Why Gordon Perished or, The Political and Military Causes

TOY GORDON PERISHED;

OR,

THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CAUSES

WHICH LED TO

THE SUDAN DISASTERS.

A WAR CORRESPONDENT 1 ,

WHO ACCOMPANIED THE NILE EXPEDITION, '

Anther ef " Tee Utt for Garden at Khartum,'* &•(.

WITH MAPS AND PLANS.

LONDON :

W. H. ALLEN & CO., LIMITED,

13. Waterloo Place, S.W.

1896.

I.''.' I

PRINTED BY

WYMAN AND SONS, LIMITED,

GREAT QUEEN STREET,

LONDON, W.C.

/'harvard

UNIVERSITYl

LIBRARY

AUG 21 1973

PREFACE.

The chief object of the Author in the publication

of his history of the Nile Expedition in 1887, was

to give a more complete account of it than either

himself or his Press colleagues, who accompanied

it with him, were able to supply through the Press

at the time. This inability was chiefly owing to the

demand for the rapid despatch of news from a seat

of war by the Journalism of the present day, and

to the precedence consequently given to telegrams

over the letters of War Correspondents. Hence

only a synopsis of the most important events at

first reaches the public ; and this, to a large extent,

reduces the interest of later and fuller communica

tions despatched by mail.

Under the trying circumstances of such an

Expedition as that up the Nile, and the rapidity

with which its most important events followed each

other, it was physically and mentally impossible,

even in our fuller despatches, to deal satisfactorily

with them, and especially with those which in plan

and conduct contributed to its sad and disastrous

failure, so far as the objects it was intended to

accomplish were concerned.

iv PREFACE.

Some of these events were noticed by the Author

in the work referred to, but, as one of its reviewers

rightly remarked, the Author knew more than he

cared to publish at the time. This was consequent

upon the difficulty of supporting his statements by

satisfactory and sufficient evidence. That evidence

Having since been available, the restraint under

which he dealt in his former volume has becii

removed, and hence the full statement of substan

tiated facts is laid before the British public in

answer to the questions :—Why Gordon perished ?

and what were the political and military blunders

which contributed to this and our other disasters

in the Sudan, after our occupation of Egypt proper,

following on the victory at Tel-el-Kebir.

The reasons which have induced the publication

of the present volume are given to the Author's

readers in the introductory chapter, and to which

he will only add here that he is inspired by the

epitaph on the monument at the Pass of Thermo

pylae, to the memory of Leonidas and his gallant

three hundred, by their fellow-countrymen, which

was this :—

Stranger, tell the men of Sparta, we who obeyed

the laws lie here !

THE AUTHOR.

London, Dtttmbtrjth, /Stf.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PAOB

Introductory i

CHAPTER H.

A "non-proven" verdict—After Tel-el-Kebir—Pressed

for an explanation—Warned of threatened danger and

complications 20

CHAPTER III.

Premature announcement of the "Rescue and Retire

Policy "—Effects on Gordon's mission 39.

CHAPTER IV.

Mr. Gladstone and the demand for Zebehr Pasha—Have

we come to this?—Sir E. Baring's interference with

Gordon's plan of evacuation $6

CHAPTER V..

Goidon in danger of being cut off—Refusal to keep his

communications open—The Berber and Suakim route 72

CHAPTER VI.

Refusal to facilitate evacuation of Khartum by a diversion

of British troops—Gordon's virtual abandonment— ... 92

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER VH.

PAGE

Lord Wolseley reports on the three lines of advance for an

Expedition to relieve Khartum—Proposals of General

Stephenson and others relative thereto 112

CHAPTER VIH.

Her Majesty's Government roused to action and adopt

preparatory measures for Gordon's relief (..127

CHAPTER IX.

Expedition delayed by the adoption of the small-boat

plan of advance up the Nile ... 137

CHAPTER X.

Key to the policy of Her Majesty's Government—Not

ready yet to sanction advance of troops beyond

Egyptian frontier 144

CHAPTER XI.

The Suakim-Berber route seriously considered—Why

rejected—Objections against it criticised 159

CHAPTER XH.

Lord Wolseley urges immediate measures for Gordon's

relief while pressing the adoption of the Nile route ... 174

CHAPTER XHI.

Gordon can only hold out after December 14th with

difficulty—How Lord Wolseley responds to his implied

demands for hasty relief 189

CONTENTS. vti

CHAPTER XIV.

PACE

Lord Wolseley's fixed plan of operations and General Von

Moltke's strategic maxim—His view of the position on

December 31st 199

CHAPTER XV.

In view of Gordon being known to be pressed for food

Lord Wolseley delays a dash across the desert to

Khartum 209

CHAPTER XVI.

The Nile Column—Its object—How delayed by unknown

obstacles—Its recall 220

CHAPTER XVH.

Caravan roads from Hamdab to Berber and from Korti to

Mutemma compared—Gordon's view for an advance

from Ambukol on Hamdab 225

CHAPTER XVIH.

The short camel supply question—The double march to

Jakdul and its consequences 235

CHAPTER XIX.

How Lord Wolseley delayed responding to Gordon's call

from Khartum on December 14th to come quickly ... 248

CHAPTER XX.

The Desert Column not primarily despatched for relief of

Khartum—Why Sir Charles Wilson was delayed at

Gubat • ... 262

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXI.

PACK

Lord Wolseley congratulates himself on having secured

the desert road to Mutcmma and a post there 276

CHAPTER XXH.

How and why Khartum fell before the Expedition could

save it « 290

CHAPTER XXIH.

The theory of the fall of Khartum by treachery disproved

—Concluding observations and final appeal 302

ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAGE

V Sketch Map of the Nile, showing Second and

Third Cataracts ... 131

✓The Nile from Dongola to Khartum ... Facing A 154

Sketch on back of Gordon's letter, Novem

ber 4th 191

Sketch Map Showing Position of Enemy round

Khartum and the Breach in Defences

through which they entered january 26th... 29 1

Ill

WHY GORDON PERISHED.

CHAPTER I.

THE SUDAN DISASTERS.

When the Prince of Wales, on a memorable public

occasion, referred to the Hero of Khartum as " the

never-to-be-forgotten Gordon," His Royal Highness

expressed not only his own high personal estimate

of him but also that of his fellow-countrymen.

Future generations will likewise regard him as the

Great Englishman of the Nineteenth Century, in

whom genius and virtue, patriotism and self-

abnegation were illustriously combined.

These high characteristics, which had marked every

step of General Gordon's eventful career, were con

spicuously displayed in the last service he was called

upon by its Constitutional Rulers to render to his

country. Although they knew the perils and diffi

culties which would have to be encountered in its

discharge, they had every confidence in his ability

to carry it out successfully. This was frankly

admitted by Lord Tweedale in moving the Address

to the Queen's Speech on February, 1884.

His Lordship then said that, while he thought

Gordon's mission to the Sudan could not fail to be

B

2 WHY CORDON PERISHED.

attended with success, he did " not mean to suggest

for a moment that it would not be attended with

risk and peril," nor did he think General Gordon

was a man to draw back from danger "when he

hoped to obtain a great good by encountering that

danger."

The lives of 40,000 Egyptian troops and 5,000

civilians, and that of their wives, children, and

servants, had been endangered by the reckless

manner in which Her Majesty's Government had

decided upon carrying out its policy with respect to

the Egyptian provinces in the Sudan. Humanity

and British honour demanded their rescue, and

General Gordon, ready to perish in the attempt,

nobly responded to that call.

We know how he faithfully discharged the high

duties he had so patriotically undertaken ; how he

held that fortress on the Nile against the savage

hordes who besieged it—held it hoping, when its

position became critical, against hope that those who

were responsible for his safety would send him that

relief which any British officer had a right to expect.

But, as we know, that succour was so tardily sent,

and so planned that it might not conflict with the

policy that had called for his mission, that it came

too late to save the fortress he had so long and so

bravely held. When it fell his high sense of duty

led him to choose rather to share the fate he

evidently knew its fall would bring upon those who

had so confidently and patiently aided in its defence

—to share it with them.

Mr. Gladstone thus eloquently recognised this self

TOUCHING KOVAL SYMPATHY.3

sacrifice of General Gordon when he told Parliament

that :—

With reference to those persons—the garrison and Egyptian

officials of Khartum —the lamented General Gordon had so

well vindicated his title to the character of hero, now recog

nised throughout the civilised world !

The reference made by H.R.H. the Prince of

Wales to General Gordon, on the occasion referred

to, not only recognises his high characteristics . as

a man, a patriot, and a soldier, but also/ patheti

cally suggests the circumstances under which his

valuable life was sacrificed. Its keynote was that of

profound regret and touching sorrow for such a

national loss.

In these sentiments our Beloved Sovereign was in

perfect and sympathetic accord with her Royal son,

for in the first letter of sympathy received by the

late Miss Gordon * after the news had been received

of the disaster at Khartum was from Her Majesty,

and was as follows :—

How shall I write to you, or how shall I attempt to

express what I feci t To think of your noble, heroic brother,

who served his country and his Queen so truly, so heroically,

and with a self-sacrifice so edifying to the world, not having

been rescued! That the promises of support were notfulfilled

—which I sofrequently and so constantly pressed on those who

asked him to go— is to me grief inexpressible; indeed, it has

made me ill I

My heart bleeds for you, his sister, who have gone through

* This letter was by Her Majesty's permission published by the late

Miss Gordon in her book—" Letters from General Gordon to hit

Sister." (Messrs. MacMillan & Co.)

B 2

4 WHY GORDON 1'EKISHEI).

so many anxieties en his account, and who loved the deat

brother as he deserved to be.

You are all so good and trustjul, and have such strongfaith,

that you will be sustained even now, when real evidence of

your dear brother's death does not exist; but Ifear there can

not be much doubt of it. Some day I hope to seeyou again, to

tellyou all I cannot express. My daughter Beatrice, who has

felt quite as I do, wishes me to express her deepest sympathy

with you.

I have so many expressions of sorrow and sympathy from

abroad, from my eldest daughter the Crown Princess o/

Germany, andfrom my cousin the King of the Belgians—the

very warmest.

Would you express to your other sisters and your elder

brother my true sympathy; and what I do so keenly feel is the

stain left upon England for your dear brother's cruel though

heroicfate.

In subsequently acknowledging the gift from Miss

Gordon of the Bible which had been the constant

companion of her brother, the Queen, after asking

how many years her " dear heroic brother " had had

it with him, thus expressed her appreciation of it :—

/ shall have a case made for it, with an inscription, and

place it in the library here with your letter and Hie touching

extractfrom his last note to you. I have ordered, as you know,

a marble bust of your dear brother to be placed in the corridor

here, where so many busts of our greatest generals and states

men are.

The extract from Gordon's last letter* to his

* This letter, dated Khartum, December 14th, 1884, was brought

down by one of Gordon's steamers that left there on that day, and

received by Sir C. W. Wilson on January 21st, when with three others

the met the Expedition at Gubat near Mutemma.

A "HERO" AMONGST HEROES. 5

sister here referred to' by Her Majesty was as

follows :—

This may be the last letter you will receive from me, for we

are on our last legs owing to the delay of the Expedition.

However, God rules to His glory and our welfare. His will

be done I

The letter from which this was taken had this

postscript :—

P.S.—I am quite happy, thank God, and, like Lawrence, I

have tried to do my duty.

Such were the high encomiums paid to General

Gordon by our Beloved Sovereign, and such her

pathetic references to his loss and the causes which

led to it. The burden of her " inexpressible grief"

was that " the promises of support made to him

" were not fulfilled by those who had asked him to

go " to a post of danger and Gordon's " cruel

though heroic death ! " And, then, that Gordon

should never be forgotten, and as if by way of a

Royal protest against those who had allowed him

to perish and thus stain the honour of England—

reminiscences of him were placed by the Queen

amongst the memorials of our greatest generals and

statesmen.

It is not often that British Sovereigns have

ventured to criticise the conduct of affairs by their

Constitutional advisers. Her Majesty was fully

justified in calling attention, as was done in the

above letter to Miss Gordon, to the policy of those

who administered Her Government because it

6 WHY GORDON PERISHED.

culminated in consequences which she regarded

as a stain upon England.

With this policy, defined by Mr Gladstone as

one of " Rescue and Retire," and especially with the

disastrous consequences by which it was. followed,

we now propose to deal in these pages.

No fault will or can be found with the advice

given to the late Khedive and his Government to

abandon the Sudan provinces of Egypt, for they

were grossly misgoverned and were a drain upon

its resources. We are at issue, however, with Her

Majesty's Government with the manner by which

they eventually enforced their advice, because it so

endangered the Egyptian garrison and officials and

others who remained loyal to the Khedive as to

oblige our intervention for their rescue. Had we

exercised sooner the authority we had unquestion

ably acquired in the direction of the affairs of

Egypt by our victory at Tel-el-Kebir and by our

armed occupation of it, that part of the policy which

obliged our intervention on behalf of those Egyptian

garrisons and officials would have been avoided. As

a consequence, we became virtually responsible for

their sad fate as well as for the death of the great

soldier whose services were accepted for their rescue.

And the responsibility thus incurred has not been

recognised as fully or as deeply yet as it ought to be.

The massacres of these garrisons and officials and

others implicated with them by the Mahdi, and the

savage cruelties by which they were accompanied,

are comparatively more appalling than were the

atrocities in Upper Armenia, which so recently

APrEALING TO THE CONSTITUTION. 7

roused the indignation of civilised humanity, and led

Her Majesty's Government, in concert with France

and Russia, to demand from the semi-civilised

Power responsible for them such guarantees in the

management of its affairs as would prevent their

recurrence.

When the causes which led to the massacres in

the Sudan and the death of General Gordon are

elearly apprehended and duly weighed, unless the

machinery of our Constitution is an absolute failure,

and unless the people of this country abandon all

their political control over the policy pursued on the

nominal responsibility of their rulers, some adequate

measures should be adopted in order to prevent the

squabbles of any Cabinet and the necessities of

Parliamentary tactics from ever again—as was the

case in this instance—inflicting similar bloodstains

on the national honour !

In reopening the question of responsibility for the

fall of Khartum, General Gordon's death, and those

other, disasters in the Sudan which preceded and

accompanied these catastrophes, we are not un

mindful that at the time of their occurrence the

policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government was

on several occasions discussed in Parliament, and

unfavourably criticised. Resolutions which were

moved by the. Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition

on several of these occasions were negatived by small

majorities strictly on Party votes.

The last of these Parliamentary discussions took

place when Parliament met in February, 1885, soon

after the fall of Khartum, when Her Majesty's Oppo

8 WHY GORTON PERISHED.

sition in both Houses moved Resolutions censuring

the Government. And if these Resolutions had

been affirmed there would have been less reason than

we now have for recalling attention to these disasters

in the Sudan. Had the full facts of the case against

the Government been fairly and fully brought before

this High Court of the nation, the Plaintiffs to it

would, in our opinion, have obtained a verdict.

The Plaintiffs, Her Majesty's Opposition, did on

this occasion make out a strong case, for they were

able to point out that the warnings they had

given had been fully and sadly justified by events.

They could, however, have greatly strengthened

their case had they been informed of the actual

state of affairs at Khartum when it fell, and as to

the true causes which contributed to the failure of

the Expedition sent for its relief. Her Majesty's

Government withheld the information they must

have possessed on both these points until the storm

of indignation which the great catastrophe had

raised against it, both in and out of Parliament, had

been weathered.*

* Her Majesty's Government were at the time in possession of

information which was caleulated to put an entirely different face on

the disaster at Khartum, and the failure of the Expedition to relieve

it. For instance, when Lord Wolscley telegraped them that the

Commander of Gordon's steamers, which put in an appearance at

Mutemma on January 2lst, had brought a letter from him with this

message:—"Khartum all-right, could hold out for years," he must

also have included in his message that Gordon's journal bad been sent

down by one of them which had left Khartum on December 14th,

and that in its last entry on that day stated that if the Expeditionary

Force, or more than 300 men of it, did not come in ten days the town

A PREPOSTEROUS CONSIDERATION. 9

Then, again, when the Ministerial responsibility for

what had happened in the Sudan was discussed in

Parliament, nobody who took part in the discussion

supposed that the Commander of the Nile Expedi

tion had erred in the advice he had given as to the

route which should be adopted first, or had made

any mistakes in conducting it which might have

contributed to that failure. In fact, the resolutions

in both Houses made no reference at all to such a

contingency. The general impression, both in and

out of Parliament, at the time—and, to a certain

extent, still existing—was that Lord Wolseley could

not have made any mistakes at all !' His military

prestige made any consideration of that kind appear

too preposterous for serious consideration in connec

tion with the fall of Khartum.

We can easily understand why the leaders of Her

Majesty's Opposition, as well as the Government,

could not have entered into any discussion of the

manner in which the expedition had been conducted.

In the first place, they had not been sufficiently

might fill. At any rate, 1 1 is Lordship when he sent this message must

have known about this entry, and from a perusal of others in the

journal that no mention whatever was made or suggested in them that

Gordon feared this catastrophe on account of treachery.

We can readily understand, on the ground of necessary precaution,

that much of the information the Government had received from

Gordon was rightly withheld when the Expedition was advancing for the

relief of Khartum ; such, for example, as the letter Lord Wolseley

received from him at Wady-Halfa on November 17th, given further

on. But now that the place had fallen, and Gordon was killed, no

such reasons could be advanced for withholding any of it, and

especially that just noticed.


informed on the subject, and, in the next place

—constitutionally and according to Parliamentary

procedure—the Ministers of the Crown could only

be held responsible for any military operations

ordered by them. The only manner in which Lord

Wolseley'^hction was mentioned was in connection

with the Nile route. This, Parliament was told, had

been adopted by the Government, as the Earl of

Morley (Under Secretary for War) told the House of

Lords in reply to a question about it,—that the various

opinions as to the best route had been weighed, and

that—

After a most careful consideration, and with the full concur

rence of Lord Wolseley, it was decided that the route by the

Nile was the only route possible at the time the Expedition

was finally decided upon by the Government.

In their defence they might, indeed, have gone

further than this, and stated that the noble and

gallant lord had himself such confidence in being

able to reach Khartum by the Nile route that he

had accepted the command of the Expedition up the

Nile when Sir Frederick Stephenson, who had given

an adverse opinion to that route, could not properly

be called upon to conduct it. Hut of this more

further on.

The Government made many statements in the

debate referred to in defending their Sudan policy

and to account for its disastrous failure—based upon

vague rumours or on imperfect and therefore untrust

worthy information, and, in some instances, upon the

misconstruction of what was substantially correct.

BOLT OUT OF THE BLUE. II

Ministers and their supporters outside of Parliament

followed the same line of defence.

We only mention here the following examples of

their statements, reserving our comments upon them

for a future occasion.

The late Earl Granville, in his statement in the

House of Lords on February 9th, with respect to the

failure of the Nile Expedition to relieve Khartum,

said :—

We had cheerful messages from General Gordon, with

whom we had at last got into somewhat closer communica

tion, and our troops were triumphing over many material

difficulties. It was on the 4th of the month—at a moment

when we were expecting to hear of the meeting between Sir

Charles Wilson and General Gordon—that the dreadful news

arrived that, what military attacks and attempts to starve the

garrison had failed to do, was accomplished by an attack of

treachery against one of our greatest countrymen. This

danger had hung over General Gordon's head for weeks and

months. It could not have been averted by any precipitate

action on our part—indeed, it appears to have been accelerated

by the approach of our troops.

The Earl of Morley (Under Secretary for War)

in the debate on the Resolution of Censure subse

quently moved in the House of Lords by the

Marquis of Salisbury, denied the statement made by

another Earl that Gordon had been abandoned, and,

in support of this denial, gave expression to the

following view of the fall of Khartum :—

The whole question, he stated, was one of time and means.

In a matter of this kind those who do not succeed are always

in an unfavourable position, but when great military operations

are undertaken, one h:is to consider whether there is a reason


able prospect of success. The result shows that we had a

reasonable prospect of success. Supposing that Khartum

could have been reached by General Wolseley in time to

relieve it, then the Expedition would not have been a case of mis

calculation ; but in point of fact Lord Wolseley nearly

succeeded in reaching Khartum in time, and but for treachery

he would have been in time. Therefore the military operations

were not miscalculated.

In the debate on the Vote of Censure on the Govern

ment, moved by the late Sir Stafford Northeote

(afterwards Earl of Iddesleigh), iMr. Gladstone took up

the parable of treachery in defence of the Govern

ment. In support of this theory, he made the

following statements :—

Lord Wolseley, in his despatch of January nth, informed

the Government that a messenger who left Korti on the iSth of

December had just returned. He was in Khartum one day

and left it on the 28th of December. And what was his

report ? That Gordon was in perfect health, and the troops

on the steamers he saw were well and happy. The steamers

seized cattle and grain and take them up the river to

Khartum.

Mr. Gladstone also quoted another despatch trom

Lord Wolseley stating that two Colonels of Gordon's

black troops had told him that Khartum had fallen

through treachery.

Gordon, Mr. Gladstone stated, had informed them in a

despatch dated August 14th, that he had provisions for five

months and hoped to get more. On December 14th he sent a

messenger to Korti, who told Lord Wolseley that the troops

in Khartum were suffering from lack of provisions. Food

they still had was little—some grain and biscuit—and that

Gordon wanted them to come quickly. The messenger goes

A MISLEADING TICLEGRAM. 13

on to say that there were neither butter nor dates and little

meat in the town, and that all food was very dear. And then

Mr. Gladstone quoted the long letter brought by the messenger

" Khartum all right."

In order to reconcile these conflicting accounts,

Mr. Gladstone attempted to do so by the-wish -

being - father - to - the - thought mode of dealing

with such information. In this instance it was as

follows :—

The scarcity which was stated to exist on the date on which

the messenger left Khartum, December 14th, was relieved

subsequently, for, according to the report of the messenger who

had left there on December 28th, it had been relieved by the

successful trips of Gordon's steamers.

As we refer more fully to these and other state

ments by Her Majesty's Government relative to the

fall of Khartum further on, we only remark now

that Gordon's steamers were actually absent from

there since December 14th. This and other facts

lead us to doubt whether this last messenger ever

had been in Khartum at all !

The two Colonels whose opinion Lord Wolseley

regarded as valuable enough to telegraph to the

Government had all along been on board of these

steamers, and therefore could not have been in

a position to state what they did. They did know,

of course, that although treachery had existed in

Khartum, Gordon had been able successfully to

deal with it. Mr. Gladstone, as we must willingly

admit, honestly believed all he stated. He was

evidently at the moment influenced by Lord

Wolseley's telegrams, in which, we confess, in this

14 WHY GORDON rERISHED.

and other instances, any reason deducible from them

was advanced, and honestly, we must admit, to

account for the failure of the Expedition.

Sir Charles Dilke gave expression to his views on

the subject in the following very confused state

ment :—

There is every evidence to show that there was plenty of

food to enable the garrison to hold out until Lord Wolseley's

forces reached the city in the ordinary course of events.

General Gordon informed us over and over again that he had

food to last up till the end of December—at least, till the end-

of September.

The Duke of Devonshire who, as Minister of War,

might be supposed to have been better informed on

the subject than any other member of che Cabinet,

expressed the same views as to the cause of the

catastrophe as did Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville.

During the debate, and near its elose, the real truth

nearly leaked out, through General Gordon's farewell

letter to Colonel Watson finding its way into the

newspapers. This letter was dated, Khartum,

December 14, and stated that the garrison was on

" its last legs," and that the town might fall any day

after that date. It, however, carried no weight, for it

was not official.

This letter, with others and Gordon's journals, was

brought down to us at Gubat by the Bordeen, which,

with the other three steamers, met our column on

January 21. They were accompanied by two letters

from Gordon addressed to the Chief of the Staff. The

one dated December 14th, 1884, contained this state

ment :—

HEWILDERMENT AND CONFUSION. 15

The state of affairs is such that one cannot foresee further

than five or seven days, after which the town may fall. I

have done all in my power to hold out ; but I own I consider

the position is extremely critical—almost desperate.

That dated December 13th, 1884, stated that

he had left open his enelosed letters to the different

people to whom he had written in order that the

Chief of the Staff, if he thought fit, could peruse

them.

If Lord Wolseley, who knew the contents of these

letters, telegraphed them to the Minister of War, why

were they not communicated to Parliament and the

public by Her Majesty's Government ?

This absence of information, or sufficient of it to

enable Parliament to come to a satisfactory con

elusion as to the failure of the Nile Expedition,

also confused the public mind outside of it. This

was indicated in the comments made by the Press

when the news of the fall of Khartum reached

London on February 5th. Its views of the causes

which had led to it were various and conflicting.

The blow had fallen so unexpectedly, and when the

progress of the Expedition, and especially the success

of the Desert Column at Abu-Klea and near Mutemma

—with the departure from Gubat of Sir Charles

Wilson for Khartum "to join hands with Gordon "—

had excited the universal expectation of its success

it was difficult, in the absence of more definite infor

mation, to account for what had so unexpectedly

happened.

As an illustration of this bewilderment, we quote

the following observations from the Times, in its issue

i6 WHY CORDON PERISHED.

of February 6th, the day after the news had reached

London :—

The announcement of the fall of Khartum occasioned a

shock which few will ever forget. We had been accustomed

to the danger so long averted by the genius of one great

soldier, and the country had learned to believe that the resist

ance could be indefinitely protracted. When the last words

from Khartum—"All right; could hold out for years "—was

telegraphed home by Lord Wolseley, all thoughts naturally

turned to the military operations, the re-inforcemcnt of Gubat

and the advance of General Earle's flotilla. It was rumoured

too hastily that the message must be authentic ; General

Gordon's estimate of his own position was hardly likely to be

wrong. A few facts certainly appeared somewhat difficult to

understand. We do not know yet why all, or nearly all, the

Europeans in Khartum abandoned General Gordon in

September. It seemed strange that, with the command of the

river from Khartum to the Fifth Cataract below Berber,

it was found impossible to send only so few messages to

Korti. A-

That General Gordon should have given his journal to

the Pasha commanding his steamer which appeared before

Mutemma on the 21st of January seemed slightly unnatural,

for General Gordon would know that Lord Wolseley, on

striking the upper reaches of the Nile, would at once send an

officer to confer with him. Why, then, did he send his journal,

and what has become of it ?

These and other circumstances caused a certain undefined

feeling of uneasiness, which was not allayed by the report that

highly-important news from the front had been received by

the Government For months past it has only been necessary

to hint that the military policy adopted was founded on a

wrong basis, and a storm of indignation was at once brought

down ; while the comparatively rare communications from

Lord Wolseley which had been given to the public breathed a

spirit of confidence which it was heresy to gainsay. Thus,

notwithstanding warnings, the blow has fallen. It is a "bolt

AFTER WEATHERING THE STORM. 17

out of the blue," and the fall of Khartum is as yet insuffi

ciently realised.*

After weathering the storm which the fall of

Khartum, and especially the death of General

Gordon, had raised against them, both in and out of

Parliament, and when the national outburst of sorrow

and indignation these events had called forth had in

great measure spent itself, Her Majesty's Government

gradually yielded to the public demand for further

information relative to these disasters. Then followed

the letters of the War Correspondents who had

accompanied the Desert Column under Sir Herbert

Stewart, which threw valuable light on the subject.

In 1886 Sir Charles W. Wilson's book, from

" Korti to Khartum," which had evidently been

written to defend himself against the hasty and

ungenerous suggestion made by Lord Wolseley in

the despatch to the Minister of War—enelosing

his report of the attempt made by him to reach

Khartum—that if he had started earlier from Gubat

he would have been in time to prevent its fall.

In 1887 it was followed by the author's fuller

history of the Expedition up the Nile down to.

February 1st, when the news reached it at Gubat

that Khartum had fallen, and that Gordon was

killed, or supposed then to be.

In 1889 the War Office published an official

* As the remainder of this article is a criticism on the Expedition

up the Nile, in which its writer points out certain defects in its plan of

operations, which, from a military standpoint, may be regarded as

having contributed to its failure, we reserve it until we come to deal

with that part of our subject. :

C

l8 WHY GORDON rERISHED.

account of the campaigns on the Nile and in the

Eastern Sudan, ably edited by Colonel Colvile,

from materials chiefly collected, as its introduction

informs us, by Major-General Brackenbury, who

assumed the command of the Nile Column when

General Earle fell at Kirbekan. It contains

valuable information on several important points,

and from the influences under which it was written

is remarkably impartial. Our chief objection, how

ever, to it is that it attributes the failure of the Nile

Expedition to " the fortunes of war " rather than to

the mistake made in selecting the river route at too

late a date for its success to be assured, and to the

mistakes made in conducting its advance.

In spite of the light thus thrown upon almost one

of the most disastrous campaigns in our military

history, so far as its objects and operations are con

cerned, public opinion still appears to be divided as

to the causes of its failure. His political opponents

still continue to charge Mr. Gladstone personally as

the chief cause of Gordon's death and all that

followed on it. Not a few have come to the con

elusion that both himself and his Cabinet showed,

by their conduct of affairs connected with the

Sudan, that they were more anxious to prevent the

insurrection led by the Mahdi from disturbing the

peace of Egypt than they were desirous of rescuing

the endangered garrison and officials in it ; or even

of rescuing General Gordon from the dangerous

position in which they had placed him.

In military cireles, and in those in touch with

them, Lord Wolseley's selection of the Nile route for

MORE LIGHT WANTED. 19

a Relief Expedition in preference to that by Suakim

and Berber, and his conduct of it, continue to be

severely criticised.

This confusion of public opinion was manifested

during the General Election in 1892 under the follow

ing circumstances :—

The political opponents of the Liberal Party

charged it during the contest with the responsibility

of General Gordon's death from not having taken

measures earlier for the relief of Khartum. The

latter, in reply, stated that Lord Hartington (now

Duke of Devonshire), the Leader of the Unionist

Liberal party, was more responsible for the catas

trophe than was Mr. Gladstone, for he was Minister

of War at the timcj

In order to settle this vexed question, a Liberal

Unionist Member of Parliament courageously ap

pealed to the Duke of Devonshire and H.R.H. the

Commander-in-Chief for such information as would

set it at rest. Both these distinguished personages

replied that the time had not yet arrived when such

information could properly be given to the public.

C 2

20

CHAPTER II.

IK view of the facts, stated in the previous

chapter, how stands the case against Her Majesty's

Government who were in power when Khartum

fell and Gordon met his cruel but heroic death ?

They were arraigned in the High Courts of

Parliament by Resolutions censuring them for these

disasters in the Sudan.

In the House of Lords the Resolution upon which

they were thus arraigned was as follows :—

vThe deplorable failure of the Sudan Expedition to attain

its objects has been due to the undecided counsels of the

Government and to the culpable delay in commencing

operations. .

In the House of Commons the charge against the

Government for the failure to relieve Khartum was

thus stated :—

That the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government in

respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Sudan has involved

a great sacrifice of valuable lives and a heavy expenditure

without an beneficialy result.

In the House of Lords the Vote of Censure

proposed by Lord Salisbury was affirmed by an

overwhelming majority, while that moved by Sir

NOT PROVEN, AND THEREFORE 21

Stafford Northeotc was negatived by a compara

tively small one, on a strictly Party vote.

Taking into account the information in the

possession of the Government at the time, and

which was withheld by them, and the Tarty

vote in the Commons in its favour, we cannot

but regard their trial in the High Court of Parlia

ment as resulting in a verdict only of " not proven."

In other words, and plainly speaking, evidence which

would have had an important influence on the case

was withheld, and the verdict it gave was given by

what we may rightly regard as a packed jury !

Such a decision cannot, nor ought not to be

regarded as being under all the circumstances of the

case, final or satisfactory, for it leaves unanswered

the question as to where the responsibility rightly

rests for the great sacrifice of valuable lives and

heavy expenditure in the Sudan, and for the stain

on England by the circumstances under which

General Gordon met " a cruel, though heroic

death." We now, therefore, propose to answer

it, or, rather, to re-try the case with additional

evidence, and by a jury independent of Party

prejudice and jealousy, and zealous, not only for

the sake of British honour, but also in order to

secure such an administration of our affairs as will

ensure them being carried on in future in such a

manner as will prevent the recurrence of such

disasters.

The first of these causes is attributable to that

part of the Egyptian policy of Her Majesty's

Government with reference to the Egyptian


provinces in the Sudan. This was manifested when

the question of these affairs forced itself on their

attention after the victory of Tel-el-Kebir, under

the following circumstances.

It was then learned that the serious insurrection

which had broken out in these provinces was spread

ing. The military power of Egypt had been

thoroughly disorganised by the success of arms in

suppressing the rebellion led by Arabi Pasha, and

there was, therefore, a danger that it would affect

Egypt proper if not promptly dealt with. We

had got rid of one difficulty, only, however, to be

brought face to face with another seriously threaten

ing the future of Egypt. We refused to meet it.

This policy of non-interference, so decisively stated

and for some time so rigidly adhered to, led to the

disastrous consequences, as will be shown, which we

now deplore. In order to deal satisfactorily with this

initial blunder in our Egyptian policy, it is necessary

to recall the attention of our readers, though

concisely, to the leading events in the Sudan

immediately preceding the battle of Tel-el-Kebir.

It will be remembered by those acquainted with

the course of events in the Sudan, that when

General Gordon was appointed Governor-General

of it for the second time, that he went to his

post resolved to put an end to the slave trade

carried on in that region. Soon after his arrival at

Khartum he was called upon, in carrying out this

intention, to suppress two formidable rebellions—

one of the slave traders in Kordofan, and another by

them in Darfur.

TRACED TO ITS ORIGIN. *3

His success in both these expeditions resulted in

seriously checking the slave trade. Unfortunately,

he did not remain long enough at Khartum to

complete the work he had so auspiciously begun,

and consequently what he did was soon undone by

his successor, Raouf Pasha.

No One acquainted with the. condition of the

country during Gordon's administration of its affairs

—and especially in 1878-9, can come to any other

conelusion than that it was even then ripe for revolt,

and his personal energy and strict impartiality alone

prevented such a crisis. In fact a leader and an

incapable Governor-General were alone required to

bring it about. That leader now appeared in the

person of Mohammed Achmed in 1881, and the

Governor-General in that of Raouf Pasha.

All previous rebellions had been local, for the

Ethiopic tribes between the Red Sea and the Nile,

the riparian population of the Nile Valley, the

negroes of the Southern districts, and the nomad

Arab tribes of the Western Desert had nothing in

common to unite them. This want was, however,

supplied in the religious fanaticism aroused by the

teaching of Mohammed Achmed, or, as he was

called, the Mahdi.

The insurrection led by him dates from August II,

1880, and its programme seems to have been to drive

the Egyptians from the Sudan ; to restore the old

system of administering justice according to the

precepts of the Koran, to abolish all taxes excepting

the time-honoured tithe, and to pay this tax and

all the spoil he collected from " infidels " into a

24 WHY CORDON PERISHEP.

common treasury, whence it was to be distributed

for the good of the community. He appointed

four Khalifs as his successors, as well as Emirs

to govern the country and conduct all military

operations.

His religious programme was to reform Islam and

to bring, if necessary by conquest, all Moslem

countries to a better observance of the true faith, and

to subdue the Giaour, or infidels.

Raouf Pasha should at once have arrested this

pretender and intending rebel. Instead of doing so

he sent a commission of learned Moslems to Abbas

Island on the Nile above Khartum to discuss his

religious views with him. Their report was so

disturbing that the Pasha sent a force of 200 men to

bring him to Khartum.

On landing at daylight on the following morning,

Ali Effendi—one of the Adjutant-Majors—shot

down a harmless villager, believing him to be the

Mahdi. This blunder was followed by a rush of

Mohammed Achmed's followers from all quarters,

and a massacre of all but sixty of the force who had

escaped to the boats.

The Governor-General seemed to have lost his

head on receiving news of this disaster, for he

ordered a strong force to assemble at Kawa, kept

it there for a month, and then dispersed it. He

thus failed to seize the opportunity he had of crushing

an incipient insurrection.

The failure of the attempt to arrest the Mahdi

added greatly to his prestige, which was further

increased by the destruction of the force under the

VICTORIES AND ITS DEFEATS. 25

command of the Mudir of Fashoda in the following

December. This victory placed a large quantity of

arms and ammunition and stores in the hands of

the enemy.

This second victory so added to the prestige of

the Mahdi that Raouf Pasha enrolled irregular

troops from Dongola, and the Shaikeyeh and Berber

districts, which were supposed to be less disaffected

than were the others.

The insurrection was in the meantime spreading

rapidly. Darfur had arisen, the Kababish in the

north, and the Abu Reif in Sennar, and the Bisharin

on the Berber-Suakim road were wavering, while the

emissaries of the Mahdi were everywhere busily

engaged in preaching the " Holy War."

In May, 1892, Raouf Pasha who was superseded as

Governor-General by Abd-el-Kadir, on his departure

for Egypt, left Gcigler Pasha, a German and late

superintendent of Sudan telegraph lines, to administer

the Government until the arrival of his successor.

A large body of Baggaras were defeated in an

attack on an Egyptian force which had been

concentrated at Kawa ; a few weeks later they were

followed by the latter, and a strong contingent of

Shukuriyehs to Kurko. The latter were in their

turn defeated with great slaughter at Mesalamia.

Geigler Pasha on hearing of this defeat, took the

field with a large force and gained the first victory

over the Mahdi's forces at Abu-Harras.

In the meanwhile the Mahdi had concentrated

a large army at El-Obeid, and on June 7, defeated

an Egyptian force at Jebel Gadic with great loss.


This was the most important victory he had achieved,

for it rendered the position of the Government most

critical.

Abd-eI-Kadir, who had now arrived at Khartum,

therefore immediately collected troops from all parts,

and by the end of July had mobilised about 1,200

men.

A number of minor skirmishes took place while

this force was being collected, nearly all of which

resulted in favour of the enemy.

During the next two months the Government

troops met with more success—by raising the siege

temporarily of El-Obeid, and defeating a rebel force

near Duem, on the White Nile, with a loss of 3,500

killed.

These successes, which had the effect of delaying

the advance of the Mahdi on Khartum for a time,

led him, however, to take the field in person.

Towards the end of September some of the

Mahdi's troops gained a decisive victory near Bara

over 3,000 Egyptian troops who were marching to

its relief, and who lost 1,100 men and the same

number of rifles, besides a quantity of ammunition and

stores. The remnant of the force managed to reach

Bara, and in co-operation with its garrison in October

made a sortie—inflicting such losses on the besiegers

as led to many desertions from their ranks. To

such an extent had this disaffection now spread

that it was generally believed that the insurrection

in Kordofan had ceased.

Abd-el-Kadir, however, telegraphed to Cairo for a

supply of Remington rifles and ammunition in order

THEN AFTER THE VICTORY. 27

that he might still further successfully deal with the

insurrection.

This telegram somewhat qualified our satisfaction

at having suppressed one Egyptian insurrection by

the victory at Tel-el-Kebir by its bringing us face to

face, as already stated, with another, and one at such

a distance off as to immensely increase the difficulty

of similarly dealing with it.

An attempt was made to settle the question thus

raised with respect to these Egyptian Provinces by a

retrocession of Bagos and Galabat to Abyssinia, by

evacuating Kordofan and Darfur, and by opening

up to commerce the Suakim and Berber road.

Before this proposal had time to be carried out

the condition of affairs in the Sudan had become

more critical, for in a telegram Abd-el-Kadir in

formed the Egyptian Government that two batta

lions of regular troops had been destroyed in a

conflict with the rebels when on their way to Bara,

and that, unless reinforced by 10,000 men, there was

great danger of the insurrection spreading so as to

endanger the peace of Egypt proper.

But where now could such a force be obtained ?

The Egyptian army had been disbanded, and the

Government were therefore not in a position to send

the reinforcements asked for by Abd-el-Kadir. It

was therefore suggested that British officers should

at once be despatched to Khartum to organise its

defence, and that the Indian contingent, then on its

way home, should be employed in the pacification of

the Sudan. It was also suggested that General

Gordon, who was then disengaged, should be asked


to resume his old post as its Governor-General.

"But the Egyptian Government would have nothing

to do with him, and Her Majesty's Government

declared that they were

not prepared to undertake any Expedition into the Sudan or

" any responsibilityfor the proposed expedition or for military

operations in that district!' They, however, assented " to

certain officers proceeding to there to make inquiries, but only

on the distinct understanding that they should under no

circumstances assume to act in any military capacity?

Under these circumstances the Egyptian Govern

ment determined to raise the 10,000 men asked for

by Abd-el-Kadir from the old soldiers of Arabi's

army, as they were the only trained men in the

country.

And now what happened ? Her Majesty's Go

vernment, which was then in authority in Egypt,

offered no advice and gave no opinion. It stood

with elosed lips and folded hands, and allowed these

poor unfortunate fellaheen to be again dragged from

their homes and sent in chains, many of them to

perish miserably in the Sudan. And all this as the

result of the policy they had decided upon at the

commencement of their interference in the affairs

of Egypt, and to which they had resolved to adhere

at any cost. As the result of this non-interference,

the bones of ten thousand of these poor fellows laid

bleaching on the plains of Kordofan soon afterwards !

Her Majesty's Government having deelined to

send British officers to render military assistance to

the Egyptian troops in the Sudan, only one officer,

the lamented Colonel Stewart, was sent on a mission

crows'" feet and shields. 29

of inquiry to Khartum, where he remained for

about three months ; and his reports fully justified

his selection for such a service.* In his private

correspondence he shows how hopeless any satis

factory solution of the Sudan question would be if

it were left in the hands of Turkish Pashas and

Egyptian troops. On January 30th he wrote as

follows :—

The troops are so utterly cowardly that it is impossible to

have any sympathy with them. ... I hear an order has

been given to arm the front rank of the Egyptians with shields.

I would give anything to see an Egyptian regiment preparing

for the field—the officers weeping and trembling with fear, and

the soldiers preparing to fix shields. . . . What with

crows'-feet and shields they are a nice army, and worthy of

being commanded by their present officers.

He also wrote thus on the political situation :—

I am quite at a loss to know what to think of the Egyptian '

position here. That they are morally and physically unfit to

govern this country is evident. . . . We may lay it down

as an axiom that the Egyptians cannot govern it, and if they

mean to retain their hold on it they must employ a few

strangers in high positions. This will no doubt entail

jealousies, but 1 can see no other solution. . . . If there is

anything more certain to my mind than another it is that the

Egyptians are absolutely unfit to hold this country with a view

of doing it any good.

Colonel Stewart, however, makes an honourable

exception in his denunciation against Egyptian

Pashas in the case of Abd-el-Kadir, for he describes

him as the best, most active, and energetic Pasha

* See " l'arliamentaiy Papas, 1, 5, 6, 11, 13: Egypt, 1883.

30 WHY GORDON PERISHED

he had met in the Sudan. He had worked hard

while getting his troops into something like military

order, had sharply defeated the Arabs in Sennar,

and had succeeded in gaining the confidence and

respect of the people. But he was too honest for

the corrupt official eliques at Cairo, who managed

by Harem intrigues to have him recalled, and one

after their own hearts—Al-ed-din—sent to replace

him.

The troops raised for service in the Soudan in the

manner we have described were placed under the

command of Suleiman Pasha Niazi, a veteran of

seventy years, and nearly deaf and blind. Hussein

Pasha Suri was his second in command, and who

proved his incompetence when events left him senior

officer.

Under these circumstances, or rather from the

known unfitness of these Pashas for the services now

required of them, the Egyptian Government asked

for the services of a British officer of ability to act

as Chief of the Staff. This request was, as might

have been expected, refused, but Her Majesty's

Government relaxed so far as to allow the Khedive

to employ Colonel Hicks, a retired officer of the

Indian Army. When he reached Khartum on the

4th March, 1883, Kordofan was in the hands of the

Mahdi, Darfur and the Bar Ghazelle were holding

out, and Abd-el-Kadir had given a severe check to

the rebels in Sennar.

Colonel Hicks found such confusion and distrust

existing, and so much intriguing going on, that at

first he could get nothing satisfactorily accomplished.

IN DEFIANCE OF DUFFERIN. 3»

In fact, the troops were in rags, and from four to

six months' pay in arrear, and actually selling grain

to the rebels ! The steamers were also out of repair.

However, in spite of these difficulties, he defeated

the Mahdi's forces at Marabiah in April, and freed

Sennar. He then proceeded to withdraw his troops

to Khartum. He had thus carried out his intention

of pacifying the Eastern Soudan, and happy would

it have been for Egypt if he had been allowed " to

keep the two rivers and Sennar, and let Kordofan

settle itself."

Elated by his success, the Egyptian Government

ordered him to reconquer Kordofan, and this in

defiance of the policy laid down by Lord DufTerin

and approved by Her Majesty's Government that

they should abandon it and Darfur, and only main

tain their authority over the provinces of Khartum

and Sennar.

Sir E. Malet drew the attention of the Downing

Street authorities to this new departure on June 5th,

reporting that Colonel Hicks had asked for 6,000

additional men, but that Egypt could not supply the

necessary funds to send them, and stated that the

question consequently was, " Whether Colonel Hicks

should be instructed to only maintain the supremacy

of the Khedive in the regions between the Blue and

White Niles?"

The answer from Downing Street five days later

was :—

Report decision of Egyptian Government as soon as you

cm, taking care to ojjer no advice, but pointing out that the

Egyptian Government should clearly make up their minds

3*WHV GORDON .l'KRISHLI).

what their policy is to be, and carefully consider the question

to its financial aspect.

Had Her Majesty's Government instructed Sir E.

Malet to have forbidden the Egyptian Government to

undertake the Expedition proposed for reconquering

Kordofan, and which in their position of authority and

responsibility they were justified in doing, it will be

readily understood that Hicks and his army, which

perished in the attempt, would have been saved.

But no such action was taken. As in the case of the

poor fellaheen who formed part of this force, Her

Majesty's Government made no objection to this

Expedition, nor to the depletion of the Egyptian

Treasury by the withdrawal from it of the necessary

funds for its despatch. They thus tacitly approved

of the attempt to reconquer Kordofan, and, there

fore, made themselves largely responsible for the

terrible disaster which followed it.

There is, however, even a more serious aspect

of the matter, as the following facts, not so

generally known to the public as they ought to be,

show.

Her Majesty's Government in Parliament had

repeatedly and emphatically deelared that they were

in "no way responsible for the operations in the

Sudan or for the operations of General Hicks."

The following facts indicate, however, that they

watched those operations with an interest difficult to

harmonise with this deelaration.

They first consented to his employment in the

Sudan by the Egyptian Government, and when his

position on the staff of Sulieman Pasha, which had

PRESSED FOR AN EXPLANATION. 33

from the very first been a false one, became intoler

able they intervened to better it, as the following

correspondence between him and Sir E. Malet elearly

indicates.

In a telegram dated May 13th, Hicks asked SirE.

Malet to use his influence with the Egyptian Govern

ment in order to induce them to give him an

" indisputable command." In reply, he was informed

that he could not be made Commander-in-Chief,

because the nomination of a Christian would fan

fanaticism. A month after this communication had

been received, and he had asked to be recalled, Sir

E. Malet led him to hope that Suleiman would either

" be recalled or forced into obedience." Evidently

annoyed at the delay in removing the obstaeles which

prevented him from satisfactorily discharging the

difficult task he had undertaken, Hicks Pasha sent

in his resignation. This settled the matter, for

Suleiman Pasha was recalled, and he was appointed

Commander-in-Chief in his place.

This correspondence between Hicks Pasha and

Sir E. Malet not having been laid before Parliament,

when its purport became known through other

channels Her Majesty's Government were pressed

for an explanation, because it directly contradicted

certain statements made by it relative to the position

this English Pasha now occupied in the Sudan. It

would appear that Earl Granville, evidently ignorant

of what had taken place, at once telegraphed to

Cairo for information on the subject. An examina

tion of the archives of our British Representative

there showed that the correspondence to which we

D

34WHY GORDON PERISHED.

have referred between Hicks Pasha and Sir E-

Malet, and on his behalf with Cherif Pasha, actually

did take place.

The Blue Books also showed that several

despatches and telegrams about Hicks Pasha's

proceedings and demands were received by Sir E.

Malet and Lord Dufferin in May and June, 1883,

and that their contents were telegraphed to Downing

Street.

In one of these despatches Sir E. Malet informed

Earl Granville that, according to a telegram received

from General Hicks, dated September 5th, that he

expected to start on his Expedition to Kordofan on

the 8th, and that he had forwarded this telegram to

Cherif Pasha, possibly, we presume, as he had sent

a despatch he had received from Hicks Pasha on

April 14th for Baker Pasha, who was then in com

mand at Suakim. Instead of sending it direct to the

latter, as he had been requested, he enelosed it

"confidentially" to Cherif Pasha, "to be dealt with

by such action as his Excellency might deem

advisable." This was followed in the communication

enclosing the telegram by the old story about the

irresponsibility of Her Majesty's Government for the

operations in the Sudan " or for the appointment of

General Hicks," and that in passing on a copy

of this telegram to him, " His Excellency is not

to understand that it indicates any expression

of opinion with regard to the recommendation it

contained."

If Sir E. Malet might thus try to guard himself

from giving weight to the recommendations con

ACCESSORIES TO A CATASTROPilE. 35

tained in this telegram, by having acted as an

intermediary between a British officer and the

Egyptian Government, Cherif Pasha would how

ever, and naturally, infer from this proceeding that

the Government of that officer was interested as

much as they were in his success, and this impression

would be deepened by the last elause of the com

munication referred to :—

These remarks must not, however, Sir E. Malet informs

Cherif Pasha, be taken to the prejudice of General Hicks, who

appears to have shown himself to be a very capable officer.

I merely intended them to prevent any misunderstanding as

to the position of Her Majesty's Government in regard to

operations in the Sudan.

It appears evident, therefore, from the communica

tions which thus passed between Hicks Pasha, Sir

E. Malet, and Cherif Pasha, the Prime Minister of

the Khedive's Government, that Her Majesty's

Government tacitly consented to the despatch of an

Egyptian Expedition to reconquer Kordofan, and did

so although they had accepted and approved Lord

Dufferin's recommendation to the contrary.

The course pursued by Her Majesty's Govern- ,

ment with respect to the despatch of Hicks's-

Expedition was utterly inexcusable. England was

then in armed occupation of Egypt, and with that

occupation had made herself responsible for the

conduct of its affairs* The power with which she

* The Duke of Argyle on one occasion thus expressed himself in

the House of Lords :—" As a matter of fact—contrary to their own

will, and owing to circumstances over which they had not had control,

the Government had been placed in a position of paramount responsi

bility with regard to Egypt."

D 2

3«WHY GORDON PERISHED.

had thus become invested, ought to have been so

exercised later on in the affairs of the country to

prevent this attempt to reconquer Kordofan. In

face of Lord Dufferin's opinion on the subject, they

thus had virtually connived at its despatch, and

consequently made themselves responsible, not only

for it, but for its ulterior consequences, in the

Sudan.

