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Will and Reason in Descartes's Theory of ErrorAuthor(s): Hiram CatonSource: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Feb. 27, 1975), pp. 87-104Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025241 .

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THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME

LXXII, NO. 4, FEBRUARY 27, 1975

WILL

AND REASON IN

DESCARTES'S THEORY OF

ERROR

I

the Fourth

Meditation

Descartes eveloped theory f

error

whose

elusiveness s extreme ven by the

standards f his

writings. ut there s a consensus

egarding ts broad

outline.

He argues, t is

agreed, that truth nd falsity esultfrom

he oint

operation

f

understanding nd will.

He

seems o say that

udgments

consist f an idea of

understanding

ffirmed

r

denied byan act

of

will. When the will

affirms hat

which

understandingcompre-

hends, the udgment s true; when it affirmsr denies an idea not

clearly understood,

the

judgment is false. (The

possibility

of

hitting he

truth

by chance s

a blind

man's

bluff

hat plays

no

role

in the theory.)Error

can be avoided

by refraining rom udging

anybut clear deas.'

The

theory s,

to

say the least,

eccentric,

nd

coming

from

an

ostensiblerationalist,

aradoxical; for to nominate the will as

the

faculty

f

judgment

r

choice is

to introduce oluntarism

nto

the

veryredoubt of

certitude nd to render trutharbitrary.

an this

really be Cartesiandoctrine?The theory s not onlyeccentricbut

baffling ecause, as most

recent

nterpreters

ave

observed,

t

also

appears to state the opposite of the

precedingdoctrine.Descartes

writes

hat

the will

is

impelled

to assent

to clear deas when

they

re-

beheld by understanding nd errorarises when

the

will is

not so

determined nd

must

choose

among

confused ideas.

There

is

then an

asymmetry

etween truth

nd

error uch

that,

when

Des-

cartes believes truly,

his will

is

passive

to

understanding,

hereas

' Anthony Kenny, Descartes on the Will, in R.

J.

Butler, ed., Cartesian

Studies (New

York: Oxford, 1972),

pp.

1/2 parenthetical

page

references o Kenny

are to this article); S. V.

Keeling,

Descartes,

2nd ed. (New York: Oxford,

1968),

pp. 171/2;

L. J. eck,

The

Metaphysics

of Descartes (New

York: Oxford, 1965),

pp. 207/8, 210;

J.

.

Evans,

Error and the Will,

Philosophy,

xxxviii,

144

(April

1963): 138.

This interpretation

mplies that hitting the truth by chance is

not

a

true udgment.

See fn 10 below

for a discussionof this disputed

point.

87








88

THE

JOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

he believes

falselywhen

he

chooses to

affirm

n idea.

We

shall

argue

that

this

asymmetry,

hen

adequately

analyzed,

exonerates

Descartes from several confusionssometimesattributed to him.

To

anticipate

one of

our

conclusions,he does

not

inconsistently

advocate

both a

voluntarist nd a

necessitarian

heoryof

judg-

ment;

instead

he

complements

a

necessitarian

theory of

truth,

consonant

with a

rationalist nd

mathematically

riented

philoso-

phy,

with a

voluntarist

heory

of error.

We

shall argue that

the

asymmetry

entioned

s

entailedby

the

manner n

which

Descartes

poses

the

problem of

the role

of

will in

judgment.

The

neces-

sitariantheory f truth orresponds o themethodological evel of

the

inquiry

and the

investigation

f its

leading

rule that

clear

and

distinct deas

are

true. The

voluntarist heory

of error cor-

responds to the

theological

level of

inquiry,

in

which context

alone

Descartes,for

reasons to be

considered,

dentifies

udgment

with

a

choice

by free will.

The systematic

ink

between

the

two

levels s

the

connection

between

epistemology nd

ethics,

r

theory

and

practice,

expressed by

the

traditional

formula: virtue is

knowledge.

In a significanttudy of the presentproblem,Anthony

Kenny,

following

he

precedent f

French

scholars,

tressed

hat

thetheory

of

the

Fourth

Meditation

appears

suddenly

in

the

Meditations

without

ny

discernible

preparation

n

prior

writings nd

without

any easily

ssignablereason.

He

writes hat

some

time .

.

between

1628 and

1640

Descartes

changed

his

mind

about

the nature

of

judgment. t

is not

easy

to discover

when

or

why

he

did so. The

Discourse

on

Method is not

helpful: t

hardly

mentions he

will

(2).

Later we shall argue that Descartes did not change his views on

judgmentbetween

the Regulae

and

the

Meditations,

nd shall

ex-

plain the

bearing

of

the

contrary

elief,

which

s common o

French,

German,and

English

commentary,

n

fundamental

questions

of

interpretation. ut at

present et us

considerthe Discourse.

Prima

facie,

Kenny's

description s

correct. No

writingprior

to the

Meditations

treatswill as the

faculty

f

judgment.

The

Discourse

assigns that function

o

reason,2

nd

mentions

will

only

in

a few

passingremarks. t has not been noticed,however,that the Dis-

course

nevertheless ssigns

a

fundamental

methodological

role

to

volition

cloaked

under

the

term

resolution'.The

conduct

of

reason

is

made to depend

upon a series

of

resolutions DM

10,

15,

18,

41,

60),

especially

the resolution that

constitutes he

first

ule of

the

2

Discours de

la

mdthode

(hereafter ited

as

DM ),

edited

by E.

Gilson,

3rd

ed. (Paris:

Vrin,

1962), p. 2.








WILL

AND REASON IN DESCARTES'S

THEORY

OF ERROR 89

method,

which is the resolve

to receive

nothing as true,

which

I

did not

know evidently

o be such;

that s to

say,carefully o avoid

haste and prejudice, nd to include nothingmore n my udgment,

than that

which

presented tself o clearly

nd

distinctly o mymind,

that

I would never have

occasion

to doubt it (DM

18). In this

passage

we find

distinctionwhich

will prove

to be characteristic

f

Descartes's

theory

f judgment and

central

to the doctrineof

the

Fourth Meditation. t is

one thing

for an idea to be

true, nother

to

receive it

as such. Ideas are

received

by formingudgments

upon them. When

unguided by method,

the mind tends

to

re-

ceive ideas indiscriminatelynd with prejudice, by receiving deas

that

are not clear

and distinct.

