness of the Being-dimension in beings, of the ontological difference. The mesure of Nietzsche's failure was his inability to escape the subject-object polarity. This could be done only by a type of thinking that could transcend subject-ism, meditate the essence of metaphysics by going beyond it to think that which metaphysics invariably forgets : the sense of Being itself.

What is said here of metaphysics may be said for the science of logic as well, for this formulates the rules of present-ative thought. Like metaphysics, logic, too, is chained to the conception of truth- as-conformity. In similar fashion, Heidegger interprets the traditional conception of humanism. Interpreting the essence of man as a rational animal, all traditional humanisms, he claims, either spring from metaphysics or found one.

Foundational thought, then, is of such a nature that it can overcome metaphysics, technicity, logic, humanism. It must be a process that is non-subjective (better pre-subjective), therefore non-present- ative (pre-presentative). By the same token, it is non-logical (pre- logical), and as long as we remain in the perspectives of logic and metaphysics, we will be able to think of Being only as Non-being (Nichts). If « rational » (ratio) means the same as « logical » (X^oç), then this thought must be called non-rational : not irrational, but pre-rational. As opposed to the tendency to dominate the objects of thought, the attitude of foundational thinking will be simply to let beings be, hence render them free unto themselves.

2. Positively.

More positively, foundational thinking tries to meditate Being as the process of truth, sc. the coming-to-pass of the lighting-process in beings. What is the fundamental structure of this thought ? It is brought-to-pass by the nature of man conceived as ek-sistence, sc. endowed with the prerogative, unique among beings, of an ecstatic open-ness unto the lighting process of a-Xifj^eta. Ek-sistence thus understood may be called the « There » (Da) of Being, because it is that domain among beings where the lighting-process takes place. Since the There comes-to-pass in a being, sc. man, this privileged

Heidegger end the Problem of Thought 75

being is the « There-being », and conversely, There-*being must be understood always as the There of Being among beings, nothing more.

To understand thought, then, we must first see more precisely the relationship between Being and its There. It is, in fact, a correlation. For on the one hand, Being maintains a primacy over its There, throwing it out and dominating it at all times, revealing and concealing itself through its There, according to the necessity proper to itself. Yet on the other hand, it needs its There in order to be itself, sc. the coming-to-pass of non-concealment, for unless non-concealment comes-to-pass in a There that is found among beings, it does not come-to-pass at all. To think Being will be to think the truth of Being in which There-being is ek-sistent.

Being discloses itself to and in its There, but since it is Being that holds the primacy, Being is conceived as sending itself unto its There. We may speak of this self -sending as proceeding from Being and call it a « self-emitting », or, if we may be permitted a neologism to designate a completely new concept, a « mittence » (Ge- schick) of Being. We may speak of it, too, as terminating in There and therefore call it a « com-mitting » or « com-mitment » (Schiksat) of There to its privileged destiny as the shepherd of Being. In any case, one thing is certain : intrinsic to the mittence of Being is a certain negativity, by reason of which Being withdraws even as it bestows itself, conceals itself even in revealment. The reason is that even though Being reveals itself in revealing beings, it can never be seized for itself and by itself (since it is not a being), therefore it conceals itself in the very beings to which it gives rise. To think Being, then, will be to think it as a mittence, not only in its posi- tivity but in its negativity.

We must go one step further. Since the mittence of Being is intrinsically negatived, no single mittence exhausts the power of Being to reveal itself. Hence Being discloses itself to the nature of man by a plurality of mittences, which we shall call « inter-mittence » (Ge-schicke), and it is this that constitutes history (Ge-schichte). Foun- dational thought must think Being-as-history and therefore is a profoundly historical thought.

All this describes, however, the relation between Being and its There. What is the precise rôle of thought in the process ? It brings this relationship to fulfillment. If we consider this fulfillment with

76 William /. Richardson

reference to Being, thought completes the process of non-concealment by bringing Being into that form of manifestation that is most proper to the nature of man : language, through which he says « is ». If we consider this fulfillment in terms of the There, thought is that process by which ek-sistence assumes, therefore achieves, itself as the There of Being. From either point of view, the fundamental attitude of thought will be one of acquiescence to Being, of responding (Entsprechung) to its appeal (Anspruch), of letting Being be itself.

The structure of this process will take the form of a re-collection (Andenken) : the tri-dimensional process by which Being comes (« future ») to the thinker in and through what already-has- been {« past ») and is rendered manifest (« present ») by the words that the thinker himself formulates. Such, too, is the structure of the thought-ful dialogue. Profoundly a temporal process (future-past-present), foundational thought is by this very fact historical, sc. thinks Being-as-history in continual ad-vent to thought through its dialogue with the past. Furthermore, thought thinks not only Being-as-history (inter- mittence), but thinks every mittence of Being in its negativity, as well as in its positivity, endeavoring to comprehend and express not what another thinker thought/said, but what he did not think/ say, could not think/say and why he could not think/say it.