The annihilation of General Hicks's army by

the Mahdi virtually placed the whole country south

of Khartum at his mercy. It left only a force

of about 2,000 Egytian troops to defend about four

miles of earthworks in Khartum. Mohammed

Achmed, who in July, 1 88 1, was only an insignificant

fanatic, surrounded by as insignificant a rabble,

was now at the head of a numerous army, and

with an arsenal of 20,000 Remington rifles and

19 guns, ineluding several Krupps and Nordenfeldts.

It was, therefore, now evident that the disaffected

provinces in which he was supreme could not be

reconquered without military operations on a scale

far beyond the present exhausted resources of Egypt.

When the news of this appalling disaster reached

London on November 21st, 1883, Earl Granville

telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring, who had then

replaced Sir Edward Malet, to consult Generals

Stephenson and Wood, and inform him "if the

destruction of Hicks's army and the present state

of the Sudan must be considered as a cause of

danger to Egypt proper." The reply his Lordship

received was, that it was premature to say what the

effect referred to would be, but that, in view of the

WARNED OF COMING DANGERS. 37

destruction of Hicks's army, it was not advisable

to hasten the withdrawal of the troops from Cairo.

The order which had been given for their with

drawal was consequently countermanded.

Telegraphing immediately after the above mes

sage, Sir E. Baring informed Lord Granville that

the Egyptian Government were determined to hold

Khartum, and to re-open the route between Suakim

and Berber. He, however, " felt bound to add that

according to telegrams* from Khartum, the general

opinion there was, that it was necessary to fall back

on Berber." On the very next day he telegraphed

to Downing - street, that Generals Wood and

Stephenson with himself felt that " the success of

the Mahdi seemed a danger to Egypt proper, and

would be increased by the fall of Khartum."

Lord Granville replied to this alarming message

that :—

. Her Majesty's Government could do nothing which would

throw on them responsibility for matters in the Sudanj

Subsequent events, however, showed that this

do-nothing policy at a critical juncture obliged

them soon after to abandon it, and to do that which

co-st us so many valuable lives and some millions of

money.

The first of these events was the endangered

position in which the Egyptian garrisons and officials

* One of the telegrams referred to was the following from Colonel

Coetlogen :—" Khartum and Sennar cannot hold out after two

months—the retreat on Berber should be made at once—to cany force

by river to Berber would be very difficult in a month's time, even if not

attacked. The troops left are the refuse of the Egyptian army."


were placed by the destruction of Hicks's army.

When Her Majesty's Government would not interfere

to save them from the wrath of the victorious

Dervish hordes, that of Egypt, though left to its own

exhausted resources, resolved to do so. Abd-el-Kadir

Pasha, at its request, agreed to undertake the

mission on condition that its objects should not

be made known until he had made such arrange

ments as would enable him to carry it out success

fully. Her Majesty's Government having insisted

on proelaiming the intention of an Egyptian with

drawal from the Sudan, he deelined it.

This policy of 14 Rescue and Retire," as it was

publiely defined by Mr. Gladstone, was right in itself,

but this determined premature announcement of it

was mischievous, and a potent cause of the disasters

which followed the attempts made to carry it out. As

Abd-el-Kadir foresaw, the loyally and peaceably

disposed tribes of the Sudan either remained

neutral or joined the Mahdi. The latter course

was not adopted by them from any love they had for

him, but simply from the very natural conelusion that

if they compromised themselves with us, he would

regard them as enemies, and after our withdrawal

treat them as such.

39

CHAPTER HI.

The following incidents connected with Gordon's

mission painfully illustrates the results of this pre

mature announcement by Mr. Gladstone of his

" Rescue and Retire" policy. ;

When he arrived at Khartum in the middle of

February (1884), the Mahdi, who was then at El-

Obeid, learned, through messengers sent by Zebehr

Pasha, that the English and Egyptian Governments

had decided to abandon the Sudan, and to make

Assouan the southern frontier of Egypt, and received

a message from Osman Digma that he had defeated

the English troops which had been sent against him.

The news caused great joy in the Dervish camp

there, and led the Mahdi to the resolution ofadvancing

at once on Khartum, and he soon afterwards put his

troops in motion for that purpose.

If Father Oberwalder is to be depended upon, he,

confirms the objection raised by Abd-el-Kadir by his

statement that when Gordon arrived at Berber, on

his way to Khartum, he told Hussein-Khalifa Pasha

the object of his mission, and that the consequent

prospect of eventual abandonment by the Egyptian

Government contributed in some measure to that

town falling into the hands of the Mahdi.

From the same source we learn that when he

40 WHY CORDON PKRISHKD.

reached Mutemma, the headquarters of the Jaalin

tribe, Gordon again openly announced the intended

abandonment of the Sudan, and with similar results.

In illustration of this, Father Oberwalder mentions

the case of Haj Ali, an influential and widely-

respected trader who had gone over to the Mahdi,

and who, in explanation of his having done so, said

to him : " How could have remained loyal to a

Government which I knew intended to leave me in

the lurch afterwards ? I would only have been paving

the way for the vengeance of the Mahdi on me ! "

These statements, although very circumstantial, do

not exactly agree with those contained in the

following extract from a dateless telegram from

Gordon, sent from Cairo to London on September

18th, 1885 :—

With regard to the Finnan issued by the Khedive to all the

notables and people of the Sudan, announcing its evacuation

by Egyptian troops, and informing them that the Sudan would

be left to them, and that its rulers would be appointed from

among them, it has been impossible for me to publish it, or to

allow any of the Sudan to read it on account of their joining

the Mahdi.

I have thought if this Firman is read to them that they

would imagine that the Turkish Government had ceased to

exist, and that there is now no Government here except that of

the Mahdi. This would be in accordance with their own

imaginations, and the representations of the Mahdi to them

for the rebellion of the people of El Ghezireh, and the fighting

of the troops against the Government is due to their having

heard of the intention to evacuate the Sudan. On my arrival

here I found that these reports had gained ground in the

Sudan. I took no notice of them and issued Proclamations

for the establishment of safety and tranquillity."

STRENGTHENS THE MAHDI. 4»

In the proelamation he issued at Berber, Gordon

stated that the Sudan was now independent

and left to govern itself without the interven

tion of the Egyptian Government. It will also

be remembered that his idea was to restore the

country to the different petty sultans who reigned

there at the time of Mohammed Ali's conquest, and

whose families still existed ; and that the Mahdi

should be left altogether out of the caleulation as

regards the handing over of the country to these,

and that it should be optional with the sultans to

accept his supremacy or not.

Then, again, in a message from Abu- Hamed,

somewhat in the form of a report, he calls attention

to the fact that, as the people were accustomed to the

Government they were under, however corrupt and

oppressive it may have been, deprecated being left

without any at all.

When Gordon issued his proelamation of abandon

ment of the Sudan by the Egyptian Government,

it was not, therefore to be wondered at that the

Members of the Council he had formed at Berber

should have entered into communication with the

Mahdi, who was then a power in the land, and

become some of his strongest adherents. Amongst

these men were Suleiman Wad-Gamr, the murderer

of Colonel Stewart and his companions.

In like manner this proelamation of abandonment

issued at Suakim on January 17 arrested the move

ment which had set in in favour of the submis

sion of the wavering tribes, and was actually the

proximate cause of the fall of Sinkat ; for on the very


evening of the day of its promulgation the Rodi

and others of these tribes left Suakim to join

Osman Digma, and spread abroad the news that the

English were going to hand over the Sudan to the

Mahdi !

Sir Gerald Graham, in his last report, stated that

from the date of his arrival at Suakim he had endea

voured to establish confidence on the part of the

Amarar tribes, hoping thus to induce them to form

a league which would inelude all tribes hostile to

Osman Digma. He did not succeed, however,

because, as he explains, of the impossibility of giving

them any formal guarantee of protection.

Abd-el-Kadir's refusal to proceed to the Sudan ♦

unless his conditions were complied with, left the

question still open for discussion with Her Majesty's

Government. We therefore find that, on Novem

ber 26th, Sir E. Baring telegraphed to Downing

Street that Generals Stephenson, Wood, and Baker

had come to the conelusion that the Egyptian

Government would find it impossible to hold the

Sudan, and that it would eventually be obliged to

fall back from Khartum on Egypt proper, after

withdrawing the military garrisons, that of Khartum

holding out long enough to allow the more advanced

posts to join them.

In a subsequent message to Lord Granville, he

stated that Cherif Pasha still strongly objected to

the policy of withdrawal from the Sudan, and that

he proposed to send Zebehr Pasha to Suakim.

The reply of Lord Granville is contained in the

following despatch, which, from its important bearing

DRIVEN TO INTERVENTION. 43

on the future events with which we will have to deali

we quote in full :—

Excepting for securing the safe retreat of the garrisons still

holding positions in the Sudan, Her Majesty's Government

cannot agree to increasing the burden on the Egyptian revenue

by operations which, if even successful, which is not probable,

would be of doubtful advantage to Egypt.

Her Majesty's Government recommends the Ministers of

the Khedive to come to an early decision to abandon all

territory south of Assouan, or at least Wady-Halfa.

They will insist in maintaining order in Egypt proper, and

in defending it, as well as the ports on the Red Sea.

The employment of Zebehr Pasha appears to Her Majesty's

Government inexpedient, both politically and as regards the

slave trade.

Sir E. Baring, evidently after an interview with

Cherif Pasha, informed Lord Granville that the

objections of the Egyptian Government to the

abandonment of the Sudan was so pronounced that

he advised Her Majesty's Government to insist upon

a change of Ministers. It would, however, he

further stated, be necessary to send an English officer

of high authority to Khartum, with full powers to

withdraw all the garrisons in the Soudan, and to

make the best arrangements possible for its future

government.

The advice to insist on a change of the Egyptian

Ministry was accepted, and resulted in Cherif Pasha

being replaced by Nubar Pasha, who was pledged to

the policy of the abandonment.

When pressed on the subject in Parliament, Mr.

Gladstone defended Her Majesty's Government for

not having earlier exercised the authority they had

44WHY CORDON PERISHED.

attained in Egypt by its armed occupation, by

declaring it would have been an impertinence to do

so. Now, however, when the support of a policy

deemed beneficial to the country is in question, that

authority is exercised in the most arbitrary manner.

We fail to see, as our readers will also, where the

impertinence would have come in when the case

of reconquering Kordofan and Hicks Pasha were

considered. We are rather inelined to think, under

the circumstances, it would have been humane to

do so.

In the elosing paragraph we have the suggestion

which originated Gordon's mission to the Sudan,

for Sir E. Baring informed Earl Granville that if the

Khedive and Her Majesty's Government yielded to

the pressure put on them to withdraw from it,

that :—

It would be necessary to send an English officer of high

authority to Khartum, with full power to withdraw all the

garrisons in the Sudan, and to make the best arrangements

for the future government of the country.

On December 1st, 1883, Earl Granville asked Sir

E. Baring, if Gordon was willing to go, would he be

of any use to you or to the Egyptian Government?

No, replied the latter, for as the movement in the

Sudan was a religious one, the Egyptian Govern

ment were averse towards the appointment of a

Christian, as it would probably excite the tribes who

arc now friendly against them.

Eight days later the Khedive received a telegram

from Colonel Coetlogen, strongly urging that if it is

decided to retire from Khartum it should be at

WOULD 1JE GREATLY .OBLIGED. 45

once ordered, that the retreat might be safely

effected. This message was at once transmitted to

Downing Street. Earl Granville asked Sir E.

Baring on the 16th if Gordon or Wilson (Sir Charles

W. Wilson) would be of any use to him under the

altered circumstances of Egypt ? The reply was,

" Not at present."

As naturally consequent upon this answer, Lord

Granville asked Sir E. Baring on the 15th if he can

give him any " further information as to the pro

spects of retreat for the army and residents at

Khartum, and the measures taken relative thereto,"

and that he had heard indirectly that Gordon was

ready to go straight to Suakim and not to Cairo—

evidently implying in this mention of the route his

intention of disregarding the objections made by the

Egyptian Government to the British officer thus

selected, because of his unfitness for the duties he

would be called upon to discharge. However this

may be, the policy of " insistence " had secured the

acceptance by the Khedive and his Ministers of

the policy it forced upon them with respect to the

Sudan, for thereafter Sir E. Baring informed Lord

Granville, in reply to his message, that the Egyptian

Government would be greatly obliged if Her

Majesty's Government would select a well-qualified

officer " to evacuate the Sudan, and that he would

be given full power—civil and military—to effect

the retreat," and that in his opinion " General

Gordon would be the best man."

What a change had come over the presiding spirits

in Downing Street ! In 1882, after the victory at

WHV GORDON PERISHED.

Te\-c\-K.ebir, they refused the Egyptian Government

1\r\t\sY\ officers to aid Abd-el-Kadir to " smash the

'Nladhi," but now, when he was likely to " smash "

the garrisons and officials in the Sudan, they

listened to this request for an officer to rescue

them I

Their choice of General Gordon for this mission

was generally regarded in England with great satis

faction, excepting to a certain extent, as would seem,

by Her Majesty's Government. This appears

evident from the fact that they regretted having to

adopt his services, from the subsequent reserve in

their relations with him.

It also appears evident that when General Gordon

left England for Khartum, on January 16th, 1884,

he did not sufficiently take into account the

great change which the prestige acquired by the

Madhi and the destruction of Hicks's army had

brought about in the Sudan. One indication of

this was that, until after his arrival at Khartum,

he felt convinced it was impossible for him to carry

out his instructions unaided, and yet, as perhaps few

men would have refrained from doing, he never made

any direct appeal for assistance

Her Majesty's Government, on the other hand,

must have then likewise learned from his telegrams

that the evacuation of the Sudan and the restora

tion of its petty sultans to their former positions

was a much more difficult undertaking than they had

been led to suppose—and one which could not be

effected without their direct assistance. And yet, in

view of this unforeseen difficulty, they did not recall

A SKRIOUS AND SAD QUESTION. 47

General Gordon, the instructions they gave him for

his guidance were very indefinite, and the aid which

at last they felt obliged to send him arrived too late

to be of any value to him.

His feelings, in view of all this, were recorded in

his journal on October 5th, and in a telegram to

the Khedive on September 1 8th, when he asks His

Highness if it was right that he should have been

sent to Khartum with only seven followers after

the destruction of Hicks's army, and no attention

paid to him until his communications were cut ; and

also in three dateless telegrams received from him

on September 16th, 1884, quoted further on.

In the first of these telegrams he stated that

on his arrival at Khartum he found it was

impossible to withdraw the soldiers and Egyptian

employes, in consequence of the insurrection of the

Arabs and the interruption of communications,

and therefore he telegraphed, " I asked for

reinforcements."

On March 2nd, or a fortnight after his arrival

at Khartum, he sent this despatch to Sir E.

Baring :—

I maintain the policy of eventually evacuating the Soudan,

including Khartum ; next anarchy will ensue, about which I

would not trouble myself ; next chaos. I see impossibility of

immediate withdrawal of all Egyptian employes, and the

remedy I propose is sending up Zebehr as my successor, who

would receive for a time a subsidy from the Egyptian Govern

ment, in order to enable him to maintain an armed force

there.

These are my ideas. ... I have no option about staying

at Khartum—it has passed out of my hands—and as to sending

WHV GORDON PKRISHED.

a\arger force than 200 men to VVady-Halfa, I do not think it

necessary. // is not the number but the prestige which I need.

\ am sure the revolt will collapse if / can say that I have

British troops at my back.

In reply to Sir E. Baring's request that he should

more distinctly state his views, Gordon telegraphed

back as foilows :—

Two-thirds of the people are terrorised over by one-third,

excited by the emissaries of the Mahdi. Instead of supporting

the two-thirds, our undisguised intention is to get Egyptian

employes out of the Sudan. To this the two-thirds strongly

object, for it leaves them impotent. To-day—daily go down—

all sick, widows, and orphans, and there remain 1,400 fellaheen

soldiers. Supposing I send down these fellaheen soldiers, in

a few days the town would send its submission to the Mahdi,

and all the machinery of the Government would be caught. It

would not be from love of the Madhi, but because they are

hopeless. They would be perfectly right to do so.

You see, therefore, the fix. What is true here is true else

where, and is, in a few words, this : that the evacuation of

the Sudan is impossible until the Government asserts its

authority ; and I mean by evacuation the removal of all

Egyptian employe's who form the machinery of the Govern

ment, and not the departure of the sick, &c, who may be

considered to have gone from here.

We can hold out and force back the revolt, but the condition

will not ameliorate by time, and our money must come to an

end.

You have to say whether this partial evacuation of the

Sudan fulfils your desires. If it does not, then you must act

by Indian Moslem troops from Wady-Haifa; and do so at

once by sending detachments of troops there.

Another telegram on the same day stated that :—

If Zebehr comes up it will be absolutely necessary for me

to stay here four months.

ZEHEHR AND MYSELF. 49

Then on the next day (March 3rd) he telegraphed

again as follows :—

The combination of Zebehr and myself is absolutely

necessary for success, and I beg you and Lord Granville

to believe my certain conviction that there is not the slightest

danger of our quarrelling, for Zebehr would know that the

subsidy depended on my safety. To do any good we must be

together, and that without delay.

He telegraphed on the 4th to Sir E. Baring again

that a caravan had come in direct the day before from

Dongola—the first which had passed this road for

years—and that this was a good sign, adding, however,

that :—

All things are not serious, although they may become so if

delay occurs in sending up Zebehr. My weakness is that of

being a foreigner and Christian, and peaceful, and it is only

by sending up Zebehr that prejudice can be removed. I wish

you would question Stewart on the subject. ,

Colonel Stewart at the same time reported to Sir

E. Baring by telegraph that :—

The principal desire of General Gordon is to have Zebehr

as soon as possible. His reasons are that he is the only man

who can hold the country together, at any rate for a time, after

the evacuation. Being a Pasha among the Shagie irregulars,

he will be able to get at sources of information and action now

closed to us. He will be opposed to the Mahdi. I agree with

Gordon. - :

Sir E. Baring very strongly supports this demand

from Gordon for Zebehr on the same principle of

policy as that adopted by the Government of India

towards Afghanistan and the tribes on the North

western frontier:—

E

WHY GORDON PERISHEO.

1 have always, he informed Earl Granville, contemplated

making some such arrangement for the future government of

the Sudan, as will be seen from my despatch of December

22nd, 1883, in which I said it would be necessary. As regards

slavery, it certainly receives a stimulus from the abandonment

of the Sudan by Egypt, but the dispatch of Zebehr Pasha to

Khartum will not affect the question one way or the other.

We must either virtually annex the whole country—which is

out of the question—or else we must accept the inevitable

consequences of the policy of abandonment.

You see what Gordon says about the security of Egypt. I

believe that Zebehr Pasha may be made a bulwark against the

approach of the Mahdi. Of course there is a risk that he will

constitute a danger to Egypt, but the risk is a small one, and it

is in any case preferable to incur it rather than face the certain

disadvantages of withdrawing without making any provision

for the future government of the country, which would, without

such provision, fall under the power of the Mahdi.

Colonel Stewart, in the despatch from which we

have just quoted, agrees with Sir E. Baring on the

importance of not consigning the Sudan to the

Madhi or anarchy.

It seems evident to me, he stated in his telegram, that it is

impossible for us to leave the country without leaving some

sort of established government which would last at any rate

for a time ; and Zebehr is the only man who can insure that.

Also that we must withdraw the Sennar and other besieged

garrisons, and here Zebehr can greatly assist us.

The principal objections, Colonel Stewart continues, are, that

Zebehr has an evil reputation as a slave dealer and his enmity

to Gordon. As to the first of these objections, it will have to

be defended on the plea that no other course is open except

British annexation or anarchy. As regards the second objec

tion, if precautionary measures are taken, such as making a

subsidy through General Gordon, I think Zebehr will see

through that his interests are in working with Gordon.

1

NOT BEYOND ITS LINE.

Colonel Stewart then refers to the secondary

measures proposed by General Gordon, which were

that :—

When the Berbcr-Suakim road is clear, to send a small force

of Indian or British cavalry to Berber, and a small force of

British cavalry to Wady-Halfa. These measures, showing that

we have forces at our disposal, would assist our negotiations

with the rebels and hasten evacuation.

Both General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, from

their anxiety to disabuse the minds of Her Majesty's

Government that they intend to do something or

other which may militate against the carrying out of

the decision to abandon the Sudan, repeat their

adherence to that policy, as will be noticed in

Gordon's despatches, and in this one of Colonel

Stewart's. It will also be noticed that, almost every

time Lord Granville excuses his rejection of

Gordon's demands, he calls attention to that policy.

Beyond its line they are not to go, and he will not, by

relaxing it, tempt them to do so.

For example, in reply to some telegram not

published, but evidently emanating from high

quarters, Gordon telegraphed Sir E. Baring on

March^rd as follows :—

Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate the reten

tion of the Sudan. I am quite averse to it ; but you must

see that you could not recall me, for I have named men to

different places, thus involving them with the Madhi. How

could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and

fled ? Could you, as a gentleman, advise this course?

Sir E. Baring evidently could not advise such a

dishonourable course, being a gentleman, and there

E 2

5*WHV CORDON PERISHED.

fore instinctively replied to this appeal to his honour

that there was not the slightest intention of recalling

him.

And if the same question had been as categorically

put to Mr. Gladstone, he could not have answered in

any other way than by an indignant negative. Yet,

when making a formal statement in Parliament as a

politician, soon after news of Gordon's death had been

received, he said that Gordon was free to leave

Khartum if he found himself in danger, and might

have escaped to the Equator. It is true he recalled this

utterance when it was met by a volley of "Ohs ! " from

gentlemen in the House of Commons. Many of his

Radical supporters of the rightly so-called " Little

England Party " even now, however, repeat this libel

on Gordon for party purposes. They do so, either

because they were ignorant of the nature of the

mission which Gordon had undertaken, and the

dishonour to which a British officer who had been

sent to hold a fortress would be exposed who left his

post without orders, however dangerous it might

have become to himself personally.

It is true, as will be seen further on, that when

Her Majesty's Government, later, saw how fatal

might be their refusal of Gordon's requests for aid

in order to rescue the garrison of Khartum, they

did send him orders to retreat with it on Berber.

But this was when that retreat had been cut off

through the place having fallen, by their neglect,

into the hands of the rebels.

In order finally to dispose of this attempt to elear

Her Majesty's Government from all responsibility,

HOLD ON AT KHARTUM. 53

made not only by Mr. Gladstone, but by other

members of the Cabinet both in the " Lords " and

" Commons," we quote Gordon's entry in his journal on

November 7th in which, being dead, he yet speaketh

to those who still repeat this slander :—

Her Majesty's Government, or rather my friend Baring, told

me I was not to leave Khartum for the Equator until I had

permission ; 1 have his telegram * (so that if it was possible

and I could do it) if I did leave Khartum I would be acting

against orders.

In the despatch of March 2nd, in which Sir E.

Baring asked Gordon to inform him more particu

larly what his views and wishes were, he told him

that Her Majesty's Government were considering

the question of a successor in the Governorship of

the Sudan, and that Lord Granville had expressed

a wish that he would not leave Khartum. With

respect to his request for troops to be sent to Wady-

Halfa, he further stated that he could not advise such

a small force as he had suggested—200 men—to be

sent there, but that two battalions of Egyptian

troops were at Assouan, but it was not yet decided

whether or not any force would be sent further

south.

This refusal of Her Majesty's Government for the

* Sir E. Baring, in a message to Earl Granville of March 13th,

refers as follows to this telegram :—" Id repeating your Lordship's

telegram of the I ith hut. (to General Gordon) I have instructed him

to hold on at Khartum until I can communicate further with Her

Majesty's Government, and have told him that 1 he should on no

account proceed to the Bahr-Gazelle or Equatorial Provinces." (" Blue

Book," Egypt 12, 1884, "Despatch " 242.)

54 WIV GORDON PERISHED.

modest amount of help he had asked as an absolute

necessity for the successful carrying out of his

mission, provoked from Gordon the following reply

to i t :—

Through the weakness of the Government many have joined

the rebels. All news confirms what I already have told you—

that we shall before long be blockaded. The utility of Zebchr

is greatly diminished, owing to our weakness, which has led the

loyal people to join our enemy.

In the event of sending an Expedition to Berber, the greatest

importance is speed. A small advance-guard there would

keep the riparian tribes between this and it quiet, and would

be an assurance to the population of the towns. The rebels

are five hours distant from the Blue Nile.

If wire is cut I shall consider your silence as a consent to

my propositions, and shall hold out and await Zebehr and

diversion at Berber. Through delay in sending up Zebehr,

the sending him up is now inseparable from British occupation

of Berber. Zebchr's value naturally diminishes as the tribes

take up sides with the Mahdi.

It is evident, even from that portion of his

correspondence with Sir E. Baring we have given,

that Gordon now found it impossible to secure the

evacuation of the Sudan garrisons without the

adoption of other measures than those which he

had originally contemplated for the purpose. Her

Majesty's Government, however, seemed unwilling

to admit that any such an alteration had taken place

in the condition of affairs there as to require their

acquiescence to his demands for the occupation of

Berber by a British force or for Zebehr Pasha. They

defended their rejection of the latter on the unfavour

able character given to the man by Gordon himself

in a communication from him when he arrived at

MISDIRECTED PUnLIC OPINION. 55

Abu-Hamed, when on his way to Khartum. Public

opinion in England, they also pleaded, was averse

to making this notorious slave-trader his successor

in the Sudan. In one despatch from Downing-

street to Cairo, their refusal was based on grounds of

policy—that is, probably, from a fear of Zebehr

becoming so powerful in the Sudan as to be a

source of danger to Egypt proper.

56

CHAPTER IV.

The fear of public opinion was the reason given

by Earl Granville in his despatch of February 22nd

to Sir E. Baring for refusing Gordon's request for

Zebehr. Why this public opinion was feared Mr.

Gladstone substantially told Parliament in May,

1884, when the Motion of Censure upon Her

Majesty's Government, made by Sir Michael Hick-

Beach, was under discussion.

Mr. Gladstone then said :—

1 am going to make a confession. I may give offence,

perhaps, to some Hon. (Gentlemen behind me ; but for my part

I felt a disposition to go every length not inconsistent with

principle in the support of General Gordon's recommendation.

General Gordon told us and gave as his reasons for thinking

so, that Zebehr, if inclined to the slave trade, would not be

able to pursue it, and would have the strongest possible motive

for not attempting to pursue it in case we allowed him to stay

at Khartum. For my part I thought the arguments and the

weight due to General Gordon so great, and that in my mind

it would have been a great question whether we ought not to

have given way to his wish ? Yes, but for one consideration ;

and what was that consideration ? Why, that we should not

have announced that intention forty-eight hours when a vote

would have been passed in this House, not merely to condemn

the Government, which is a trumpery affair, but to recall Zebehr,

and I think that not improbably the Right Hon. Gentleman

would have been the man to make that motion.

HAVK WE COME TO THIS? 57

Parliamentary tactics and Party interests on both

sides of the House of Commons were painfully

displayed in this debate, on a question which

may be safely regarded as involving the safety of

Gordon and the Khartum garrison and Egyptian

cniployt's there.

If General Gordon was right in asking for Zebehr

—as Mr. Gladstone seemed strongly inelined to

think—he should have yielded to his urgent appeals

for him to be sent to Khartum. They dared not do

so, according to his admission, from a fear of being

left in a minority ! Have we come to this in the

management of our affairs by Party Government ?

Are Her Majesty's Ministers no longer to be animated

by a sense of what is right, and by a conviction of

duty to their Queen and country ? or are they to be

left by the British people, as in this case, to pursue a

line of conduct which would secure for them a Party

majority in order that they might retain office ?

In review of the appeals from Gordon for aid from

Her Majesty's Government to enable him to carry out

his mission, and their constant refusal of any one of

them, we quote the following censure pronounced

upon them by one of their own supporters, Mr. Joseph

Cowen, during the debate :—

The Ministry desire to dissociate General Gordon from the

garrisons. This is impossible. They sneakingly suggest that

he should sacrifice his comrades in captivity and decamp.

Hut they mistake their man. It was the helpless to help and

the hopeless to save that sent him on his forlorn and chivalrous

mission, and he spurns such cowardly counsels. . . . His

ability or inability to hold out does not acquit us of our

accountability for hiin, and for them with him.

$8 WHY GORDON PERISHKD.

Referring to the objection raised by some of the

supporters of the Government to an Expedition for

Gordon's relief, that although as an economist he

did not approve of it, he further said :—

When a nation halts to count the expense of doing its duty

it parts with the essence of its virility. Other members, he

continued, object to an Expedition because scores of lives may

be lost to save one. Very likely. But England's amenability

for the safety of her citizens and the redress of their wrongs is

no perfunctory engagement prescribed by Charter. It is

comprehensive and far reaching. Occasions, in fact, may and

have arisen when the whole strength of the Empire must be

put forth to get reparation for a solitary act of injustice by a

foreign power, on even the humblest British subject. But the

number will be greater from the decrepitude and nervelessness

of ministers. Had they acted with decision at first, and if

they had moved to the relief of Sinkat and Fokar sooner, we

should have been saved the slaughter of El Teb and Tamanieb.

If they had sent 500 sabres to Berber after General Graham's

victory the road to Khartum would now be open and the

refugees on their way to Cairo I

Had this last operation been authorised by Her

Majesty's Government, and not been hindered by Sir

E. Baring's peace policy, as Gordon calls it, there

would have been no necessity for him to ask for

Zebehr as his only alternative. The refusal to keep the

Suakim and Berber road open was, perhaps, the most

serious of all the causes which contributed to the

failure of Gordon's mission and the disasters in the

Sudan, and as such it now elaims our attention. In

order more elearly to understand its bearing on these

points, we must go back to the period when the

services of Gordon were invoked by Her Majesty's

Government in January, and to his original plan of

CAPTURED AND CHECKMATED. 59

operations for the evacuation of the Sudan. This

was to proceed direct to Khartum vi:\ Suakim and

work through Sidi Osnian of Kassala and Sheik

Musa of the Hadendowas and the Beni-Ameer tribe.

After thus pacifying the Eastern Sudan, he pro

posed to proceed to Khartum and establish some

form of government through the petty sultans who

governed the country before it was conquered by

Mehemet Ali.

Beiore Gordon left London—namely, on January

1 6th—Earl Granville informed Sir E. Baring that

he had heard indirectly- Gcrdon was ready to go

straight to Suakim without passing through Cairo,

and asked him for his opinion.

Sir Evelyn, being of the opinion that Gordon had

better come to Cairo before doing anything with

respect to the Sudan, brought him there from

Ismailia and thus managed to get him under his

control, as the following instructions, given to him

before he left London on January 1 8th, fully

shows :—

You will be under the instructions of Her Majesty's Agent

or Consular General at Cairo through whom your reports

should be sent under flying seal. You will consider yourself

authorised and instructed to perform such other duties as the

Egyptian Government may desire to intrust you with, and as

may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring. On your

arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir E.

Baring, who will arrange to meet you and will settle with you

whether you should proceed direct to Suakim, or go direct to

Khartum, or despatch Colonel Stewart there vi& the Nile.

To Sir E. Baring Earl Granville telegraphed on

the same day as follows:—

6o WHY GORDON PERISHED.

General Gordon will be under your instructions and will

perform such other duties beyond those specified in my

despatch as may be intrusted to him by the Egyptian

Government through you.

On the 19th, Sir E. Baring sent this message to

Earl Granville:—

I am of the opinion that it would be useless for these officers

to proceed to Suakim, as General Baker is doing all that can

be done in that quarter with the means at his disposal. They

should at first come to Cairo, and, after discussing matters

with myself and others, proceed to Khartum. ,

It was thus that Gordon was prevented from

carrying out the pacific means he intended to

employ for the evacuation of the Sudan, which

we have already described. In fact, we may

say more strongly that it was chiefly owing to this

interference with him, especially by Sir E. Baring—

or, perhaps, owing to the arrangements made by him

for Gordon with the Egyptian Government—which

entirely changed the character of his mission. The

defeat of Baker Pasha, followed by the compara

tive or actual fruitless Expedition of General Sir

Gerald Graham, capped this unfortunate elimax.

General Gordon had also objected to any military

operations in the Eastern Sudan, and had strongly

urged on that ground the recall of General Baker's

Expedition. The results justified his advice, for it

ended, as we know, in disaster.

General Baker, as will be remembered, was sent

with a purely Egyptian force to relieve Sinkat, which

Avas then threatened by Osman Digma. The news

of his defeat reached London on February 6th, 1 884,

REFUSED HIS ADVICE. 61

in a telegram from Admiral Sir W. Hewett,to which

he added these remarks :—

Arabs fanatically mad, and after this success will probably

attack Suakim. Some trustworthy . . . troops should be

sent to protect the placed camps—only manning the two forts,

Sir E. Baring on the same day telegraphed Lord

Granville as follows :—

Have consulted Nubar Pasha and Sir E. Wood as to the

course of action to be pursued in consequence of Baker's defeat

at Tokar. We propose to await General Gordon's views before

coming to a decision. When here he was strongly in favour

of recalling General Baker from Suakim as soon as possible,

leaving only 150 men, which he considered sufficient to hold

the place.

On February 10th Lord Granville instructed Sir

E. Daring by telegraph to ask Gordon whether he

could suggest anything about Sinkat and Tokar. In

reply to the message sent to him from Cairo, Gordon

replied as follows :—

About Tokar and Sinkat you can do nothing, except by

proclaiming that the chiefs of the tribes should come to

Khartum to an assembly of notables (Medgliss) when the

independence of the Soudan will be decided.

Her Majesty's Government, however, refused to

accept Gordon's advice, and instructed Sir E. Baring

to forward the following message to him :—

It has been suggested by a military authority that to assist

the policy of withdrawal a British force should be sent to

Suakim—sufficient to operate in its vicinity. Would such a

step injure or assist you ?

In a telegram to Sir E. Baring on nth, Gordon

stated that he understood his desire " to be the

62 WHY GORDON l'ERISHED.

pacification of the Sudan without bloodshed," and

therefore in this spirit he replied as follows to the

above message :—

Would care more for a rumour of such an intention than

for such a force. What would have the greatest effect would

be the rumour of English intervention.

Again, regardless of Gordon's views, and turning

a deaf ear to his advice, not only as Governor-

General of the Sudan, but as specially commis

sioned to report to them the best means of

evacuating the country, Her Majesty's Government,

on the day after they had received this message,

ordered General Sir Gerald Graham to collect a

force at Suakim for the relief of Tokar, and for the

defence of the former. Admiral Sir W. Hcwett was

warned of the arrival there on the 19th or 20th.

In submitting the Estimates for this first Expedi

tion to the Eastern Sudan on March 6th, Lord

Hartington, as Minister of War, explained its objects

and origin as follows :—

Her Majesty's Government, in advising the Egyptian

Government and in assisting it to evacuate the Sudan, have

undertaken the protection of the Red Sea ports, and especially

that at Suakim. That port had, for some time, and was now,

threatened by the insurgent tribes, and after the defeat of

Baker Pasha and the fall of Sinkat and the surrender of

Tokar, it was menaced by very considerable bodies of warlike

and victorious tribes who had resolved that, after having

disposed of the Egyptian garrisons, to capture Suakim, and

drive the British into the sea.

From this explanation it is apparent the origin

and objects of the Expedition did not in any way

1IARTINGT0N versus GORDON. 63

connect it with the evacuation of the interior of the

Sudan, but by Her Majesty's Government simply

with the defence of Suakim. It is difficult to compre

hend how it could have aided Gordon or his mission.

As we have seen, both he, Sir E. Baring, and therefore

Nubar Pasha, were of the opinion that it would

seriously interfere with it. Unfortunately, Her

Majesty's Government seem in this, and in other

instances, to have given more consideration to the

advice they had received from the military authorities

in London than they did to that which had come to

them from Khartum and Cairo.

Lord Hartington, in fact, flatly calls in question

the opinions of both General Gordon and the other

authorities named by stating to the Committee

that—

He thought the position of the Mahdi and that of Osman

Digma was not threatening any position which the British

Government had undertaken to defend, nor was the latter, as

far as they were aware, actually engaged in obstructing the

measures which General Gordon had been directed to take for

the evacuation of the Sudan.

General Gordon, however, said it did and would,

but Lord Hartington said it did not and would not.

In fact, Osman Digma was in fact at the time

actually threatening Berber, upon the safety of which

his line of communication depended, and, therefore,

the success of his mission.

Fvidently alarmed by the hint given by Gordon at

any intervention on his behalf, Lord Granville

telegraphed to Sir E. Baring on February 12th as

follows :—

64 WHY GORDON I'KKISHED.

With reference to my previous despatch and that sent to Sir

W. Hewett, I have to state that the attempt which is to be

made by a British force to relieve the Garrison of Tokar is in

no way intended to interfere with the main principles of the

policy which Her Majesty's Government have announced with

regard to the Sudan.

It did, however, very seriously interfere with the

pacific policy upon which Gordon had undertaken to

carry out his mission, and which he had reason to

believe was approved of by the Government, as the

following facts indicate.

With respect to the proelamation Gordon had

requested should be issued to the Chiefs, Sir E.

Baring suggested to Earl Granville that it should be

at once carried into effect by Admiral Hewett, and

that he should be authorised to add to it these

words :—

Uy accepting the terms now offered by General Gordon, the

Chiefs will secure their independence, and will be relieved from

all the oppression and mis-government under which they had

hitherto laboured.

Admiral Hewett, however, deelined to issue the

proelamation after he had been instructed on the

1 6th February to do so, because he thought that the

rebels ought to be defeated before this was done.

Then, when he was again asked to issue it, he

declined doing so, because, as he telegraphed Sir E.

Baring :—

I cannot ask Chiefs to leave people to meet Gordon at

Khartum, when I know that English troops are about to be

sent against the people in question.

NOT AS HE HAD REQUESTED. 65

On February iSth Gordon sent the following

telegram to Sir E. Baring :—

Received information of intention to relieve Tokar—would

advise Proclamation to Rebels :—Gordon at Khartum ready

to redress wrongs—Chiefs to proceed there and sec him, who

was invested with full power, &c.

On February 27th Lord Harrington telegraphed

General Graham as follows :—

You should, before attacking, summon Chiefs to disband

forces and a'tend Gordon at Khartum for settlement of

Sudan. Say we are not at war with Arabs—but must disperse

force threatening Suakim.

Following his instructions, General Graham, before

advancing, sent out, on February 28th, under a (lag

of truce, a letter in Arabic addressed " From the

General Commanding English Army to the Sheiks of

the tribes between Trinkitat and Tokar."

It first summoned them, in the name of the

English Government, to disperse their fighting men

before daybreak next morning, or the consequences

would be on their " own heads," and advised them

as follows :—

Instead of fighting with English troops, you should send

delegates to Khartum to consult with Gordon Pasha as to the

future settlement of the Sudan Provinces.

The EnglUh Government is not at war with the Arabs, but

is determined to disperse the force now in arms in this

neighbourhood (Trinkitat), and near Suakim.

The answer to this letter was directed to be left at

a certain place before daybreak next morning

February 29th.

V

66 WHY GORDON PEKISHEP.

No answer having been found at the place

indicated, General Graham, without any further

delay, advanced and drove the Arabs from their

entrenchments at El Teb with a loss to them of

2.IOO men, and to his force of 34 killed and 155

wounded.

A summons was then sent through prisoners to

the rebel Chief at Tokar to surrender by March 2nd

on the previously offered terms. General Graham

and his force then returned to Trinkitat, bringing

with him the inhabitants of Tokar on March 4th.

The force then marched back to Suakim, where

the Government had resolved to concentrate it, in

order to give effect to a proelamation from General

Graham and Admiral Hewett, denouncing Osman

Digma, and summoning the rebel chiefs to submit.

No answer having been received to this proelama

tion, another was issued on March 8th, warning the

Arabs that if they did not submit General Graham

would march on Tamai, where it was known about

] 2,000 Arabs had entrenched themselves and awaited

his attack.

To this message a defiant reply, signed by a large

number of Sheiks, was received. The threatened

advance was then made by General Graham and the

Arabs driven from their entrenchments with a loss

to them of 2,000 men and to the attacking British

force of 102 rank and file killed and 112 wounded.

And so ended the attempt made by Her Majesty's

Government not to interfere with Gordon's pacific

intention with regard to the settlement of the Sudan

question. It failed because, first, the proelamation

A CHIVALROUS ADMIRAL. 67

he asked for was couched in too belligerent a tone

to secure its object.

The mistake thus made by Her .Majesty's

Government was bluntly hinted at by Admiral

Hewett in his refusal to issue any pacific proelama

tion under the circumstances. When asked to do so

his answer was :—

I cannot ask Chiefs to leave people and meet Gordon at

Khartum when I know th.it English troops are about to . be

sent against the said people !

Had the gallant and chivalrous Admiral been

informed that troops were being sent only for the

defence of Suakim against Osman Digma, he

probably would have felt it his duty to issue such a

proelamation to the Arab Sheiks.

In view of Gordon's evident desire that no military

operations should be undertaken against the Arabs

—not even to save Tokar—the Expedition should

have been primarily confined to the defence of

Suakim. There can be little ,doubt that the

imperious tone in which the Sheiks were addressed

by General Graham, emphasised as it was by the

force he had with him, deprived the proelamation

he issued of the pacific character which Gordon

obviously wanted it to bear.

Giving Her Majesty's Government credit for their

intention with respect to this proelamation, and for

an apparent honest desire to avoid doing anything

that might interfere injuriously with Gordon's

mission, they actually did so in the manner we have

pointed out. On the other hand, in order to save

f a

68 WHY GORDON I'EKISHKR

their policy of non-interfcrence in the affairs of the

Sudan, they would not allow General Graham to

utilise the success of his operations against Osman

Digma in order materially to assist Gordon by

occupying Berber.

In confirmation of this opinion, we first quote the

following telegram from General Graham to Lord

Hartington on March 17, in which he summarises

the results of his operations :—

Present position of affairs is that two heavy blows have been

dealt at rebels and followers of Mahdi, who are profoundly

discouraged.

They say, however, that the English troops can do no more

—must re-ernbark and leave the country to them. To follow

up these victories and bring wavcrers to our side, we should

not proclaim our intention of leaving the country, but rather

make a demonstration of our force. I propose, therefore,

making as great a show as possible without harassing troops.

Acting upon this determination, General Graham

sent a strong battalion, with a regiment of cavalry,

to Hamdab, from whence it made a reconnaissance,

along the Berber road as far as Tambuk. Colonel

Stewart — afterwards Sir Herbert Stewart — who

commanded the flying column, reported that no

Arabs had been seen during its march, excepting

a few women around the wells with their flocks,

and that the country presented quite a peaceful

aspect.

A caravan of pilgrims from Central Africa, which

had left Berber fourteen days previously, and had

arrived at Hamdab when the column reached there,

reported the road safe between these points, and that

WE MAY HE CUT OFF ! 69

they had only encountered on their way a few armed

men tending their (locks.

Anticipating that his victories over Osman Digma

would have such a result as these reports from

Colonel Stewart indicated, General Graham had on

March 5th telegraphed General Stephenson suggest

ing that Gordon should be asked if he would

recommend an advance on the Berber road, and,

if so, how far he would be prepared to co-operate

with it. In reply, Gordon telegraphed as follows :—

The Mahdi hai attempted to raise the people of Shendy by

means of an emissary. Should he succeed we may be cut off.

J think it most important to follow up the success near

Suakim by sending a smallforce to Berber. . . . Should

the telegraph be cut I have told Hussein Khalifa, Mudir of

Ilerber, to send out scouts, and himself to meet the forces at

O-Bak that might be advancing from Suakim.

General Stephenson, in transmitting this message

to Lord Hartington, reported that he was not

prepared to recommend Graham's force marching

from Suakim to Berber " owing to the necessity of

water," and this although he had already recom

mended that route as an alternative to Lord

Wolseley's proposal for an expedition to Khartum

up the Nile ! He also knew at the time he made

this objection that Colonel Coctlogen had taken a

battalion over the Suakim-Berber road without diffi

culty. Both the Foreign and War Offices were also

cognisant of the fact that towards the end of 1882

ten thousand Egyptian troops had been sent over it

in response to the demand made by Abd-el-Kadir

from Khartum for reinforcements !

70 WHY GORDON PKRISHED.

Gordon once referred to Iigyptian soldiers as

"hens" on account of their lack of staying powers,

and, therefore, if they could traverse a region so

short of water as this route was alleged to be,

certainly British soldiers could be relied upon now

to do likewise.

Neither General Graham's proposal nor Gordon's

urgent appeal for the occupation of Berber were

listened to by Her Majesty's Government, for on

March 6th they informed Sir K. Baring with respect

to the operation that " The attempt to rescue the

garrison of Tokar is in no way intended to interfere

with the principles of the policy which Her Majesty's

Government have announced with regard to the

Sudan," and that " operations at a considerable

distance from Suakim were not to be undertaken."

On March 1st Gordon telegraphed Sir E. Baring

as follows :—

I maintain a firm policy of eventual evacuation, but I tell

you plainly it is impossible for me to get Cairo employe's out of

Khartum unless the Government help me in the way / have

told. They refuse Zebehr, and are quite right (may be) to do

so, but it was the only chance. It is scarcely worth while

saying more on the subject. I will do my best to carry out my

instructions, but I feel convinced that I shall be caught in

Khartum.

On March 14th Sir E. Baring informed Lord

Granville that the European Consular Agent at

Berber had telegraphed him that the Sheik-el-

Obeid* had without doubt deelared in favour of the

* The camp of this powerful Sheik is marked in the sketch map

tent by Cordon with his letter of November 4th, and which we have

given on p. 191.

A PAINFUL SURPRISE. 71

Mahdi, and that the tribes between Khartum and

Shendy were in revolt ; and on the 15th that the

telegraph line, which was working as far as Shendy,

had now been cut between there and Berber ; and

on the 1 6th that—

It had become of importance to open road between Derbe r

and Khartum.

The reply to these urgent messages will be a

painful surprise to those of our readers who have

not as yet been made acquainted with it, for it was

as follows :—

Unable to authorise advance of British troops in the direc

tion of Berber until I have received further information with

regard to such an Expedition, and am satisfied that it is

necessary in order to ensure the safety of General Gordon,

and that it will be confined to that object. According to

present information it is not safe to send a small body of

cavalry to Berber as proposed, and the despatch of a large

force would be impossible.

General Graham not having, however, yet aban

doned all hope of being allowed to occupy Berber,

instructed Colonel Stewart, who was in command of

his cavalry, to prepare a scheme for the advance of

mounted troops for that purpose.

CHAPTER V.

In the middle of March, when news came from

Khartum of very serious import, such an operation

with respect to Berber as General Graham had

proposed was again discussed.

Although Generals Stephenson and Wood now

had come to the conelusion that it was possible,

though involving great risk, Her Majesty's Govern

ment telegraphed General Graham, through Sir E.

Daring, as follows :—

The Government have no intention of sending British troops

to Berber. The operations in which you are engaged must

be limited to the pacification of the district round Suakim, and

restoring communication with Berber, if possible, by other

means and influence of tribes.

In evident explanation of this telegram, another

of the same date by Sir E. Baring from Lord

Granville :—

Although, Lord Granville telegraphed, the demand for a

military demonstration by a British force at Berber was

contrary to the original policy agreed upon, it has been care

fully considered, and Her Majesty's Government would not

willingly refuse it, coming from General Gordon, with the

additional weight of your concurrence, if the military objec

tions to it had not appeared conclusive. The distance, the

nature of the country to be traversed, and, above all, the

climate, render the march of a force to Berber at the present

AM) WHY NOT? 73

season .in undertaking so difficult as almost to be imprac

ticable. For a large body of all arms the military authorities

regard the Expedition as impossible. While for a small force

of cavalry to undertake the expedition without support, in the

face of possible opposition by largely superior numbers, would

be an extremely hazardous venture, and might in the end

prove useless.

And why useless? Because, Lord Granville ex

plains

It was understood that Khartum was provisioned for six

months, and that its present garrison was sufficient for its

security during that period from any attack from Arab tribes,

who are without artillery.

livery other consideration but that of the com

munications with the beleaguered town, and the

importance of keeping its communications open

with Berber, are taken into account by Her Majesty's

Government !

The military authorities, upon whose advice their

refusal to allow General Graham to occupy Berber

was evidently based, gave no weight to the im

portance of keeping the line of communication with

Khartum open, although this necessity was pressed

on their attention by the increased embarrassing

circumstances in which it was placed by the advance

of the Dervishes from below it. Gordon had warned

them of this danger, and told Her Majesty's Govern

ment that, if Berber fell, he would be cut off. The

military authorities advised them that it would be

dangerous to send a small column of troops to save

it without support. General Graham said it could

be done, Generals Wood and Stephenson both said

74WHY GORDON PERISHED.

it might be, though rather risky, but Lord Wolscley,

then Chief Military Adviser, said, or suggested, as

may be supposed, that on strictly tactical principles

it ought not to be attempted. Therefore Her

Majesty's Government, rather than run the slight

risk General Graham's proposition involved, chose

the greater one of having Gordon's communica

tions cut because he had six months' provisions and

the Arabs round the town had no artillery t

Certainly such reasoning, and such a decision, defies

the wit of man to comprehend !

Taking for example the question of distance,

it will be seen that the route from Suakim to

Berber was only 240 miles, while that from the

sea up the Nile to Khartoum was about 1,600

miles !

It could also be easily shown that, so far as

elimate was concerned, Her Majesty's Government

had been greatly misinformed, but even admitting

that they were not, what then ? Had a British force

• never before been called upon, in carrying out

military operations, to face such a difficulty as the

elimate of the country presented, which they would

have to traverse before reaching Berber from

Suakim ? What about our occupation of Cyprus

during the intensely hot months of July and August,

1878, and its malarial fever, not to mention the

Ashanti War, which in these respects presented even

greater obstaeles to a military European force than

did the Eastern Sudan. The Egyptian Campaign

of '82—what about the heat endured then by our

Army? Whoever dreamed of abandoning the siege

AN INADMISSIBLE EXCUSE. 75

of Sebastopol, when our troops before it were struck

down by cholera, or exposed to the severities of the

season which then overtook them ?

When Imperial interests demanded the prompt

despatch of an army, either to defend or to advance

them, no such obstaeles as those now raised by Earl

Granville in the present instance, were considered.

It might be, it is true, impossible to carry on a

campaign in Russia during its Arctic winter, but a

march of only 240 miles from Suakim to Berber, in.

a elimate only suspected of being unhealthy,

although known to be hot during the summer

months, presented no obstaele in itself which should

have prevented its having been undertaken.

Then the objections to adopting General Graham's

proposal to occupy Berber in March, 1884, were the

same in 1885, when Her Majesty's Government sent

12,000 men to open the road to it, and to attack

Osman Digma in all his positions.

