Why Technical Metrics Aren’t Enough: 10 Strategic Security ...Metrics.pdf · Some typical...
Transcript of Why Technical Metrics Aren’t Enough: 10 Strategic Security ...Metrics.pdf · Some typical...
© 2014 Carnegie Mellon University
Why Technical Metrics Aren’t Enough: 10 Strategic Security Measures to Consider
Julia Allen, Lisa YoungEDUCAUSE Security Professionals Conference8 May 2014
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Session expectationsThis session
• does not cover specific technical security metrics• does cover strategic security metrics and their importance
Why you might want to stay for this session anyway -if you are interested in
• determining the current state of security in support of business objectives
• identifying risks and gaps in your current measurement processes
• selecting and implementing practices and controls tied to business objectives
• a description of candidate metrics that will help you do these things
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Key takeaways Determine which metrics are most important: key
questions to ask Articulate 5 business objectives and 10 key
metrics that better • illustrate your current state of security at a
strategic/business level• inform the selection of improvements
Put metrics in place that stick Communicate with business leaders in their
language
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CERT | Software Engineering Institute | Carnegie Mellon
Software Engineering Institute (SEI)• Federally funded research and development center
• Basic and applied research in partnership with government and private organizations
• Helps organizations improve development, operation, and management of software-intensive and networked systems
CERT Division – Anticipating and solving our nation’s cybersecurity challenges• Largest technical program at the SEI
• Internet security, digital investigation, secure systems, insider threat, operational resilience, vulnerability analysis, network situational awareness, and coordinated response
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CMU-SEI-CERT Cyber Risk Management TeamEngaged in applied research, education and training, putting improvements into practice, and enabling our federal, state, and commercial partners
http://www.cert.org/resilience/
In areas dealing with • operational resilience• resilience management• operational risk management• integration of cybersecurity,
business continuity, disaster recovery, and IT operations
Carnegie Mellon University Office of Risk Initiatives
• Purpose: Advance educational and research mission by championing risk‐aware decision making, planning, and response. Deliver expertise, tools, and best practices to campus risk owners to support confident risk‐taking.
• Executive Steering and Advisory Committees – Guide, shape, influence approach– Support and champion – Promote communication throughout organization
• Campus risk management partners– Environmental Health & Safety, CMU Police,
Internal Audit, Health Services, insurance, sponsored research, others…
– Integrated with Disaster Recovery / Business Continuity efforts
• Initial implementation efforts– Web site– Standard core message development – Higher education risk register
Oversight
Common RiskInfrastructure
Risk Process
Tone at the top
Identify Risks
Assess & Evaluate Risks
Integrate Risks
Respond to Risks
Design, Implement & Test Controls
Monitor, Assure & Escalate
People Process Technology
Risk CategoriesMission Impact Human Impact Asset Impact Compliance
Risk Governance
Risk Infrastructure and Management
Risk Ownership
Board of Trustees, President
Executive Steering Committee, President’s Council, Management Team,
& Executive Sponsors
Academic & Administrative Departments
CMU Office of Risk Initiatives web site
Single source for information, tools, and best practices including:• Governance model and services• Concepts and vocabulary
– Risk altitudes– Risk categories– Risk tolerance and risk appetite– Risk management process– Case study resources
• Risk management tools– Planning tools and checklists– White papers, studies and best practices– Higher Education Compliance Alliance compliance matrix link
• CMU risk partners and resources
www.cmu.edu/erm/
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Topics
CERT Resilience Management Model (CERT-RMM) Overview
How Secure Am I? Why Measure? What Should I Measure? Measurement Defined Key Metrics Getting Started
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CERT-RMM Overview
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physical property of a material that can return to its original shape or position after deformation that does not exceed its elastic limit
ability to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of faults and challenges to normal operation
power or ability to return to the original form, position, etc., after being bent, compressed, or stretched
capability of a strained body to recover its size and shape after deformation
ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change
ability of an ecosystem to return to its original state after being disturbed
ability to recover readily from illness, depression, adversity, or the like
Operational re·sil·ience noun [ri-ˈzil-yәns]
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Operational risk and resilience Security and business continuity are risk management processes Effective operational risk management requires these activities to
work toward the same goals Operational resilience emerges from effective operational risk
management
Actions of people
Systems and
technology failures
Failed internal
processes
External events
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CERT-RMM
“…an extensive super-set of the things an organization could do to be more resilient.”