The first

ule of the method

is

designed

to eliminate

this source

of error

by resolvingto receive

only

ideas that

are

clear and distinct

nd

hence

true. The

puzzle

here

is

that,by

one

kind

of

mental act,

deas are

known

to

be

true;

by

another, udgment,

they

are

received or

assented to,

whereas

ordinarily

ne would

not wish

to

distinguish

hese

acts.

The reason

for

the

distinction ecomes

clearer

f

we

consider

ts

methodological

unction.

Aristotelian

nd

scholastic

ogical analysis

assess the propositionthat,forexample, the earthmoves,and its

denial,

as

judgmental

acts

of

understanding.

Cartesian

analysis,

however,

onsiders he first

clear

idea,

and the latter prejudice.3

For

Descartes

the

two

udgments

re not

logically ymmetrical,

e-

cause his

analysis

approaches

them

methodologically

ather

than

formally.

is

analysis

tends to

identify

eason

with clear

ideas,

with

the result

hat

confused

deas

and false

udgments

must

be

assigned

to

a nonrational faculty.

We

call this but

a

tendency,

ince the

Discourse states, f looselyand in passing,that the judgmentsof

reasonable

men contradict

ne

another;

and in

the

Meditations

the

perception

of

all

ideas,

whetherclear

or

obscure,

is

assigned

to

understanding.

But

upon

more

exact

analysis, especially

in

the

Sixth

Meditation,

Descartes

tracesobscure

and confused

udgments

to

appetites

and

passions,

i.e.,

to

the

will;

and these

modes

of

volition

are

the source

of

prejudice.4

When

all false

udgments

re

traced

to

these

sources,

reason

or

understanding

s treated as

the

faculty orclear ideas and hence tout courtas an infalliblefaculty

of

truth hanks

o which

t is

possible

to avoid error

lways.5

n

the

Discourse,

the

will,

as

resolution,

oes

not

udge

of

truth,

ut

func-

3

DM 60;

Principles of

Philosophy I,

??71,

72.

4

Oeuvres

de Descartes

(hereafter

ited

as

AT ),

VII, 82-83,

37-439.

5

[Ijt

is a

flat contradiction

that

understanding

should apprehend

the

false

as

true

(AT VII,

378).

When

the

mind confines

tself to

clear

cognitions,

t

can

scarcely

err except

by

inadvertence

(AT X,

365, 368,

420,

425).








90

THE JOURNAL OF

PHILOSOPHY

tionsrather s

a sergeant-at-arms

hich enforces eason's udgments

by causing them to be received

as true despite

prejudiced in-

credulity.The functionof will as resolution s to subdue will as

prejudice. Such are the anticipations

n the

Discourse of Medi-

tationsdoctrine.

New in the Meditations s the

treatment f

judgment as a free

choice. Examination

of the structureof the

argument suggests

that

this nnovation

s dictated

by the novel theological ontext nto

which theanalysisof truth nd

error s woven.

The argumentative

strategys this. Descartesconsidered

he possibility

hat God might

have so createdhim that he is deceived n all things, ven his clear

ideas. The question then arises

whether uch a

God is good, since

to err and to

be

deceived

are evil. This doubt is

incorporated nto

the notion of a malign genius,

or

a deus deceptor,

which becomes

the focus of the theological argument

of Meditations

I-IV. The

doubt poses

the traditionalproblem

of providence n a peculiarly

philosophic

way,

for

on

his

path

to

certainty

he

only

evil

Descartes

considers s

error

and

deception.

From

this

initial

mingling

of

philosophy

nd

theology,

escartes

proceeds

to solutions

similarly

mingled;

that is, the structure f his solutions flows fromthe

initial

amalgamation

f

the

philosophic

ask

of

securing

he founda-

tions of science

with the

theological

task

of

vindicating

divine

providence.

Thus

Descartes undertakes

to

prove

that God

is a

perfect eing,

ncapable

of

deception,

nd to

prove

that his

errors

arise

from

himself.

n order to

bring

the

problem

of errorwithin

the

scope

of

theological rgumentation

bout

providence,

Descartes

construes

rror

s

sin;

but since

theology

ttributes

in to the

will,

the argumentative trategyonspires o generate n explanationof

error

hat

attributes

t to the will. The

mingling

f

the

theological

and

philosophical

points

of view

produces

he result

hat,

s Rtienne

Gilson

put it,

the

problem

of sin

is the

theological

form

of

the

problem

of

error,

nd

the

problem

of

error s the

philosophical

form

of the

problem

of sin. To

satisfy

hese

requirements,

es-

cartes

must

dentifyudgment

withchoice and attribute oth

to

the

will.

The characterization

f

judgment

as a choice of free

will

appears suddenly in the metaphysicalwritings, nd only there,

because

it

is

demanded

by

the intentionof his

theological argu-

mentation.

The

eccentricityppears

already

n the titleof the Fourth

Medita-

tion,

Of

Truth

and

Error,

which

seems to

promise

an

analysis

f

both.

Yet

the

questions

Descartes

actually pursues

presuppose

the

6

La Libertd chez Descartes et la

Thdologie (Paris:

Alcan,1913), .

266.








WILL AND REASON IN

DESCARTES S THEORY OF ERROR

91

result of the Third Meditation.

There certaintywas characterized

as clear and distinctperceptionof that which I affirm AT VII,

35). Descartes then makes it a general rule that everythings

true which I perceiveveryclearly

and distinctly. e has reverted

to the first ule of the method

which the doubt called into question.

Almost as an afterthought e

remembers he deus deceptor,who

now occasionsdefense f the rule

via a proof that God is veracious.

Only after ll thesepreparations oes Descartesdeem it appropriate

to take up the question of truth

nd error.He takesup the subject,

therefore, ot to explain to

himself he nature of truth-he knows

that it consists ntirely f clear

and distinct deas-but to explain

to himself he nature of error: No

doubt [concerning ruth]would

remain, xcept that t seems to follow that am never able to err

(AT VII, 54). Since he beginswiththe premise haterror risesfrom

the wronguse of the faculty f udgment, he Meditation s con-

ducted with

a

view

to

discovering

he

right nd wronguse

of

it; and

indeed he concludeswith the

pronouncement hathe knows

how

to

conduct

his thoughts o as never

to

err.