Nor can we admit the excuse then made that

our military authorities were at the time ignorant

of the elimate of the Sudan. There was no

reason why they should not have been informed

about it, and they would have been if they had

consulted those who were able to enlighten them

on the subject.

Amongst these were General Gordon himself,

Colonel Coetlogen, Colonel Watson, and some others.

Instead of obtaining information on the subject from

such sources of information, they listened to those

who, while later on advocating the Nile route for an

Expedition to relieve Khartum, had confessed they


knew nothing about the river and its obstaeles

above Cairo !

They would not even listen to Sir E. Baring when

he telegraphed Lord Granville—probably in reply

to a question for information on the subject—that the

prejudice against the Sudan on account of its

climate originated in general statements made by

the late Sir Samuel Baker and others, to the effect

that Europeans could not live in it.

Amongst them was Mr. II. M. Stanley, who, in a

letter to The Times in July, 1884, when the Nile and

Suakim-Bcrber routes were being considered, thus

derided altogether the proposed Expedition to

Khartum :—

Think of the consequences of an Expedition to Khartum to

release Cordon, the immense expense and (he terrible loss of

life which must necessarily ensue frem travelling in the

country ! What do we think English soldiers could do in

these deserts ? They would drop off faster than you could

count them almost ! You would have to provide an abundance

of provisions and an abundance of doctors, I should say one

doctor for every twenty-live men.

Such weight had tln's extravagantly expressed

opinion by the great explorer of other parts of

Africa on Her Majesty's Government that Lord

Granville actually quoted him as an authority against

the Suakim-Berber route when defending the choice

of that by the Nile for the Expedition to Khartum

in the House ol Lords.

Colonel Kitchener, in a despatch dated from

Debbeh, on September 1st, 1884, thus criticised Mr.

Stanley's letter :—

IN POINT HERK. 77

I have just read Stanley's statement in the Weekly Times of

August ist, in which the climatic influences on the road to

Khartum arc grossly exaggerated. There are no extensive

deserts to be traversed—the heat in the day is much less than

it was at Cairo during the same season last year, and the nights,

are quite cool, required blankets, and I have never been better

than since I have been at Debbeh, which is only 200 niilcs

from Khartum.

The late Lord Napier of Magdala is in point here,

for—when he asked the Government in the House of

Lords on April 3rd, 18S4, whether, under the possible

contingency of finding it necessary to make an effort

to relieve General Gordon, the military departments

had been requested to consider by what means such

relief could possibly be effected either from Cairo or

Suakim—he made the following observations on the

practicability of the latter route :—

No doubt the climate of Suakim was very severe indeed,

but it was not unhealthy ; and he believed thab the country

could be crossed by British troops, properly equipped, at any

season of the year. Mis Noble and Gallant Friend (Lord

Strathnairn) and many other generals before him had

marched and fought in the hottest weather in India, and

there was no doubt the same could be done again by our troops

The crossing of the 100 miles of desert certainly would be

difficult, but water might be transported, and with the resources

the Government had at their command, even a light railway

might be laid down to carry up supplies of water. Cavalry

might cross fifty miles on a march—that distance being done

over and over again by the Scinde Horse and other regiments

in India.

In the debate on the Vote of Censure the Noble

Lord said that

Great misapprehensions prevailed as to the heat in the Sudan.

The temperature recorded on the higher lands was from


110 deg. to 112 deg. in the shade {i.e. in summer). I have

records in my possession from officer* in Moultan in India

showing a temperature of 1 20 dcg. in the shade. The heat of

the Sudan is not so trying as that of India, although it is very

great, and although no one would wish to send troops to the

Sudan in the hot weather if it could be avoided, yet I believe it

would be possible to conduct operations even, if necessary, in

the hot season—provided they are supplied with Indian tents

and proper means of assistance.

Here was a source of information on the feasibility

of a dash on Berber in March which Her Majesty's

Government, as well as the usually well-informed

Army Intelligence Department, might have con

sulted, so far as elimatic difficulties were concerned,

with great advantage on this critical point in

Gordon's position.

We return again to the rejection of General

Graham's proposal about Berber when dealing with

his second Expedition. The real reason of its

rejection was apparently that given by Lord

Granville in the following telegram to Sir E. Baring

on March 28th, in reply to one in which the latter

had pressed his Lordship to consider the dangerous

position in which Gordon would be placed if his

communications with Berber were cut :—

The circumstances with which it (Gordon's mission) had

necessarily to deal were no doubt difficult, and might change

from day to day, but it certainly was not contemplated that

the duties assigned to General Gordon should be of a nature

which would require the despatch of a British Expedition to

support or extricate him I

As the special and temporary policy of Her

Majesty's Government had been made the subject

LXCITES UNPARLIAMENTARY LANGUAGE. 79

of deelarations to Parliament, and communicated

diplomatically to Foreign Powers, Earl Granville

further informs Sir E. Baring in this despatch that—

Her Majesty's Government desired to keep within its limits as

thus laid down and not to extend the scope of Dritish

intervention than is necessary for the realisation of the objects

in view.

Then follows this deelaration, which we will not

venture to criticise, as it deserves to be, for its cool

deliberation under the whole circumstances of the

case, lest we should be tempted to use un

parliamentary language :—

General Gordon's mission, even though not successful, will

have added to his very high reputation. Her Majesty's Govern

ment are aware of the complicated difficulties of the under

taking, but they believe that there is a reasonable hope that at

least a portion of what they desire may be accomplished.

• Earl Granville in the previous despatch had

recalled Sir E. Baring's attention to the fact that

Gordon's mission had been extended by his having

been authorised by the Egyptian Government, and

with the approval of Her Majesty's Government,

and instructed to undertake such other duties as the

English Government desired to entrust him with,

and as might be communicated to him.

If we refer to these instructions we will find that

the evacuation of the Sudan stands first. As

regards the most opportune time and methods of

carrying it out, Gordon, from the full confidence

reposed in him, was really given full discretionary

powers to retain the troops at Khartum for such a

So WHY GORDON PERISHED.

reasonable period as he thought necessary, in order

to accomplish the abandonment of the country with

the least possible risk to life and property. Gordon

did hope, when he undertook his mission, to be able

to evacuate the Egyptian garrison and employes, as

Her Majesty's Go%'crninent also did at the time,

by pacific means, or, as Lord Granville expressed

it, " without involving any movement of British

troops."

British troops had, however, been moved to the

Eastern Sudan to relieve Tokar, but this move

ment was explained by Her Majesty's Government

referring their despatch to the pledges given to the

Egyptian Government about the protection of the

Red Sea ports, especially that of Suakim.

Her Majesty's Government knew at this time

(March 28th) that Gordon had already begun the

work of evacuating Khartum down the Nile, viA

Abu-Hamed and Korosko, and they also knew, or

ought to have known, that if they allowed Berber to

fall that it would be impossible for him to continue

that operation.

Although the British force they had sent to

Suakim had an object of admitted importance, they

yet refused to sanction any portion of it to be

employed for an object of equal, if not of a more

pressing, character. Even if such a movement of

troops had been attended by a greater risk than

they had been advised by the military authorities,

it would be, that risk, under the circumstances, ought

to have been faced. Through their failure to do so

they not only checked Gordon's work of evacuation, •

SEND KOR WOLSELEY. 8l

but, as events show, they put the first seal on his

tragic fate and that of the garrisons and officials at

Khartum and elsewhere in the Sudan.

Gordon thus commented on the despatch of this

Expedition under General Graham in the following

entry in his journal of October 8, 1884 :—

Truly the indecision of our Government has been, from a

military point of view, a very great bore, for \vc never could

act independently ; there was always the chance of their taking

action which hampered us. Take the Tokar business. Had

Baker been supported, say by 500 men, he would not have

been defeated ; yet, after he was defeated, you go and send a

force to relieve the town. Had Baker been supported by these

500 men he would in all probability have been victorious and

would have pushed on to Berber ; and once there Berber would

not have fallen. What was right to do in March was right to

do in February. . . . The worst of it was that, Baker

having been defeated, when you did send your Expedition to

Tokar, Baker's force no longer existed and his guns resist me

at Berber. Take your present Expedition, I do not know the

details, but it seems to me that till August 20th, or thereabouts,

we were supposed to be quietly disposed of, but about that

date our resurrection occurred, and then " Let us have an

Expedition and send for Wolseley.'' Personally, I do not care,

but I think what a perfect mess we would be in in a European

war.

General Graham's force was recalled soon after the

events we have noticed, and he himself left for

London early in April. This withdrawal rendered

it impossible to utilise the influence of the friendly

tribes to open the road to Berber—for, had they

consented to help us to do so, it would have brought

down upon them (as they well knew) the wrath

of Osman Digma and his sympathisers. It was a

O

82 WHY GORDON PEKISHKI).

vain hope in this instance as in every other when

such a suggestion was made without any guarantee

of protection from a British force. It was equally

absurd to suggest—as Earl Granville actually did—

that this road should be opened by Hussein Khalifa

Fasha, the Mudir of Dongola with the forces at his

command, because if there was danger to a British

force sent on such a mission from hostile Arab tribes,

how much more dangerous would it have been to

one of Egyptian troops under the circumstances ? A

co-operation, as Gordon had proposed, between the

garrison of Berber and General Graham's force was,

however, another and a more feasible operation,

and could have been carried out if Earl Granville's

mode of sustaining the policy adopted by Her

Majesty's Government had been based on broader

and more intelligent lines.

Soon after the withdrawal of General Graham's

force, the position of Gordon at Khartum became

still more critical, for the rising he feared at Shendy

took place, and cut his communications with Berber.

Had proper measures been taken to occupy the latter

place, they might have been reopened. Acting under

the advice finally of Sir E. Baring, it was, as the

following correspondence shows, allowed to fall into

the hands of the enemy, who then had completely

isolated Khartum.

On April 20th Hussein Khalifa Pasha, as Mudir of

Dongola, telegraphed to the Egyptian Government

that the Bishareen tribes were ready to join the

rebels, and that he feared Berber would be sur

rounded, adding that as the

" NUBAR AND THE GENERALS."»3

Government had abandoned them they could only trust in

God.

Sir E. Baring immediately telegraphed Earl

Granville that Nubar Pasha had sent him this

telegram, with a semi-official note stating that—

As the conduct of the retreat from the Sudan had been under

taken by Her Majesty's Government, the Council of Ministers

requested him to ask what answer should be sent to it, adding

this warning :—

The matter is serious. Please send reply early, unless some

prospect of help can be held out ; there is some risk he will be

thrown into the hands oi the rebels, and this would seriously

affect Gordon's position.

The reply from Downing Street acknowledged

that the danger to Berber appeared imminent, and

directed Sir E. Baring to report, after consulting

Nubar and generals whether there is any step by negotiation

or otherwise, which can be taken at once to relieve it.

To this Sir Evelyn replied that, in the opinion of

" Nubar and generals," there was no possibility of

negotiating without a force to back the Governor of

Berber ; Nubar's personal opinion was that, consider

ing the pressing demands of the Governor, two

Egyptian battalions and 500 Ababdies—when

collected—should be sent on at once to Berber.

Generals Stephenson and Wood, he stated, objected

to sending the Egyptian troops alone, but considered

It possible to send an Anglo-Egyptian force, either over the

Korosko desert, or by Wady-Haifa and Dongola.

Sir E. Baring then stated that the immediate

G 2


safety of Berber might be secured by assuring

Hassein Khalifa Pasha

That material English aid would be rendered as soon as prac

ticable, but that Nubar's opinion was that this assurance could

only be made effective by an immediate advance ofan Egyptian

force to Berber.

After all these consultations with Nubar Pasha

and " the generals," and in face of the warning he

had given Her Majesty's Government of the risk of

Hussein Khalifa being thrown into the hands of the

rebels, and that thrs would seriously affect Gordon's

position, he seals the fate of Berber by advising Her

Majesty's Government, in a subsequent despatch,

that "it would be madness to send either English or

Egyptian troops by either of the routes named," and

acting upon what we do not hesitate to designate

as his " mad advice," they instructed him to inform

Hussein Khalifa that no immediate aid would be

sent to him !

And thus Berber was allowed to fall on May 28th,

under the circumstances we have narrated. Her

Majesty's Government would not move themselves

to save it, nor would they allow the Egyptian Govern

ment to do so.

Unless, said Nubar Pasha, Egyptian troops are at once sent

no assurance of English material aid will suffice to save the

place. Probably it was in consequence of this declaration that

they declined to do what they might have done to prevent this

catastrophe to Gordon. To allow Egyptian troops easily and

safely to be employed in such a service would, however, or

might perhaps be or taken to be, a departure from their

" Rescue and Retire'' policy. Had they not refused to allow a

EVACUATION PURE AND SIMPLE. 85

battalion of Egyptian troops to take part in General Graham's

Expedition in February, 1884?

In a despatch to Sir E. Baring, Earl Granville

reminds him that the force under the command of

Sir E. Wood was organised for service in Egypt

proper. And probably on the principle here referred

to, Her Majesty's Government did risk everything

with respect to Gordon and the objects of his mission,

rather than incur the censure of Mr. John Morley and

others of their supporters if they did anything that,

even in appearance, looked like a departure from

the policy to which they had committed themselves

with respect to the Sudan,

General Gordon and Colonel Stewart evidently

understood the feeling which thus prevailed in

Downing Street, and hence subsequently, when pres

sing for aid to their mission—on several occasions

they deelared their strict intention of adhering to the

policy of evacuation "pure and simple." On one

pressing occasion, the latter emphatically assured

Sir E. Baring that both General Gordon and

himself were very anxious to get out of the

country at the very earliest moment they could do

so honourably.

With the foregoing facts before us, it is difficult to

avoid coming to the conelusion that Gordon was

being virtually abandoned by Her Majesty's Govern

ment. He had served their purpose by meeting the

public demand for the rescue of the Sudan garrisons.

Instinctively, he appears to have recognised this, and

in the entry in his journal on October 5th, he thus

stated his views :—


Let us consider dispassionately the state of affairs. Does

Her Majesty's Goverment consider that they are responsible

for the Sudan garrisons and Cairo inhabitants ? We can

only judge that Her Majesty's Government docs recognise

this responsibility, for otherwise why did they send me up, and

why did they relieve Tokar? Once this responsibility is

assumed, I sec no outlet for it but to relieve the garrisons

conle que eoiile. It may be said that the object of the present

Expedition is ior my relief personally. Hut how is it possible

for me to go away and leave men whom I have egged on to

fight for the last six months? How could I leave after

encouraging Scnnar to hold out ? No Government could take

the responsibility of so ordering me. Had Baring said in

March " Shift for yourself as best you can ! * which he could

have done, the affair could have been arranged ; but if you

look over my telegrams you will see I ask him what he will do,

and he never answered. The people had not then endured

any privations and I was, as it were, not much engaged to

them ; but now it is different, especially as we have com

municated to them that English help is coming.

No one can judge the waste of money and expense of life

in the present Expedition— it is an utter waste of both—but it is

simply due to the indecisions of our Government. Had they said

from the first, We do not care — we will do nothing for the

garrisons of the Sudan — they may perish ; had they not

relieved Tokar ; had they not telegraphed to me as to the force

to relieve me {vide telegrams May 5th from Suakim, April 29th

from Massouah) ; had they telegraphed (when Daring tele

graphed to Cuzzi 29th March saying No British troops are

coming to Berber, negotiations going on about opening road-

Graham was about to attack Osman Digma) Shift for

yourself! why nothing could have been said. But Her

Majesty's Government would not say they were going to

abandon the garrisons, and therefore shift for yourself ! It is

that which has hampered us so much. On the one hand, if I

bolted I deserted them (Her Majesty's Government), on the

other hand I have brought about these Expeditions.

/ do say that Her Majesty's Government ought to have

WILL ACT DETRIMENTALLY. 87

taken the bold step, andspeaking out, to say in March " Shiftfor

yourself! " when I could have done it, and not now when Iam

bound to the people after six months' bothering warfare.

From the following entry in his journal on

November 6th, it is evident that Gordon had con

eluded, from the manner in which his appeals for

help had been refused by Her Majesty's Govern

ment, that he would be made a sacrifice to their

political emergencies :—

I am quite sure that the policy followed up till lately is one

which will act detrimentally on our army—for what officer, if

he was in a fortress, could have any confidence that it might

not be advisable to abandon him ?

These criticisms, and that last sad reflection upon

the conduct of Her Majesty's Government towards

Gordon, were justified by its fatal results. He

certainly was, as a military man at any rate,

warranted in coneluding that he was about to be

•abandoned—or rather to be sacrificed to the political

exigencies of the Party in power, from their having

allowed his communications to be cut with Berber.

In fact, the whole correspondence relative to

keeping them open in order that Berber might not fall

into the hands of the rebels is a painful and heart-

sickening illustration of the tortuous and hesitating

policy pursued by both the War and Foreign

Departments of our Government, and not creditable

to either of them. It was one also likely to throw

discredit upon the Liberal Party, for it was unworthy

of its best traditions. The only comfort we have in

calling attention to this last aspect of the policy

referred to is that it was not that of a Cabinet reprc

88 WHY CORDON 1'KRISHF.D.

senting the party per se, but of a Cabinet calling

themselves Liberal, but which comprised elements

not politically homogeneous with its principles.

Had the policy of the Government towards Gordon

been a frank one, it would not have darkened its

counsels by cunningly-devised words and phrases.

They had to do with an honourable, straightforward

agent. Why, therefore, did they not treat him in

their communications as such ? Had they done so,

as he complains in the extract quoted from his

journal, how different might have been the results to

him and to -the garrisons and civil employe's at

Khartum !

Her Majesty's Government were plentiful in their

expressions of respect for General Gordon, and even

spoke of him as a I Iero ! They were equally profuse

in their expressions of anxiety for his safety. All

the military movements in the Sudan, when pro

posed in Parliament, were represented as intended

either to help him in his mission, or to rescue him if

exposed to danger in carrying it out. But they dared

not, under the pressure of public opinion, openly

deelare an intention to abandon Gordon to his fate ;

and yet the measures they adopted, either for his aid

or for his rescue, were always so delayed in execu

tion as to fail of their object.

We do not say that the Government absolutely

determined by a Cabinet vote to abandon Gordon ;

but we do affirm, on the facts before us, that they

practically did so by rejecting his counsel, and turning

a deaf ear to his warnings, as they did in the case of

Berber.

MAY HE CUT OFF. 89

We now come to the consideration of the im

mediate consequences which followed the inter

ruption of Gordon's communications with Berber

through the occupation of the country between it

and Khartum by the rebels.

On April 18th, Sir E. Baring informed Lord

Granville that since this interruption between

Khartum and Berber—telegrams to Gordon were a

week and some ten days in reaching him. Some

which had been sent had not.he believed, reached him,

and that several messengers who had been despatched

with messages had been captured. " If therefore,"

he very naturally, and in an apparent tone of

irony, said

Her Majesty's Government desired to send anything to him,

it is quite worth while to make the attempt, although it was not

certain that the messages will reach him. No time, however,

he further stated, should be lost in doing so, as it was possible

thai before long communication with Berber would be cut of.

Then followed, on next day, a message informing

Lord Granville that Gordon had telegraphed to Sir

Samuel Baker asking him about the feasibility of

applying to American and English millionaires for

£200,000 to subsidise Turkish Regular troops to

aid him in evacuating the garrisons, and for smashing

up the Mahdi, an operation which, he hinted, would

fetch " the Sultan and secure his help."

A few hours later Sir E. Baring wired Downing

Street as follows :—

Cuzzi (telegraphs from Berber) that the garrison and civilians

of Shendy attempted to come down the river on the 16th.

When they reached a spot two hours from Darner the boat


stuck in the sand-banks. Soldiers have no ammunition and are

said to be surrounded by rebels. $00 men have gone from

here to help them. They are said to have been massacred.*

On April 18th another message came from Gordon,

in which his demand for Turkish troops was repeated.

In transmitting it to London, Sir E. Baring

remarked that it was most unfortunate that, of all

the telegrams he had sent Gordon, only one very

short one had reached him, and that he had

evidently thought he was to be abandoned, and

was very indignant. Enelosed was the following

message from him in which this indignation was

expressed :—

As far as I can understand the situation is this : You refuse

me Zcbehr. I consider myself free to act according to

circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as 1 can, and if

1 can suppress the rebellion I shall do so, if I cannot I shall

. Tetire to the Equator and leave you the indelible disgrace of

abandoning the garrisons of Scnnar, Kassala, lierbcr, and

Dongola.

The evident reason why Gordon considered him

self free to act now that Zebehr was refused, appears

clearly to have been that, having been commissioned

by Her Majesty's Government to report upon the

best means of evacuating the garrisons, &c., of the

Sudan, when he had done so no notice was taken of

his recommendations.

The following telegraphic message from Colonel

Stewart, which Sir E. Baring enelosed with the

* Mr. Cuui telegraphed four days later that the 500 men had failed

to relieve them and that they had been massacred.

WE ARE QUITE BLOCKED. 91

above, ought certainly have had some effect in

calling the earnest attention of Her Majesty's

Government to the critical position of affairs at

Khartum at the time :—

General Gordon has acquainted me with your intention of not

relieving Berber and trusting to your negotiations for opening

road from Suakim to Berber. General Gordon has given you

his decision as to what he himself intends doing. And weighing

•ill the circumstances, and doubting the success of your opening

Jhe road to Berber, unless by advancing troops, I am inclined

to think my retreat will be safer by the Equator. I shall,

therefore, follow the fortunes of General Gordon.

Enelosed also to Lord Granville, and of the same

date, was the following message from Mr. Power,

Her Majesty's Consul at Khartum :—

General Gordon, in view of the present critical situation here,

lias made the following intimation to me : " As soon as possible

I propose that you should go to Berber. If you do not elect to

do so, then justify me to British Minister." At present I do not

see how it is possible for any but an Arab to get. to Berber ; I

would elect to take the less risky route and go viil the Equator.

We are quite blocked on the North, East, and West.

93

CHAPTER VI.

As it has an important bearing upon the incidents

to which \ve now proceed to call attention, reference

must be made to the following important message

from Gordon, dated Khartum, March 9th, and to

the reply he received from Earl Granville on the

1 3th of that month.

On March 9th Gordon telegraphed to Sir E.

liaring as follows :—

There is no probability of the people rallying round mc or

paying any attention to my proclamation. If you mean to

make the proposed diversion to Berber (of British troops) and

to accept my proposal to instal Zebchr and so evacuate, then it

is worth while to hold on to Khartum.

If on the other hand you determine upon neither steps, then

I can see no use holding on to Khartum, for it is impossible

for me to help the other garrisons, and I should be sacrificing

the whole of the troops and cmployts here.

In the latter case (/'.*. neither sending Zebehr nor occupying

Berber) your instructions to me had better be that I should

evacuate Khartum and with all the cmployts and troops

remove the seat of Government to Berber.

You must give a prompt reply to this, as even the retreat to

Berber may not be in my power in a few days, and even if

carried out out at once the retreat will be of extreme

difficulty.

If the immediate evacuation of Khartum is determined

upon, irrespective of outlying towns, I would propose to send

VIRTUALLY ABANDONED.93

down all Cairo cmployts and white troops with Colonel Stewart

to Berber, where he would await your orders. I would ask

Her Majesty's Government to accept the resignation of my

Commission and I would take all the steamers and stores up

to the Equator and Bahr-Gazelle Provinces, and consider these

Provinces under the King of the Belgians. It is the only

solution I see if Khartum is evacuated irrespective of

outlying towns.

Earl Granville, in reply to this communication,

informed Sir E. Baring that Her Majesty's Govern-

• ment could not accept General Gordon's proposals

for a diversion by British troops to Berber, or for the

appointment of Zcbehr as Governor of the Sudan.

If General Gordon, his Lordship further stated, is of opinion

that the prospect of his early departure diminishes the chance

of accomplishing his task, that by staying at Khartum himself

for any length of time which he may judge necessary he- would

be able to establish a settled Government at that place, he is

at liberty to stay there. In the event of his being unable to

carry out this suggestion, he should evacuate Khartum and

save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without

delay.

On March 25th Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir

E. Baring that—

Having regard to the danger of climate, as well as the

extraordinary risk from a military point of view, Her. Majesty's

Government do not think it justifiable to send a British

Expedition to Berber, and they wish you to communicate this

decision to General Gordon, that he may adopt measures in

accordance therewith. Her Majesty's Government desire to

leave full discretion to General Gordon to remain at Khartum,

if he thinks it necessary, or to retire by southern or any other

route which may be found available.

It is impossible to regard the reply sent to

94 WHY CORDON PERIS1IED.

Gordon's message of March 9th as an honest,

straightforward one. Gordon himself has expressed

the feelings which it is likely to rouse in any candid

mind in the extract from his journal which we have

quoted.

I do say, he wrote, that Her Majesty's Government ought to*

have taken the bold step, and speaking out said, shift for

yourself ! when I could have done it. But Her Majesty's

Government would not say they were going to abandon the

garrisons, and, therefore, shift for yourself.

Gordon's message, in which the two alternative

courses are submitted to Her Majesty's Government,

demanded, in justice to him, that a categorical reply

should have been sent to it. The Government dared

not at the time proelaim their abandonment of the

garrisons, or they evidently would have been glad to

do so. The responsibility of such a course they

apparently desired to shift from themselves to

Gordon. They were also anxious that his safety

should not depend on them in any way, hence Mr.

Gladstone's statement in Parliament on April 3rd

that Gordon was, if in danger, free to escape to the

Equator.

Possibly Gordon might have acted upon the

message giving him permission to retire to Berber in

order to save the people ; but it does not appear to

have reached him, for Gordon telegraphed him on

April 16th that the only message he had received

from Sir E. Baring, since March 10th had come

into his hands on April 9th, and which informed

him that he should not expect British troops to

A GLARING INCONSISTENCY. 95

advance from Suakim to Berber, and that if other

messages had been sent he had not received them.

And yet, in view of the difficulty of communi

cating with Khartum pointed out by Sir E. Baring

in his message to Downing Street on April 18th,

and the imminent danger of his not being able to

do so at all by that route, during his temporary

absence, our Charge" d%Affaires there, Mr. Egerton,

received instructions on April 23rd to the following

effect :—

Cordon should be at once informed, in cypher, by several

messengers, at sonic interval between each—or in such other

ways as may, on the spot, be deemed most prompt and certain

—that he should keep us informed, to the best of his ability,

not only as to an immediate danger at Khartum, but to be

prepared for any such danger he advise as to the force neces

sary in order to secure his removal, its amount, character,

route for access to Khartum, and time of operations.

And, apparently most inconsistently with the

latter part of his instructions, he was to inform

Gordon that—

Her Majesty's Government did not propose to supply him

with Turkish troops, or other force, for the purpose of military

operations, as such were beyond the scope of the Commission

he held, and at " variance with the purpose of his mission to

the Sudan,'' and further, that "if, with this knowledge, he

continues at Khartum, he should state to us the cause and

intentions with which he so continues."

He was also instructed to add to these messages

an expression on behalf of Her Majesty's Govern

ment both of

their respect and gratitude for his gallant and self-sacrificing;

conduct, and for the good he had achieved.


A more heartless message could not have been

sent by a British statesman to a British officer, or

a more insulting one than this. It presumes that

Gordon had not been frank with them, and that

he wanted Turkish or some other forces to use for

other purposes than for the successful carrying-out

his mission of evacuation. From the despatches

we have quoted, out of the many in which he had

again and again explained his object in asking for

British intervention. As he was then shut up in

Khartum through their failure to keep his road

of escape and communication open, how galling

it must have been to him to have received such

a message as this !

Had he not sent them, no later than February 29th,

when he first became fully aware of the problem

he had undertaken to solve for them, through Sir

E. Baring, the following message :—

Should you wish to interfere, send 200 troops to Wady-

Halfa, and then open the Suakim-Derber road by Indian

troops. This will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt.

Whether you think it worth while to do this or not you are, of

course, the best judges. I can only tell you the modus

optrnndi of intervening.

On the 8th of March he sent separately the

following telegrams to Sir E. Baring :—

The Mahdi has raised the tribes, who will try and cut oft

provisions from Khartum, and cut telegraph.

We have provisions tor six months.

If we get shut in you should send an expedition of

Indian troops—Mussulmen—to Suakim, and open road to

Berber.

WHY SMASH THE MAHDI ?97

In face of storm likely to bnak on us, why not utilize Wood

and his forces to move on Dongola and thence to Berber ?

The route is safe and camels plenty.

It must be remembered, however, that Gordon had

from the first called the attention of Her Majesty's

Government to the manifest impolicy, as well as to

the injustice to the people of the Sudan, of with

drawing peremptorily a Government which had been

of some advantage to them, and the danger to which

Egypt proper would be exposed if the Sudan was

abandoned to a condition of anarchy. He, there

fore, proposed that it should be returned to its

ancient sultans. The increase of the power of the

Mahdi not only rendered this difficult, if not

impossible of accomplishment, but also seriously

interfered with the objects of his mission. Hence all

his references to smashing up the Mahdi ; in fact, in

his telegram to Sir Samuel Baker he remarked that

the presence of Turkish regulars, coming by Berber,

would enable him to settle, as he puts it, "our

affairs "—that is, the evacuation of the country.

We can quite understand the objection to the

employment of Turkish troops in the Sudan.

Gordon had asked for other help and had been

refused. Rather than the lives he had volunteered

to save should be lost, he asked for this help to save

them, and only in despair of obtaining the other

help he would have preferred. To this view of the

case Her Majesty's Government was blind and

deaf.

For example, in a despatch to Mr. Egerton on

May ist, Lord Granville, in summarising the instruc-

H


tions he had sent to him on the 23rd, gives the

following explanation of their refusal of Turkish or

other troops for expeditions in the Sudan :—

Such a course would involve a reversal of the original policy

of Her Majesty's Government, which was to detach the

Sudan from Egypt and restore its inhabitants to their former

independence.

The request for Turkish troops was not founded on any

necessities of defence in Khartum, as, according to Sir E.

Baring's telegram of April 9th, General Gordon considered

himself safe for a certain time—the town was provisioned for

some months, and the market was well supplied. It is clear

from his message to Sir E. Baring and also to Sir S. Baker,

that in asking for these troops his object was to effect the

withdrawal of the Sudan garrisons by military expeditions,

and to bring about the collapse of the Mahdi.

Operations in the vicinity of Khartum must be taken as

required for the defence of the place, and it can well be

understood that such action may be necessary even for

defensive purposes.

Turkish troops will not be sent for offensive operations

General Gordon cannot too clearly understand—cannot receive

the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, and they are

beyond the scope of his Mission.

The telegrams referred to from Sir E. Baring on

' April the 9th from Gordon, stated that he might

rest assured that for the present and for two months

thence they were as safe at Khartum as at Cairo.

It is painful to notice how Her Majesty's Govern

ment seemed to pounce on any statement of this

kind from Gordon, while they turned a deaf ear to

the warnings he had again and again given them, as

we have seen, of the dangers which threatened him,

'nd, by implication, he asked them to take the

INCO.MI'ATIULU WITH HEROISM. 99

necessary steps to avert. A general sent on a

dangerous mission does not like to go whining for

help when in peril. All the qualities which make

men heroes are incompatible with such a course.

These qualities rather lead them to underrate

danger, and to shrink from any appeal for effort for

their relief. Gordon would rather have cut off his

right hand than have written a telegram to Sir E.

Baring stating that he was in imminent peril—send

help to save me ! And it would appear it was

something like this style of appeal that was needed

to move the Government that had sent him on his

perilous mission. They knew he had provisions for

six months from March, and that when the Nile rose

his position strategically would be strengthened ; but

they had allowed his communications to be cut ;

they must have been uncertain as to the "circum

stances which might, in spite of all this, seriously

affect him ; and they would not make any effort to

ensure his safety. He might be in peril, but even

200 soldiers could not be sent either to Wady- Haifa

or Berber, because from a military and elimaterical

standpoint it would have been too unsafe to send

them, and in one case, that of Wady-Halfa, and

under the advice of His Royal Highness the

Commander, because of the danger to small bodies

of troops so isolated and so far from support

as they would be there. Gordon might, however,

be endangered, his communications cut, but the

non possumus policy these British statesmen had

adopted and held fast, left him to his own

resources. He has two months' provisions, and

II 2

lOO WHY CORDON 1'ERISHEI).

as the Arabs who are besieging him have no

guns, why need you trouble us about him ! And

so, at last, when driven to it by the force

of circumstances and Party necessities, they ask

him first, What is the object of his remaining at

Khartum ? as if he had not so often told them ; to

let them know if he was in danger—although they

had every evidence that he was ; and then leave to

him the responsibility of remaining at his post and

let the garrisons and employes they had sent him to

rescue, perish !

In the despatch referred to, Mr. Egerton is thus

instructed to express himself on their behalf to

Gordon :—

Her Majesty's Government fully acknowledge their debt of

gratitude to General Gordon for the heroic courage with which

he has proceeded upon his mission, which presented difficulties

unsurmountable by ordinary means, together with the possi--

bility of serious danger.

They recognised the benefits which have resulted from it ;

the confidence which at all events for a time he restored hi

Khartum, and the despatch of the women and children in

safety from that place, and hi* success, perhaps, in averting

any military movements upon Egypt, certainly in dispelling

the alarms connected with the expectation of such an event ! !

We quote the paragraph in extenso, leaving our

readers to draw their own conelusions from it, only

calling their attention to the omission from it of

all mention of the endangered garrisons and employes

in the Sudan.

Writing again to Gordon relative to the instruc

tions given to him by Her Majesty's Government,

Mr. Egerton said :—

EVACUATION, IJUT NOT DESERTION. IOI

You will bear in mind the main end to be pursued is the

evacuation of the Sudan ;

Now by implication this ineludes not only the

garrison and others at Khartum who were to be

withdrawn from the country, but those at Kassala,

Sennar, and elsewhere.

The observations made by Gordon in his journal

on November 22nd are so much in point here that

we feel constrained therefore to quote them :—

It may be agreed, he then writes, I was made Governor-

General in order to carry out the evacuation of the Sudan,

and that I am bound to carry that out, which is quite correct ;

but I was named for evacuation of Sudan (against which

I have nothing to say), not to run away from Khartum, and

leave the garrisons elsewhere to their fate. If it is positively

determined on not to look after the garrisons and not to

establish some sort of provisional government in the Sudan,

then the course to pursue is to name a governor in my place,

and carry out with that governor this policy. Personally,

looking at the matter from a very selfish point of view (and

seeing I have done my best to prevent this policy being

followed, and am impatient to oppose it), I should be much

relieved at the dt'nouemcul, for I would be in Brussels on

20th January.

If the Expedition comes here before the place falls (which is

doubtful), and if the instructions are to evacuate the place ac

once and leave Kassala and Sennar, &c., I will resign, and

have nothing more to do with the Government of the place or

of the Sudan.

Early in May Her Majesty's Government were

pressed in Parliament, as they had often previously

been, relative to the position of affairs at Khartum.

Amongst the questions asked was one by the late

Lord Randolph Churchill, on May 1st, 1884, when,


referring to a previous application for information

about Berber, he asked whether the attention of the

Prime Minister had been drawn to the despatch of

Sir E. Baring of April 20th, stating that, unless

some promise of help was sent to the Governor of

Berber, there was some risk of his joining the rebels,

and that this would seriously affect the position of

* Gordon ?

Mr. Gladstone, on the occasion referred to, denied

that the fate of Berber would have any serious

effect on Gordon's position, saying that :—

Whatever might take place in Uerber would make no

essential change in the position at Khartum, although the fall

would affect one of the routes to Khartum unfavourably

rather than otherwise. The opinionof Her Majesty's Govern

ment was that it would make nothing like an essential change

in the position or security of General Gordon.

Lord Randolph Churchill, in reply to these observa

tions, said :—

So the House is to understand that the deliberately expressed

opinion of Her Majesty's Envoy (Sir E. Daring) is absolutely

and utterly worthless.

During the same sitting, Mr. Staveley Hill having

asked if the time had not come when the Govern

ment might properly take steps towards ending the

mission of General Gordon, Mr. Gladstone replied

by stating that—

The honourable and learned Gentleman was aware that

General Gordon was sent out to the Sudan upon a mission

which involved the use of pacific means, and that the first

accounts from him were encouraging. Those, however, subse

INTERCEPTED MESSAGES. I03

nuently received, he admitted, threw some doubt upon his

being able to carry it out by such means ; !Hit that upon that

subject they had asked him for information, which would

naturally enlarge it with respect to his views of there being

any prospect of accomplishing that pacific mission, and until

they received his replies to these inquiries, he would not be in

a position to answer the question.

Having laid before our readers the explanations

which Gordon had from time to time sent Her

Majesty's Government about his position and pros

pects, and about his anxiety that Berber should be

occupied in order that he might be able to con

tinue his mission at all, it is hardly necessary for

us to comment upon these evasive and unsatisfac

tory answers from Mr. Gladstone. To a far more

serious extent than he stated did the fall of Berber

affect the route thence to Khartum, as we shall

presently see. In fact, when his communications

with Berber were interrupted by the revolt of the

tribes between it and Khartum, and more especially

when it fell, his mission of evacuating the Sudan

by pacific means was rendered impossible. One

result of it was that no reply was received from

Gordon to the message sent him on April 23rd

until September 28th, when one came from him

dated Khartum, July 30th.

Mr. Egerton informed Lord Granville on May 1st

that the message of April 23rd had been sent as

directed, and by Berber, Dongola, Suakim, and

Massowah. The agent (Mr. Cuzzi) at Berber had

telegraphed him that it was " impossible to send

letters or telegrams thence to Khartum for General


Gordon," and that "the situation was becoming

more desperate than ever." Duplicates were sent

by different messengers from Dongola, and likewise

from Suakim and Massowah.

Gordon, in his letter of November 4th, received

by Lord Wolseley at Wady-Halfa, stated that since

March ioth, exelusive of Kitchener's of October 14th,

only two despatches had reached him—one from

Dongola of no date, one from Suakim, May 5th,

and one of same import of April 27th from

Massowah. He had sent out a crowd of messengers

during the eight months, and one of them had

brought the message dated Khartum, July 30th,

and from which we quote the following paragraphs,

with this explanation : that " Yours of the 5th May,"

with which it commences, must refer to the fact of

its bearing the message of April 27th from Massowah,

for it was of the same import. The acknowledgment

by Gordon of the expression of thanks for good

wishes seems to refer to the congratulations appended

to both messages.

Your telegram of the 5th May received. . . . My retreat

is impossible, unless I abandon the civil employes and their

families. The feeling of the soldiers is against this. I will not

leave Khartum till suitably replaced. Before abandoning the

Sudan I must remove the Egyptian population. Even if the

road was open, the people would not let me leave without

them—unless a government was established.

P.S.—Reading over your telegram of May 5, 1884, you ask

ine to state cause and intention of staying at Khartum,

knowing that Government means to abandon Sudan, and in

answer I say I stay at Khartum because the Arabs have shut

as up and will not let us out. I repeat, I have no wish to

ANOTHER MESSAGE TO CORDON. 105

retain this country. The sole desire is to restore the prestige

of the Government, aad put some ephemeral Government in

^ position in order to get away.

Having been partially roused from their over

weening confidence in Gordon's ability to hold out

at Khartum or to escape from it, and evidently

under the pressure in Parliament, which as we have

seen was brought to bear upon them, Hef Majesty's

Government did not wait until they had received

replies to the communication to which Mr. Gladstone

then referred, for on May 17th they instructed Mr.

Egcrton to send him the following message :—

Having regard to the time which has elapsed, Her Majesty's

Government desire to add to their communication of April

23rd, as follows :— '

As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has .

been dropped, and as aggressive operations cannot be under

taken with the countenance of Her Majesty's Government,

General Gordon is enjoined to consider and either report

upon, or, if possible, adopt at the first proper moment, measures

for his own removal and for that of the Egyptians at Khartum

who have suffered for him, and who have served him faithfully,

including their wives and children, by whatever toute he may

consider best.

With regard to the Egyptians, General Gordon is to be

informed also that he is authorised to make free use of money

rewards, or promises, at his discretion. For example, he is

at liberty to assign to Egyptian soldiers at Khartum sums

for themselves and for persons brought with them per

head, contingent on their safe arrival at Korosko or other

places of safety, or he may employ and pay the tribes to escort

them.

Then follow the compliments which we have


already quoted, and which on their connection would

seem to indicate that Her Majesty's Government

meant to say to Gordon :—

And we think you have done a great deal—quite as much

really as we had designed when we sent you to the Sudan ;

do oblige us, therefore, by coming out of it as soon as you

can, for you know, from circumstances you will readily under

stand, we could not send you any British force to help you

out of the scrape we have got you into I

The absurdity of sending such a message as that

just quoted to Gordon under the circumstances under

which he was then placed is expressed by him in

the following entry to his journal on September

17th :—

Egerton's telegram (May 17th), carefully written in cypher

(and equally carefully without date, but which we ascribe to

June) respecting the contracts to be entered into with the

Bedouin tribes to escort down (and be sure to look after

yourself) might as well have been written in Arabic, for it

would have produced hilarity in the Mahdi.

The pomp of Egerton's telegram, informing me " that Her

Majesty's Government would (really) pay on delivery so much

a head for all refugees delivered on the Egyptian frontier, and

would positively (it is incredible) reward tribes with whom I

might contract to escort them clown ! '

It was too generous for me to believe ! Egerton's chivalrous

nature must have got the better of his diplomatic training

when he wrote it The clerks in my divan, to whom I

disclosed it are full of expectations ofwonder at this generosity.

Egerton must consider that I was a complete idiot to have

needed such permission. I hope he will get promoted, and

will not be blamed for overstraining his instructions.

It is evident, we think, that Mr. Egerton did not

A JOCULAR DIPLOMATIST. I07

really overstrain these instructions on the points

criticised, but Gordon's were, as we have seen, ineluded

in them. The criticism, therefore, must be regarded

as falling upon Her Majesty's Government.

Gordon, in view of all the warnings he had sent

through Sir E. Baring about his increasingly

dangerous position, and the demand he had made

in his message of April 23rd—asking him to state

exactly how he was placed, and, if in danger, how,

and by what route, and how strong a force would be

required to rescue him—wrote as follows in his

journal on September 23rd, on a message he

had received through Colonel Kitchener from

Debbeh, dated August 31st. The message was as

follows :—

Tell Gordon steamers are being passed over the Second

Cataract, and that we wish to be informed through Dongola

exactly when he expects to be in difficulties as to provisions

and ammunition.

I am sure I should like that fellow Egerton. There is .1

light-hearted jocularity about his communications, and I

should think the care of life sat easily on him. He wishes

to know exactly — "day, hour, and minute" — that he

(Gordon) expects to be in " difficulties as to provisions and

ammunition."

Now I really think if Egeiton was to turn over the

"archives" of his office he could see we had been in difficulty

for provisions for some months. It is a man on the bank,

having seen his friend in river already bobbed down two or

three times, bawls, " I say, old fellow, let us know when we are

to throw you the life-buoy. I know you have bobbed down two

or three times—but it is a pity to throw you the life-buoy until

you are in extremis, and I want to know exactly, for I am a

man brought up in a school of exactitude, though I did forget

to date my June telegram about that Bedouin contract."

io8 WHY GORDON PEKISHEU

In order to let Gordon defend his decision to

remain in Khartum, and to explain his meaning

when he states that the people would not let him

leave the place, even if he could or would do so, we

quote the following from an entry in his journal on

November 9th :—

The people up here would reason thus if I attempted to

leave : You came up here, and, had you not come, we should

have some of us got away to Cairo, but we trusted in you to

extricate us ; we suffered, and are suffering, great privations in

order to hold the town. Had you not come we should have

given in at once, and obtained pardon. Now we can, after our

obstinate defence, expect no mercy from the Mahdi, who will

avenge on us all the blood which has been spilt around

Khartum. You have taken our money, and promised to

repay us ; all this goes for nought if you quit us ; it is your

bounden duty to stay by us, and to share our fate, fif the

British Government deserts us, that is -no reason for y.ou_to (to

so] after our having stood by you. I declare positively, and

once for all, that I will not leave the Sudan until every one

who wants to go down is given the chance to do so, unless a

Government is established which relieves me of the charge.

There'ore, if any emissary or letter comes up here ordering me

to come down, / will not obey it; but will stay here andfall

with the town, and run all risks.

In Sir C. W. Wilson's instructions from Lord

Wolseley relative to his mission to Khartum when

Mutemma was occupied by the Desert Column

under Stewart in January, 1885, his attention is

called to an accompanying letter to General Gordon

which is left open in order that he may read it. The

contents of this letter has never been made public.

It is possible, however, that its contents may have

IMPORTANT TELEGRAMS WITHHELD. IO9

been in accord with what Gordon instinctively

supposed would follow the course which Her Majesty's

Government had evidently been following with

respect to his mission. In fact, it was rumoured at

Korti, before the writer left there, that Lord Wolseley

had prohibited any of us correspondents going up

to Khartum with Sir Charles Wilson lest they

should become acquainted with some message that

he was bearing from Her Majesty's Government to

Gordon, because it was feared it would rouse his

indignation.

In the entry just quoted (November 9th) Gordon

further said that he had got all the "telegrams"

"European" sent from and received in Sudan "for

1SS3-84," and which he says were a "splendid collec

tion " full of interest. " What," he asks, " would the

Stividtird give for them ? However, I think I can

afford to be generous, and so I shall send them

down with this vol. vi." The Government, however,

withheld them when sending the original of the

journal to Sir Henry Gordon. Possibly, and very

probably, some of these telegrams, if published,

would throw considerable light on the contents of

this letter.

Before passing on to the inception and develop

ment of the plan adopted in August for the despatch

of the Expedition under Lord Wolseley, ostensibly

for the relief of Gordon and Khartum, we call the

attention of our readers, by way of introduction,

to the following extracts from the entry in Gordon's

journal of November 8th :—

1 10 WHY GORDON l'ERISH KI>.

There is one thing that is quite incomprehensible. If it is

rirfht to send up an Expedition now, why was it not right

before? It is all very well to say one ought to consider the

difficulties of the Government, but it is not easy to get over

a feeling that " a hope existed of no Expedition being necessary,

owing to our having fallen." As for myself, personally I feei

no rancour on the subject ; but I own I do not care to show

that I like men, whoever they may be, who act in such a

caleulating way ; and I do not think one is bound to act the

hypocrite's part and pretend to be friendly towards them. . . .

I know of no sort of parallel to all this in history except it be

David and Uriah the Hittite, and thtn there was an Eve in

the case, »ho, I am not aware of, exists in this case.

Remember, also, that I do not judge the question of

abandoning the garrisons or not ; what I judge is the in

decision of the Government. They did not dare say "abandon

the garrisons,"' as they prevented me leaving for the Equator,

with the determination not to relieve me and the hope (well,

I will not say what their hope was . . . March, April ....

August, why ? he ought to have surrendered, he said six

months), there is my point of complaint.

In the message sent to Gordon on April 25th

Lord Granville acknowledges that the original plan

upon which he hoped Gordon would be able to

evacuate the Sudan had failed. The Government,

as we have seen, considered him to be in a com

paratively safe position, and that he would be so

for some months to come, for he had told them

on March 8th that he had then six months' pro

visions and plenty of ammunition, and they sup

posed that, as the forces by which he was besieged

were without artillery, he would be able to resist

any direct attacks they might attempt to make

KHARTUM CONTINGENTLY SECURE. Ill

on the place. When the Nile rose Gordon also had

informed them his position would be strengthened.*

This would begin to occur about the end of May.

* This was consequent upon the ditch or canal dug from the Blue

to the White Nile being then flllcd with water. This canal, with its

parapet, formed the defensive works of Khartum on the south, and

converted it into an island. It was 5,900 yards in length at high Nile,

and at low Nile 6,700 yards. Its depth was eight feet, and width at

top seventeen feet, and at the bottom eight feet. Its principal defect*

as a defensive work were its great length, which required a large force

to man, and the absence of flanking defences.

t

112

CHAPTER VII.

Her Majesty's Government, however, had early

in April begun to contemplate the probability of

despatching an Expedition for the relief of Khartum,

and the rescue, not only of its garrison and the

Egyptian employes, but especially of Gordon, and

Colonel Stewart, and Mr. Power. On April 8th, we,

therefore, find that Lord Hartington received from

Lord Wolseley, as Adjutant-General, a communica

tion stating that he thought such aplan of operations

should be framed with a view of placing in the field

in the neighbourhood of Shendy, on the right bank

of the Nile, and nearly opposite to Mutcmma, a

British force of at least 6,506 men.

He named Shendy because, as he stated, it might

be assumed that, as long as Berber and Dongola

were held by the Khedive's troops, a force advancing

to the relief of Gordon at Khartum need not

anticipate any serious fighting until it or its district

was reached.

His reasons for an exelusively British Force were

that it was doubtful whether even the best of our

Indian regiments could stand a charge of Arabs

such as those which had recently been encountered

by General Graham's force, and because they were

WOLSELEV AND THE QUESTION OK ROUTES. 113

encumbered with numerous followers, who would

have to be fed, &c. If, however, for political reasons

it was thought best to employ Indian battalions, he

suggested they should be Punjaub troops. "

Lord YVolseley then refers to the three lines of

advance which had as their respective bases

Massowah and Suakim on the Red Sea, and Wady-

Ilalfa on the Nile.

Wady-Halfa he mentions as a base, because, for

a Relieving Force following the Valley of the Nile, it

could be easily reached with men and stores during

low water on that river.

The two last-named routes, his Lordship pointed

out, pass directly through Berber, and the first very

near it as it strikes the Nile at its junction with the

Atbara. Taking Berber as a central converging

point of these routes, he gives their relative distances

from their bases as follows :—

Miles.

No. i. Massowah to junction of Atbara

with the Nile 603

No. 2. Suakim to Berber 240

No. 3. Wady-Halfa to Berber... ... 666

As the selection of the route for a Relieving Expe

dition chosen by Her Majesty's Government was, in

its consequences, one of the causes which so largely

contributed to its lateness in accomplishing its object,

we have given Lord Wolseley's description of its

relative difficulties and advantages, in which he

stated to Lord Hartington that, owing to its vast

saving in expense by the water-facility for transport,

I

114 WHY GORDON PKRISHED.

as compared with that over land, he had no hesitation

whatever in saying that the river route from Wady-

Halfa to Khartum was infinitely preferable to any

other.

Lord Hartington, after examining this Memo

randum, asked Lord Wolseley if there was "No point

on the Nile, between the southern end of the Wady-

Halfa railway and Berber, where further progress in

boats became impossible?" and received the follow

ing reply :—

To those who do not know what was done by the men of the

Red River Expedition, the possibility of reaching Berber by

boats may well be doubted. Sir Redvcrs Duller took part as a

Captain commanding a company in that Expedition ; tell him

to study this question and state his opinion.