- CERT-RMM adopter
Framework for managing and improving operational resilience
http://www.cert.org/resilience/
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ServiceService Mission
Organization Mission
People Information FacilitiesTechnologyprotect sustainprotect sustain protect sustain protect sustain
CERT-RMMapplieshere
Organizational context
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CERT-RMM: 26 process areas in 4 categories
EngineeringADM Asset Definition and Management
CTRL Controls Management
RRD Resilience Requirements Development
RRM Resilience Requirements Management
RTSE Resilient Technical Solution Engineering
SC Service Continuity
Enterprise ManagementCOMM Communications
COMP Compliance
EF Enterprise Focus
FRM Financial Resource Management
HRM Human Resource Management
OTA Organizational Training & Awareness
RISK Risk Management
Operations ManagementAM Access Management
EC Environmental Control
EXD External Dependencies Management
ID Identity Management
IMC Incident Management & Control
KIM Knowledge & Information Management
PM People Management
TM Technology Management
VAR Vulnerability Analysis & Resolution
Process ManagementMA Measurement and Analysis
MON Monitoring
OPD Organizational Process Definition
OPF Organizational Process Focus
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How Secure Am I?
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How secure am I?When asked:
• How secure am I?• Am I secure enough?• How secure do I need to be?
What does this mean?• How secure am I compared to my competition?• Do I need to spend more $$ on security? If so, on
what?• What are the PR and legal consequences of getting
hacked?
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Key questionsWhat should I be measuring to determine if I am meeting my performance objectives for security?
• Do I know what these are? Do they reflect today’s realities?
What is the business value of being more secure?
• Of a specific security investment?
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So what? Why do you care?This is the most important question.If I had this metric: (*)
• What decisions would it inform?• What actions would I take based on
it?• What behaviors would it affect?• What would improvement look like?• What would its value be in
comparison to other metrics?
(*) informed by Douglas Hubbard, How to Measure Anything, John Wiley & Sons, 2010
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Why Measure? What Should I Measure?
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What are you measuring today?Some typical technical metrics
• % of assets (systems, devices) patched—min/mean/max time from patch release to patch
implementation• % of scanned assets not found in the CMDB
—Goal: 100% of assets inventoried in CMDB and reflect standard configurations
• % of devices/assets regularly scanned by anti-virus software
• number of incidents reported/closed—number of incidents with a known solution (patch) that was not
applied• % of assets subject to ingress/egress filtering
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What are you measuring today? (cont.)
Some typical strategic/business metrics• % of senior executives who have documented security
objectives that are reviewed as part of the performance management review process
• % of security policies that are met (no violations; all exceptions approved)
• difference in planned vs. actual to perform security activities/actions/investments— schedule— resources— cost
• % of staff who have been assessed to determine if training has been effective commensurate with their job responsibilities
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Why measure? Demonstrate that the security
program has measurable business value
Speak to decision makers in their language
Answer key questions
Demonstrate that security objectives are (and continue to be) met
Justify new investments; improve
Help predict the future
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What should I measure? Determine business objectives and key questions Define the information that is needed to answer
the question• What information do you currently have?
• What additional information do you need to collect?
Qualify and quantify the information in the form of metrics
Analyze the metrics and report out Quantify the value of each metric (cost/benefit) Refine and retire metrics as you go
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Who, what, where, when, why, how? Who is the metric for? Who are the stakeholders?
Who collects the measurement data?
What is being measured?
Where is the data/information stored?
When/how frequently are the metrics collected?
Why is the metric important (vs. others)? The most meaningful information is conveyed by reporting trends over time vs. point in time metrics.
How is the data collected? How is the metric presented? How is the metric used?
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Measurement Defined
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Terminology (*)
Measure vs. metric• I had 2 eggs for breakfast this morning• It’s 90 degrees in Las Vegas, NV• This workshop is 8 hours long
A measure (or measurement) is the value of a specific characteristic of a given entity (collected data).A metric is the aggregation of one or more measures to create a piece of business intelligence, in context.
(*) Visualize This! Meaningful Metrics for Managing Risk. Session GRC-F02, RSA Conference 2014.
OR
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Technical vs. process metrics
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Types of process metricsImplementation
• Is this process/activity/practice being performed?