The

analysis

of

the

relation

between

understanding

nd

will

is

based on thedivisionof thoughtsnto twoprincipal modes, which

are understanding

nd will.

In

the Third

Meditation

Descartes

assigned

to

understanding ideas,

which

might

be

sensible, magi-

native, or supersensible.

tems

assigned

to

will are classed as voli-

tions

or

passions,

nd others

udgments

AT VII, 37). Anticipating

the

Fourth

Meditation,

he remarks

hat

there

s errorneither

n

ideas (or perceptions)

taken

by

themselves

nor

in

volitions

or

passions,

so that

judgments

alone remain

as

the

source

of

error.

The Fourth Meditationdivergesfromthis schemaby suppressing

the distinction

between

volitions and

judgments,

but

persists

n

maintaining

hat the relation

between

n

idea

and

a volition

s one

in which the

will

affirms

or

denies)

an

idea

or

assentsto an

idea.

The

broad, vague pronouncements

bout

this

relationship

re

more

or

less restatements

f what was said

in the

Discourse.

Descartes

believes

that

he errs

when

he

extends his will

beyond

understand-

ing, .e.,

when he

affirms

r denies

something

hat

he does not

clearly

perceive.

But if we

press

for a more

precise formulation,nquiry

s

broughtto a rude halt, sinceneitherherenor elsewhere s such a

formulation

ffered.What

appears

to be his best statement

ppears

in Notae

in

Programma,

wherehe wrote:

. .

. I saw

that,

ver and above

perception,

hich s

requisite

or

judgment,

heremust e affirmationr

negation

o constituteheform

of

the

udgment,

nd that t is

frequentlypen

to us to withholdur








92

THE

JOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

assent,

ven f we

perceive thing.

referredhe

udgmental

ct

itself, hich

s nothing

ut assent, .e.,

affirmationr

negation,

ot

to the perceptionf understandingut to thedeterminationf the

will

(AT

VIII-2,

363; Principles

, ?34).

The

equation of

assentwith

affirmationnd

negation seems to

provide

the key to

Descartes's

thought on

judgment;

he

has ap-

parently

onfused

belief

(assent)with

predication affirmation

nd

negation).

The confusion

eems

to explain

some

of

Descartes'smore

baffling

ssertions. hus

he

stipulates

basically

two mental

attitudes

toward

ideas-mere

contemplation, r

suspension

of belief,

and

assent.But it is not to be understoodwhatone believes when one

assents

o

the dea of a

man

or

a

chimera.

What is

requisite

to

belief

is

predication,

which the

scholastics,

n the

wake of

Aristotle,

on-

sidered

the form of

judgment,

but which

is distinct

from

assent.

It is not

surprising, hen,

to

find Descartes

careless about

the dis-

tinction

etween

oncept nd

judgment,withthe

result

hat

he

takes

ideas as

propositions,

concepts,

or images, as it

suits his turn.

Owing

to his

conflation f

predication and

belief,

he

can

give

no

general

description-cannot

state the form -of judgment. For

example,

when

he

speaks

of

his assent to

nonpredicative

deas,

he

means

that

he believes in the

existence of

objects

corresponding

to

them.

ndeed his discussion

f

assent

nd

judgment s

thoroughly

mingledwith the material

problems

f

his

doubt.

To

manywho

have

written

ecently

n

Descartes's

notion of ideas

and

upon

the

theme

presently nder

discussion, ome

such

analysis

has seemed

obviously required.7

But

this

approach

assumes

that

truth nd

falsity

re

symmetrical alues in

a

binarymatrix,

whereas

thewholethrust fDescartes's heorys to deny thatsymmetry.or

the purpose

of

understandinghis

theory,

s

distinguishedfrom

evaluating t,

it

is

necessary

o

accept

his

premise

that truth

s

un-

problematicbecause clear

and

distinct deas

are

known

to

be

true

per

se. His

analysis

therefore

bstracts

from

the

formal

question

about the

logical

properties

f

true

ideas-to an

unknown

corre-

spondent

who raised

this

question,

he

wrote

hat

t

does not

matter,

for

his

purposes,

whether

deas

are

taken

to

be

propositions

r con-

7

Alan Gewirthwrites: For if it is simply y the act ofwilling n idea or

perception

hat he

udgment omes

nto

being,mustnot

the dea or

perception

have

previouslyeena

propositionr

group

f propositions?

Clearness nd Dis-

tinctnessn

Descartes,

hilosophy,

viii,69 (April

1943):

26. After

nalyzing

Cartesianudgmentsnto

phrasticsnd

neustics, enny oncluded:

Descartes,

n

lumping

together

ffirmationnd

desire,

negationand

aversion,

onfounds

the different

nus of

match involved

n

the two different

inds of assent

and

dissent.

his,

it

seems o

me,

is

the

fundamental

efect

n

his

theory

f

judgement

s

an act

of the

will

op.

cit.,p. 17).








WILL AND

REASON

IN DESCARTES'S THEORY OF ERROR

93

cepts AT

III, 395). To

say that his analysis

abstracts rom

formal

questions

about judgment s

equivalent to saying

that it is not a

logicaltheory t all; it is a psychological, r, better, methodological

theory

which replaces

formal ogic by the logic

of ideas. The

re-

placement

s part of

Descartes's critique of

scholasticism.

ormal

logic, he

thought, s

sterilebecause it is not an ars

inviniendi;

his

logic of

ideas is

intended to remedythis

deficiency y

anchoring

reasoning directly n

what he took

to be the natural illation

of

ideas which

reflects he

natural articulation of

things.Since

the

logic of ideas is a

material ogic, t

can be characterized nly

with

reference o, and is unintelligible ndependently f the subject

matter, e it

mathematics

rmetaphysics,o which

t is in a

particu-

lar case

addressed.8 et

us see how itworksout in

the present

ase.

Owing to Descartes's

malgamation

f scholasticism ith his

own

views,

t

is difficult

o

see the

endurance of the standpointof

the

Regulae

in

the Fourth Meditation.

Let us specify

he difficulties.

In

setting p his analysis, escartes

ays

that

the understanding

nly

apprehends deas, clear

and

obscure,

while the will affirmsr

denies

them,

hereby nviting

he inference

hat

clear

ideas are

recognized

and assentedto as true owing to a willful act. The correctness f

the

inference ppears

to be

endorsed

by

the conclusion

of

the

analysis,

where

Descartes

speaks

of

two

types

of

libertywhereby

he affirms

lear or

obscure

ideas.