The cataracts of the Nile he acknowledged were, without

doubt, very serious, and of these difficulties Lord Wolseley

further stated there was no positive information, but what was

possessed led him to believe that all the boats of the Expedi

tion could be taken up every cataract (rapids) of the 140

beyond the point to which the Wady-Halfa railway he proposed

should be extended* when the river was full. If they could

not be so taken up, he adds, they should be portaged, as we

portaged our boats dozens of times in 1S70.

We should, Lord Wolsclcy continues, have camels with the

Expeditionary Force, who would march with the cavalry along

the banks. These would portage (carry) the stores round any

rapid required, the boats and small steamers being hauled over

if necessary on rollers, to be carried for that purpose in the

boats. The work should, if possible, be done by moonlight !

* Fifty-five miles of the roadway of this line had been built, but only

thirty-six miles from Wady-Halfa had been completed, thus leaving

forty-five miles roadway ready for the rail', which Lord Wolseley

proposed should now be laid.

STEPHENSON AND WOOD'S NEWS. 115

Lord Wolscley further stated in his Second

Memorandum, dated April 14th, that he considered

the 15th November to be the latest date up to which

General Gordon could hold out at Khartum, and

that preparations should bo made in view of that

fact. The force, he therefore advised, should be at

Berber not later than October 20th, and that if the

Government decided on the Suakim route, the force

should rendezvous there on the 1st of September.

General Sir Frederick Stephenson, then in com

mand of the British Force in Egypt, was strongly in

favour of the Suakim-Berber route ; and Sir Evelyn

Wood, in command of the Egyptian Army, was in

favour of that by Korosko to Abu-Hamed. The

former telegraphed his opinion to the Minister of

War on May 4th, as follows :—

l'roposc Suakim route—Wood Korosko Desert—Nile

throughout impracticable—Kassala undesirable. Force re

quisite 10,000 men, English or Indian—Wood can furnish 2,000

men for line of communications and two batteries. Best time

for Expedition to start October—Wood says for Korosko,

August—For Suakim early September.

General Stephenson reported that Wady-Halfa,

which Lord Wolseley proposed as a base for an

Expedition up the Nile by smaller boats to

Khartum, was 750 miles south of Cairo, and 860

from Khartum, with a known stretch of 180 miles of

broken water (Second and Third Cataracts) between '

it and Dongola. At the usual rate of progress,

steamers, &c., could only be expected to reach

Assouan, 210 miles below Wady-Halfa, in fourteen

days. Their stores would have to be carried past

I 2

Il6 WHY GORDON PERISHED.

the First Cataract which occurs, there to Philrc and

shipped again.

From Wady-Halfa to Khartum, this mareli route

along the river, as he supposed the advance of the

proposed Expedition would be made, would take 100

. days, with a camel for each man. There would, as

he supposes, also be an insufficiency of provender

for both camels and horses, and great difficulty in

taking care of the sick. In view of all these

difficulties—some of which Lord Wolseley proposed

to meet by the adoption of small row-boats for

transport—General Stephenson stated that he re

garded the Nile route as quite unsuited for such an

advance.

He then proposes the Suakim-Berber route as an

alternative one, and which could be traversed in

nine weeks from Suakim to Khartum. Our readers

will notice how completely this able officer proposes

to meet the obstaeles alleged by Lord Wolseley and

the military authorities who had advised. The

advantages of this route for an advance were, as

Sir Frederic states—

A shorter land march than by any other which had been

proposed—having a firm base at Suakim—with facilities for

the supply of meat and the care of the sick, and one protected

by the Fleet.

Reports on the subject were also received from

Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice, R.A., Quarter-Master

General, extracts from which we also give else

where, and from Admiral Sir John Hay, and

several other authorities.

Early in May Her Majesty's Government decided

ANOTHER VIEW OF Tilt: QUESTION. 1 17

upon having a careful survey made of the Second

and Third Cataracts, and Commander Hammill,

R.N., who was detailed for the duty by the

Admiralty, reached Wady-Halfa on the 15th of that

month. His report was an exhaustive and very able

one.

In his opinion, the proposed Relieving Expedition

should be so timed in its dispatch as to reach

Dongola not later than the 1 5th or 20th of September.

As the Nile was usually high on September 4th at

Wady-Halfa, he had no doubt but that steamers,

deahbeahs, &c., could ascend to Dongola (/.*,over

the 180 miles of the broken water of these cataracts)

after this date, but that, in order to avoid any risk

and the least delay and to reduce the amount of

assistance required at different points from the shore,

he advised that the river should be taken at its-

highest, because

It should be remembered that, with a falling Nile, the diffi

culties on that account would be experienced earlier, the

farther an Expedition ascended. As a rough mean, he also

stated September 25th might be looked upon as the usual date

of high Nile.

If advantage was taken of this period, that an Ex

pedition could be pushed forward from Wady-Halfa

within twenty days.

It recommended that preparations should be made

for getting eight steamers over the Second Cataract

to Semneh by September 1st for the transport of

men and stores to Dongola.

Commander Hammil gives also in his report an

estimate for supplies and rations of 3,500 men and

118 " W1IV (JORUON PERISHED.

800 horses for forty-five days, weighing a total of

S69 tons.

• He recommended cargo boats of about twenty-

eight tons—the usual size of the ordinary craft

(nuggars) used in the river above the Third Cataract.

Forty of them leaving space for thirty men, would

provide for 1,120 tons, and the steamers for ten tons

each. The horses and cavalry would, of course,

proceed by land. A large number of native craft

could, he stated, be obtained for such a transport

service in the long open reach of the Nile between

Hannek Mcrawi.

We have on a previous page mentioned that Lord

Hartington had asked Lord Wolseley if he knew of

any difficulty between the southern end of the Wady-

Halfa railway and Berber which might arrest the

progress of the boats, to which he replied that the

matter should be referred to Sir Redvers Buller to

study, as he hail commanded a company in the

Red River Expedition.

A report from a Committee composed of Generals

Sir Redvers Buller and Sir C. NcNeill and Colonel,

afterwards General, Sir W. Butler, dated July 29th,

1884, made the following statements on the proposal

of Lord Wolscley :—

Remembering the Red River, we believe that a brigade can

easily be conveyed in small boats from Cairo to Dongola on

the lines stated by Lord Wolscley ; and further that, should it

be necessary to send a still larger force by water to Khartum,

that operation will present no insufferable difficulties.

From all that we can learn about the N ile, and the difficulties

of desert journeys—when water for men and animals employed

AN HYPOTHETICAL IMSIS. 119

liavc to be conveyed on camels, \ve are convinced that, if it be

necessary to take a fighting force to Khartum before the end

of January, the Nile will be found the easiest, the safest, and

immensely the cheapest line of advance to adopt.

The report however stated that, in order lo ensure

the success of such an Expedition, the small row-

boats to be used for transport should be at Sarras—

the southern end of the Wady-Halfa railway—not

later than October 5th. This recommendation was

in accord with Lord Wolseley's warning to the

Government that Gordon could only be expected to

hold out up till November 15th. Sir Redvers Buller,

however, it appears from his mentioning that date,

thought with his colleagues that getting up to

Khartum by the end of January, would nevertheless

"do for Gordon" —which it did, fatally and

completely, as' we all, alas, know.

In order to bring out in full relief the hypothetical

basis upon which this proposal of Lord Wolseley and

his Red River colleagues rested, we mention that

Sir W. Butler in a separate report and with his

characteristic frankness, admitted that he knew

nothing whatever about the Nile above Cairo!

Neither did Lord Wolseley nor the others, but all of

them soon became better acquainted with the

difficulties it presented to navigation, and the ob

structions not only of the Second and Third Cataracts

but of the fourth above Merawi.

For example, in the middle of October, 1884, Lord

Wolseley telegraphed to Lord Hartington that he

had witnessed six Nile boats successfully hauled up

the Bab-el-Kebir (Big Gate, or main channel) of the

120 WHY GORDON l'EKISHEP.

Second Cataract, which was, he telegraphed to Lord

Hartington, " the greatest obstaele to the navigation

of the river."

About a fortnight after this incident, made historic

in the Nile Expedition by this telegram from Lord

Wolseley, we straddled all the water left in this

channel by the falling Nile and which was now

nowhere deep enough to float a biscuit box.

From the same cause other and similarly

important channels above this one—at the time

these small boats, or " whalers," as we usually called

them, were so triumphantly hauled up through the

" Big Gate," easy of passage—began to be either

entirely elosed to navigation, or had the depth of

water in them so lessened, or their currents so

increased, as to render their ascent either very

difficult or altogether impracticable.

Her Majesty's Government, however, had the

Suakim-Berber route still under their serious

consideration on June 14th, for on that date, and as

the result of enquiries that had been instituted about

the advantages or otherwise of a railway between the

points named, Lord Hartington informed General

Stephenson that it had been decided to take some

steps to facilitate its construction, if it was

eventually coneluded to do so.

As up till July 27th no reply had been received

to the messages sent to Gordon on April 23rd and

May 17th, and as a consequence fears were

entertained that he had not even received them,

Mr. Egerton was authorised to offer through

Colonel Kitchener, then at Debbeh, a reward

ROUSED FROM THEIR LETHARGY. 121

of £20,000 to Saleh, chief of the Kabbabish tribe, if

he would bring Gordon safely away from Khartum.

The message to Mr. Egerton further stated that—

Her Majesty's Government would not only not grudge that

amount provided the expenditure were effectual for that pur

pose, nor would they desire that Colonel Kitchener should be

absolutely restricted to that sum.

Colonel Kitchener, when he received this message,

said he would try and carry out his instructions,

but that he was not so sanguine about his being

able to do so successfully. Beyond this attempt,

and the consideration of the best route for an

Expedition for the relief of Khartum, nothing of a

practical nature was attempted for its relief until

early in August, under the following circumstances.

The rebellion in the Sudan had up till then been

gathering so much strength that, at the beginning

of July, it had actually begun to involve the upper

portion of Dongola. General Stephenson therefore

considered the situation so threatening that he

regarded the movement of British troops above

Wady-Halfa as absolutely essential. This primarily

roused Her Majesty's Government to action, for the

peace of Egypt proper was becoming endangered,

and on August 7th they obtained a Vote of

Credit from Parliament for £300,000 to enable

them, as Lord Hartington explained in a

despatch on August 8th to General Stephenson,

" to undertake operations for the relief of General

Gordon, should they become necessary, and to

make certain preparations in respect thereof," and

I 22 WHY CORDON* I'EKISHED.

then, in spite of all the warnings the Minister

of War had received and the knowledge of the fact

that Gordon's communications had been cut not

only by the fall of Berber but by the spread of the

rebellion, he qualifies this intention by adding to it

that they were not

At present convinced that it will be impossible for General

Gordon, acting on the instructions which he has received, to

secure the withdrawal from Khartum, either by the employ

ment of force or by pacific means, of the Egyptian garrisons,

and ofsuch of the inhabitants as may desire to leave !

Let our readers compare this deelaration with the

preamble to the message sent to Mr. Egerton for

transmission to Gordon on April 23rd, and say how

they can be reconciled, for in that preamble it is

plainly deelared that Gordon's mission on the lines

originally laid down for it, or believed to be, or as

represented by Earl Granville again and again in the

despatches from him we have quoted—had entirely

failed, and he was therefore virtually recalled by

that message in consequence of that failure !

And this extraordinary statement made by a

Minister of the Crown is followed by this one

equally so :—

The time, however, which has elapsed since the receipt of

authentic information of General Gordon's exact position, plans

and] intentions, is so long, and the state of the country as

evidenced by the difficulty of communicating with him is so

disturbed, that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that

the time has arrived when some further means for obtaining

accurate information should be adopted.

General Stephenson was then informed that

l'ROHAHLY UV SUAKIM AND 11ERBER. 123

although Her Majesty's Government had not then

actually made up their minds as to the best route

for an Expedition, that—

Certain preparations had been made at Suakim to receive the

stores for a light railway thence to Herber, and for the landing

of troops and the necessary supplies for an Expedition across

the desert by that route, he is told that the most recent infor

mation as to the existing condition of affairs, imperfect as it is,

appears to point in a different direction.

Amongst these " affairs " the despatch mentioned

was the danger of any advance by that route not

being unattended with " severe fighting," which the

Government wished to avoid, with the hostile tribes,

and the withdrawal of General Graham's force,

" rendered necessary by the approaching heat of the

summer."

Another of these " affairs " was that, Berber being

in the hands of the followers of the Mahdi, it was

probable that the operation of sending a force to the

place—necessarily on account of the scarcity of

water—" in small detachments would be one of

considerable difficulty and risk."

And here, again, we must express our astonish

ment at Lord Hartington pleading, in extenuation,

the consequences for which Her Majesty's Govern

ment were responsible through refusing to allow

General Graham, when he knew he could have so

easily occupied Berber, and when Gordon had

earnestly suggested that this should be done !

On May 28th, a telegram from Consul Baker stated

that Osman Digma, whose fighting force barely

numbered 300 men at the end of March, had since


been increased to 3,000 men, because of the sudden

revival of his popularity with the Hadendowa tribes,

owing to the spread of rumours amongst them of the

fall of Berber. On June 1st this was confirmed by

Major Chermside, who reported that he had then

enrolled 3,200 men.

The danger on account of severe fighting

mentioned by Lord Hartington as one which Her

Majesty's Government wished . to avoid was a

danger brought about by their refusal to occupy

Berber, as we have shown could have been done

by General Graham.

What further information could Her Majesty's

Government have required to warrant them

adopting immediate measures for Gordon's relief

than they had already in their possession ? They

knew he was besieged and his communications

had been cut ! They had been informed in a

despatch from him on March 8th that he had

provisions only for six months from that date, and

which would be exhausted now in a few weeks.

They admitted that the country was disturbed, and

the insurrection had spread down to Berber and to

the upper part of Dongola ; and yet they still waited

for further information before they were willing to

strike a blow on his behalf and on that of the

beleaguered city he had been sent by them to

rescue ! They had sent him a message on April

23rd, to which they had no reply as yet. What

reply could have been given to that message other

than was contained in those he had already sent

them ?

SOME STUMBLING-BLOCKS. , 125

They had admitted Gordon's right to the title of

" Hero," and had praised his marked abnegation.

Did they expect a man with such marked charac

teristics to telegraph to the Minister of War :—" I

am in the greatest danger! Do send troops to save

me ! " Such would not be the conduct of a hero.

Gordon, or any other British officer similarly placed

as he was, would have cut off their right hands

before they would have sent such a telegram as

thatl

However his action in the matter may be viewed,

the general impression has been that Lord Harting-

ton was personally in favour of immediate and

energetic efforts being made for the relief of General

Gordon, but that he failed to induce his colleagues

to adopt them. It is further believed that the chief

stumbling-blocks in his way, as "Minister of War,"

were the Foreign Secretary, our Diplomatic Agent at

Cairo, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The

first-named of these distinguished members of the

Cabinet seems to have had a free hand in his depart

ment, and used his power to prevent any departure

from the rigid policy he had laid down with respect

to the Sudan, and consequently and continuously

turned a deaf ear to any of General Gordon's

requests or suggestions which might, in any measure

or degree, compromise that policy.

There have been distinguished strategists in

diplomacy as well as in war, but the late Earl

Granville was not one of the former, at least there

was always a want of boldness about his procedure

which was illustrated by his preference for a series of

126 WHY CORDON rERISHED.

flank movements in place of a bold and direct attack-

in order to gain his object.

We have many illustrations of this characteristic

in the diplomacy of the late Earl, amongst which

was his dealing with France with respect to the Joint

Control—a question which uncomfortably cropped

up after our occupation of Egypt in 1882. Instead of

treating it as having been abrogated by the refusal

of France to join us in suppressing the rebellion led

by Arabi— as we know M. Freycinet actually did—

he regarded it as still existent, and only removable

as a stumbling-block in our way by negotiation

with France.

Communications, therefore, continued to pass

between London and Paris, but in none of them did

Lord Granville indicate that he had the courage of

his opinions. Lord Granville " beat about the bush,"

and never came to the point with M. Duclerc. At

last the latter, then Minister for Foreign Affairs,

seemed, on one occasion, to have lost patience, and

said to our Charge* d'Affaires," Mr. Plunkett, we wish

your Government would tell us plainly what they do

want, and if possible we will try and meet their

wishes."

127

CHAPTER VIII.

Lord Granville had no reason, as we have already

stated, to fear that Gordon would do anything to

compromise his policy of evacuating the Sudan,

and yet he acted towards him as if he really thought

that such would be the case if he sent him the

material aid he needed to carry out this one acknow

ledged object of his mission. To some extent the

course he followed was, no doubt, shaped to meet

the Parliamentary exigencies of the Cabinet. Hut

it was not a bold course—nor was it creditable to

the Foreign Minister of the Liberal party. Better

for him and the Cabinet to have resigned office than

to have contributed, as his Lordship unquestionably

thus did, to the delay in intervening on Gordon's

behalf.

It is an open secret that Mr. Childers, who held

the "sinews of war" in his keeping, also used his

power by urging delay, in order either to save

expense or to avoid it altogether.

These, then, were probably the chief hindrances

in the way of the Minister of War yielding to his

convictions relative to the danger in which Gordon

was evidently placed long before he obtained the

grant from Parliament for the purposes mentioned


in his despatch of August 8th. Although, therefore,

we are warranted in criticising the paragraphs in it

to which we have thus far called attention, in the

interests of fair play we feel bound to make this

admission. Lord Hartington spoke in Parliament,

and quoted this despatch diplomatically ; but it

would have been better for him to have put his foot

down earlier, and if he had, probably the disaster at

Khartum would not have occurred.

Following the paragraphs of this despatch already

quoted, we find the following:—

On the other hand, the intelligence which had been received

of the spread of the insurrection in the direction of Berber and

Dongala and the uncertainty which still existed as to the

position of affairs at the latter place, had created a feeling of

alarm and insecurity on the frontiers of Upper Egypt, which

has made it, in our opinion, necessary to direct a portion of

the Egyptian army to positions at Koroskoand Wady-Halfa to

support the advanced portion of British troops at Assiout and

Assouan, and I understand you to contemplate occupying the

the advanced posts by British troops.

We have quoted this paragraph chiefly on account

of this one which follows it :—

Under these circumstances it seems probable that if any

active measures for the relief of General Gordon and the

garrison of Khartum should become necessary, the object in

riew could be accomplished with the least risk of serious

opposition and loss of life combined with the greatest amount

of protection to the Egyptian territory by an operation in the

Valley of the Nile if it should appear practicable.

The question of the practicability is then thus

referred to :—

AS ON THE RED RIVER. 129

Although the obstacles caused by the series of cataracts

which intercept the navigation of the Nile between Assouan

•and Dongola and Khartum are such as to render almost

mpossible the transport by means of the river, of a

considerable force and its necessary supplies in the steam

boats and other craft which have hitherto been employed, I

am advised by competent authorities that the transport of a

force of moderate dimensions in small boats—such as were

employed in the Red River Expedition in 1870—beyond the

points where the ordinary means of Nile navigation would not

prevent any insuperable difficulties. Her Majesty's Govern

ment have therefore come to a conclusion that the best mode

in which they can place themselves in a position to undertake

the relief of General Gordon, should the necessity arise, would

be by the provision of the means by which such an expedition

could be despatched to Dongola, and as circumstances at the

time may render expedient and necessary, to Berber aiid

Khartum.

The principal preparatory measures which General

Stephenson is informed had been decided upon were

(1) The passing up the First and Second Cataracts

as many steamers as might be possible or expedient.

(2) To obtain from the Admiralty and other sources

a supply of small boats suitable for the transport

of troops and supplies beyond the point at which

ordinary transport would be available. (3) The

despatch to Egypt of one battalion of infantry

and ordering two others—the first in the list for

relief from India—to be stopped in Egypt when en

route. (4) The despatch of British troops to VVady-

Halfa as he might consider requisite.

General Stephenson was also directed to collect

supplies at Wady-Halfa for a force up to the limit

of 3,000 men. He was also directed to put the

K


railway thence to Sarras in good working order, and

to purchase 1,200 camels for a transport corps.

So far so well, and equally satisfactory was

the following message from Lord Hartington to

General Stephenson :—

If, during the progress of these preparations for the

operations above described, it should appear that an actual

advance on Khartum is imperatively required, it will be

necessary to further increase the number of troops at your

disposal, and the scale of preparations now sanctioned. But,

in any event, these measures and the advance of the force

indicated, should it be decided on, cannot fail in the opinion of

Her Majesty's Government materially to facilitate the

adoption of such further measures, if they should unfortunately

be found to be ultimately required.

On the day before this despatch was sent by post

to General Stephenson, Lord Hartington telegraphed

that he was about to send him instructions, the

general scope of which would facilitate the move

ment of a battalion at short notice from Wady-Halfa

to Dongola, and asked him what he could do with

the force and resources at his command, and to

which he received the following reply :—

Can send four battalions, 2,200 bayonets, 200 cavalry, one

battery field artillery, two batteries mountain guns, and,

mounted infantry. Small boats not suitable, and could procure

native craft.

General Stephenson telegraphed on the 14th that,

the Nile began to fall at Wady-Halfa about the

middle of September, and at Dongola a week

earlier, and then its navigation would become more

difficult.

AN IMPORTANT DESPATCH. 133

Two days later he telegraphed Lord Hartington,

urging that steamers and other craft should pass up

the Second Cataract (above Wady-Halfa) by the

middle of September, adding :—

Advise they then embark men and stores, and proceed to

Dongola while the Nile is favourable. Sufficient and suitable

craft can be obtained here (i.e., Cairo), and further supply from

Dongola if necessary. Early occupation of Dongola desirable

from political as well,as military grounds. If approved prompt,

reply necessary.

In order to place the fullest information possible

before our readers on this important question of a

route for a Relieving Expedition, we have given the

accompanying Map showing the obstruction to

navigation by the Nile Cataracts, and will now lay

before them the following despatch from Lord

Hartington to General Stephenson, for which we

have in our foregoing quotations and remarks

prepared the way. It was dated August 15th, and

was as follows :—

With reference to my recent correspondence and telegrams

upon matters connected with defence of the southern frontiers of

Egypt, and upqn the military operations beyond this frontier,

for the purpose of relieving General Cordon, in Khartum.

Should such an operation become, necessary, 1 think it advisable

to place you further in possession of my views on these subjects,

and of the measures which, I think, should now be adopted

with a view to carry out that undertaking.

After a careful revision of the military and political position in

Egypt, and the comparison, which recently obtained informa

tion enables me to make between the respective difficulties

which an advance on Khartum by the Suakim-Berbcr line,

and which a movement by water up to the Nile Valley would

134 WHY CORDON I'ERISHKI).

present, I am led to prefer the latter line of operations, for any

troops that may have to be employed in the event of its being

found necessary to send help to General Gordon. It is

essential that the plan adopted should provide for the return

of all the troops employed before the end of the approaching

winter season.

The Nile Valley having been selected as the line of advance,

and water transport having been considered the safest and

most economical, if not, indeed, the only practical transport

"when all the circumstances attendant upon any such possible

operation .ire fully weighed and considered, it is evident that

the first step would be the conveyance by water to Dongola of

a brigade of all arms.

Having this preliminary object in view, I informed you in my

telegram of the 7th inst. that the proposal was to use small

boats above the cataracts, as the Red River Expedition, and

I asked you what you could do with the force and resources at

your disposal to enable such a brigade to be dispatched at

short notice from Wady - Haifa to Dongola, and that the

additional battalion you ask for had been placed under orders

for Egypt.

On the 9th I informed you we could build here in one month

500 boats 30 ft. by 6 ft. 6 in., and drawing 22 inches when

loaded, with a crew of 12 men and too days' rations for

them and other stores, and asking you if you wished them to

be proceeded with and sent to Egypt for the purpose described

in my telegram of August 7.

On the nth I received your despatch of that date. You

tell me you can move 2,200 bayonets, &c., and that the

small boats are not suitable, and you could procure a large

amount of water transport locally.

Captain Molyncux and Commander Hammill, R.N., who

have examined the cataracts of the Nile, have similarly

reported as to the unsuitability of small rowing-boats for

transport purposes on that river. The latter officer has lately

submitted a most detailed scheme for the conveyance to

Dongola of a brigade of all arms by means of deahbeahs,

nuggars, and steamers.

an admiral's oP.j ACTIONS. '35

In forwarding that scheme to the Admiralty on

August 4lh, Admiral Sir John Hay remarks:—

It will be gathered from reading this report that no neces

sary preparations having been made, time does not admit of such

an Expedition being armed at this season. Still, undoubtedly,

one in which a less amount of water transports would suffice

might be undertaken. Whatever could not be carried by

water would, in that case, require to be carried by land.

He had previously telegraphed that small boats

would not be useful, and in his telegram of July

2 1st he repeats this as follows :—

Afier a full consideration I am of opinion it is too' late for an

Expedition (to Dongola) this season, if transport by the Nile

beyond Second Cataract is to be a main feature. Preparation

cannot now with any certainty be made in time.

Nevertheless, I have such confidence in your ability, and in

the zeal and energy of the Staff and Departmental Offices

under your command, that I am sure you can surmount all

difficulties. It is essential, however, to remember that, as the

operation has for its sole object the relief of General Gordon,

and that, therefore, in framing any plans for the movement of

troops south of Wady-Halfa, the possibility of an advance

as far as Khartum itself should be included in and form a

necessary part of such plans. To move troops, therefore, lo

Dongola, I consider would be to ignore the one great object in

view, unless the scheme embraced and provided for the

advance of a still much larger force to Khartum.

I am convinced, after a careful study of Commander

Hammill's report, the opinion of Sir John Hay, and the pro

posals contained in your telegrams of the nth instant that it

would not be possible for a suitable force to reach Khartum

by water* and return to Egypt before the end of the

approaching winter, if the steamers and native boats now at

your disposal were alone to be used as a means of conveyance.

Under these circumstances I feel it necessary to make

preparations for giving effect to the small-boat plan, to enable


.-j

you to send up a force towards Khartum in the |event of itsy^

being necessary to do so. (

A similar plan of operations was most successful in the Red -

River Expedition of 1870, where greater river difficulties had ^

to be overcome than any which the Nile presents. ,

I am informed by experinced officers who took part in *

the Expedition that those accustomed to working in small

boats in any rapid and difficult rivers are apt to attach too •

much importance to the obstacles which cataracts or even v^

falls present to navigation. After carefully considering the\)

difference in levels between the Nile below Wady-Halfa and^

at Khartum, and the able Reports of Commissioner Hammill

upon the cataracts he examined, they pronounce that an

advance up the Nile in small row boats is a practical operation,

altogether independent of the height of the river.

General Stephenson is then informed that General

Karle and General Sir Redvers Buller, as his Chiet

of Staff, were to be placed in command of the troops

at Wady-Halfa—receiving their orders from him—

the former because " he was acquainted with the

organisation of the force which was sent to the

" Red River," and the latter as having been selected

because " besides his considerable experience in

war, took part in the Red River Expedition," and

was, therefore, well versed in all the arrangements

necessary for the successful organisation of one on

the same plan, &c., up the Nile. 1

General Stephenson was also informed that

Colonel Butler, C.B., had been selected to

superintend the purchase and fitting up of the 400

boats which had been ordered, and that it was hoped

they might " be on the water ready for use at Sarras

by the 1st November."

137

CHAPTER IX.

BEFORE replying to his telegram of the 1 6th August,

Lord Harrington, on the 19th, informed General

Stephenson—in order to avoid any misunderstanding

—that Her Majesty's Government wished to be in a

position to send a force that season (1884) to

Dongola, and, if necessary, to Khartum this winter,

and then as follows :—

From Hammill's Report we believe it impossible to effect

that object if we employ only steamers and Nile boats; also

that to effect it at all there must be at least twelve good

steamers and Nile boats below Assouan, and eight between that

place and Wady-Halfa. Consequently, until twenty steamers

are thus distributed, it appears wrong to pass any steamer above

Wady-Halfa. In these circumstances we are organising an

Expedition in small boats, propelled by their crews beyond

Wady-Halfa.

You disagree, but what do you propose ? What force do

you propose to send to Dongola, and how could you get it

there ? How would you send it to Khartum, and how bring

it back ? State approximate number of camels you would

require to assist in each operation. How many steamers

would you keep on the Nile south of Wady-Halfa before you

sent any south ?

To this General Stephenson replied (August 21st}

that it was possible to send a force to Dongola that

season, but impossible, owing to distance, for it to

proceed by that route to Khartum and return it*

133 WHY GORDON PEKISHEI).

the winter, and that it should consist of S.ooo men.

The number of camels required would depend upon

the success of water transport and difficulties of

the Fourth and Fifth Cataracts, but that a good

supply was reported at Debbeh and Merawi. An

Expedition, he further states, by the Nile route

must return by Nile unless the Suakim Berber route

be open, because it would be most difficult to furnish

supplies to forces returning by Nile.

And we now have the cruxot the dispute between

the Red River men and Sir F. Stephenson and

Commander Hammill in his further observation on

this report :—

Believe Expedition to Dongola by means of small boats

impracticable. Difficulties on river too gieat. Naval

opinion here is the same. Can be best done by steamers and

local craft, but prompt decision urgent to secure craft for

force you propose in yours of 8th. Already arranged that

eight steamers be placed above Assouan and twelve below ;

more available if required. Former fit to pass Second Cataract,

arrangements made to pass over six, at least, directly river

is fit.

General Stephenson then plainly and frankly

stated that his own opinion still was in favour of the

Suakim-Berber route if the friendly tribes are armed

and subsidised and would procure sufficient camels,

which he believed they easily could.*

* The possibility of thus using the friendly tribes was substantially

confirmed by a telegram from Commander Molyneux from Suakim on

August 8th, stating that five chiefs, representing a large force, had

sworn on the Koran loyally to support the Government, to retake

Handout and Disabil (probably Tambouk was meant), and to keep

their section of the Berber road open. They gave as hostages five

ONLY HY SMALL-ltOATS. 139

Three days later General Stephenson was further

informed by Lord Hartington that he gathered from

the telegraphic correspondence with him, since he

had received his despatch of the 15th, that he had

based the plan of his operations substantially on that

sketched out by Commander Hammill dated August

4U1. After referring to his offer to send the brigade

to Dongola, on August nth, but that it would

not be practicable to send it to Khartum and back

by the same route during winter, his Lordship

stated he was not prepared to authorize a move

ment of troops by native craft and steamers to

Dongola, for reasons stated in his despatch of

August Sth, being still of the opinion that an

Expedition by small-boat transport for troops and

their supplies was not only practicable, but that the

risk would be lessened by their use, and that they

would afford the best means for bringing back the

troops before the commencement of the hot weather.

He had, therefore, ordered 400 more boats for the

larger force which it might eventually be found

necessary to send beyond Dongola. He therefore

instructed General Stephenson that the measures

ordered to be taken by him must be conformed to

this decision. This, however, must not be taken as

inconsistent with the instructions he had already

received, and the preparations in which he" was

actively engaged for collecting a force and supplies at

■ datives of Ihe Chiefi and received supplies of aims, ammunition,

grain, and biscuits. Colonel Chermsirfe also then telegraphed

Colonel Watson, K.E., then at Suakim, that Osman Digma's forces

had been reduced by 3,000 deserters.

140 WHY GORDON rEKISHKD.

Wady-Halfa and Sarras, although his Lordship,

as he further informed General Stephenson, did not

think it desirable,

Actually to move a larger number of men than was necessary

much before the time it would be possible for them to proceed

further.

He then, after authorising him to pass two steamers

up the Second Cataract stated that—

However desirable as it was to increase the transport above

that Cataract, it is, having regard to the plan of making use of

small boats capable of being propelled by their own crews

above the Cataracts, of the first importance that the river

transports should be maintained in a condition of complete

efficiency, and I desire that nothing should be done which

would tend to impair it.

Then, as if moved by some unreported influence,

Lord Hartington somewhat modifies the fore

going stringent instructions on August 23rd in the

following message to General Stephenson :—

You are authorised to send British mounted infantry to

Dongola, and with them Bedouins if you think desirable. Use

your discretion as to the concentration of British troops at

Haifa—but they must not proceed south of Sarras until the

arrival of boats from England. When the mounted infantry

arrive at Dongola, form a large depot of supplies there. I

give you authority to hire or purchase native boits for this

purpose, either below or above Second Cataract. Only

move two steamers up Second Cataract. When safely placed

above Semneh, the propriety of sending up more will be

considered.

Then, on August 26th, Her Majesty's Government,

after anxious consideration, came to the conelusion

A PRACTICAULE SUGCESTION. 141

that it would be unjust to Sir Frederic Stephenson

to ask him to be responsible for directing an

operation which, after full knowledge of the plan

he considered to be impracticable, and it had, there

fore, been decided to send Lord Wolseley to take,

temporarily, the Chief Command in Egypt.

VVe have thus laid before our readers in full detail

the official correspondence between the Minister of

War and General Stephenson, which ended in the

rejection of his proposal to send a brigade of troops

to Dongola, when it could have been taken there

early in September. The circumstances in which

Gordon, as we have seen, was placed, were such as

to call for immediate action, but that was now

postponed until the small boats from England had

arrived on November 15th at Wady-Halfa !

Colonel Kitchener, who was at Debbeh in August,

appears to have also been consulted about sending a

force to Dongola, from the following telegram

received from him on the 31st of the month.

I do not think a large Expedition would be necessary from

here to Khartum. A flying column composed of a strong fore;

of cavalry and artillery and some infantry on camels and on

foot—altogether about 4,000 men—could, I believe, relieve

Khartum. My opinion is, decidedly send up your troops.

There is no difficulty, and one good right close to Khartum

will see the matter through.

When submitting the Supplementary Estimates to

Parliament, on November 13th, Lord Hartington,

having stated that the' Government had acted upon

the recommendations and advice of certain officers,

when asked who they were, gave the names of the


officers engaged on the Red River Expedition.

They were not only, he said, Lord Wolscley himself

but there were General Buller, General McNeill.

Colonel Alleyne, and Colonel Butler ! These were

the officers consulted on the subject.

His Lordship seems to have forgotten to mention

the names of others who had likewise been consulted

—but who had not reported so favourably as the

officers he had mentioned.

Amongst these was Colonel Maurice, R.A.,

Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General at head

quarters. In his report of May 17th, he referred

thus to the Nile route :—

The Nile route, if the railway be completed round the

Wady-Haifa Cataract, so as to pass below the more serious

cataracts, and reach the Nile below Semnch Cataract, seems

to me by far the safest for the mass of the Expedition.

I think, from what I have been able to learn from the

engineers who were employed on the railway, that this could

be completed in two months—say by middle of July, if the

orders were now given for it.

In the same time, or less, steamers adapted to Nile trans

port could be built in this country and arrive at Semnch in

time to complete the number of boats required. ... As the

movement of the Flotilla cannot begin below the Second

Cataract prior to August 20th, the lighter draft boats built

in England would certainly be in time to supplement those

probably able to pass the cataract.

There can be but little doubt that had the Nile

Valley route, small boats and all, been adopted a

month earlier, and practically entered upon, it

would have been successful, although at the same

time the burden of proof, in the opinion of those who

NOT ON A FALLING NILE. '43

have carefully studied the information about the

Suakim and Berber route, and that by Massowah,

were relatively in their favour.

The adoption of the Nile route, even early in

August, if prompt measures had been taken to

despatch the Expedition, might still have been

successful. whole month, however, was lost in

constructing special boats for the Expedition.} This

delay was fatal to it.

It is interesting to mark here Gordon's opinion on

this point, as recorded in his journal on October 29th.

I am still of opinion, if the season was not so far advanced

and the Nile not on the fall, that the route up the Nile for a

covering force was a correct one—but it ought to havs been

undertaken in July with a rising Nile.

The three men caught to-day say the Expeditionary Force is

still at Debbeh, and I expect that is the truth, for the eight

steamers coming up the Nile is scarcely possible now, since the

Nile is falling.

The distance direct from Khartum to Debbeh is nearly

250 miles, and the Kabbabish are friendly, the road is not a bad

one. However I think Ambukol to Mutemma (could the

force know I had five steamers there) would be better, for it is

only 1 50 miles, and from Debbeh there is water transport.

Mcrawi to Berber is 150 miles with water transport to

Merawi. You have the map of the railway. When debouched

at Mutemma, split off one detachment to capture Berber and

another towards Khartum.

144

CHAPTER X.

THE correspondence from which \ve have quoted

so largely, between Lord Hartington and General

Stephenson, requires more than a passing notice, as

it supplies us with a key to the policy acted upon by

Her Majesty's Government, from the beginning to the

bitter end, with respect to General Gordon personally

and with respect to his mission towards the garrisons

of the Sudan, which they endangered as we have

already pointed out.

Although the grant 'of £300,000 was readily

obtained from Parliament for the objects named,

its application for their attainment was marked

by inexcusable delay. Lord Hartington told the

Committee, for example, that Her Majesty's Govern

ment were not yet convinced that General Gordon,

acting upon his instructions, might not be able to

withdraw the garrison and civil employes at

Khartum—and by implication—without any Expe

dition of British troops being despatched to aid him

in that withdrawal. They were, therefore, not ready

to sanction any movement of troops beyond the

southern frontiers of Egypt proper, for that purpose,

and only did so shortly afterwards to protect it from

the threatened advance of the Dervish rebels. Now

what further evidence did they require than they

PROPOSED HASTY RETREAT. MS

had to convince them that such an Expedition was

needed ?

, In March, when, as \ve have seen, the forces of the

Mahdi had seriously threatened Gordon's communi

cation with Berber, he had telegraphed the Govern

ment, that as the road from Suakim to it was elosed,

and from the growing strength of the besieging force,

leave had been given to Colonel Stewart and Mr.

Power to escape from the threatened fortress. The

despatches which we have quoted showed how despe

rate that condition had become. It is evident that

they shrank from leaving the gallant soldier alone,

and hoped that British aid would be sent to them in

their critical position. Gordon at last persuaded

them to go down the Nile and to explain verbally

the necessities of the case, hoping that they might

be listened to, although his statements and appeals

had been disregarded. We know the fate which

befell them. Before they left him he telegraphed

Sir E. Baring that, with the permission of Her

Majesty's Government understood, he proposed

to send the garrison of Khartum and the civil

employts by Colonel Stewart to Berber, and that

then he would seek personal safety by a flight to the

Equator, requesting an immediate answer because

the operation would even thert be a difficult, and

might soon be an impossible, one. The message

sent in reply to him—to conduct this retreat himself

—they had substantial grounds for believing had

never reached him, for Sir E. Baring informed them

on April 8th, that it was most unfortunate that of

all the telegrams he had sent to General Gordon

L


since March ioth, that is, three days earlier than the

one ordering the retreat to Berber, only one very

short one, of March 28th, had reached him.

This seems to have alarmed Her Majesty's

Government, and instead of taking immediate

measures then to open up communications and to

make some practical military demonstration on his

behalf, as British statesmen ought to have done, they

decided to send the beleaguered hero the message

of April 23rd. Why did he stay there? they asked.

Because, as Gordon had previously replied, " I cannot

get away or carry out my obligations to the people

of Khartum without your aid ! " Then followed the

additional message of May 17th. Nine days later

Berber fell, and Gordon was entirely isolated, help

less, and in deadly danger of perishing.

On March 8th, it is true, he had told them he had

eight months' provisions, and that when the Nile

rose, his position, from a military point of view,

would be strengthened, as we have already explained

it would. These provisions would be exhausted, or

nearly so, and they had no right to come to any

conelusion—and yet they did not yet feel convinced

but that Gordon might be able to fight his way

down to Berber. The flooded river which would

have enabled Gordon single-handed to have held

Khartum, would also have facilitated the pushing up

of a force ready to help him, but this was not done,

for Her Majesty's Government was not yet con

vinced by all they had learned, as we have seen, of

his being in such danger as to require it. They

must forgive us if we err in charging them with the

NOT YET DECIDED. 147

facts before us—that they were not willing to be

convinced—on the principle of the old adage :—

" Convince a man against his will,

He's of the same opinion still."

Even on September 17th we find them still in this

frame of mind, for on that date in a telegram to Lord

Wolseley, who had then assumed the command of

our Army in Egypt, they said that while complying

with his requisition for additional troops, they must

at the same time remind him that no decision had

as yet been arrived at to send any portion of the

force under his command beyond Dongola, but that

they recognised the fact that to put him in a position

to undertake such a military operation would pro

bably do more than anything else to render such

an operation unnecessary.

And then we have the last sentence of this

despatch to guide us in criticising, as we shall soon

do, Lord Wolseley's conduct of the Expedition sent

for the relief of Khartum and the rescue of Gordon,

which was as follows :—

You are fully aware of the views of Her Majesty's Govern-

tnent on this subject, and know how adverse they are to under

take any warlike expedition not called for by absolute necessity I

Not called for, indeed, by absolute necessity ?

Was not Khartum so elosely hemmed in as to be

cut off from all communication with the outside?

Had not Her Majesty's Government informed its

heroic defender that he was not to abandon the

place without orders ? Was there not enough in all

this to call for an immediate effort by force of arms,

L 2


to hurry to his relief? Patriotism, humanity, and

British honour called for such a movement—and yet

it was delayed until, as \ve know, it was too late to

be effective.

• That Lord Wolseley should have undertaken the

command of the Expedition under such restrictions

seems unaccountable. We will not attempt to

explain it, but let our readers form their own con

elusions on this delicate subject.

Lord Wolseley seems certainly to have allowed

himself to be handicapped not only by his under

standing with the Government, but also by his

instructions, which were drawn up by himself, at

Cairo, with Lord Northbrook and Sir E. Baring.

We ask our readers if they know of any page in

British history which records such treatment of a

brave and gallant officer as that meted out to General

Gordon by the Government which had sent him on a

dangerous and hazardous mission, and who, by their

delay in affording him the protection he elaimed at

their hands, virtually abandoned him to his fate?

Gordon himself cites the case of Uriah, the Hittite,

in Jewish history, as a parallel one ; adding that,

however, there was an Eve in it. In that of the

Gladstone Cabinet the Eve was either place and

power and parliamentary necessities, or incom

petency ! Our limits prevent us illustrating this by

a reference to the defence made by the Cabinet in

Parliament of their conduct in this matter when it

was called in question. No patriot can read the

excuses and evasions—if not something more dis

creditable—in that defence without feelings of shame

INCORRECTLY ACCOUNTED FOR. 149

and fear for the future of Constitutional Govern

ment conducted as now on Party lines.

Returning from this digression again to the

correspondence of Lord Hartington—which ended

on August 26th, when General Stephenson was

superseded in his command by Lord Wolseley—

we find the former referring to it in Parliament on

November 13th, when submitting the Supplementary

Estimates for the Sudan Expedition, as follows:—

It appeared to Her Majesty's Government that while the

officers in Egypt were prepared to place a considerable force

at Dongola, and one larger than they thought necessary—

relying on steamboats, &c., for the means of transport, they

had not formed in their own mind and did not appear to be

able to so, any definite plan of operations by which, in the

event of necessity occurring, that force could be successfully

transported beyond Dongola as far as Khartum, should that

be requisite . . . and that, therefore, that it would both in

justice to the officers who had recommended the operation

(i.e., by small boats), and to those on the spot who felt a doubt

as to the practicability of carrying out the operation, and also

in the success that the responsibility for its execution might

be placed in the hands of the officer who had been principally

concerned in recommending it, and felt perfectly confident of

its success on carrying it out.

Lord Hartington is not quite correct in stating

that the officers on the spot had been unable to form

a plan for taking a force to Khartum, because they

had reported chiefly against the small-boat plan of

transport up the Nile. General Stephenson had,

however, formed and submitted a plan to get the

larger force to Khartum by the Suakim-Berber

route, and had forcibly urged it on the attention of


the Goverment as swifter, safer and more certain

than that which was then being pressed for their

acceptance by officers who were not on the spot.

Again, with respect to the inability or the failure

of these " officers on the spot " to form any definite

plan for moving a force beyond Dongola to Khar

tum, it is important to call attention to the fact

that neither in August had the officers in London—

in their plan—gone beyond that of transporting it

by water all the way to Shendy. In fact, Lord

Hartington himself, on the occasion, referring to the

fact of Lord Wolseley's intention of concentrating

a force of 2,ooo men at Debbch, stated that if the

position of Gordon became so critical as to demand

such an operation, part of that force might be sent

direct to Khartum !

Now we find that Lord Wolseley first proposed

this to Her Majesty's Government in his despatch

from Cairo, on September nth, in which he made

the requisition for reinforcements already alluded to.

It was on that occasion he suggested the formation

of a Camel Corps, for the very purpose of making

such a dash across the desert.

General Stephenson had, as will be seen in his

report, given a very strong opinion against reliance

being placed on small boats as a means for trans

porting a force to Khartum, and, in fact, against

the route of the Nile Valley ; and every one of his

objections, excepting as to the practicability of taking

them up the Second and Third Cataracts, was fully

justified by Lord Wolscley's subsequent and sad

experience.

A DOUHTFUI. TRIUMPH. >5I

General Stephenson had also stated—and his

statement was confirmed by Colonel Kitchener from

Debbch—that camels were plentiful both there and

at Merawi. Some such movement as that proposed

by Lord Wolscley direct to Khartum must have

occurred to the Colonel when he telegraphed :—

"Send up your troops, etc., and one fight near

Khartum will settle the whole business ! " It is

not at all unlikely that the suggestion of the " flying

column," proposed in the despatch referred to, came

from the same officer, for he was connected with

the Army Intelligence Department. Atany rate.it

is evident that the dispute between the War Office

and the officers in Egypt turned upon the proposed

water-transport all the way to Shendy or Khartum,

and the former, being at hand, triumphed. In fact,

Lord Ilartington admits it was too difficult to

negotiate plans with officers to be satisfactory—as

this had to be done by telegraph !

Lord Wolscley's plan had, however, been in pro

cess of elaboration since April 8th, and was now,

with the exception mentioned about the Camel

Corps, ready for adoption, even when Lord Harting-

ton asked General Stephenson, on August nth,

what he could do, with the means at his command,

to push a force up to Dongola. Colonel Colvile's

book gives us all the details of this plan, and they

certainly showed the skill of an able Adjutant-

General. It, however, entirely failed in its object.

Time was a question of great importance, and when

it was adopted by the Government, it was too late

for it to be carried out successfully. Had it been,


however, prepared for two months earlier, or even a

month sooner, as already admitted, there was every

chance of its success. It, however, should never have

been adopted by Her Majesty's Government in

preference to the Suakim route, or even to that by

Massowah, as we shall presently try to prove. The

main argument in its favour, used by its originators,'

was the success of the Red River Expedition. That

Expedition comprised a force of 1,141 men, two-

thirds of which were Canadian Militia. In order to

move them up the Red River, no less than 400 native

boatmen—the very best in the world—were nearly

all utilized, and, as an officer with the Expedition

stated, without them the Expedition would never have

reached its destination.* The obstructions in the

way of navigation which the Red River Expedition

had to overcome cannot fairly be compared with

those which had to be encountered in the proposed

one up the Nile, because the latter were, in various

respects, much more serious. This will appear when

the number of the constituents of both Expeditions

are considered, and the length of the line of advance.

In fine, the success of this Canadian Expedition

was not a safe argument in favour of the proposed

one in Egypt, for in the latter case there were a

* Captain Huyshe, of the Rifle Brigade, which formed part of the

Red Rivet force, in a lecture before the Royal United Service

Institution on this Expedition, remarked on Ibis point as follows :—

" A proportion of these voyagcurs were 1 Iroquois Indians,' who were

found splendid fellows, and without whom, it is not too much to say,

the Expedition would never have reached its destination." (Journal

R.U.S. Institution, vol. xv., p. 73.)

SUCH A CONFUSING MEDLEY.

greater number of possible contingencies, and of such

a nature that all of them could not be provided

against beforehand.

The scheme, however, as proposed by Lord

Wolscley, was a novel and attractive one, to which

his prestige evidently gave weight. It would have,

however, been well, not only for that prestige, but also

for Gordon and Khartum—as its failure demon

strated—that no Expedition up the Red River had

taken place.

Then the equipment of the force to be employed in

it was to differ from that of any previous British

Army that had been sent into the field. For example,

two regiments of cavalry, a detachment of marines,

a part of the infantry and its bearer company and

transport corps, were to ride to battle mounted on

camels ! The bulk of the infantry were to make

their way to the final rendezvous by paddling them

selves and their rations against the current of a river,

the navigation of which was seriously interrupted by

rocks !

This medley of forces and variety of transport made

sad confusion in the supply of the stores required

in the service, because the usual routine regulations

affecting their provision and distribution could not

now be easily applied in such a campaign in which

transport was difficult, scarce, and tedious. Even

the main base—Wady-Halfa—was, in point of

time, farther from Alexandria than India was from

England.

In fact, the plan, as a whole, was too large under the

circumstances to be easily carried out—too complex

IS4 WHY GORDON PERISHED.

to be compact. What a contrast in all these respects

would have been General Stephenson's brigade of

small arms !

A commanding officer, when \ve marched out from

Jakdul, on Mutemma, on January 14th, 1885—when

discussing the mixture up in the column of cavalry

on horse and on camel-back, and of sailors, marines,

and infantry, remarked to me—" A little ofeverything,

they say, makes a good salad—but a little of each

corps of the Army will not make a good fighting

column ! " Our experiences, both at Abu-Klea and

Mutemma, proved he was right. In one case we

came near a disaster, and in the next failed, as a

consequence, lo capture a village.

Let us now compare Lord YVolseley's accepted

plan for an Expedition to relieve Khartum in

August, so far as routes are concerned, with those

by Massowah and Suakim.

Lord Wolseley, in his report on the various routes

when dealing with that by Massowah, compares it

as a base of operations with Wady-Halfa. In doing

so he gives, as we have noticed, their respective

distances from Berber. The former as a sea- port

was, however, nearer to the object of the proposed

Expedition than Wady-Halfa—inasmuch as the

latter was about nine hundred miles from the sea

at Alexandria—or, as stated, in point of time, farther

from England than was India, so far as transport

was concerned.

There are also substantial grounds for questioning

the accuracy of Lord Wolseley's statements re

specting the time it would take for a column to

AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE. 1 55

march from Massowah to Gos-Regeb. He caleulated

that it would require seven weeks to cover this

distance of four hundred miles. This would limit

the marching of the force—leaving out Sundays—

to nine and a half miles per day, when at least

fifteen miles could easily have been done, thus making

the time of traversing the distance between these

points within four weeks.

He places the objective of the proposed Ex

pedition at Berber—200 miles below Khartum—

when Shendy, where he proposed to concentrate

his force, was less than half that distance. Now,

Shendy is about 145 miles from Gos-Rcgeb, and

Halfiyeh—immediately below Khartum—is less than

100 miles from that position on the " Atbara."

And then, again, the junction of the Rahat with

the Blue Nile, only a short distance below Sennar

on the latter, is only 195 miles from Kassala, and

could be reached by a road plentifully supplied

with water.

