(with Daniel Fehder), 2015. Science, Vol 348 #6240.

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1200 12 JUNE 2015 • VOL 348 ISSUE 6240 sciencemag.org SCIENCE INSIGHTS Shakedown on fracking p. 1204 How cancer chromosomes shatter p. 1205 Financing experiments By Ramana Nanda 1,2 and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf 1,2 Venture capital (VC) investors have recently been criticized for no longer financing innovations related to society’s “biggest problems.” We have shown that two defining features of VC investments are an extremely skewed distribution of outcomes and an inability to tell—up front—which will be successful. VCs therefore learn about the viability of potential investments through a multistage financing process, where each round of funding is tied to results of “experi- ments” that create information about future prospects ( 1). The value of staging stems from being able to abandon investments partway if information from early experiments is negative. Startups for which experiments are cheaper to run and are more discriminating are more attractive investments. The advent of cloud- computing significantly lowered costs of early experi- ments for firms in software, Internet, and digital media and shifted funding away from sectors where early experiments cost more and are less discriminating, such as biotechnology and energy production. Advances in simulation technologies, rapid prototyp- ing, and gene sequencing have begun lowering costs of experiments in these sectors, as have platforms, such as Science Exchange, that allow startups to conduct early tests without investing in infrastruc- ture upfront. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs in science-based ventures that are expensive to commercialize can also benefit from setting up experiments that help investors learn about viability early on. Al- though entrepreneurs are never happy when investors stop funding, structuring early experiments that facilitate such abandonment, by being highly specific (correctly identifying all failures), even if at the expense of sensitivity (correctly identifying every success), can actu- ally help obtain investment in the first place. To increase the chances that innovations focused on society’s biggest problems attract suf- ficient funding, government policy should focus on sectors or stages where the cost and the time to learn is high, thereby making it more difficult for private investors to finance experimentation. REFERENCES 1. W. R. Kerr, R. Nanda, M. Rhodes-Kropf, J. Econ. Perspect. 28, 25 (2014). 10.1126/science.aab4135 Founders and joiners By Michael Roach 3 and Henry Sauermann 4,2 Most efforts to promote technology entrepreneurship, such as courses and incubators, focus on potential founders of startup com- panies. Yet the vast majority of scientists and engineers contribute to entrepreneurship as “joiners”—employees who join founders in their efforts to start companies. We investigated individuals’ entre- preneurial interests through a survey of nearly 4200 science and engineering Ph.D. candidates at tier 1 U.S. research universities ( 1), focusing on three questions: How prevalent are interests in joining a startup as an employee versus being a founder? How are joiners different from founders? How do contextual factors shape different entrepreneurial interests? Among the Ph.D.’s surveyed, 46% were interested in joining a startup as an employee, whereas 11% ex- pected to one day start their own company. Compared with Ph.D.’s interested in careers in established firms, founders and joiners share similar preferences for an entrepreneurial work setting, such as a desire for greater autonomy, tolerance for risk, and a desire to commercialize technologies. However, founders are significantly more risk tolerant and have a stronger interest in management, whereas joiners are more interested in functional work activities ENTREPRENEURSHIP PERSPECTIVES Studying the start-up system POLICY There is seemingly limitless, often breathless, rhetoric championing “innovation” and “entrepreneurship” as keys to harnessing science and technology for economic advancement. More elusive, and illuminating, is solid evidence on features that allow a dynamic technology commercialization ecosystem to thrive. Science invited social scientists to highlight insights from their research on what makes entrepreneur-driven systems flourish and how those lessons might inform policies and practices to help make rhetoric reality. 1 Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, USA. 2 National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. 3 Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850, USA. 4 Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA. 5 School of Management, Polytechnic University of Milan, 20156 Milan, Italy. 6 Rice University, Houston, TX 77251, USA. 7 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. 8 Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. 9 Barcelona GSE, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. 10 Banco de España, 08002 Barcelona, Spain. 11 Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA. 12 Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.*The opinions in this article are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España. Corresponding author. E-mail: †[email protected] (R.N.); ‡[email protected] (M.R.); §[email protected] (C.F.); ¶[email protected] (C.S.); [email protected] (Y.V.H.); #[email protected] (S.S.) Published by AAAS on June 12, 2015 www.sciencemag.org Downloaded from on June 12, 2015 www.sciencemag.org Downloaded from

Transcript of (with Daniel Fehder), 2015. Science, Vol 348 #6240.

Page 1: (with Daniel Fehder), 2015. Science, Vol 348 #6240.

