Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality

Sharon Ryan

Published online: 26 May 2012# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. (outside the USA) 2012

Abstract After surveying the strengths and weaknesses of several well-knownapproaches to wisdom, I argue for a new theory of wisdom that focuses on beingepistemically, practically, and morally rational. My theory of wisdom, The DeepRationality Theory of Wisdom, claims that a wise person is a person who is rationaland who is deeply committed to increasing his or her level of rationality. This theoryis a departure from theories of wisdom that demand practical and/or theoreticalknowledge. The Deep Rationality Theory salvages all that is attractive, and avoidsall that is problematic, about theories of wisdom that require wise people to beknowledgeable.

Keywords Wisdom . Knowledge . Rationality . Epistemic humility . Epistemic virtue

1 Introduction

What is wisdom? Philosophers, psychologists, poets, playwrights, spiritual leaders,and a wide variety of other serious thinkers have tried to understand and define‘wisdom.’ Psychologists tend to think of wisdom as the highest developmental stateor as an especially valuable type of intelligence.1 Nearly everyone agrees that beingwise is among the highest virtues, and many reflective and morally ambitious humanbeings spend their lives trying to achieve wisdom. Some contemporary philosophersand psychologists working on this topic advocate a revolution in education and

Acta Anal (2012) 27:99–112DOI 10.1007/s12136-012-0160-6

1As a stage of development, Jean Piaget’s and Erik Erickson’s works are good examples. As a kind ofintelligence, Robert Sternberg’s work is a good example.

S. Ryan (*)Department of Philosophy, West Virginia University, 262 Stansbury Hall, Morgantown,WV 26506-6312, USAe-mail: Sharon.Ryan@mail.wvu.edu

society. They argue that we should be teaching not with the aim of merely ofimparting information, but for the development of wisdom.2 Despite our love forand pursuit of wisdom, I believe we have fallen short of providing a fully adequateaccount of wisdom. In this article, I will present some interesting ideas about wisdom,including some of my former ideas on this topic. I will explain why I think thoseideas, although interesting and helpful, are ultimately inadequate. I will also defend anew theory of wisdom. I think my current theory of wisdom is at least more adequatethan any of the other theories I have considered. The theory I will propose herecharacterizes wisdom as a deep state of rationality. 3 One consequence of my theory isthat knowledge is not a necessary or sufficient requirement for wisdom. My theory isalso intended to be a comprehensive theory of wisdom. That is, I will not accept theview that there are two very different types of wisdom: practical and theoretic. On myview, one cannot be wise if one satisfies only the criteria set forth in practical theoriesof wisdom. Moreover, one cannot be wise if one satisfies only the criteria set forth intheoretical theories of wisdom.

Many theories of wisdom can be put into at least one of at least three categories.One category focuses on epistemic humility, or having an accurate sense of one’sepistemic limits, being scrupulous when forming beliefs, and possessing a healthydose of skepticism. A second main category focuses on possessing extensive knowl-edge or understanding. A third category focuses on the ability to apply one’sknowledge and successfully navigate through life’s practical and moral challenges.

2 Wisdom as Epistemic Humility

Epistemic humility theories are theories that characterize wisdom as a humble attitudetoward what we really know. Socrates’ view about wisdom, as described in Plato’sApology, can be understood as an epistemic humility account of wisdom (Plato, 1997).In The Apology, Socrates learns from the oracle at Delphi that he is the wisest person ofall. Plato leads us to believe that this is puzzling to Socrates because Socrates claimsignorance on so many issues. In all of his conversations, Socrates is fully equipped withthe most probing questions, but he very seldom puts forth any direct answers of his own.In an attempt to figure out the oracle’s puzzling proclamation, Socrates contrasts himselfwith some other thinkers that he and his peers find to be the most impressive candidatesfor wisdom. They are poets, politicians, and craftsmen.

After interviewing an assortment of poets, Socrates appreciates their deep insights,but since Socrates believes the poets are basically taking dictation from the gods, theyreally do not deserve much credit for their revelations. Moreover, Socrates thinks

2 For example, see Nicholas Maxwell From Knowledge to Wisdom (Maxwell, 1984); CopthorneMacDonald “Wisdom: The Highest Aim of Life and Higher Education,” on The Wisdom Page http://www.wisdompage; Robert Sternberg’s “Why Schools Should Teach for Wisdom: The Balance Theory ofWisdom in Educational Settings,” Educational Psychologist 36/4: 227-245 (2001) and “What is Wisdomand How Can We Develop It?” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 591: 164-174 (January 2004); and Andrew Norman (1996) “Teaching Wisdom” in Knowledge, Teaching, andWisdom eds. Lehrer, Lum, Slichta, and Smith, 253-265 (Lehrer, et al., 1996).3 See “The Deep Rationality Theory of Wisdom” forthcoming in The Continuum Companion to Episte-mology ed. Andrew Cullison (Ryan, 2011) for an earlier statement of this theory.