But

these are

appearances.

The

question

under

investigation

s:

given

that

truth

s

unproblematic,

how

is

error

possible

and avoidable? It

is

possible

because of his

tendency o

judge some

unclear

ideas;

it

is

avoidable

by abstaining

from

udging things

whose

truth

s

not

apparent.' )9

he truth

f

things r ideas can be knownpriorto judging them because clear

ideas are

known

to be

true

per se;

it follows

then that

udgment

plays

no role in

knowledge

f

truth, xactly

s was the case

in

the

Discourse.

At no

point

in

the

Meditations

does

Descartes

say

that

knowledge

f

truth

equires

udgment,

whereashe

affirms

hrough-

out that

the

commission

f

error

does.

Just

this

asymmetry

f

udg-

ment

in

the

two

cases

marks the

asymmetry

f truth and

error.

Having

defined

udgment

eccentrically

s

a choice of free

will,

Descartesmakes t the cause of errorbut not of truth.The reason

for

this

eccentricity

s not a

logical

confusion,

ut

the

requirements

of his

theological rgument.

8

On the

relation

between

Descartes's

logic

of ideas

and

formal

ogic,

ee

L. J. Beck,

The Method f

Descartes

New

York:

Oxford,

952),

hs.

6

&

7.

9

[Q]uoties

de

rei

veritate

on liquet,

a judicio

ferendo

sse

abstinendum

(AT VII,

62);

also

AT X,

396: veritatum

roprie

el

falsitatum

on

visi solo

intellectu

sse

posse ;

lso

Principles

, ?37.








94

THE JOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

The

asymmetry

f

truth and

error s

built

into the asymmetry

of the

action

of thewill

when

confronted

with

clear and

unclear

ideas, respectively. s we mentioned,whenclear ideas supervene n

the

understanding

he will

is

passive

toward

them;

the

will

submits

by

assenting,

s it

must according

o the

necessity

f its nature

AT

VII, 58;

Principles

1, ?43).

Echoing

the doctrine

f the Oratory,

es-

cartes alls this

choice

the

liberty

f spontaneity.

ut when

clear

ideas are

wanting,

the

will

is

left undetermined

n the liberty

f

indifference,

s

he

calls

it,

echoing

the Molinist doctrine

of

the

Jesuits.

n this

case there

are two options.

The will can

assent

to the idea, despite the lack of evidence; and when it does so it

falls

nto

error nd

sin.

10

Or it can

act

virtuously

y

refraining

from hoosing

or

judging.

The

liberty

f

indifference e calls

the

lowestgrade

of

freedom.

The Jesuits

and Oratorians

were

at

loggerheads

over

the

doc-

trineof

free

will

because

they

believed

that

the liberty f

sponta-

neity and

of indifference

were

incompatible.

Therefore,

when

Descartes

alled them

both acts of

free

will, he presented

is readers

with

an

equivocation

which

pursued

him for

years

afterward.

e-

viewingthe contradictionsn Descartes'scorrespondence egarding

the two liberties,

nd

the politics

that

Descartes was

playing with

the theological

powers

that

were,

Boyce Gibson

wrote:

It would

thus

appear

that

on the

main

issue

in

the controversy

etween

Jesuit

nd Jansenist

e

held no definite

oint

of

view, and,

what

is

more,

that he

did

not regard

a solution

of

the problem

as

vital to

his philosophy.

1

Gibson,

and

more

emphatically

Gilson,

detected

10

The argumentative tructure of the text (AT VII, 60) shows that chance

hittingon the truth

s not

a true udgment, .e.,

that any affirmation

f unclear

ideas is a false judgment.

After asserting that

the right

use of his will consists

in affirming lear

ideas as

true while abstaining

from udging

others, he con-

siders

the

alternatives

o nonabstention:

either he

affirms hatwhich is not

true,

in which

case

he plainly errs, or

he embraces

(amplectar) the

truth

by

chance,

n which

case he has again used

his will badly, i.e., judged

falsely.

This

outcome

is noted

by Alquie

in his

gloss:

Truth found

by

chance

is

thus

assimilable to error Oeuvres philosophiques,

I, 464,

n.

2).

The Latin

brings

out

this

point

more

clearly

than

the

French

translation,

which the

HR

translation

follows.

For

in the

Latin Descartes

avoids

the

technical

term

judicio,

writing

inistead hemetaphorical amplectar'.'

The Philosophy

of Descartes (London: Methuen, 1932), p. 334.

Gilson has minutely

documented

both the theologico-politics

of

Descartes's

initial

treatment f the two liberties

and

the

ways

in which he later shifted

his

exposition

of

it to accommodate the rapidly changing

events

in

France (La

Libert6,

268-269, 292-332).

Noting the

inconsistency etween

Descartes's

assur-

ance

that the Meditations

do not discuss practical questions

of faith

and the

manifest practical

bearing

of the equation

of sin with error,Gilson

dismissed

the

assurance as

only

a

feint (ibid.,

268).

The

assurance

is

also incompatible








WILL AND REASON

IN

DESCARTES'S THEORY OF ERROR

95

in

Descartes'suse

of

Jesuit-Oratorianargon

an expedientfor

ecur-

ing the

receptionof his

philosophy

n

a

theologically verheated

environment, s Descartes himselfon a number of occasionsindi-

cated was

the partial objective

of

the

Meditations. It

is

thus

no

wonder that

recent

commentary,

hich almost

without

exception

ignores this

context of

meaning, finds

Descartes's

meaning

so

ob-

scure. n the

present

ase,

that

contextenables us

to

identify

non-

arbitrarily he mismatch

etweenhis

terminology

nd

his

concept.

He

calls assent to clear

ideas

the

liberty

of

spontaneity;

but

the

mental act

described

nvolves

no

choice,

but

rather

xcludes t pre-

cisely as the arbitrary lement that corruptsknowledge.The pre-

destinarian

tendency

f Oratorian

theologymerelyprovided

Des-

cartes n opportune

way

of

speaking

of

rational

necessitarianisms

though t were

dependent

upon the

will.

The difference etween

Descartes

and the Oratory

s easily

ndicated.

