SECOND DIVISION[G.R. Nos. 140371-72. November 27, 2006.]DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO,petitioners,vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO,respondents.D E C I S I O NAZCUNA,Jp:This is a petition forcertiorari1with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."The facts of the cases are as follows:On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98-90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardianad litemof petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo's holographic will is quoted, as follows:Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng manaTantunin ng sinumanAko si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na siAlfredoSeangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.IaEScCLabis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi.3(signed)Segundo SeangioNilagdaan sa harap namin(signed)Dy Yieng Seangio(signed)Unang Saksiikalawang saksi(signed)ikatlong saksiOn May 29, 1999, upon petitioners' motion, SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396 were consolidated.4On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings5primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo's will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case ofAcain v. Intermediate Appellate Court[155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for . . . respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void . . . would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility.The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved(underscoring supplied).WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99-93396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.aDHCEASO ORDERED.7Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.Petitioners contend that:THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:ITHE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR'S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR'S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;IIEVEN ASSUMINGARGUENDOTHAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR'S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,IIIRESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.Petitioners argue, as follows:First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states,Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent's will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.CDAHaEThe purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.The document, entitledKasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo's intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:Article 919.The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:(1)When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;(2)When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;(3)When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;(4)When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;(5)A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;(6)Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8(7)When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;(8)Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to disposemortis causa9can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.12In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned asKasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,13the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14With regard to the issue on preterition,15the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion, Segundo's last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.HSEIATConsidering that the questioned document is Segundo's holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.17In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.No costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, CoronaandGarcia, JJ.,concur.|||(Dy Yieng Seangio v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November 27, 2006)

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 140975. December 8, 2000.]OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU,petitioner,vs. PASTORA PIEDAD,respondent.Ceferino Padua Law Office and Gatmaytan Law Officefor petitioner.P.C. Jose & Associatesfor respondent.SYNOPSISPetitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree of the decedent. Respondent, on the other hand, is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a collateral relative within the third civil degree of the decedent. The issue here is the applicability of the rule on proximity among collateral relatives. Thus, the question is: Can petitioner inherit alongside respondent?The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference. Applying now the rule on proximity, respondent relative within the third civil degree excludes petitioner relative within the fifth civil degree from succeedingab intestatoto the estate of the decedent.SYLLABUS1.CIVIL LAW; DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; SUCCESSION; APPRECIATION OF THE LAW. The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed incongruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set out by the Code.2.ID.; ID.; ID.; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RULE ON PROXIMITY; APPLICATION OF RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. . . . By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. . . . In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.SacTCA3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO "OTHER COLLATERAL RELATIVES WITHIN THE FIFTH CIVIL DEGREE." The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who aresixthin the order of preference following,firstly, the legitimate children and descendants,secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants,thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants,fourthly, the surviving spouse, andfifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962 of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeedingab intestatoto the estate of the decedent.D E C I S I O NVITUG,Jp:On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law.Finding merit in that argument, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review oncertiorariin accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently withCircular 2-90 of the Court.In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact, thus:"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is question of fact when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, and their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."1Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had aprima facieinterest over the case, (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of the deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal within the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus:"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit from the estate of Augusto H. Piedad; that the notice of hearing was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court; and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee."These facts are undisputed."In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to whether intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her intervention; the question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question as to whether the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the application and interpretation of the proper law. There is doubt as to what law is applicable on a certain undisputed state of facts.aHCSTD"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the evidence, nor the credibility of witnesses presented, nor the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances. Resolution on the issues may be had even without going to examination of facts on record."2Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review oncertiorari.The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated, does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives?Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth degree relative of the decedent.The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set out by the Code.The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones, except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:"ARTICLE 26.In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place."Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines.By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded."ARTICLE 970.Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.""ARTICLE 971.The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded."In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts."ARTICLE 972.The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending."In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sister, whether they be of the full or half blood.""ARTICLE 974.Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be madeperstirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit.""ARTICLE 975.When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."The right of representation does not apply to "othercollateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who aresixthin order of preference following,firstly, the legitimate children and descendants,secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants,thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants,fourthly, thesurvivingspouse, andfifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent.Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction."ARTICLE 966.. . ."In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth."SCHATcAccordingly

Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeedingab intestatothe estate of the decedent.The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code "ARTICLE 1009.Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate."The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."Article 1010.The right to inheritab intestatoshall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line." invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among theother collateral relatives(the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason ofrelationshipbythe whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative.ISADETWHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Melo, Panganiban,andGonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.|||(Bagunu v. Piedad, G.R. No. 140975, December 08, 2000)

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.]IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIACARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG,petitioners,vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2respondents.3D E C I S I O NCORONA,Jp:In this petition for review oncertiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5dated October 24, 2002.FACTS OF THE CASEThis case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7his nephews and nieces,8his illegitimate child,9and thede factoadopted child10(ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADOThe deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.ITcCSAHowever, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado's life. Before him was Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio's and Felisa Delgado's union is in dispute.The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter's intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado's intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, hisPartida de Casamiento14stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father.16Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADOSometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:1.Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;2.Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;3.Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;184.Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIAGuillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect asampun-ampunan.During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,19the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father's demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado's obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption22of theirampun-ampunanGuillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction."23The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustiavda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGSOn May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgadovda. deDanao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustiavda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26(2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia's late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) theampun-ampunanGuillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.EaCSHIOn April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia werenevermarried but had merely lived together as husband and wife.On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgadovda. dede la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgadovda. deDanao, who had died on May 18, 1987.On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgadovda. dede la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27The dispositive portion of the decision read:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.SO ORDERED.28On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time.29They then filed a petition forcertiorariandmandamus30which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties' oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors' appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors' failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33read:As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.xxx xxx xxxThe respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court's pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.xxx xxx xxxIn this instance, private respondents' intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.xxx xxx xxxA review of the trial court's decision is needed.xxx xxx xxxWHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court herebyAFFIRMSthe Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for theAPPROVALof the private respondents' Record on Appeal and theCONTINUANCEof the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court's May 11, 1990 decision.SO ORDERED.Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34partially set aside the trial court's decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,35the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:With the further modification, our assailed decision isRECONSIDEREDandVACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. A new one is herebyRENDEREDdeclaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator's qualification and posting of the bond.The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDEDto the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.cIaCTSHence, this recourse.The issues for our resolution are:1.whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;2.who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;3.who should be issued letters of administration.THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADOA presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:Sec. 3.Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:xxx xxx xxx(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;xxx xxx xxxIn this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgadovda. deDanao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39We are not persuaded.First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which areprima facieevidence of the facts stated therein.44No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.Second, Elisavda. deAnson, petitioners' own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.Third, the baptismal certificate45was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein,46such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety.Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADOTo determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them.48On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado's and Caridad Concepcion'sPartida de Casamiento49identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51were her natural children.52Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeedab intestato(from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are herbrothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57Art. 1001.Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa's estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent's entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is thesoleheir to the estate:SECTION 1.Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. . . . (emphasis supplied)THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIAIntervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia onlyafterthe death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:(1)in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;(2)when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother)61by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;(3)when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;(4)when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.62On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but amere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66In this case, intervenor Guillerma's right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma's second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.67Did intervenor's report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado's obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor's parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the SUNDAY TIMES on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor's claim.CSAaDEThe same misfortune befalls theampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter's death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from themab intestato. We quote:Adoption is a juridical act, a proceedingin rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.68Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and theampun-ampunanGuillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69nieces and nephews.70ENTITLEMENT TO LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATIONAn administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:Sec. 6.When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:(a)To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;(b)If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;(c)If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed.71The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates,72a situation which obtains here.It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgadovda. dede la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is herebyDENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMEDwith the following modifications:1.Guillermo Rustia's June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is herebyANNULLED.2.the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado's full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado's grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.3.Guillermo Rustia's estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado's estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustiavda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall beper capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall beper stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustiavda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.4.Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgadovda. dede la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.No pronouncement as to costs.DTIACHSO ORDERED.Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AzcunaandGarcia, JJ.,concur.|||(Vda. De De La Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia, G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006)