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other people are actually better at explaining the meaning of a poem than is the poetwho wrote the poem! For these reasons, Socrates concludes that the poets are notworthy of the honor of being counted among the truly wise.

Socrates interviews some politicians, and he acknowledges that some of the mostimpressive among them are capable of moving people with their powerful rhetoric.What matters for Socrates, however, is not whether speech actually moves people,but whether it ought to move people. And, as it turns out, he is not at all impressedwith the quality of their ideas.

The craftsmen turn out to be Socrates’ favorite candidates for the honor of wisdom.They at least know something useful, and, unlike the poets, they deserve credit forwhat they know. They have practical knowledge, and they apply that knowledge tomake chairs and other useful objects. Unfortunately, the craftsmen suffer from a fatalflaw that they share with all of the poets and politicians. Every one of them proclaimsto know all sorts of things that they have no right to claim to know. The poets, forexample, make unsupported and fully confident assertions about politics, the politi-cians make unsupported generalizations about nearly everything, and the craftsmen,for example, make unsupported assertions about love and justice. Socrates is drivenabsolutely crazy by epistemic arrogance, and that flaw, Socrates concludes, is suffi-cient to rule a person out as wise. Socrates’ hypothesis for why he is wise, and whythe others are not wise, is that he does not (or so he claims) suffer from epistemicarrogance. Socrates fully acknowledges his own ignorance.

This idea that wisdom is some sort of epistemic humility is a common theme in thecontemporary wisdom literature in psychology as well. Patricia Kennedy Arlin, acontemporary psychologist, finds wisdom not in the answers one reaches, but in thequestions one poses (Kennedy Arlin, 1992). Although many people who havethought seriously about this topic take for granted that wisdom typically increaseswith age and experience, John Meacham, a contemporary psychologist, challengesthis assumption. He contends that for many people, wisdom actually decreases withage. According to Meacham, this is because as we age, many of us become moreepistemically arrogant and less intellectually cautious. Wise people, according toMeacham, appreciate their own fallibility (Meacham, 1992). The idea that wisdomis epistemic humility shows up in great works of literature as well. For example, inAct V, Scene I, of William Shakespeare’s (1623) comic play, “As You Like it,”Touchstone, the clown, says, “The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knowshimself to be a fool.” There is widespread agreement among many intelligent peoplewho have pondered the nature of wisdom, that epistemic humility is, at least, animportant aspect of wisdom.

There are many different ways to formulate epistemic humility theories. Thetheory could be cashed out as an endorsement for some healthy form of skepticism.It could be developed as a viewpoint falling short of skepticism, but neverthelessrestricting the virtue of wisdom to people who do not extend their beliefs, theirconfidence, or their claims to know, beyond what they really do know. And, certainly,there are also several more complicated formulations of the theory. In some of myprevious work on wisdom, I presented and carefully analyzed several distinct for-mulations of epistemic humility theories (Ryan, 1996 and Ryan, 1997). I will refrainfrom going over that again here. Instead, I will simply explain why I think allepistemic humility theories fail to provide a satisfactory understanding of wisdom.

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Being wise is not just being careful about what you believe. It is not just about askinggood questions. It is not just about realizing one’s epistemic limits. Being wiserequires much more. A person could be perfectly epistemically humble, in anyinteresting sense of ‘humble,’ and yet be very uninformed about most subjects, live amiserably self-destructive and unsatisfying life, and be definitively unwise. Epistemichumility, no matter how it is precisely understood, is just not enough for wisdom. Beforemoving on to other approaches to understanding the nature of wisdom, let me point outthat while I will avoid the pitfalls of epistemic humility theories, the theory I willultimately defend in this article will utilize what is most attractive about some sort ofepistemic humility being a requirement for being wise. Thus, my theory should satisfyall those who appreciate the importance of epistemic humility.