The

apparent

volun-

tarismof the

Fourth

Meditation, lready diluted

by

necessitarian-

ism, is

followed

by

the undiluted

necessitarianism f the

Fifth.

Speaking of mathematical

ruth, escartes

tates

n

many

and vari-

ous

formulasthe

necessity

f the mind

to

assent,whether

t will

or no, to clear and distinctdeas; just because they re independent

of

the

will,

mathematical ruths

re

necessary.

And of

course

the

Augustinian

Oratory

would have no

part

of

Descartes's

laim

to be

able to avoid

error

always,

if

that

claim carried with

it,

as

for

Descartes t

does,

the implication that

sin is

avoidable. As

for the

Jesuitdoctrine of

indifference,

escartes

actuallytaught

that the

most mportant

rrors,

alled

in

the Sixth

Meditation

the teachings

of nature,

rise

not

by choice but

by

a

natural mpulsion

that can

be set aside onlyby the mostvigorous elf-criticism,nd even then

theymustbe

followed n

practical ife.

The

notion of

judgment

as choice

functions

xclusively

n the

theological plane

of the Meditations. An

adequate account of it

presupposes lengthy

reparation

which

cannot

be given

here; a

sketch of

the

argument

tselfmust

therefore

uffice.

he

relation

between

philosophy

nd

theology

n

the

MVIeditations

s

determined

by the fact

that

theology

nters

the

argument n

the form

of the

deus deceptor,

.e.,

as an

objection

to

the certain

and demonstra-

tive science

which

Descartes

has

undertaken

to

found. The deus

deceptor s

destructive f

foundations

ecause

it

calls into question

mathematical

truths,

mplying

that

clear

and

distinct

deas are

with

Descartes's

declared intention

to

refute the

atheists

in

defense of faith,

and

with his admission

that the

doubt

endangers the

faith of

the

weak-

minded (AT

VII,

7, 247, 346;

AT

I,

558;

AT

V,

153,

560).








96

THE

JOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

not true.

While

admitting

that

his doubts were

hyperbolic

or

exaggerated,

escartes

yet nsisted

hat

they

were

serious and well-

considered.The serious sense of this doubt depends upon dis-

covering

in

the

theological

tradition

the

dogma

to

which

the

doubt

refers.The

relevant

dogma

must be

one

concerning the

relation

between

reason

and

revelation,

r

between

philosophy

nd

theology,

which s,

according o

its classic

formulation,

hat

philoso-

phy

s

the

handmaidento

theology.

he

subordination

f

reasonand

nature to

faith and

gracemeant

that, n the

event

of a

clash be-

tween

them,

faith

was to

take

precedence,

s being

more certain

and authoritative. ut since thedogmasoffaith urpass hecapacity

of

understanding, ssent to

them

s

by grace,

and

grace is

directed

to

the

will

rather han to

understanding; ence

Descartes,

ollowing

Augustine, ays

that

assent to

grace

is

by the will.

The

theological

plane

of

the

doubt

renews he old

struggle

etweenfaith

nd

reason

by

representing he inner tension of

the mind torn

between

these

poles. The

tortured

iction

f

the

malign

demon, who

embodies

a

willful

negation

of

reason's clear and

distinct

deas,

is the

image

of

the

quite real

capacity

o

forsake

ational

truth or

faith.12

The theologicalargument f theMeditations-or to be precise,

its

argument

with

theology-is

meant

to

restore

he

autonomyof

reason.

The Cogito

discovers

necessary ruth

bout

the

subject of

the doubt which

not

even an

omnipotent

God

can

alter.

The

alter-

native,

deceiving

God/veracious

God,

seizes

the

initiativefrom

he

theologians

by

posing

a

dilemma:

either God

ordains truth

con-

trary o

reason,

n

which

case the

energy

f

faith,

kepticism, eigns

supreme;

or he

is

veracious,

n which

case

God

is

on

the

side

of the

philosophers. The Fourth Meditation completes the process of

auto-emancipation

y

assimilating

in

to

error,thus

arming

the

mind

against

the

vain

fears

t

the root

of

its

subjugation.18

or this

reason

Descartes

posits

the

dependence of

error

upon

free

will;

on the other

hand,

for

conscience's ake

and in

deference

o

the

truth, e

must

assert

he

necessity

f

assent

to clear

ideas. It

follows

then that

virtue s

knowledge

nd

sin is

rebellion

against reason.'4

The

Jesuit-Oratorian

ontroversy

ffered

escartesthe

equivocation

12 For a

detailed

treatment f

this

interpretation, ee

my

The

Origin

of Sub-

jectivity:

An

Essay

on Descartes

(New

Haven,

Conn.:

Yale,

1973), pp.

115-130.

13

The

vulnerability

of

the

doubter to

bad

conscience

is

most

visible in the

Discourse,

where Descartes

equips

himself

with

a

provisional

morality

to sub-

stitute for the

faith

and conventional

opinions

he

has

stripped

away.

Gen-

erosity,

he

key

to all the

virtues,

s

a

teaching

about

good

and

bad

conscience

in

regard

to the use of the

will

(AT

IV,

266;

Passions

of

the

Soul, ?190).

14

DM

28; Passions,

??144,

160,

212;

AT

I,

367.








WILL AND

REASON IN DESCARTES'STHEORY

OF ERROR

97

he needed

to carry

ff his piece of legerdemain.

he conclusion

of

his analysis,

however, s neither

Jesuitnor

Oratorian,but

Pelagian,

for he has learnedhow to employhis own resources o avoid error

and sin

always.

These

results re sufficiently

emotefrom

urrent

xpectations

o

warrantcomment

on the present

conditionof Cartesian

studies.

There is

a pronouncedtendency

o divide

Descartes's hought

nto

two phases,

with science

and methodpredominating

n

the

earlier,

metaphysics nd religion

n the

later phase. It is widely believed

that the

Meditationsreviseor abrogate

the

basically

nonmetaphysi-

cal thoughtof the

Regulae by

founding scientific ertainty

pon

an

elaborate

cholastic

difice.'5 his characterization

tands

or

falls

with the premise that

the theological

argumentation

f the

work

represents

ts genuine

intention. n the

scope of this

article we

can only indicate

the grave objections to

which this interpreta-

tion is open.'6 What

we can show

is that the theological

rgument

has not

yet been correctly

ssessed.For if

our reading

is

correct,

Descartes

uses traditional

theologicometaphysics

o

undermine he

very beliefs

that traditionally

t had been

used

to defend.