The fact must also be taken into account—which

was not done by Lord Wolscley in his report, probably

because of the interest he felt in his proposal about

the Nile Valley—that at Kassala and Scnnar there

were garrisons to be relieved as well as at Khartum,

and that the forces of the Mahdi were along the

left bank of the Nile. Referring to the fallacious

hope, as it turned out to be—entertained by Her

Majesty's Government and shared with them by Lord

Wolseley, and probably at first mooted to them by

himself—that when the Mahdi learned that a large

British Army had reached Dongola, he would raise


the siege of Khartum and withdraw to El-Obeid, or

elsewhere up the White Nile.

Then, again, owing to these garrisons at Kassala

and Sennar holding out, there was the additional

reason that no opposing formidable force would have

been encountered in its approach to Khartum by

this route.

When the force at Kassala learned that Tokar had

been relieved, they sent a touching message to

Gordon on March 28th, expressing the hope that

the same service would be rendered to them. In a

message dated a day later they sent him this addi

tional message :—

The road from Massowah to Sanheit, and from thence to

Beni-Amcr, being safe, and communications are free through

it, and the telegraph lines are in good working order through

them ; if, therefore, reinforcements come by this route there is

no danger.

Lord Wolscley also takes exception to this route,

because

Ranges of hills have to be crossed before Kassala is reached,

and the spurs of the Abyssinian Mountains, which present

serious difficulties. Now, neither these hills nor these

mountain spurs prevented an Italian force from marching

on this town, and why, then, should it have prevented a British

force from attempting to do likewise ?

Mr. William James, brothcrof the late W. L. James *

who visited the Eastern Soudan in 1883, has kindly

sent the author the following description of a part of

this route based upon his own observation :—

* ^Author of «' The Wild Tribes of the Soudan."

KOROSKO AND I5ER!IER ROUTES. 157

With regard to the various routes adopted, I can, of course,

only speak with any authority on those which I have myself

traversed—from Cairo to Herber by the river, and also across

the Korosko desert and from Massowah to Berber vid Kassala.

As I said to you in my former letter, the Italians have

proved the practicability of marching from Massowah to

Kassala. This route is, for the Soudan, well watered, healthy,

and teeming with flocks and herds.

From Kassala to Gos-Regeb, and down the Atbara to

Berber, the road is level ; water, of course, in abundance, but

not so large a number of cattle and sheep.

From Kassala to Khartum I can say nothing from personal

experience ; but from what I was able to ascertain I believe it

would be practicable for a small force, and their march probably

could have been made in somewhat the same way as the

march across from Korti to Mutemma was made.

Although not relevant to the point under con

sideration, \ve quote from Mr. James' letter the

following expression of opinion about the Korosko

route and Herber, because it has some bearing on

Sir Evelyn Wood's suggestion when the relief of that

town was under consideration :—

Had an earlier start been made, Berber could have been

held, vid the Suakim road, and a camel corps could have

traversed the Korosko desert to co-operate. The camel corps

now stationed at Wady-Halfa has, on several occasions,

already traversed this desert till almost in sight of Abu-

Hamed.

Her Majesty's Government does not appear to

have taken this route into consideration, although

Mr. James and others, ineluding the late Sir Samuel

Baker, had called their earnest attention to it. Had

they been seriously bent upon the relief of the two

important garrisons mentioned, an effort might have

WHY GORDON PEIUSHED.

been made by it to relieve them. That it was

important to have done so, so far as Khartum was

concerned, will appear from the fact that Sennar,

upon which Gordon chiefly depended for his supplies

of grain and cattle, was cut off when Berber fell

at the end of May. He did, however, manage by

his steamers to capture large quantities of grain on

its way thence to the army of the Mahdi.

No doubt, acting upon the advice of the military

authorities in London, and being restrained by the

policy communicated to the Powers in diplomatic

correspondence, as Earl Granville, as we have seen,

so often referred to it when Gordon asked for help—

and more especially as it was defined in Parliament,

all the garrisons of the Sudan but Khartum were

deliberately abandoned to the cruel mercy of the

Dervishes. Hence this Massowah route was not

at all taken into account by them.

•59

CHAITER XI.

THE Suakim-Berber route was, however, seriously

taken into consideration, and Her Majesty's Govern

ment were primarily advised with respect to it by

Lord Wolseley, although General Stephenson had

subsequently reported favourably upon the facility

or otherwise which it presented as a route for the

intended Expedition. The error they made in not

adopting it may be traced to the same cause as

led to the adoption of the Nile Valley by small

row-boats route, to the greater influence of the

officers who knew nothing personally about that

route—but urged it upon hypothetical grounds—and

against the opinion of the officers on the spot.

It is, therefore, important for us to point out the

utter fallacy of the objections raised to the Suakim-

Berber route by Lord Wolseley in the extract we

have given from his report of April 8th, and to

which he evidently adhered, as may be inferred

from references made to them in the official history

of the " Sudan Expedition," when it was written.

The objections to this route were that, from the

scarcity of water along it, and the hostility of the

adjacent Muluke tribes, it would be impossible to

send across it the force which he deemed necessary

lOO WHY CORDON rERISHED.

for the proposed Expedition for the relief of

Khartum.

We have also the objections made to this route by

General Sir William Butler, which were summarily

as follows :— i, That the route has many mountains ;

2, That these passes are from 3,000 to 4,000 feet

above the sea level ; and 3, That for distances of

eighty miles there is not a drop of water.*

To these " a priori " objections we must add those

which are made to an advance of a relieving column

in the official War Office book on the Sudan

Campaign.f after Berber had fallen. They are

stated in a footnote to the following paragraph:—

On May 261I1 the town surrendered, after a feeble resistance,

thus cutting off Khartum completely from the world, and

taking away the main reason for an advance along the

Suakim-Berber road,

The footnote comment on this is as follows :—

It may be assumed that, after the fall of Berber, the

r conditions of a march from Suakiin to that place would have

been similar to those of the march from Korti to Mutemma,

with |these differences, that the whole distance between

Suakim and Berber would have been longer ; that the distance

from O-Bak, the last well on the road, to the river at Berber,

was fifty-eight miles, against twenty-four miles from Abu-Klea

Wells to Mutemma ; while the O-Bak Wells are small and

bad, those at Abu-Klea are relatively large and good ; that

Jierber is ninety-five miles further from Khartum than

Mutemma ; that a difficult range of hills about 4,000 feet

in height has to be traversed, the known passes through

* Gordon'! " Men of Action," p. 222.

t " History of the Sudan Campaign," Part I., pages 25 and 26.

FROM SUAKIM TO BERBER. l6l

which are 2,700 feet above sea level, and finally that, owing to

the time the march would have taken, and to the fact that the

concentration of a force at Suakim could only have one

objective—tl)c operation could not have partaken of the nature

of a surprise, and that, not being menaced from any other

points, the Mahdi could have concentrated.

The following statements from persons actually

acquainted with this route either fully contravert

the objections thus advanced against the Suakim-

Bcrber road, or so favourably modify them as to

reduce to a minimum the difficulties in the way of an

advance of British troops on Berber by this route.

We quote first from a paper read before the

Geographical Society at Manchester, by Colonel,

then Major, C. W. Watson, R.E., in which he gives

information about this route—based upon a survey

made of it by himself, in 1874—the report of which

is ineluded with the paper in the bound volume of

the Society's Journals for 1SS7.

The route from Suakim to Berber, he then stated, was 270

miles long, and along it were Nine Wells, at no very unequal

distances apart. 1'he highest point of the road is at Odios,

eighty-three miles from Suakim, where the track passes over

the hill at an altitude of rather more than 3,000 feet. In this

section of the route the steepest average gradient seems to be

not more than one in sixty. From Odios to Berber—distance

of 187 miles—there, is a fairly gradual fall of 1,800 feet to the

Nile.

The Suakim-Berber route is not a desert road like that be

tween Abu-Hamed and Korosko. There is water every day on

the march, and if proper wells were dug, there would be a

large supply. The climate is good ; there are quantities of

cattle, sheep, and goats, and everywhere there is plenty for the

camels to eat.

M

1 62 WHY GORDON PERISHED.

To insist, as some do, that this is an impracticable road, as

omc do, I would ask, " How, then, do they explain that 9,500

Egyptian soldiers* were sent over it without difficulty in the

months of December, 1882, and January, 1883 ?"

Another paper, by Mr. A. 13. Wylde, merchant, of

Suakim and Jeddah, was read at the same time, in

his absence, by Mr. Yates, barrister-at-law, from

which \ve make the follow ing quotations :—

The water question on routes is also one of great interest to

commercial people, and, as far as my experience since 1874-5

extends, there is absolutely no water difficulty, nor ever has

been, in the Suakiin-Bcrber route. There is ample supply from

Suakim to Ariab, and even in the warmest of summer weather,

with the heaviest loads, in the sections between Ariab and

O-Ilak, and O-Bak and Mohebe, say in round figures about fifty

miles each, a quick half section was done. The same was done

on the other side Mohebe.t From Mohebe to Berber is about

eight miles. In winter this need not be done, as camels can

go through without watering. These sections might be

improved, as it is only a question of sinking wells.

There is one bad piece of road—namely, the moving dunes

of O-Bak, hillocks of soft sand, the surface of which is

constantly changing with the northerly and southerly winds.

The wells at O-liak are bad and over 80 feet deep—the water

bitter, and not in large quantities during the summer. The

sand dunes, however, can be got round by proceeding north

and turning them. Thus a longer and better road, and that

water nvght be found on it, and wells sunk is a certainty. . .

At Mohebe and Ariab water is plentiful. Taking the difference

of heights at 650 feet between the two roads of this section,

* " These hens," as Gordon called them, probably because of their

lack both of courage and of endurance.

t In his report of 1874 Colonel Watson states that at Mohebe there

ti a good supply of water.

THE SHORTEST CUT TO KHARTUM. 163

and that tlie slope is a gradual one, water ought to be found,

and at no great depths.

The question of wheel traffic I settled during General Hicks'

Expedition, when Krupp guns with six mules were wheeled

over the desert to Berber in fourteen days.

Mr. Wylde, in this paper, as well as Colonel

Watson in his, compared the Nile route to Berber

and that by Suakim as follows :—

Products leaving Manchester, vid Suez Canal, arrived at

Suakim as soon"as products from it could be put at Assiout, and

at a considerably lower cost.

Then from Assiout it had to be transhipped from the rail

road to Nile craft, then the time expended on the voyage to

Korosko against stream, and then the very difficult and

waterless track from thence across the desert, with the exception

of the Murad Wells, to Abu-Hamed and thence to Berber—a

longer and more expensive route than the perfectly easy route

from Suakim to Berber. . . . Part of the Government

ivory sold at Khartum to private firms and shipped vid

Berber and Suakim, arrived in London in less than six weeks

from Khartum, and were sold six months before the

Government ivory, vid the Nile, arrived there.

These statements made upon unquestionable

authority, are a sufficient reply to both Lord

Wolseley's and General Butler's objections against

the Suakim-Bcrber route. The former, however,

recognises the fact that by sinking wells the water

difficulty might be overcome—but that this would

require time and would be difficult to arrange for—

but not so much time as the preparation for the

small-boat expedition required to get it fairly under

way, as will be shown.

We come now to the footnote quoted from the

M 2


official account of the Sudan Expedition, compiled

in the Intelligence Division of the War Office, and

in the preface of w hich it is stated that the original

manuscript had been "subjected to much revision,

consequent upon suggestions of the various Officers

and Departments to whom the proofs were referred."

There can be but little doubt, we presume, there

fore, as to the personality of the suggestion of this

footnote, although the Editor of the book can only

be held responsible for it.

The note deals with Wady-Halfa and Suakim as

bases of equal value for an advance on Khartum,

just as Lord Wolseley, as we have seen, dealt with

the latter and Wady-Halfa. In this case as in that,

such a comparison is not a fair one. The accom

panying diagram will aid us in apprehending the

difference between them in this respect.

As will be noticed—the distance from Alexandria

—the sea base of the Nile route is 1,876 miles

from Khartum and 860 miles from its main base

at Wady-Halfa.

In favourable contrast we have Suakim, the sea

base of the route via Berber to Khartum ; distant

from it but 457 miles. Then, again, as regards the

important question of concentrating a force at the

main base of operations, the superiority of Suakim

over Wady-Halfa is obvious, for it was only four-

and-a-half days distant from Cairo and within three

weeks ordinary steaming from England, while the

former, 903 miles up the Nile, required nearly a

month to reach.

Let us now follow Colonel Colvile's comparison

DIAGRAM

Of Comparative Distances of Four of tkt Koults from the

SEA TO KHARTUM,

Submitted to Her Majesty's Government for consideration in 1SS4.

Miles.

;ooo

1900

1800

I1-00

1600

1500

1400

1300

1200

II '00

I1000

I900

800

I700

Coo

Scale.—150 miles to 1 inch.

500 jKhartum

J00

Khartum

Berber

Abu-Hamed

Korosko

300

200

ijoo

Berber

Assiout

Khartum

Mutemma

Assiout

Khartum

LJerber

Mi'cs.

2000

I90O

1800

17 loo

16

Abu-Hamed

1500

1A0

Klorti

\

12

II

00

00

00

10 00

|VVady-Halfa 900

8

Assouan

[Assiout .

Cairo

00

00

600

00

400

300

2 00

100

Alexandria

Overland— Railway =

WHY GORDON l'ERISHED.

of the Suakim-Berber route with that across the

Bayuda Desert from Korti to Mutemma — taking

for example the first 100 miles from the former

position on the Nile to Jakdul.

The first source of supply upon which any

dependence could be placed for a column was at

El-Howeiyat, fifty-two miles distant from the Nile

at Korti. The wells here are pits sunk in the soil

and supplied with water by percolation from the

surrounding strata. My own personal experience,

when accompanying Colonel Stanley Clarke's

convoy which left Korti for Jakdul, of the supply

here was as follows.

We reached these wells at sunset after two long

marches, but, although the men worked hard all

through the night, they only succeeded in completing

the watering of the convoy at seven o'elock next

morning. We had then so drained them that when

General Stewart's column, which had left Korti on

the 8th, reached these wells a few hours after we had

left them, the men had, on account of the want of

water in them, to push on nine miles further to

Aboo-Halfa to quench their thirst.

At Jakdul, 100 miles from Korti, there was an

abundant supply of water in rock cisterns, but no

other until Abu-Klea, fifty-two miles distant, was

reached.

We marched out from Jakdul on January 14, but

had to fight our way there and did not reach the'

Nile until the lSth.

The supply of these wells was then so insufficent

that General Stewart was detained until nearly 4 p.m.

THE WATER-SUPPLY DISCUSSE1X 167

before he could march on Mutemma, which we did

that night, coining in sight of the Nile at daylight

next morning. Mere we had another fight with the

Arabs, and did not reach the river until the afternoon

of the 20th, that is excepting the men who fought

their way there on the 19th.

It will be seen from the statements we have quoted

about the Suakim-Berber route, that as far as Ariab,

to ,140 miles distant from its base, there was water to

be had daily, and that the supply was abundant

at tlns point.

The wells at O-Bak were, as was always supposed,

brackish, and contained but little water in summer,

and, like Jacob's well, were very deep. Although the

liquid was hardly suited for bipeds, quadrupeds

enjoyed it. Mr. Wylde] however states that, by a

short detour, better water and more of it could easily

be obtained.

Colonel Colvile then states the distance from

O-Bak to the Nile at Berber as being fifty-eight

miles, but, as wc have seen, an abundant supply of

water was to be had eight miles from Berber, at

Mohebe.

We do not question the emphasis the Colonel

lays upon the importance of the post we occupied at

Abu-Klea, but to his observation about its not being

so valuable as affording a feasible line of march for a.

surprise, and about the length of time to make an

advance on Berber, which would give the Mahdi

time to concentrate a large force to meet the advanc

ing column before it could reach its objective, we

will reply by venturing the opinion that such an

1 68 WHY GORDON PliRlSHED.

operation would very much depend upon the genius

and dash of the general commanding.

We would also call his attention to the misuse made

of the Bahuda Desert road, which he represents as

being more favourably adapted for such an operation,

by Lord Wolseley when he had resolved to occupy

Mutemma. Instead of pushing General Stewart's

column directly across it, as we shall see more par

ticularly further on, he sent it first to Jakdul, to

establish a post there, and then allowed nearly a

fortnight to elapse after this had been done before

he pushed it on beyond Jakdul, 76 miles further to

Mutemma. Now Jakdul and Mutemma were only

100 miles distant from the Mahdi and his army,

and the consequences were the battles of Abu-Klea

and El Gubat, the capture of Omdurman, and the

fall of Khartum.

Now Berber was 200 miles below the Mahdi's

army, the mass of which was concentrated on the

left bank of the Nile, and it was only held by a

comparatively small force of Dervishes, such troops

as we had fought at Abu-Klea, when our square of

some 1400 men defeated 10,000 of them.

Colonel Colvile, when he wrote this lame and

impotent conelusion, had before him Lord Wolscley's

despatch to Lord Hartington after the fall of

Khartum, in which he describes how easily he could

have relieved Khartum by an advance on the right

bank of the Nile, because the Mahdi was on the

other side of an unfordable river !

This attempt of Colonel Colvile to depreciate the

Suakim-Berber route, and defend that up the Nile,

BUAVERY, DASH, AND STEADINESS. 169

by pleading in the abstract a canon in military

tactics, was not the only instance of its kind, for

many others occurred during the debate between the

officers on the spot and the officers of the Horse

Guards on the question of routes for an Expedition

to relieve Khartum if it should become necessary.

During the course of the Expedition, this tendency

to move by " rule " was often manifested, and once,

as we ventured to point out at Mutemma on January

2 1 st., in our detailed history of the Expedition.

The bravery, dash, and steadiness of our soldiers,

and the often inferiority of their commanders, in

tactics, according to his views of the matter, led

Napoleon to describe our Army as one of lions com

manded by a quadruped vastly inferior. And from his .

personal experience of it he was substantially right.

When they are ordered, and however dangerous the

service or the movements which they are directed

to carry out, they go to victory or death as the gallant

Six Hundred did at Balaelava. And no officer in

the latter respect bears personally a brighter record

in all that is worthy of the best traditions of our

soldiers that does Lord Wolseley himself.

Yet, in the discussion that took place about the

occupation of Berber, early in 1884, by General

Graham, and in the refusal to send 200 soldiers

to Wady-Halfa at Gordon's request, based ostensibly

on military as well as elimatic dangers, a strange

and discouraging timidity and nervousness is mani

fested on the part of those at the head of our

Army. Perhaps Her Majesty's Government were

chiefly responsible for all this, for they seemed


rather pleased than otherwise that it should be as

these high military authorities suggested, because of

its enabling them to keep within the lines of their

policy. They were not willing, in the language of

one of their supporters in Parliament, to risk a

corporal's guard at first to rescue the Egyptian

garrisons in the Sudan. This want of courage to

do the proper thing, at the proper time, led them

further on to an excess of expenditure both of

treasure and of life which might have otherwise

been avoided. It was so specially in the case of

Berber, for if Her Majesty's Government had

listened to General Graham's report and heard

Gordon's appeal for its occupation, there would

have been no necessity for the advice and counten

ance of the military authorities they had consulted.

We come now to consider the route decided upon

for the Expedition for the relief of Gordon, and will

confine ourselves now to only a few general remarks—

intending to deal more particularly with it when re

ferring to its course and final and fatal issue.

The plan of transport by small-boats up the Nile

of a force to relieve Khartum was in itself, under

certain conditions, a feasible one if Debbeh, or even

Merawi, had been its ultimate objective. With one

beyond that it was not so, for no one, not even the

Red River men themselves, knew anything of the

difficulties which the broken water of the Fourth and

Fifth Cataracts might interpose. Those of the Second

and Third had been carefully examined and were

therefore known—and that there was an open reach

of the river up to Merawi.

MIGHT YET HAVE SUCCEEDED. 171

Colonel Colvile, in the official account of the Ex

pedition, loses no opportunity of saying a good word

for his Chiefs plan of operations, and in some cases

seems to have carefully refrained from introducing

into his pages anything per contra. In one instance

he cites Gordon as a witness in its favour, by stating

that, after Berber fell, he advocated the Nile route.

We admit he did, but, as the entries in his journal

show, Gordon never dreamed of Lord Wolseley

advancing a force all the way by water for his relief,

nor did he know anything about the small row-boats.

In all the entries referred to, and in the last messages

received from him by Lord Wolseley, he indicates

the impression that Debbeh or Ambukol would be

the objective of the Expedition up the Nile for his

relief.

In bringing our remarks to a elose on the adoption

of the Nile route for an Expedition, we have

admitted that, if Her Majesty's Government had

accepted Lord Wolseley's plan for it a month or six

weeks earlier than "they did, there was a fair

probability of its success, and that, if the 250

boats which were available at our Dockyards

and from ships in reserve had been utilized, instead

of waiting till others could be specially constructed

for the purpose—there would have even then been a

chance of its success. It was also a cause of serious

delay, curtailing General Stephenson's operations to

the extent mentioned in sending up troops and stores

above the Second and Third Cataracts by steamers

and native craft while the Nile was high. Had this

been done, the small boats, lightened of the greater


part of their subsequent cargoes, would have made

more rapid progress up the river. They took

subsequently six weeks to reach Korti, while General

Stephenson sent up the Royal Surrey Regiment in

thirteen days from Wady-Halfa to Dongola.

Then, again, the greater part of the stoics might

have been carried past these cataracts on the camels

used by the Camel Corps. To a large extent such a

mode of relief, in principle, was followed by Lord

Wolseley in the Red River Expedition with success,

and some such method of aiding the advance of

the Expeditionary Force at the late season when it

was despatched ought to have been adopted.

It was also a serious mistake to have missed the

high Nile in September ; but these Red River men,

in their enthusiasm, assured Her Majesty's Govern

ment that small boats could do the work demanded,

whatever might be the state of the river.

Colonel Colvile, in defence of the river route,

states that, after the fall of Berber, Gordon was in

favour of it, but not, as the entry we have quoted from

his journal indicates, in the way Lord Wolseley

proposed to advance by it for his relief. He never

supposed that it would be by small boats all the way

up to Berber before it joined hands with him. On

October 6th for example, when he had heard that

three steamers had reached Debbeh, he made these

remarks in an entry in his journal :—

In reality, with a well-equipped force, Debbeh is not more

than eight days from Khartum at the outside. Saying that

150 miles were made in six days and a half, which for camels

is twenty-five miles a day—very easy marching—while from

A WONDERFUL CONFIDENCE. 173

Mutemma to tliis is 100 miles (when I say Debbeh, I mean

Ambukol, to which place from Debbeh you have the open

river). The appearance of one British soldier or officer here

settles the question of relief, v/W-t'/j the townsmen, for then

they know 1 have not told lies.

When General Gordon had learned that Lord

Wolseley had been sent out as Commander of the

Expedition for the relief of Khartum, and probably

learned something about the plan of operations he

had adopted, he made the following entry in his'

journal in November.

If Lord Wolseley did say he hoped to relieve Khartum

before many months, he mu«t have a wonderful confidence in

our power of endurance, considering that when he is said to

have made this utterance we had been blockaded for six and

a half months, and arc now in our ninth month I

General Gordon here suggests the rock upon which

Lord Wolseley, in concert with Her Majesty's Govern

ment, wrecked the Nile Expedition and brought

about the disaster at Khartum, as will be made

evident by his conduct of the Expedition, to which we

will now proceed to call the attention of our readers.

«74

CHAPTER XII.

ON July 24th Lord Wolscley wrote to Her

Majesty's Government that he thought no time

should be lost in pushing up a small brigade of

between three or four thousand troops to Dongola,

for that such a force might probably end the whole

business, adding :—

Hut you must know lime presses. I believe such a force

could be sent from England, and reach Dongola on Octo

ber 15th, if the Government be in earnest and act at once.

Remember we cannot command things, but all the gold in

England will not affect the rise and fall of the Nile, or the

duration of the hot and cold seasons in Egypt. Time is an

important clement in the question, and indeed it will be an

indelible disgrace if wc allow the most generous, patriotic, and

gallant of our public servants to die of want or fall into the

hands of a cruel enemy, because we would not hold our hands

to save him.

Lord Wolseley had thus given utterance to the

prevailing public feeling at the time, and it must

ever be, not only to himself, but to the nation at

large, a matter of profound regret that Her Majesty's

Government yielded so slowly to this urgent appeal

and remonstrance on behalf of General Gordon.

And yet, in face of this urgent appeal, Lord

Wolseley, as we have seen, urged upon the Govern

ment the adoption of a route for an Expedition for

WAITING FOR THE "WHALERS.". 175

Gordon's relief in apparent contradiction to that

part of his remonstrance which called attention to

time being an important element in the question,

and the rise and fall of the Nile.

How Lord Wolseley, in view of his subsequent

correspondence with the Government, in which the

employment of small boats was urged as an absolute

necessity, could have expected that by their use a

brigade of the strength he mentions could be sent

up to Dongola by October does not appear.

Iler Majesty's Government did, however, so far

respond to Lord Wolseley's advice about sending a

force to Dongola in September ; but not, as we have

seen, with the object of any immediate effort on

Gordon's behalf, but only.to prevent the insurrection

affecting Egypt proper. This was accomplished in

September by General Stephenson, by sending up

the Royal Sussex Regiment in native craft, with

three months' supplies, from Sarras to Dongola in

thirteen days. The operations in this direction

were, however, arrested, and everything placed at a

standstill until the small boats were sent out to

Wady-Halfa*

Lord Ilartington, as will be remembered, informed

him on August 8th that amongst the measures which

Her Majesty's Government were then prepared to

sanction, was to obtain from the Admiralty and

from other sources a supply of small boats capable

of being employed in the transport of troops and

* With reference to the despatch of these troops to Dongola, Colonel

Colvile only states they were sent in " nuggars," with no mention of

the short time in which the operation was carried out


supplies beyond the point at which ordinary means

of transport would be available.

Sir Redvers Buller, with General McNeill and

Colonel Butler, in their report in favour of the

employment of small boats, deelared that in their

opinion the question of the relief of Khartum

resolved itself into this :—

Is it possible to procure and place on the Nile at Sarras

500 boats by the 5th of October ? adding : Surely this

should be possible. The Admiralty would undertake to convey

the boats and stores required as far as the foot of the Second

Cataract. If this is done by the date specified above, we

believe that the further advance of the brigade to Dongola is

a matter of detail well within the power of the military

authorities.

The Admiralty agreed to take charge of the dis

embarkation of the boats and stores at Alexandria,

and suggested that use should be made of the boats

belonging to ships not in commission, as well as

those to be had at the Dockyards. They also

suggested that others could be obtained from various

large steamship companies.

On August 7th a committee, composed of the

officers who had been engaged in the Red River

Expedition, was appointed to report on the most

suitable craft, and make arrangements for their

purchase. The officers comprising it were of

opinion, after inspecting the various boats used

by the Royal Navy and some of the chief steamship

companies, that not more than 200 to 250 of them

were adapted for the navigation of the Nile, and

that this limited number would not fulfil the require

ments of the proposed Expedition.

AN ENTIRE NEW FLEET. 177

After more inquiries and caleulations about the

loads each boat would have to carry, and its conse

quent size, the Committee came to the conclusion

that the best model to adopt was that of a man-of-

war "whaler."

Instead, however, of availing themselves of the 250 boats,

which could have been at once obtained from the sources

named, and then building whatever number of others might be

needed for the Expedition, the Committee reported in favour

of building an entire new fleet of certain dimensions, and after

the model referred to.

An experimental boat, 30 ft. long by 6 ft. broad,

and 2 ft. 3 in. deep, was found to weigh, with

fittings, 1,073 lb., while the weight of the model

Royal Navy boat, 28 ft. long by 7 ft. 6 in. by 2 ft.

6 in. was, with fittings, 1,960 lb. It was evidently

a matter of weight which decided against the latter,

but how was the lighter weight obtained ?

The boats for the Expedition were built of

Canadian white spruce*—the most common and

fragile of soft woods—and with comparatively thin

planking. The boats for the Red River Expedition

were, on the contrary, built of pine, like the whalers

of the Royal Navy, and must have consequently

weighed quite as much as they did.

This lightness of the boats, and their fragility,

on account of the material with which they were

constructed, turned out to be a more serious blunder,

so far as the progress of the Expedition was con-

* This is the wood of which boxes for groceries, &c, are made,

an<7 a blow will shiver.

N

i78 WHY GORDON PERISHED.

cerned, than the weight of the rejected Royal Navy

whalers would have been on the high Nile in

September.

Their progress was delayed by having to haul

them up often for repairs, and their leakage damaged

a great many of the stores carried in them. How

Tommy Atkins and his officers got these frail craft

up the Second and Third Cataracts so safely as they

did, speaks volumes for them.

There was but one place at which the boats had

themselves to be portaged, and this would not have

been necessary if they had been at Wady-Halfa a

month earlier, when the Royal Navy boats could

have been there.*

Colonel Colvile, who never misses an opportunity

of saying a good word for the small-boat plan of

operations, thus records their arrival at Wady-

Halfa :—

At 8.30 a.m., November 1st, two months and three weeks

After they were ordered in England, the first " whaler'' boats,

propelled by English crews, left Ccmai.

. On August 1 2th, orders were given for the first

400 boats, which were ready for shipment on Sep

tember 10th, the first thirty of them arriving at

Alexandria on September 22nd, and eleared four

* Theie was no such uniformity in the dimension! of the boats

'constructed for the Red River Expedition. These boats differed

considerably in size and shape—averaging 25 ft/to 30 ft. long by 6 ft. to

7 ft. broad, with a draught when loaded of from 24 in. to 30 in., and

a carrying capacity of 2J tons to 4 tons, and were to carry ten men, two

voyageurs, and thirty days* rations. The " whalers " were to carry

twelve men and a hundred days' store*.

THIRTY-TWO DAYS AKTER DATE. 1 79

days later, and the last of this batch were landed

there about October ioth. They were delivered,

by contract with Messrs. Cook, at Wady-Halfa on

November 1st, and the first regiment—the South

Staffordshire — left there on November 5th, and

reached Korti on December 17th, or thirty-two

days after the date upon which Lord Wolseley

had informed Her Majesty's Government, that

Gordon could not be expected to hold out, and

three days after the date on which he had been

informed by the latter it would be difficult for him

to do so. It was also one day after the date of

the message he had received from Gordon, on

December 30th, asking him to come quickly ; and

when he elosed his journal in the entry that, if

the Expedition did not come to its relief in ten

days, the town might fall !

We might content ourselves with the above general

observations about the delay caused to the Expe

dition by not utilizing the 250 boats which were

found available, as emphasizing the mistake made

by adopting, at so late a date, the Nile route for

the relief Expedition. There were, however, a

number of other contingencies to be met and other

mistakes made, to which attention must be called.

One of these has reference to the fact that, as

the boats were constructed by some seventeen

builders, their gear could not be expected to be

interchangeable. Every care was, however, taken

to see that it, and the boats to which it belonged,

were landed together.

Unfortunately, the boats arrived in Egypt before

N 2

180 WHY GORDON TERISHEI).

Mr. Thomas Cook did, and his agent contended

that the firm were only bound by their contract to

deliver the boats at Wady-Halfa. The gear—that

is the masts, sails, oars, rowlocks, rudders, etc.—

were, therefore, separated from the boats to which

they belonged, and carried up the country independ

ently, and had, in consequence, to be sorted to their

own boats, and when this could not be done they

had to be refitted !

Colonel Grove, in his report, stated that in

dealing with such large masses of gear—some

of it, like a mast, a burden for one man — the

mere transport of it occasioned much labour. In

addition, each boat had twenty-six artieles, which

did not fit any other boat, save those by the same

maker, and often the gear of one maker would

arrive with the boats made by another, and vice

versd, etc.

One part of Lord Wolseley's scheme had refer

ence to the facility of transport past the worst part

of the Second Cataract by the railway from Wady-

Halfa to Sarras. Unfortunately, this part of his

scheme was rendered comparatively ineffective by

several mistakes. There was delay in getting the

road into anything like running order. When it

was used, the engineers employed in carrying it on

were not sufficiently acquainted practically in such

work to do it efficiently. The rolling-stock was short,

and in order to increase it, trucks and carriages were

sent for to the Cape of Good Hope, because they

could be obtained there of a gauge to suit the Sarras

line ! This delay, it is evident, could have been

A TOO-LATE REPENTANCE. 1 8 1

obviated by altering its gauge to suit carriages

which might have been obtained in EngJand.

Then there was delay caused by the difficulty of

advancing such a force, with a narrow front, so long

a distance.

We have thus far traced the chain of events and

the pressure of public opinion, both in and out of

Parliament, by which Her Majesty's Government

were compelled to abandon their original policy

of absolute non-intervention in the Sudan, under

circumstances of greater embarrassment, and in

volving a greater risk of life and expenditure than

it would have cost had this course been adopted

after the victory at Tel-el-Kebir.

Attention has also been called in the foregoing

pages to the grounds upon which they adopted theNile

route for a Relieving Expedition to Khartum, and

to the manner in which the Expedition in the

Eastern Sudan had seriously interfered with

Gordon's mission, as well as the mistake made in

not allowing its Commander, Sir Gerald Graham,

to seize Berber—as Gordon had urged should be

done.

By way of recapitulation we quote Lord Gran

ville's definition in the House of Lords, in February,

1885, of the objects of the Expedition the Govern

ment had now decided upon, which was as

follows :— . •

The object of this Expedition was primarily to rescue

General Gordon, and those to whom General Gordon con

sidered himself honourably bound, and also to provide for

defence against an attack on Egypt.

1 82 WHY GORDON rERISHED.

The pressure of public opinion which compelled

them to undertake it was thus summarily and forcibly

expressed by His Grace the Duke of Argyle in the

House of Lords, on April 3rd, 1884 :—

The Government had said that the Sudan was not a

necessary appendage of Egypt, and, having given that

opinion, having dictated the Government policy of Egypt, we

were bound in honour to sec that those populations, such as

that of Khartum, should, if possible, be taken out without being

massacred. He believed that to be the feeling of the country.

The interpellations might have been far too frequent, because

no Government could explain to Parliament beforehand the

detailed policy which they might have in view in regard to

military and naval operations. But let the Government not

mistake, and he hoped his noble friends did not mistake—it

was not a mere agitation on the part of Egyptian bondholders

—it was no mere agitation upon the part of the press—but it

was a deep feeling of interest among all parties in the country.

As a matter of fact, contrary to their own will, and owing

to circumstances over which certainly they had not had control,

they bad been placed in a position of paramount responsibility

with regard to Egypt

Lord Denman on the same occasion said that, " if

there was another slaughter like that of Sinkat, the

whole of Christendom would be roused to indig

nation."

For reasons which will be understood further on,

we also quote here the following observations, made

by the Earl of Morley in the House of Lords in

the debate on the Vote of Censure, in February,

1885 :—

It was upon the distinct advice of Lord Wolseley that it was

decided to adopt the Nile route. Its advantages were manifest

for the following reasons :

AN OPTIMIST VIEW OF THINGS. 183

First. A considerable portion of their route was easily

navigable. They had a base, although at a considerable

distance from the sea.

Second. There was also the great advantage, that by-

following the river route, each boat was able to carry supplics-

for its crew for 100 days.

Third. The third reason was that, in addition to the military

advantages, from a political point of view it was of great

importance that the advance should be made along the Nile,

because there was great danger of the spread of fanaticism

among the tribes of Upper Egypt and Nubia, and it was

eminently desirable that a force should appear on the Nile

with a view to securing the allegiance of the wavering and

disaffected tribes. They knew the great importance of Dongola,

and of conciliating the allegiance of its Mudir, and it was

indispensable that a brigade should be prepared in order to

advance as quickly as possible from Assouan and Wady-Halfa

to Dongola.

While fully recognising the ability of Sir Frederic

Stephenson, it was only fair to state that he had none of

the peculiar experience of the mode of passing cataracts which)

had fallen to the lot of Lord Wolseley in the Red River

Expedition. ,

The noble Earl went so far as to say, after stating:

the advantage offered by being able to carry 100

days' rations in boats, that " he thought that Lord

Wolseley's plan, in spite of the difficulties he had

had to undergo, had been perfectly justified by its-

success."

It will be remembered that this statement was

made after the fall of Khartum, and the death of

General Gordon, and the massacre of those to whom

he was honourably bound. The primary object of

the Expedition, so far as they were concerned, had

not been attained, although Lord Wolseley had.

184 WHY GORDON PEKISHED.

after a fashion as \ve shall see, taken up in boats

the quantity of provisions the noble Earl mentioned.

We now, therefore, proceed to call attention to the

disastrous ending of the Expedition Lord Wolseley

had recommended through the collapse of his plans

and his own mistakes in endeavouring to give it

effect.

By way of introduction to this part of our subject,

ive will first refer to the statement made by Lord

Hartington before Parliament, when submitting to

the Committee of the House of Commons, on

November 13th, 1S84, a Supplementary Vote or

Estimate for the Expedition to the Sudan.

His Lordship then told the Committee of the

House of Commons that the order given to Sir

Frederic Stephenson in August had been carried out,

and that the troops he had been directed to send to

Dongola had been despatched there from Wady-

Halfa. Lord Wolseley had determined, he further

stated, upon concentrating a force of 2,000 men at

Debbeh, a place at a considerable distance above

Dongola. If he should then find the attitude of the

tribes such as they had reason to expect it would

be, it would then be in his power to " advance that

force on Khartum, if necessary, in advance of any

considerable movement of infantry, and that, in the

opinion of Lord Wolseley, the Camel Corps,

composed of drafts from a number of different

regiments, would be particularly suitable for that

operation, and would, in his opinion, render the

advance of any considerable force from Dongola

unnecessary."

AN ELASTIC PLAN OV OPERATIONS. 1 85

In fact, his Lordship further told the Committee

that the advantage elaimed by the Government for

this plan of operations adopted by them was, to

a certain extent, an elastic one, as it provided the

means of sending a force of 5,000 or 6,000 men

the whole distance by river, which, in the opinion of

our military advisers, will be a sufficient force to

meet successfully any resistance likely to be offered.

On the other hand, that very considerable operation

might be converted, if circumstances were favourable,

into one of a considerably smaller character, namely,

the sending of a much smaller, but sufficient, force

across the desert, which would accomplish the object

in view with much greater rapidity, and render it

possible that the rest of the troops would not be

necessary.

Lord Partington then stated that information

received both publiely and privately from Lord

Wolscley tended to show his confidence in the

soundness of the plan he had adopted, and that he

still held the opinion that it would not have been

possible by any other means than by that of small

boats sent out from England to have secured the

possibility of an advance on Khartum with a

sufficient force during the ensuing winter.

As to the objects of the Expedition, Lord

Hartington referred the Committee to the instructions

given Lord Wolseley in the Blue Book, Egypt, 35,

1884, and from which we abstract the following :—

The primary object of the Expedition up the Nile is to.bring

away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from Khartum.


When that object has been secured, no further offensive opera

tions of any kind whatever are to be undertaken.

Although you are not precluded from advancing on Khartum

if you consider such a step necessary to secure the retreat of

General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, you should bear in mind

that Her Majesty's Government is desirous to limit the sphere

of your military operations.

Lord Wolseley, while further instructed to direct

his attention to rescuing the Egyptian Garrisons and

civil employes at Khartum, was informed that Her

Majesty's Government had no intention of sending

any Expeditions for the relief of the other beleagured

garrisons in the Sudan, namely, those in Darfur,

the Bahr-el-Gazelle and Equatorial Provinces, and

that of Sennar. The former were to be abandoned,

because, as his instructions stated, it would be

impossible that he should take any action which

would facilitate their retreat without extending his

operations " far beyond the sphere which Her

Majesty's Government " were prepared to sanction ;

and as regarded Sennar, no Expedition, on the same

grounds, would be despatched up the Blue Nile for

its relief.

Then Lord Wolscley was told in these instructions

that—

The feasibility of relieving Khartum, and the possibility of

relieving General Gordon, might depend very much indeed

upon the arrangements which may be made beforehand for

announcing to the people (of the Sudan) the establishment of

some form of government in the district after General Gordon

shall have left.

The considerations thus stated in Lord Wolseley's

instruction, the Marquis of Hartington further told

THE BARINGS AND WOLSF.LEV. 187

the Committee, were before his mind, and that

he fully understood that the greatest possible

triumph they could achieve—a triumph very much

greater than that of any victory he could gain, or any

successful march he could accomplish—would be the

making of such political arrangements as would

enable the object of his mission, and of General

Gordon's mission as well, to be successfully

accomplished without the necessity of fighting.

These instructions to Lord Wolseley, were drawn

up by himself in concert with Lord Northbrook and

Sir Evelyn Baring, and approved by Her Majesty's

Government. The bearing they had upon his Lord

ship's subsequent actions in conducting the Nile

Expedition will appear as we discuss it. They are

by no means satisfactory when we consider General

Gordon's position at the time they were drawn up.

The period beyond which, as Lord Wolseley had

informed the Government in April—that is Novem

ber 15th—Khartum could not be expected to

hold out, was less than a month from the date upon

which, for example, Lord Wolseley had informed

Lord Hartington of what he intended to do in

concentrating troops at Debbeh, and adding a Camel

Corps to his boat-plan of advance. *

In considering these instructions, the painful

impression is produced that, although Her Majesty's

Government proposed to do something that ought

to be done, and quickly under the circumstances, that

they had no real heart in doing it—that they hoped,

in fact, that events would not make it obligatory on

them to do it. In fact, their intention, as gathered

WHY CORDON PERISHED.

from all their statements in Parliament and out of

it, and from these instructions to Lord Wolseley,

seems to be as elastic as Lord Hartington had

described the former plan of operations were.

They also seem to impose a restraint on Lord

Wolseley's movements. He is to relieve Khartum

without fighting, for instance, if he can do so ; and

consenting to such conditions he failed to take the

only effectual measures to attain this primary object,

if he had had, as we shall see, a freer hand.

With these preliminary remarks \ve now proceed

to call attention to the manner in which the Nile

Expedition, thus despatched by Her Majesty's

Government on Lord Wolseley's plan of operation,

was carried out.

189

CHAPTER XIII.

The Nile boats which, as already stated, ought,

according to the opinion of Lord Wolselsy, Sir

Redvers Buller, and other officers, to have been on

the water at Wady-Halfa on October 5th, were not

delivered there in part (400 out of the 600) until

the end of that month and the first days of November.

The first detachment of troops started up the

river on November 5th, and others rapidly followed.

On November 17th a letter was received from

General Gordon by Lord Wolscley, dated Khartum,

4th November, which appeared to us at the time to

have exerted no more influence in Downing Street

than it did at the Headquarters Staff on the Nile ; for

it did not lead them in any appreciable or important

way to accelerate the advance of the Expedition, as

our readers will easily comprehend from its purport

it ought to have done.

After acknowledging the receipt of a letter from

Colonel Kitchener, on November 3rd, dated Debbeh,

October 14th, and another dated September 17th,

and one from Lord Wolseley in cypher, on Septem

ber 20th, General Gordon wrote as follows :—

At Mutemma waiting your orders are four steamers with

nine guns. We can hold out for forty days, but after that it

1 90 WHY CORDON PERISHED.

will be difficult. Mahdi is here about eight miles away. All

north side along White Nile free of Arabs ; they are on the

south, west, and cast of the town some way off. They are

quiet.

I should take the road from Ambukol to Mutcmma, where

my steamers meet you.

Do not let any Egyptian soldiers come up here. Take

command of steamers direct, and turn out Egyptians

(fellaheen).

You may know what passed here. The Arabs camped out

side Khartum, March 12th, 1884. We attacked them on

March 16th, and were defeated and lost heavily—also a gun.

We then from that date had continual skirmishes with Arabs.

When river rose we drove off Arabs in three or four engage

ments, and freed town. Sent up to Sennar two expeditions,

had another fight,and again were defeated with heavy loss ; the

square was always broken. This last defeat was 4th September.

Since then we have had comparative quiet. We fired 3,000,000

rounds ; the palace was the great place for firing. Arabs have

Krupps here, and have often hulled our steamers. Arabs

captured two small steamers at Berber, and one on Blue Nile.

Since the 10th March, 1S84, we have had up to date, exclusive

of Kitchener's 14th October, only two despatches, one Dongola,

no date, one from Suakim, 5th May, one of same import

Massowah, 27th April. ... I should take the road from

Ambukol to Mutemma, where my steamers wait you.

On the back of this letter was the adjoining

map.

When Lord Hartington received a telegraphic

summary of this letter he at once telegraphed Lord

Wolseley, asking how the news from General Gordon

would affect his plans, and received the following

reply from him :—

Your 15th, news from Gordon makes no change in my plans,

but it seems to indicate the almost impossibility of his relief

without fighting.

A SKETCH OF GORDON'S. 191

What these plans were \ve know substantially,

namely, that no mounted troops were to be concen

trated at Debbeh in advance of the infantry, so that,

in the event of intelligence from Gordon rendering a

Copy of a Skttck on tit hack of Central Gordon': Ltlttr of

November the 4th.

rapid movement to be made across the desert, " at

all hazards," it could be accomplished. Hence his

proposal, on October 19th, for a Camel Corps.

As Colonel Colvile informs us, when referring to

192 WHY GORDON PERISHl-D.

the proposed concentration of troops at Debbeh,

Lord Wolseley felt " that at any time after reaching

Debbeh he might receive an urgent appeal from

General Gordon for immediate help," and that such

an appeal could only be met by an Expedition on

camels across the desert from the neighbourhood

of Mutemma.

The force he proposed to concentrate at Debbch

for this purpose, ineluding 36b men of the

19th Hussars, the Camel Corps, &c, was 2,250

men and twelve mountain guns. Sir Evelyn

Wood was instructed to collect supplies there by

native craft, or otherwise, for 3,000 men and 4,500

camels and 500 horses for one month, for 4,000

men for fifteen days, and for 600 for forty days.

The Senior Commissariat Officer was warned to be

liberal in his estimates, because the people coming

from Khartum would have to be provided for.

When General Gordon's letter of November 4th,

was received by Lord Wolseley at Wady-Halfa, we

naturally expected that the crisis it threatened to

occur at Khartum within four weeks—that is after

December 14th—would have led to the adoption of

measures to avert it in some possible way. Such

wc found upon enquiry at the Head Quarters Staff

then was not to be the case. The anxiety we

ventured to express was sought to be relieved by

one Staff Officer assuring us that there were no

grounds for it, because—and we quote his words

verbatim—

"If General Gordon stated that he can hold out for six

weeks—never fear—he can do so for six months.

EXAGGERATED AND UNWARRANTED. 193

It did, however, seem to me unfair thus to

construe Gordon's word " difficult," for with him—as

we told the officer—it certainly meant "desperate; "

and events proved the correctness of my conelusion.

That a similar exaggerated and unwarranted

confidence was cherished by Lord Wolseley himself

in Gordon's ability to hold out, even under the most

adverse circumstances, until he could relieve him, may

be inferred from the following address issued by him

to the troops of the Expedition from Dongola on

November 22nd :—

We are all proud of General Gordon, and he cannot

hold out many months longer, and he now calls upon us to

save his garrison !

In a despatch from Cairo on September nth, to

the Minister of War, asking for an augmentation of

the force in Egypt, Lord Wolseley stated that he

should be wanting in his duty if he did not point out

in elearest terms that without this augmentation, that

if the force surrounding General Gordon remained

where it was, it would be impossible to relieve him

this year, and that, in his opinion, it was a certainty

" that want ofammunition would prevent him holding

outfor another twelve months /"

Is it any wonder that Her Majesty's Government

should defend themselves against the charges ofdelay

made against them, for not despatching the

Expedition earlier than they did, when their high

military adviser—who had warned them in April,

1884, that Gordon could not be expected to hold out

beyond November 1 5th, now indefinitely extended

such a crisis in his position ?

O

194 WHY GORDON PERISI1ED.

Her Majesty's Government had evidently such a

contingency in view as that indicated in Gordon's

letter, and we must suppose that the plan of the

campaign, in the success of which they had so strongly

been assured by its designer, would meet it satis

factorily. This we infer from Lord Hartington's

statement to Parliament in November—made on the

very day before that letter had been received at Wady-

Halfa, namely, that Lord Wolseley "could if

necessary" send "direct to Khartum a part of the

2,000 men he intended concentrating at Debbeh as

a mounted force."

Now, the very fact that Gordon could only hold

out with difficulty after December 14th ought to

have led Lord Wolseley to have immediately made

such a movement from Debbeh.

If Gordon's warning—that it would be difficult

to hold out after forty days from the date of his

letter, November 4th—did not cause the movement,

the following message from him, dated Khartum,

September 9th, and received at Dongola by Lord

Wolseley on November 29th, ought certainly to have

done so, for this is what it told him :—

There is money and provisions enough in Khartum for four

months, after which we shall be embarrassed. At Sennar

there is doura enough.

Then, after referring to the despatch of Colonel

Stewart and the Consuls to Dongola, the letter

continues as follows :—

How many times have I written asking for reinforcements,

and calling your serious attention to the Sudan. No answer

SEND TROOPS WITHOUT DELAY. 195

at all has come to us as to what has been decided in the

matter, and the hearts of men have become weary of this

delay. While you are eating, drinking, and resting in good

beds, wc and those with us, both soldiers and servants, are

watching by night and day, endeavouring to quell the move

ment of the false prophet.

Of course you take no interest in suppressing the rebellion,

the serious consequences of which you will have to deal with

later on.

The reason why I have now sent Colonel Stewart is because

you have been silent all this while, and have neglected us and

lost time without doing any good. If troops were sent, as soon

as they reach Derber this rebellion will cease, and the inhabi

tants will return to their former occupations. It is, therefore,

hoped that you will listen to all that is told you by him and

the Consuls and send troops without delay.

Although he had not concentrated the force

named at Debbeh, when Gordon's message of

November 4th had been received, Lord Wolseley

was in a position to do so on December 1st, as the

following facts fully indicate.

In September, Sir Frederic Stephenson, in co

operation with Sir Evelyn Wood and his Egyptian

troops, had collected 52,000 rations at Hannek, at

the head of the Third Cataract, and from whence

there was open water to Korti and beyond it.

These, with additional supplies and grain, were

taken up the Nile by the native craft used in these

transports so far, to Debbeh.

In confirmation of this statement, we quote Lord

Wolseley's following telegram to Lord Hartington,

dated Dongola, November 28th :—

Telegraph to Debbeh not working. Liable to interruption.

Am naturally anxious, owing to large quantity of stores there,

O 2


and am sending up this afternoon 200 Royal Surrey to

construct redoubt and act as guard.

That Lord Wolseley had men enough at hand

available for such a movement is indicated by the

following abstract from the official report of the

position of his troops on November 18th :—

The Royal Surrey Regiment and the Mounted

Infantry, giving a total of 1,260 men, were at

Dongola. At Dal, sixty miles below it, there were

the 600 men of the South Staffordshire Regiment,

and the Mounted Guards Camel Corps, 320 strong—

in all, 920 men.