3 Wisdom as Knowledge

After appreciating the insufficiency of epistemic humility theories, it is natural toexplore the hopes for theories of wisdom that focus, not on appreciating fallibility,uncertainty, or ignorance, but on the possession of knowledge or understanding.There are a wide variety of knowledge theories of wisdom. They vary, for the mostpart, on the basis of what, and how much, the wise person must know. A natural wayto divide the many knowledge theories is between those that focus on theoreticalknowledge and those that focus on practical knowledge.

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s theory of practical wisdom, or phronesis, inpart, focuses on knowing how to live well (Aristotle, 2004). Robert Nozick (1989)develops a similar, practical, line of thought. William James (1890) said, “The art ofbeing wise is the art of knowing what to overlook.” Paul Baltes and Jacqui Smith(1992), leading wisdom researchers in the psychological literature on wisdom, out-lined five criteria for wisdom. All five focus on practical knowledge. They are:

1. Rich factual knowledge about matters of life.2. Rich procedural knowledge about life problems.3. Knowledge about the contexts of life and their relationships.4. Knowledge about differences in values and priorities.5. Knowledge about the relative indeterminacy and unpredictability of life.

Other theories, such as Aristotle’s account of theoretical wisdom, or sophia, focuson knowing fundamental, scientific laws or general truths. According to NedMarkosian,wisdom is earned through the acquisition of intrinsically valuable knowledge.4

Markosian would count a deep understanding of philosophical concepts such astruth, justice, wisdom, etc., as the most intrinsically valuable.5

Almost every reasonably plausible theory of wisdom has knowledge built in as anecessary condition for wisdom. I say almost because the theory I will ultimatelydefend actually lacks a knowledge condition, and I believe it is the most plausible

4 Defended in discussion and developed in Sharon Ryan, “What is Wisdom?” Philosophical Studies (93):119-139.5 A refreshing consequence of Markosian’s theory is that philosophers have a nice advantage in the questfor wisdom.

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theory of wisdom. Although it would be interesting to outline and carefully analyzeall of the best knowledge theories of wisdom, I am unable to take on that project here.Instead, I will simply note that all knowledge theories suffer from some devastatingproblems. One problem is that knowledge is not enough. Wisdom requires anapplication of one’s knowledge in order to successfully navigate through the chal-lenges of life. Weakness of will, lack of courage, and a failure to appreciate the valueof living well, for example, can leave an extremely knowledgeable person withoutwisdom.

Later in this article, I will take my criticism of knowledge theories a step further. Iwill argue that knowledge is not even necessary for wisdom. But first, let us considerknowledge theories that add on a condition about how one actually utilizes his or herknowledge.

4 Wisdom as Knowledge and Living Well

Many practical theories of wisdom focus on not only knowing how to live well, buton how we apply what we know and how we actually live out our lives. When we doit well, by taking the long view on things, knowing what is worth worrying about andwhat we should just shrug off and move on from, knowing how best to spend ourtime and effort, etc., we achieve wisdom. I defended a version of this sort of theory inan earlier essay (Ryan, 1997). Theories developed by Aristotle, John Kekes (1983),Nicholas Maxwell (1984), Copthorne MacDonald (2006), Richard Garrett (1996),Lehrer et al. (1996), and Robert Nozick (1989) include, among various other require-ments, the idea that the way a person applies their knowledge in real-life situations ispart of what determines whether or not one is wise. I agree that how we live our livesis essential to the achievement of wisdom. However, a theory such as the one Idefended at one point, that focuses exclusively on how one lives and the practicalknowledge required for living well (living rationally and morally, having soundjudgment, etc.), leaves something crucial out of a satisfactory account of wisdom. Ibelieve that knowing how to live well and actually living well are not enough forwisdom. There is an intellectual and educational component to wisdom that ismissing from all such theories. I think the term ‘theoretical knowledge’ is a mislead-ing way to describe what I have in mind. I will use the term ‘academic knowledge’instead. Although I rejected this idea in my earlier discussion of Ned Markosian’sview, I now believe my rejection was too hasty (Ryan, 1997). Although academicknowledge is not, as Markosian thinks, the whole story, I think it is clear thatsomething like it is an important part of the story. A wide and deep variety of well-grounded, rational beliefs in basic academic subjects such as philosophy, science,literature, history, etc., are essential for wisdom. Someone who has not had theprivilege of a well-rounded education6 may be quite intelligent, might be living well,and may well be a person to admire and consult on wide variety of issues, but he orshe is not informed enough to count as wise. A person who satisfies criteria for atheory of practical wisdom has some good things going for her, but I would argue that

6 I am not suggesting that one must learn in a traditional school environment, but one must be exposed to,and understand, the big ideas and questions.