1200 12 JUNE 2015 • VOL 348 ISSUE 6240 sciencemag.org SCIENCE

INSIGHTSShakedown on fracking p. 1204

How cancer chromosomes shatter p. 1205

Financing experimentsBy Ramana Nanda 1, 2 † and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf 1 ,2

Venture capital (VC) investors have recently been criticized for no

longer financing innovations related to society’s “biggest problems.”

We have shown that two defining features of VC investments are

an extremely skewed distribution of outcomes and an inability to

tell—up front—which will be successful. VCs therefore learn about

the viability of potential investments through a multistage financing

process, where each round of funding is tied to results of “experi-

ments” that create information about future prospects ( 1). The value

of staging stems from being able to abandon investments partway

if information from early experiments is negative. Startups for

which experiments are cheaper to run and are more discriminating

are more attractive investments. The advent of cloud-

computing significantly lowered costs of early experi-

ments for firms in software, Internet, and digital media

and shifted funding away from sectors where early experiments cost

more and are less discriminating, such as biotechnology and energy

production. Advances in simulation technologies, rapid prototyp-

ing, and gene sequencing have begun lowering costs of experiments

in these sectors, as have platforms, such as Science Exchange, that

allow startups to conduct early tests without investing in infrastruc-

ture upfront. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs in science-based ventures

that are expensive to commercialize can also benefit from setting

up experiments that help investors learn about viability early on. Al-

though entrepreneurs are never happy when investors stop funding,

structuring early experiments that facilitate such abandonment, by

being highly specific (correctly identifying all failures), even if at the

expense of sensitivity (correctly identifying every success), can actu-

ally help obtain investment in the first place. To increase the chances

that innovations focused on society’s biggest problems attract suf-

ficient funding, government policy should focus on sectors or stages

where the cost and the time to learn is high, thereby making it more

difficult for private investors to finance experimentation.

REFERENCES

1. W. R. Kerr, R. Nanda, M. Rhodes-Kropf, J. Econ. Perspect. 28, 25 (2014).

10.1126/science.aab4135

Founders and joinersBy Michael Roach 3 ‡ and Henry Sauermann 4,2

Most efforts to promote technology entrepreneurship, such as

courses and incubators, focus on potential founders of startup com-

panies. Yet the vast majority of scientists and engineers contribute

to entrepreneurship as “joiners”—employees who join founders in

their efforts to start companies. We investigated individuals’ entre-

preneurial interests through a survey of nearly 4200 science and

engineering Ph.D. candidates at tier 1 U.S. research universities ( 1),

focusing on three questions: How prevalent are interests in joining

a startup as an employee versus being a founder? How are joiners

different from founders? How do contextual factors shape different

entrepreneurial interests? Among the Ph.D.’s surveyed, 46% were

interested in joining a startup as an employee, whereas 11% ex-

pected to one day start their own company. Compared with Ph.D.’s

interested in careers in established firms, founders and joiners

share similar preferences for an entrepreneurial work setting, such

as a desire for greater autonomy, tolerance for risk, and a desire to

commercialize technologies. However, founders are significantly

more risk tolerant and have a stronger interest in management,

whereas joiners are more interested in functional work activities

ENTREPRENEURSHIP

PERSPECTIVES

Studying the start-up system

POLICY

There is seemingly limitless, often breathless, rhetoric championing “innovation” and “entrepreneurship”

as keys to harnessing science and technology for economic advancement. More elusive, and illuminating, is

solid evidence on features that allow a dynamic technology commercialization ecosystem to thrive. Science

invited social scientists to highlight insights from their research on what makes entrepreneur-driven

systems fl ourish and how those lessons might inform policies and practices to help make rhetoric reality.

1Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, USA. 2National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. 3Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850, USA. 4Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA. 5School of Management, Polytechnic University of Milan, 20156 Milan, Italy. 6Rice University, Houston, TX 77251, USA. 7Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. 8Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. 9Barcelona GSE, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. 10Banco de España, 08002 Barcelona, Spain. 11Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA. 12Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.*The opinions in this article are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España. Corresponding author. E-mail: †[email protected] (R.N.); ‡[email protected] (M.R.); §[email protected] (C.F.); ¶[email protected] (C.S.); � [email protected] (Y.V.H.); #[email protected] (S.S.)