Effectiveness (aka outcome)• How good is the work product or
outcome of the process/activity/practice? Does it achieve the intended result?
Process performance• Is the process performing as
expected? Is it efficient? Can it be planned? Is it predictive? Is it in control?
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Key Metrics
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Structure of the 10 strategic metrics Title: The context for the metric (a.k.a. business
driver)• business objectives• high-value services and assets• controls• risks• disruptive events
Two metrics to aid in determining if each business driver is being met
Scenario example: The organization has decided to outsource selected security services and contract for such services using an SLA
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Given business objectives (1 of 10)
Metric 1Percentage of security activities(*) that do notdirectly (or indirectly) support one or more business objectives
ExampleOutsource in-house security services Transition/retire in-house services Retrain/reassign staff
(*) An activity can be a project, task, performance objective, investment, etc. It represents some meaningful decomposition of the security program.
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Given business objectives (2 of 10)
Metric 2For each security activity, number of business objectives that require it to be satisfied (goal is = or > 1)
ExampleSLA relationship with external security services providerCIO/CSO objective
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Metric 3Percentage of high-value services that do not satisfy their security requirements(*) (should be zero)
or measure a specific service of interestmake sure criteria for selecting a specific service are defined
(*) confidentiality, availability, integrity
ExampleSLA specifies security requirements and thresholds
high-priority alerts from incident detection systems are resolved within xx minutes
Provider performance periodically reviewed to confirm compliance; corrective actions identified and addressed
Given high-value services and assets (3 of 10)
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(+) technology, information, facilities, people
Given high-value services and assets(4 of 10)
Metric 4Percentage of high-value assets(+) that do not satisfy their security requirements (should be zero)
such as network infrastructure, a specific application, a database, a lead system administrator
ExampleSLA specifies security requirements and thresholds
Incident database: backups and ability to restore from backupsProvider performance periodically reviewed to confirm compliance; corrective actions identified and addressed
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Given controls (5 of 10)
Metric 5Percentage of high-value services with controls that are ineffective or inadequate (should be zero)
unsatisfied control objectivesunmet security requirementsoutstanding assessment/audit problems above threshold without remediation plans
ExampleSLA specifies controls (policies, procedures, standards, guidelines, tools, practices, metrics) Provider performance periodically reviewed to confirm compliance; corrective actions taken and confirmed
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Given controls (6 of 10)
Metric 6Percentage of high-value assets with controls that are ineffective or inadequate (should be zero)
unsatisfied control objectivesunmet security requirementsoutstanding assessment/audit problems above threshold without remediation plans
ExampleSLA specifies controls (policies, procedures, standards, guidelines, tools, practices, metrics) Provider performance periodically reviewed to confirm compliance; corrective actions taken and confirmed
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Given risks (7 of 10)
Metric 7Confidence factor that all risks that need to be identified have been identified
ExampleMajor sources of risk identified in SLA
Risk thresholds by service identified
Confidence factor expressed as plan vs. actual risks for all sources, displayed as a Kiviat diagram
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0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Organizations with defined risk parameters
Lines of business with risk parameters
inherited from organization
Assets with associated services
Services with associated assets
Asset risks from all sources identified
Service risks from all sources identified
Plan
Actual
Confidence in risk identification
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Given risks (8 of 10)
Metric 8Percentage of risks with impact above threshold (should be zero)
without mitigation plans (target = zero)that are effectively mitigated by their mitigation plans (target = 100%)that have been reviewed/actioned in the required timeframe (target = 100%)
ExampleProvider risk periodically assessed to ensure risk impact is <= zero; corrective actions taken and confirmed
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Given a disruptive event (9 of 10)
(An incident, a break in service continuity, a man-made or natural disaster or crisis)
Metric 9Probability of delivered service throughout a disruptive event
ExampleSLA specifies service-specific availability and service levels during normal and disrupted operations
Provider performance periodically reviewed to confirm service levels; corrective actions taken and confirmed
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Given a disruptive event (10 of 10)
Metric 10For disrupted, high-value services with a service continuity plan, percentage of services that did notdeliver service as intended throughout the disruptive event
ExampleSLA specifies requirements for SC plans
Services with SC plans that do not maintain required service levels identified
Updates to provider and customer plans made, confirmed, tested
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Top ten strategic metrics1. Percentage of security “activities” that do not directly (or indirectly) support one or
more organizational objectives
2. For each security “activity,” number of organizational objectives that require it to be satisfied (goal is = or > 1)
3. Percentage of high-value services that do not satisfy their allocated security requirements
4. Percentage of high-value assets that do not satisfy their allocated security requirements
5. Percentage of high-value services with controls that are ineffective or inadequate
6. Percentage of high-value assets with controls that are ineffective or inadequate
7. Confidence factor that all risks that need to be identified have been identified
8. Percentage of risks with impact above threshold
9. Probability of delivered service through a disruptive event
10. For disrupted, high-value services with a service continuity plan, percentage of services that did not deliver service as intended throughout the disruptive event
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If these don’t work for you . . .