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it is not enough to count as wise. If being practically wise were enough, a lotof people would be wise. But, along with Dennis Whitcomb, I think anyadequate theory of wisdom ought not have the consequence that it is fairlycommon to achieve wisdom (Whitcomb, 2010). Wisdom is difficult to achieve, inpart, because of all the investigating, reading, thinking, studying, analyzing, andlearning it requires.

Perhaps, if my criticisms offered so far are correct, the best theory of wisdomshould combine the positive elements that remain from theories reviewed thus far.

5 A Hybrid Theory of Wisdom

In my 2007 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on ‘wisdom,’ I held outpromise for the development of a hybrid theory that attempts to preserve what is goodabout humility theories, knowledge theories, and theories that include conditionsabout actually living well. The following theory was suggested.

Sharon Ryan’s 2007 SEP HYBRID:S is wise iff

(1) S has extensive factual and theoretical knowledge (academic knowledge).(2) S knows how to live well.(3) S is successful at living well.(4) S has very few unjustified beliefs.

I liked the basic idea of this theory because it utilizes the idea that wisepeople are people we can go to for reliable information, understanding, andinsights. I felt that the theories that I had defended in my earlier work onwisdom were too narrowly focused on knowing how to live well and did notgive enough attention to “book smarts.” I had not given due respect to NedMarkosian’s views on wisdom. The SEP hybrid theory rectifies that mistake.Moreover, the SEP hybrid theory also requires that the wise person havesuccessful strategies for navigating through life’s practical and moral challenges.Also, I liked that some epistemic humility is preserved in the fourth conditionof this theory. By knowing a lot, and by not having many unjustified beliefs,one is a trustworthy source of information. Such a person would avoid the fatalflaw suffered by all of the poets, politicians, and craftsmen who were inter-viewed by Socrates. I am extremely sympathetic to Socrates’ intolerance ofepistemic arrogance. I agree with Socrates’ judgment that a person with a lot ofunjustified beliefs has a character flaw that disqualifies him or her as wise.Such a person does not have trustworthy opinions, and having trustworthyopinions is essential to wisdom. I also liked the vagueness built into the theory.Any acceptable theory of wisdom must respect the fact that wisdom comes indegrees. Some people are wiser than others. Also, a wise person can increase(or decrease) his or her level of wisdom. Wisdom is definitely a vague concept,and this hybrid theory gets that right. Unfortunately, the SEP Hybrid theory isnot as promising as it might seem. I will take on four different objections tothe theory.

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6 Objections to SEP Hybrid

Consider objection 1. Dennis Whitcomb (2010) has objected to the SEP Hybrid (andall theories of wisdom that include a living well condition or an appreciation of livingwell condition). He gives several interesting cases, against various views. Whitcombthinks that a person who is deeply depressed, evil, or totally void of any ambition forliving well could nevertheless be wise. As long as such a person was deeplyknowledgeable about academic subjects and knew how to live well, that personwould have all we need for wisdom. SEP and other views that require appreciationof living well or actually living well would exclude such people from the wise. Hethinks that would be a mistake. With respect to the very knowledgeable and deeplydepressed person with no ambition but to stay in his room, he claims, “If I ran acrosssuch a person, I would take his advice to heart, wish him a return to health, and leavethe continuing search for sages to his less grateful advisees. And I would think he waswise despite his depression-induced failure to value or desire the good life. So I thinkthat wisdom does not require valuing or desiring the good life.” Other cases describedby Whitcomb include people who are evil and live miserably, but who are willing andable to give great advice and also know all sorts of important facts about life andreality. After considering all of Whitcomb’s cases, I remain sided with Aristotle,Nozick, Zagzebski, Sternberg, and the others. A deeply depressed person who is wisewould still live as well as she can and would still value living well, even if she fallsfar short of perfection. Such a person would attempt to get help to deal with herdepression, for example. If she really does not care at all, or if she is evil, she may bevery knowledgeable, but she is not wise. She may be extremely clever and shrewd,one to listen to on many issues, one to trust one many issues, one to fear or respect,and she may even win a Nobel Prize for her intellectual greatness, but she is notadmirable enough to be wise. Wisdom is a virtue and a way of living, and it requiresmore than smart ideas and deep knowledge. If all it took were deep knowledge aboutideas and life, then a good computer could be wise. (Wisdom also requires less, butI’ll save that for later.) Awise person has rational beliefs about what is true and goodand does the best he or she can to have knowledge and a good life, and to make theworld a better place. Failure to do so is a failure to achieve wisdom.