Between Dal and Gemai, sixty miles apart, there

were also coming up the river, then, 1,588 men, and

at Wady-IIalfa 1,895 men, ineluding the Black

Watch.

Then, again, between Wady-Halfa and Assouan

there were 3,210 men on their way up, some by

steamers, others in barges towed by them or by

native craft, and a few in the small boats.

Ineluding the 300 men of the 19th Hussars,

mounted on horses, Lord Wolseley had on this date

at Dongola, and rapidly approaching it, no less than

4,1 18 men.

From this force he could readily have organised

and despatched a flying column adequately sup

plied with rations and ammunition direct to

Khartum, as Lord Hartington puts it, " in advance

of any considerable movement of infantry." In

fact, he iiad ready organised at Dongola 440

Mounted Infantry admirably adapted for such a

movement.

WHAT GORDON EXPECTED. 197

It was just such a movement as this that Gordon

expected would be made for his relief; for in his

letter of November 4th, he advised that Lord

Wolseley should take the road from Ambukol to

Mutemma, where his steamers would be met.

When Gordon heard, in September, of the dis

patch of an Expedition for his relief, he made the

following entry in his journal :—

My view is this as to the operation of a British Force : I will

put three steamers, each with two guns in them, and an armed

force of infantry at disposal of British authority. I will send

these steamers to either Mutemma or to the cataract below

Berber, to meet any British force which may come across

country to the Nile . . . . t would not attempt to pass

the bulk of British force across the country, but only thefighting

column, to co-operate with the steamers. No artillery is wanted

with either force—it is not needed in any way in this country.

From this entry it is evident that he also expected

this force coming across the country would, " D.V.,

capture Berber, and then communicate with

Khartum."

Instead of making some direct and immediate

movement of troops towards Khartum, in view of

Gordon's warning in his letter of the 4th November,

Lord Wolseley replied to him as follows on the

17th, the day on which he had received it at Wady-

Halfa :—

Yours of the 4th. 17th, Will be at Dongola in ten days. I

shall have an army between Dcbbeh and Ambukol on a date

which you can fix by counting 283 days from the date of your

appointment as Major-Gcneral, etc.

As Gordon was promoted to his Major-Generalship

I98 WHY GORDON PERISHED.

on March 31st, the date therefore thus indicated was

December 31st. This would be six weeks after the

limit at first fixed by Lord Wolseley to Gordon's

ability to hold out. It was also seventeen days after

that from which Gordon had told him it would be

difficult for him to do so.

199

CHAPTER XIV.

LORD WolSELEY had not only now deviated from

the plan of the Expedition, as sketched by Lord

Hartington before the Committee of the House of

Commons on November 13th, by not sending a

flying column to Khartum, but also, by adhering

rigidly to a fixed plan of operations, he had acted

contrary to an important strategetic maxim thus

referred to by the late General Von Moltke in his

memoirs :—

It is a delusion that a plan of war may be laid down for a

prolonged period and carried out in every particular. The

first collision with the enemy changes the situation entirely.

Something decided upon will be impracticable ; others deemed

originally impossible may become possible.

All that the leader of an army can do is to get a clear view

of the circumstances, and to decide for the best for an unknown

period.

After stating that the plan of the Franco-German

War was based on the determination to attack the

enemy at once, this greatest of modern strategists

further remarked that :—

By whatever means these plans were to be accomplished was

left to the decision of the hour. The advance to the frontier

alone was pre-ordained in every detail.

2O0 WHY GORDON PERISHEO.

Now, where was the frontier on the present occa

sion ? It certainly was Dongola, and the point in

that Province from which Lord Wolseley had selected

for concentrating a force—part of which was to be

employed in relieving Khartum, if hard pressed, or

likely to be—was Debbeh, ninety miles above its

chief town, then Lord Wolscley's head-quarters.

From Gordon's letter of November 4th, and the

sketch-map showing the position of the enemy

round Khartum, he had every reason to conelude

that they had come to stay, and were likely to cut it

off from approach by a relieving force. At the

moment, any General, not wedded to a particular

plan of operations, could—taking Gordon's letters

received by Lord Wolseley on the 17th and 29th of

November—have arrived at no other conelusion than

that General Gordon was in imminent danger of

being " in extremis." Hut, as he informed Lord

Hartington, the position of Gordon, as revealed in

his letter, would make no change in his plans, which

had been, in General Von Moltke's words, pre

ordained, and to the success of which he had pledged

himself to the Government. The main feature of

these plans was the transportation of a force with

its supplies by small boats. Under his Lordship's

advice the Government had adopted it, and, there

fore, we may conelude that he was unwilling to

compromise it by sending any part of his force on

camels, or with them, to check the enemy which was

now so seriously threatening the place he was sent

especially to relieve.

There had been greater delay than Lord VVolseley

WHALERS FIRST, THEN CAMELS. 201

had anticipated in taking up the Nile an Expedition

for Gordon's relief on the plan he proposed. As

the writer in the Times, from which we have quoted

in our introductory remarks, very elearly stated :—

The dangers involved in the adoption ol the Nile route in

light boats were repeatedly stated, and this plan of advance

was from the first opposed by many thinking men. Given

success, unquestioned and unqualified—the violation of all

rules may entail no dangers—but once a check, even a slight

derangement of plans arrives, all the evil results of a mistaken

policy at . . . To provide a large camel force would be to

discount the boats, from which so much was expected, and the

Camel Corps was, therefore, an adjunct, and not a principal

feature in the scheme.

The time came a month ago when the two modes of advance

must be separate. The Camel Corps must justify its presence

—the boats must go on or prove a failure.

All that was known as to the position of Gordon

in June had led Lord Wolseley to the conelusion

that he could not be expected to hold out beyond

November 15th. Why, then,when that date was passed,

did he hope he could hold out, as he told the troops

in his address, " many months longer " ? There can

be only one reply to this question, namely, that

Lord Wolseley had resolved not to compromise that

part of his plan of operations for which, as we have

seen, he had, as Lord I lartington told Parliament on

November 13th, expressed a preference and still

adhered to when, as he had learned a few days

subsequently by Gordon's letter that Khartum was

endangered, and he should, therefore, have now so

far departed from his original plan as to have

despatched a flying column for his relief.


The disastrous consequences which followed this

rigid adherence to the small-boat transport up the

Nile part of his plan at this juncture—to the exelusion

of his mounted force—is condemned by General Von

Moltke's maxim, which denounces it as " the greatest

delusion under which the leader of an army could

fall?"

It would, perhaps, not have been impossible for

Lord Wolseley to have carried out successfully the

small-boat plan of an expedition up the Nile if Her

Majesty's Government had accepted it even a month

earlier.

Colonel Colvile interjects, when discussing Lord

Wolseley's adoption of it, that Gordon was in its

favour. He certainly was, but only when the Nile

was high. The date upon which the Expedition

was prepared to leave Wady- Halfa the river was

rapidly falling, with the delaying results we have

already pointed out. .

There were in November substantial grounds,

therefore, for fearing that, by Lord Wolseley's own

calculations, it would now take him two-and-a-half

months beyond the date which he had advised

Her Majesty's Government that it would be im

possible or difficult for Gordon to hold out.

It was possible for him, as we have proved, to have

modified his plan of operations so far, at any rate,

as to send a flying column on December 15th,

direct to Khartum, for the risk of doing so then was

much less than it would have been a month later

when he despatched Stewart's Column across the

Bayudu Desert to establish a post at Mutemma.

LOOKING FOR THE ADVANCE GUARD. 203

That column had to fight its way there with a loss

in killed and wounded of a tenth of its number.

When it did reach the river its waters had so

subsided as to make navigation thence to Khartum

much more difficult, as was seen in the case of

Sir C. W. Wilson's flotilla, than it would have been

a month earlier.

It will also be remembered that Stewart's Column

only met Gordon's steamers there to convey to him

the disheartening message, that effectual relief could

not reach him until six weeks later.

These steamers had been on the look out for the

advance guard of the English force coming for the

relief of Khartum since September 30th, or nearly

four months before our column reached Mutemma.

Gordon had during all this time been deprived of

their assistance in foraging for supplies and for

defensive purposes. In fact, owing to their absence

he had lost Omdurman, and with it the command

of the Blue Nile, along which the defences of

Khartum had been weakened by the fall of the

river.

Lord Wolseley, in what reads like an exculpatory

telegram after Khartum fell, informed Lord

Hartington that, in despatching Stewart's Column to

establish a post at Mutemma, he had exceeded the

limits of military precautionary prudence. ~Be that

as it may, the message now received from Gordon

would have justified him in adopting measures of

even a more hazardous character in order to avert

even a more remote possibility of Khartum falling

before he would be in a position to relieve it,

204 WHY GORDON PKKISI 1 1£I>.

according to his plans, than that indicated in the

letter he had now received from Gordon.

When dealing with the Desert Column, under

the command of Sir Herbert Stewart, it will be

shown that it not only did not serve to secure the

object for which the Nile Expedition had been

despatched, but, on the contrary, it hastened the

fall of Khartum.

We now come to a more striking illustration of

the delusion into which Lord Wolseley had fallen,

according to General Von Moltke, when he received

Gordon's last appeal for immediate assistance on

December 31st.

This appeal was dated Khartum, December 14th,

the day after which Gordon had informed him it

would be difficult for him to hold out.

The Sudanese Arab had come provided with

one of the tiny letters Gordon had been in the

habit of sending out, a bit of paper about the

size of a postage stamp, having on one side the

words " Khartum, all right," and bearing on the

reverse his seal.

The verbal message with which the Arab was

charged to deliver to Lord Wolseley showed, how

ever, that it was far from being all right, for it was

as follows :—

Wc are beseiged on three sides, Omdurman, Halfiyeli, and

Haggiali. Fighting goes on day and night. Enemy cannot

take us save by starving us out. Do not scatter your troops.

Enemy is numerous. Bring plenty of troops if you can. We

still hold Omdurman on the left bank and the fort on the right

Mahdi's people have thrown up earthworks within rifle shot of

HIS LAST APPEAL. 205

Omdurmnn. About four weeks ago Mahdi's people attacked

that place and disabled one steamer. We disabled one of

Mahdi's guns ; three days after fighting was renewed on south,

and the rebels were driven back.

This part of the message was evidently intended

for general circulation, and all that was com

municated to us war correspondents at the time.

The rest of it, which was as follows, was withheld,

but is published by Colonel Colvile under the

heading of " Secret and Confidential," and was as

follows :—

Our troops arc suffering from lack of provisions. Thefood

wc have is a Utile grain.

Wc want you to come quickly.

You should come by Afutemma or Berber; do not leave

Berber in your rear.

Do this without letting rumours of your approach spread

abroad.

On the receipt of this message a summary of it

was telegraphed by Lord Wolscley to Sir Evelyn

Baring, who, in reply, immediately consulted him

as to the desirability of operating from Suakim in

order to aid him. In answer he received the

following reply from his Lordship :—

Gordon's message on December 31st compels measures that

will postpone my arrival at Khartum . He warns me not to

leave Berber in my rear, so I must move by icafcr and fake it

before I march on Khartum; meanwhile I shall have

established post at Afutemma by men and stores across the

desert. I shall then be able to communicate with Gordon by

steam—learn exact position, and if he is in extremis before

infantry arrive by river, to push forward Camel Corps to help

him at all hazards. On this point I would like an expression


ofopinion ofHer Majestys Government, without at all wishing

to shift responsibilityfrom myself to them.

My view of the position is this :—

/ feel confident of success IF KHARTUM CAN HOLD OUT

UNTIL DOATS WITH TROOPS CAN REACH ITS NEIGHBOUR

HOOD.

If I have to make a hazardous push on Khartum with

Camel Troops only, I do not think military operations at

Suakim would affect mine at Khartum.*

The WORST DISASTER which COULD OCCUR WOULD BE

THE FALL OF KHARTUM AND GORDON MADE A PRISONER.

We have not been officially informed what effect

the message from Gordon of December 14th had

upon Her Majesty's Government, or as to how it

regarded Lord Wolseley's plans in view of it. It

certainly led the authorities at Downing-street to

regard the situation at Khartum as very critical,

for a number of telegrams passed to and fro

between them and Cairo and Korti. These were of

either such a serious and delicate character that

those sent from or received at the War Office were

despatched and deciphered by Lord Hartington

himself, and not allowed to pass through the hands

of those upon whom such duties devolve in the

Department. It is most important, both in the

interest of the public as well as in that of Her

Majesty's Government and due to Lord VVolseley

himself, that the purport of this animated and im

portant correspondence should be made known. It,

* These military operations referred to weie those undertaken on

February 7th, 1885, by Sir Gerald Giaham, and had for their chief

object the construction of a railway from Suakim to Berber, to

facilitate withdrawal of Lord Wolseley's force.

DELUDED STILL. 207

however, resulted in Lord Wolseley being allowed to

put into execution his proposed plan of operations.

How perplexing and discouraging must the

situation have been to Her Majesty's Ministers

during that first week in January, 1885 ? They

would naturally recall Lord Wolseley's warning to

them in April, 1884, to the effect that, as Gordon

could not be expected to hold out beyond November

15th, any force sent from England for his relief

should, therefore, be concentrated at Berber not

later than October 20th. In November, as we have

seen, they were informed that he could hold out a

month longer, but that afterwards it would be

difficult for him to do so. 'Then came his message,

dated on the very day when his position would

become seriously embarrassed. In reply to Gordon's

- appeal to come quickly to his relief in view of his

desperate position, Lord Wolseley had now informed

them that his advance on Khartum would be

delayed until he could capture Berber, because he

had been warned by Gordon not to leave open his

rear ? It would not be surprising to us to learn that

at a Cabinet meeting held that week, regret would

be expressed that they had not accepted Sir

Frederic Stephenson's proposal instead of that of

the Red River men. It was too late now to rectify

this serious blunder. —

A high authority informed us that the feeling in

Downing-street at the time was substantially as

follows :—

" Lord Wolseley told Her Majesty's Ministers

that, if they gave him a carte blanche to carry out his


proposed Expedition up the Nile, he could reach

Khartum at such a period as would prevent its

fall, but that when that time arrived he told them he

could not do so."

It appears probable from his despatch of January

12th, 1885, to Lord Hartington, and to which

reference will presently be made, that the date of

this negative reply may have been about December

29th.

209

CHAPTER XV.

We must now call the attention of our readers to

a question of a most serious character suggested by

some of the statements made by Lord VVolscley in

his telegram to Sir Evelyn Baring, already quoted.

At first sight it would appear from that telegram

that Lord VVolscley had been led to the resolution of

advancing by water and take Berber by the warning

he had received from Gordon in his message not to

leave it in his rear, and which he advances as a

reason for his being delayed longer than he expected

in reaching Khartum. But that such was not

actually the case is evident from the following state

ments to Her Majesty's Government in his Lord

ship's despatch to the Minister of War on January

1 2th, and to which we have just incidentally

referred :—

I had always, he then stated, thought it possible that upon

my arrival here (December 16th) I might find it necessary to

operate beyond this point in two columns—one continuing up

the river in our English-built boats, while the other pushed

rapidly across the desert to Mutemma ; and it was in view of

moving across the desert that in my letter of September 21st

last I proposed the formation of a Camel Brigade of picked

troops under carefully-selected officers, and organised on lines

then recommended.

In any march across the desert with a small column it would

P

210 WHY GORDON* PERISHED.

most probably be able to fight its way into Khartum — and

possibly fight its way out of it again— but it could not bring

away Gordon and his garrison in safety. . .

Upon arrival here 1 had to decide whether I should keep all

my forces together and follow the Nile to Khartum, or to

divide it into two columns, one to follow the river, while the

other was pushed across the desert.

If I were not restricted by time, the first course would be by

far the most satisfactory and the safest, and would insure the

best results ; but I know that General Gordon is pressed by

want offood (the italics are ours), and the hot season is not far

off, when military operations in this country are trying to the

health of European soldiers.

I therefore decided upon the last-mentioned course, and so

reported to your Lordship by telegraph on 29th December that

I had despatched a brigade of Guards under Sir Herbert

Stewart on the 30th to seize the Jakdull wells— 101 miles from

here, and seventy-six miles from Mutcmma. . .

The column to advance in boats under the command of

General Earle, C.B., will rendezvous at Hamdab, about fifty-

four miles above this (i.e., Korti), where a camp has already

been formed.

It is thus elearly proven by the foregoing extracts

from this despatch, and by Lord Wolseley himself,

that he had decided upon an advance on Khartum

by water, and on the establishment of a post at

Mutemma by men and stores across the desert,

soon after he had reached Korti on December 16th.

May it not be asked here why Lord Wolseley,

after having informed Her Majesty's Government on

the 29th of December that he had decided upon

these movements, telegraphed Sir Evelyn Baring two

days later, when he received Gordon's message, that

they were, consequent upon the warning it contained,

not to leave Berber in his rear. The only reply that

QUI s'excuse, s'accuse! 211

can be given is that this statement was a mani

festation of that state of mind in which the wish is

described as being father to the thought.

This despatch and telegram, however, when taken

together, suggest the lesson inculeated by that well-

known French adage, Qui s excuse, s'accuse I

Napoleon, as Allison observes in reviewing the

incidents of the Battle of Waterloo and Grouchy's

alleged failure to put in an appearance there, never

took blame to himself for any of his failings if

he could "justly or unjustly lay it on another."

Generally, and in some instances, as we shall see

also particularly, Lord Wolseley, in accounting for

his failure up the Nile, seems to express himself as

if imbued by a similar spirit, for in the instance

before us he pleads Gordon's warning about Berber

as an excuse for continuing his boat plan of the

campaign inster.d of responding to its appeal to him

to come quickly across the desert to his relief.

Then, in the despatch of January 12th, he ex

presses his heartfelt regret that he was not able to

reach Korti at an earlier date, because " his advance

had been delayed through the difficulty of collecting

supplies at this point ^Korti), 1,400 miles by river

from the sea, in sufficient quantities to warrant an

advance into the neighbourhood of a besieged

garrison that is very short of food, where all the

surrounding districts have been laid waste, and

where even the besieging army finds it difficult to

subsist."

Great as had been the difficulty of getting supplies

up the Nile to Korti, Lord Wolseley deelares in

P 2

212 WHY GORDON J'EKISIIKD.

another paragraph of this despatch that " it would

have been simply impossible for his force to have

reached there, ready and provisioned for a movement

on Khartum, without the aid of 'our English-built

boats.' "

Now, here we are at an absolute issue with both

his Lordship's logic and with his facts.

In the first place, it was not originally intended—

as Lord Hartington, in describing the plan of the

Expedition, told Parliament, that an immediate

advance of the whole force of the Expedition on

Khartum was to be made. A part only of the

2,ooo men which Lord Wolseley expected to

concentrate at Debbeh might, in case of neces

sity, be used for that purpose. We have also

shown, when dealing with Gordon's letter of Novem

ber 4th, that, although he had not yet actually

concentrated this proposed force at Debbeh, he had

then both men and sufficient supplies at his disposal

for such an advance. These supplies had nearly all

of them been accumulated at Dongola by native craft

before one of Lord Wolseley's English-built boats had

left Wady- Halfa or the advance of their flotilla had

eleared the broken water of the Third Cataract.

It has also been pointed out that, if Her Majesty's

Government had not, by the advice of the officers

engaged in the Red River Expedition, arrested the

operations in which General Stephenson was thus

engaged in August, a much larger quantity of

supplies could have been collected by the native craft

he was hiring for the purpose.

The small boats did certainly get up supplies to

LEARNED TO FEATHER THEIR OARS. 213

Korti from the Second Cataract in large quantities,

but it took them on an average forty days to do so,

and to Dongola thirty days, whereas Sir Frederic

Stevenson sent the Royal Sussex to the latter point

by native craft, with three months' supplies for it and

the mounted infantry, in thirteen days !

We bear cheerful and even proud testimony to

the infantry regiments who navigated these boats

up the Nile from Gemai or Sarras to Korti. Many

of them had little or no experience in boating when

they started up the river ; they soon, however,

became such adepts at rowing that they had actually

learned to feather their oars !

In August and September our Consular represen

tative at Cairo and General Stephenson again and

again urged upon the Government the importance

of taking advantage of the approaching high Nile

to get stores and men up to Dongola. The advo

cates of the small row-boat plan of operations, as

already stated, had assured them that an advance up

the river by them was "a practical operation

altogether independent of the height of the river ! "

And this notion was tenaciously adhered t^by the

Headquarters Staff at Wady-Halfa, in the middle of

November. In a conversation with one of them he

pooh-poohed the difficulties to which I called his

attention, which would impede the progress of the

boats by the fall of the river.

So enthusiastic was he in favour of the plan Lord

Wolseley and his chief had adopted, that he even

went so far as to assert that, instead of hindering, it

would facilitate their progress. The contrary was,

WHY GORDON PERISHliD.

however, the case, for as the river fell " reef after

reef"—as Colonel Colvile justly remarks, and as we

noticed in riding up along it subsequently to that

conversation — " was bared ; the difficulties to

navigation were increased until it became im

passable at low water for native craft, and a grave

source of difficulty even to the buoyant English

whalers."

The progress of the boats had been also seriously

delayed by the damages they received from collision

with rocks, owing to the turbid water of the

river concealing them until too near to be avoided.

The material of which they were constructed—

Canadian white spruce—rendered such accidents

often very serious, for the blow received in such

collisions often literally " shivered their timbers."

In two of the many instances which came under

our notice, in which both boats were hopelessly

wrecked, one had a hole made in her bottom as

if a round shot had been driven through, and the

adjacent timbers shivered into splinters, as if struck

by a hammer. In the other instance, we found the

stern and stern-post had been made of semi-decayed

elm, and the planking fastened to it by copper nails

only an inch long. The bow of this boat was com

pletely stove in. These damages were repaired by

patches of white tin, and in the journal of one of

the officers of the Royal Irish, which we published

with our history of the Expedition, instances are

given of the delay caused by the necessity of making

. such repairs. And yet, although the boats had thus

often to be hauled up and patched, and carried two

NOT THE DETAILS, BUT THE OBJECTIVE. 215

tons of stores, they did, with lemarkably few acci

dents, get up to Korti with their heavy loads.

Lord Wolseley had certainly a right to call

attention, in his despatch to Lord Harrington, to the

fact that the boats he had recommended as a means

of transport up the Nile had, in that respect, proved

their feasibility.

We are not dealing, however, now with the

success of these English-built boats, but with

that of the Expedition for the relief of Khartum,

of which they formed an important detail. Had

they been in the water at the Second Cataract a

month earlier than they were, and with a higher

Nile, it is probable that Lord Wolseley would not

have had to express to Lord Harrington his heart

felt regret on December 16th at the delay in

getting his forces together at Korti at an earlier

date.

In the despatch of January 12th his Lordship

admits that he believed that the garrison at

Khartum was very short of food. He must also

have anticipated from its elose investiture by the

enemy that its supplies would be still further

diminished. In fact, so short had they become that

on that very day Lord Wolseley reached Korti

Gordon made this entry in his journal :—

If some effort is not made before ten days, the town will fall.

It is inexplicable, this delay. If the Expeditionary Forces have

reached the river and met my steamers, one hundred men are

all that are required—Just to show themselves.

Why, therefore, did not Lord Wolseley yield to

the impression which Gordon's last message and the

2l6 WHY GORDON PERISHED.

inferences which ordinary common sense should

have led him to draw from it, namely, that Khartum

was in imminent danger of falling from starvation ?

At his own suggestion he had been supplied by Her

Majesty's Government with a Camel Brigade to

enable him, if any such an emergency arose, to push

a force across the desert at any hazard for its relief,

instead of deciding to adhere to his original plan of

operations. These he ought to have now appre

hended would delay him from raising its siege for at

least two months after he had received that urgent

message from Gordon which implored him to " come

quickly " to the rescue.

Lord Wolseley's unwarranted confidence in

Gordon's ability to hold out, even when he received

Gordon's letter of November 4th, had encouraged

him to delay accelerating his movements in the

manner we have indicated he might easily have

done. In the paragraph in his telegram to Sir

Evelyn Baring, on January 1st, he asks the opinion

of Her Majesty's Government on what he proposed

to do after receiving Gordon's message of December

1 6th, namely, that when he communicated with him

" by steam " from Mutemma, and if he found him

in extremis before the infantry sent up the river to

Berber had arrived there, he would—" Push forward

the Camel Corps to help him at all hazards."

From asking this opinion, Lord Wolseley either

betrays a want of confidence in his own judgment,

or seems to have lost that nerve and dash as a general

which so distinguished him in his early soldiering

days as a subaltern. Perhaps, however, we are

DISCORDANT NOTES. 217

warranted in coneluding that he would rather risk a

disaster at Khartum than incur the responsibility of

one to any part of the force which had been sent

under his command to avert it. Rather than run any

such a risk Khartum may fall and Gordon may

perish—or, as he hopes, be only made a prisoner! If

Her Majesty's Government approved of his plan of

operations, they, and not he, would be held re

sponsible for these catastrophes to the British public

Lord Wolseley's despatch of January 12th to

Lord Hartington seems, in some of its statements,

out of harmony with the message he sent to Gordon

by Sir C. W. Wilson four days previously. The

mission of the latter to Khartum was based upon

the hope that Gordon would be able to encourage

his garrison to hold out, when they had some

tangible evidence that English troops, coming to

their rescue, were at hand, but that no active move

ments would be made on their behalf by these

troops until the March following. He was instructed

to tell Gordon that—

No British troops will be sent to Khartum beyond a few

red coats in steamers for the purpose of impressing the

inhabitants that it was to the presence of an army that they

owe their safety. The siege of Khartum thus raised, all our

military arrangements would be made with a view to the

immediate occupation of Berber, and to a march across the

desert to Ariab, on the Berber and Suakim road.

From the words we have italicised, we are not to

infer that the siege was to be raised by the few

British soldiers which Sir Charles was ordered to

take up with him to Khartum. Nol In a previous


elause in these instructions, Lord Wolseley expresses

the hope that, when the Mahdi learns that the advance

guard of the coming English army had reached

Mutemma, he would flee ! This, his Lordship

informs Lord Hartington in his despatch of January

1 2th, would occur when Stewart occupied that place

on January 16th, for, as he enthusiastically observed,

" this column would be regarded as the head of

what the natives of this country believe to be an

enormous army, as it seems to them, from covering

in its advance up 450 miles of the river."

Then, after stating that a small column, marched

across the desert, would probably be able to fight its

way into and out of Khartum, but could not be

relied upon to bring away Gordon and his garrison

in safety, Lord Wolseley asserts that such an opera

tion, when Mutemma was occupied by a small force,

would present a different aspect, for then " this so-

called Mahdi and his followers would be well aware

that they had not only to deal with it, but also with

the English army, which they know is advancing up

the Nile on Khartum by Abu-Hamed and Berber."

Subsequent events proved how visionary all these

hopes had been, and also to a certain extent incon

sistent with his telegram to Lord Hartington, after

he received Gordon's letter of November, namely,

that it indicated the almost impossibility of his relief

without fighting.

His Lordship's opinion now was that the Mahdi,

whose army round Khartum had been .greatly

strengthened since November, would not stay to

SERIOUSLY MODIFIED INTENTIONS. 219

fight when he became aware of the advance of an

English army against him !

The points just mentioned seem to explain why

Lord Wolseley did not concentrate troops at Debbeh,

as he had originally proposed to do, and also to

modify very seriously his deelared intention to push

a column, at all hazards, across the desert to save

Gordon, if he should ascertain " by steamer that he

was really /'// extremis."

We dare not assert that his Lordship was resolved

at all hazards to avoid such a movement, but we may

safely assume that he did not evince, in his subse

quent operations, any readiness to do so. On the

contrary, he tenaciously adhered to his original plan

of operations, under the evident delusion that, what

ever happened to Khartum, his force would be well

fed, and not, if he could help it, be very much

exposed to danger.

220

CHAPTER XVI.

This deliberate plan of procedure acted upon by

Lord Wolseley is further most painfully manifested

in the despatch of the River Column, under the late

General Earle, in order primarily to capture Berber,

but also to seize Abu-Hamed, where supplies were

to be forwarded from Korosko across the desert to

supplement those carried with it. In fact, the trans

port by this route for supplies, in addition to those

brought up the Nile by the small boats, had been

previously arranged for by Lord Wolseley, in view

of the despatch of the River Column.

For example, we learn from his instructions, dated

December 27th, that General Earle was told it was

desirable to concentrate his force at Hamdab and

start thence as soon as he had 100 days' supplies

per man in hand to take with him, and that Major

Rundle had undertaken to have other supplies at

Abu-Hamed from Korosko four days after his

arrival at Hamdab.

These supplies were to have been conveyed across

the desert by the Ababdeh tribes who were under

Major Rundle's control, and comprised 200,000 rations

of groceries, 100,000 rations of biscuit, and 50,000

rations of preserved meat, then collected by native

craft at Korosko. Having thus filled up at Abu

HALTED AND FELL BACK. 221

Hamed, General Earle was to continue his advance

on Berber.

General Earle could not start from Hamdab until

January 24th, owing to the delay in filling up his

100 days' supplies, and he did not advance very far

until he had to fight a few hundred Monnassir

Arabs, strongly posted at the Jebel Kirbekan. In

dislodging them the column lost its general, two

colonels, and a number of men.

When the news of the fall of Khartum reached

Korti on February 4th it was halted, and its subse

quent history is told concisely in the following

correspondence with the Chief of the Staff and

Colonel Brackenbury, who, as Brigadier - General,

assumed command of the Nile Column after General

Earle was killed.

On February 24th, when the column was

encamped sixteen miles above Hibbeh, General

Brackenbury telegraphed to the Chief of the Staff at

Korti as follows :—

I am by map twenty-six miles from Abu-Hamed. My latest

information is that the enemy intend to fight there—at Abu-

Hamed—and I expect opposition if I advance upon it. There

is a cataract between this and Abu-Hamed ; and, if opposed,

it might take some days before I could occupy this place.

Therefore, although confident of being able to beat any force

opposed to me, I feel it my duty, in view of the first part of

your telegram, to fall back immediately to Abu-Dom.

The telegram here referred to by General Bracken

bury from Sir Redvers Buller, was one sent imme

diately after news had reached Korti of the fall of

Khartum.


Another despatch, sent from Korti by the Chief of

the Staff on February 26th, informed General

Brackenbury that Sir Redvers Buller, who replaced

Sir Herbert Stewart, who had been severely wounded

in the engagement of January 19th, had evacuated

Gubat, as the position on the Nile near Mutemma

was designated, because he had abandoned all

hope of going to Berber before autumn. He was,

therefore, ordered not to go to Abu-Hamed, but

having burnt and destroyed everything in the neigh

bourhood where Colonel Stewart was murdered, " to

withdraw all his force to Abu-Dom, near Merawi."

And then comes this significant sentence :—

Having punished the Monassir people for Stewart's murder,

it is not intended to undertake any military operations until

after approaching hot season.

In a telegram from Korti, asking him when he

expected to occupy Berber, General Brackenbury

replied that he did not think it possible to reach Berber

before the 28th February, and that any date given

must be pure conjecture, the time being dependent

on unknown rapids and unknown movements of the

enemy, but that he did not think he would reach

Berber before the 1 2th of March !

Unknown rapids ! Unknown, of course at the

time Lord Wolseley submitted his plans to Her

Majesty's Government. When asked, as we have

seen, if there were any difficulties to navigation

beyond those interposed by the Second and Third

Cataracts below Dongola, he replied, if there were,

they were not worth considering, for, as in the Red

AN UNJUSTIFIED RISK. 223

River Expedition, they could be passed by small

boats !

What a risk there was, in view of the state of

affairs at Khartum, for Lord Wolseley to venture

to move by water and take Berber because Gordon

had warned him not to leave it in his rear !

This decision to capture Berber before relieving

Khartum seems difficult to account for under the

uncertainty in which Lord Wolseley was placed from

his not having had accurate information about the

cataracts of the Nile beyond Merawi and the

absolutely accurate information he possessed of the

desert route from Korti to Mutemma.

This latter was supplied for the use of the Expedi

tion by the Army Intelligence Department, based

on the surveys made in 1875 for a railway from

Wady-Halfa to Khartum, and was as perfect almost

as a sea chart—for it gave, not only the topography

of the region, but indicated the distances by

kilometres.*

This department, however, according to a remark

made by Colonel Colville, were so puzzled about

the Shushuk Pass, near Kirbekan, that they could

only infer from reports about it that, if held by the

enemy in any force, it would be a serious obstacle

to the advance of a column up the river to Abu-

Hamed. Lord Wolseley himself had acknowledged

to Lord Hartington that he had no positive informa-

* This map was a facsimile of one borrowed from Messrs. Lease

and Bakewell, engineers, engaged in the survey of this railway, and

drawn by that firm in 1876, in view of its being valuable for the use

of travellers.

224 WHY GORDON PERISlIEl).

tion as to any point beyond the southern end of the

Wady-Halfa railway, where further progress in boats

became impossible—that, in fact, he had no informa

tion as to any such difficulties—but that, so far as

informed, the boats could be taken up all the cataracts.

It is rather strange to say that what the General

of the Expedition was thus in ignorance about, one

of the war correspondents at Sarkamatto, who

accompanied it, had ascertained early in December,

when on his way to Dongola. Mere he met Mr.

John Cook, who was on his way down the river in

a deahbeah, the reis of which, and the oldest on the

river, informed him that the obstaeles to navigation

between Abu-Dom and Berber were equal to those

of the Second and Third Cataracts, and would be

much greater as the river fell. Even when it was

at its flood native craft were over two months

voyaging from Ambukal to Berber.

Lord Wolseley, while acknowledging to Lord

Hartington the imperfection of the existing

information about the obstaeles to navigation of

the Nile beyond Sarras, affirmed that, whatever these

cataracts were, the small boats could either be taken

up or portaged round them. How long a time it

would take to do this in the case of those between

Korti and Berber he could not caleulate from his

want of exact information as to their character.

And yet, with the fate of Gordon and Khartum

trembling in the balance, he decides to " advance

by water " to take Berber, when he could have more

rapidly and surely done so by a march across the

country, as Gordon had suggested.

225

CHAPTER XVII.

The River Column, by which Lord Wolseley

moved by water to take Berber, even if it had gone

on, could not in any way have aided the attainment

of the main objects of the Expedition, for it was

not intended to reach there before the middle of

March.

Even if Lord Wolseley felt himself compelled, on

strategic grounds, to act upon Gordon's warning

about Berber, why, may we not ask, did he not

advance by road across country to do so ? Such

an operation, we contend, would not have been

more hazardous than his advance to occupy a post

at Mutemma by men and stores across the

Desert of Bayuda, which he subsequently attempted,

and as the following facts indicate, was equally

feasible.

The caravan road, evidently thus referred to by

Gordon in his message, leads up along the left bank

of the Nile from Korti for thirty miles to Abu-Dom,

and thence strikes for 143 miles across the country

to Berber, a distance thirty-three miles shorter than

from Korti to Mutemma.

Between Korti and Abu-Dom there is an open

reach of the river. This would have facilitated the

Q


rapid collection of the supplies necessary for a

flying column at the latter point.

The following table shows the comparative water

supplies along these two roads—the distances noted

being caleulated from their respective termini on

the river :—

Caravan Road to '^Beruer.

Wells. From Abu-Dom.

El-Kun 46 miles.

Saini 52 „

Tebel-El-Soped 74 „

Bir Karbai 124 „

Nile at Berber 143 „

Caravan Road to Mutemma.

Wells. _ From Korti.

El-Howeiyat 50 miles.

Aboo-Halfa 90 „

Jakdul 100 „

Abu-Klea 153 „

Nile at Mutemma 176 „

So far as our information goes, it leads us to

believe that the supply of water at the wells on the

Berber road was quite equal, if not superior, on that

leading to Mutemma. Our own personal knowledge

of the wells along the latter, however, enables us

to spe-'k positively about them.

After leaving the Nile at Korti with a supply of

water carried on camels fifty miles, two good days'

journey had to be traversed before the wells at

-

WATER IN THE DAYUDA DESERT. 227

El Howeiyat were reached. When Colonel Stanley

Clarke's convoy of stores, which we accompanied,

reached these wells at sunset on January 9th it

took the force twelve hours to replenish its water

owing to the paucity of the supply. We designate

them wells, but they were only pits from 12 ft. to

1 $ ft. deep, into which the water percolated from the

adjacent strata ; and the slowness with which it did

so caused this delay. Sir Herbert Stewart, on his

second march to Jakdul, arrived at El-Howeiyat

wells a few hours after our convoy had left them,

and finding the supply had been so thoroughly

lessened by us, had to push on to Aboo-Halfa.

The supply in the rock' cisterns at Jakdul was so

abundant, that from one pool 20,000 camels had been

watered during the course of the Expedition. The

supply at the Abu-Klea wells was from the

same sources as those at El-Howeiyat and

quite as deficient, so much so that it took our

column nearly eight hours to partially replenish its

supply.

Be all this as it may, we may feel confident that

General Gordon, who knew about their water supply,

would not have advised Lord Wolseley to come to

Berber or Mutemma by the roads leading to them

from Ambukol had he not deemed it sufficient

along either of them.

But Gordon did not expect, as we have seen from

the entry in his journal on September 21st, that

Lord Wolseley would march his whole force, or the

greater portion of it, across the desert. His words

are :—

Q 2

228 WHY GORIX>N PERISHED.

My view is ... I would not attempt to pass the bulk of

British Force across the country, but only the fighting column

to co-operate with the steamers.

But Lord Wolseley, as \ve have seen, had decided

upon concentrating his whole force at Shendy

(opposite Mutemma) before he made any direct or

serious attempt to relieve Khartum, and adhered to

this decision after he had received Gordon's urgent

message of December 14th, imploring him to come

quickly to the rescue.

In view of this decision, and the consequences

by which it was followed, how different would have

been the result had General Lord Wolscley been be

leaguered in Khartum and General Gordon been in

command of the army sent for its relief ! The latter,

as we infer from the above entry in his journal,

would have sent at least two of the infantry regi

ments out of the four which formed the River Column

to capture Berber, in co-operation with his steamers,

and then to communicate with him direct !

Lord Wolseley, as we have reasons for stating,

excuses himself from following the course thus sub

stantially recommended by Gordon, on the ground

of his lack of camel transport at the time. From our

point of view, we regard this excuse as inexcusable

as it is untenable, for the following reasons.

In the first place, had not his Lordship in his

despatch of January 12th reminded Lord Hartington

of his recommendation for the organisation of a

camel brigade in his letter to the War Office in

September, because it would secure for him the

power of moving rapidly across the desert to

THE CAMEL CORPS. 229

Mutemma ? This brigade, he then further stated,

was to be formed of picked troops, under carefully-

selected officers on lines recommended. This

brigade, known as the " Camel Corps," was formed

upon the lines laid down by Lord VVolseley.

When on the field it comprised the three following

regiments :—

I.—The Guards Camel Regiment, formed out of

detachments from the Grenadier, Coldstream, and

Scots Guards, and from the Royal Marines.

II.—The Heavy Camel Regiment was, as its

designation implies, comprised of detachments from

the Household Cavalry and from several Dragoon

Regiments and Lancers.

III.—The Light Camel Regiment was made up of

detachments from various Hussar Regiments.

If this Camel Corps was intended for fighting we

can hardly see where the picked cavalry troops come

in. One third of it were certainly all that could be

desired, for it ineluded the " Guards " who, we need

hardly remark, are recognised as the very cream

of our infantry, both as regards officers and men.

The other two thirds of the corps were composed of

cavalry on camels, and yet, as the following extract

from the " Notes issued by Lord Wolseley for the use

of camel regiments " these two regiments, when in

action, were to fight as infantry :—

The cavalry soldier fights on horseback ; infantry, mounted

on horses, fight dismounted—but within easy reach—on which

they retire if hard pressed, or have their horses brought to

them.

The soldiers of the Camel Regiment will fight only on foot.

230 WHY GORDON PEKISHED.

They are mounted on camels only to enable them to make

long marches. . . . The men of the Camel Corps must,

therefore, trust solely to themselves and their weapons

whenever they have dismounted for action.

The men and officers of the two cavalry regiments

in the Camel Corps were, therefore, according to

Lord Wolseley himself, not to fight as cavalry, but

to be used, when brought into conflict with the

enemy, as infantry, for which, from their drill and

training, however, they were as wholly unfitted, as

were the infantry from fighting as cavalry by them.

We know how bravely they fought on foot in the

square at Abu-Klea. It was not wholly their fault,

as we have shown in our history of the Expedition,

that the Dervishes broke into it at the corner round

which they were formed, but was owing in great

part to the pressure of the camels against it and the

fact that the two masses of the enemy which entered

the formation there were screened from the fire by

an intervening hill in their approach. Two-thirds

of the men and the majority of the officers who

were killed on that occasion belonged to those

cavalry detachments. Had they been as well trained

in the use of the Martini-Henry Rifle and of the

bayonet instead of the sword and the carbine, as were

the mounted infantry which formed two-thirds of the

left face of the square, probably the breach in it

referred to would not have happened, for the latter

received and repelled—without their formation being

broken or moved a pace to their rear—the masses of

the enemy which surged up against it.

We have good reasons for stating that the late Sir

CAVALRY NOT INFANTRY. 231

Herbert Stewart, himself a cavalry officer, placed

these detachments of the heavy camel regiment in

a part of the square which he did not think would

have to bear the brunt of the fray. They formed

its rear face and a part of its left face. He fully

expected that the attack of the enemy would be made

in the front and right faces, both of which and the

right of the left face being formed of infantry. It

was their steadiness and withering fire on the masses

of the enemy that saved the Desert Column in this

battle from a crushing defeat.

Why was it that Lord Wolseley " picked " these

men for such a service ? They were not trained to

fight as infantry, and yet were called upon to do so.

An infantry regiment would have been more reliable

in such circumstances.

But Lord Wolseley did not expect any serious

fighting would have to be done when this Desert

Column was despatched from Korti. The " Heavies "

were to be employed after Mutemma was reached,

according to his instructions to Sir Herbert Stewart,

in the convoy of supplies from Jakdul to that post.

And this was based on the fancy that, as cavalry

were often employed, or usually, in such a service,

these " Heavies," mounted on camels, but on which

they were not to fight, could plausibly be used for

that purpose. We mean " plausibly," for that appears

to have been the only reason which can be assigned

for their employment under such conditions on this

occasion. And here the spirit of the courtier was

manifested rather than that of military genius in

planning a campaign, for the latter always has in


view the "practical," while the other seeks for a

purpose—what we may call the ornamental.

These cavalry regiments absorbed, as mounts,

about 800 of Lord Wolseley's stock of camels.

Then, according to a statement made by Colonel

Colvile, the weight carried by each animal, ineluding

150 lb. for that of the rider, was 400 lb. With the

man marching at his side the camel would only have

to carry 250 lb. It would therefore require, at this

rate, about 500 camels to transport the rations, kit,

and spare ammunition for 800 men.

The chief causes which contributed to shortening

this supply of camel transport is variously accounted

for by Colonel Colvile. He refers it in one instance

to the scarcity of forage, which necessitated its

reduction to the lowest possible limits. Then he

inform his readers that the camels were not forth

coming which the Mudir of Dongola promised them

Saleh, chief of the Kababish tribes, should supply

for the Expedition. In another place he states,

"so meagre was the supply of saddles that, in

spite of the urgent necessity for camels, orders had

to be issued that none were to be bought unless

furnished with saddles."

This lack of camel transport at a critical moment,

however caused, is but an additional evidence of

the failure of Lord Wolscley's elaborate plan of

operations. The contingencies which Colonel

Colvile mentions as chargeable for it had evidently

not been sufficiently taken into consideration when

they were formed. Nevertheless, we venture to

assert that such provision should have been made,

THE PROVENDER QUESTION. 233

in view of some of them occurring, as would have

reduced their influence in the progress of the

Expedition to a minimum. Others, that of shortness

of provender, as stated by Colonel Colvile, is not

in strict accordance with facts. Finally, all these

difficulties which he alleges shortened the supply

of Lord Wolscley's camel transport might have

been met by a possible departure from some of the

previously fixed details of his plan of operations.

While there was undoubtedly an absolute dearth

of forage in the region on both sides of the Second

and Third Cataracts, that from Wady-Halfa to

Hannek, beyond the latter point, and in the district

of Dongola, there was an abundant supply.

There was a large stock of grain in the Govern

ment stores at Dongola and Debbeh in December.

At the former place the quantities were as follows :

—Barley 357,000 lb., dhurra 591,000 lb., wheat

54,000 lb. We have no estimate of the quantity

in store at Debbeh, but from our personal observation

coneluded that it was nearly equal to that at

Dongola.

On our way up the left bank of the Nile to Korti,

we found plenty of dhurra at nearly all the villages.

In many places there were also, as at Khandak, large

standing fields of it available for use as green fodder.

If correctly informed, Lord Wolseley had been

authorised by the Egyptian Government to deal

with the Mudir, not as a suppliant for supplies,

but as master of the situation. Instead, therefore,

of making contracts through him for camels, grain,

or labour, and also paying those who furnished


them through him, he ought to have dealt directly

with the latter. As a consequence of his failure

to do so, enormous prices had to be paid to these

middlemen by us for everything that was thus

bought, and those who supplied the " goods "

either did not receive their usual market value

for them, or, as in the case of those who were

thus contracted with to labour for us, many were

not paid at all. Several gangs of natives engaged

through the Mudir to help the boats up the

cataracts, and for other work consequently deserted

en bloc!

The Vakeel boasted, in the middle of December,

when we were passing through Dongola, and

most unblushingly, that he had himself made a

profit of £10,000 by these nefarious modes of

dealing. We never learned, of course, what was

the share of the Mudir in the plunder, but it must

have exceeded that of his subordinate. Both of

them not only thus enriched themselves, but also

discredited us with the native population, who

naturally, and so far as they could, evaded the

pressure put on them by the Dongolese authorities,

and held back their camels and produce.* It was

this indirect mode of dealing with the natives, which

largely contributed to shorten Lord Wolseley's camel

transport and supplies of fodder.

* The premature announcement of the " Rescue and Retire policy of

Her Majesty's Government had also its influence in the matter."

235

CHAPTER XVIH.

IT seems, however, from another statement made by

Colonel Colvile in this connection, that more camels

could have been easily procured if there had

been saddles for them. Hereby hangs a tale of

want of forethought on the part of those whose

duty it was to have secured in advance an adequate

supply of this absolute necessity for baggage

animals.

A sufficient number of riding saddles had, however,

been provided for the Camel Corps, which, ineluding

the mounted infantry, required about 1,600 to

mount them. Much skill and taste and ingenuity

had been exercised in the design and construction

of these. They were grand saddles, covered with

crimson coloured sheep-skin, and fitted with easy

riding cushions. They were also supplied with

two haversacks, and saddle eloths of the crimson

leather, and also with stirrups.

The foundation of those manufactured at Cairo

for the Expedition was of wood, but some genius,

not well up in the natural history of the animal

on which they were to be used, had invented an

iron saddle. We saw specimens of these at Wady


Halfa, and were told they were of English manu

facture.

The latter were, undoubtedly, too heavy to be

used at all, and the former were so badly constructed,

as far as fitting the camel's back was concerned,

that they largely contributed to swell the loss of

many of them during our hard desert march.

Nearly all of them suffered from sore backs, and

the general use of carbolic oil to heal or soothe them

made it necessary, for one like myself not obliged

to ride in the column, to keep to windward of it.

It does seem strange that, while so much attention

was given to provide such swell mounts for the

officers and men of the regiments of this Camel

Brigade, but little, or inadequate attention, had

been paid to provide saddles for the camels which

would have to be employed in transporting their

supplies, kits, and ammunition.

Rope lashings also seem to have been forgotten,

for, in order to supply them, a regular " rope walk "

was established by the Transport Department, in

which the cotton spun by the natives was used

in manufacturing substitutes. These deficiencies

were painfully evident to mc on January 7th at

Korti, under the following circumstances:—

A convoy with stores under Colonel Stanley Clarke

was ordered to leave that day for Jakdul, and

on his invitation I gladly decided to accompany it.

It was originally intended to march at noon. Two

o'elock came and it was not ready. My tent was

struck and camels loaded and ready. This made

the delay so irksome that I rode out to that part

WORKED TO DEATH. 237

of the camp where preparations were being made

for its despatch, and learned that both saddles and

lashings were needed to complete the loading of

the stores. It was nearly sunset before the tail of

the column of 1,066 camels got up on the desert-

plateau from the alluvial plain, and where it had to

halt until the moon rose shortly after midnight

before it could proceed.

The transport which Lord Wolseley even had at

his command was not economically used, for it was

soon reduced by the unnatural use made of the

camels employed in it. As has been remarked, his

Lordship regarded them as animals whose powers

of endurance had never been properly appreciated.

He, however, had coneluded that they could

be worked to any extent without proper food and

necessary rest. Take, for example, the way they

were driven and used in the Desert Column.

Jakdul is ninety-eight miles from Korti, and Sir

Herbert Stewart, in his first march there, covered

this distance in three marches of 32^ miles each with

loaded camels. These were returned empty to Korti,

and were driven at the same rate back to it. In

consequence of this unnatural speed, over 600 of

them were almost completely done up, and the

others rendered less fit for the work before them

than they would have been by those who knew how

to use them.

It was a serious mistake on the part of Lord

Wolseley to have made two marches to Jakdul in

order to occupy Mutemma, instead of one. He had

been warned by Gordon not to let rumours spread

238 WHY GOKDON PERISHED.

abroad of his approach. This double march in

effectively did so, and led to the battles at Abu-

Klea and Mutemina.

Colonel Colvile, in asking us to excuse the mistake

thus made by Lord Wolseley for not making a dash

all the way across the Bayuda Desert on Mutemma,

on account of the shortness of camel transport,

seems not to have been aware of the fact that Sir

Herbert Stewart^ on his first march, carried with

him secret orders to the effect that, if he did not find

a sufficient supply of water at Jakdul to warrant

the establishment of a post there, he was to push

seventy-six miles further onto the Nile at Mutemma.

Unfortunately he found the supply adequate for the

purpose, and, after examining it, and as he stood

before the lower pool, from which no fewer than

20,000 camels had been watered during the course

of the Expedition, he turned to one of his staff and

said :—

As I cannot conscientiously report that there is an insuffi

cient supply ofwater here for a post, I must, as ordered, return

to Korti, with the prospect of having to fight our way to

Mutemma, when wc march on it from here, for evidently we

were not expected to come by this route.

The information Lord Wolseley received on

December 31st, from his Intelligence Department,

was sufficiently favourable to warrant such a dash

across the Bayuda Desert on Mutemma.