Published by AAAS

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12 JUNE 2015 • VOL 348 ISSUE 6240 1201SCIENCE sciencemag.org

such as research and development (R&D). Preferences for financial

income have little relation with interests in entrepreneurship. To-

gether these preferences shape individuals’ predispositions toward

entrepreneurship, which in turn condition how they respond to

factors thought to promote entrepreneurship, such as having a fac-

ulty adviser who has founded a company. Individuals with a strong

predisposition toward entrepreneurship are most likely to be inter-

ested in becoming a founder, whereas those who lack preferences

for entrepreneurial job attributes show no interest in founding,

regardless of external factors. Individuals with a moderate entre-

preneurial predisposition are most susceptible to external factors,

which increase their interest in joining a startup as an employee.

Efforts to foster technology entrepreneurship should recognize that

individuals may respond in different ways; blanket efforts, such as

mandated entrepreneurship training, are likely to be inefficient.

Programs should also prepare scientists and engineers for a variety

of entrepreneurial roles—joiners as well as founders.

REFERENCES

1. M. Roach, H. Sauermann, Manage. Sci., 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2100 (2015).

10.1126/science.aab2804

Cash from the crowdBy Massimo G. Colombo ,5 Chiara Franzoni, 5§

Cristina Rossi-Lamastra 5

Crowdfunding (CF), in which financing for projects is sought via

the Internet from large groups of individuals, is a $3.3 billion

per year phenomenon. But it’s not clear how well CF, typically

used for creative arts projects, can be used to finance science and

technology (“tech”) projects. We analyzed nearly 112 thousand CF

campaigns launched on Kickstarter.com through late 2014 (see

supplementary materials). The share of tech projects is increas-

ing, from 4% of total projects in 2009 to 8% in 2014. Tech projects

have the largest average target budgets ($86,529; nontech average,

$18,003). The rate of tech projects that reached their target bud-

get and were funded, 38%, is lower than the overall 58% success

rate. Tech projects received 14% of the capital raised through

Kickstarter, totaling $139.8 million. Although this is a substantial

amount, it is only 3% of the $4.7 billion invested by venture capi-

talists in high-tech ventures in the United States in 2013. CF also

differs qualitatively from other forms of entrepreneurial finance. ILL

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INSIGHTS | PERSPECTIVES | ENTREPRENEURSHIP

CF money is not invested in exchange for a financial return but

is pledged in the form of product prepurchasing from end users

as consumers. This has three important implications. First, CF in-

vites gathering feedback from users during project development,

a practice shown to be effective in problem-solving and product-

testing in open-source and open-innovation platforms. By cutting

development time and failure rates, this feature offers new means

for tech transfer. Second, crowdfunders are highly responsive

to social exchanges that the entrepreneur uses inside the CF

community and beyond ( 1). Third, CF is more suitable when the

project outcome is a ready-to-use product that can be offered in

exchange for the pledge. This makes CF more suitable for applied

projects, which are close to market delivery, but calls into doubt

the suitability of CF as a means for funding basic research.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

www.sciencemag.org/content/348/6240/1201/suppl/DC1

REFERENCES

1. M. G. Colombo, C. Franzoni, C. Rossi-Lamastra, Entrep. Theory Pract. 39, 75 (2015).

10.1126/science.aab3832

Intangible but bankableBy Yael V. Hochberg , 6,7, 2 Carlos Serrano ,8, 9 ,10 *¶

Rosemarie Ziedonis 11, 12

Young science and technology companies are often rich in intan-

gibles but lack physical assets and cash flows required to secure

a loan. Intangibles, such as patents, are effectively “unbankable”

for traditional lenders because of international banking regula-

tions. Intangibles also are often difficult to value and sell. External

debt is therefore widely cast as an unlikely way to fund the risky

projects of intangibles-rich companies. Despite this conventional

wisdom, we uncover a surprisingly active market for “venture lend-

ing” to patent-producing U.S. startups in three innovation-intensive

sectors: medical devices, semiconductors, and software ( 1). Venture

lenders fund such startups in early stages of development, most

often alongside VC investors. According to one estimate, venture

lenders supply roughly $5 billion in growth capital to startups each

year, with funds originating from both regulated banks and special-

ized lenders. To minimize downside risk, lenders typically require

a lien on assets, including intangibles, and record liens involving

patents with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Lenders also

pay keen attention to the solvency and reputations of VCs backing

startups that apply for funding. Among VC-backed startups in our

sample, 36% received venture loans. Lending was more prevalent

for startups with top-tier VCs and for startups with more “sale-

able” patents. After the NASDAQ crash of 2000, many VCs faced

severe constraints in raising capital, whereas others were flush

with recently raised funds. Lenders continued to finance startups

backed by less capital-constrained investors but withdrew from

otherwise promising projects that may have needed their funds the

most. Thus, VCs play a vital intermediary role in lending relations

with risky startups. Attempts to stimulate entrepreneurial activity

through debt channels alone may have limited economic effects

in the absence of well-developed markets for buying and selling

patents and infrastructures for equity investing.