Christopher Smith, a WVU philosophy student, challenged my objection toWhitcomb. Smith thinks I am getting more mileage than I deserve from the idea thatwisdom is a virtue. After all, Smith argues, courage is a virtue, and courageous peoplecan be quite evil. Patience is a virtue, and patience is not always put to good use.Someone can be too patient. This is an interesting objection, but one that I cananswer. Wisdom, unlike courage or patience, is perhaps the highest virtue. Moreover,it is a virtue that guides the other virtues. A wise person would not use courage forevil. A wise person would not be too patient. It is the virtue of wisdom that guidespeople to use the other virtues toward good. Thus, I am not persuaded by Whitcomb’scriticisms.

Consider objection 2. Imagine a “wise” elder from an ancient tribe or society withlittle contact with the rest of the world. Imagine that she is radically mistaken in herbeliefs about science, math, geography, history, etc. Suppose she, like the otherpeople in her society, bases her beliefs on superstition, the Ouija board, and similarmethods. Suppose further that she and her compatriots are intellectually satisfied with

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her opinions, and they are not interested in seeking out alternative ideas from the restof the world. The objection is that such a person could be regarded, in her remotesociety, as a deeply wise person. But, it seems that the hybrid theory would excludeher as a wise person. It seems that she would violate conditions 1 and 4, and it seemsthat it would be exceedingly difficult for her to satisfy conditions 2 and 3. If she livesaccording to what the Ouija board says, it seems safe to predict that she will verylikely encounter a lot of failure and unhappiness. Thus, if this “wise” elder is actuallywise, it appears that this hybrid theory is in serious trouble. 7

One might argue that this objection could be avoided by interpreting the SEPhybrid theory in a way that counts the “wise” elder as wise. One might say thatwisdom is not only a vague concept, but a relative, or subjective, concept as well.That is, wisdom not only comes in degrees, but it is also something to be measuredagainst a relative, as opposed to an absolute, standard. One might insist that all of theconditions of the hybrid theory should be interpreted relativistically. That is, as longas the elder has a lot of knowledge relative to her society and time period, she livessuccessfully relative to her society and time period, and she has few unjustifiedbeliefs compared to others in her society and time period, then she is wise for hersociety and time period.

There is reason to have serious reservations about this attempt to salvage the SEPhybrid theory of wisdom. What is a society? How do we determine what society aperson belongs to? Probably, we all belong to many societies, but which ones arerelevant when determining if one is wise? What is a time period? These are deeplyperplexing questions, and without satisfactory answers to these questions, we cannotreally understand and evaluate this interpretation of the theory.8 Moreover, even if wecould give answers to all of these questions, any person who joins a very unwisesociety of people will turn out to be wise, as long as that person is relatively “wiser”than the others. That surely makes it much too easy to achieve wisdom! And that is anunacceptable consequence of this line of thought. There is a better response to thisobjection to the hybrid theory.

It would be better to accept the consequence that the “wise” elder, in the circum-stances described, is not actually wise. That is, the SEP hybrid theory gives thecorrect assessment of the so-called “wise” elder. Although her tribe may haveregarded her as wise, the tribe was mistaken. The Ouija board and superstition donot provide adequate evidence for justified belief or knowledge. If we are willing toaccept this consequence, then the example, although interesting and instructive, doesnot refute the SEP hybrid theory.

Consider objection 3. Although I do not think the previous example about the so-called “wise” elder refutes the SEP hybrid theory, it does open the door to bigproblems. A modification of the example will show that the SEP hybrid theoryneeds to be abandoned. In discussion of the previous example about the personwho is regarded as wise, but who lacks justified beliefs and knowledge about awide variety of subjects, I argued that it would be best to accept the conse-quence that the “wise” elder is not really wise. She may be interesting,

7 This objection was raised in my 2010 Theory of Knowledge class at West Virginia University.8 Fred Feldman (1978) makes this point in his chapter about moral relativism in his Introductory Ethics,Prentice-Hall (1978) pp. 160-172.