This fact has been detected with varyingdegreesof clarityby

modernThomists,

not to mention

he manydetractors ontemporary

with

Descartes. Gilson's

study of the sources

of the

Meditations

led

him

to conclude

that the work,particularly

he

Fourth Medi-

tation,

was a tissue of borrowings

from

theologians ancient

and

contemporary;nd he attributed

his

eclecticism

o

Descartes's

anxiety

to ensure acceptance of

his physics

n a

world

dominated

by theology.'-

hese admissions

re significant

ecause

Gilson,

more

than any other ndividual, s responsibleforestablishing he view

that Descartes's

metaphysical

hought s

heavily dependent

upon

scholasticism.

lthough todaysuch an assertion

passes

as a

truism,

Gilson

had to establish

t in the teeth of

a

contrary

iew, whose

last significant

dvocate was

Charles Adam,

that

the

scholastic

edifice

of the Meditations is

but a

flag

to

cover

the

goods,

namely,Cartesian

physics.Gilson

thus agreed

with

his

opponents

15

This

interpretation,

n one form r

another,

as been upheld by every

significant

omprehensivetudy

f Descartes

ince Louis Liard's

pathbreaking

study n 1882,which mphasized fundamentalreakbetween hemetaphysics-

less

Regulae and the

scholasticMeditations.

1e

For an account

f thesedifficulties,

ee Caton,

op. cit., pp. 10-20, 6-73,

101-108.

17

Gilson,

a

Liberte, p.

160, 174-76,

4142. Maritain

wrote hat

Descartes

knew

the profound

ncompatibilityf

his

philosophy

ith

the whole uthentic

tradition

f Christian isdom ; ee

The Dream of

Descartes

New

York: Philo-

sophical

ibrary,

944), . 44.








WILL AND REASON IN DESCARTES'S THEORY OF

ERROR

99

ligious. It is typical of Descartes's procedure that

he provides

his

readerswith both premises, ut denies the

conclusion; thus he says

that we should have no difficulty elieving religious mysteries

because the immensepower of God can createmany

thingsbeyond

human understanding. ut Descartes also

explained how this con-

tradiction s to be understood.He wrote that

anyone who teaches

that Scripture ontradicts

atural

reason does so

only to show in-

directly hat he has no faith in Scripture.For as

we were born

men beforewe were made Christians, t is beyond belief that any

man

should seriously mbrace opinions which he thinks

contrary

to right reason that constitutes man, in order that he may

adhere to the faithby whichhe is a Christian AT

VIII-2,

353-54).

Descartes'sdenial of the conclusion hatfollows romhis premisess

a

way of showing indirectly hat the resolve to

achieve clarity,

and to accept nothingbut clear ideas, is already

mplicitly rejec-

tion of faith and authority. he first ule of the method

is first

because it states what Descartes believed to be the

necessary

on-

dition for rational inquiry.But because his renewal of philosophy

was

destructive

f

the regnantbelief of his time,

Descartes

found

it necessaryodissemblehis position n orderto avertpersecution.2'

The

theory

of Meditation Four

is part

of

this

program.

As

an

apparent assimilation

of current

heological nterpretations

f the

will,

it

is a weapon of

defense.

But

when its

logic

is

more

exactly

studied,

ne sees

that

t

is not

merely

efensive.

The

interpretation

e offer

mplies that Descartes

had but one

philosophy

and

that

continuity

with

pre-Meditations

doctrine

should lie

just

beneath its scholastic

surface.

Because its

origins

have been so thoroughly tudied,the theory f error s well suited

to testing f this claim. Gilson declared that Descartes derived the

theory

rom St.

Thomas by generalizingThomas's

analysis

of

the

relation between reason and will in practical

udgments.Anthony

Kenny recently ejected

that

explanation

as

textuallyunfounded

and

declared

that,

o

his

knowledge,

herewas no

antecedent or the

notion of the

will

as judgmental power. We shall attempt o show

that the

theory

f

the

Fourth Meditation, n our

adjusted

form,

embodiesfundamentalmethodological deas present lready n the

Regulae and that Descartes took his theory f

judgment without

the

light of grace,

would

commit a sin

in not

using his reason

rightly

AT

VII,

148).

21

For a study of this

question, and the

problems it

presentsfor

correct

nter-

pretation,

see Caton, op.

cit., pp.

10-20; and my

The

Problem of

Descartes's

Sincerity,

hilosophical

Forum, ii,

3

(Spring

1971): 355-369.








IOO

THE JOURNAL OF

PHILOSOPHY

change

fromStoic doctrine,

probably as it was expounded

by

the

primary

ource

of Latin Stoicism,

Cicero.

The divisionofthought ntothe modesof understandingnd will

is

based

upon the cardinal

premise that

perceptions

s such

con-

tain no error,

nd

that error

stems from

faulty

treatment f

per-

ceptions.

Thus

Descartes

remarks

that his

perceptions

of sensed

objects

are sufficiently

lear and distinct

aken

bythemselves;

ut

he

has

a habit of udging

that there re

objects

outsidehimself

imilar

to

his sense impressions,

lthough

he has

never perceived

such

a

relationship.

This

extension

of judgment

beyond

understanding

involves

more than bare

assent;

it adds

positive

content to

the

perception,

r

mingles,

as the Sixth Meditation has it, an un-

perceived

ontent

with

a perception.

Error

s accordingly

haracter-

ized as a

faulty

ttempt o

make good

a lack of

some

knowledge

which t seems ought

to possess

AT VII,

55). Error

arises

from

a refusalto be

content

with clear

ideas

as the sole

criterion

of

truth.The refusal

stems

fromtwo

distinct

ources-the

practical

needsof

life,which

engender

natural

prejudice,

and a

tendency o

prefer

lofty and obscure

metaphysical

and

religious reasons

tothe simpleclarity fmathematicsAT X, 371-72,405; DM 8, 30).

A

critique of

reason,

one may

say, is

already implicit

in

the

restriction

f truth

o clear and

distinct

deas.