But when all is said and done, the function of foundational thought is to help Being be itself, to dwell in Being as in its element, just as a fish dwells in water. Thought as the fulfillment of the There proceeds from Being and belongs to it, for the There is thrown-out by Being. On the other hand, thought attends to Being, inasmuch as by it the There assumes itself as the guardian of Being. This thought that belongs to 'Being and attends to Being is what Heidegger in his later period — let us call him simply « Heidegger II » — means by the « thinking of Being » {das Denken des Seins). Briefly : foundational thinking is the process by which human ek- sistence responds to Being, not only in its positivity but in its negativity, as the continual process of truth-as-history. Our first task would be to see how all this finds its roots in the early Heidegger (« Heidegger I »).

Before we conclude this general survey, it is worth-while calling attention to the fact that an authentic response to the appeal of Being is precisely what Heidegger understands by « philosophy ».

Heidegger and the Problem of Thought 77

He develops the point in an address to the philosophers of France in 1955 (48).

The word appears for the first time, the author claims, in Hera- clitus, and there as an adjective rather than as a noun, describing the man who çiXeî tô aocpdv. OiXsî is interpreted to mean « respond », and oo<pdv to mean frEv-IIàvxa, se. Being-as-A^YOÇ (7Ev), insofar as it gathers together beings (Ildcvxa) unto themselves and lets them be. During the era of sophistry, both appeal and response took different forms. Then the mystery of Being in beings disclosed itself to the true thinker as threatened by the crass charlatanism of the sophists. In such a situation the authentic response was to try to salvage Being from this fallen condition, hence to strive after Being in beings beyond the level of every-dayness. The fundamental drive was an ïpoç. To Aristotle, the Being^to-be-sought disclosed itself as being-ness (oôafa), and responding to it he posed the question : Xl TÔ Ô'V % Ô'V ? (49).

Now Heidegger's thesis is that what the occidental man traditionally has called « philosophy » is precisely that striving after the Being of beings that implied a passage beyond the sensible (physical) to the supra-sensible that began with Plato. We can see, then, that for Western thought philosophy, as we know it, is identified with metaphysics, so that when Aristotle comes to define philosophy, the result is the classic definition of metaphysics : 'emaxYJtiY] xôv ?cp<j)Ta)V àpx©v Kaï alxiôv ■ô'ewpextx1^. Paraphrasing in Heidegger's sense, we take this to mean : philosophy is that endowment in man (êmax^jMf]) by which he can catch and hold in view (d-ewpYjxtx^) beings in that by which they are as beings (ipx^v, aZxUBv). No one will doubt, least of all Heidegger, that this conception of philosophy is a legitimate one. What makes it so, however, is not that it crystallizes once and for all the meaning of metaphysics, but that it is an authentic response by Aristotle to the address of Being to him. The author insists, however, that the historic formula is only one way of conceiving the correlation of address-response between Being and man. It is helpless, for example, to express this correlation as it comes-to-pass in Heraclitus and Permenides. Why, then, absolutize it ? Being remains after Aristotle, as before, eminently « free » to

<"> Wat Ut da» — die Philosophie} (Pfullingen: Neake, 1956). (Hereafter: WP).

<"> WP, pp. 21-22 (Heraclitut), 23-24 (Sophists), 24-25 (Aristotle).

7è William j. fcicharâson

address itself to man in some other type of mittence, articulated in some other way (s0). If we, for our part, remain docile to Being, which in the Aristotelian tradition imparted itself as metaphysics, are we not after all — indeed in a very original way — still « philosophical » ?

During the course of Heidegger's development, he uses the word « philosophy » sometimes in the narrow sense, by which it is identified with metaphysics, sometimes in the broad sense, as a response to Being's appeal. In the first case, it shares the same destiny as metaphysics and must be overcome. In the second, it is a consummation devoutly to be wished (51). Clearly, to the extent that we disengage the sense of foundational thought, we delineate Heidegger's conception of philosophy as well.

William J. RICHARDSON, S. J.

St. Peters College Jersey City 6, N. J. U. S. A.

(«•> WP, pp. 25-27 (èmanfjlir)...), 28-29 (freie Folge). The word < free » here has a polemical connotation, directed against the Hegelian notion according to which the mittences of Being would be determined by a dialectical necessity. Cf. p. 31.

<"> V. g. PW, p. 48 (narrow sense); W, p. 24 (broad sense).