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inspirational, and in high demand for her thoughts, but she is not wise. This isan example where a society simply gets it wrong. If the “wise” elder isirrational, and her beliefs are radically unjustified, then she’s not really wise.Although the SEP hybrid theory does successfully avoid this criticism, the SEPhybrid theory ultimately fails because knowledge is not an essential componentof wisdom. Imagine a wise and rational elder who forms her beliefs based onextremely credible evidence (not Ouija boards and superstition), but fails,through no epistemic fault of her own, to be right. Suppose, that is, that shehas a lot of very highly justified, but false, beliefs. A nice example of this isPtolemy. Ptolemy had justified beliefs about a geocentric solar system. I willassume that, given how intelligent he was, he had a lot of epistemicallyjustified beliefs about a wide variety of subjects. He discussed his ideas andexperiments with the best scientists of his time. As it turned out, many ofPtolemy’s justified beliefs about the solar system were false. Ptolemy did notknow that the earth is the center of our solar system. If he had a lot of false, but highlyjustified beliefs about a wide variety of subjects, he should not, on that basis alone, beexcluded from the honor of being a genuinely wise person. Since so much ofwhat was considered knowledge has been abandoned, or has evolved over time,a theory that requires truth (through a knowledge condition) would excludealmost all people who are now long dead, including Hypatia, Socrates, Aristotle, Homer,Lao Tzu, etc., from the list of the wise. Bad epistemic luck should not countagainst being wise. But, since truth is a necessary condition for knowledge, badepistemic luck is sufficient to undermine a claim to knowledge. What matters,as far as being wise goes, is not that a wise person has knowledge, but that shehas highly justified and rational beliefs about a wide variety of subjects,including how to live well, science, philosophy, mathematics, history, geogra-phy, art, literature, psychology, and so on. And the wider the variety ofinteresting topics is, the better. Another way of developing this same point isto imagine a person with highly justified beliefs about a wide variety ofsubjects, but who is unaware that she is trapped in the Matrix or some otherskeptical scenario. Such a person could be wise even if she is sorely lackingknowledge. A theory of wisdom that focuses on having rational or epistemicallyjustified beliefs rather than the higher standard of actually having knowledge wouldbe more promising.

If that is not enough, consider objection 4. Matthew Robinson noted anothershortcoming of the SEP hybrid theory.9 It seems that the theory neglects an attitudethat all wise people have. Truly wise people value learning, and they look out for newevidence and critically examine and re-examine their opinions. Wise people arecontinually pursuing a deeper and wider understanding of various aspects of realityand how to live better, and they follow through by putting that understanding intopractice. In the original attempt to refute the SEP hybrid theory, the unwise eldersuffers from this flaw. She is intellectually satisfied with her irrational set of beliefs. Atruly wise person would be more intellectually open and curious, seeking outalternative opinions on the many matters that are complex, uncertain, and controver-sial. Any acceptable theory of wisdom needs to include this intellectual virtue.

9 In discussion in my Theory of Knowledge class at West Virginia University in May 2010.

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7 Wisdom as Deep Rationality

Appreciating the many strengths and weaknesses of alternative theories has led me toembrace a theory of wisdom that focuses on rationality. I will call my current theory “TheDeep Rationality Theory of Wisdom.”More specifically, I endorse the following theory:

7.1 Deep Rationality Theory (DRT)

Person S is wise at time t iff at time t:

(1) S has a wide variety of epistemically justified beliefs on a wide variety ofvaluable academic subjects and on how to live rationally (epistemically, morally,and practically).

(2) S has very few unjustified beliefs and is sensitive to his or her limitations.(3) S is deeply committed to both:

(a) Acquiring wider, deeper, and more rational beliefs about reality (subjectslisted in condition 1).

(b) Living rationally (practically, emotionally, and morally).

In condition (1), DRT takes account of what is attractive about knowledge theories and,to some extent, the various living well theories, by requiring epistemically justified beliefsabout a wide variety of standard academic subjects, as well as epistemically justified beliefsabout how to live in a practically, emotionally, and morally rational way. Having justifiedbeliefs about what really matters, what ought to be ignored, when one should just laugh at asituation, how one ought to treat others, how to best spend one’s time, what would be thebest course of action in various situations, and so on, would be captured in the first conditionof the DRT. For example, having justified beliefs about how to live in a practically rationalway would include having a well-reasoned strategy for dealing with the practicalaspects of life. Having a rational plan does not require perfect success. It requireshaving good reasons behind one’s actions, responding appropriately to, and learningfrom, one’s mistakes, and it requires having a rational plan for all sorts of situationsand problems. Having justified beliefs about how to live in a morally rational waywould not involve being a moral saint, but it would require that one has good reasonssupporting his or her beliefs about what is morally right and wrong, and about whatone morally ought and ought not do in a wide variety of circumstances. Havingjustified beliefs about living in an emotionally rational way would involve, notdispassion, but having justified beliefs about what is, and what is not, an emotionallyrational response to a situation. For example, it is appropriate to feel deeply sad whendealing with the loss of a loved one. But, ordinarily, feeling deeply sad or extremelyangry is not an appropriate emotion to spilled milk. A wise person would haverational beliefs about the emotional needs and behaviors of other people.