REFERENCES

1. Y. V. Hochberg, C. Serrano, R. H. Ziedonis, “Patent collateral, investor commitment, and the market for venture lending” (Working paper 20587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2014); www.nber.org/papers/w20587.

10.1126/science.aac4837

Accelerators and ecosystemsBy Yael V. Hochberg 6 , 7 ,2 � and Daniel C. Fehder 7

A new institutional form has emerged in the entrepreneurial

ecosystem in recent years: the seed accelerator. These fixed-term

cohort-based “boot camps” for startups offer education and mentor-

ship for startup founders and culminate in a “demo day,” during

which graduates pitch their businesses to potential investors. Many

local governments hope to use accelerators to transform their local

economies through establishment of startup technology clusters.

Evidence of accelerators’ efficacy is limited, however, so we examine

their effects on regional entrepreneurial ecosystems, particularly

provision of venture capital (VC) financing to new startups ( 1).

Accelerators emerge in different regions in different years, often

for reasons exogenous to the nature of the ecosystem or precisely

because of its lacking. This allows us to compare changes in regions

that receive an accelerator with similar regions that do not have one.

We see a shift in funding for startups in accelerator-treated regions:

more deals, more dollars, and more local investment groups. This

applies to startups that attend the accelerator and those that do not.

Most accelerators focus on software companies, and regions with

accelerators shift toward a higher share of early-stage software and

information technology–related VC deals (although financing for

other industry groups, such as biotechnology, is not necessarily re-

duced). These patterns hold both for high- and low-ranked accelera-

tors in the annual Seed Accelerator Rankings, which suggests that

the funding increase is less about the effect of accelerator programs

on companies that attend them and more about what such programs ILL

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do to encourage latent entrepreneurial activity in the region more

generally—providing role models, catalyzing establishment of other

ecosystem institutions, and acting as a nexus for startup activity. Al-

though accelerators studied so far focus on software startups, further

research will be needed to assess new programs emerging to serve

biotech and hardware startups.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. D. C. Fehder, Y. V. Hochberg, Accelerators and the Regional Supply of Venture Capital Investment (Social Science Research Network, 2014); .http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2518668.

10.1126/science.aab3351

Linking and leveragingBy Fiona Murray 7,2 and Scott Stern7,2#

Beyond aspiring to become the “next” Silicon Valley, how can a

region leverage innovation-driven entrepreneurship for economic

and social progress? Given the poor performance of government

support for entrepreneurship, should the job be left to the private

sector? Moving beyond the traditional public-private debate, the

MIT Regional Entrepreneurship Acceleration Program (REAP)

(http://reap.mit.edu) charts a new approach.

REAP builds on an ecosystem framework drawing on recent

research highlighting distinct, yet interdependent, roles of innova-

tive capacity (the ability to develop new technology), entrepre-

neurial capacity (the ability to scale startup businesses), and the

economic clusters supporting a region. Rather than focus solely on

entrepreneurship (as do many government initiatives) or innova-

tion (often focused on increased R&D investment), REAP builds

on evidence that successful regions link the two to establish a com-

parative advantage through innovation-driven startups.

MIT REAP’s 2-year program brings together regional teams of

entrepreneurs; risk-capital, corporate, and university leadership;

and government. Although this approach is simple to describe,

most regions have found it challenging to link high-level stake-

holders for sustained effort (and are often surprised by the many

connections that are “missing” from their ecosystem). Teams

undertake data-driven, regional diagnoses, including assessing

strengths and weaknesses in their regional capacities, and bench-

mark their ecosystem using our novel methodology for measuring

entrepreneurial quality through the use of business registration

records and predictive analytics ( 1). These insights are turned into

action: Teams aim to catalyze their innovation ecosystem in a mea-

surable and sustainable way and build an organization for ongoing

regional collective action.

For example, REAP Scotland is leading changes in Scotland’s

economic-development approach to emphasize entrepreneurial

mentoring (an area that had been previously downplayed) and the

development of a dynamic network for Scottish entrepreneurs and

expatriates (a potential strength that had not previously been lever-

aged). These initiatives upgrade the region’s entrepreneurial capacity

in order to match its traditional strength in innovative capacity (see

www.hie.co.uk/business-support/entrepreneurship/mit-reap/).

REFERENCES

1. J. Guzman, S. Stern, Science 347, 606 (2015).

10.1126/science.aac5843

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