That information was to the effect that the bulk

of the Mahdi's army was concentrated round

Omdurman Fort, and round Khartum itself, which

was still safe in Gordon's hands. Small raiding

UNWARNED OF DANGER. 239

parties were believed to be operating on the Khar

tum and Debbeh road, but the Bayuda Desert was

reported to be quiet. The Dervish force at Mutemma

was computed to be only 2, $00 or 3,000 Arabs, armed

with Remington rifles, fowling-pieces, and two brass

field-guns. The Mahdi was, however, reported to

be about to send another brass gun and a Gatling

there, and a reinforcement of a 1,000 men to Shendy.

Lord Wolseley had subsequently received infor

mation about the state of the road between Korti

and Mutemma, in a telegram from the Mudir of

Dongola, on December 30th. It stated that the

enemy were about sending 20,000 men to the

Bayuda Desert, to elose this road against an advance

over it by British troops.

Sir Herbert Stewart had, however, left Korti

before this latter information had been received by

Lord Wolseley, and even then if he had been

disposed to countermand or modify his orders about

returning to Korti from Jakdul under the circum

stances mentioned, he could not have done so

excepting by despatching a messenger by camels

after him, for he had no other method of communi

cating with Sir Herbert, nor had the latter with

him, when he found his way open to Mutemma. '

A field telegraph-cart with Sir Gerald Graham's

column had kept up a communication between him

and Suakim, but no such a provision had been made

either on Sir Herbert's first march to Jakdul nor

subsequently. He was sent off from his base, as

our Gallican neighbours would express it, en i'air.

A large amount of telegraph equipment and


stores had been sent up the river to Assouan, but

from lack of transport it had been detained there,

excepting about twenty miles of wire. When Lord

VVolseley took leave of us on the night of November

17th at Wady-Halfa, on his return to Dongola,

Colonel (now Major-General) Webber, the energetic

and able chief of the Telegraph Department of the

Expedition, asked leave to bring some of it up the

river, Lord Wolscley refused to grant it, because

" Men can do without news, but not without food."

It appeared to me then, and the impression was

deepened by subsequent events, that generals could

not, while their soldiers could do without the former.

One hundred and twenty camels could have run

a line of field telegraph on six days from Korti to

Jakdul, and there was at the former place a large

heliographic apparatus.

Lord Wolseley, in giving an estimate of the force

he would require in September, had ineluded in it

four battalions to keep open his line of communica

tions between Assouan and Shendy. This was of

unquestionable importance. Viewed from the same

standpoint, he certainly in such a case as that of

the Desert Column should have adopted the means

supplied by the heliographic apparatus at hand , for

keeping himself in touch with it after it left Korti.

In fact, Sir Herbert Stewart, on his second march,

fully expected that this would be done. Had he

been followed by an heliographic communication

with his base, even as far as ELHoweiyat, half way

to Jakdul on his first march, it might have prevented

his second, by affording a way of consulting Lord

WHY, WHAT NONSENSE? 24I

Wolseley about the importance of taking advantage

of the open road he found between Jakdul and

Mutemma.

Then again, before \ve marched out from the

former place on January 14th on Mutemma, when

it was known by the Intelligence Department at

Korti that the Mahdi, becoming aware of the

intention of the English troops crossing the Bayuda

Desert, had sent a large force to prevent our column

from reaching the Nile, unfortunately there were no

means such as those indicated to warn us of this

movement by the enemy.

The omission of this now regularly-adopted means

to enable an advancing army to keep up a con

tinuous communication with its base was, for the

reasons stated, unfortunate. It was humorously, and

perhaps also correctly, accounted for by a well-

known officer of our force thus : Why, what

nonsense ! They did not need any such thing as a

field telegraph, for they were just going to make a

dash across the desert to Khartum and bring back

General Gordon in their arms and then be all made

dukes and viscounts !

Returning to Colonel Colvile's observation in

extenuation of Sir Herbert's double march from

Korti to Jakdul before Lord Wolseley's intention

of occupying Mutemma was effected, on the ground

of the lack of camel transport, we assert that for the

following further reasons we regard it as untenable.

We take it for granted that Lord Wolseley, who

probably made the suggestion to Colonel Colvile

on which this explanation is founded, felt the

R

242 WHY GORDON PliRISHED.

importance of sending a column direct from Korti

to Mutemma. If, therefore, this ought to have been

done, a shortness of camel transport should not

have hindered him from making the movement.

The Camel Corps had been organised for a

hazardous inarch direct on Khartum if it should

at any time during the Expedition be thought

necessary. But, as we have seen, Lord Wolseley,

from his confidence in Gordon's ability to hold out

until his more roundabout and scientific mode of

reaching him two months later could be carried out,

did not require its use on this occasion. The

column was despatched by him to seize Mutemma

and establish posts at the Jakdul and Abu-Klea

wells. Gordon's boats were waiting for it at

Mutemma. Now if Sir Herbert Stewart had been

sent direct to Mutemma when he left Korti on

December 30th and pushed on as rapidly as he had

done to Jakdul, he could have reached there on

January Cth, and communicated with Gordon by his

steamers by the 8th at the latest. It was not,

therefore, as has been represented by Lord Wolseley

and others, and believed by Lord Cromer, that the

fall of Khartum on January 26th would have been

averted if Sir C. W. Wilson had left El Gubat two

days earlier than he had done. The bare possibility

of the relief at this juncture of the critical, nay

desperate, condition of things with Gordon when

our column reached there on January 20th, was lost

by this imperfect attempt of Lord Wolseley to

establish a post at Mutemma for the objects at

which it was aimed.

EXACTLY WHERE IT HALTED. 243

That there was even a bare possibility of that fall

being arrested by a rapid movement on Mutemma

to meet Gordon's steamers ought to have led Lord

Wolseley, therefore, to have ventured making such a

movement—even if it had been more hazardous than

it really appeared to him to be at the time. In fact,

it was not so hazardous as has been generally

supposed ; but was actually made so by being

imperfectly carried out.

In the first place, Lord Wolseley was provided

with a map of the route from Ambukol and Korti to

Jakdul,Abu-Klea, and Mutemma based upon surveys

made by Mr. Fowler for a projected railway from

Wady-IIalfa to Shendy and Khartum. It gave

him, in the most minute detail, a topographical

description of the country, and had even marked on

it the distances from point to point in kilometres.

So accurate was it in the latter respect that the late

Sir Herbert Stewart, in his despatch describing the

battle of Abu-Klea wells, stated that the column

had halted on the morning of the 16th January for

breakfast at 1 1.30 a.m. " at the spot marked on the

map by the 840th kilometre."

Nor can we, as Colonel Colvile suggests, take into

consideration the lack of camel transports as justi

fying the double march to Jakdul, not only for the

reasons already given—namely, that Sir Herbert

Stewart had orders to push on to the Nile at Mutemma

if water enough for a post was not found there—but

because Lord Wolseley adhered rigidly to his fixed

plan of the campaign about the use of a mounted

force. It does not appear, therefore, that being short

R 2


of camels he might not have deviated from this

feature of the Expedition, by either marching part

of his men in this first march across the desert, or

have economised his transport by sending with Sir

Herbert Stewart a less quantity of supplies, to be

forwarded subsequently under the protection of

infantry marching on foot. It was not necessary

that a sufficiency of these supplies for the establish

ment of a post at Jakdul should have been sent with

the flying column intended to seize and occupy

Mutemma.

The possibility of such an operation as \ve have

thus suggested is proved by the fact that, when Lord

Wolscley received Sir C. W. Wilson's despatch about

the battle near Mutemma, he promptly marched two

regiments across the desert to strengthen the

decimated force at El Gubat.

The Royal Irish (one of these regiments) left Korti

in half battalions on January 28th and 29th respec

tively, and this is how they marched :—

Each man carried on him a filled water-bottle,

70 rounds of ammunition, and his rolled overcoat.

Their blankets and water-proof sheets, 230 rounds

of reserve ammunition, eight days' rations for each

man, and a kit-bag for four, with an allowance

of one gallon of water per man per day, and

considerable quantities of supplies were sent on

camels with these half battalions, one camel trans

porting thirteen days' rations for eight men quite

easily.

The marches were made at night, and the average

daily distance covered between Korti to Jakdul

NOT SAILORS, HUT SOLDIERS. 24$

was 14J miles. The shortest was ten miles, and the

longest seventeen miles.

Having personally withdrawn from Gubat on the

evening of the day when the news was received

there of the fall of Khartum, in order to keep

up our communications with London, we had the

gratification of witnessing three companies of them

marching into the Jakdul gorge on February 5th.

Their step was as elastic and their formation as

well kept after their march of 100 miles across the

desert as one would naturally expect from our well-

trained and disciplined infantry. In fact, they

marched as they would have done past the Colours

on a review at Aldershot !

This was not our first acquaintance with the

Royal Irish, for we had met them on their arrival at

Wady-Halfa, and were not surprised from their

seasoned appearance to learn subsequently that

Colonel Shaw, who commanded them, had thus

expressed himself when he received the order to

proceed up the Nile in the small boats :—

I am the Colonel of a regiment of soldiers, not sailors !

Why do they not let me march my men up the river to the

front ?

Lord Wolseley had now a practical illustration

of his ability to do so by this march across the

Bayuda Desert.

It is certain that the rest of the infantry of the

force under his command could have done likewise,

and that, therefore, shortness of camels, in view

of the crisis at Khartum, was no reason why they

■

/

/

246 WHY GORDON PERIS1IED.

should not have marched across the desert for its

relief. Take, for another example, the Guards'

Camel Regiment, composed of picked men from

regiments which have always been regarded, and

on every occasion have proved themselves to be,

the very first in physique and training of our

infantry regiments. They also gave abundant proof

of the mistake Lord Wolscley made in not sending

them on to Mutemma instead of to Jakdul, in the

first instance, as he had now despatched the Royal

Irish on an emergency.

For example, when the force at Gubat was with

drawn in February, owing to the collapse of the camel

transport of the Desert Column, the Guards, like the

other regiments of the Camel Corps, had to march

back on foot to Korti. We have not all the particulars

of their march, but this we do know, that that able

officer, Colonel Mildmay Wilson, who was in

command of them at the time, marched his

men easily, after leaving Jakdul for Korti, forty-

eight miles in forty-two hours, and subsequently

marched them down to Dongola, about 170 miles,

without any material discomfort to the men, and in

tropical June weather !

We may mention in this connection also that in

his final report (March, 1885) of the operations in

the Eastern Soudan, General Graham bore the

following testimony to the physical endurance of

two battalions of the Scots GuaiJs he had with him.

In a reconnaissance made by them in different

directions in order to protect those engaged on the

construction of the railway from Suakim to Berber,

A SUCCESSFUL CAMEL COUPS. 247

he stated that one day they marched nearly twenty

miles over rougli passes without a man falling out !

Sir Gerald further stated in his report that his

Camel Corps was most successful, and that of the

500 camels sent to him from India as mounts for it,

300 only were used for mounting them. These were

provided with saddles made for the transport of two

men on each animal, and had one native driver for

every three camels.

The remaining 200 camels were used on the " ride-

and-tic " system, that is, familiarly, " You ride and

I'll walk, and then by-and-by we'll change places."

By this economical use of his 500 camels General

Graham informs us that he had thus secured the

means of moving on an emergency about 1,800

infantry, one-half of which would always be mounted ;

and, further, that with his Camel Corps, infantry,

and cavalry, he had at his command a formidable

column.

In view of these facts, Colonel Colvile was not

justified in pleading Lord Wolscley's shortness of

camels as a reason for his not having sent the

Desert Column direct to Mutemma on December

30th, instead of first occupying Jakdul.

248

CHAPTER XIX;

Nor can we admit, under all the circumstances,

that before seizing Mutemma, Jakdul should have

been occupied as a post, for even this was contingent

upon its water supply.

That its occupation as post before moving on

Mutemma formed part of Lord Wolseley's cast-iron

plan of operations is evident from a despatch he

sent to Sir Evelyn Wood, on December 27th,

directing him to come to Korti at once. In it he

explains that the intention was to form a post at

Jakdul wells, to be garrisoned by the Royal Sussex

Regiment, and collect there sixty days' supplies for

the whole force. The mounted troops were then to

occupy Mutemma, and either at once proceed to

Khartum, or else bring some more supplies to

Jakdul, or to form a garrison at Shendy, as circum

stances may direct.

Now, knowing Gordon's perilous situation, as Lord

Wolseley must have, or certainly ought to have

known, from General Gordon's letter of November

4th and the sketch it contained of the position of

the enemy round it, and from the message he had

received from him on December 31st, informing him

of the critical condition of Khartum on the 14th of

SHORT OF ITS KIGHT OBJECTIVE. 249

December, these deliberate and cool caleulations for

moving for its relief not only excite our surprise, but

also, if we may use such a term, our indignation.

We naturally, therefore, ask if the needed supplies,

to which he referred in his despatch to Sir Evelyn

Wood of December 27th, and for the object he

proposed, could not have been collected at Jakdul,

after Mutemma had been seized, and communication

opened with General Gordon by his steamers, which

his Lordship knew were there ? Was it not a

matter of stratcgetic importance that, in view of

the nearness to Mutemma of the large army of

the Mahdi, to have seized it by a forced march ?

Such a march, as we have shown, might even easily

have been effected by Sir Herbert Stewart when he

reached Jakdul on January 2nd.

" We want you to come quickly ! " was Gordon's call

to Lord Wolseley from Khartum on December

14th. " Make by the roads to Berber and Mutemma.

Do not let rumours of your approach. spread abroad.

My steamers await you at Mutemma."

To these urgent appeals Lord Wolseley virtually

turned a deaf ear, although in September he

informed Lord Hartington that, if he found Gordon

to be in extremis, the Camel Corps he was about to

organise would enable him to move for his relief.

And yet now, from want of camels, as Colonel

Colvile tells us, could not do so effectively. He

had spoken, in another and later despatch, of

having gone beyond the limits of ordinary prudence

in sending it across the desert as he did. By the

double march to Jakdul instead of making a dash


and a surprise march on Mutemma, as events

showed, he had nearly risked its entire failure,

and no doubt led to that other dash on Khartum,

as Father Ohrwalder has told us, on that fatal

January 26th !

We cannot but compare his decision and action

in this case with the conduct and decision of other

generals in Her Majesty's Army when called upon

to make rapid movements to meet emergencies.

Take, for example, the march of General Lord

Roberts from Cabul on Candahar in order to relieve

its beleaguered and endangered garrison.

From a paper read before the Royal United

Service Association by Colonel (now General)

Chapman, we quote here the following reference

to the inception and execution of this celebrated

march, because of its comparative bearing upon the

Nile Expedition in both these respects.

A march conducted without a base of operations or com

munications of any kind through a hostile country, and

towards a point presumably in the hands of an enemy who

had recently been successful, could only be warranted by such

a necessity as had now arisen. In this instance, however,

the wisdom which prompted the measure, and the courage

which executed it, sprang of experience and of the confidence

which claims success as a certainty. The result justified the

conception, and the march from Cabul to Candahar has been

recognised as a great achievement. It will be remembered

that when it was undertaken, and until a crushing defeat had

been inflicted on Ayub-Khan at Candahar itself, the movement

was condemned in no measured terms by military critics, its

originators being judged to have acted in complete disregard

of the principles of military science ! With troops, however,

trained and equipped as were those selected for the under

FROM CABUL ON CANDAHAK. 251

taking, .1 commander may, humanly speaking, anticipate

success in any enterprise.

When the news was received at Cabul, on July

28th, of the defeat of General Barrows' brigade

and the retirement of our troops into the City of

Candahar, it was decided at first by the generals

there that relief to the beleaguered garrison could

only be effected from Scinde with great delay and

difficulty at that season of the year. When Sir

Donald Stewart was called upon for his opinion by

the Indian Government, he counselled the despatch

of a force from Cabul, under the command of

General Roberts (now Lord Roberts) to accomplish

this object.

Orders for the despatch of this column were

received on August 3rd, leaving the constitution of

the force, its equipment, and other details to the

officers at Cabul. It was decided that, as no

dependence could be placed in Afghan assurances

about supplies along the route, that the columns

should march without any dependence upon them

—in fact, independently. It did so march, and

accomplished its object.

^-Napier's march on Emaum-Ghur is also in point

here.

At Dcjee, he wrote, I found such prevarication and such

ignorance as to the route, that I became impressed with the

objections which Moorad and all the other Ameers felt to our

entering the desert, and also judged it unsafe to risk a large

force without any positive information about water. All the

authorities were in the belief that to reach Emaum-Ghur

was necessary to the tranquillity of Scinde, I therefore


resolved to advance with a small force, leaving the other troops

at Dejee. On the night of the 5th we moved with 350 of the

Queen's 22nd Regiment—all moved on camels, two soldiers

on each. We had two twenty-four pounder Howitzers, with

double teams of camels. 200 Scinde horse, and fifteen days'

provisions, and four days' water. The road was in some

places hilly, and in others very sandy.

The daily marches, he informs us, were from ten

to eleven miles, and the last march, being through

deep sand, the guns had to be hauled by 160

camels and sixty men, and yet he informs us that :—

Nevertheless, having foreseen and prepared for all

mishaps, they could only have delayed, not baftled me. The

desert presented some difficulties, but we overcame them.

Our burden camels were miserable animals, but we only lost

eight or nine out of 600 !

The recent Chitral Expedition may also be

quoted here as an illustration of what a general

may be called upon to accomplish, and do so

successfully by a reliance on the discipline, endurance,

and native pluck of the rank and file of the troops

under his command, and by his skill in directing

their movements.

Frost and snow, high mountain passes held in

strong positions and in superior numbers by a daring

enemy, were the difficulties with which the small

force comprised in the Expedition had to contend.

Yet these were met and overcome by General Sir

Robert Low in order to attain its object.

This object was of a far less pressing nature and

national importance than was that of the Nile

Expedition, and yet the manner by which it was

NOT RECKLESSLY, DUT BRAVELY. 253

successfully attained has added another proof of

the prowess of our soldiers when efficiently led.

In the instances \ve have thus quoted the generals

never hesitated to incur risk in order to attain the

objects of the Expeditions upon which they were

despatched. They faced such risks—not recklessly,

but bravely—and never allowed them to delay or to

baffle them.

The inception of the Nile Expedition, the choice

of its route and the great care manifested by its

Commander to avoid any extraordinary risk to his

men—and the measures so far as supplies were

concerned to save them from, not merely want of

food, but from any discomfort—is all strangely in

contrast with the examples of the generals men

tioned, as well as of others to which reference might

also be made. It does appear, from the manner in

which Lord Wolseley conducted the Nile Expedition,

in these and other respects, as if he would rather

run the risk of Khartum falling, than by any

movements to relieve it he might endanger the

force placed under his command for that object.

On one occasion he gives expression to this

excessive carefulness. It occurs in a despatch,

dated February 8th, 1885, to Sir Redvers Buller,

who was then at Gubat—informing him that he was

waiting for the decision of Her Majesty's Government

about seizing Berber. In order to quiet any anxiety

his Lieutenant might feel as to the danger of such a

movement, Lord Wolseley adds :—

I have no doubt the first thought of the Government will be

the absolute safety of this Army.


This reminds us of the remarks made about

Admiral Blake by a contemporary writer when

Sir Henry Vane appointed him to succeed such

Admirals of the Commonwealth as Warwick and

Moultaine, because they allowed Prince Rupert to

carry on unscathed his piracy along our coasts.

" This prototype of Nelson, this writer quaintly

observed, was not one of those admirals who

would think that the main object of a naval

expedition was to bring himself and his ships safe

home again."

In the hope Lord Wolscley expressed to Sir

Redvcrs Buller about Her Majesty's Government's

first thought about the absolute safety of the Army

under his command would seem to simply suggest

that his moments were not entirely free in some

respects, but controlled by it. Another indication

of such a control was his telegram to Lord Hartington

when he received Gordon's letter of November 4th,

that "it did not seem from it that Khartum could

be relieved without fighting." We have no

published reply to this intimation, but in justice to

Lord Wolseley we should have one. We have,

however, his instructions to guide us, in which it

has been seen he was placed under obligations not

to fight if possible. General Gordon refers in his

journal, in the extract we give from it, to Sir Evelyn

Baring's "peace policy." The latter, with Lord

Northbrook, drew up Lord Wolseley's instruction,

and must also, therefore, have had a hand in

checking any movement involving risk on financial

grounds.

AN OPEN ROAD.

Sir Herbert Stewart left Korti with the Desert

Column, as stated, on December 30th, at 3 p.m., and

arrived at the Jakdul wells at 6.45 am. on

January 2nd, the total distance being ninety-eight

miles, and the time consumed in covering it was only

32$ hours. Thence to Mutemma was seventy-six

miles further, but it was only fifty-two miles from the

Abu-Klea wells. The march so far was evidently a

surprise, for no Arabs were met along the desert

tracks, though traces of them were seen. On nearing

Jakdul, a party of men wearing the Mahdi's uniform

were captured, who were supposed to be on their

way from Mutemma as emissaries of the Mahdi

to a Sowarab Sheik, who had for some time been

raiding the villages between Korti and Merawi.

It was very evident to Sir Herbert Stewart that

the road was equally open on to Mutemma, and,

if his orders had allowed him to do so, he would

have pushed on there ; and, as the place was known

to be only occupied by about 2,500 Dervishes, he

could easily have captured it.

His general orders were to occupy Jakdul, leaving

the Guards Camel Regiment and a detachment of

the Royal Engineers there — 422 of all ranks,

under the command of Colonel the Hon. E. E. T.

Boscawen — and then return to Korti with the

camels (2,206) he had taken with him for transport

purposes. He was, however, instructed, as we are

credibly informed, that if the supply of water was

not sufficient to warrant the establishment of a

post at Jakdul, to push on to the Nile and seize

Mutemma.


After an examination of the pools* or rock

cavities, and finding in them an abundant supply of

water, he observed to one of his aides-de-camps that

he could not conscientiously report that they were

not sufficient for a post, and that, therefore, he would

be compelled by his orders to return to Korti, and

run the risk of having to fight his way to Mutemma

when he made the projected advance on it.

No doubt, if Sir Herbert had been able promptly

to inform his chief of the position of affairs, either

by a military telegraph or a heliograph, as we have

described, he would have been directed to proceed

to Mutemma. There can be little doubt that, if

he had been authorised to do so, he could have

seized Mutcmma on the 5th of January, and not

only been able to communicate with Gordon by his

steamers, who were on the look-out then for the

Expedition, and so saved Omdurman from falling

and strengthened the defences of Khartum by their

return, but by the sudden and unexpected appearance

of a British Force only ninety miles from him, the

Mahdi would have fled south.

We have some reasons, given by Father Ohrwalder

for supposing that the Mahdi would thus have fled,

because he informs us that when the news of the

defeat of his troops at Abu-Klea reached him, he

wished to raise the siege of Khartum and retire to

Kordofan, and that, " if the English had appeared

* These pools were three in number, and well known as the Upper,

Middle, and Lower Tools. The two former were computed to contain

1 19,050 gallons of water, and the last one no less than 420,000. They

were replenished by the heavy periodical rains of the region.

THE AUU-KLEA VICTORV. 257

any time before he delivered the attack, he would

have thus acted."

The final advance was made from Jakdul by Sir

Herbert Stewart on January 14th, when the author

accompanied his column. The day after it marched

fresh horse tracks bore evidence of the vicinity of

the enemy, and in the afternoon an advance guard

caught sight of a few of his camel men. W hen we

halted for breakfast at 1 1 a.m. on the 16th, a message

was received from Colonel Barrow, who had been

sent on before daylight to reconnoitre the Abu-

K!ea wells, that they were occupied by the enemy.

On the 17th the battle of Abu-Klea was fought,

in which our column of 1,685 bayonets defeated

ten or twelve thousand Arabs. From papers found

on several Emirs who were killed, we learned

that, when it became known that the English

were advancing by this route, the tribes in the

vicinity were summoned to oppose them in the

desert.

It was also ascertained from prisoners then

captured that a large force of Dervishes had

occupied the wells on the 12th, and that on the

morning of the battle this force had been

strengthened by a strong detachment from Omdur-

man, which had, they further informed us, been

captured by the Mahdi on the 6th or 7th,

We marched out from Abu-Klea wells on the

afternoon of the 18th, and went on all night, coming

in sight of Mutemma before sunrise on the 19th.

Unfortunately we halted, and in such an exposed

position that, before it could be left to fight our way

S


to the Nile—about three miles distant—it had to

be fortified. The square only moved out at 2.30 p.m.,

and succeeded, though strongly opposed, on reaching

the river that evening, and the rest of the column

next day—that is on the 20th. It had, therefore,

been six days in fighting its way seventy-six

miles, which, if Sir Herbert Stewart had not

been hindered by the inelasticity of his orders,

could, on his first march to Jakdul, have reached

the Nile from there without firing a shot in half

the time. In fact, he could have occupied Mutemma

on the 5th instead of on the 20th, as had now been

accomplished with heavy losses in killed and wounded,

amounting in all to about a tenth of the force !

The general impression in England at the time it

was despatched from Korti, was that Lord Wolseley

had sent the Desert Column, under Sir Herbert

Stewart, for the immediate relief of Khartum.

We have, however, learned from his Lordship's

message to Sir E. Baring, that its object was

primarily to establish a post at Mutemma, " by

men and stores across the desert," in view of future

movements for the above main object of the

Expedition.

As the above impression still prevails in many

quarters, and in order to correct it, we therefore

call particular attention to the instructions given

to Sir Herbert Stewart, who commanded it, and

to Sir C. W. Wilson, who accompanied it as a

Staff Officer charged with a message to General

Gordon, and for other purposes.

Sir Herbert Stewart was ordered to leave Korti

THE LINES ON WHICH IT MOVED. 259

on January 8th, with a force, the fighting part of

which number 1,607 of nll ranks, out of which he

was to leave fifty men at El-Howeiyat wells, and

1 50 men at Jakdul. After such rest as his camels

required at the latter place, he was to proceed

to Mulemma with the "Guards" and "Heavy"

Gamel Regiments, the Mounted Infantry, 250 of

the Sussex Regiment, the Naval Brigade, and a

detachment of Royal Engineers. He was also to

take with him eight days' rations for the force,

and 25,000 rations for the post at Mutemma, and

3,000 rations for the post to be established at

Abu-Klea. After occupying the latter he was

ordered to advance upon, attack, and occupy

Mutemma, where, leaving the Guards' Gamel

Regiments, the detachment of the Royal Surrey, the

Naval Brigade, and the half-battery of the Royal

Artillery, he was to return with the camels used in

the transport of stores to Jakdul, from whence he

was to forward stores to Mutemma.

Sir Herbert Stewart was further informed that

Colonel Sir C. W. Wilson, D.A.G., and Gaptain

Verner, D.A.A.G., would accompany him for intel

ligence duties, and that the former would be in

command at Mutemma, when he returned to

Jakdul, and that Colonel Burnaby would act as

Commandant there after Sir Charles had left for

Khartum.

Colonel Sir Charles W. Wilson's instructions were

as follows, the italics being ours :—

I am sending Captain Lord C. Ceresford, R.N., with a small

party of seamen, to accompany Sir H. Stewart to Mutemma,

S 2


where, if there are any steamers, Lord C. Beresford will take

possession of one or /wo of them, as he may think best, &c.

As soon as Lord C. IJeresford reports that he is ready to

proceed with one or more steamers to Khartum, you will go to

that place with him, and deliver the enclosed letter to General

Gordon. I leave it open so that you may read it.

Orders have been given to Sir H. Stewart to send a small

detachment of infantry with you to Khartum. If you like

you can, upon arrival there, march these soldiers through the

city, to show the people that British troops are near at hand.

If there is any epidemic in the town you will not do this. I do

not wish them to sleep in the city. They must return with you

to Mutemma. You will only stay long enough in Khartum

to confer fully with General Gordon. Having done so, you

will return with Lord C. licresford in steamers to Mutemma.

My letter to General Gordon will explain to you the object

of your mission. You will confer with him, both upon the

military and upon the political position. You know how we

are off in the matter of supplies, the condition and distribution

of the troops under my command, the dates when General

Earle will be able to move on Abu-Hamed, &c.

It is always possible that when Mohammed Achmed (i.e., the

Afahdi) fully realises that an English Army is approaching

Khartum he will retreat, and thus raise the siege. Khartum

would, under such circumstances, continue to be the political

centre ofour operations, but Berber would be our objective. No

British troops would be sent to Khartum beyond a few red

coats in steamers for the purpose of impressing on the inhabi

tants the fact that it was to the presence of our Army they

o~Mcd their safety.

The siege of Khartum being thus raised, all our military

arrangements would be made with a view to the immediate

occupation of Berber, and to a march across the desert to

Ariab, on the Suakim road.*

* Berber could not be occupied, as we have seen by Lord Wolseley's

Memorandum of April 8th, on account of the water supply being

short in this desert, except by pushing small detachments across it,

ONLY THREE OFFICERS.

Sir Charles was also informed in these instruc

tions that three officers would accompany him to

Khartum, to " remain there to assist General

Gordon," until Lord Wolseley was able to relieve

the place.

which would be dangerous. Then the last objection to General

Stephenson's proposal was that only by the small-boat plan could

troops not only be taken to, but brought from, Khartum during the

winter.

262

CHAPTER XX.

It will be seen from the instructions of Lord

Wolseley to Sir H. Stewart and to Sir C. VV. Wilson

that the Desert Column was not primarily sent for

the relief of Khartum, and that so far, as we have

already pointed out, neither his Lordship nor the

Chief of his Staff appeared to recognise any imme

diate or pressing necessity for an armed intervention

for that purpose.

In further proof of the statements already made

on this state of confidence at the Head Quarters

of the Expedition, we refer to Lord Wolseley's

despatch of January 29th, enelosing one from Sir

C. W. Wilson, describing the operations of the

Desert Column after the 18th, when, after Sir H.

Stewart had been wounded, he had taken command

of it :—

The result, Lord Wolscley informed Lord Hartington, of

these successfully-executed operations has been to place us in

possession of the desert route from this place (Korti) to the

Nile, in the vicinity of Mutcmma, near which place wc are

now fairly established, cutting off in great measure the enemy's

forces north of Shendy from those besieging Khartum, thus

rendering still more difficult than before the feeding of the

Mahdi's army, already short of provisions.

MILITARY ROMANCING. 2C3

Further on in this military romancing spirit—for

common sense will not permit any other description

of the views Lord Wolseley expresses in it—he

further congratulates himself by these successes of

being able to capture Berber, " as Gordon's steamers,

manned by the Naval Brigade, will assist him in that

operation." So far, however, as Gordon himself was

concerned, these steamers would enable him to com

municate direct with him, and ascertain the real

condition of Khartum !

When Lord Wolseley wrote this despatch he must

have known when Sir H. Stewart marched out from

Jakdul on January 14th, that the information

Colonel Kitchener had been able to obtain about

Mutemma was in harmony with what was believed

to be the case when the Desert Column was

despatched from Korti on the 8th. This was to the

effect that it was held by only from 2,500 to 3,000

Arabs.

He did not on this occasion take into adequate

account the condition in which our small force was

placed on its arrival on the Nile near Mutemma,

nor the following facts and circumstances which

combined either fatally to delay or might entirely

upset the caleulations upon which he had so

enthusiastically dilated in his despatch.

Sir Herbert Stewart was dangerously wounded in

the engagement of the 19th, and Colonel Burnaby

had been killed. Our force had lost in killed and

wounded nearly a tenth of its number, and had with

it at Gubat 104 of the latter to care for. As we had

only ten days' rations with us, a convoy had to be

264 W"Y GORDON PERISHED.

sent back to Jakdul for supplies, and this had reduced

its numbers to 868 bayonets.

The Naval Brigade was in a hopeless state of

collapse. Lord Charles Beresford, who commanded,

and who was to take possession of one or more of

Gordon's steamers, and take Sir Charles Wilson up to

Khartum, was in hospital unable to walk, and all

the officers under his command had been killed or

severely wounded. A third of his sailors had fallen in

the square at Abu-Klea, and all but one of his petty

officers. Those who survived had become, according

to Lord Charles Beresford himself, in a statement made

to the author and ten officers, thoroughly demoralised,

or, as he put it, had funked it in the square at Abu-

Klea after the Arabs had captured their Gardner

gun and killed their officers. In fact, this was

apparent to many others at Gubat, and it did not

surprise us that the Naval Brigade was not in a

position to discharge the duty assigned to them by

Lord Wolseley.

In fact the disasters to the Desert Column in its

gallant march and successful seizure of a post on the

Nile had considerably affected the objects his Lordship

had in view in its despatch.

To add to its difficulties, Sir Charles Wilson had

learned from prisoners captured at Abu-Klea, that

Omdurman had fallen, and that one of the Mahdi's

generals or emirs—Feki-Mustapha—was marching

down the left bank of the Nile with a strong force

to Mutemma, and that another army was advancing

up from Berber.

Lord Charles Beresford and his artificers are,

HOPING AGAINST HOPii. 265

nevertheless, credited by Sir Charles Wilson with

having overhauled the engines of the two steamers

selected for the trip up the river to Khartum—a

matter, as he observed, of great importance, for,

according to the following information received from

the captain of one of them which had left Khartum

on December 14th, it was evident he would have to

fight his way there.

This captain told him that when he left there on

that date Gordon Pasha had said to him: "If you

don't come back in ten days with English troops you

need not come at all, for all will be over."

Sir Charles Wilson also learned from the comman

dant of the flotilla that at several points on the river

between Mutemma and Khartum the enemy had

constructed batteries and breastworks, from which

they had fired upon the steamers and had sunk one of

them. In a conversation with the captain of the

Bordecn he particularly described to me several

below Halfiyeh, but said he :—" Never fear, when

Gordon Pasha sees the smoke of the steamers he

will make a diversion."

We therefore consoled ourselves when Sir Charles

left us on the 24th by the thought thus suggested,

and picturing how the " hero " of Khartum would

anxiously look out for the steamers he was destined

never to see.

Father Ohrwalder confirmed the view this captain

had taken of what Gordon would do in the following

extract from his " Ten Years' Captivity in the Camp

of the Mahdi " :—

Every day, and many and many a time, did he look north


from the roof of the Palace for the relief which never arrived.

, . . He was sure they would come—but when ? The

time was pressing. How eagerly he searched the distant

horizon for the English flag he longed to see—but every day

he was doomed to disappointment.

The last entries in his journal, which had been

written up from the day Colonel Stewart had been

sent down the Nile, on September 9th, up till

December 14th, added to the anxiety now felt about

Gordon, for on the 13th he had made the following

ominous entry in it

Certainly this day-after-day delay has a most disheartening

effect on every one. To-day is the 276th day of our anxiety.

. . . We are going to send down the Bordcen the day after

to-morrow, and with her I shall send this journal. If some

effort is not made before ten days, the town may fall. It

is inexplicable, this delay. If the Expeditionary Force have

reached the river and met my steamers, 100 men are all

that we require—just to show themselves. . . . This is not

asking for much, but it must happen at once or it will be

(as usual) too late.

The last entry on the 14th was in the following

similar strain :—

Now mark this, if the Expeditionary Force—and I ask for

no more than 200 men — docs not come in ten days, the

town may fall, and I have done my duty. Good-bye !

Thirty-eight days had elapsed since these entries

had been made, and therefore but little hope

remained to cheer us that we might , still be in time

to save Khartum. Yet, small as it was, Sir Charles

Wilson resolved to act upon it, and did so as promptly

as circumstances would permit.

MIGHT STILL DE RELIEVED. 267

It has been alleged, and is still believed by some

that the fall of Khartum on the 26th would have

been averted if Sir Charles Wilson had left Gubat

on the 22nd instead of the 24th of January. In

fact, Lord Wolseley implied this in his despatch

to Lord Hartington when he enelosed to him Sir

Charles Wilson's report of his journey from Gubat.

We are credibly informed that even Lord Cromer

still holds this view.

Sir Charles Wilson, however, fully explained and

justified his delay in starting on his official mission

in his book, " From Korti to Khartum " (pp.

1 1 3- 1 14), as follows :—

I had every reason to believe that forces of the enemy were

advancing upon us from the north and south, and I could not

leave the small force in its position on the Nile without

ascertaining whether it was likely to be attacked. I knew

that Omdurman had fallen, and that Gordon expected

Khartum to fall on Christmas Day ; but I also knew that it

was still holding out, and I hoped that the pressure upon

the town would be relieved by the large number of men sent

down by the Mahdi to meet us, and that news of our victories

would have got into Khartum and given Gordon and his

garrison fresh heart. At any rate, there was nothing to show—

and I questioned the commanders of the steamers carefully—

that the crisis at Khartum, which had been deferred from

the 25th December to the 19th of January, would be hurried

on, or that a delay of a couple of days would make much

difference.

The fight at Abu-Klea on the 7th was known to

Khasm-el-Mus on the 17th, and probably also in

the Mahdi's camp and in Khartum on the 19th

and 20th. This, he hoped, would further delay the

268 WllV GORDON PEKISHED.

impending crisis, and he therefore resolved to

make a reconnaissance on the 22nd, in two of

Gordon's steamers, to ascertain if the report he

had received was true, stating that a large body of

the enemy had collected at Sayal, a few miles below

Mutemma.

Finding no force there, upon his return late on the

afternoon of that day he handed over the command

of the force at Gubat to Colonel the Hon. H. H.

Boscawen (now Lord Falmouth), and gave orders

for two steamers to be got ready to take him to

Khartum.

From daylight on the 23rd until sunset every

effort was made to get these steamers ready for the

evidently dangerous service on which they were to

be employed. In order to effect this their engines

were overhauled, rations put on board, and their

crews changed, so that, in compliance with Gordon's

urgent request, none of the " fellaheen " soldiers, or

" hens," as he called them, should be brought back

on them to Khartum.

A supply of fuel had to be obtained for stoking

purposes. This was no small item, as the old-

fashioned boilers of the steamers, in which wood

only was used, consumed a large quantity of it.

Some difficulty was encountered in obtaining a

sufficient supply, owing to our virtually besieged

position.

As an eye-witness, the author can bear testimony

to the diligence and earnestness manifested in these

preparations, which were carried on with a view

at first of getting the steamers off that day. It was

RED COATS AND GREY. 269

too late to accomplish this, bvit all was made ready

for an early start next morning.

During the day it was discovered that the " rod

coats " sent up with the column by Lord Wolseley

for the detachment Sir Charles Wilson was ordered

to take with him were not to be found. It was

ascertained subsequently that they had been lost

with other more valuable stores in one night march

from Abu-Klea. Happily a sufficient number of

scarlet tunics were found amongst the men of the

" Heavies " to replace them.*

Much amusement was caused by this incident

amongst both officers and men, who were all elad in

light grey. The fun, as well as the absurdity of

the thing, was well expressed in my hearing by a

Tommy Atkins of this Sussex detachment, thus :—

" Have we not thrashed these niggers in grey, and

what the use is there in dressing us up in

red now? They'll not think us the same fellows

whose acquaintance they made at Abu-Klea."

The very earliest date on which Sir Charles

Wilson could have started for Khartum was the

22nd, as the steamers had only put in an appear

ance at Gubat. late on the morning of the 2 1st.,

and when our force was out making an armed

reconnaisance of Mutemma. If Sir Charles Wilson

had been even able to start up the river that day,

he could only have travelled at the same rate he did

* It was subsequently reported that this bale of " Red Coats " fell

into the hands of the Dervishes, and were exhibited by the Mthdi to

his troops as proofs of his victories over us at Abu- Kita and at

Mutcmma.

270 WHY CORDON PERIS1ILI).

two days later, and therefore could not possibly

have reached the place before midday on the 26th,

and to find it in the hands of the enemy.

It was alleged by the writer of an artiele in the

Nineteenth Century magazine for May, 1892, that

Sir Charles might have travelled faster than he had

done after leaving Gubat on the 24th. This state

ment is absolutely contradicted by the following

abstract from the report of the Commandant of

Gordon's flotilla, and by the " log " of that of Sir

Charles Wilson's trip up to Khartum.

Khasm-el-Mus, in his report, gives the following

particulars bearing on the condition of the river, and

the increased difficulty of navigating it in the middle

of December :—

On December 17th the flotilla proceeding up the

Nile from Mutemma met the Bordeen, then on its

way down from Khartum, at the head of the

Shablooka Cataract. She was in a sad plight, for,

on coming down it (the river) she had struck a rock,

and had only escaped sinking by running the boat

ashore on Wad-Hassoureh Island, where she lay full

of water. All the crews set to work to take out her

cargo and ammunition, pump her dry, and stop

the leak. Before this could be accomplished, a

watertight cistern to cover up the hole had to be

made.

On December 26th her cargo and ammunition

were put on board of the steamer, and on the 28th

it was decided to return to Mutemma.

At a council of the captains of the steamers, con

vened by Nusri Pasha, it was decided, as they

OFF FOR KHARTUM.

were too heavy to pass the cataract of Shablooka, to

bring the troops on board of them down in boats.

Khasm-el-Mus was ordered to start down the

cataract with the Tewfikich, with the boats in tow,

and wait at its foot for the other steamers.

Referring to the success of this operation, Nusri

Pasha thus expressed himself in his journal :—

We thanked God because no damage was done to any of the

steamers, although the cataract is not passable at this time of

year. .

Sir Charles Wilson in his own graphic and often

touching account of his voyage gives us the following

daily " log" of his flotilla :—

Our progress (January 24th) had been slow, owing to the

heavy loads that the (two) steamers were carrying, and to the

low state of the water, which made navigation difficult amongst

the sandbanks.

With respect to the 25th he writes :—

We made a good start, steam up and off at daylight. In the

morning we had to stop for wood Such a business

this wooding is ; first the houses or Saiiehs* have to be pulled

down and carried to the bank, and then the logs have to be

cut up, so as to go into the furnace, with the roughest axes and

a couple of cross-cut saws, which have not been "set" for no

one knows how long.

About an hour before sunset on the 25th, the

Shablooka Cataract with its stretches of open water,

* So called Persian Water Wheels in the construction of which, as

their only material, a large quantity of wood is used.


and the rapids with their many dangerous rocks,

was entered.

When one of these stretches, three or four miles

long, had been reached about the hour named, the

captains of the two steamers objected to go further,

because no good place could be found before

sunset to tie up for the night. As there was

still a hour and a half of daylight, Sir Charles

pressed them to go on. After "an expenditure of

strong language and gesticulation " the captain of the

Talahawiych said he would go and she started off,

the Bordecn following. Sir Charles then remarks :—

It was exciting work, and I could not help thinking ofGordon's

" praying up " the nuggars on the Upper Nile. All went well

until sunset, when the Bordccit struck heavily on a rock at the

head of the last rapid we had to surmount before getting to a

reach of open water. . . . We worked hard under the

bright moonlight until past ten, but could not move her.

On the 26th [he continues] we were all up at the first streak

of dawn to make a last effort to get the ship off, little thinking

of the awful tragedy then being enacted at Khartoum.

The ammunition and all the stores were shifted aft

and the soldiers landed on a small sand - bank to

haul upon a hawser from the starboard quarter.

It was nearly nine o'clock, Sir Charles continues, before all

these arrangements were completed, when the signal was given

to pull, but she did not respond. Then we tried, "Turn astern

full speed, and pull together." I was watching a mark on the

shore, Sir Charles states, there was a slight move, followed

by a short " Stop her," and then, " Turn ahead full speed "—

.ill orders are in English— and we were again quivering in

the rapid water.

Steaming slowly ahead, the flotilla reached the

UNDER SUCH A FIRE.

most difficult part of the cataract, and, after passing

through some " nasty broken water with many

pointed rocks peeping out of it," and just as open

water was in sight " bump went the old steamer

on a sand-bank with a crash that set every thing

in a dance. . . . It was an unlucky day.

We had worked hard and yet at nightfall we

were only three miles from the place where the

Talahawiych had passed the previous night.

On January 27th, a start was made at daylight

and the steamers kept on till dark. During the

afternoon a camel-man on the left bank shouted

that Khartum was taken and Gorden killed, but

he was not believed.

Next day (28th) a start was made at 6 a.m.

Soon Khartum was in sight above the trees of

Tuti Island, when a shagiyeh on the right bank

shouted out to the Talahawiych to stop and told

them that Khartum had fallen and that Gordon

was killed two days previously.

The fire which had been opened on the little

flotilla became very hot after Halfiyeh was passed,

and from both banks of the river.

It was clear, writes Sir Charles, that the enemy's riflemen

were on Tuti Island—but ^Khartum might still be holding

out So, after a delay of.about a quarter of an hour, we went

on. Old Khasm protesting it was all up, and predicting

terrible disaster to numbers. No sooner did we start upwards

than we got into such 'a fire as I hope never to pass through

again in a " penny steamer." Two more guns opened on us

from Omdurman Fort, and three or four from Khartum, or

the upper end of Tuti ; the roll of musketry from each tide

T


was continuous, and high above that could be heard the grunt

ing of the Nordenfeldts, &c.

The flotilla kept on to the junction of the two

hills, when Sir Charles states :—

It became plain to every one that Khartum had

fallen into the Mahdi's hands ; for not only were there

hundreds of Dervishes ranged under their banners standing on

the sand pit close to the town to resist our landing, but no flag

was flying in Khartum, and not a shot was fired in our assist

ance ; here, too, if not before, we should have met the two

steamers I knew Gordon still had at Khartum. I at once

gave orders to turn and run full speed down the river. It was

hopeless to attempt a landing, or to communicate with the

shore under such a fire.

And here ended the attempt of this gallant officer

to communicate with Khartum and deliver the

message and letter Lord Wolseley had sent by him

to General Gordon. What that message was Sir

Charles Wilson tells us summarily in the following

extract from his book :—

January 25th.—I lay awake for a long time last night

thinking over the situation, and how Gordon would receive

the news I had to tell him, and what effect it would have in

Khartum. Buller's calculation was that Earlc would be at

Shendy on March 5th, and Lord Wolscley at Mutemma on

the 2nd of March ; more than another month to wait, and

Gordon had given up hope in December.

In November we knew that he could only hold out with

difficulty after the middle of December, and I had to inform

him that we could not relieve him till the middle of March.

Then I had to tell him of the rough handling of the little force

which had reached the Nile, the losses in officers, and the state

cf the transport—all of which must delay the relief—and last,

my orders to take back the few soldiers I had.

TOO CRUEL TO DE TRUE. 275

Then, when turning back from Khartum, this

gallant officer—characterized by the gentleness of

the lamb, and, when the occasion required its exer

cise, by the boldness of a lion, as this effort to reach

Khartum shows—thus expressed his feelings of

sorrow and disappointment :—

To me the blow was crushing. Khartum had fallen, and

Gordon dead !—for I never believed he would allow himself to

Tall into the Mahdi's hands alive. Such was the ending of all

our labours and of his perilous enterprise. I could not realize

it, and yet there was a heavy feeling at the heart—telling of

some awful disaster. For months I had been looking forward

to the time when I should meet Gordon again, and tell him

what everyone thought of his splendid defence of Khartum,

and now all was over—it seemed to me too cruel to be true.

And in this feeling, our little force, which had

suffered so much in fighting its way to Gubat, and

had held it against fearful odds, deeply Empathised.

And that sympathy was also felt for the present

position of the " heroes " who, in " penny boats," had

fought their way up to Khartum and back from it.

276

CHAPTER XXI.

When Lord Wolseley, however, received the report

from Sir Charles Wilson of his attempt and failure

to reach Khartum, he sent it to the Minister of

War with these ungracious remarks :—

My Lord,—I have the honour to forward a letter from

Colonel Sir Charles Wilson, R.E., giving the reasons for the

delay in the departure of the steamers from Gubat.

I do not propose to add any remarks of my own to this letter.

The reasons given by Sir Charles Wilson must speak for -

themselves.

And they did, for Her Majesty's Government had

previously received from Sir Charles Wilson the

orders Lord Wolseley had given him, which he had

done his best, under the circumstances already

explained, to carry out, and the conelusion to

which they had come about " the delay in the

departure of the steamers from Gubat " were stated

in Parliament on the occasion of the vote of thanks

to the Army, by Lord Hartington, as follows :—

I cannot upon this occasion, and I think the House cannot,

withhold its sympathy and admiration of the small body of

men who, under the leadership of Sir Charles Wilson, supple

mented the march across the desert, by the perilous and

romantic Expedition up the river to Khartum. I am aware

that criticism has been levelled at what was alleged to have

GREAT HOPES DISAIM'OINTED. 277

been a slight delay on the part of Sir Charles Wilson in

embarking on that Expedition. I think it only due to that

gallant officer to say that in the paper which has been laid

before Parliament, Sir Charles Wilson has justified himself

from any imputation of that kind.

It was certainly his own bitter disappointment at

the course and fatal issue of his plans, so elaborately

sketched and in view of his non-appreciation of the

imminent danger of Gordon so deliberately and

coolly carried out, that must have led Lord Wolseley

to withold his sympathy from Sir Charles Wilson

and his gallant band, indicated in the despatch we

have quoted.

That Lord Wolseley did naturally feel such

a disappointment may be inferred from the manner

in which it referred to what the Desert Column

accomplished by its occupation of Gubat.

In that despatch Lord Wolseley thus expressed

himself on the matter:—

The result of these successfully executed operations has

been to place us in the possession of the desert route from

this place to the Nile, in the vicinity of Mutcmma—near

which place we are now fairly established—cutting off in a

great measure the enemy's forces at Berber from those

besieging Khartum, and thus rendering still more difficult

than before the feeding of the Mahdi's army, already very-

short of provisions.

I am in great hopes that the position thus gained on the*

Nile will materially facilitate the capture of Berber by General

Earle's column, as the steamers from Khartum, now at my

command, manned by the Naval Brigade and by detachments

of infantry, will be able to assist in that operation.

I am now enabled to communicate by steamer direct with

Khartum, and thus raise the veil which has so long hung


round that city — preventing us from ascertaining its real

condition, or communicating my plan to the heroic soldier

who has so long and nobly defended it under the most adverse

and trying conditions.

The operations of Lord Wolseley—in view of

and subsequent to the information received from

General Gordon on November 17th and 22nd, and

by a messenger from him on December 31st, at

Korti, who had left Khartum on the 14th of

that month, asking him to come quickly to his

relief—have been regarded by us as indications of

that delusion, according to the great German

strategist, under which a general falls if he attempts

or hopes to carry out successfully in every particular

his predetermined plan of a campaign. The despatch

under consideration is indicative of the tenacity

with which he held on to this notion. Every

sentence is marked by it.

The self-congratulatory manner in which he

expresses himself and the positive confidence of its

tone was not warranted, for the double march to

Jakdul, by which the desert road had been secured

had hastened the fall of Khartum rather than it

had tended to its relief. The post at Gubat

had been secured by two serious engagements

with enemy which might have been avoided had

it in the first instance been sent direct to Mutemma

when the road was actually free of the enemy to

that place from Korti. We have shown that this

could have been accomplished if Sir Herbert

Stewart's orders had been elastic enough to have

warrant him in making such a movement.