DRT also respects epistemic humility. Condition (2) requires that a wise person notbelieve things without epistemic justification. The Deep Rationality Theory rules outall of the unwise poets, politicians, and craftsmen that were ruled out by Socrates.10

10 Of course, I am not claiming that all poets, politicians, and craftsmen are unwise. I am only claiming thatthose poets, politicians, craftsmen, …philosophers, astronauts, and anyone else who lacks epistemichumility, because they have a lot of unjustified beliefs, is unwise.

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Wise people do not think they know when they lack sufficient evidence. Wise peopleare not epistemically arrogant. The second condition also includes an awareness ofone’s limitations. Such limitations would include, yet not be limited to, epistemiclimitations.

DRT requires that one be deeply committed to seeking out new ideas, becomingmore educated, and testing one’s own theories against all of the best evidenceavailable.11 This condition is very similar to the “appreciation condition” I defendedin an earlier theory and is rejected by Whitcomb. Furthermore, it requires the wiseperson to put his or her justified beliefs into practice. The theory requires the wise tobe deeply committed to having appropriate emotions, treating others morally, andhaving successful strategies for getting through the trials and tribulations of life, etc.Surely, being rational would include asking the right questions, having strong andcreative problem-solving skills, possessing good judgment about what to overlook,and treating others kindly, fairly, and justly. The Deep Rationality Theory does notrequire knowledge or perfection. But it does require rationality, and it accommodatesdegrees of wisdom.

8 Objections to The Deep Rationality Theory of Wisdom

During a discussion about DRT at the 2011 Bled conference on “Wisdom, Knowledge,and Understanding,” Stephen Grimm and Michael Pace worried that DRT is too weakbecause it requires only justified belief, rather than knowledge.12 They challenge thatDRT mishandles skeptical scenarios and that it ought to be rejected for that short-coming. To see why, consider two people, Flo and Joe. Imagine that Flo satisfies allof the criteria of the DRT. If so, then Flo is wise. Imagine that Flo and Joe have thesame evidence, the same beliefs, the same values, the same interest in learning, etc.The only difference between Flo and Joe is that Flo is in the real world and most ofher beliefs are true. Joe, unfortunately, is in a Matrix-like world that seems just likeFlo’s world. When Flo believes she’s talking to real people in a real world, she’s right.When Joe has the exact same experiences, he’s deceived. He’s an unfortunate victimof mass deception. DRT seems to treat Flo and Joe as equally wise. However, onemight argue that Flo seems to be much better off, with respect to wisdom, than Joe. Itseems that although Flo and Joe might have equally well-justified beliefs, Joe’smassive lack of knowledge in his matrix world should perhaps disqualify him aswise. Even if his unfortunate situation does not disqualify him as wise, he should atleast be considered considerably less wise than Flo, who has a lot of knowledge.

I agree with Grimm and Pace that Flo is better off, but I disagree that this is aneffective counterexample to DRT. There are several reasonable responses to thisobjection. Let me begin, however, by noting that I am not at all convinced that Flo’sepistemic advantages should have any impact on our attributions of wisdom. I amcomfortable with the consequence that Flo and Joe are equally wise in their respectiveworlds. Joe, although deceived, is also much better off (epistemically) than our Ouija

11 By ‘available’ I mean to include both evidence one explicitly has “in his head” and also evidence that aperson is personally unaware of but could become aware of it with a diligent investigation.12 In discussion at the Summer 2011 Wisdom conference in Bled, Slovenia.

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board elder in an example considered, but rejected, as a problem for SEP Hybrid.That elder, I argued, was NOT wise because she was irrational. Joe is very rationaland he’s epistemically blameless. Joe is a model epistemic citizen in the matrix. And,he’s living as well as could be expected for him in his matrix world. Joe’s onlyproblem is bad epistemic luck. He is, unless he has reason to believe he is in thematrix, just as wise as Flo.