In Rule

XII

of the Regulae,

which

summarizes

all

that went

before,

very imilar

teaching

s set forth:

Thirdly, e say

hat ll

these imple

atures

re known y

themselves

(per

se

notas)and contain

no falsity.

his is easily

hown,

f we

distinguishhe

faculty f understanding

intellectus)

y

which

hings

are known nd intuited,rom hatbywhich t judges n affirming

and

denying.

or we

may

think

urselves

gnorant

f

things

which

we

really now,

s

whenwe

believe hat

n

such

hings

here s

some-

thing

idden rom

s,

beyond

whatwe

intuit

r attain

by

reflection,

and

this

elief

f

ours

s false.

Whence

t

is

evident

hatwe err f

we

judge

that

ny

of

these

imple

aturess not

completely

nown

y

us.

For f the

mind

ttains

he east

cquaintance

ith

t,

which s

neces-

sary, ssuming

hat

we

make ome

udgment

ponit,

from

his

fact

itselfwe

know

t completely

AT X,

37).

The second

sentence

of this

passage

is

usually

cited as evidence

of

the

change

in Descartes's

hought

rom he

Regulae

to the

Medita-

tions,

ince

it

assigns

perception

nd

judgment

to

understanding.22

22

Kenny,

p. cit.,

p. 1;

J.-M.

Gabaude,

Libertd

t

raison

Toulouse:

Associa-

tion

des

publications

e

la Faculte

des

lettres

t

sciences

umaines

e

Toulouse,

1970),

ol.

, p.

113.








WILL AND REASON IN

DESCARTES S THEORY OF ERROR

IOI

This observation s

not

so significant

s it is thought o be. Judg-

ment and perception are assigned

to differentmodes of

under-

standing, reating n equivocation n the meaning of the term. n-

deed the Regulae use 'understanding'

n three senses.

It may

designate the mind with all

its powers; or the power of percep-

tion; or pure understanding,

s distinguished romsensation and

imagination.23n the present ase the term s used in the first nd

second senses; that s, understanding as two functions, erception

and judgment, nd perception s also called understanding.

his

equivocation is continued

in the Meditations,

where the

modes,

understanding nd will, are said to be modes of that comprehensive

powerwhichmaybe called understanding,

eason,mind, r soul (AT

VII, 27; Principles , ?32).

At the root of the equivocation

is Des-

cartes'sreplacement f the

Aristotelian oncept of the soul as an

orderedhierarchy f faculties y the conceptof mind as a thinking

thing,which is nothingelse than its respectivemodes

of thought:

The facultiesof willing,

sensing,understanding, tc.,

cannot be

called its parts,for t is one and the same thing

which

wills,

senses,

and

understands (AT VII, 86). The faculty terminology,

ike

the soul terminology escartes ontinues o employ, s anachronistic

with respectto his own philosophic

nnovations.The correct erm

is 'mode'; the will is a mode .

.

. of thought, .e., of understanding,

reason, mind, or soul. Hence

it is correct o say within the frame-

workof Descartes's equivocationsthat understanding udges.

His

'voluntarization f judgment

goes hand

in hand with an

intel-

lectualization of volition.

We find, therefore,

he

following correspondence etween

the

Regulae and the Meditations. Clear ideas or simple natures are

known to be true by their own sign, and this truth s perceived,

although the

mind

also

levies a

judgmental

assessment

f these

perceptions.

he

only

difference

s

thatthe

Regulae

do not call

mind

in

the mode of judgment

will.

But

they

do

anticipate

the

later

terminology.

t

is

by

the will,

he

says,

that

the

mind

assents

to

revealed faith AT X, 370).

In a more significant assage,Descartes

speaks of the liberty by which we make conjectural udgments,

which do not deceive us

so

long

as

they

re not affirmed

o be

true

(AT X, 424). Speaking

in

the same

context of

deduction as

a

compounding of simple natures, i.e.,

an

activity by

which

the

mind

puts together llations,

he notes

that

t

is withinour

power

23

AT X, 395,

411, 415-16. The

Regulae also use 'cognition' nd

'mind' as

synonymous ith the general

meaningof understanding;

ikewise he later

wvorks,.g., AT

X, 360,

362,

395,

411.








I02

THE JOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

to

avoid

errorhere,

provided

that the

compounding

s intuitively

necessary AT X,

424-25).

Similarly, n

the

Meditationsthe

distinc-

tion between what is and is not withinour power operatesas the

criterionwhich

distinguishesnecessary,

nd

therefore rue

judg-

ments,from

rbitrary hoice,

for it is

impossible not to

assent

to

clear

ideas.24

We conclude

that

the difference

etween

the Regulae

and the

Meditations

regarding

he role of will in

judgment

s

not

a

difference

f

principle, as is

widely

believed, but a

difference f

stress nd

terminology,ue less

to a

maturation f

thought

han to

the

differencen

the

problems he two

works

ddress.

The continuity etweentheRegulae and the Meditationsmaybe

attributed

n part to

Descartes's

early, asting,

nd

profound

debt

to

Stoic

doctrine.This

indebtedness s usually

thought o be con-

fined

to

ethical

questions. But

Descartes

follows

the Stoics also

in his

conception

that ethics s

anchored n logic,

and

conversely.

The

Stoics

teach that

udgment

judicio) is the

fundamental

ct

of

sentience

thinking ) s

such and

comprises he

groundupon

which

the whole

of

philosophy s built.25

It

consists f two

components,

a

perception or

conception (visum

=

phantasia) and

assent

(ad-

sensio).Whereasperceptions re adventitious,he one thing within

our

power,

whichwe can

will

to do or not to

do, is

assent

to

per-

ceptions II,

xii, 38; I, xi,

40-41).

Philosophy

therefore onsists n

dealing

well with

perceptions

with a view to

attaining

firm

nd

constant

judgments

that cannot be

overthrown by

contrary

evidence or

by

the

inconstancy f

the

passions;

in

this

way,

firm

and

constant

udgments

re the

key alike to

scienceand

to conduct.

Steadfast

udgments are

attained

by

distinguishing

mong per-

ceptionsthose which are unstable and inconstant,nd those which

are

strictly

peaking

comprehensible

katalPpton). The latter are

recognized

by their

clarity

declaratio) (I, xi,

41).