STILL RIDES HIS 1I0UBY. 279

It is also difficult to understand upon what

authority Lord Wolseley coneluded that the army

of the Mahdi drew such a quantity of supplies from

Berber, if indeed any at all, and that by his having

cut it off from Khartum by the occupation of

Mutemma it would be more difficult for him to

continue his siege of the place than was actually

the case.

Then, again, as to the material aid which his

command of Gordon's steamers under the circum

stances would give him in the capture of Berber

he had no right to be so hopeful. For example

on January 12th, seventeen days previously, he haa

thus telegraphed Lord Hartington :—

The river has now fallen so low that its navigation by the

native craft of the country has become quite impossible, but

to our boats movement by water is actually more feasible than

it was in November.

He was hardly warranted in making this statement,

for the water up the river had become less every

day, and very rapidly, and so low when the small

boats of the River Column were despatched, that

their loads had to be consequently considerably

reduced from what they had been in coming up

the Nile in November.

At any rate it does not seem to have occurred to

Lord Wolseley, at the time he sent the congratula

tory despatch with which we are now dealing, that

if the Nile in the reach below the Fifth Cataract, that

is from Hannek to Merawi, had so fallen as to

prevent its navigation, how much more so must it

have fallen in the reach between Berber and Gubat,


where Lord Wolseley had, as he supposed, four

of Gordon's steamers at his command ! He found

out, thirteen days later, that his navigation was

similarly interrupted, for in a despatch dated Gubat,

February nth, Sir Redvers Buller informed him

that, according to Lord Charles Beresford's report,

the two steamers there were unfit for offensive

purposes, and that the larger one could only ascend

the river twenty-two miles, and descend it twenty-five

miles, on account of the low water.

In view of the information indicative of the

serious position of affairs at Khartum which Lord

Wolseley had received from General Gordon on

November 17th or 22nd, which was emphatically

confirmed by the communication he had received

from him at Korti on December 31st by a messenger

he had despatched on December 14th, how could

his Lordship have so hopefully expressed himself in

the last paragraph we have quoted from this

despatch ? As one of the results of these success

ful operations, he stated that of his being now able

to lift the veil which had so long hung over that

city, and prevented its real condition from being

known, and of communicating to Gordon his plan

of operations for its relief.

That plan, we have learned from Sir Charles

Wilson's instructions, could not then, as he had to

inform Gordon, relieve him until early in March. Two

officers were, in the meantime, to be sent to aid him

in holding out until then ; and ten English soldiers,

clad in scarlet, were to be exhibited to the tried and

famine-stricken garrison of Khartum, to convince

THE DISILLUSIONMENT AT HAND. 28l

them that the relief, of which they had been assured,

was now at hand !

The impression all this produces is that, however

desperate might be the circumstances of Gordon,

up till the last moments of its history the Com

mander-in-Chief of the Nile Expedition still remained

under the delusion that he could carry out, in all its

details, his predetermined plan of operations ! This

disillusionment was, however, near at hand. It

came to him on February 4th, on Sir Charles

Wilson's despatch announcing the fall of Khartum

and the probable death of its heroic defender. What

effect this " bolt out of the blue "—that is Lord

Wolseley's " blue," as painted with the colours of

his self-congratulatory despatch—is not difficult to

imagine. , '

His Lordship was not at first inelined to believe

it, for, in his despatch of February 9th to the Minister

of War—enelosing Lieutenant Stuart-Wortley's

report of the attempt made to reach Khartum, in

order to communicate with General Gordon—he

thus expressed his incredulity :—

Up to the moment of my writing this no native here

believes that Khartum has fallen, as no rumour on the

subject had been received in any neighbouring village. The

Mudir of Dongola, who is in my camp, says it is impossible

that Khartum should have been taken on the 26th ultimo

without the fact being long since known far and wide.

There can be no doubt that the enemy have captured

Omdurman and Tuti Island, as an artillery fire was opened

from both these places on the two steamers carrying Colonel

C. Wilson and party. It is not, however, clear that any shots

were fired from Khartum itself on those steamers, thus

B82 WHY GORDON PERISHED.

leaving a gleam of hope that, although the positions above

referred to are certainly in the Mahdi's possession, the city

itself may still be uncaptured.

One rumour is, as will be seen from enclosed papers, that

General Gordon and a party of determined men had taken

refuge in the Roman Catholic Church, which is strongly built

of stone. The accompanying sketch of the city shows its

position.

And yet at the same time in another paragraph

in this despatch, he thus further informed Lord

Hartington that he would not attempt to disguise

the fact from his Lordship how deeply the report of

the fall of Khartum was felt by all ranks in the Army

under my command, and remarked as follows :—

If it be literally true—and it is difficult to believe it—the

mission of this force, which was the relief of Khartum, falls

to the ground.

In a despatch, dated March 6th, to Lord Harting

ton he wrote as follows :—

My despatch of the 9th ult. (February 9th) informed your

Lordship of the reported fall of Khartum on the 26th of

January last, only two days before the detachment of troops

I had ordered, forward in steamers from the neighbourhood

of Mutemma, to open communications with General Gordon,

&c.; I have now the honour to report that, in my opinion, there

can be no longer any doubt that Mohammed Achmed's troops

took possession of Khartum and killed General Gordon on

the date I have named.

From the observation made by Lord Wolseley in

his despatch of April 13th (enelosing the letter from

Sir Charles Wilson explaining the cause of his delay

in starting for Khartum from Gubat after the

NO DIFFERENCE ANY WAV. 283

Desert Column had reached there on January 20th)

it would appear that on the date of this despatch he

still held the opinion—as sonie of his admirers still

do—that if only the detachment of ten soldiers elad

in scarlet had put in an appearance at Khartum on

January 25th it would not have been captured next

day.

With the despatch of January 23rd, about the

operations of the Desert Column, from Sir Charles

Wilson, Lord Wolseley also received the contents of

Gordon's farewell letter to Colonel Watson, and a

copy or the substance of the entry in his journal on

December 14th, in which Gordon expressed the

opinion that, if help did not come to him in ten

days, the town might fall.

Now, if even Sir Charles Wilson had been able to

reach Khartum on the 25th, from the command the

Mahdi had of the White Nile consequent upon his

capture of Omdurman, it is very improbable that

the ten scarlet soldiers would, by their exhibition,

have prevented its fall on the 26th.

The facts which later on convinced Lord Wolseley

that the place had fallen and Gordon was killed on

January 26th were followed by others proving how

desperate had been its condition subsequent to

December 14th—the date after which Gordon had

informed him it would be difficult for him to hold

out. The latter, amongst which are the following,

must have further convinced him that the sight of

ten English soldiers and the presence of two officers

could not have enabled a garrison famine-stricken

to hold out until his plan for the relief of the


place could be carried out on the date he had

fixed.

We quote first those given to us by Father

Ohrwalder, who was for ten years a captive in the

camp of the Mahdi.*

The troops were famine-stricken and began to lose heart,

whilst the enemy without the walls daily grew bolder in

anticipation of the plunder they hoped so soon would be theirs.

From Bun to Kalkala the Dervishes extended in one unbroken

mass, whilst their hundreds of naggoras {tom-toms) never

ceased beating in Gordon's ears day or night. The town was

close hemmed in on three sides. Wad Gutasa was near cnorgh

to shell his palace, and under the hole whet e the first shot

struck the wall Gordon inscribed the date as a remembrance.

None of us can realize how heavily his terrible responsibilities

weighed upon him. Despair had seized upon the town. The

unreliable nature of the Sudanese was a constant source of

anxiety to him, and enhanced the critical situation.

In his consideration of the chances of the success

of the English Relief Expedition he thus expresses

himself :—

The defeat at Abu-Klea struck terror into the Mahdist's

gathered round Khartum, and the arrival of some wounded

men at Omdunnan added to the general alarm . Had twenty

red coats arrived at Khartum, it would have been saved.

Their presence would have given fresh courage to the inhabi

tants, and, confident of their approaching deliverance, they

would have striven might and main to hold out longer.

Losing faith in Gordon's continued promises that the English

were coming, "They became broken-hearted—the Father

informs us—and in despair."

Had the Khartum people but seen one Englishman with

• *' Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp " : Major Wngate,

R.A.

THE STARVED AND HELPLESS TOWN. 285

their own eyes, they would have taken fresh courage, and

would, in all probability have held out for another month, until

the relief, for which they had waited so long, was a fait

accompli.

When *he Nile was high, towards the end of

August, Gordon made several counter attacks on the

enemy. Mohammad-AH Pasha in one of these

defeated the Arabs on August 31, at Gereifa, a short

distance up the Blue Nile. He also attacked the old

Sheik El-Obeid at Halfya and captured from him a

quantity of grain and cattle. Then, as Father

Ohrwalder remarks :—

Khartum breathed once more, and it seemed as if all would

be well; the town was full ofjoy, which, alas, was soon turned into

sadness. Mohammed-Ali emboldened by his late successes,

advanced again against the Sheik El-Obeid, and defeated him

near El Eilefun. Following him across the desert to renew

the attack on the 4th of September, he fell into an ambush,

when 800 of his troops were slaughtered. This proved a very

severe blow to Gordon, and Khartum being now closely

invested, he decided to send a steamer north and communicate

with the Government, and give them full information of the

state of affairs. This was his object in sending Colonel

Stewart down the Nile in the Abbas on September 10th.

His murder was another terrible blow to Gordon, for he had

counted upon his being able to inform the Government about

the dangerous position in which Khartoum was placed.

Its position had now become dangerously critical, for

upwards of 10,000 Dervishes extended from Kalkala to Buri,

and threatened it. From morning to night they attacked the

starved and helpless town, and many of their bullets fell into

its streets.

Then, again, when Colonel Stewart was killed,

the letters he had from Gordon explaining his


position, and that part of his journal written down to

the ioth September, fell into the hands of the Madhi

and made him fully acquainted with Gordon's

desperate position.

In consequence of this information, the Mahdi

wrote to Gordon on October 22, stating that the

messenger he had sent asking for speedy relief had

been killed, and summoning him to surrender as a

consequence.

It was the knowledge of the deplorable condition

of things in Khartum previously acquired by the

Mahdi from deserters from its garrison and from

other sources in the place which led him to expect

that it would soon fall into his hands by famine,

unless relieved by the Expedition under Lord

Wolseley, of the movements of which he was kept

well informed by his agents at Cairo and in Upper

Egypt, amongst the chief of whom, it is supposed,

was Zebehr Pasha.

Although we have no positive information on the

point, there are sufficient grounds for coneluding that

up till the first week in January he had been led to

expect that Lord Wolseley's advance on Khartum

would be made all the way by water—at least as far

as Berber. Aware of the delay which would be

caused by the rapid fall of the Nile, the Mahdi con

tented himself with a elose investment of Khartum.

The occupation of Jakdul on January 2nd by Sir

Herbert Stewart must have been an unweleome

surprise to him and to his Emirs. If, as we have

already pointed out, the Desert Column had then

gone on to Mutemma, which it could easily have

WOLSELEY OUT-GEN ERALLED. 287

reached twenty days before Khartum fell, it is

possible that the surprise, as Ohnvalder c&neluded,

would have led the Mahdi to raise the siege and

go to Kordofan.

When, however, he learned of the occupation of

Jakdul, and that any further advance across the

desert was not evidently immediately intended, we

must give the Mahdi and his Emirs the credit of

having out-generalled Lord Wolseley by immediately

occupying the wells at Abu-Klea. His concentra

tion of troops there began on the 12th, and when the

Desert Column reached there on the 1 6th, they found

this important strategical position held by not less

than io.ooo Arabs. He also, with remarkable

military prescience, elosed upon Omdurman, and,

after the defeat of his troops on the 17th, sent

fresh forces to oppose the further advance of the

English on Mutemma.

If the Desert Column had been despatched in the

first instance direct to Mutemma, as it might and

ought to have been, it could have reached its objec

tive on January 5th, but, owing to the serious mistake

of the double march to Jakdul, it did. not accomplish

this until the 20th of January, or a fortnight later.

It was not the delay of two days by Sir Charles

Wilson, as alleged by Lord Wolseley and his friends,

at Gubat before starting for Khartum that sealed

Gordon's fate, but this longer delay in seizing

Mutemma and communicating with him that did so.

When the Mahdi, for instance, heard of the

occupation of Jakdul on January 2nd by Sir

Herbert Stewart, he made another masterly

288 WHY GORDON TERISHED.

movement, as a preliminary to a direct assault on

Khartum, by elosing at once upon Omdurman.

The communications with this fort with Khartum

had been cut off since November 3rd, when it had

been provisioned for six weeks. By the 20th of

December its garrison must, therefore, have been in

great straits.

Gordon had so weakened himself by sending four

of his steamers down the Nile to meet the Expedition

and another with Colonel Stewart and his companions,

that he found it impossible to reopen his com

munications with Omdurman.

Its commander, Faraj Bey-Allah, had signalled

him for ammunition, but it could not, under the

circumstances, be sent to him. When his provisions

were exhausted, early in January, he surrendered,

some time between the 6th and 13th January.

When Omdurman fell into their hands, the Arabs

had obtained a most important key to Gordon's

position, for it enabled them to elose the White Nile

to Gordon's steamers by constructing batteries along

its banks. This enabled them to establish ferries on

the river south of Khartum, by which a constant

and rapid communication between the left and right

banks of the river could be established.

On October 25th Gordon noted in his journal the

following pertinent observations :—

A lot of people are moving from the right bank of Nile

towards Sheik-el-Obeyed (the man, not the city). Are they

leaving on account of the advance of the (English) troops ? or

is it only for offensive purposes ? or is it a raid which is return

ing from pillage ? We sent up the steamers and stopped the

Arab ferry near the lines.

"COULD ONLY LOOK ON." 289

For two days previous to the attack of the 26th

on Khartum, Ohrwalder states that Gordon had

noticed a considerable movement going on in the

Mahdi's camp, and had observed numbers of boats

passing to and fro on the White and Blue Niles.

This must have led him to the conelusion that the

Mahdi was preparing for some serious movement—

perhaps for an assault on the town. Now he could

only look on, for the absence of his steamers

prevented him from taking measures, as he had in

October, of meeting this threatened danger!

The Mahdi, as Ohrwalder informs us, however, only

made up his mind to make an assault on Khartum

when he found that the English at Gubat had delayed

any further advance, for " he did not begin to cross his

troops from the left to the right bank of the river

until the 24th, and it was not until the evening of the

25th (Sunday) that the crossing was completed. He

could not have attacked earlier, therefore, than he

did."

U

293

CHAPTER XXH.

KHARTUM, as will be noticed on the sketch map

(see p. 191), was built oix point of land where the

junction of the Blue and White Niles occur. Two

sides of the triangle it thus formed were protected

from assault by these rivers. The line of its defences

on the land, or third side, comprised a ditch and

parapet extending from one of these rivers to the

other. At various points along this parapet there

were strongly-built forts with guns, and a little in

its rear there was high earthwork, commanding the

ditch.

During high Nile the parapet had been seriously

damaged by the water at its White Nile end—and

had not been repaired. This Ohrwalder remarks, was

not Gordon's fault, for in his desperate condition he

could not be everywhere. When the ditch was full

of water—as was the case during high Nile—the

land defences were substantially impregnable, as

were also those on the other two sides under a low

state of the river.

General Gordon himself, in one of his earlier

despatches to Her Majesty's Government, informed

them that when the Nile began to rise his position

would be much strengthened. This message, like

others of the same nature, were sent as an assurance

HIS LAST MESSAGE. 293

that he could hold out until nn Expedition for his

relief reached him. Unfortunately and strangely? as

we have shown, they were often pleaded as a reason

for delay in its despatch.

Colonel Kitchener informs us that Gordon had

a complete system of telegraphic communication

with all the forts or posts along the line of

communication, and expresses the opinion that

" there must have been great irregularity in the

telegraph stations to account for his having been

left entirely unwarned of the attack and entry of

the rebels," and that for this irregularity he thinks

Farag Pasha was responsible.

We, however, differ from Colonel Kitchener

because of the following facts :—

Father Ohrwalder states that General Gordon, was

so unwell on Sunday, the 25th, that he did not leave

the Palace—worn out, in fact, by the weight of his

terrible responsibility, and the anxiety caused by the

non-arrival of the relief he had so long expected.

In a telegram, dated December 29th, and brought

down by a telegraph elerk to Dongola in &

cartridge, Gordon expresses his deep anxiety and

anguish consequent upon the failure of the

Expedition coming to his relief within the ten days

after the 14th of December. It ended as follows :—

Although, personally, too insignificant to be taken into

account, the powers were bound, nevertheless, to fulfil the

engagements upon which my appointment was based, so as to

shield the honour of their Governments.

" What 1 have gone through I cannot describe. The

Almighty Cod will help me I


How that anxiety and anguish must have been

increased by the accumulated difficulties with which

he had to contend for nearly a month later! After

an heroic struggle of 317 days to hold the fort,

ineluding the long period during which its com

munications had been cut, and when he had

reason to fear that the crisis he had so long staved

off, might now be hourly expected—what must have

been his feelings on that Sunday ? They must have

been such as to have seriously depressed his energies.

No wonder, then, if there were irregularities at this

point of the defences.

Then what was the condition of the garrison on

the eventful night of the 25th and 26th? From

Colonel Kitchener's own description it was most

deplorable.

On December the 14th he tells us that Gordon

had only eighteen days' provisions on hand for the

garrison alone, and that this supply must have been

almost, if not altogether, exhausted on January 1st.

On the 6th he consequently offered the poorer

people free permission to leave the place, and of

which many of them took advantage.

During the interval between then and the 25th

the state of the garrison became desperate from

want of food, for all the donkeys, dogs, cats, &c., had

been eaten. A small ration of grain had been issued

daily to the troops together with a sort of bread

made from pounded Palm-tree fibre ! Is it,

therefore, to be wondered that, on the night of the

25th as Colonel Kitchener further informs us:—

Many of the famished troops left their posts on the

THEIR WILD l)ATTLE-CkY. 295

fortifications in search of food in the town. Some of the

troops were also too weak from want of nourishment to go to

their posts. This state of things was known in the town and

caused some alarm. Many of the principal inhabitants armed

themselves and their slaves and went to the fortifications in

place of the soldiers.

We therefore believe that Gordon's illness and

exhaustion, together with the famine-stricken con

dition of his troops, afford substantial causes for the

failure of the telegraphists to warn him of the assault

on the fortifications by the Dervish hordes !

Hut, further, the suddenness of this unanticipated

assault may also be taken into account here. Father

Ohrwalder thus describes it :—

The moon had gone down, deep obscurity reigned ; and now

the Dervishes stealthily advanced in perfect silence towards

that portion of the defence which had been destroyed during

h'gh Nile, and, which, as the river recedtd, had left an open

space in which ditch and parapet had almost disappeared.

Here there was little to impede their entry, and the Dervishes,

shouting their wild battle cry, dashed over the open ground.

Colonel Kitchener states, in his report on the fall

of the town, that the assault of it took' place about

3.30 a.m. on the 26th. The principal points cf

attack were the Buri Gate at the extreme east end

cf the line of defence—that is, on the Blue Nile, and

the Mesalamia Gate, at the west end, abutting on

the White Nile.

The defence of the former post held out against

the attack, but at the White Nile end, he further

states :—

The rebels having filled the ditch with bundles of straw,

brushwood, beds, &c, brought up in their arms, penetrated

296 WHY COKDUX PERISHEl).

the fortification;. The (black troops) defenders of the Buri

Gate, seeing the rebels inside the works in the rear, retired

and left the town at the mercy of the rebels."

When the breach had been thus entered, the Der

vishes, according to Father Ohrwalder, broke up

into two parties, one of which dashed along the

parapet, breaking all resistance, and slaughtering

the soldiers in all directions. The inhabitants, roused

from their sleep by the din of rifle shots and the

shouts of the Arabs, hurried out, anticipating what

had occurred. Like a pent-up stream suddenly

released, over 50,000 wild Dervishes, with hideous

yells, rushed upon the inhabitants of Khartum, and

on the 5,000 soldiers left out of the 9,000 at the

commencement of the siege, their only cry being—

" To the church ! To the palace ! "

The sudden assault and what has been described

as subsequently having taken place, not only

accounts in large measure for the irregularity

alleged by Colonel Kitchener, which prevented

Gordon being warned of the entry of the Dervishes

into the town, but also the utter uselessness of any

such warning under the circumstances.

In view of Gordon's inability to check the move

ment of the Dervishes acrcss the Nile,' as he had

done in August, owing to the fall of Omdurman,

and the absence down the Nile of five of his

steamers, and of the famine-stricken condition of

his garrison, and the unrepaired breach in the

line of his land defences, we can come to no other

conelusion than that arrived at by Colonel Kitchener,

namely :—

WOLSELliY, NOT WILSON. 297

Khartum fell from sudden assault when the garrison west

loo exhausted by privations to make a proper resistance.

It was not, therefore, because Sir Charles Wilson

delayed two days at Gubat after Gordon's steamers

had put in an appearance there that Lord Wolseley's*

plan of operations for the relief of Kiiarturji had

failed, but, as we have endeavoured to point out,

because of his tenacious adherence to it when, as a

military man, he ought to have feared, from what

he had learned of Gordon's critical condition on

November, and at the end of December, that

Khartum might fall before that elaborate plan could

be carried out in all its particulars.

Gordon, in an entry in his journal on Novem

ber 8th, seems to have apprehended the manner in

which his appeals for speedy help were being

responded to when he thus expressed himself:—

If Lord Wolseley did say he hoped to relieve Khartum

before many months, he must have a wonderful confidence in

our powers of endurance, considering that when he is said to

have made this utterance we had been blockaded six and a half

months, and are now in our ninth month.*

From an A priori standpoint the above facts dis

prove the allegation made by Mr. Gladstone and by

other members of Her Majesty's Government, and

still held by many not acquainted with them, that

Khartum had fallen by internal treachery.

* In a telegram dated Khartum, March 13th, and received at Cairo

on April 19th, Gordon informed Baring that he was in this position :

—" We have provisions for five months and are hemmed in."


Colonel Kitchener, in his report on its fall, came to

the conelusion to which the above and other facts

led, that .—

The accusations of treachery have all been vague, and .ire (o

my mind the outcome of mere suspicion.

Referring to the irregularity of not using the

telegraphic communication between the forts on the

land line of defences and the palace to warn Gordon

of the attack, he holds Farag Pasha to some extent

responsible for it. This Pasha was also further

accused of opening the Mesalamia Gate to the

enemy and otherwise of having connived at the

entrance of the enemy. This, however, he remarks

was distinctively denied by a colonel who com

manded a battalions of irregulars in the town and

by thirty refugee soldiers who had escaped to

Dongola, and who had been examined by him in

preparing his report.

Hassan P-ey Bahnawassi, who commanded at the

Bab-Mesalamia Gate, so named, and which is

marked on our Sketch Map showing the defences,

was also accused of not having made a proper

defence there, and of having failed to warn General

Gordon of the danger in which the town was. It

was even said that he had taken a commission from

the Mahdi, and also that he was in receipt of money

from him.

The conelusion, nevertheless, to which Colonel

Kitchener arrived negativing the allegation of

treachery has been fully confirmed by subsequent

and fuller information obtained by the Egyptian

AN IMPORTANT WITNESS. 299

Army Intelligence Department and published by its

able Adjutant-General Major Wingate*

Perhaps the most valuable information thus

obtained was from the Emir Medawi, who took an

important part in the siege, assault, and capture of

Khartum. Having opposed the elaims made by

Abdullah Taash as Khalifa in succession to the

Mahdi, he became the object of his wrath and was

obliged to flee to Abyssinia. King John refused to

give him up and aided his escape to Cairo, where he

was pardoned by the Khedive.

When the Arabs had gained possession of that

part of the defences which had been injured by

the Nile, he stated, as Father Ohrwalder did,

that they " then pushed along the whole length

of the inside of the parapet, and met with

some resistance at various points ; while the

stream of them, still pouring in where the first

attack had been made, entered the town," adding

that—

Farag Pasha, who was at the Mcsalamia Gate, when he saw

that it was useless to fight—for by this time thousands of our

men were inside the lines—gave the order to his men to stop

firing, opened the gate, and surrendered. ... By that time

resistance was useless, for Nejumi's attack over the broken-

down part of the parapet had been quite successful, and

Khartum was in our hands. . . . Farag was made prisoner

and taken to the camp outside. Three days afterwards he

was killed by one of his old servants for something he had done

him a long time ago. He was not killed by the Mahdi, and he

* "Mahdism in the Egyptian Sudan," by Major F. R. Wingate,

D.S.O., R.A.


did not betray the town, nor open the Mesalamia Gate until

Khartum was actually in our hands.*

The charge against Hassan Bey Bahnawassi was

that, being in command of the regiment which held

that portion of the fortifications of Khartum

through which the enemy first entered, he

treacheously delivered up his post to the enemy.

On this main and two subsidiary charges he was

tried by court-martial at Cairo, which he had reached

after escaping from imprisonment at Khartum.

As Major Wingate observes, this court-martial

was not " an inquiry by generous officers into what

had been the conduct of a brother officer under

circumstances of extreme difficulty. Large sums of

money depended on the finding." "If the officers and

men who arrived daily from the Sudan had done

their duty, they were entitled to pensions and long

arrears of pay. Were treachery or neglect proved

against them they were entitled to nothing. The

officials of the Egyptian Finance Department who

took part in the inquiry were of themselves a safe

guard and an assurance against unfair dealing, and

that the matter should be thoroughly sifted."

Major Owen Quick, in summing up, stated the

prosecution had failed to produce one tittle of

evidence to prove one word of the charge against

* One of the witnesses at the Court Martial held at Cairo with

respect to the charge of treachery, &c, made against Hassan Bey

Bahnawassi, stated that the Arabs opened this gate after they had

entered the defences. This, we think, more likely, for it would

naturally be done in order to gire access to that part of their force

engaged at the Buri Gate.

NOT BY TREACHERY WITHIN. 30I

the prisoner. An ex-elerk of the Khartum treasury,

for instance, having stated in support of his alleged

treachery, that Hassan Bey received an allowance

from the Mahdi, the evidence for the defence con

elusively proved that, on the contrary, after he had

been made prisoner on the capture of Khartum he

had been beaten severely, and that his wives and

daughters had been taken as concubines by the

Mahdi and his officers. The court-martial honour

ably acquitted the prisoner of the treachery alleged

against him.

. Treachery, therefore, cannot, from the circum

stances under which Khartum fell and the sudden

and well-made assault by which it was captured, be

alleged to account for the catastrophe, and those who

were charged with it were found to be innocent of

the crime.

302

CHAPTER XXIII.

As another set off against the failure of the Nile

Expedition to relieve Khartum—that is too late to

effect this—it has, as \ve have seen, been alleged by

a Member of the Cabinet in the House of Lords,

that the place might, or indeed would, have fallen

through treachery on the approach of a British force,

even if it had been despatched for its relief at an

earlier date.

Immediately after Gordon's arrival at Khartum,

he informed Sir Evelyn Baring that he found two-

thirds of its people terrorised over by one-third ;

and evidently reasoning from the existing feeling

between the parties, and the influences under which

the latter were from the Mahdi's camp, he further

stated, that he must, therefore, " be aware that a

conspiracy up here is more to be feared than any

outward revolt." Others of his despatches show how

that any mutiny of his soldiers or treachery of their

officers might, at any moment, bring on a crisis fatal

to himself and his companions.

And yet knowing this—Her Majesty's Govern

ment, in face of such a peril which would likely be

increased by delay in sending the aid he asked for

—they did not move on his behalf until Khartum

was hemmed in by the Mahdi, and his garrison

A STRATEGICAL PLUNDER. 3Q3

reduced to the last extremity, and then turned round

and pleaded, as an excuse for their conduct, the

inevitable nature of a catastrophe which their own

neglect of duty had thus contributed to bring about !

They knew in April, by a telegram dated March

13th, that Gordon was then hemmed in. If the

danger from treachery to Gordon's safety then

existed in a latent form, the conditions of things

consequent upon his being hemmed in would

certainly develop it, and should led to more prompt

measures than were adopted to safeguard him

from it.

Lord Wolscley seemed to have had no fear of

danger from this source, else he would have made a

single march on Mutcmma, instead of a double one ;

for in the latter case the Mahdi and the alleged

traitors in the beleaguered town had, as has been

shown, fourteen days' notice of his advance across

the desert. All the evidence adduced already and

to follow, goes to assure us that if the Desert Column

had reached Mutemma on January 2nd, Khartum

would probably have been saved.

On December 31st, when Lord Wolseley had

received his last message from Gordon—despatched

from Khartum on the very day after which he had

been told it would be difficult to hold out—he might

have occupied Merawi because it threatened the

Berber road, but not another soldier nor a biscuit

should have been sent further up the Nile beyond

his base at Korti, until he had potentially joined

hands with Gordon

If camel transport was lacking, the whole or part


of the Desert Column, as we have further insisted,

should have been marched on foot in order to secure

this object.

That 31st of December marked an important, nay

final, crisis in the Expedition his Lordship com

manded, and every risk and sacrifice should have

been run and made in order to meet it successfully.

Late as it had been despatched, and delayed as it

had been by unforeseen obstaeles in its advance up

the Nile, it was now within measurable distance—as

regards both time and space—of Khartum, and not

an hour should have been lost by Lord Wolseley in

pushing on for its relief. All other mistakes made in

the conduct of the Expedition sink into insignificance

when compared with this final and fatal blunder.

In order to emphasise as well as confirm this

serious and important conelusion, we quote General

Sir William F. Butler's view of the position of affairs

at Khartum, as revealed to Lord Wolseley by,the

message sent to him by Gordon on December 14th,

and received at Korti by him on December 31st*:—

As for Khartum, closer than ever had been the cordon of

silence surrounding it. One little scrap—a postage stamp— on

which was written " All right," had come through the encircling

Arabs, but the messenger who had brought it had a different

story to tell by word of mouth.

Come quickly—come together—do not leave Derbcr behind

you ! These were the message words he carried, and his

own spoken testimony was still more pressing. Famine was

in Khartum—the Arabs knew it—there was not a moment to

be lost. This message—the last to leave the doomed city—

* "The Campaign on the Cataracts," pp. 2O4, 2S1.

BY THE DESERT TO THE RESCUE.30S

was dated 14th December. It was all that was needed to give

to the column, which was about to start across the desert,

the supreme interest of a forlorn hope.

I have said that but for one consideration there could have

been no hesitation between the routes to be followed from

Korti. That consideration was, however, all important. It was

time. The New Year had begun ; the date to which Khartum

could hold out had already been passed, and if the place

was to be succoured and Gordon saved, the attempt, cost what

it might, must be made across the 180 miles of desert, and not

by 400 miles of liver to Mutemma But that was

now past. Time had thrown his single weight into the scales,

and had over-balanced all other considerations. Across the

Bayuda Desert 1800 men on camels and 200 on horses must

try to get quickest touch with the steamers, even if all the

Arabs in the Sudan stood to bar the road between Korti and

Mutcmma.

We have already stated that the Mahdi was inelined

to raise the siege of Khartum, and return to

Kordofan, when he heard of the defeat of his troops

at Abu-Klea on January 20th, and, in fact, when he

had learned that the English army had reached the

Nile at Mutemma. The Emir Medawi, in his

statement to the Egyptian Army Intelligence

Department, already referred to, confirms this as

follows •—

When he . (the Mahdi) heard that the English were

approaching Mutcmma for the relief of Khartum he sent

a large force of fighting men, under Mussa Wad Helu and

Abu-Safia to attack them. A great battle took place at

Abu-Klea and another at Abu Kru, in which Nur Angara was

defeated, and at last the English reached Gubat, driving the

Arabs before them. The news of the defeat' at Abu-Klea

reached the Mahdi on the 20th January, and made a great

consternation in the camp. He at once ordered a salute of

X


101 guns to be fired, which is the signal for a victory, and by

which he thought to delude the garrison at Khartum.

The Mahdi was alarmed for his safety, and, after afternoon

prayers, he assembled a meeting of his Khalifas, and

favourite Emirs, and told them secretly that he had had

a vision in which the prophet told him that he should

make an hejira (or flight) to El Obeid. For, he argued, if

one Englishman, Gordon, has been able to command the

Sudanese and Egyptian soldiers, and keep us at bay for

almost a year, how much more w ill these thousands of English,

who have defeated our bravest men at Abu-Klea, be able

' to crush us and drive us away. He then asked his Khalifas

and Emirs for their advice. All agreed to the Mahdi's

wishes except Mohammed Abd-el-Kerim, who agreed that an

attempt should be made to attack Khartum. " For,1' he said,

" if we succeed and enter Khartum, then the English will not

dare to come on ; and if we fail, then we shall have time to

retreat." After this, several meetings were held. The Mahdi

had full information of every movement of the English ; the

delay on their advance gave us a fresh courage, and we knew

too, that the garrison in Khartum were in despair when, day

after day passed and the steamers did not come. If they had

come on at once, when we were all alarmed by the defeat of

Abu-Klea, the Mahdi might have carried out his hejira to the

south, but the delay strengthened Abd-cl-Kerim, and when on

Sunday, the 25th, a messenger arrived from Gubat with the

news that the steamers had started on the 24th, another

council was held, in which it was decided finally to accept

Abd-cl-Kerim's advice, and to attack Khartum the following

morning before the steamers should arrive. ... I had orders

to send some men down the river to harass the steamers as

they came. Fiki Mustapha's force also received orders to

proceed down the river, and everybody was warned to fire on

the steamer* when they appeared. Wc also received orders to

attack Tuti and Kasikh from Kubba at the same time as

Nejumi attacked from the south.

The next morning, about an hour-and-a-half after mid

night the force left Kala Kala under Wad en-N'cjumi. It

DATED KORTI, MARCH 6ni. 307

was divided in two parts : the advanced portion was to attack

the lines between the White Nile and the Mesalamia Gate,

which were known to have been partially destroyed by the

Nile, while the other part was to attack towards Huri ; but it

was decided that if the attack towards the White Nile- suc

ceeded, the second portion of the force, instead of attacking

Buri, was to follow in the track of the first portion of the force ;

and this is what happened. . . . The orders were to march

silently as possible till close up to the fortifications, and not to

attack until the soldiers fired from the lines. . . . The advance

continued quite silently till close up to the lines, for the ground

was soft and the men's feet bare ; at last the ditch was almost

reached, and when it was seen that it was partly filled up with

mud and the parapet broken down, the Arabs did not hesitate,

but shouting their war-cries dashed into the ditch and up the

parapet. Some shots were fired from the lines, but in a few

minutes it was all over ; the soldiers seeing the Arabs were on

them made little resistance ; some were killed, while others

escaped.

Let us now refer again to Lord Wolseley's

despatch to the Minister for War, dated Korti,

March 6th, in which he reported to him that in his

opinion there could be no longer a doubt bu.t that

the Mahdi's troops had taken possession of Khar

tum and killed General Gordon on January 26th.

After quoting that part of his instructions which

defined the scope and object of the military opera

tions to be undertaken by him, he stated that,

although they contained no direct reference to raising

the siege of Khartum, or the defeat of the Mahdi's

troops surrounding it, he always considered such

operations would be necessary before General

Gordon and his Egyptian garrison could safely bs

withdrawn. He then observes that, as the fall of


Khartum and General Gordon's death had left him

and his army without any defined mission to

accomplish in the Sudan, he had, therefore, in reply

to his request " for further instructions and a elearly-

defined exposition of the policy that Her Majesty's

Government intended to adopt under the altered

condition of affairs," been informed by them that his

immediate duty was " the protection of the Pro

vince of Dongola, and that, as soon as arrangements

could be completed, Her Majesty's Gdttfernmcnt had

determined to destroy the Mahdi s power at

Khartum in order that peace, order, and a settled

government might be established there."

After Khartum had fallen and Gordon had

perished, Her Majesty's Government, as it will

be observed, decided to do the very thing which

Gordon had urged them to do all along ! They

had sent him to report, as Mr. Gladstone told

Parliament, on the best methods of withdrawing the

endangered Egyptian garrisons and officials, but they

did not respond in one instance to the reports he

sent. The only part of those reports sent in messages

and telegrams to which they paid any attention at

all were those in which he spoke of his ability to hold

out. These were evidently the sources of hope that,

somehow or other, he would be able to do something

or other which would enable them to keep within the

bounds of the policy they had adopted, of absolute

non-interference in the Sudan. It was this that led

them to adopt the Nile route. This latter decision,

was not, as we have seen, adopted until they

had obtained a considerable amount of valuable

THE "THUNDERER" SPEAKS OUT. 309

information about the impediments to navigation

presented by its cataracts. The opinions of others

than Lord Wolscley were against this route, but

nevertheless, the latter scheme was adopted, and

with fatal consequences.

In fact, as the writer in the Times of February6th,

from whose artiele we have already quoted, very

correctly observed :—

The news of yesterday (that is of the fall of Khartum) has

a further meaning, and one which it is useless to disguise and

set aside.

The great principles of military science are almost absolute.

To violate them is to accept certain risk, and to leave far too

much to the chances of war.

The dangers involved in the adoption of the Nile route in

light boats were repeatedly stated, and this plan of advance

from the very first was opposed by many soldiers. Given

success, unquestioned and unqualified, the violation of all

rules may entail no dangers ; but once a check, even a slight

derangement of plans arise, all the evil results of a mistaken

policy at once assert themselves. Great commanders have

frequently abandoned their line of communications, but it has

been in order to assume another and a moie advantageous one.

When the first whaler reached Korti Lord Wolseley had

practically no communications—a telegraph line and a post

maintained by steam-launches, but no more. His whole force

was from henceforth en Pair, and, under any circumstances, the

position was, from a military point of view, unsatisfactory.

Yet an advance from Suakim to Berber would, as has been

pointed out, have given the force a line of communications

only 260 miles long, with a sea base of twenty days from

Portsmouth.

Admitting that the Nile route in whale boats was wise and

inevitable—the opening up of the Suakim route was its

necessary compliment weighed strongly with those who

advocated its adoption for the main advance.

3IO WHY GORDON rERISHED.

If you must inevitably operate on a certain line, the

argument for its primary adoption becomes particularly

strong ; more especially when measured by your distance

from your ships. This line, the Suakim-Berber, is nearly

one-fifth of the length of the alternate, or Nile route.

Possibly because of the reluctance to undertake any fighting

near Suakim—by far the best place to fight at—a nondescript

mode of advance was adopted, involving boats and camels.

The boats being trusted overmuch, and their rate of advance

being enormously over-estimated— it was only natural that

camels should be too few, and that the desert equipment should

be incomplete and inadequate.

To provide a large camel force would be to discredit the

boats from which so much was expected, and the Camel Corps

was, therefore, an adjunct and not a principal feature of the

scheme.

The time came a month ago (early in January) when the

two modes of advance must separate. The Camel Corps must

justify its presence, the boats must also, or be pronounced

a failure. Thus a force already en fair, and by no means too

strong, had to be divided, and no reserve practically remained.

These are the circumstances which have conferred upon the

news of the fall of Khartum a grave significance, and the

country should clearly understand the issues.

If Lord Wolseley were now at Berber, with every group

of wells occupied, and forming a strong link in a strong chain

of posts, the military position pure and simple would have

been entirely different. We might have been at Berber two

months ago and have finally crushed Osman Digma, and

at no greater sacrifice of life and expenditure than has already

been incurred.

How strange would the following paragraph in

Lord Wolseley's dispatch of March 6th, if written by-

anyone else appear ! It is, however, in perfect

harmony with what we have, after Von Moltke,

called a delusion. Khartum had fallen, Gordon

DEFEATED, YET CONGRATULATORY. 3 1 1

was killed, and the Nile Expedition had, therefore,

failed to attain its object. And yet, in view of

all this, and as if what happened was only one,

not of the fortunes, but the misfortunes of war, he

could thus express himself to the Minister of War :—

I take this opportunity of congratulating Her Majesty's

Government upon having adopted the Nile route as the line of

advance on Khartum. Had the Army been despatched from

Suakim as a base, and upon arrival at or near Berber learnt

that Khartum had fallen it could not possibly have transferred

its base to the Mediterranean, for it could not have been fed

under these circumstances in this part of the Nile Valley.

The province of Dongola would have been at the enemy's

mercy, and that portion of Egypt would have been open to

his attack.

As if condemning the route itself, and the manner

in which the Expedition had been conducted, he

adds the following pertinent observations :—

Recent events at Khartum have naturally added greatly to

Mohammed Achmed's influence and power, and have gone far

towards persuading many to believe in the truth of his sacred

pretensions. He occupies a very different position in the

Sudan now to that in which he found himself during the

three months when he was making frequent, but apparently

hopeless, efforts to take Khartum. He wields an almost

undisputed sway over the whole ol the Sudan, the Province

of Dongola, which we occupy, alone excepted. All classes

look up to him as a great conqueror, and a very holy man.

We, on the other hand, have no party here in our favour.

Then Lord Wolseley expresses the opinion that

all these circumstances must be considered in

planning a compaign next autumn for smashing

the Mahdi—that, in the meanwhile, Osman Digma's


power in the Eastern Sudan should be crushed as

a counterpoise to the Mahdi's'capture of Khartum.

Then, referring to the proposed Expedition under

General Graham to crush Osman, and construct a

4 ft. 8J in. railway from Suakim to Berber, as not

likely to be of any use in connection with an advance

on Khartum in the autumn, makes the following

suggestive observation :—

Had Berber beenjoined by a line of rail when the Madhifirst

took up arms against the Egyptian Government his poiuer

would long ago have been disposed of! I

And then, again, this :—

In the campaign before us the construction of this railway

even as far as Ariab, will, in case of necessity, secure us a

second and alternative line of communication by which

supplies may be obtained, and sick andjwounded taken to the

coast for embarkation.

Not to the Mediterranean, but to the Red Sea

coast, be it observed !

It is not necessary for us to criticise in detail the

grounds upon which Lord Wolseley complimented

Her Majesty's Government for having selected the

Nile route for the relief of Khartum and the rescue

of Gordon, because we have already shown them to

be fallacious and to have been proved to be so by

the Expedition sent by it failing to attain its object.

In view of that failure how could they congratulate

themselves in view of what had happened as a con

sequence of that choice } That they did, however,

was the case, for Lord Hartington, the Minister

of War, officially responsible for the choice of that

A COURAGEOUS WAR MINSTER. 3 13

route for the Expedition, when seconding the Vote

of Thanks to the Army in the House of Commons

on August 1 2th, 1885, said :—

The ascent of the Nile fora distance of 1,500 miles from what

was practically the base of the Expedition at Alexandria, by

means which had to be improvised for the occasion, and means

which depended altogether on the troops themselves for their

efficiency is, in my belief, a precedent altogether new in our

military annals. The conception of that operation will form a

new chapter in our military history. In my opinion great

credit is due to Lord Wolseley for the courage and self reliance

with which he formed the plan of that operation, and for the

manner in which he staked his great military reputation on the

success of measures which were hitherto untried, and of which

we had no knowledge.

General Von Molike, his Lordship further stated,

had given his enthusiastic approval of the plan of

the Expedition, by saying to his informant that " our

troops were heroes, not soldiers—that our British

cavalry had become infantry, our infantry turned

into sailors, and our sailors into mounted infantry."

Lord Hartington had, in our opinion, shown as

much courage as Lord Wolseley had shown, in lauding

the Nile Expedition, because of its disastrous failure,

and because the measures upon which it depended

for success were, as he admitted, " hitherto untried

and of which we had no knowledge."

We are not informed of any subsequent opinion

given by the great German strategist about the

Expedition. If he did so it must have been based

on the principle of war which we have already

quoted, and which we have shown Lord Wolselcy

violated in its conduct.


Our readers—or, as \ve may call them, our

empanelled jury—will, from the facts we have laid

before them in these pages, find the causes >vhich

combined to bring about our disasters in the Sudan.

The questions they are called upon to decide are :—

Who is responsible for not having rescued Gordon

from the sad but heroic end that befell him ?

Who stained the honour of England by the neglect

to do so ? And upon whom should rest the blood

of Hicks's army and of the garrisons which,

endangered by the policy pursued with respect to

the Sudan factor in the Egyptian Question, had

been recklessly left, by an adherence to it, to their

cruel fate ?

INDEX.

A.

AnAiiniF-s, 83

Abbas Island, 24

Alxl-cl-Kadir, 25, 26, 27, 69

Aboo- Haifa, 226

Abu-Dom, 225

Abu- 1 Limed, 41, 115

Aim K lea, 1 5, 226, 227

Abu- Keif, 25

Alexandria, 154

Ali Hi i t nil i, 24

Alleyne, Colonel, 142

Ambukol, 190

Argyle, Duke of, 182

Armenia, Upper, 6

Assouan, 138

Atbara, 155

B.

Bah-ei.-Kkhik, 1 19

Baggaras, 25

Bagos, 27

Baker, Consul, 123

Baker, General, 42, 60

Baker, Sir Samuel, 157

Baling, Sir E., 36, 41, 45, 4S,

49, 58, 60,61,65,89,96,302

Bayuda Desert, 245

Berber, 25, 54, 68, 72, 74, 73,

84, 113, 225

Bern ford, Lcrd Charles, 264,

2So

Bir-Karbai, 226

Bisharecn, 82

Brackcnbury, General, 18, 21

Duller, Sir Kedvcrs, 11S, 119,

I76, 222

Buller, SirW., 118, 160, 176,

C.

Cahul Candahar, 250

Cairo, 30, 40

Camel Corps, 229, 230, 235

Chancellor of the Exchequer,

'25

Chapman, Colonel, 250

Cherif I'asha, 35, 43

Chitral Expedition, 252

Chu-chill, Lord R , 102

Clarke, Colonel Stanley, 226

Coellogen, Colonel, 37, 69, 75

Colvile, Colonel, 18, 164, 167,

171, 172, 178, 202, 205, 235,

241

Cuui, Mr., 103

D.

Dai, 196

Darfur, 25

Debbeh, 138, 184, 195, 212,

*33

Denman, Lord, 182

316 INDEX.

Dacrt Columr, 204, 231, 246,

264, 277, 283

Dongola, 49, 103, 117, 137,

«39. *>3. *33

Duclcrc, 126

DuSerin, Lord, 36

E.

Eari.e, General, 221

Egcrton, Mr., Consul, 97, 100,

103, 107

El-Ghezircb, 40

El-Howciyat, 226

El-Kun, 226

El-Obeid, 25

El-Teb, 66

Emaum-Gbur, 251

Emir-Medawi, 299, 306

F.

Farag Pasha, 299

Faraj-Bey- Allah, 288

Feki-Mustapha, 264

Fowler, Sir John, 243

Freycinet, M., 1 26

G.

GALAnAT, 27

Geigler Pa- ha, 25

Getnai, 209

Gladstone, Mr., 2, 14, 102, 297

Gordon, Miss, 3

Graham General, 60, 62, 65, 68,

72, 81, 181, 246

Granville, Kail, II, 43, 82, 83,

93

Grove, Colonel, 180

H:

Haj-Ai.i, 40

Halfiyeh, 155, 265

Uamdab, 68

Hammill, Commander, 117

Hannek, 68, 195, 279

Hartington, Lord, 19, 62, 63,

112, 114, 133, 206, 312, 313

Hay, Admiral Sir John, 1 16, 135

Hewitt, Admiral Sir \V., 62, 64

Hibbch, 221

Hiclcs Tasha, 32, 33, 35, 36,

44. 46

Hussein- Hey- ISahnawassi, 300

Hussein Khalifa Pasha, 39, 82,

84

I.

Iddesleigh, Eakl of, 12

J-

JAKDUL, I54, l66,?'226, 231,

257

James, Mr. W., 156, 157

Jebel Gadic, 25

K.

Kababisii, 25, 232

Kassala, 155. 156

Kiwa, 2$

Khandak, 233

Khedive, Tne la'.e, 6, 45, 47,

&&

Kitchener, 77, 104, 107, 121,

263, 293, 295

Kordofan, 27, 30, 31, 35, 44

Korosk-> Desert, 1 15

Knrko, 25

INDEX. 317

M.

IfAHDI, 23, 25, 26, 39, 71, ic.

Malet, Sit E , Jl, 33, 34, 35.

36

Massowah, 103, 113, 138, 154,

158

Maurice, Lieut. -Colonel, 1 16

McNeill, General, 11S, 176

Merawi, 118, 119, >5>. 3°3

Mesalamia Gate, 25

Moltke, General Von, 199

Morley, Earl of, 1 82

Mudir of Dongola, 233

Mutemma, 197, 205, 226, 239

N.

Napier, of Macdala, Lord,

77. «5»

Nile, 23, 74, 111, 213

Northbrook, Lord, 254

Nubar Pasha, 43, 83

Nusri Pa> ha, 271

0.

O-Bak, 167

Ohrwalder Father, 39, 40, 265,

284, 285

Omdurman, 264, 2S3, 287

Otman Digma, 39, 63, 66, 67,

75

P.

Power, Mr , 112

Prince of Wales, 1, 2

Q.

Queen, Her Majesty the, 3

Quick, Major, 300

R.

KAllAT, 155

Raouf Pasha, 23

Red River Expedition, 152

Red Sea, 23

Roberts, General Lord, 250,

*5 1

Royal Irish, 244, 246, 255

S.

Saini, 226

Salisbury, Lord, 20

Sanheit, 156

Sarkamatto, 224

Sarras, 1 19, 224

Semneh, 117

Sennar, 25, 37, 155, 156

Shablookah Cataract, 271

Shagie, 49

Shaw, Colonel, 245

Sheik El-Obeid, 285

Shendy, 71, 155

Shukuriyehs, 25

Stanley, H. M., 77

Stewart, Sir Herbert, 218, 339,

&c

Stuart-Won ley, Li :u tenant, 2f 1

Sinkat, 61, 155

Suakim, 41, 59, 61, 62, 63, 74,

"3

Sudan, 41, &c

Suleiman Pasha Niaza, 30

Suleiman-Wad-Gam r, 4 1

3'8 INDEX.

T.

Tamkuk, 68

Tebel-el-Soped, 226

Tel-el-Kebir, 22

Times, The, 15, 309

Tokar, 61, 65, 66, 70

Trinkikat, 65. 66

Tuti Island, 274

Tweedale, Lord, I

W.

Wady-Halfa, 113, 119, 154

Watson, Colonel, C. W., 75,

161, 283

Webber, Colonel, 240

Wilson, Colonel Mildmay, 246

Wilson, General Sir C W., 109,

203, 217, 259, 28 1, 303

Wolseley, Lord, 109, 112, 114,

11S, I47, >8s. 189, 193, 197,

205, 283, 311

Wood, General Sir E., 37, 4*,

72, 192, 195, 249

Wylde, Mr., 162, 163, 167

Z.

Zebehr Pasha, 42, 49, 50,

54. 55. 56, 57. 70, 95

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Why Gordon Perished or, The Political and Military Causes

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