For others who find DRT attractive, yet find this case of Flo and Joe morethreatening, there are two alternative ways to respond. If one has reliabilist intuitionsabout epistemic justification, which I do not, one could argue that Joe’s beliefs are notreliable in the matrix world, and so they are not justified. Thus, he fails to satisfycondition 1. For similar reasons, condition 2 is not satisfied.

For those who find DRT attractive, and find the case of Flo and Joe threatening,but lack reliabilist intuitions about epistemic justification, there is room to takeadvantage of condition 2. One could argue that although Joe has many justifiedbeliefs, his ignorance about his epistemic limits in the matrix world explains why heis less wise than Flo. This is a stretch from what I meant by “being sensitive to one’slimitations,” but perhaps this could satisfy those who find Flo to be wiser than Joe.

Again, I am willing to accept the consequence that Flo and Joe are equally wise.But, it is worth noting that there are other interesting responses available.

Whitcomb’s objections to SEP Hybrid are equally challenging to DRT. Someonewho really does not care about living well, learning, or truth, or who is wicked,epistemically lazy, or evil, will be ruled out by DRT. I am pleased with thatconsequence, since I believe such individuals ought to be ruled out as wise. Whit-comb’s characters have admirable intellectual strengths, but they do not possess thevirtue of wisdom.

The final objection I will discuss is the problem of divine wisdom. One mightargue that an omniscient god, for example, would be ruled out as wise on this theory.Such a being would fail to satisfy the third condition. A being who already knowseverything and is perfectly rational would not be deeply committed to learning moreor being more rational. I have two responses to this objection. I agree that DRT rulesout an omniscient being as wise. I am pleased with that, since I don’t think it makessense to call such a being wise. Wisdom is something that non-omniscient beings useto better deal with their ignorance and imperfections. One could also argue, asSocrates did, that there are two different kinds of wisdom. There is divine wisdom,which is really great. And then there is the lesser variety of wisdom−human wisdom.DRT is an attempt to understand human wisdom.

Thus far, I have left many interesting issues unanswered. For example, what makesa belief epistemically justified for a person? The theory would be best if it accom-modated many of the leading accounts of epistemic justification. It is a virtue of DRTthat this question is left somewhat open. As far as I can see, the theory is compellingwhether one takes a coherentist, or foundationalist, or evidentialist, or reliabilistinterpretation of epistemic justification. However, it is important to acknowledge thatmy theory is definitely meant to have an exclusively objectivist interpretation ofepistemic justification. All I mean by ‘objectivist’ is that what matters is whetherone’s beliefs are actually supported by evidence or reliably formed, rather than thatone merely thinks that his or her beliefs are supported by evidence or reliably formed.The theory also leaves imprecise what being ‘deeply committed’ and ‘being rational’

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mean. Like ‘wisdom,’ these concepts are intended to be understood as vague conceptsthat come in degrees. In this short essay, I cannot do full justice to developing thoseideas. The basic idea of being “deeply committed” is that a wise person is a seeker oftruth and understanding. Again, the idea of epistemic humility is at work. A wiseperson appreciates the complexity of things, and she is interested in keeping an eyeout for more information and evidence. A wise person is devoted to living anexamined life, and she works at intellectual, moral, and practical improvement.

It is inevitable that there will be occasions in which it is impossible to be rational inall senses. Thus, being deeply committed to being rational will involve making harddecisions. For example, being morally rational might require patience workingthrough a problem, while being practically rational, in the exact same situation, mightinvolve dealing swiftly with the problem. Being epistemically rational might notalways be practically rational. Surely, there will be conflicts. This theory does notrank the various kinds of rationality. That is another virtue of the theory. In such asituation, all the theory would require is that the wise person have justified beliefsabout what is more important to focus on in various different situations and that shebe committed to doing what’s best.

Although DRT leaves us with a lot of interesting issues to ponder and discuss, Ithink it very nicely captures the essence of wisdom. I also believe the Deep Ratio-nality Theory accommodates and respects all of the best ideas from leading philos-ophers and psychologists working on this topic.13

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13 I am grateful to Michael Blumenthal, the students in my 2010 and 2011 Theory of Knowledge classes atWest Virginia University, the students in my Wisdom seminar at WVU, and the participants at the 2011Wisdom, Knowledge, and Understanding conference in Bled, Slovenia, for helpful comments on this paper.

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