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 84240. March 25, 1992.]OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL,petitioners,vs.ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila,respondents.Joaquin P. Yuseco and Reynarte D. Hipolitofor petitioners.Cortes & Reyna Law Firmfor private respondents.SYLLABUS1.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; NO RIGHT TO INHERITAB INTESTATOFROM LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND RELATIVES OF THEIR PARENTS;DIAZ V. IAC(150 SCRA 645) CITED. The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, (150 SCRA 645) where this Court ruled that: "Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a successionab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment."2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO RIGHT TO REPRESENT THEIR PARENTS IN THE INHERITANCE OF A LEGITIMATE PARENT. "Article 902, 98, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights ofillegitimatechildren, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselvesillegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants oflegitimatechildren in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that 'the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation.' Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 982 prohibits absolutely a successionab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It May not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. "The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation' and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate aresubject to the limitationprescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inheritab intestatofrom the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother." (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diazv. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).3.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHEN THE WORDS AND PHRASES OF THE STATUTE ARE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL; RULE. Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Barandav. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparriv. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al.v. RFC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samsonv. C.A. 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).D E C I S I O NPARAS,Jp:This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals1dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al.", which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.cdphilThe undisputed facts of the case are as follows:Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:(a)Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouse:(b)Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:Esperanza C. Pascual-BautistaManuel C. PascualJose C. PascualSusana C. Pascual-BautistaErlinda C. PascualWenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.(c)Children of Pedro Pascual, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:Avelino PascualIsoceles PascualLoida Pascual-MartinezVirginia Pascual-NerNona Pascual-FernandoOctavio PascualGeranaia Pascual-Dubert;(d)Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:Olivia S. PascualHermes S. Pascual(e)Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by the following:Dominga M. PascualMamerta P. FugosoAbraham S. Sarmiento, IIIRegina Sarmiento-MacaibayEleuterio P. SarmientoDominga P. San DiegoNelia P. MarquezSilvestre M. PascualEleuterio M. Pascual(Rollo, pp. 46-47)Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).On December 18, 1973, Adela Soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for Letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although Paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:LibLex"This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual." (Rollo, p. 108).The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual" (Rollo, p. 136).On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526), and such motion was denied.Petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15).On April 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the dispositive part of which reads:"WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners."SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 38)Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.The petition is devoid of merit.Pertinent thereto,Article 992 of the Civil Code, provides:"An illegitimate child has no right to inheritab intestatofrom the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child."The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:"Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a successionab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment."Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light ofArticles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.The Court held:"Article 902, 98, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights ofillegitimatechildren, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselvesillegitimate.The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants oflegitimatechildren in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that `the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation.' Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 982 prohibits absolutely a successionab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It May not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception."The rules laid down in Article 982 that `grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation' and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate aresubject to the limitationprescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inheritab intestatofrom the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother." (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. RFC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).llcdClearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.Finally underArticle 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, RegaladoandNocon, JJ.,concur.|||(Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, G.R. No. 84240, March 25, 1992)

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 117246. August 21, 1995.]BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL,petitioners,vs.HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL,respondents.Eufrocino L. Bermudezfor petitioners.Marcelo C. Espinozafor Modesta Baltazar.Nolan R. Evangelistafor Estanislaoa Manuel.SYLLABUS1.CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; ART. 992, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES; "BARRIER" BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FAMILY; CONSTRUED. Article 992 of the Civil Code, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects successionab intestatoin thecollateral linebetween legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. (Desiderio Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Succession, 8th ed., 1991, pp. 423-424.) His thesis: "What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child.Consequently, when the law speaks of 'brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces' as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters." The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain," firstly, in the early case ofGrey v. Fabie(40 O.G. [First S] No. 3, p. 196 citing 7 Manresa 110) and, then, in the relatively recent cases ofDiaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court(150 SCRA 645) andDe la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. (181 SCRA 861) InDiaz, we have said: "Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a successionab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment." The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; (Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567) that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; (Cacho v. Udan, 13 SCRA 693) that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; (Llorente v.Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585;Allarde v. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909) that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; (Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29) and that an illegitimate child has no right to inheritab intestatofrom the legitimate children and relatives of his father. (Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 890) Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative (Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042) by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. (Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil 688;Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil 709)2.ID.; ID.; ORDER OF PREFERENCE AND CONCURRENCE IN INTESTACY; GRAPHIC PRESENTATION. We might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order