Identify the high-level objectives for your security program
Define metrics that demonstrate the extent to which objectives are (or are not) being met
Make sure the metrics you are currently reporting support one or more objectives• If they don’t, ask “why not?” and “so what?”
• Measuring “security hygiene” is necessary but not sufficient
Measurement is expensive; collect and report metrics that inform decisions and affect behavior
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Getting Started
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To get started Identify sponsors and key stakeholders
Define security objectives and key questions
Determine information that informs these• What information do you already have?
• What information do you need to collect?
• What is the value of collecting additional information?
Define and vet a small number of key metrics
Collect, analyze, report, refine
Leverage an existing measurement program
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Set up a measurement programDefine
• measurement objectives including audiences and key stakeholders
• metrics (5-10 based on the metrics template)
• key roles to collect, analyze, and report these metrics
• data collection and storage methods and tools
• analysis methods and procedures
Collect measurement data
Analyze measurement dataStore data and results in a secure mannerReport resultsStart small
• data collection
• analysis procedures
• number of metrics
• number of participating business units
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Metrics template [provided as a separate file]
Metric name/ID Goal Question(s) Related processes &
procedures Visual display Data input(s) (data
elements, data type) Data collection (how,
when, how often, by whom)
Data reporting (by, to whom, when, how often)
Data storage (where, how, access control)
Stakeholders (information owner(s), collector(s), customer(s))
Algorithm or formula Interpretation or expected
value(s)
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Questions
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CERT-RMM contactsRich [email protected]
Nader [email protected]
Lisa [email protected]
Julia [email protected]
Richard LynchPublic Relations — All Media Inquiriespublic‐[email protected]
Pamela [email protected]
Joe McLeodFor info on working with [email protected]
SEI Customer Relationscustomer‐[email protected]‐268‐5800
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Resilience measurement resourcesSEI blog: Measures for Managing Operational Resilience http://blog.sei.cmu.edu/post.cfm/measures-for-managing-operational-resilience
CERT Podcast: Measuring Operational Resilience https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=34512
CERT-RMM Measurement & Analysis websitehttp://www.cert.org/resilience/research/resilience-measurement-and-analysis.cfm
[Allen 2011b] Allen, Julia; Curtis, Pamela; Gates, Linda. Using Defined Processes as a Context for Resilience Measures (CMU/SEI-2011-TN-029). Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, October 2011. http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetID=9887
Allen, Julia & Curtis, Pamela. Measures for Managing Operational Resilience (CMU/SEI-2011-TR-019). Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, June 2011. http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetID=10017
[Allen 2010] Allen, Julia & Davis, Noopur. Measuring Operational Resilience Using the CERT Resilience Management Model (CMU/SEI-2010-TN-030). Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, September 2010. http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetID=9401
Hubbard, Douglas. How to Measure Anything. John Wiley & Sons, 2007.
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CERT-RMM resources
Caralli, Richard A.; Allen, Julia H.; White, David W. CERT® Resilience Management Model: A Maturity Model for Managing Operational Resilience. Addison-Wesley, 2011.
CERT-RMM website: http://www.cert.org/resilience/products-services/cert-rmm/cert-rmm-model.cfm
CERT Podcast Series: Security for Business Leaders, specifically podcasts on risk management & resilience: http://www.cert.org/podcasts/index.cfm
Allen, Julia & Young, Lisa. Report from the First CERT-RMM Users Group Workshop Series(CMU/SEI-2012-TN-008). Carnegie Mellon University: Software Engineering Institute, April 2012. http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetID=10085
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