Perceptionsof

this kind

give rise

to

an

assent or

judgment

called

synkatathesis,

i.e., a

union of

perception

nd assent

uch that

the mind

necessarily

assents o

what t

clearlyperceives

II,

xii, 38).

Notwithstandinghis

necessity,he

Stoics

assign udgment to

the

will because

assent is

within

our

power: to

perception

[Zeno] joins

the act of

assent

24

AT

VII,

38, 64, 65, 66,

67, 69,

75. As for

the

letter

to

Mesland

(?) in

which

Descartes seems to

deny

this doctrine,

see

the judicious

remarks of Kenny,

op. cit.,

pp.

25/6. In

general,

Descartes's

correspondence

n this as

well as

other

theological

subjects

is almost

always

written d

hominem, as

Gilson has

shown.

In

evaluating such

correspondence, t is

necessary

o

bear in

mind that

Descartes

said that

his letters were

usually

written with too

little

care

to

warrant

reading

by others

than

those to whom

they

are written

(AT I,

178).

25

Cicero, Academica

II,

ix, 29; x,

31; xii,

37-39.








WILL

AND REASON IN DESCARTES S

THEORY OF ERROR

I03

which

he says

s

in

us and voluntary I, xi, 40; De Finibus III, v,

17).

In

this way the Stoics arrived

at

their conception of

the

unityof theory nd practice: Error,rashness, gnorance, pinion,

suspicion,

and

in

a

word

all

things

alien to firm nd

constant

judgmentZeno

set apart from irtue nd

wisdom I, xi, 42).

Virtue

is knowledge.

The seeming inconsistency n the

Stoic position between the

assertions hat

assent to clear ideas is

necessary nd that assent to

it

is within

our power is duplicated by Descartes.The explication

in the two

cases s the same. Although he

mind is so constituted y

naturethat tmustassentto what s clearly erceived, t may,owing

to passions

and erroneousbeliefs,

ttemptto resist that necessity,

thereby

ngendering condition of vacillating self-estrangement

which

theStoicsdiagnosed as the stateof the unwise.

The diagnosis

points to the cure: it is withinour power

to

will what

is necessary,

in

this way achieving that harmonia

between conduct

and

convic-

tion which s

the fruit f wisdom that not

even

Zeus

can disturb.

Assent as an

act

of

volition occurs

exclusively

on the

secondary

level of

reflection,fter he first evel of

necessitated ssent

to clear

ideas has been understood.This double meaning of 'assent' runs

throughout

escartes'swritings. he problem

of

understanding

he

role of will in

judgment therefore educes

to the

question why,

n

the

Meditations,Descartes makes it appear that

it

is

by

an

act of

free will or choice that we assent to

clear ideas on

the

first

evel.

And

thisquestion has,

I

believe, been

adequately

answered.

In the third

ule of his provisional

morality escartes ommended

the Stoic

wisdom. His

implementation

f

it in

the doubt

of

the

Meditationswas meantto freephilosophy romvacillationbetween

revelation and

reason, by affirming is

nature

(reason)

as more

certain than

any other

claim. Persistence

n

this

evidence,

he

says

in

the Fourth Meditation, depends on

the constancy f his will

in refusing o yield to counterclaims. ut

Descartes departed from

the Stoics on one decisive point-his

project

for the

mastery f

nature.His

attempt

o combinereliance

upon

nature

as

a

standard,

with

intellectual

and

practical opposition

to

nature, produced al-

ready

in

his

philosophy

new vacillation.

ts working ut

in

sub-

sequent philosophy has eroded every

possibilityof retaining the

natural basis of Cartesianrationalism. he

result s thatphilosophy

finds tself nce more n the lap of faith,

ven if a secular faith, s

Karl

Popper, among others,

ndicates

when

he

admits

that his

rationalism rests

on

an

irrationalfaith

n

the attitude of reason-

ableness. The

willfulness

of

Descartes's

self-assertion f reason.








104

THE

JOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPHY

deprived of its natural basis,

now

seems, and is, completely

rbi-

trary. erhaps studyof thehistory f philosophy an

help us find

our way out of this wilderness y showingus how we got into it.

HIRAM

CATON

The AustralianNational University

BOOK REVIEWS

Education

and theDevelopment

fReason, edited by R. F.

Dearden,

P. H.

Hirst, and R. S.

Peters.

London and Boston:

Routledge

&

KeganPaul, 1972.xiv,536p. $18.25.

This book is

a collection

of articles which

is, I

think, stronger

in its conception

than

in its execution.

Unfortunately,

moveover,

its usefulness

s

a text s somewhat

vitiated

by its price. The

point

of the

collection

s to raise and

illustrate

he thesisthat education

aims

at the development

f reason.

ts authors'

method s to

bring

together hilosophical

papers on educational

aims

with papers on

the nature of

reason that

ack any specifically

ducational

focus. t

is an excellentand usefulidea to designan anthology o develop

a

particular

thesis, nd

it is clearly

mportant o

show the

connec-

tionsbetween

questions

raisedwithin the

philosophy

f education

and

questions

thathave been of

broader

philosophicalconcern.

But

I

have

qualms

about the way the

thesis s

developed by the

authors

of the

anthology nd

about the

sorts of papers

selected

to show

the relevance

of general

philosophy

to philosophy

of education.

The

first

ection

s designed o

be largely

negative,

nd

is,

n

many

ways,the strongestn the book. It consists f

a number

of

papers

that consider

critically

variety of aims

for education,

most

of

which

derive

from the child-centered

heory

of education.

Al-

though

ll the

articles

n this ection re

well

worth

eading,

hose

by

R.

F.

Dearden on

needs,

on

education

as

a

process

of

growth,

nd

on

happiness

are especially

nteresting,

s is

J.

P. White's

paper

on

creativity.

aken

together,

he

papers

n this ection onvincingly

show the

inadequacies

of theories

hat

try

to derive aims of edu-

cation

solely

from heories

bout

the natureand

propensities

f chil-

dren,and theirgoals, aims, likes,and dislikes.The authorsargue

that

education,

on theseaccounts,

will be

unable to

equip

children

to

give

acceptable

reasons

for what

they

decide

to

do,

or to enable

them to

understand

and

participate

in

knowledge

as

a

public

enterprise.

From

these sorts

of

argument

he conclusion s

supposed

to

be

drawn

that education

should

aim

instead

at

the

development

of

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